id
stringlengths 4
8
| url
stringlengths 32
188
| title
stringlengths 2
122
| text
stringlengths 143
226k
|
|---|---|---|---|
51977037 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key%20finding%20attacks | Key finding attacks | Key Finding Attacks are attacks on computer systems that make use of cryptography in which computer memory or non-volatile storage is searched for private cryptographic keys that can be used to decrypt or sign data. The term is generally used in the context of attacks which search memory much more efficiently than simply testing each sequence of bytes to determine if it provides the correct answer. They are often used in combination with cold boot attacks to extract key material from computers.
Approaches
In their seminal paper on Key Finding attacks, Shamir and van Someren proposed two different approaches to key finding: statistical or entropic key finding and analytical key finding. The former relies on detecting differences in the statistical properties of the data that make up cryptographic keys while the later relies on determining specific byte patterns that must necessarily exist in the target key material and looking for these patterns.
Statistical key finding
In general for most cryptographic systems the cryptographic keys should be as random as possible. For most symmetric ciphers the keys can and should be a truly random set of bits. For most asymmetric ciphers the private keys are either numbers chosen at random with certain constraints (such as primality or being generators in a group) or are the result of computations based on a set of random numbers with some constraints. In either case the key material exhibits high entropy. In contrast to this, most uncompressed data in a computer's memory has relatively low entropy. As a result, if a key is known to exist in memory in its raw form then it is likely to stand out against the background of non-key data by virtue of its high entropy and an attacker needs to only test for matching keys in areas of memory or storage that have high entropy.
The contrast between the low entropy of most data and the high entropy of key data is sufficient as to be apparent by visual inspection. The image to the right shows an example of this.
Analytical key finding
While statistical key finding can be effective for reducing the amount of memory that needs to be searched, it still requires high-entropy areas to be tested to check if they contain the correct key material. In certain cases, particularly in the context of public key encryption systems, it is possible to determine patterns that must occur in the key material and then limit the search to areas where these patterns are found.
Shamir and van Someren demonstrated one example of this analytical approach for finding private RSA keys where the public key is known and has a small public exponent. In the RSA system the public key is a pair , where with p and q being two large primes. The corresponding private key is (or sometimes or some variant thereof) where , which is to say that e multiplied by d is equivalent to 1, modulo where φ represents Euler's totient function and is the size of the multiplicative group modulo n. In the case of an RSA key:
}}
Finding the value of from n allows for the factorization of n and the security of the RSA cryptosystem rests on the difficulty of doing so. As such an attacker cannot determine d exactly, given e and n. An attack can however know a fair amount about what d looks like, given the knowledge that p and q are typically chosen to be the same length in bits and are both 'close' to the square root of n. Thus an attacker can approximate a guess of:
and typically this approximation will be correct in the more significant half of its bits of its binary representation. The relationship of e and d means that:
where the exact value of k is unknown but Using this fact and the approximation , the attacker can enumerate a set of possible values for the top half of the binary representation of d for each possible value of k. These binary patterns can be tested for many orders of magnitude faster than performing a trail decryption. Furthermore, in the common case of it can be shown that which allows the top half of the bits of d to be determined exactly and searched for directly.
Application
Key finding attacks have been used in conjunction with cold boot attacks to extract keys from machines after they have been switched off. Heninger and Shacham showed that keys can be extracted even when the data in memory has been corrupted by having the power removed.
Statistical key finding was used by Nicko van Someren to locate the signature verification keys used by Microsoft to validate the signatures on MS-CAPI plug-ins. One of these key was later discovered to be referred to as the NSAKEY by Microsoft, sparking some controversy.
Mitigations
Key finding attacks can be mitigated in several ways. For analytic attacks, randomized key blinding will prevent the expected patterns from being found in memory as well as protecting against some other sorts of side-channel attack. Statistical attacks can be made less effective by storing other sorts of high-entropy or compressed data in memory and key material can be spread over a larger block of memory when not in use to reduce the concentration of entropy in one place.
References
Hacking (computer security) |
51988079 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20Red%20Digital%20Cinema%20cameras | List of Red Digital Cinema cameras | The following provides a full list of cameras and notable accessories manufactured under the Red Digital Cinema Company brand.
Cameras
RED ONE
The RED ONE was RED Digital Cinema’s first production camera. Using an S35mm image plane, the RED ONE displays a natural depth of field from 2K to over 4K resolutions.
The first RED ONEs were outfitted with the 12 megapixel MYSTERIUM sensor, capable of capturing up to 120 frames per second at 2K resolution and 30 frames per second at 4K resolution. The only possible acquisition format is REDCODE RAW.
The cameras were initially sold with a CF card slot that later could be replaced with a REDMAG module.
The second generation, RED ONE MYSTERIUM-X has a 14 megapixel MYSTERIUM-X sensor. It captures up to 120 frames per second at 2K resolution and up to 30 frames per second at 4K resolution. With the upgraded sensor, the RED ONE MYSTERIUM-X offers more dynamic range, higher sensitivity and enhanced color management tools than the RED ONE MYSTERIUM.
DSMC
DSMC cameras are modular and can be customized in various configurations. Several lens mounts can be attached to the camera. The only possible acquisition format is REDCODE RAW. Introduction of REDMAG SSDs, later RED MINI-MAGs.
Touchscreen introduction.
Scarlet M-X
SCARLET shoots regular speeds of up to 30fps at 4K and up to 120 fps at 2k. At 5K, it can't exceed 18fps.
DSMC2
DSMC2 cameras are modular and can be customised in various configurations. Several lens mounts can be attached to the camera. Differences to the former DSMC line are reduced size and weight, cable-less connections, as well as the addition of Apple ProRes and Avid DNx.
Sensors
Up to this point, RED deployed a tick tock strategy. Red stated sensors are their most important asset.
The Dragon sensor received a score of 101 DxO Mark sensor rating. This marked the first time a digital cinema camera was tested alongside leading stills cameras. The Red Dragon sensor is available within Epic and Scarlet camera systems.
Mono better spectral response and weaker OLPF.
REDCODE
REDCODE RAW (.R3D) is a proprietary file format that employs wavelet compression to reduce the RAW data coming off the sensor. This allows reduced file sizes while still keeping all advantages of a non-destructive RAW workflow.
In the beginning REDCODE was a JPEG2000 12bit linear file stream with PCM sound without encryption. Several third party applications were able to read and convert to other file format such as Cineform RAW. Redcode started as having two different options, named Redcode 28 and Redcode 36, later a 42 option was added.
With the introduction of the DSMC line compression ratios were introduced, making
Formlerly in 28Mbs now x:x
ffMpegasset.
HDRx
With the DSMC line HDRx was introduced as extension to Frame Summing asset; allowing the shooter to get up to 6 extra stops of dynamic range on a shot.
Media
RED CF
Proprietary CF cards
REDMAG 1.8" SSD
Proprietary SSD
RED MINI-MAGs
Proprietary interconnect to off the shelf mSATA SSD. Sold by RED in sizes of 120GB, 240GB, 480GB and 960GB.
Network
Capture over LAN
RCP Development Kit
Announced at NAB 2013 and launched in 2014, The RCP Development Kit is a SDK (software development kit) that allows programmers to create custom applications to control their camera via mobile device, computer, or micro-controller. The kit included the RCP Bridge, a wireless module that allows apps to communicate with the camera. The bridge supports a wireless communication range of approximately 50 feet.
Workflow
REDCINE-X PRO
REDCINE-X PRO is a free-of-charge post-processing software collection developed by RED, built specifically for RED camera systems. It includes a coloring toolset, integrated timeline, and post effects software collection for both stills and motion. The post-production software allows for non-destructive manipulation of raw .R3D files. REDCINE-X was the first workflow software developed solely by Red. Like REDCINE, RED offered it as an end-to-end workflow solution for Red customers. It preceded the current REDCINE-X PRO.
With REDCINE-X PRO, users can mark frames while shooting and access those specific frames within their timeline. Additionally, there are features like A.D.D. (Advanced DRAGON Debayer), a new algorithm for Dragon that analyzes every pixel, plus grading and RAW adjustment options.
Previous Workflow Software
"RED Alert!" was the first form of workflow made available to RED owners/operators, though it was more of a diagnostic tool. It allowed RED ONE users to tweak debayer settings and render out to dpx/tiff/mov.
REDCINE was the first end-to-end workflow for RED users. A third-party company developed the software, and RED provided the SDK.
Hardware accelerators
RED ROCKET
Red Rocket is an internal PCI Express card that is capable of 4K, 2K, or 1080p real-time debayering and video playback of R3D files coming from Mysterium and Mysterium-X sensors. It can be used to accelerate video editing in compatible Non-linear editing systems, outputting the image via HD-SDI to a user-supplied monitor. A component of the Red Rocket allows users to convert the HD-SDI signal to four HDMI outputs.
RED ROCKET-X
RED ROCKET-X is an internal PCI Express card optimized for the 6K RED DRAGON sensor and is designed to accelerate the processing of R3D workflow, regardless of resolution. Compared to RED ROCKET, RED ROCKET-X processes and transcodes files up to five times faster.
Debayering subpar asset.
Third party workflow systems
RED offers the RED Apple Workflow Installer, which allows R3D RAW settings within Final Cut Pro X. Other applications include support for QuickTime to use .R3D files, and plugins for Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Premiere Pro, Avid Media Composer, Final Cut Pro X, and Sony Vegas Pro.
Notable accessories
3-Axis lens control system
The RED 3-Axis lens control system is a turn-key wireless lens control kit for driving focus, iris and zoom. Included is the T.H.C. (Tactical Hand Controller), a wireless remote that allows the operator to adjust lens settings from a distance.
References
Red digital cinema
Red Digital Cinema |
52067295 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discriminant%20Book | Discriminant Book | The Discriminant Book (German: Kenngruppenbuch; literally: Groups to identify the key to the receiver) shortened to K-Book (K. Buch), and also known as the indicator group book or identification group book was a secret distribution list in booklet form, which listed trigraphs in random order. The Kenngruppenbuch was introduced in May 1937, and used by the Kriegsmarine (German War Navy) during World War II as part of the Naval Enigma message encipherment procedure, to ensure secret and confidential communication between Karl Dönitz, Commander of Submarines (BdU) in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean operating German submarines. The Kenngruppenbuch was used in the generation of the Enigma message Key that was transmitted within the message Indicator. The Kenngruppenbuch was used from 5 October 1941, for the Enigma Model M3, and from 1 February 1942 exclusively for the Enigma M4. It must not be confused with the Kenngruppenheft which was used with the Short Signal Book (German: Kurzsignalbuch).
History
The Kenngruppenbuch was a large document with the first edition coming into force in 1938, that mostly remained unchanged when a second edition was released in 1941. The Zuteilungsliste, however, was continually updated. After 1 May 1937, the Kriegsmarine had stopped using an Indicating system with a repetition of message key within the indicator, a serious security flaw, which was still being used by the Luftwaffe (German Airforce) and Heer (German Army) at the beginning of 1940, making the Naval Enigma more secure. The introduction of the K Book was designed to avert this serious security flaw.
On 9 May 1941, when a version of the K Book was recovered from U-boat U-110, Joan Clarke, and her compatriots at Hut 8, the section at Bletchley Park tasked with solving German naval (Kriegsmarine) Enigma messages, noticed that German telegraphists were not acting in a random way, which they were supposed to when making up the message Indicator. Rather than selecting a random trigram out of the K Book, the telegraphist had a tendency to choose a trigram from either the top of the column list, or near the bottom and grouped in the middle. It was a problem that the Kriegsmarine later corrected with the introduction of new rules, later in 1941.
Design
The Kenngruppenbuch consisted of two main parts. The first half consisted of the Column List (German:Spaltenliste) which consisted of all 17,576 of trigrams (Kenngruppen), divided into 733 numbered columns of 24 trigrams displayed in random order. The second half consists of the group list (German:Gruppenlist) where the trigrams are sorted in alphabetical order. After each trigram are 2 numbers, the first giving the number of the column in the Spaltenliste in which the trigram occurs, the second giving the position of the trigram in the column. The table pointer, or table selection chart (German:Tauschtafelplan) told the operator which column of a given table was used to select the required trigrams. By means of the Assignation list (German:Zuteilungsliste) told the radio man which table he should use for a particular cipher net. Large keys would be given several blocks of columns, small keys as few as 10.
Naval Enigma Operation
Naval Enigma used an Indicator to define a key mechanism, with the key being transmitted along with the ciphertext. The starting position for the rotors was transmitted just before the ciphertext, usually after having been enciphered by Naval Enigma. The exact method used was termed the indicator procedure. A properly self-reciprocal bipartite digraphic encryption algorithm was used for the super-encipherment of the indicators (German:Spruchschlüssel) with basic wheel settings The Enigma Cipher Keys called Heimische Gewässer (English Codename: Dolphin), (Plaice), Triton (Shark), Niobe (Narwhal) and Sucker all used the Kenngruppenbuch and bigram tables to build up the Indicator. The Indicator was built up as follows:
Two Trigrams were chosen at random. The first trigraph was taken from the Key Identification Group table (German:Schlüsselkenngruppe), from the Kenngruppenbuch as determined in the Zuteilungsliste. The second trigraph was taken from the encryption indicator group or Process characteristic groups table (German:Verfahrenkenngrupp),also taken from the Kenngruppenbuch and also determined in the Zuteilungsliste.
For example:
S W Q - and R A F,
and arranged in the scheme:
∗ S W Q
R A F ∗
with the empty position would be filled in a random letter:
X S W Q
R A F P
Encipherment with a Bigram table called double-letter conversion table (German:Doppelbuchstabentauschtafel), arranged with vertical pairs, was as follow:
X→V S→G W→V Q→X
R→I A→F F→T P→T
which would give
V G V X
I F T T
This was read out vertically, giving:
VIGF VTXT
and this was sent without further encoding, and preceding the encrypted message. The message was sent by Morse and on the receiving end the procedure was reversed. Nine bigram tables were known to exist, including FLUSS or FLUSZ (English:River)). Other bigram booklets existed and were used including BACH (1940), STROM (1941) and TEICH, UFER etc.
See also
Short Weather Cipher
Short Signal Book
References
Further reading
Arthur O. Bauer: Direction finding as Allied weapon against German submarines from 1939 to 1945. Selbstverlag, Diemen Netherlands 1997.
Friedrich L. Bauer : Decrypted Secrets. Methods and Maxims of Cryptology. 3rd revised and expanded edition. Springer, Berlin and others 2000 .
Cryptography
World War II military equipment of Germany
Signals intelligence of World War II |
52082745 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hive%20Connected%20Home | Hive Connected Home | Hive is a trademark owned by Centrica Hive Limited that produces smart home devices. It is one of the largest connected home providers in the UK and, as of May 2018, the company had more than 1,000,000 customers.
Using the Hive app and website, customers can control a range of internet-connected devices, from a thermostat to lights, smart plugs, motion sensors, and window and door sensors.
History
Before the creation of the Hive brand, British Gas had been trialling a remote control heating service, starting in September 2011, using technology from AlertMe. This led to the launch of the Remote Heating Control service in 2012 paving the way for the later Hive-branded smart heating system.
Hive was established when parent company Centrica, owner of British Gas, formed its Connected Homes sector in 2012. The year after it was founded, the company launched Hive Active Heating on October 14, 2013, a smart thermostat that allows customers to control heating and hot water in their homes via the company's website or app. The system can be installed in customers' homes by a British Gas engineer.
In February 2015, British Gas purchased the connected home firm AlertMe in a deal worth £65 million. This allowed Hive to build its devices using the Honeycomb platform developed by AlertMe, which facilitates the capability for users to control all their smart home devices through an app. This meant Hive could more closely compete with similar platforms used by rivals such as HomeKit, Project Brillo and Nest Labs.
Hive Active Heating 2, the second edition of the company's smart heating system, was released in July 2015. The new model was upgraded to include two additional features. The holiday mode setting allows customers to set a given temperature while away from home. The boost function allows customers to immediately turn heating and hot water on for a period of up to six hours.
The smart thermostat was designed by Silicon Valley-based, Swiss designer Yves Béhar, who won Design Miami Design Visionary Award in 2015. It was praised for its sleek look, with critics saying it was an improvement on the company's first active heating model, which was criticised for having a dull aesthetic. However, in the same year, complaints about the lack of data security led to changes in the software. The company improved data encryption as a result of an investigation by Which? magazine.
The company also paired up with Dulux to provide accessory frames for the thermostat in a range of different colours.
In 2015 the company announced future plans to use the Honeycomb platform to support and allow integration with third-party products including a Samsung camera.
The company launched two new products in January, 2016. The Active Plug enables users to attach devices, monitor whether they are on or off, remotely-controlling them using a mobile device or laptop. The Window or Door Sensor allows customers to remotely monitor when windows or doors in their home are opened or closed.
The company released the Motion Sensor on February 9, 2016. Customers can use it to keep track of movement within their homes remotely.
On June 13, 2016, the company launched the Active Light, supplied by the Aurora Group, which users can control remotely to turn the bulb on and off and program lighting schedules.
On August 11, 2016, the company announced a partnership with IFTTT (If This, Then That) to allow the smart thermostat to connect to 300 additional products and services through expanded recipe-based automation.
In September 2016 Hive announced it will partner with Amazon Echo, allowing customers to use Alexa voice control to activate lighting, plugs and heating.
On September 27, 2016, the company launched two new smart LED bulbs that can be controlled to alter the colour and tone of the bulbs.
Effective December 31st, 2019 Centrica Hive Limited discontinued the direct sale of products and related services for Hive in the United States and Canada.
Marketplace
Energy efficiency targets set by UK energy industry regulator Ofgem aim to convert 53 million homes and small businesses to use smart gas and electricity meters by the end of 2020. Since this was announced, there has been an increase in partnerships between smart thermostat companies and utility companies.
Operations
The company is the only UK-based, connected homes organisation that provides an end-to-end service, including the creation and installation of devices while also providing customer support on an ongoing basis.
Beginning with 15 staff members, by 2015 this had grown to 200. The company offers services in the UK, the Republic of Ireland and North America.
Devices
The main devices offered include a smart thermostat, lightbulbs, motion sensors for doors and windows, and what the company refers to as a smart plug - all of which operate on an interconnected system that links to a central hub connected to the internet.
Devices can be controlled via the hub, either by using the company website or smartphone app (available on iOS and Android). Users can turn devices on and off both remotely and manually.
Criticism and controversy
In August 2015, a Which? investigation claimed that the Hive app was a "burglars dream" because it was sending data that was unencrypted, including heating schedules and away settings, posing a security risk to customers should their Wi-Fi be tapped into. The company was informed about the Which? investigation in May 2015 and immediately began encrypting previously vulnerable data.
There was criticism of Hive because users could only operate devices designed for the company's system, instead of integrating multiple platforms like companies such as nCube do. However, in August 2016 it was announced the partnership with IFTTT will allow for cross-platform collaboration.
Awards
References
External links
Home automation companies
Internet of things
Centrica |
52111378 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codentify | Codentify | Codentify is the name of a product serialization system developed and patented back in 2005 by Philip Morris International (PMI) for tobacco product authenticity, production volume verification and supply chain control. In the production process, each cigarette package is marked with a unique visible code (also called “Codentify”), that allows authenticating the code against a central server.
In November 2010, PMI licensed this technology to its three main competitors, namely British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG), and Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and the four companies together formed the Digital Coding and Tracking Association (DCTA) which works to promote the system in order to replace governmental revenue stamps. Codentify was branded by its inventors as a “track & trace and product authentication technology”.
History
In July 2004, Phillip Morris International and the European Union had settled a 12 year long legal dispute concerning cigarette smuggling allegations. PMI agreed to pay 1.25 Billion USD to the EU budget and its member states. In addition, PMI was legally obligated to mark its products with trackable serial codes. Agreements were subsequently signed with the other three major tobacco companies.
PMI's affiliate company, Philip Morris Products S.A. created and patented the Codentify system in 2005.
In late 2010, PMI licensed Codentify technology to its main competitors BAT, JTI, and ITG free of charge. The four companies, which together account for 71% of global cigarette sales (excluding China), agreed to use the PMI-developed system on all of their products to ensure “the adoption of a single industry standard, based on Codentify.” The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) immediately voiced concerns that “Codentify should never be used for tracking and tracing purposes as tracking and tracing provisions should be implemented under the strict control and management of governments.”
In 2011, the four companies formed the Digital Coding and Tracking Association (DCTA) to promote international standards and digital technologies to help governments fight smuggling, counterfeiting and tax evasion. The association was officially launched in 2013.
According to the DCTA, around 12% of the global cigarette market is illicit, depriving national governments of more than US$40 billion a year in lost tax revenues and some say this is a serious underestimate. The agreements between the EU and the four major tobacco companies aim to stem the illicit trade of cigarettes, but some academics and the anti-tobacco movement have criticized it as a wholly inadequate deterrent. The EU has since not renewed this deal after MEPs complained that it was inappropriate for governments and tobacco companies have such a deal.
Inexto
In June 2016 the DCTA announced that it transferred Codentify to Inexto, an affiliate of the French Group Impala. This was criticized by leading industry watchdogs such as the FCTC and academics such as Anna Gilmore, who is the director of the tobacco control research group at the University of Bath. She said that “Inexto could not be considered sufficiently independent from the tobacco industry". Martyn Day, Scottish National Party Member of Parliament, says while Codentify was sold "the new owner is merely a front company and that the system is still under the effective control of the tobacco firms". Other academics such as Luk Joossens, who is the advocacy officer of the Association of European Cancer Leagues, said the sale was “predictable” and that tobacco companies will now “pretend” that Codentify is no longer part of the tobacco industry. PMI have rebutted that “Inexto is fully independent from the tobacco industry."
Technology
The Codentify system is based on a machine-created, unique, human-readable multi-digit alphanumeric code that is printed directly onto every individual product during the manufacturing process. A double key encryption system, with separate central authority level and factory level encryption keys are stored on a respective server ,allows for factory line production of a pre-defined number of Codentify codes that have been authorized by a central (e.g.: government) server.
The system generated 12 digit variant of the code is described as pseudo-random, offering 3412 possible combinations. Data which is unique and attributed to each discreet item (product) is encrypted into the code such as the date and exact time of manufacture, machine count of the item, specific machine line of manufacture, brand, variant, pack size, pack type, destination market, and price.
Critics of this system have argued that this approach only allows for the verification of the code itself and not of the product the code is printed on; thereby leaving the potential for copying. A European Commission Assessment Report into Tracking and Tracing notes in section 5.1.2 that in addition to the Codentify code being easily copied, it also fails to link the cigarette packets to the master cases.
However, this critique omits to recognize that the system does allow for recognition of copied codes when an illegitimate copy is queried. The system logic leverages geo-positioning data and will recognize if a code has been previously queried to highlight and notify that the item is suspect. Illegitimate products are invariably developed and replicated in significant numbers from a legitimate example. Once the system logic recognizes illegitimate code, it is able to notify the system authority that this code has been compromised and is no longer valid. Due to the pseudo-random encrypted design of Codentify, illegitimate parties cannot predict codes and therefore can either default to replication of one legitimate code, which the system will logically identify from duplicate queries and provide notification, or the generation of random illegitimate codes, which the system will immediately recognize. Given the geo-positioning data at the time of query, both illegitimate approaches provide legitimate authorities important data on the suspect illegitimate supply chain.
Furthermore, when the Codentify technology is coupled with aggregated data (parent-child packaging) and supply chain event tracking, the ability of the system to identify a suspect query is thereafter immediate. In essence, supply chain event tracking along the legitimate supply chain generates additional data encompassing that legitimate product’s specific provenance. Provenance that the illicit supply chain cannot replicate.
Criticism
Codentify has been the subject of harsh criticism as a tobacco industry promoted system which is aimed at undermining public health efforts and not capable of curbing the illicit trade of cigarettes. This criticism has come from some academics and pro-health groups, to include the WHO.
The WHO FCTC Protocol on the Elimination of the Illicit Trade in Tobacco products states in article 8, section 12 that tobacco tracking and regulation “shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry”. Today, the Codentify technology is under a totally independent ownership and management, having no capitalistic or governance link to the tobacco industry, with application of a successor product (INEXTOR) that is now present across multiple industries outside of tobacco, to include beer, fine spirits, luxury goods, automotive parts, and pharmaceuticals.
Critics of the tobacco industry say Codentify is simply not good enough, “because it focuses too much on production and does not store product codes or track them.” However, the Codentify system does not require the storage of codes in the clear for security purposes (though it is capable to perform this task, if specified by the central authority), as such mass storage of legitimate codes exposes them to potential compromise. The Codentify technology uses decryption processes to deliver authentication and validation of an item and is able to provide the item’s descriptive and unique attributes in parallel, with a near instant response time.
Heavy criticism has also been launched at the factory-level keys the system uses to provide unique verification codes for the product. Since these secret keys are stored on company and government servers, abuse of privileges on this level would allow criminals to generate additional codes, which would appear to be genuine to the system. However, this criticism does not take into account that the central server keys are not shared with the manufacturer nor does it account for the dynamic and static key multi-level encryption method designed into the system, which jointly provide the legitimate authority with complete and secure control over the code authorization process.
The decentralized nature of the system the realities of imperfect connectivity across complex, cross border supply chains by ensuring a central control and oversight of secure code generation within production environments whilst providing legitimate manufacturing assets continuity of production under parameters dictated by the central authority.
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) described the system as a black box created by the tobacco industry that uses unsecured equipment that is vulnerable to code recycling. However, this criticism does not take into account that: (i) codes can only be legitimized by the central authority server, (ii) the algorithm and both static and dynamic keys remain secret to and under strict control of the central authority, (iii) the method applied in the generation of the codes is patented and therefore visible by the public. Under this strict control regime, illegitimate creation of codes is not possible. Illicit techniques such as “code recycling”, using codes of products rejected in quality control, “code cloning”, printing the same code on multiple products, and “code migration”, reprinting codes used in one country elsewhere, allowing to reuse genuine codes multiple times, are therefore rendered obsolete and defeated by this multi-layer encryption method.
Philip Morris has been accused, via its South American subsidiary Massalin Particulares, of using bribery and extortion to implement Codentify and Inexto in Argentina.
“The directors, managers and legal representatives of PMI and its Argentine subsidiary Massalin Particulares S.R.L. (MP) are being investigated within the framework of a criminal case in federal court…,” Attorney Alejandro Sánchez Kalbermatten wrote in a 2017 letter to the Security and Exchange Commission in the United States.
A decision by the Federal Court of Argentina overseeing the case concluded that the plaintiff, Attorney Alejandro Sánchez Kalbermatten, had no standing and that the accusations made in the complaint were not substantiated by material facts. As a consequence, the case No.17.766/2016 was fully dismissed on September 28, 2017.
References
Tobacco industry |
52154740 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave%20Weinstein | Dave Weinstein | David J. Weinstein (born January 13, 1988) is an American consultant and the former Chief Technology Officer of New Jersey. He previously served at U.S. Cyber Command. In 2020 he joined management consulting firm McKinsey & Company.
Education and early years
A native of Westfield, New Jersey, Weinstein attended Delbarton School in Morristown, New Jersey where he lettered in baseball and soccer. He graduated from Johns Hopkins University before earning his Master's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.
Upon graduating from Johns Hopkins, Weinstein worked at U.S. Cyber Command, where he advocated with Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, for splitting U.S. Cyber Command from the National Security Agency. Weinstein is an encryption advocate and has called the choice between security and privacy a “false dilemma”.
Chief Technology Officer of New Jersey
On June 20, 2016 Governor Chris Christie named Weinstein, then 28 years-old, New Jersey's first Chief Technology Officer, calling him "an individual, who truly understands how to manage cyber risk across a large enterprise." Prior to his appointment as CTO, Weinstein had "spearheaded the implementation of Governor Christie’s New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell, the State’s central hub for cyber operations and resources that is the first of its kind in the nation." He was praised for "bringing a fresh attitude" to information technology at the state level and instituting a "more vibrant and innovative culture" to attract talent and modernize public sector technologies. According to Politico, Weinstein's experience in both Washington and Trenton has led him to be "often called upon on the national scene to provide the state perspective." He was not retained by the incoming Murphy administration after the inauguration of Phil Murphy.
References
1988 births
Living people
Delbarton School alumni
Georgetown University alumni
Johns Hopkins University alumni
New Jersey politicians
People from Westfield, New Jersey |
52174112 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multibeam%20Corporation | Multibeam Corporation | Multibeam is an American corporation that engages in the design of semiconductor processing equipment used in the fabrication of integrated circuits. Based in Santa Clara, in the Silicon Valley, Multibeam is led by Dr. David K. Lam, the founder and first CEO of Lam Research.
Technology
Multibeam developed miniature, all-electrostatic columns for e-beam lithography. Arrays of e-beam columns operate simultaneously and in parallel to increase wafer processing speed. With 36 patents filed, Multibeam develops multicolumn e-beam systems and platforms for four major applications: Complementary E-Beam Lithography (CEBL), Direct Electron Writing (DEW), Direct Deposition/Etch (DDE), and E-Beam Inspection (EBI).
Applications
Direct Electron Writing (DEW) embeds security information in each IC including chip ID, IP or MAC address, and chip-specific information such as keys used in encryption. Chip ID is used for supply chain traceability and to detect counterfeits. Hardware-embedded encryption keys are used to authenticate software. Chip-specific information written into DEW-bit registers is non-volatile.
Complementary Electron Beam Lithography (CEBL) works with optical lithography to pattern cuts (of lines in "lines-and-cuts" layout) and holes (i.e., contacts and vias) with no masks.
Direct Deposition/Etch (DDE) can be used in chip fabrication or wafer defect repair. Precursors or reactants are introduced through gas injectors. Activation electrons are directed in accordance with the design layout database to deposit or remove material at precise locations on the substrate.
Multi-column Electron Beam Inspection (EBI) for wafer defect detection and metrology.
References
External links
Equipment semiconductor companies
Nanotechnology companies
Technology companies established in 2010
Companies based in Santa Clara, California
Technology companies based in the San Francisco Bay Area
American companies established in 2010 |
52257996 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MX%20Linux | MX Linux | MX Linux is a midweight Linux operating system based on Debian stable and using core antiX components, with additional software created or packaged by the MX community. MX Linux was developed as a cooperative venture between the antiX and former MEPIS communities. The MX 'name' came from the M for MEPIS and the X from antiX - an acknowledgment of their roots. The community's stated goal is to produce "a family of operating systems that are designed to combine elegant and efficient desktops with high stability and solid performance".
MX Linux uses the Xfce desktop environment as its flagship, to which it adds a freestanding KDE Plasma version and in 2021 a standalone Fluxbox implementation. Other environments can be added or are available as "spin-off" ISO images.
History
MX Linux began in a discussion about future options among members of the MEPIS community in December 2013. Developers from antiX then joined them, bringing the ISO build system as well as Live-USB/DVD technology. To be listed on the Linux distribution clearinghouse website DistroWatch, MX Linux was initially presented as a version of antiX. It received its own DistroWatch page with the release of the first public beta of MX-16 on November 2, 2016.
The MX-14 series was based on Debian Stable "Wheezy", using Xfce 4.10 and then, with the 14.4 release, Xfce 4.12. The MX-14 versions were intended to fit onto a CD, which limited the number of applications that could be included. This series saw the gradual evolution of the MX Tools, a collection of utilities to help users with common tasks that are often complicated and obscure.
MX-15 moved to the new Debian Stable "Jessie" using systemd-shim, meaning that systemd is installed but the default init is sysvinit. The size limitation was lifted, enabling the developers to present a full turnkey product. There was substantial expansion of MX Tools.
MX-16 was still based on Debian Stable "Jessie", but with many applications backported and added and from other sources. There were further refinements to MX Tools, import of advanced antiX developments, expanded support, and a completely new icon/theme/wallpaper collection.
MX-16.1 collected all bug fixes and improvements since MX-16, added a new kingfisher theme, upgraded and streamlined MX Tools, revised documentation, and added new translations.
MX-17 changed its base to Debian 9 (Stretch) and brought upgraded artwork, new MX Tools, improved Live operation via antiX and other changes.
MX-18 continued the development of MX Tools, introduced a new kernel, enabled whole disk encryption, and added grub themes, splash functionality through MX Boot options artwork, and improved localization.
MX-19 upgraded its base to Debian 10 (Buster) and its default desktop to Xfce 4.14. It is characterized by new and revised Tools, artwork, documentation, localization and technical features.
MX-21 was released on October 21 2021. It is based on Debian 11 (Bullseye) and is available as Xfce, KDE or Fluxbox versions. Details in the MX Blog.
Desktop Environments
Besides the fast and medium-low resource default XFCE desktop environment MX Linux also has two other desktop editions:
A free-standing 'Fluxbox' version with very low resource usage was released October 21, 2021.
A 'KDE' version was released on August 16, 2020 which is an Advanced Hardware Support (AHS) enabled (64-bit only) version of MX featuring the KDE/Plasma desktop and the currently features a long-term supported Linux 5.10.x AHS kernel.
In addition, a 'XFCE' (64 bit only) Advanced Hardware Support (AHS) was released with newer graphics drivers, 5.10 kernel and firmware for very recent hardware.
Releases
Features
MX Linux has basic tools like a graphic installer that handles UEFI computers, a GUI-based method to change a Linux kernel and other core programs.
It includes MX Tools, a suite of user-oriented utilities, many of which were developed specifically for MX, while some were forked from existing antiX applications or are existing antiX applications; a couple were imported with permission from outside sources.
A particularly popular one is MX-snapshot, a GUI tool to remaster a live session or installation into a single .ISO file. The "cloned" image is bootable from disk or USB flash drive, maintaining all settings, allowing an installation to be completely backed up, and/or distributed with minimal administrative effort, since an advanced method of copying the file system (developed by antiX-Linux) uses bind-mounts performing the "heavy lifting".
System Requirements
Minimum
8.5 GB hard disk space for installation.
1 GB RAM for i386 and AMD64 architectures.
Bootable CD-DVD drive or a USB stick.
A modern i686 Intel or AMD processor.
Recommended
20 GB of hard disk space, SSD for faster performance.
2 GB of RAM.
modern i686 Intel or AMD processor. Multi-core for good performance.
3D-capable video card for 3D desktop support.
SoundBlaster, AC97 or HDA-compatible sound card.
For use as a LiveUSB, 8 GB free if using persistence.
See also
antiX
MEPIS
References
External links
MX Linux support forum
MX Linux support group on facebook
A full list of substantive reviews, both written and video, that are known to MX Linux developers can be found with summaries on this page.
The complete feature list can be seen on this page.
2014 software
Computer-related introductions in 2014
Debian-based distributions
Linux distributions without systemd
X86-64 Linux distributions
Linux distributions |
52260491 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General%20der%20Nachrichtenaufkl%C3%A4rung | General der Nachrichtenaufklärung | General der Nachrichtenaufklärung was the signals intelligence agency of the Heer (German Army), before and during World War II. It was the successor to the former cipher bureau known as Inspectorate 7/VI in operation between 1940 and 1942, when it was further reorganised into the Headquarters for Signal Intelligence () (abbr. LNA) between 1942 and 1944, until it was finally reorganised in October 1944 into the GdNA. The agency was also known at the OKH/Gend Na, GendNa or Inspectorate 7 or more commonly OKH/GdNA. Inspectorate 7/VI was also known as In 7 or In/7 or In 7/VI and also OKH/Chi.
Chi-Stelle
From Chiffrierabteilung (English: "cipher department"). Chi-Stelle, translates to "Cipher Department Location".
Background
Key personnel
Senior personnel
General der Nachrichtentruppe Erich Fellgiebel, was Director of the Code and Cipher section of the Defense Ministry from 1931 to 1932 and held the dual combined office of Chef HNW and Chief Signal Officer Armed Forces (Chef WNF) from 1939 until 20 July 1944. Fellgiebel was executed in July 1944 after an attempt on Hitler's life in the failed 20th July plot.
The unit was then subordinated to Generalleutnant Fritz Thiele, who was Director of Section III of the Armed Forces Signal Communication Group, Radio Defense Corps, or more accurately the AgWBNV, Radio Communication Group 3 (), (AgWNV/FU III) were responsible for locating, eliminating, or neutralizing all enemy agents' radio activities.
Generalleutnant Wilhelm Gimmler, () was Chief Signals Officer subordinated to Commander in Chief OB West and Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Communications Office. Gimmler was responsible for coordinating all the cryptographic security studies undertaken by German Armed Forces and was notable for standardising wireless phraseology between different Army Groups.
Colonel Hugo Kettler was a career Signals officer, who volunteered at the start of World War I, entering the Telephone Replacement Department No. 6 () and after undergoing continual promotion during World War I and the interwar period, was a senior signals officer at the start of World War II. Colonel Hugo Kettler was a Director of OKW/Chi from October 1943.
Kettler was first director of HLS Ost and who would later become Chief of OKW/Chi in the summer of 1943. During the summer of 1942, Kettler was succeeded by Baron Colonel Rudolf Von Der Osten-Sacken, who remained its chief until July 1944, when he was implicated in the 20 July plot on Hitler's life and committed suicide before he was scheduled to be hanged.
Headquarters
Agn/Gen. der. Nachr. Aufkl – Oberst Fritz Boetzel
Chief of Staff () – Oberstleutnant Andrea
Adjutant Leutnant Norawec
Chief of Understaff () Oberleutnant Köbe
Group Z – Major Hüther
Oberst Fritz Boetzel, was the officer who was responsible for the German Defense Ministry's signals intelligence agency, during the important interwar period, when the service was being enlarged and professionalised, In 1939, he was posted to Army Group Southeast () to take up the office position of Chief of Intelligence Evaluation in Athens, Greece. In 1944, following the reorganisation of the Wehrmacht signals intelligence capability, Fritz Boetzel, now General Fritz Boetzel, who was promoted by Albert Praun, created 12 Communications Reconnaissance Battalions (KONA regiment) in eight regiments, with each regiment assigned to a particular Army Group. Fritz Boetzel was considered to be one of the sources for the Lucy spy ring. Boetzel knew Hans Oster and Wilhelm Canaris and had fit the anti-nazi personality of Rudolf Roessler contacts, the man who had run the spy ring.
Cryptanalysis unit command
The directors of the In 7/Vi cryptanalysis units from January 1941 to February 1945 were:
Major Major Mang. 1941–1942
Major Mettig. November 1941 to June 1943
Major Lechner 1943
Major Dr Rudolf Hentze 1944–1945
Oberstleutnant Mettig was a career signals officer who joined the military in 1933, and worked up to command the Germany Armies cryptologic centre, Inspectorate 7/VI from November 1941 to June 1943. After working in the Signals Battalion on the Eastern Front for several months, he was assigned second in command of OKW/Chi in December 1943, and subordinated to Hugo Kettler, and held the position until April 1945. After the war he was considered such a high-value target that he was moved to England to be interrogated by TICOM.
Communication office
The following German Army officers worked with the communication office and provided the main liaison function for conveying intelligence from the central office to the field.
Unit Commander Johannes Marquart and I/C Cryptanalysis Leutnant Schlemmer were Commander of KONA 5 and were communication intelligence liaison officers for several army groups on the southern part of the Western Front.
Unit Commander Major Lechner and I/C Cryptanalysis Leutnant Herbert von Denffer were Commander of KONA 6 and were communication intelligence liaison officers for several army groups for the northern part of the Western Front.
Colonel Walter Kopp, was a senior communication intelligence officer for OB West, i.e. for Sig. Int. West
Oberst Gotthard Heinrici was on the General Staff and Chief Signals officer for OB West.
Oberst Leo Hepp was a member of the General Staff and was Deputy Chief of Army Signal Communication. Hepp was later chief of staff for the Chief Signals Officer at the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and directly subordinated to Fellgiebel and later General Albert Praun, when Fellgiebel was killed.
Colonel Muegge was a communication intelligence officer for an army group.
Colonel Kunibert Randewig was commander of intercept units with various army groups. Randewig was a career Signals officer, who joined the German Army in 1914. During the World War I and the interwar period, he became a veteran of monitoring Soviet wireless communications and a support of decentralisation of signal intelligence. He would eventually become Commander of all KONA Signal Intelligence regiments in the west. Randewig would later work on the rocket programme.
Cryptanalytic staff
Sonderführer Johannes Marquart. He was a mathematician, who was also a German Army hand cryptographic systems specialist. In a later role, he was the liaison officer between the clearing centre of communications intelligence, and the Western Intelligence Branch, Army General Staff.
History
1919–1933
Little was known about the Signals Intelligence of the German Army during this period. A Codes and Ciphers Section of the German Defence Ministry (German:Reichswehrministerium Chiffrierabteilung) was subordinated to an Army Signal Officer, that had been maintained in skeleton form since the end of World War I. The following people were directors of the unit:
Lieutenant Erich Buschenhagen 1919–1927
Major Rudolf Schmidt 1927–1931
Major Erich Fellgiebel 1931–1932
Major Hans Oschmann 1932–1934
Major Fritz Boetzel 1934–1939
The directors of the ciphers section also controlled the Defense Ministry's intercept network, which was used to gather operational intelligence and was divided into two branches. The first branch was the fixed intercept network stations which were dated from 1923–1924 (German:Feste Horchstelle) (Feste), and at least seven stations were operating before 1933 in military districts. The second intercept branch was the motorised Intercept Companies (German:Horchkompanien), created by Fellgiebel himself. Six of the stationary intercept stations were aligned specifically to the interception of foreign military traffic and the last one specifically designed for foreign diplomatic traffic. The military traffic stations were: Stuttgart, Munich, Münster, Königsberg, Leignitz and Breslau with the diplomatic traffic intercept station located at Treuenbrietzen. Each intercept station was assigned a series of intercept assignments, with the most important assignments monitored by two stations, e.g. the Soviet Union was monitored from Königsberg and Frankfurt, and so on. The assignments were established in the Assignment Plan H-Aufgabenplan. Each assignment was prioritised from first to fourth, sometimes absolute, sometimes relative, e.g. Poland was assigned first for Frankfurt/Oder stations and a first or second for Königsberg. Priority could change depending if a country went to war.
1933–1939
During the 1933–1934 period, the Defense Ministry created three more intercept stations: one Feste was at Hersbruck, (that was later moved to Lauf) with the other two located at Striegau and Chemnitz. Using the ten intercept stations to intercept foreign military and diplomatic communications, the Defense Ministry created its own military code and cipher section, called Intercept Control Station (HLS) () in 1933/34. To run the control station, the Ministry reassigned several trained cryptanalysts from the Ministry of the Reichswehr Codes and Cipher Section. All Army intercepts were forwarded to the HLS, but other intercept traffic types were forwarded to the Commander-In-Chief aligned agency, e.g. Foreign Air Force traffic was sent to chi-stelle, the Luftwaffe Cipher Bureau. Diplomatic intercepts were sent to both German War Ministry () and to Foreign Office civilian cipher bureau AA/Pers Z S.
1939–1941
During the early years of World War II, substantial change occurred within the German Army signal intelligence service. The main developments were:
The intercept service mission was narrowed to include only Army Traffic. With the formation of OKW/Chi, the signals intelligence agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in 1939, OKW/Chi took over all diplomatic intercept traffic. To help facilitate message interception, the Army transferred two interception stations at Lauf and Treuenbrietzen.
The intercept service expanded. In 1939, the Army established two new branch stations for the intercept of foreign Army communications from the east. The branch stations were created as Graz and Tullin.
Five new Signal Intelligence Regiments (German:Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung, abbr. KONA) were created. The KONA operated in the theatre as complete intercept and evaluation units, while attached to Army Groups, (e.g. Army Group A). Each KONA unit was numbered from one to five. KONA units 1,2,3 were assigned to the Eastern Front. KONA 1 was assigned to the southern front, KONA 2 to the Central front and KONA 3 to the Army Group on the Northern Front. KONA 4 was not attached to any Army Group, but was subordinated to the commander of the German Armies in the Balkans (German:Befehlshaber Südost). KONA 5 was assigned to Army Group B on the Western Front.
In 1939, to cope with the increased demand and difficulty of decryption of enemy Army traffic, a large number of mathematicians and linguists, e.g. translators and interpreters were drafted and assigned to various field units, or intercept stations. When intercept units moved into the field in 1939, no cryptographers were available. Colonel (German:Oberst) Kunibert Randewig, was a veteran of pre-war monitoring of Soviet Union wireless traffic. As commander of all the intercept units in the west, he was tasked with seeking available personnel. Those cryptographers which were available from Y Units around Berlin were reassigned with additional linguists and mathematicians recruited as necessary. As a result, when the German offensive started in April 1940, a sufficient group of cryptanalysts personnel was available
The Army showed an increased interest in the security of their own key systems. This gave rise, via a concentration of personnel, to a new agency, a math referat that was created in 1939/40, Army Signal Security Agency Group IV of Inspectorate 7 (abbr. 7/IV). This was subordinated to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army (German:Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres) (abbr. Chef H Rüst u BdE). The unit initially had about a dozen mathematicians including Dr Hans Pietsch, Friedrich Steinberg, Friedrich Böhm, Dr Herbert von Denffer, Hilburg, and Dr Hans-Peter Luzius. Most of these were drawn from the statistical offices of insurance companies. Dr Otto Buggisch had his first contact with the group at the end of 1940. The group was loose at first, as men could be detached for specific projects in security work, but over time the work gradually split into three functions. This was General Theory – Referat F under Denffer, Hand ciphers under Oblt. Lüders and machine systems with the heading, Referat 13 commanded by Wachtmeister Döring.
The German Army Signal Intelligence service in 1939 consisted of the following parts:
At least 10 intercept stations for the interception of foreign traffic (German: Feste Horchstellen, abbr. Feste).
Five Signal Intelligence Regiments (KONA) attached to Army Groups.
An Intercept Control Stations (German: Horchleitstelle) for the evaluation and analysis of foreign Army traffic.
An Army Signal Security Agency, Inspectorate 7/IV for testing and issuing codes and ciphers for the Army.
1941–1944
Western evaluation centre
During the middle of war, the small staff of the intercept and listening stations () was found to be inadequate to cope with the large amount of traffic resulting from the pressures of the war. A central cryptanalytic agency was established in Berlin, around 1 February 1941, that was designated as Inspecktorate 7 or more simply In 7. It was also commanded by the Chief of the Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army (), specifically Obstlt. Hassel. The experience of 1940 illustrated the fact that huge expansion of the German Army cryptologic effort was desirable. A central evaluation agency was created at the Zeppelin bunker near Zossen, which was designated as Control Station for Signal Intelligence () (abbr. LNA).
Gruppe VI of In 7 (In 7/VI) was organised by Major Mang, whose aim was to not only build staffing levels at the centre, but to provide reserves of staff that could be called upon when necessary. In order to provide sufficient staff, Mang subordinated the In 6/VI unit to Chief of the Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. In matters of policy, In 7/VI was subordinated to the Field Army only. Considered a curious form of organisation, it enabled the cryptanalytic service to recruit sufficient staff without operational interference, at the same time maintaining close support of field units. The cryptographic section would eventually become independent.
Eastern evaluation centre
During the first months of the unit, Russian cryptanalysis was conducted as part of the operational schedule of In 7/VI, with Russian evaluation included as part of the cryptanalytic work done by unit LNA. Both of these units felt, incorrectly, that cryptanalysis and evaluation of Russian intercepts should be carried out close to the front lines of the field army in East Prussia. This resulted in significant numbers of personnel being detached from the LNA and In 7/VI in late 1941, made up of cryptanalysts and evaluators skilled in Russian traffic and sent to Loetzen to work. This group would eventually become the nucleus of the organisation: Intercept Control Station East () (abbr. HLS Ost) for Russian evaluation and traffic analysis. From this point on until November 1944, signal intelligence was divided into Russian cryptanalysis carried out by HLS Ost, and non-Russian signal intelligence carried out by OKH/Chi and LNA.
Expansion
In 1942, the responsibility for security testing of existing German Army cryptographic systems had been transferred from In 7/IV to In 7/VI. From that time, the Army Signal Security Agency, In 7/IV had been confined to the development of new systems for the Army and for the production, printing, and distribution of current keys and systems.
In the autumn of 1943, OKH/Chi had been transferred to the newly created Department of Signals of the General Army Office and renamed Signal Intelligence, Department of Signals, General Army Office, Army High Command () (abbr. OKH/AHA/AgN/NA). Minor changes in internal organisation were affected, but the function and operation of the agency was not changed.
Although there was no essential change in the organisation of the field units of Germany Army Sigint Service from 1941 to 1944, additional units were put in place in the field. In 1942, the eastern KONA units (1,2,3) were supplemented by the addition of KONA 6, which was formed to cover the German campaign in the Caucasus. The KONA unit was not subordinated to any Army Group but was directly under HLS Ost. KONA 7 was established in February 1943 and was subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief South, Albert Kesselring, who controlled Army Group C, and the German forces in Italy.
The organisation of the German Army Sigint Service in 1944 consisted of the following:
A central cryptanalytic agency for non-Russian traffic: In 7/VI, later AgN/NA
A central evaluation agency for non-Russian traffic: LNA
A central cryptanalytic and evaluation agency for Russian traffic: HLS Ost
Seven Signal Intelligence Regiments (KONA)
An Army Signal Security agency for the distribution and development of Army systems: In 7/IV
1944–1945
In October 1944, the various organisations of the German Army signal intelligence service was completely changed again, through the amalgamation of the three central agencies. The In 7/VI (later AgN/NA), the LNA, and HLS Ost was combined into one central cryptanalytic and evaluation agency: OKH/GDNA. This combined unit was the logical result of the retreat of HLS Ost together with the German Army, from East Prussia to Zeppelin bunker near Zossen where In 7/VI and LNA were situated.
The KONA signal intelligence regiments were not greatly affected by the amalgamation of the central agencies into the GdNA, although the KONA units did come under closer centralised control in matters of administration and signal intelligence policy. The main change to the Armies field organisations in 1944 were brought on by the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. To cope with the situation, KONA 6 was moved from the eastern front to the western, and a Senior Commander of the Signal Intelligence () (Abbr. Höh Kdr d NA) was created to coordinate and control KONA 5 and KONA 6. In late 1944 and early 1945, two additional KONA regiments were created, KONA 8 and KONA Nord, but it is worth noting that these KONA regiments were largely borrowed from other eastern front regiments, and were not a mark of expansion, merely a redeployment to areas under stress.
Colonel Boetzel, chief of the OKH/GdNA stated that KONA 4 was transferred to the west at the end of the war. A captured document indicated that KONA 4 had been succeeded by a signal battalion, () (Abbr. NAA) 16, in February 1945 but did not mention its transfer to the west. It is probable that the KONA disintegrated and that various parts were sent to the different fronts.
The organisation of the signal intelligence service at the end of World War II consisted of the following:
The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA), a central cryptanalytic and evaluation agency for all traffic.
A Senior Commander of the Signal Intelligence (Hoeh Kdr d NA) with control over the KONA stationed in the west and responsibility for all the signals intelligence activities of the German Army in the west.
Nine Signal Intelligence Regiments (KONA) which were attached to Army Groups or Commanders in the field.
Organisation of central agencies
Intercept Control Station
Intercept station operations 1939–1944
Before the war, cryptography in the German Army was carried out by In 7 Listening Position () (Abbr. HLS). This organisation originated in the cipher section of the German War Ministry and grew up in parallel with the cipher section of OKW/Chi. Before the war, In 7 Horchleistelle was merely a small department. It had a number of fixed intercept stations called Festes, i.e. Fixed News Services (German: Feste Nachrichtenaufklärungsstelle) (Abbr. FNAST or Feste). These were staffed by a skeleton organisation and were working to monitor the traffic of neighbouring states.
Inspectorate 7/VI organisation
In Autumn 1941, Inspectorate 7/VI was headed by Major Mang, and was divided into the following sections:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Inspectorate 7 / Group VI Commanded by Major Mang
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Referat Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Director
|-
| Referat Z
| Captain () Herbrüggen
|-
| British Referat
| Senior Inspector () Zillman, Senior Inspector Liedtke
|-
| French Referat
| Senior Inspector Kuehn
|-
| Italian Referat
| Captain () Dr Fialla
|-
| Balkan Referat
| Superior Government Councillor () Dr Rudolf Bailovic
|-
| Russian Referat
| War administration inspector () Oberleutnant Alexis Dettman
|-
| Mathematical Referat
| Oberleutnant David Lüders, Special leader () Dr Hans Pietsch
|-
| Linguistic Research Referat
| Special leader () Köhler
|-
| Training Referat
| Senior Inspector Kühn
|}
Between 1941 and 1943, the following changes in OKH/Chi took place:
The Russian Referat was sent to Loetzen, East Prussia.
A Referat for cryptanalysis of USA systems was formed with the entry of the US into the war on 7 December 1941.
A Referat for cryptanalysis of traffic of agents (foreign and internal) was added in 1943.
The investigation of the security of the current German Army systems was transferred from In 7/VI, the former Army Signal Security Agency, to the mathematical Referat of In 7/VI.
An IBM Referat together with its machinery from In 7/IV was added.
In the spring of 1943, OKH/Chi organisation was as follows:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Inspectorate 7/ Group VI Commanded by Major Mettig
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Referat Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Director
|-
| British Referat
| Senior Inspector () Zillman
|-
| USA Referat
| Senior Inspector Dr Steinberg
|-
| Balkan Referat
| Superior Government Councillor () Dr Rudolf Bailovic
|-
| French Referat
| Senior Inspector Kühn
|-
| Italian Referat
| Corporal Manaigo
|-
| Mathematical Referat
| Special leader () Dr Hans Pietsch
|-
| Linguistic Referat
| Special leader () Köhler
|-
| Training Referat
| Senior Inspector Kühn
|-
| Agents Referat
| Oberleutnant Vauck
|-
| Hollerith Referat
| Special leader () Schenke
|}
The sections of In 7/VI were housed during this period in buildings near the Bendlerstrasse in Berlin. The Headquarters Training Section and sections for USA, French and Agents traffic were located at Mattaekirchplatz 4; the British and Balkan sections were located at Schellingstrasse 9, with the Hollerith machinery located at Viktoriastrasse. Location of the Mathematical section was not known. In November 1943, the first large RAF raid on Berlin destroyed a large part of the offices of the Army High Command on Bendlerstrasse in Berlin, among which were those of OKH/Chi. In 7/VI was thereupon moved to Jüterbog in Oct 1943, where it was located until its amalgamation in November 1944 into GdNA. No estimate is given of the number of people employed in In 7/VI.
Organisation of AgN/NA
When In 7/VI was reorganised as the Signal Intelligence Section of the Department of signals of the General Army Office, of the Army High Command () (Abbr. AgN/NA), the internal organisation was changed. The previously independent sections were organised into a main section () for mathematics, and a main section for languages. The Hollerith section retained its autonomy.
The main section for languages, with the exception that one section was added for Swedish traffic, covered the same field as had been covered by the additional language sections of OKH/Chi. The organisation of AgN/NA is as follows:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Organisation of AgN/NA
|-
! colspan="2" style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Chief of Unit
! colspan="2" style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Major Lechner
|-
| colspan="2" | Main Referat A for Mathematics
| David Lüder's
|-
| colspan="2" | Main Referat B for Languages
| Rudolf Bailovic
|-
|
| British Referat
| Zillman
|-
|
| United States Referat
| S. Steinberg
|-
|
| French Referat
| Hans Wolfgang Kühn
|-
|
| Balkan Referat
| Rudolf Bailovic
|-
|
| Swedish Referat
| Pfc Rohden
|-
|
| Linguistics Cryptanalysis Referat
| Köhler
|-
|
| Training Referat
| Hans Wolfgang Kühn
|-
|
| Hollerith Machinery Referat
| Schenke
|}
Control Station For Intelligence LNA
The nature of this obscure unit was as an evaluation agency, which focused primarily on non Russian traffic. The unit which was called Control Station For Intelligence () (Abbr. LNA) had sections for evaluating British, US, Italian, Balkan, Greek, Turkish, Tunisian, Near Eastern, Portuguese and Spanish traffic. Evaluation was made both of traffic and post decoded intercepts, passed to the unit from OKH/Chi. This unit size of the LNA was small, and consisted of 75 military personnel.
HLS Ost
The Intercept Control Station East (German: Horchleitstelle Ost) (Abbr. HLS Ost) was the central cryptanalytic and evaluation centre for Russian traffic located at Loetzen, East Prussia from late 1941 to late 1944. The size of the unit was not known, but had the following organisation, as defined below:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|HLS Ost organisation in late 1944
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Referat Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Function
|-
| Referat Z
| Administrative
|-
| Referat 1
| Supply, maintenance, evaluation of captured documents and general research into wireless procedures
|-
| Referat 2
| Evaluation, compilation of intercept situation report.
|-
| Referat 3
| Russian cryptanalysis section
|-
| Referat 4
| Monitoring of inter-Soviet State traffic; Russian radio broadcasts and Reuters and Tass News Agency broadcasts
|}
In the winter of 1942–43, the Baudot Reception Station was moved from Minsk to Loetzen and subordinated to HLS Ost, Referat 4. The first director of HLS Ost was Colonel Hugo Kettler who would later become Chief of OKW/Chi in the summer of 1943. During the summer of 1942, Kettler was succeeded by Baron Colonel Rudolf Von Der Osten-Sacken who remained its chief until July 1944 when he was implicated in the 20 July plot on Hitler's life and committed suicide.
Signal Intelligence Agency
The three agencies, OKH/Chi (lattery AgN/NA), HLS Ost and LNA were amalgamated in November 1944, into the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (German: Oberkommando des Heeres, General der Nachrichtenaufklärung) (Abbr. OKH/GdNA) almost intact. OKH/Chi had some personnel reassigned, and became Group IV of GdNA, which was assigned responsibility for all cryptanalysis on foreign military traffic. LNA was transferred as a unit to Group II of GDNA, except for those referats which had been dealing with wireless and news agency traffic. These section were assigned to Group I and GDNA. The various sections of HLS Ost were absorbed into the appropriate sections of GDNA as follows:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Signal intelligence organisation in November 1944
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Referat Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Function
|-
| Referat Z
| Moved into Group Z
|-
| Referat 1 (Miscellaneous)
| Moved into Group V (Miscellaneous)
|-
| Referat 2 (Eastern Front Evaluation)
| Moved into Group III (Eastern Front Evaluation)
|-
| Referat 3 (Russian Cryptographic Section)
| Moved into Group IV (General Cryptographic Section)
|-
| Referat 4 (Intercept Service on Soviet Traffic)
| Moved into Group VI
|-
| Group I
| Wireless and news agency joined Group I
|}
Organisation of GDNA
This organisation of OKH/GdNA was in effect from November 1944 to the end of the war. Approximately 700 people were employed by the unit.
Headquarters Unit. The HQ unit of OKH/GDNA, was managed by () (colonel) Fritz Boetzel, his chief of staff, ) (lieutenant colonel) Andrea, the Adjutant Lieutenant Moravec and staff officer Lieutenant () Koebe. As well as all staff being subordinate to the unit, the unit also controlled two intercept stations, Feste 6 and Feste 11 (KONA Unit), who specialised in intercepting high frequency traffic of the Red Army and the NKVD The officers and men of the unit supervised the intercept traffic requirements of the KONA units and their subordinate units, directly in the case of KONA 1, 2,3,7, and 8, and through the Senior Commander of Signal Intelligence (German: Höherer Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung) (Abbr: Höh Kdr d NA) for KONA 5 and KONA 6. In October 1944, the HQ was run by Lieutenant Colonel () Andrea, Chief of Staff was Colonel () Köbe, with Group Z being run by Major () Hüther.
The authority of the staff was exclusively in matters of intelligence policy and did not extend direct to intercept units in the field. It could however liaise with these through the unit staff. The final responsibility for policy, issue of intercept reports and allocation of work within the groups lay with staff HQ.
Group () I: This unit was directed by Amtmann Bodenmüller and was responsible for two main tasks:
The first task was the maintenance of communications between the units of the GdNA.
The signals officer of the group, Inspector Strahlendorf was in charge of a wireless centre and teleprinter centres of a network connecting to the outlying units of the HQ. Teleprinter was the preferred method of communication unit the end of the war, when radio was used. In the middle of April 1945, a plan was evolved for creating wireless stations in occupied parts of Germany for intercept purposes. Comms with these stations was to be maintained by the wireless centre of the GdNA. The plan was abandoned. Personnel employed by the comms unit were almost exclusively women.
The second was wireless monitoring. This section was known as Radio Reception Point () and was commanded by Wm Pretterebner. This unit had four subsections:
Referat Ia: The broadcast monitoring East () unit monitored eastern wireless.
Owing to personnel shortage its efforts were restricted to monitoring the Moscow wireless. Latterly, a certain amount of Balkan monitoring was instituted particularly for Turkey and Romania
Referat Ib: The broadcast monitoring West () of western wireless.
Owing also to personnel shortages this unit only monitored the BBC London Service.
Referat Ic: The Plain text monitoring () unit.
This unit was responsible for the intercept activity which concentrated on the Reuters agency.
Referat Ic: An evaluation section.
This section was responsible for collating all information from the other three sections and consolidating it into reports. The collated reports were divided into separate parts for political, economic or military news. They were circulated within the departments of the Army High Command (OKH), sometimes with the classification TOP SECRET () (Abbr. GKdos). Special news flashed on items of urgent importance were also issued.
Group II: This unit which was known as End Evaluation WEST () was commanded by Major Thiel. Formally group II was known as LNA West and was located at the Zeppelin bunker near Zossen, and had a personnel count of around 50 people, producing radio situation reports correlating the information from KONA 5, KONA 6 and KONA 7. Captain Thiel, who was head of this group, had been with the LNA for a long time, and was thoroughly familiar with the problems of western evaluation. The evaluation sub-section was responsible for collating all information received from the three Referat in Group I and consolidating them into reports. Collated reports were issued, divided into separate parts for political, economic or military news. The reports were circulated within various departments of the OKH. Frequently, and owing to the political nature of the information, the reports were graded GKdos (Top Secret) although they were obtained merely from monitoring enemy wireless news. Special news flashes on items of urgent importance were also issued.
Group III: This unit was known as End Evaluation EAST ). Captain () Gorzolla was responsible for this unit. This unit undertook evaluation of intercept traffic and cryptanalytic work emanating from the Eastern European Front, e.g. Soviet Union.
With the HQ of Group III, there was a special receiving office through which all messages emanating from the forward intercept units and fixed stations were passed. At the reception office, the unit originating the message was identified by the call signs used. Undecipherable messages were thence passed immediately to Group IV for deciphering and messages which were already in plain text were passed to the special evaluation sub-sections according to the nature of the traffic. In addition, deciphered messages were passed back from the Gruppe IV through the reception office for evaluation. The head office of Groupe III kept a central card index in which call signs, cipher indicator groups and contents of messages were registered.
The department was subdivided into the following sections:
Referat IIIa: Traffic Sorting Office.
Referat IIIb: Northern Sector Evaluation.
Referat IIIc: Central Sector Evaluation.
Referat IIId: Southern Sector Evaluation.
Referat IIIe: People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) Evaluation.
Referat IIIf: Partisan traffic evaluation.
Referat IIIg: Swedish traffic evaluation.
Sources of information for the evaluation unit were call signs, cipher indicator groups and D/F reports. Using these it was possible to establish a detailed order of battle. Surnames were considered an exceptionally valuable source of intelligence since they were used so infrequently in Russian traffic dealing with promotion and transfer. Surnames about Major were tracked in a card index. The evaluation of NKVD traffic was equally valuable since reinforcements and movements of NKVD traffic normally indicated similar movements in the Red Army Field Army. They also gave a good indication of lines of communication. Partisan traffic was also intercepted, for appropriate countermeasures.
Group IV: Major Rudolf Hentze was responsible for all cryptanalytic work done at GdNA. It was one of the largest groups within the GdNA, having been built up from parts of the three former agencies: The defunct OKH/Chi, LNA West at Zossen and the HLS East at Lötzen. The HLS East group, which operated in Loetzen, East Prussia, during 1942–1944, intercepted Soviet teletype transmissions. This unit was captured wholesale in May 1945 in Rosenheim, Germany, by the Allies, and transported by TICOM and put to work so their methods could be evaluated. The Allies then either directly copied the German equipment, or built similar models and used them to intercept the internal Soviet network traffic.
The unit was divided into separate Referat according to the origin of the material. Material dealt with in the Group IV, consisted of traffic which the forward intercept units had intercepted but had been unable to decipher. A certain amount of special traffic was also intercepted by the Feste attached to the GDNA.
Referat I: The mathematician, Dr Hans Pietsch was responsible for the unit. It was responsible for analytical research. It was the former Mathematical Section of OKH/Chi. It was responsible for the security of German Army Systems.
Referat Ia: The subsection was headed by Johannes Marquart, and was engaged in research on German Army hand cryptanalytic systems.
Referat Ib: This subsection was managed by Dr Pietsch, handling research on German Army machine systems.
Subsection F:This subsection designated F for the German word for research (). This subsection was headed by Herbert von Denffer and handled research on foreign systems. Otto Buggisch rated Herbert von Denffer as the most capable cryptanalyst within the German Armed Forces.
Subsection 7:This subsection dealt with the security of German hand systems.
Subsection 13:This subsection was heading by Dr S. Döring and dealt with the security of own machinery and process of German Army machine systems.
Referat II: Headed by the mathematician Dr Alfred Kneschke, it dealt with the cryptanalysis and deciphering of non-Russian traffic. It had three sub-sections:
Referat IIa: Cryptanalysis and decoding of British, USA and Swedish systems. This unit was managed by Dr Werner Schulze. Ludwig Falter worked as an English interpreter,mathematician and cryptanalysis on the British desk.
Referat IIb: Cryptanalysis and decoding of French, Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian and Swiss ystems. This unit was managed by Otto Kühn. Most of the volume of traffic from these countries was extremely small and was thus was unimportant.
Referat IIc: Cryptanalysis and decoding of Balkan systems. This unit was managed by Alfred Kneschke, previously Sonderführer Giesler, previously Oberregierungsrat Dr Rudolf Bailovic.
Referat III: This subsection was managed by Lieutenant Alexis Dettman. The section was composed of the cryptanalytic sections of HLS Ost. It dealt with the Russian systems and had four sub-sections:
Referat IIIa: Cryptanalysis of NKVD traffic.
Referat IIIb: Cryptanalysis of Russian army traffic.
Referat IIIc: Cryptanalysis of Partisan traffic.
Referat IIId: Cryptanalysis of Russian systems.
Referat IV: This unit was the former Hollerith machinery section of OKH/Chi. This section performed mainly statistical work. Most of the members of the unit were women used to run the machinery. The section maintained its own repair shop for the machines.
Referat V: This unit was the training department of the GdNA where cryptographic and cryptanalytic courses were given under the direction of Inspector Kuehn, who had headed the Training section of OKH/Chi. During the last months of the war, the once flourishing section dwindled to a group of 40 students every three months.
Group V: This unit was commanded by Amtmann Block. It had a fair wide field of activity. It had a mixed group containing three Referat all of which carried out unrelated work.
Referat I: This section was named () headed by Inspector Zipper, and was engaged in reconstructing Russian, British and USA call signs and call signs systems, and deducing units therefrom. It covered various procedures of enemy wireless traffic and the allocation of wave lengths.
Referat II: This section managed specifically by Amtmann Block was responsible for the exploitation of captured Russian documents and manuals of signals interest. Captured manuals were translated and descriptions of Russian equipment examined. By April 1945, the Referat II had completed an up-to-date booklet on Russian abbreviations, which was ready for publication. This book was to have been made available to all forward intercept units.
Referat III: This section had two tasks. The first was engaged in supplying the KONA signal intelligence regiments with the necessary intercept equipment and in maintaining a workshop to service the needs of the GdNA HQ itself.
Group VI: This unit was located in Potsdam under Captain () Röder, and was responsible for intercepting and evaluating special high-grade machine systems.
Referat I, with three sub-sections, handled Russian Systems:
Sub-Section Ia: This section was responsible for interception and evaluation of Inter-Soviet State traffic, picked up on Baudot traffic.
On the basis of this, the () (Abbr. WWN) bulletins were compiled. These bulletins gave a detailed summary of Russian economic situation, particularly in the areas of Moscow, Baku, Rostov and included production figures and details of supply and labour conditions. About 30 copies of this report were issued. Detailed card indexes were kept, which included names and locations of factories and personalities therein.
Sub-Section Ib: Interception and evaluation of Russian Baudot.
The unit consisted of two cryptographers who undertook research into the cipher machines employed for Baudot traffic forward of GHQ Moscow. They also assisted Referat Ic in preliminary evaluation.
Sub-Section Ic: Interception and evaluation of Russian Army traffic.
This section picked up Inter-Soviet and Red Army Baudot traffic and dealt with the preliminary evaluation of Ref Army Baudot traffic. Based on this analysis, a situation report was brought out, giving the Order of Battle, personalities, frequencies, call signs and cipher indicator groups used in the traffic. This was passed to Group III for evaluation. Referat Ib carried out joint initial evaluation.
Referat II had two sub-sections. Inspector Heller was responsible for this unit.
Sub-Section IIa: Interception of western teleprinter and automatic morse traffic intercepts.
Sub-Section IIb: Evaluation of the intercepts from section 2a.
Group Z: This unit was responsible for general administrative control of all departments with OKH/GdNA. The work was divided into four types:
Personnel: A central card index was kept for all personnel employed with the GdNA. The unit was also responsible for all transfers, either interdepartmental or outside the unit.
Registry Office (). This communications unit registered all incoming and outgoing correspondence and was responsible for all courier communications between HT General GDNA and its outlying subordinate units. For local communications, the registry had its own runners, but for long distances, the courier services of the Army High Command (OKH) were used. In addition, the Registry Office duplicated some reports for the individual groups.
Paymaster. All of OKH/GdNA were paid by this section.
Drawing. This unit managed the production of situation maps and maps of WT radio networks were produced. Mimeograph and Bookbinding activity was also carried on here.
Signal intelligence operations
Intercept Control Station
HLS before World War II was principally engaged in intercepting traffic from France, Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, and Russia; Switzerland was only casually monitored. The main successes were gained at the expense of France, Netherlands and Russia.
Russia
HLS was able during the first Russo-Finnish War to break a number of Russian 2,3 and 4-figure codes. In addition, a copy of the Russian 5-digit code was obtained, which was handed over to the Finish General Staff (Finnish radio intelligence). That particular code was used by the Russians in the first year of the war with Germany in 1939.
Netherlands
An exercise of the Dutch Army was covered in 1937. Very simple techniques, principally double transposition ciphers, were used and these could be read without much difficulty. As a result, it was possible to establish the Order of battle of the Dutch units participating in the exercise down to the battalion level.
France
Continuous and significant successes were obtained against the French (Deuxième Bureau) before the war. Before 1939, HLS Ost covered the French static wireless net which radiated from Paris to the static formations in France. Cypher procedures were continuously read, and provided valuable information during the international crisis of 1937, Spring and Summer 1938 and 1939.
Britain
Very little success was obtained in the reading of British cyphers before the war, principally due to the low quality of the personnel involved.
Inspectorate 7/VI operations
Static period 1939 to 1940
The signal intelligence picture provided during the early period of the war was good. The complete picture of British, French and Dutch orders of battle was available. Changes in that order could always be followed. The French, Belgium and Dutch picture was partly obtained as a result of cryptanalysis achievements, the order of battle of the British Army could only be built up by the results of Direction-Finding (abbr. D/F) information, and the evaluation of call-signs and other items of the wireless traffic procedure.
France
In 1939, OKH/Chi cryptanalysed the mobile cipher which had replaced the peacetime cipher of the static French wireless net with the outbreak of war. All messages of an administrative or supply nature, nevertheless, helped to fill in the tactical picture, e.g. the strength of units being created on the training ground at Camp de Châlons at Mourmelon-le-Grand, was estimated by statistics of water bottles and blankets. It was equally possible to deduce facts about the shortage of armour-piercing ammunition with the French infantry units. Similarly, the conversion of the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassier Regiment to armoured division status in the area northeast of Paris was ascertained in December 1939. Likewise, the order of battle of the French 6th Army on the French-Italian border was well known.
Poland
According to Lieutenant Colonel Metting, who was interrogated, that owing to the speedy development of the Polish campaign, very little cryptographic work was undertaken. The main signal intelligence information on the regrouping of the Polish forces was derived from the Polish relay wireless traffic which was believed to be carried out in Plaintext.
German offensive May–June 1940
France
With the opening of the Battle of France in May 1940, the French began to use ciphers in increasing quantities. Germany at this point suffered an acute shortage of forward cryptographers and was therefore unable to undertake much work on the French forward ciphers. As a result, the forward units concentrated on the two French cipher machines, the B-211, which was an electromechanical cipher machine, designed and built by Boris Hagelin for use by the French Army and the C-36. Progress was slow, but as the result of the research on two captured C-36 machines, Army Group C was in a position by July 1940 to undertake satisfactory reading of the traffic. Likewise, it was impossible to break the B-211 machine in time for that information to be of any value. Nevertheless, the research undertaken during this period was to justify the results later.
united Kingdom
Although similar successes were achieved against the Dutch and Belgian ciphers, Germany still failed to break into any important British procedures. The English desk cryptanalysts, consisting of six personnel from the HLS, were put to work while located in Bad Godesberg, but in spite of a plentiful supply of intercepts, they failed to achieve any successes.
Supplies of cryptanalysts in the west 1939 to 1940
When the forward intercept units moved into the field in 1939, no cryptanalysts were available. Oberst Kunibert Randewig, the commander of all units in the west, was able to procure a number of cryptanalysts from intercept stations around Berlin and filled that number out by calling in a number of mathematicians and linguists including translators and language interpreters from the statistical offices of insurance companies. As a result, when the offensive started in April 1940, the intercept stations with the army groups, contrived to have a moderate supply of cryptanalyst personnel.
Reorganisation of Inspectorate 7
The experience of 1940 showed that considerable expansion in the German Army cryptographic service was desirable. This organisation was carried out by Major Mang. His aim was not only to increase the cryptanalysis staff at the centre, but also to provide reserves of cryptography to work in certain key areas. The cryptanalysis section thereupon became independent and was reorganised as Group VI of In 7. Henceforth it was subordinated to the reserve army for personnel and administrative matters, but remained subordinated to Chef HNW of Field Army, just as Horchleitstelle was converted to Group IV. Nevertheless, this curious form of organisation paid, and enabled the cryptographic service to recruit sufficient personnel without serious interference.
In general, the object of OKH/Chi was the organisation of cryptanalysis in the field and in the rear; training of cryptographers and the investigation of the security of German Ciphers
It was also felt that in certain critical regions, an extra cryptanalytic effort should be enforced, to help in the cryptanalysis of War Office cipher W, the British Army's universal high-grade codebook, which carried traffic between Whitehall, commands, armies, corps and later divisions. To this end, the Russian Referat of OKH/Chi was detached to the Horchleitstelle Lötzen, while special cryptanalysis sections for British traffic were detached to the Horch kp in the Middle East under the command of Seebaum and Commander of Signals Troops () in Athens.
Reorganisation of Referat
In 1942, the Mathematical Referat had expanded to such an extent that three sections were created out of it. Sonderführer Steinberg and the mathematicians who had been working with him on the M-209 cipher machine and the strip cipher separated to form the American Referat while two separate sections were formed, one under Oberleutnant Lüders for the investigation of cipher security and security of own processes, and one under Wachtmeister Dr Döring for the investigation of secret teleprinters.
Work on Hollerith Referat
The Hollerith Referat was commanded by Baurat Schenke. The department was equipped with all kinds of German machines and also with all kinds of French Hollerith equipment. This department proved invaluable in the investigations of unclear or difficult cipher techniques. A lot of time and manpower was saved, particularly in the sorting of traffic and the ascertaining of parallelisms and in the calculation of recurring differences. Contrast this with the Cipher Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (abbr. OKW/Chi), the organisation that In 7/VI grew out of. The OKW/Chi cipher bureau did not have a Hollerith machinery department, hence custom mechanical aids had to be built, termed Rapid analytic machinery that were time-consuming to build and costly, and only worked in specifically defined areas, whereas Hollerith machines were generic in nature. The exploitation of Hollerith methods was particularly favoured by Baurat Schulze, who in civilian life was an employee of Hollerith company Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft at Lankwitz in Berlin.
Work on Mathematical Referat
Baurat Dr Hans Pietsch collected together in this section the best available mathematicians. In this section all unbroken intercept traffic from the country desks was investigated for however long it to achieve initial cryptanalysis by purely analytical methods. As soon as a technique for breaking a particular cipher was evolved, they handed back for further work to the specific country desk concerned. In some cases mathematical specialists were attached to a specific desk to work on various procedures.
A further large field of work undertaken at the Mathematical Referat was the investigation of the security of the current German cipher procedures, i.e. security own processes, and in the assessment of discoveries that were always being brought forward. The compromise of the security of a cipher usually resulted from exceeding the days safety margin for transmission, thus creating Depth or by other breaches of standard operating instructions.
In order to provide some check on the use of German ciphers and to provide the Mathematical Referat with the necessary material, the News Reconnaissance Division/Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army () was created in Berlin during November 1941. Two companies of this unit were to act as normal holding companies for In 7/VI, while the third was an intercept company which worked within the field and for the Reserve Army for collecting material to use to build statistical models to determine the efficacy of German ciphers. However, at the end of February 1942, this unit was dissolved owing to personnel shortages. Thus the control of cipher security became once more the responsibility of the Field Army, a responsibility which was never fully undertaken.
As a result of the security investigation of German ciphers and the reporting of new discoveries, Pietsch's Referat naturally began to develop new cipher techniques of its own. In 1942, however, the development of these techniques was handed over to OKW/Chi. However, by the time the organisation had morphed into the OKH/GDNA, it had been specifically banned from intercepting and attacking German traffic as a security precaution.
The main investigation carried out by the Mathematical Referat was a continual enquiry into the security of the main German cipher machines: Enigma machine. The cause of this anxiety lay in the fact that it had been established before the war that Czechoslovakia in collaboration with France had been able to read traffic enciphered by the Enigma machine. This was named as an old model, without plugboard and socket connections, possibly describing a commercial Enigma K. Evidence on this subject was captured during the occupation of Czechoslovakia during 1938. Moreover, in Poland in 1939, the plaintext version of a wireless transmission (abbr. WT) message was found; this message has been transmitted from a German cruiser in Spanish waters during the Spanish Civil War, and had been transmitted using Officers Keys. An exact proof as to whether these successes were due to compromise, or to cryptanalysis, despite detailed investigation, is not known. As this instance of compromise affected the Stecker Enigma, investigations were carried out thoroughly. The Biuro Szyfrów located in the right wing of the Saxon Palace in Warsaw was searched in 1939. In subsequent years, in 1943, and 1944, General Erich Fellgiebel ordered the re-interrogation of two captured Polish cryptanalysts to check this point. This was the so-called Der Fall Wicher (Case Wicher). In 1943–44, the two Polish officers, who were being held in a PoW camp in Hamburg volunteered the information to Pietsch, that the Enigma was being read several years before the war, considering the fact that after so long a period, the information was no longer valuable.
Nevertheless, these investigations revealed that the safety margin of the Enigma cipher machine had to be reduced from 50,000 to 20,000 letters on a day's cipher (an experience which resulted in the daily cipher, which at the beginning of the Russian campaign was very heavily burdened, being split up into two or three portions). As the final result of the investigations described above, the value of carrying out investigations into machine ciphers of enemy nations was recognised and the process undertaken.
Russian Referat
This department had a curious history in that it was detached to Chef NNW Horchleitstelle at Lötzen before the outbreak of hostilities with Russia. Under the leadership of War Administration Inspector () Dettman, and for a time under Professor Peter Novopashenny, this unit achieved considerable initial success until spring 1942. The 5-figure code was acquired by the Germans during the Winter War of 1939–1940, and was still used by the Russians, two years later. An additional copy of this procedure was also captured by Germany. Through the allocation of call signs and of indicator groups, it was possible to establish the entire Russian order of battle and the location of strategic reserves. This was additional to intelligence gained by reading the content of traffic. On 1 April 1942, the Russians introduced a new 5-figure code. The migration from the old to the new cipher was so faulty that within the first week it was possible to establish 2000 groups of the new code. Indeed, it was possible at that time to leave the decoding to the front line NAZ unit cryptanalysts, instead of at the rear at the large centralised Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS) unit. The Russians gradually improved their security, and by spring 1943, altered the indicator group system and split up the code, making it specific to various front sectors. As a result, it was necessary to collect all the 5-figure traffic at Lötzen and to call in the assistance of the Hollerith Referat of OKH/Chi. Only by this method was the necessary depth on a days traffic, achieved. The quantity of traffic read decreased considerably. 2,3 and 4-digit traffic was continuously decoded.
Cryptanalysis work on partisan traffic was carried out by the forward Long Range Signal Intelligence Platoons in the area. Particular successes were achieved in the Smolensk area with the arrival of specialist cryptanalysts and translators.
It was in the summer of 1943 when KONA 6 with Oberleutnant Schubert in charge, was committed to anti-partisan work, that the traffic between Moscow and the partisans was successfully read.
British Referat
This referat commanded by Oberinspektor Zillman was assisted in its early days by the successes of its forward cryptographic teams. These successes, however, were restricted purely to forward techniques.
In spite of continual efforts, Oberinspektor Zillman was unable to break into the British Typex cipher machine. Several British cipher machines were captured during the summer campaign of 1940, but for each of them, the wheels were missing.
The general successes of the British Referat ceased therefore, in the summer of 1942, after an intercept company, commanded by Oberleutnant Seebaum was captured in North Africa. Despite the report to the cryptanalysis section, by a NCO who had escaped, that all cipher material had been destroyed, it had obviously proved possible for Britain to recognise, from other evidence, which British procedures had been read and which had not. In consequence the department was reinforced in order to win back the lost ground, which it was unable to do.
From summer 1942, Germany concentrated on watching military exercise traffic in Britain from KONA 5 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye and the Stationary Intercept Company (Feste) in Bergen. The Feste also watched Swedish traffic, but apart from unimportant police wireless there was very little army traffic to provide enough depth to break the British encryption.
As a result of watching Britain, it was still not possible to gain any assistance in winning back the ground lost in the Mediterranean traffic. It was nevertheless possible to gain some information regarding the training and order of battle for the forthcoming invasion of the continent, although the extent of this information was not known by TICOM interrogators.
Intercept station operations
Soviet cryptanalysis
Organisation of cryptanalytic effort against Soviet Union
Review of Central Office organisation
Prior to 1939, the Intercept Control Station [Ref 5.1] had a section for handling Russian traffic, but little was known of its operation or achievements. Early successes against Russian cryptography were evidenced by cryptanalysis of 2,3, and 4-figure codes with 5-figure codes broken at the start of the war using a Russian 5-figure code book obtained from Finland, that was used in the first year of the war. When HLS was replaced in 1941 with the new agencies: OKH/Chi and HLS [Ref 5.2], the Soviet evaluation section was moved to LNA and the cryptanalysis unit for the Soviet sector remained with Inspectorate 7/VI. In late 1941, on a recommendation by Kunibert Randewig, both cryptanalysis and evaluation sections were moved to Loetzen, East Prussia. This section formed the nucleus for the third central agency, the HLS Ost [Ref 5.5]. From that time, until 1944, the German Army Signals Intelligence activities were sharply divided into non-Russian, which were undertaken at Inspectorate 7/VI and into Russian activities, performed by HLS Ost and the LNA.
In October 1944, the three agencies were amalgamated together into the GdNA, into a central agency.
For a breakdown of Russian signals intelligence activities, Group II under Captain () Gorzolla and Group IV under Major Rudolf Hentze were the principal units with the GdNA which worked on Russian systems [Ref 5.6.1].
Review of Field Office organisation
Cryptanalytic effort against Soviet Union
Introduction
The Soviet Union state used various military cryptographic systems in order to secure its communication. Two organisations prepared and evaluated cipher procedures. This was the NKVD 5th Department and the Red Army's 8th Department of the main intelligence directorate GRU. The soviet military used 2,3,4, and 5-digit codes enciphered with substitution methods or with additive sequences used with the most important 4 and 5 figure codes. The NKVD relied on figure codes enciphered both with substitution and addition methods. Partisan groups also used figure codes enciphered with additive sequences or transposed based on a key word. The diplomatic service used 4-digit codebooks enciphered with One-time pads tables.
2-Digit codes
The Soviet Union 2-digit codes were used by the Russian Army, Air Force and NKVD. In the Army, they were used by Army Groups, Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Regiments; and by small independent special units such as Combat Engineer Brigades, Motor Regiments, and artillery. In the NKVD, they were used on regimental communication close to the front, and from divisional level downwards.
Cryptanalysis of 2-digit systems was done mostly in FAK units at the company level, but was also handled by NAA, the NAAS and at HQ level of the GDNA itself.
It was clear from interrogations that 2-digit codes were not always in use, but were being constantly read. POWS of NAA 11 stated that the last known table was PT-43, and it could not be constructed. For Lieutenant Alexis Dettman, who stated that solving PT codes was:
merely a form of crossword puzzle
Dr. Wilhelm Gerlich of NAAS 1, stated that one or two men at NAAS 1 were able to cope with decipherment of 2-digit messages, especially as the greater part of them were being solved at company level. KONA 1 prisoners stated categorically that the Soviet Union has ceased using 2-digit codes after 1943, however other evidence would seem to have indicated that they were used up until the end of the war by the Red Army and NKVD, particularly by units in active combat, and were still being actively used, even if not appearing.
3-Digit codes
3-digit codes were used by the Red Army, the Air Force and the NKVD. They were first used in 1941–1942, initially mainly by the Air Force and later, more widely, by the Army. Traffic from Army Group down to Battalion had its own 3-digit code. The 3-digit codes were replaced by 3-digit Signal Codes in 1943, which were used by all units. For the NKVD, they were used by the Black Sea Fleet and from division downwards.
The solution of these codes was done mostly in FAK companies, but also handled by the NAA, NAAS and the HLS Ost.
They were first noticed in February, 1941, and used increasingly from May 1941 at the beginning of the Russian campaign (Eastern Front (World War II)). From then until late summer 1942, the Air Force made the most use of the code and each Air Division had its own cipher. In 1942, the 48th Army, the first Army to use it, started by using a 3-digit syballic code.
Interrogations of personnel from Feste 10 and KONA 1: By the time of Stalingrad practically every Army engaged in the battle had its own 3-digit cipher. Dettman and Samsonov do not discuss any 3-digit codes as such, so it must be assumed that they considered these types of codes similar to the 2-digit PT series, and did not warrant discussion as a special sub-type.
Technical description
The first 3-digit ciphers were very simple in form, consisting of several pages, ten at most, and contained alphabetically semi-hatted or completely hatted, the numbers 1 to 0 and punctuation marks. See Fig IV.
Soon afterwards the letters of the alphabet were put in their alphabetic position in the book. See Fig V.
Besides the above types of codes, syllabic codes contained few words but practically all the possible syllables which could be formed out of 2 or 3 letters. All codes of this kind which were broken were alphabetic. See Fig. VII
After some months, the strictly alphabetic nature of the books was given up and the alphabeticity only maintained within the area of a letter. The numbers were at the same time distributed at random over the page. See Fig VI. The book could have 1000 groups, but Oberleutnant Schubert stated that the average number of groups was 300–800, stating: in general small scope, but frequent change. If the codes were smaller than 1000 groups, alternatives were given either to pages or first figures of the lines. The substitutions could be constructed without any recognizable system or they could be made up from a Latin square, with the square usually lasting about one month, although with the Air Force, it sometimes lasted longer. Schubert stated that towards the end of the war, there appeared quite isolated 4 to 7-digit substitution, presumably private systems of the respective cypher departments, but appeared very seldom.
From the beginning of 1943, most 3-digit codes no longer contained single letters but used the initial letter of the words for this purpose. In order to indicate which meaning was to be used two groups were introduced:
736 1) Read the initial letter
737 2) Read the whole word
The 3-digit groups were read in the order of page-line. The recipher of 3-digit ciphers was as varied as in the case of 2-figure ciphers. Each figure was re-enciphered separately. This is to say, for the page numbers, a hatted order of the figures 1 to 0 was substituted. Thus Page 1 became 4, 2 became 6 and so on. Fig. VIII.
3-digit code R3ZC which was mentioned by Corporal A. Faure of NAA 11 and was discovered as part of the Norway codes. It was a code with 10 pages of 100 positions each, 10 x 10 alphabetically arranged. One column of each page, the 8th was empty. Only the 100's and 10's figures of each group were reciphered.
The 3-figure code, it is clear from all interrogations, was mainly used by the Army, but also by the Air Forces. According to a report by Uffz. Karrenberg of Group VI, on regimental networks and for less important messages on the level of assault armies, mainly the 3-digit codes (with a 2-digit Latin square encipherment) was used. KONA 1 personnel stated that every Army Group down to Battalion had its own 3-digit code.
It is curious to note that a good deal of plaintext was inserted into the 3-digit enciphered code as it was transmitted. Gerlich pointed out the advantages of plaintext insertion stating: They often gave words and names not contained in the code. 3-figure traffic was always solved when one encipherment was available 3-figure traffic was only slightly more secure that 2-digit code traffic and was 80% readable. It was known that Air Force codes were often current for much longer periods than those for the Army, and thus be able to find depth. Army 3-digit codes were changed after a big operation and were in use for one week to one month. However, all 3-digit codes were readable and Lt. Col. Mettig stated that from spring 1943 to 1945, 2-digit and 3-digit traffic was read regularly, providing a large amount of tactical intelligence.
The operational 3-digit codes were discontinued in 1943 and replaced by 3-digit Signal Codes, which were different only in that they contained no letters, only words and phrases of importance, and were not alphabetic but had meanings grouped under headings such as attack, defend, enemy movements. Each meaning had two or three, 3-figure groups allotted to it. As in the case of the former code, anything not in the codebook was sent in plaintext. It was assumed that these types of codes were also read as consistently and as fully as the 2-digit and 3-digit codes they superseded.
4-Digit codes
4-digit (abbr. 4/F) codes were used by the Army, Air Force and NKVD. There were used in the Army as General Army Codes, called General Commanders Codes, and on lower operational levels by mobile formations such as Tank and Mechanised Corps, Tank Armies, and Tank Administration and Supply Units. For the NKVD, they were used on Railway and Transport Nets.
Solutions to these codes were handled at FAK, NAA and GDNA level. At FAK level, the companies usually had a 4-figure unit, as well as a 2-digit unit and 3-digit units, in a cryptanalysis department.
Lt. Schubert of KONA 6 stated under interrogation that: The Soviet Army keys are 3 or 4-digit systems. The basis is the same. The construction of 4-digit codes was the same as 3-digit codes, except the book had a possible 10,000 groups instead of 1,000. with the book length being described as either six or seven pages each with a block of consecutive numbers, or with KONA 1 personnel stating that book length being of from 5 to 100 pages long. The latter value seemed more likely. The Air Force Codes usually had about 10,000 groups and the Army 5,000 groups, and each page could have a variant page designation.
Technical description
The actual construction of pages varied in 4-digit code books as much as it did in 3-digit books, in respect of alphabeticity and sequence of numbers. But the methods of enciphering the last two digits were still more varied than those used in 3-figure systems:substitutions by row, digraph substitution (in comparison to single-letter substitution in the case of 3-digit codes), combinations of these two, abbreviated figures in the substitution, and others. Uffz. Corporal Karrenberg, who was a GDNA cryptographer, and was a specialist on Russian Baudot stated, while under interrogation, in his discussion of the Russian Cryptanalysis course given for field training, that 3-digit or 4-digit could also be reciphered on an adder. For this purpose a text chosen at random is enciphered (likewise by the code) and the code text added to or subtracted from (non carrying). There was no other indication in interrogations that this method was met in actual practice. The general method seem to have been variant page designations for the book (2-figures) and encipherment of the last 2-digits by various means, including 2-digit Latin square.
From May 1942, the Air Force began to use 4-digit codes in many different forms, but often of the simplest construction. In the middle of 1943, many mobile formations, Tank and Mechanised Corps, Tank Armies and Administration, and Supply units also started using these 4-digit codes. They were also used by the Railway and Transport Nets.
Dettmann and Samsonov described the first general army and air force code, which was a 4-figure with 4,600 groups, enciphered by digraphic substitution. The successor codes were the names OKK5 to OKK8 which were General Commanders Codes that rapidly replaced one another from 1939 to 1941. OKK 5 was captured in the Winter War, and OKK 6, 7, 8 later.
Dettmann and Samsonov stated:
All these systems, however, recovered by cryptanalysis before their capture and were made completely and currently readable.
Ltn. Harry Loeffler of Feste 10 stated that a:
General army 4-digit cipher was last observed in use in Tajikistan (North Persia) in the winter of 1941–42. It had 50 pages, each designated by two alternative Bigrams and 100 lines to each page.
There was no indication in interrogations that 4-digit codes were either less or more frequently employed. In 1944, 4-digit Signal Codes, of the same form as the 3-digit Signal Codes, appeared, and were used by army groups. and probably superseded in great part, if not wholly, the 4-digit codes discussed above.
Four-digit codes were changed less frequently than other codes but Dr Wilhelm Gerlich's of NAAS 1 of KONA 1 stated, the change in encipherment was not quick enough to make decipherment impossible [by Germany]. Certainly the 4-digit codes gave Germany cryptanalysts a certain amount of trouble, as a large amount of material was absolutely necessary and the majority of unsolved 4-digit codes and ciphers were abandoned because of an insufficient number of messages.
Captain Holetzlo, a member of LN Regiment 353, the Luftwaffe signals regiment intercepting Russian Air Force traffic, speaking mainly about 4/F air force codes (ground/ground) stated that they were only 60% readable. Corporal Heudorf of NAA 8 of KONA 2 stated that later 4/F traffic provided some difficulty in cryptanalysis, but an Engineer unit's in March and April 1945 was being read concurrently.
In the interrogations of KONA 1 members, the following 4/F codes were listed as solved:
4-digit code of VI Guards Mech. Corps of 1st Ukrainian Front from January 1945 to end of war.
4-digit code of 152 Tank Brigade of 60th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
4-digit code of Tank Supply and Administration Authorities of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
4-digit code of the 76th Regional Air Base (Russian 76 RAB).
4-digit code of Supply Units of 13th Army of 1st Ukrainian Front.
4-digit code of 3rd Guards Tank Army.
Horst Schubert stated:
We broke Army 3 and 4-digit re-enciphered books. These were enciphered on a conversion table. Early in the war we read most of this traffic, but by the end only 40% to 50%.
5-Digit codes
5-digit codes were used by the Army, Air Force and NKVD. In the Army, they were used by the People's Commissariat for Defence (), Army Groups, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Brigades. In the Air Force, they were used by Air Armies, Air Corps, Air Divisions, Regional Air Bases, Anti-Aircraft Corps and Divisions and Anti-Aircraft units. They contained strategic, tactical, personnel and supply matters, and political reports and directives.
With the exception of a short period in 1943, when KONA 1 did independent 5-digit cryptanalysis, solution of 5-digit codes was handled exclusively by the GDNA.
In discussing the achievements of the OKH/Chi, Lt. Col. Mettig, stated glibly:
The breaking of the Russian 5-digit recyphered code...was the most outstanding cryptanalytic achievement of In 7/VI.
The Soviet 5-digit code was broken chiefly by War Administration Inspector () Lieutenant Alexis Dettman. When rating the relative importance of cryptographic including cryptanalysis achievements contributing to total intelligence, Mettig was most impressed by the continuous breaking of the Russian 5-digit code despite the difficulties that were experienced after spring-summer 1943. However Mettig could have been stressing organisational changes carried out to facilitate the breaking of codes rather than actual cryptographic achievements. Dr Otto Buggisch, also of OKH/Chi stated that Mettig had few fundamental ideas of cryptanalysis.
Certainly other evidence exists that points conclusively and without doubt to an almost complete failure on the part of the German cryptanalysts to make any progress with the solution of the 5-digit code. Corporal () A. Althans of the KONA 1 stated that cryptanalysis of 5-digit codes was only possible with the following conditions:
There was a number of messages, at least three, which had the same additive applied.
The 5-digit code had been captured.
Dettmann and Samsonov stated that codes 011-A, 023-A, O45-A, 062-A and 091-A used successively from the beginning of World War II to the end, did prove difficult from a pure cryptanalytic solution. They stated:
It is interesting to point out that during the course of the war all the newly appearing versions of each cipher were captured through fortunate circumstances and always so soon that the originals were almost always in the hands of the cryptanalysts at the instance of their being put into use by the Soviets. Of course, this 'contentious capture' was an aid in solution, under such circumstances because of the One-time pad encipherment. The individual tables offer almost complete security against breaking.
In the reports of personnel from NAA 11, a Captain Schmidt stated that:
With regard to Russian [Soviet] traffic, the Abteilung [Battalion] did everything up to and including 4-digit. 5-digit they considered insoluble and forward these to the GdNA.
One Corporal Karrenberg, of GdNA, while under interrogation discussed 5-letter and 5-digit codes used for operational orders, stated:
These were so-called Blocknot codes, which were only used once and were therefore unbreakable.
Blocknots were random sequences of numbers contained in a book and organised by numbered rows and columns and were used as additives in recyphering and were considered as a type of One-time pad. The GdNA mathematician Johannes Marquart conducted research on Blocknots and was unable to determine how they were generated. Corporal Karrenberg stated flatly:
5-figure and 5-digit messages were not touched at all. In general very little work was done on decipherment of 5-group messages, although these contained the most important operation reports. They were only used to identify units and were only read if code books happened to have been captured.
In 1943, KONA 1, for a period, undertook 5-digit cryptanalysis independently of GdNA, but the general practice was for all units to forward 5-digit traffic directly to Berlin to GdNA for possible cryptanalysis and evaluation. Karrenberg stated:
even at the GdNA HQ, very little attention was give to 5-digit messages and very little enthusiasm displayed in working on it. Only the preambles were used to identify units, from Blocknots and indicator groups.
Finally Lt. Schubert, when questioned on possible success on 5-digit codes replied:
In the Finnish campaign the book was captured and the Russians used the one-time pads over again. Because of this we had considerable success. Recently the Russians used the [one time] pads correctly and only very few messages were read, these through re-encodements.
Technical description
This small measure of success was obviously due to the fulfilment of the two conditions set forth by Corporal Althans for successful cryptanalysis.
Corporal Althans stated that successful cryptanalysis is possible only if:
There are a number of messages, at least three, which have had the same additive applied.
The 5-figure code was captured.
Cryptanalysis starts from the mathematical rule that the difference between two code groups remains constant if both have the same additive row applied to them. For example:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Example calculation for table of differences
|-
|
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Code group
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Additive
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Cipher group
|-
|
| 39214
| 20186
| 59390
|-
|
| 98315
| 20186
| 18491
|-
| Difference
| 41909
|
| 41909
|}
The most important cryptanalytic aid was therefore the catalogue of differences, a numerically arranged table of the differences between the most frequently used code groups.
Directly the code, which changed approximately semiannually, was captured, about 1000 frequently used clear groups (positionen) were written out by the Gen. d. N.A., arranged and serially numbered according to frequency, and then each subtracted from the other, non-carrying, by Hollerith (Herman Hollerith) machines and entries made on the catalogue as follows:
"41909 17-32" which means:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Example of a differences table entry
|-
| Number 17
| u
| 9214
|-
| Number 32
| TUPE
| 98315
|-
| Difference
|
| 41909
|}
In 1943 KONA 1 for a period undertook 5-figure cryptanalysis independently of GdNA. For this purpose a difference catalogue of 200 clear groups (which equals 19900 differences) was compiled by hand. A calculation aid, in the form of a wooden frame with five paper belted wheels I to V, where one wheel represented each digit of the 5-figure group, was used. The apparatus also served as an aid in actual decoding, when a great deal of non-carrying addition or subtraction had to be done. Note: little information is available from TICOM as to how this device functioned.
The Finnish predecessor to the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency, during the early period of World War II had captured and turned over to the Germans, a Russian 5-figure book which was used continually until the Winter War. An additional copy had been captured by the Germans and though the Russians introduced a new 5-figure code on 1 April 1942, the changeover was faulty, and it was possible to establish 2000 groups of the new code within a week. Indeed, it was possible at this time to leave the decoding of this procedure to the forward KONA units. The Russians gradually improved their security, however, and in the spring of 1943, altered the indicator group system and split up the code into various front sectors. As it result it was necessary to collect all the 5-figure at Giżycko (Lotzen) intercept station and to use the Hollerith department of the In 7/VI. Only thus could have the necessary depth on a day's traffic be achieved. But it was clear that after this time, there was practically no success in 5-figure code solutions, although the Germans were able to establish the nature of the book and the type of encipherment:
The 5-figure code books contained about 25,000 out of a possible 100,000 groups, the pages being numbered 000 to 999 with a hundred lines on each page. The Germans never broke a book and any examples they had were captures. The books were alphabetic at first but then became "semi-hatted", i.e. all groups with the same initial letter were grouped together but not alphabetically, nor were the initial letters alphabetic with reference to one another.
Alphabetic at first, the 5-digit codebooks later became partially alphabetic. They contained:
Single letters
Words
Phrases
Two-figure numbers
Types of units
Specific units of the Red Army
Full stops and commas on every page
Add designations of types, such as Types of Tanks, ammunition, wireless stations (W/T), transport etc.
The encipherment was effected by applying additives taken from enciphering pads known as Blocknots, that were a variable of sheets on which 50–100 5-figure groups appeared. The second condition for successful cryptanalytic success established by Corporal Althans was fulfilled: Depth was established.
Address codes
Soviet Address Codes (2-digit, 3-digit, 4-digit) were used by the Army for Army Groups, Armies and Independent Corps. They were used more widely by the Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defense.
Solution of address codes was considered somewhat special to judge the statements in KONA 1 interrogations describing cryptanalytic operations of the various units:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Unit numbers by signal organisation
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Unit Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Comment
|-
| In the FAK
| 15 to 20 people were adequate for company cryptanalysis. Special procedures such as Signal Codes (3-figure and 4-figure) and word codes and address codes (3-digit) were studied by chosen cryptanalysts. The strength of the various sections was modified to cope with developments on the Russian side: namely the shifting of emphasis from 2-digit to 3-digit and then to 4-digit traffic. Special procedures, such as Signal Codes (3-digit and 4-digit), Word Codes and Address Codes (3-digits), were studied in the appropriate section by specially chosen cryptanalysts, for the most, also sometimes by the chief cryptanalyst. The average working time to recover a new code varied a great deal and depended on the difficulty of the procedure.
|-
| In the NAAS
| Section 4 of the NAAS, concerned with new developments in cipher design did the real cryptanalysis. It normally concentrated on difficult systems which the companies had neither the time nor manpower to deal with adequately. It consisted mainly of mathematicians and worked on ~ inter alia, addresses, specifically 2-F, 3-F and 4-F address codes.
|}
Although mention was in the KONA 1 interrogations of 2-digit address material, nothing was recorded in the interrogations on this subject except one statement in the final interrogation of NAA 11 personnel:
Bigrams and Trigrams in Addresses. Blome knew of the two used separately, but could not recall any case of the two in conjunction. He suggested that this might accompany something he had seen, namely 3 Z code mixed with 2Z traffic.
There was no record of extent or success of solution with regard to 2-F address codes. Likewise, there was no description of 4-F (figure, or digit, both the same) address codes nor any statement regarding the extent or success of solution.
Oberleutnant Schubert of KONA 6, stated that towards the close of hostilities, the Soviets (Russians) were using 3-F codes for addresses. He stated:
In this code the clear position remained unchanged for periods, but the ciphers were changed daily. These ciphers were in some way related to the call signs.
The only description of 3-F address codes was given in the KONA 1 reports.
Technical description
3-Figure (3-Digit, or 3-F) Address codes were used in conjunction with 5-Digit messages to enable wireless stations to ensure that messages arrived at their proper destination. Their construction was similar to that of the PT-39 or PT-42 codes, described above, but they contained only figures, unit designations, authorities, words such as for or from. See Fig X.
Example of an address:
A code of this type was first used at the beginning of 1944 on the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian and the 1st White Russian Fronts for communications between their Army Groups and their respective Armies and independent Corps. In the summer of 1944 armies began to use similar codes with their subordinates units and latterly the use of such codes increased still further.
The solution to these codes, given a fair amount of material, was generally easy. They were often simpler than the example given in Fig. X and sometimes appeared in the form of straightforward lists with each meaning numbered consecutively of 100 pages instead of 10. See Fig XI.
The same variations in construction occur as with three-figure.
Alphabetic with the letters of the alphabet grouped at the end of the Code.
Each letter of the alphabet placed before the part devoted to words beginning with that letter.
Semi-hatted, i.e. with all the words beginning with one letter grouped together but the groups in random order.
Letters of the alphabet with alternatives.
Syllabic Codes (with words distributed over the code).
Letters of the alphabet with alternatives.
Read the initial letter.
Read the word.
With the two groups directly above appearing several times, often on each page.
Codes had anything from 5 to 100 pages. The Air Force Codes usually had about 10,000 groups and the Army 5000 or fewer. According to members of KONA 1, the solution of these codes given a fair amount of material, was generally easy. Members of the NAA 11 stated the following:
Addresses to personal names rather than titles were common in all Russian traffic and this suggested the use of initials. The vagueness of this answer surprised the interrogator who asked if the addresses, being enciphered on the PT table, were not read currently. The answer was that unless the same address was used frequently and some outside hint was given they were unusually unable to read the address. They supposed it used values which had special local meanings added to the table.
Miscellaneous codes
Most of the statements given here are taken from the interrogations of members of KONA 1. It is not the complete story, as the POW's themselves were aware:
The examples described are only those ciphers whose basic construction was established. There were many types of cipher which were only partially broken (solved) and whose basic form could not be established, these are not mentioned.. The number of Russian ciphers of all types that were broken was about 3000.
4-letter codes
Two forms of four-letter codes first appeared in practice traffic between Army Groups and Armies and Independent Corps of the 1st Ukrainian Front in November 1944:
Revolving Stencil
This consisted of a sheet of paper ruled off into 8 x 8 squares. On top was placed another sheet in which 16 holes were cut of corresponding size to the squares on the first sheet. These holes were so cut that if the sheet is turned through 90° round the centre point in the four possible positions and a letter written on the bottom sheet through each hole in each position, all 64 squares on the bottom sheet would be filled. The text of the message to be enciphered was written in the holes horizontally with the stencil in the first then in the second, third and fourth positions The cipher text was then read off horizontally and sent in four letter groups. If a message was longer that 64 letters the process was repeated as many times as necessary. The revolving stencil was changed from time to time.
Transposition
This cipher is a simple transposition cipher, the key given by a Keyword and the text being written in vertically according to the key and either upwards or downwards according to accompanying instructions. The cipher text was then read off horizontally and sent in 4 or 5-letter groups. See Fig. XVI
The contents of messages sent in both the above types of cipher were usually about technical signal matters though in later stages units and positions were named.
Word-Code
From the middle of 1944, a word code was used in the area of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The book consisted of two halves, each designated by a word such as SEVER ZAPAD literally meaning North West. Clear groups such as numbers, units, offices, designations such as Tank, Guards, Mechanised, were grouped in two columns. Each half of the code identified was only used by the Army and contained strategic and tactical reports and the names of the units. They were small in size and contained only essential groups.
The first half of the code is used with column 1 and the second half with column 2. The order of the halves can be changed and indicated by the indicating word.
If the cleargroup consists of more than one word such as In the former sector = Dolvnost and the wanted word is former, this can be indicated by saying the second word of DOLVNOST. See Fig XVII.
Example:
{|
|-
| MOLIĀ
| POZDNO
| REMONT
| KTO
| PAKET
|-
| 1a
| 3
| Guards
| Tank
| Army
|}
The codes identified were only used by the Army and contained strategic and tactical reports and the names of units. They were small in size and contained only essential groups. Anything that could not be enciphered was sent in plaintext or in the clear. Coordinates also appeared in messages.
Periodic and Columnar Substitutions
Corporal Karrenberg stated in discussing the German Army Cryptography Course stated: "These rarely appear in Russian cipher systems... Periodic and columnar substitutions concluded the sections on substitutions systems in the course. Not so much time was spent on them as they are rarely encountered in practice."
Coordinate systems
These were very varied. Armies made up their own systems and arbitrary reference points and grids were used.
Machine Ciphers
The handling of Teleprinter traffic was processed exclusively at GdNA. Lt. Schubert, whose position at the GdNA chi-stelle was Director of Main unit East, (), stated that teleprinter traffic was worked on in the machine section, specifically Group IV, whose director was Rudolf Hentze. Lt. Schubert thought that messages in Depth had been read, but was uncertain whether the machine had been recovered. Schubert himself never worked on cipher machines, but knew that the Soviet (Russians) had a machine, already in use at the beginning of the war, but not on military traffic.
Corporal Karrenberg spoke of the Bandwurm, the so-called Russian FISH, who defined it as Russian Baudot letter strip, that should not be confused with Soviet 5-F traffic also carried on Baudot lines. Karrenberg believed the first traffic was intercepted in 1940 in Warsaw, and as far as he believed there was no interest taken in it. The first actual knowledge of the traffic, with the same external features,e.g. chat, indicators, was in summer 1943, when the first real interest was taken in it. Dr Pietsch and Döring conducted the initial research. The German intelligence agencies did not capture any of the apparatus used, but felt that it consisted of two parts:
A Baudot teleprinter.
A cipher attachment consisting of five small wheels driven by one large wheel.
Depths were frequent, but the Germans did not seem to make any attempt to reconstruct the wheel patterns. The system was used by the Red Army and the Air Force and to a lesser extent the NKVD.
Otto Buggisch of the In 7/VI later GdNA and the OKW/Chi went into somewhat more historical detail and stated that:
In 1943, Buggisch heard that the Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry, Hermann Göring's Research Bureau, had success on a Russian teletype machine and had recreated the action. It was a machine with a very long cycle, not being prime but the product of several small cycles, like the S42. Buggisch did not know the cycles of the individual wheels or any other details. He found this out from Döring, who was undertaking research on the T52. Liaison with the FA was considered bad anyway. Mettig was particularly opposed to the SS. Nothing came of the FA work. Buggisch stated in interrogation that the cycle of one wheel was 37, varying from 30–80.
Late in 1943, early 1944, OKH began to intercept non-morse 5-impulse traffic, named Hughes by Buggisch. Group IV worked on it, at the end of 1943, resulting in a Kompromise and a depth of eight messages with the same settings was created. The section was able to recover 1400 letters of pure key, and to determine the traffic was derived from a 5-figure code, with regular station chat enciphered at the same time on the machine. Corporal Karrenberg stated that part of the depth was created within the same long message, so that the machine had a cycle, at least in this one case of about 1450 letters. The actual number was thought to be very significant by the Germans, as it was prime, so could not be the product of smaller cycles in any way they could image. Germany postulated a tape machine like the T43, or a machine in which the motions of the wheels influenced each other, 1 and 2 affecting 3, 3 affecting 5, etc. as in the T52 (which was known to be insecure). They were not able to prove any theories they had. Germany had chronic personnel problems, and the OKH/GdNA was no exception, being short of mathematicians. Buggisch believed there would be a solution.
After this experience, they devised Hollerith machinery to locate depths, but in fact only found three or four more cases and none of these gave additional cycle evidence or even furnished another key.
Buggisch thought the traffic slumped, left the unit in June 1944, and the LNA stepped in to improve the solution, to improve reception as they believed the traffic was still present, which it was not. Buggisch stated in passing that their own security idea on the subject of wheel machines of this sort was that the cycle should not be a product of small periods (as in Hagelin cipher machines), even if this was long. Mutual influence of wheels should be used to avoid this, but at the same time care must be taken that too short a period was not created in the process. This in fact had apparently been done by the Soviets, but the fact that it was not repeated suggested to him that they might have seen the weakness and corrected it.
Buggisch stressed one fact which had surprised him, that they never had information about either of these machines, from POW's or agent sources. He assumed that the one that the FA broke was not the same because of the difference of cycles.
The number of links, according to Corporal Karrenberg, varied according to the number of armies, with the maximum of eight. One end of the link was Moscow, the other mobile. After 1944, no work was done on the traffic except on the spot. No vital clues to the system were given away by the Soviets, though their security precautions were not considered effective.
NKVD codes
NKVD Codes were simple mono-alphabetic Substitution cipher 2-figure, 3-figure, 4-figure, 5-figure and 5-letter types. They were used without any apparent reason on two large networks:
The networks of the NKVD Central Authorities, that were divided into those of Security Troops, Frontier Troops, and Railway Troops and Convoy Troops.
The network of NKVD Formation, communication between units attached to Army Front Staffs.
4-figure and 5-figure codes were used on the front line: there was a 4-figure code, e.g. used by the military police, and a general 4-figure code used on Staff-Regiment-Battalion links.
Solution of NKVD codes was handled by the NAAS and the GdNA. In interrogation:
The traffic of the NKVD formed a special group of Russian wireless traffic. The distinction applied equally to the manner of conducting traffic and to the message themselves.
The German Army cryptanalysts reflected this Russian distinction in their own attacks on NKVD systems, allocating the work, again in their own attacks on NKVD systems, to levels of operation determined by difficulty of solution. Lt Ed. Wöllner of KONA 1, stated that:
NKVD traffic was always covered, but only by FAK companies. Evaluation and cryptanalysis were done by NAAS.
On the same subject Lt. Löffler of Feste 10 stated that
all NKVD signals originated in the regiments area were worked on in the NAAS, others were sent to the LNA.
But in neither case was there specified what type of NKVD traffic was worked on, and what type was passed to higher echelons. Apparently the distinction corresponded to that observed in the case of actual army traffic. All lower-level operational codes, up to 4-figure codes, could be handled by the NAAS. The 5-figure codes were not dealt with by the KONA, but handled by 40 to 50 men in the LNA, [Ref 5.4] at Zeppelin bunker at Zossen. Löffler thought that a good deal of success was obtained in the case of Far Eastern Traffic. An additive was used for the recipher. Dettman and Samsonov substantiated this point, in their discussion of the German army cryptanalytic effort:
All the five-place message material from the Army or the Airforce, as well as the NKVD messages, was submitted for the exclusive processing of the GdNA
They also gave full descriptions of NKVD systems. There was no discrepancy between the facts in their report and the facts given by Lt. Löffler. The details of description were scattered throughout the report according to types of encipherment. They mentioned the following:
Mono-alphabetic substitution systems common to all NKVD organisations.
Conversion systems: substitution and additive:
1936: 4-figure code: 2500 values, used in district.
By 1939: three 4-figure conversion systems with codebooks of up to 5000 values, enciphered by digraphic substitution or conversion table.
1939: first general NKVD 4-figure code, with 10000 book positions enciphered first by single digit substitution, later by additive. At time of capitulation, three 4-figure systems (ZERNO, NEVA, VIZA, see infra) used respectively by:
NKVD Troops.
NKVD Border defense troops.
NKVD Security troops.
(200 messages were read daily in all three)
5 figure Railway Troops code, which used 2500 groups with digraphic substitution encipherment. A few 3-figure small codes (read currently) existed, that used letter transposition. These were never found in NKVD traffic number series.
1940: 4-figure single letter conversion encipherment (1941–1942): 4-figure, enciphered by text key, which was letters equalling numbers.
1942: 4-figure enciphered by military technical manual (used by Interior troops) until end of 1944 with encipherment combining single digit conversion and Gama Tables (no description of these is given).
NKVD codes technical description
NKVD traffic was always covered, but only by Long Range Signals companies, with evaluation and cryptanalysis done by the NAAS units.
When W/T traffic was restricted during radio silences, NKVD traffic was often the most important source for Radio Intelligence. At such times, it was more completely covered. When the Army W/T was in full swing, coverage of NKVD was correspondingly reduced. On an average day, 6–12 receivers were employed exclusively on NKVD cover.
In general the following nets were covered:
Networks of Central Authority. The covered the Chief NKVD authority in Moscow with the Front HQ's. The NKVD W/T radio intelligence picture, gave indications of groups, or the insertion of new Fronts. E.g. the appearance of a new W/T station communication with the 1st Ukrainian Front and 2nd Ukrainian Front showed that the 4th Ukrainian Front had been inserted between the 1st and 2nd Fronts. In addition, the new Front HQ could be located by Direction finding (abbr D/F).
The Central Authority Networks were subdivided into;
Central Authority of the Security Troops.
Central Authority of the Frontier Troops.
Central Authority of the Security Troops (Divisions and Brigades of the Back Area).
Central Authority of the Railway Troops.
Networks of Formation. This covered the Front staffs with the Grenztruppen Regiments. Communication between commanders of the security troops at the front and their regiments, was monitored. D/Fing of the Regiments revealed the approximate extent of the Front. D/F of the Chief of Security Troops with the Front HQ. Finding the High Command indicated the approximate location of the Front HQ. Besides, when a forward echelon of the Chief of Security with the Front HQ appeared, it was possible to deduce that the Front HQ would move. This, on the basis of NKVD traffic alone.
Regiments to Battalions. Most of the messages could be read, they mentioned Army units by name, e.g.;
Before the attack from the NEISSE sector (1st Ukrainian Front), a 2nd Army and 3rd and 4th Field Replacement Rifle Regiments were mentioned by III Bn.of the 83rd Grenztruppen Regiment, operating in the Görlitz area. The conclusion drawn was that the 2nd Polish Army had been newly brought up to the NEISSE sector.
Lines of advance and boundaries of battalions were mentioned. Battalion boundaries often proved to be Army boundaries.
Traffic of rear NKVD troops and of the Signals Regiment were of no interest, and were not covered by KONA 1.
A constant watch was kept on the 1st network, Central Authority of the Security Troops. It consisted of the communications between the Central NKVD Authority in Moscow and the commanders of those troops in Army Groups, directing staffs North and South, the less interesting GHQ Signals Regiments. These messages were not readable.
Apart from the characteristics already noted they were also to be recognised by their use of Call-signs which were made up from a square. The Russian wireless station numbers were:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Wireless radio stations
|-
! colspan="2" style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | Station numbers
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" | W/T Radio station name
|-
|
| 08-12
| Central Authority Moscow
|-
| 23
| 08-12
| Central 3rd White Russian Front
|-
| 24
| 08-12
| Central 2nd Baltic Front
|-
| 25
| 08-12
| Central 1st White Russian Front
|-
| 26
| 08-12
| Central 1st Ukraine Front
|-
| 27
| 08-12
| Central 3rd Ukraine Front
|-
| 28
|
| Higher directing staff in Lodz
|-
| 29
|
| Front staff 4th Ukrainian Front
|-
| 49–65
| 1-17
| Independent GHQ. Signals Regiments
|-
| 81
|
| Directing staff north (Minsk)
|-
| 84
|
| Front staff 2nd Ukrainian Front
|-
| 85
|
| Directing staff south
|-
| 87
|
| Higher directing staff, area east of Stanislaw
|-
| 60
|
| Unidentified
|}
The method of working was controlled () circle working. The Kreise were known by the number of the controlling station. They were:
Kreis VIII: Station 8 with 21, 23, 23 Night Frequency on 3170/3380 kcs
Kreis IX: Station 9 with 20,21,25,28 Night Freq. on 3850/4230 kcs.
Kreis XI: Station 11 with 26,29,87 Night Freq. on 4580/4940 Day Freq. 7400/8670 kcs.
Kreis XII: Station 12 with 27,84 Night Freq. on 4580/4940 kcs.
Kreiss LXXXI: Station 81 with 20,21,22,23,24,25,28,49,50,55,57,59,60,61,63,65 Night Freq. 2850/2975 kcs. Day Freq. 4080/4480 kcs.
Kreiss LXXXV: Station 85 with 26,27,29,51,52,53,54,56,58,62,64,80.84,87 Night Freq. 2700/3050 kcs. Day Freq. 3950/4400 kcs.
Call signs were mostly pronounceable. The Front Staff networks usually changed their call-signs daily, the Regiment networks at regular intervals of several days, in many cases of weeks. Frequencies used lay mainly between 2400 & 3600 kcs. It should be mentioned that 5-figure NKVD messages had been picked up in nets identified as belonging to the Army or the Air Force, such messages contained SMERSH in the
preamble. Such messages were originated by units of the Red Army counter-intelligence units.
Lt. Schubert spoke of two 5-figure codes, the SMERSH organisation code, used with an individual subtractor, and the Railways Troop codes, that was a 4-figure code, enciphered with substitutions tables, the 5th digit representing the quadrant on the page in which the group appeared. Schubert was more familiar with the 4-figure NKVD codes, which were apparently more exploitable than the 5-F codes.
The Security Troops Codes were of two types. One was used forward of regiment, when a regiment was used in approximately an Army Group Sector, i.e., it is a cipher, therefore, used forward of Army Group. This particular code ran for comparatively long periods, at least 1.5 years. The code, a Substitution cipher, was alphabetical and contained 100 pages, with 25 or 50 groups per page, and enciphered by means of an enciphered indicator, which provided for page and position substitution, the result of which was again enciphered by a substitution table. These substitution tables were also valid for a longer time and varied with the network. The additives on the page did not change, only the substitution table.
The second type, a code used rearwards of regiment, was enciphered by a figure subtractor originally from tables (up to September 1944). The same tables could appear on different networks, and since the subtractor was used very frequently, it was not uncommon for 20 messages to have the same subtractor In October 1945, 2 subtractors were used, taken from different tables, and the indicators for the 2nd subtractor were enciphered with the first one. In spite of the potential difficulties involved in this method on encipherment, the system was solved by 15 February 1945, though mainly because of bad Russian usage of the system.
The Frontier Troops Code was exactly like the Security Code rearwards of regiment, with a different basic book, at least in traffic out of Saint Petersburg (Leningrad) Lt Schubert made a statement on the Railways and Convoy Troops code quotes above.
The 4-F NKVD codes exploited by KONA 1 were used by front line units, i.e. regiments and battalions, mainly employed by the Soviet Military Police. From the period of 1933 to 1942, code R4ZC4 Russian 4-Figure, Code 4/ was in use. It consisted of a 100-page alphabetic book each with a hundred lines. It was broken by Germany in 1940. Only one code book, known to Germany as R4ZC 1800 and to the Russians as KODOWA TABLICA ZERNO was used by the NKVD from October 1943 until the end of 1944.
NKVD R4 Z C 1800 Code
The R4 Z C 1800 code, had since October 1943 had 50 pages, each consisting of 50 lines and totalling 2,500 clear groups, alphabetically arranged. Each page is shifted by means of Cipher antenna () and the bigrams (ab and cd) are then replaced by others according to a substitution table.
The recipher consists of two elements:
Shifting by means of Chiffranten enciphering: Any figure, chosen from Row A (sample code in Annexe 1), will indicate on any page, in Row B below, the figure must be added to that standing beside the clear group (and subtracted when deciphering). The chiffrant consisted of the figures 0 to 9 in random order printed at the top of the page, a different order being used for each page. The third figure of the 4-figure indicator group gave the number of the chiffrant to be used, i.e., if 5 was the 3rd figure of the indicator group, the fifth figure of the chiffrant reading from left to right would be the one used for each page. This number was then added to the numbers of the lines on the page before they were reciphered by means of the bigram table, i.e. if the number was 6 then line 00 would become 06 and line 24 would become line 05.
Substitution of bigrams: For the first and second halves of the 4-figure group (elements ab and cd) there are substitution tables, each of which contains 100 bigrams (each bigram from 01 to 50 occurs twice). There are 10 such tables (numbered for the most part from 0 to 9). Two different bigram substitution tables were used for recyphering the big ram representing the page and that representing the line. 10 such tables were in use concurrently for the recipher of both page and line. Each table was 10 x 10 so that each bigram could be reciphered in two different ways and each table was designated by one of the figures from 0 to 9. The figure designating the table used for the line was put in the second place of the indicator group and that designating the table used for the page in the fourth place. The first place was a dummy. A series of substitution tables was current for a period of from 2 to 6 months.
The reciphering is indicated by a 4-figure group (indicator) which appears at a definite position in the message and contains;
Number of the clear-group table (indicated with two digits).
Chiffrant.
Number of the pagination table.
Example:
Indicator 0151
Chigruppe 2406
Decipherment (according to the tables below)
Element ab (=24) yields 20 according to the pagination table. The clear-group therefore is on page 20. Element cd yields 02 according to the clear-group table. From this the chiffrant is subtracted, in this case 1 (the number of page 20 under the fixed figure 5). Thus the clear group 2001, which represents Komandirowatj is derived.
The indicator group was inserted en clair in one of the first ten groups of the message according to instructions. The penultimate group consisted of the date and length of the message and the last group the Chi number.
R4ZC4 was used from 1933, solved in 1940 and in use until 1942. There were 100 pages each with 100 clear groups arranged alphabetically. Recipherment was by means of 31 substitution tables.
NKVD Other codes
Though the emphasis by the POW's being interrogated by TICOM was on 4-figure NKVD codes, it should be pointed out that a great variety of encipherments were worked on, though not all of them read. Corporal Karrenberg, gave the following breakdown of nets and types of codes used:
Administration networks: usually sent 5-figure messages and less often, 4-figure and 5-letter messages.
Frontier networks: used 4 and 5-figure codes: on regimental networks, also 2-figure systems.
Black Sea Fleet: used 3-figure and 5-figure codes networks from divisional level downward: used 2-figure and 3-figure, plain language and figure messages with plain language.
Corporal Exeter of NAA 11 stated that he worked on 2-figure NKVD codes. Traffic of an NKVD net on the White Sea Front, controlled from the NKVD HQ at Archangel was worked on with some success.
NKVD Conclusions
In general, certain elements seemed to be constant in all NKVD codes:
Simply that NKVD messages were enciphered on the same system.
NKVD messages were always arranged alphabetically.
NKVD messages whether 5-letter or 4-figure or 5-figure, had the date in the penultimate group.
Agent codes
Agents' Codes included codes used by agents, guerillas and scouts () All systems were used from substitutions, double transpositions, grilles and subtractors to one-time pads (tape based). Solving agents' traffic was always done centrally in Berlin.
The solving of agent, guerilla and scout traffic was the responsibility of Referat IIIc of Group IV. Solving the cipher depended mainly on captured material and there was generally enough material to accomplish solutions. Some agent traffic was one-time tape and therefore unbreakable. By and large the group did not place much value on agent traffic and neglected it.
It should be pointed out that Russian agent systems were not handled exclusively by OKH/GdNA/IV/3c, but were also handled by:
Section III of the Armed Forces Signal Communication Group, Radio Defense Corps, or more accurately the AgWBNV, Radio Communication Group 3 (), (AgWNV/FU III) who were responsible for locating, eliminating, or neutralizing all enemy agents' radio activities. The unit was subordinated to Generalleutnant Fritz Thiele. Preliminary reading, especially when the code was captured, or the system recognised, was done at WNV/FU/III. For more difficult cryptanalysis, traffic was turned over to OKH/Chi and worked on in Referat Vauck, named and managed by Dr. Wilhelm Vauck.
Some agents traffic was picked up independently of FU III, by the regular police, the Ordnungspolizei, known colloquially as the Orpo, who sent their traffic to Kurt Sauerbier at the Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry (FA), Principle Department IV, Referat 9c. There existed an entirely independent relationship between the Orpo and the Sauerbier and Sauerbier senior officer. Sauerbier's direct senior officer in the FA was Specialist Wenzer, who was an expert in Agents' ciphers and was sent from FU III to the FA to assist Lt. Schubert, of the OKH/GDNA, to assist on Polish Resistance Movement Traffic, in January 1944.
There was, consequently, a certain duplication of effort and a certain amount of confusion as a result of this arrangement. There were also conflicting opinions of the opinions of the successes achieved. Schubert reported that Russian agents''' systems were tried by Dr Vauck, who stated they could not be solved. Later, he said that they were digit substitutions and P/L enciphered with a one-time running key derived from a book. Schubert thought that in the middle of 1944, e.g. the Soviets had about 3,000 agents in the field, and it was impossible to pick out one system and say that it was used in one area. Moreover, Schubert pointed out that he himself had worked on only Partisan and Kundschafter traffic and knew of other systems only indirectly.
Agent codes technical description
For the W/T traffic of the Soviet Partisans and the spies there were used:
Double Transposition
Subtractor Recyphers
Occasional simple substitution systems
The subtractor systems consist of 3 Cipher elements:
The basic cypher i.e. the substitution of the plain text by a substitution system
The recypher with the figure subtractor
The recyphering of the indicators
The Basic Cypher
On certain links, a 3 or 4-figure code was used as basic cypher.
In General, however, simple substitution systems were used, which substituted a 1 or 2-figure number for each letter, and were such that seven letters, which usually formed a key-word, were substituted by single figures, and the other three figures were used as tens for the other letters. The following is an example:
Special points of this substitution system are as follows;
When plain text is enciphered by this system, in the cypher text 2 mostly, or all three, tens-figures occur with particular frequency. The frequencies of the figures vary.
A letter is not substituted by two like letters. For example., the squares 22,44,66 are empty. This in normal text, no figure can come three times in succession.
Numbers are recyphered by repeating each figure three times: e.g. 1945=111999444555
There are two ways of using this system:
The basic cypher is the same for all messages.
The basic cypher is variable, i.e. it changes from message to message, with the indicator. The indicator is constructed of five different figures.
These are written over the letters of the key and completed with the remaining five figures.
The tens figures are taken from empty squares.
The following is an example, with an Indicator of 37245
There are occasional simple substitution systems which substitute each letter by a 2-figure number.
The Composition of the Subtractor
The figure subtractors used are of three different kinds:
They are printed on T/P rolls
They are taken from tables
They are built up from an indicator
The subtractors printed on T/P rolls were most frequently used and increasingly replaced the other systems, and had the soviet name of Blocknot rulon. The instructions for use stated that each recyphering strip was to be destroyed when it had been used once. There were different rolls for in and out messages. Thus an unbreakable individual recyphering is achieved. A subtractor group from the roll, which is not used for recyphering and is sent in the clear, gives the starting point on the strip of the roll used.
Research into regularities in captured subtractor rules showed that:
The rolls are made up on several machines, clearly show by the use of several type-faces.
Longish repeats do not occur in a roll.
The rolls have 5-figure numbers, which are given in clear as indicators in Partisan traffic, but not in Spy-traffic.
The use of subtractor tables comprises in the main, 4 different systems:
There is a simple recyphering with a table of 100-300 groups. The starting point is given by a indicator which gives line and column of the first recypher groups: e.g. 11511=line 11, Column 5. Systems of his kind come especially in the traffic of NKGB Saint Petersburg (Leningrad), and were solved.
There are 100 recypher pages. The first two figures of a 5-figure indicator, made up of five different figures, gives the page used. At the same time the basic cypher is changed by the indicator. This system too occurred especially in the traffic of the NKGB Saint Petersburg (Leningrad).
There is a double recypher. For this is a table of 30 lines of 10 groups. The first recypher is taken from the first 18 lines, the second from lines 19-30. The starting point of the first recypher is given by an indicators, as bullet point 1, the second recypher always begins with the first group of the 19th line. This was also solved.
There were besides other isolated systems using independent double recypherment. The system is shown by example. Two groups are table from a simple subtractor table, at a starting point, given by the indicator. e.g.
{|
|
!
|-
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 27395
|
|
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 80112
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="9" | To these numbers, according to their numerical value, are allocated the numbers from 1 to 0
|
|-
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 37596
|
|
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 80124
|
|
|
|
|-
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 27395
|
|
|
| style="text-align: center;" | 80112
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="9" | From this is obtained, by mixing and dividing off:
|
|-
| style="text-align: center;" | 3
| style="text-align: center;" | 7
| style="text-align: center;" | 5
| style="text-align: center;" | 9
| style="text-align: center;" | 6
| style="text-align: center;" | 8
| style="text-align: center;" | 0
| style="text-align: center;" | 1
| style="text-align: center;" | 2
| style="text-align: center;" | 4
|-
| style="text-align: center;" | 3
| style="text-align: center;" | 27
| style="text-align: center;" | 753
| style="text-align: center;" | 9
| style="text-align: center;" | 96
| style="text-align: center;" | 588
| style="text-align: center;" | 0
| style="text-align: center;" | 01
| style="text-align: center;" | 121
| style="text-align: center;" | 42
|}
The following groups in the subtractor table are next changed. This gives the recypher, but of course, has not been solved.
Note: The marking off into blocks of 1,2 and 3 figures was apparently done to transpose the figures in these blocks according to the key provided by the top line.
Figure subtractors arithmetically constructed. The subtractors are built up from a 5-figure indicator, which contains five different figures. The methods of building them are demonstrated by examples.
A) Simple addition in columns. The most usual type of this subtractor construction are the following: There are two substitution series, e.g.:
{|
!
! 1
! 2
! 3
! 4
! 5
! 6
! 7
! 8
! 9
! 0
|-
| a
| 0
| 9
| 1
| 8
| 3
| 6
| 2
| 5
| 4
| 7
|-
| b
| 7
| 6
| 8
| 2
| 0
| 1
| 9
| 4
| 3
| 5
|}
The indicator, e.g. 27245 is written down then substituted according to a) and the result written underneath. Then the indicator is substituted according to b) and the answer written at the side of the right:
27344 69820
92183
The groups on the left are now added, and the result written under on the right. Then the two groups on the right are added, and the result put below on the left, and so on:
27345 69820
92183 19428
78248 60321
79749 47987
07208 ----- etc.
The groups are used as subtractor, starting from the second or third line. In some systems, the right hand column is pushed down a line, which was solved. In some cases, the substitution series b) is derived from a). by pushing it along one or more places. The case also occurred of their being only one substitution series, with addition in one column only.
Simple cross addition. Starting wth the indicator, each pair of adjacent figures is added, and the result written alongside. The following is an example:
Indicator 27345
Subtractor 27455 90794 97633 63969
This system occurred only as an emergency cypher, that was solved. There is a variation, in which one skips a figure:
27345 51896 30426
or one may add in normal fashion three times and then skips a figure twice:
27345 90735 97022 .....
These last systems were in use in conjunction with a changing basic cypher. This was solvable.
Addition in columns with a key phrase. The basic key varies by the indicator. A key group or phrase is enciphered in accordance with the basic key so that five groups of five are produced. The indicator is written under the first of these groups, the total of these two groups is put under the adjacent one, and so on:
{|
! 49458
! 03242
! 56083
! 03824
! 26493
|-
| 27345
| 66793
| 69936
| 16919
| 18733
|}
The subtractor is obtained either by adding these two rows and every subsequent row being the total of the last two rows or by containing the addition. This was solved.
Cross addition with key phrase. By enciphering a key phrase with the fixed basic key, you have a 5 -- 5-figure groups. The indicator is written under the first of these groups; as the next group you take the missing five numbers in ascending order and by cross addition, the five groups are filled in. The first row of the subtractor is produced by adding both rows. For example:
{|
! Key Phrase
! 49458
! 03243
! 56083
! 03824
! 26493
|-
| Indicator
| style="text-decoration:underline;" | 27345
| style="text-decoration:underline;" | 16890
| style="text-decoration:underline;" | 90796
| style="text-decoration:underline;" | 74799
| style="text-decoration:underline;" | 97653
|-
| 1 Subtractor Row
| 66793
| 19033
| 46799
| 77513
| 13046
|}
By cross addition of the groups of the first subtractor row, four groups are formed for each original group and these are entered underneath. You then get a block of 25 groups.
{|
! 66393
! 19033
! 46779
! 77513
! 13046
|-
| 23625
| 09363
| 03469
| 42647
| 43400
|-
| 59870
| 92992
| 37053
| 68013
| 77407
|-
| 47574
| 11813
| 07572
| 48147
| 41471
|-
| 12215
| 29945
| 72299
| 29519
| 55188
|}
From the first group of the block, a key is made up by indicating the figures according to numerical orders by the numbers 1-5.
23451
66793
In accordance with this key, the columns are read out from the columns of the first subtractor block, commencing with the right column. From this, the second subtractor block is created:
{|
! 60718
! 14745
! 33715
! 04441
! 40078
|-
| 37379
| 74642
| 72889
| 56015
| 14141
|-
| 99229
| 40307
| 63772
| 74052
| 76579
|-
| 33235
| etc.
|
|
|
|}
The third subtractor block comes correspondingly from the second by re-arranging the second group of the first subtractor row. This was solved. In a variation of this system, the first subtractor block is composed differently, the first subtractor row is exactly the same. The cross addition from the indicator is, however, extended to six groups. The sixth group is put under the first subtractor group. After the formation of the subtractor proceeds as described under c). This was solved. In this last type variable basic keys are also used.
Substituted cross addition. The indicator is substituted by a table. Five groups are formed by cross addition from the result. These were then converted into the same substitution table. From this, the first subtractor row is obtained.
Subtractor Boxes. First the figures 1-0 are written down and underneath the indicator and remaining figures. By adding every 2 rows, 9 further rows are formed. The 2-11th row are numbered 1–0. The following is an example.
{|
!
! 1
! 2
! 3
! 4
! 5
! 6
! 7
! 8
! 9
! 0
|-
| 1)
| 2
| 7
| 3
| 4
| 5
| 1
| 6
| 8
| 9
| 0
|-
| 2)
| 3
| 9
| 6
| 8
| 0
| 7
| 3
| 6
| 8
| 0
|-
| 3)
| 5
| 6
| 9
| 2
| 5
| 8
| 9
| 4
| 7
| 0
|-
| 4)
| 8
| 5
| 5
| 0
| 5
| 5
| 2
| 0
| 5
| 0
|-
| 5)
| 3
| 1
| 4
| 2
| 0
| 3
| 1
| 4
| 2
| 0
|-
| 6)
| 1
| 6
| 9
| 2
| 5
| 8
| 3
| 4
| 7
| 0
|-
| 7)
| 4
| 7
| 3
| 4
| 5
| 1
| 4
| 8
| 9
| 0
|-
| 8)
| 5
| 3
| 2
| 6
| 0
| 9
| 7
| 2
| 6
| 0
|-
| 9)
| 9
| 0
| 5
| 0
| 5
| 0
| 1
| 0
| 5
| 0
|-
| 0)
| 6
| 3
| 7
| 6
| 5
| 9
| 8
| 2
| 1
| 0
|}
When figure pairs are extracted from a particular row, e.g. row 3, and these indicate from which point each 5-figure group is to be read out of the box. This produces:
56=31420
69=70169
92=05050 etc.
This system appeared in conjunction with the variable basic key. A variation consists in a key phrase being enciphered on a basic key and from this, the first rows of the box are formed. This was not solved. Recognition of the subtractor system and its solution was achieved by the appearance of similar message endings and beginnings.
Indicators
Indicators for the subtractor, based on the roll, were always inserted plain. In the other systems there were several ways of putting in the indicator. Apart from a few exceptions, there were always two indicators. Possibilities regarding recyphering of these indicators were as follows:
Indicator groups plain
A certain 5-figure number is added to every indicator and the number is a constant
A certain group of the message is added to every indicator group.
Like bullet list 3, with the different that groups in the message are converted according to a substitution table
Like bullet list 4, where different substitution tables are used for the two groups of the message to be converted
Like bullet list 3, except that figures of the message groups are arranged in order and then added to the indicator group
Certain figures are extracted from several groups of the message, which are almost invariably the first five groups, for instance, the last figures of the first five groups and then added to the indicator group
Like bullet list 7, but substitution the adders in accordance with a substitution table.
Combinations of two of the above methods, doubled recypher of indicator groups, e.g. 2 with 3, 2 with 4, 2 with 5, twice 3.
In general both indicators are recyphered on the same process, where one indicator is included at the beginning and one at the end of the message. The groups used for enciphering are also taken one each from the beginning and the end of the message.
Miscellaneous cryptanalysis
1939 to 1941
German Army Cryptanalytic Effort 1939-1941
In the early years of the war, the cryptanalytic staff of the Horchleitstelle [Ref 5.1] were unable to cope with the added burden of the wartime traffic. The British section of the HLS was unable to solve British systems. The failure of the British section of the Horchleitstelle to achieve any success with British ciphers and codes continued. In 1940, the six people comprising the section were moved to Bad Godesberg where no successes were achieved despite an abundance of material with which to work on. Dr Otto Buggisch who, in 1942, looked over the files of the British section regarding work on the British high grade machine, Typex, characterised the work of Inspector Breede who worked in the winter of 1939–1940 on the British "big machine" as complete nonsense. Buggisch stated that Breede described an imaginary machine which had nothing whatever to do with Typex. No cryptanalytic success was recorded in this period. In April 1940, however, the British section received a copy of the British War Office Code captured in Bergen during the Norwegian Campaign. A second copy was obtained at Dunkirk. Successes with this system were therefore possible, since the British continued to use this system until 1943.
The failure of the cryptanalysts of the Horchleitstelle to solve independently the French Army succeeding the F110 was another indication of their inadequacy. In early autumn 1939, the French replaced the peacetime ciphers, the F90 and F110 cipher with a new wartime cipher whose names was not known to TICOM sources. The French section was forced to call upon the services of the Cipher Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW/Chi) to aid in the solution of French Army systems. Dr Erich Hüttenhain was sent to the Army Intercept Station in Frankfurt to aid in the solution. Among his papers were two memoranda, where Hüttenhain reported that the task was accomplished with his own colleagues at OKW/Chi by October 1939. Among those who worked with Hüttenhain, when on 2 September 1939, the old French Army F110 code was changed was Professor Ludwig Föppl of HLS with Trappe and Schmidt of OKW/Chi. There were not enough cryptanalysts on HLS to furnish the forward units with adequate staffs. The system worked so successfully that all the September material could be read retrospectively. The system continued to be worked on successfully through to November. Hüttenhain returned to his own agency with the system solved. It may be noted that the head of the Army station requested of Hüttenhain to convey the thanks of the army to OKW/Chi for the assistance given to HLS's section and remarked that in his opinion such a large cryptographic task could not be done by the Army Command either then or in the near future.
The system was solved until the German offensive in the spring of 1940. At this time, the French began to use systems in forward echelons which Horchleitstelle was unable to solve. Mettig remarked that the Army cryptanalysts both of the forward units and the HLS finally concentrated on two machine systems, the C-36 cipher machine and the B-211. Neither was solved however, until after the Armistice of 22 June 1940 and a considerable quantity of captured documents. According to Mettig, the final solution of these two machines rated lower than that of the preceding system since it was not timely and was done only with the aid of captured material.
In the winter of 1939, the dearth of field cryptanalysts became apparent to the German Army. When the Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung (KONA) signal intelligence regiments were preparing to move into the field, the army found that there were no trained cryptanalyst personnel to send with them. Colonel Kunibert Randewig, the commander of all intercept units in the west, was able to procure cryptographers for intercept units around Berlin and filled out that number with mathematicians and linguists.
Summary
HLS achievements during this period were minor, their success in intercepting traffic and solving known systems was a great aid to the German Army. Mettig stated that all messages which succeeded the F110 cipher were read from late 1939 and these messages, despite their administrative nature helped to reveal the tactical layout of the French. For example, the strength of units on the training ground at Mourmelon was estimated by statistics of water bottles and blankets. It was possible to deduce facts about the shortage of armour-piercing ammunition with the French infantry units. Similarly, the conversion of the Second and Third French Cavalry Divisions into Armoured Divisions in the area north-east of Paris was ascertained in December 1939. By the end of 1939, the complete order of battle of the French Army was known to Germany. The capture of a copy of the British War Office Code in Norway in 1940 and a copy in Dunkirk in June of that year, afforded the British section its first successes and furnished a constant and important source of information from that time until 1943, when the British discontinued use of the code.
In this period, the Germans realised the inadequacy of their personnel effort, and set about correcting them.
Period from 1941 to 1945
German Army Cryptanalytic effort 1941-1945
Western and Southwestern Cryptanalysis 1941-1944
Western and southwestern cryptanalysis was handled at In 7/VI by British section with outposts in North Africa, Athens, Paris and Bergen, Norway. The American and the French section with subsections for the Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese and Brazilian traffic. The Italian section was within this group. The field units which handled western and southwestern traffic were the western field units, KONA 5 and KONA 7. The Swedish Army traffic was handled by a special unit of Feste 9 in Norway.
Work on British traffic 1941-1944
War Office Code
During the years 1941–1943, the main success of the British section was the reading of the British War Office Code (WOC), two copies which had been captured in early 1940, from Dunkirk and in Bergen, Norway. The code was numerical 4-Figure groups, enciphered by means of a subtractor. After the capture of these documents, the British section under Inspektor Liedtke was successful in reading messages from North Africa during the spring of 1941, encoded with WOC and superenciphered with additives. British traffic encoded with WOC was read constantly throughout 1941. In March of that year, a considerable volume of messages was read during the British Cyrenaic Offensive Operation Compass of the British 8th Army under General Archibald Wavell. The organisation of the base services and the Order of Battle of the Army were recognised. During the late summer of 1941, General Erwin Rommel's counter-attack took place leading to the Siege of Tobruk. The besieged fortress was solely dependent on radio for its signal communications to the 8th Army and Cairo, and as it used the WOC with an enciphering table almost exclusively, its traffic was read by OKH/Chi. The British section followed accurately the British 8th Army's relief attempts in November 1941, which led to the cutting off of Rommel between Tobruk, Sidi Omar and Sallum, eventually leading to Rommel's break-out to the west as Sidi Rezegh.
As the result of the success with the WOC in Berlin, a special detachment of eight cryptanalysts was sent to the evaluation centre of KONA 4 at Athens to solve traffic at that point and thereby reduce the time wasted in sending the traffic back to Berlin. Unfortunately for OKH/Chi about the time the party started in December 1941, certain difficulties were encountered in the solution of the War Office Code which prevented the solution of the WOC for the following eight or nine months. During this time period the British section suffered a further blow through the capture in July 1942 of the greater part of FAK 621, which had been in operation in North Africa under the aristocratic Seebohm. Although the remnants of the unit continued to operate under a Captain Habel, information gained from the captured part of the unit provided evidence to the British that their code was being read and from that time, the British section had no success with the code. Heinz Wolfgang Herzfeld stated in interrogation, that after his return to Berlin in October 1942, there was a little WOC traffic but that its volume was too small for successful exploitation. From December 1942 to March 1943, the British used enciphered indicators, and in March and April 1943 changed to a form of One-time pads for enciphering tables. The British section had no success with these innovations although Liedtke worked for a year attempting to break into the new system.
Slidex
From 1942 to end of the war, the only success attained was with the British low-level traffic, particularly Slidex. Slidex was designated by Germany as English Code () (EC), followed by a number to denote the variations of the basic system. Slidex was used by the British and later by the American and Canadian Army in front line units and in air support networks. The variations of the EC system mentioned in TICOM sources are:
After D-day, Slidex was also used by the American Army. When Germany found that American military police units were using Slidex to report all Army units which passed their control points, the deciphering of Slidex was given high priority. Slidex messages were also particularly valuable for identifying bombing and artillery objects. The time estimate for the solution of Slidex was one to three hours if the basic cards were at hand, five or six hours if they were not. 65% of the work is said to have been done with the cards available.
Low grade codes and cyphers
Not much material concerning other British low-grade systems solved was found by TICOM. Hentze of KONA 5 stated that Maplay code was worked on throughout 1944, but this code was harder to break than Slidex, and were successful only with a great deal of traffic. Codex was solved by OKH/Chi largely with the help of a captured specimen which had been in the possession of Germany since the days of the Leros Invasion. It was read by Feste 9 in 1944–1945, when that unit was in Italy.
A Tiger-code, so called from its use during Exercise Tiger, was solved by OKH/Chi after six month's work. Solution was made possible by a long report in a British paper giving the names of the units, officers, etc. Another British system, the 999 code which was used during the pre-invasion period, was solved by In 7/VI, but was never used operationally. KONA 5 is said to have had considerable success with the Tiger-code and to have achieved a solution on the 4th or 5th day after its regular monthly changes. Matin, another British Army system, was never solved. Rudolf Hentze stated that Germany arrived at the decision that Matin was a small machine, but he does not say whether research on this system was carried out at OKH/Chi or in KONA 5.
Failures
The outstanding failure of the British section of OKH/Chi and of OKH/Chi in general, was the failure to solve the British big machine, Typex. Mettig states that had OKH/Chi been able to solve this system, it would have been their outstanding achievement. Mettig stated that Typex was read in 1942 from which time OKH/Chi had no more success. Ultra sources state that FAK 621 in North Africa had been reading Typex at the time of its capture in North Africa in July and November 1942, brought about a thorough investigation of this subject by TICOM interrogators. The story in brief was that in June 1943 one of the prisoners claimed that he had worked on British machine methods from 1937 to 1940 and that messages which could not be decoded by FAK 621, were sent to In 7/VI in Berlin. Two prisoners from FAK 621, Haunhorst and Possel, stated that all high grade traffic was handled by a Warrant Officer named Wagner. Wagner had one or two Typex machines at his disposal which had been captured in Tobruk. The evidence given by Wagner was later contradicted by Dr Erich Hüttenhain, Dr Walter Fricke of the OKW/Chi and Colonel Mettig emphatically denied having solved or heard of a solution to Typex. They had never seen a Typex machine with rotors although all admitted that a Typex machine without rotors had been captured at Dunkirk. The TICOM interrogators of Hüttenhain and Fricke reported:Should it turn out that some experts named above, e.g. Mettig were in possession of a complete Typex machine and have achieved successes, both these people (POW's) would lose their last faith in their fellow beingsMettig, moreover, stated categorically that a success of this nature would have been mentioned in the list of German cryptographic success which was drawn up for him, prior to his visit to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Mettig's statement about Typex (being read in North Africa) may have been misstatement for Slidex. At least, the interrogators assumed Hüttenhain, Fricke and Mettig were speaking the truth.
Although it is almost certain that OKH/Chi never solved Typex, a great deal of effort was expended on the project from 1940 to 1943. In January 1942, the files relating to the work on Typex were handed over to Otto Buggisch, who found work dating back to 1940, when Inspector Breede of the British section had attempted to solve the system. Breede recognised the traffic as machine traffic but described a purely imaginary machine, which Buggisch says bore no relation to the actual Typex, and as complete nonsense. In 1941, some mathematical studies were made on Typex, and in January 1942, Buggisch made a study of the system, from which he made the following conclusions:
The system was similar to that of the Enigma, according to a single letter frequency counts based on 10,000 cipher letters.
Certain relationships between the two message-settings frequently existed.
There was no evidence that Buggisch proceeded further than this in his investigation. There seem to be no knowledge of how many rotors the Typex had. Buggisch estimated up to 25. No one at OKH/Chi knew the inner wiring of the wheels, nor how many wheels there were, so the question of cryptanalysis was of no practical interest. The whole matter was evidently permanently abandoned sometime in 1943.
Work on USA Traffic 1941-1944
The USA section of In 7/VI was created with the entry of the United States into the war in early December 1941. The section, made up of personnel who had been drafted from the mathematical section of OKH/Chi, was placed under the leadership of Friedrich Steinberg, a leading mathematician. Initial attempts at breaking USA traffic was fraught with difficulties. Due to the size of the US wireless network and the use of alternative frequencies by USA operators, considerable trouble was experienced in identifying the various links and sorting the different systems. After a few weeks however, order was established through the reading of Call signs and the sorting of discriminants.
The first major success of the US section was in the summer of 1942 when the M-94 device was solved. In 7 designated the M-94 unit, either URSAL, CDAF, strip and ACr2. URSAL was given to the system from the fact that traffic from the US weather stations in Greenland which used URSAL as an indicator provided the first breaks into the system. CDAF was found in the traffic emanating from the Caribbean Defense Area. Strip and ACr2 () stem from the fact that this system was long thought to be a strip system. The solution of the M-94 was achieved by Friedrich Steinberg and Hans-Peter Luzius, mathematicians of the US section, who are said to have written a 25-page report on their work. After the cryptanalytic solution was achieved, a USA manual (FM 11-5) with a complete description of the M-94 was found in a Berlin library
Current solution of the M-94 from 1942 to 1943 was done both at OKH/Chi and at KONA 5 at St. Germanin. The work consisted of finding the daily key. A set of 25 charts of synoptic tables, corresponding to the 25 discs of the machine was constructed, apparently similar to the synoptic tables used by American cryptanalysts. The daily key was found by assuming a beginning, and using the charts to discover possible disc arrangements. Later, IBM machinery was used to eliminate impossible charts. Graupe of NAAS 5 stated that it usually took two days to recover the order of the discs and that only fifty groups were required for the system to be broken. Estimates on the amount of material solved range from 70% to 90%.
The M-94 was succeeded in 1943 by the M-209, which was first solved by the Germans in the autumn of 1943, and continued to be solved with some success throughout the remaining years of the war. The breaking of M-209 was achieved in OKH/Chi by Steinberg and Luzius, who were aided by the knowledge that the US government had brought the Hagelin machine which had once been offered to the German government. At first only relative settings could be recovered,I-142 p. 3 but later the section refined its technique of recovering absolute settings so that not only paired messages but in a large number of cases, a whole day's traffic could be read. The technique of achieving true settings was passed on by OKH/Chi to the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe.
Work on an operational level was carried out jointly by the US section of OKH/Chi and NAAS 5 at St. Germain. Early in 1944, NAAS 4 had been supplied with a group of cryptanalysts skilled in work on the M-209, and this small group competed with the section at In 7/VI in the quick solution of M-209 traffic. It estimated that 10%-20% of all M-209 messages intercepted were read by establishing the true settings of the wheels, and that about half of these settings were established at OKH/Chi, half at NAAS 5. To insure speedy solution all subordinated to KONA 5 were ordered to teleprint to NAAS 5 all messages on the same settings or with Indicators differing only in the first two letters. Under the most favourable circumstances two days were needed to solve a depth, and two more days to reconstruct the absolute settings. There were times, however, when captured lists of keys or settings made possible a quick solution of the traffic. During the Allied invasion of Sicily and the Allied invasion of Italy, messages of great tactical value were decoded using captured booklets containing M-209 settings. At the time of the Normandy landings, the M-209 keys of the 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division which covered the critical days of 6–11 June were captured and all traffic on those days was read.In 7/VI knew of the existence of a big American machine which was designated the AM1 (), but it was clear that OKH/Chi never solved this machine and had no idea about its construction. Hentze stated that his unit (KONA 5) never succeeded in getting a model of the machine. Other statements by OKH/ChiI that the machine was tackled in Berlin was considered utter nonsenseOKH/Chi were successful with American codes. The Army Administrative Code, designated by In 7/VI as AC 1 () had been captured before 1939, and photostatic copies of the code had been distributed to all field cryptanalytic units.IF-105 p. 5 The code was a 5-letter code with 60,000 groups, each page containing 90 groups. Feste 9, intercepted and read traffic from this code from the summer of 1942 to the autumn of 1943, while stationed in Bergen, Norway. Although no traffic of strategic value was passed, the intelligence was valuable enough so that when AC 1 was succeeded by a simplified version designated as TELWA, Feste 9 reconstructed the code.
Feste 9, aided by the US section of OKH/Chi, also broke the simple codes used by the US Army units stationed in Iceland and the Caribbean. These were designated as Divisional Field Code (DFC) followed by a number indicating the variation of the system. The variations described in TICOM sources were: DFC 15, 16, 17, 21, 25, 28, 29.IF-144 pp. 3–5
Mention should also be made of the success of the US section of OKH/Chi with the Air Transport Code used for air cargo and passenger transport circuits to Africa and South America. This code, consisting of two-figure elements from 00–99, was successfully decoded by In 7/VI from May 1942 until early 1943, when it was given to the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe.
Summary
The work on OKH/Chi, USA section, appears to have been successful in low-grade ciphers and in some medium grade ciphers such as M-94 and M-209. Mettig rated the solution of the M-209 as the outstanding achievement of this section and one of the best of In 7/VI. It is clear also from references concerning the work on this system made by members of other agencies such as Wilhelm Tranow and Ferdinand Voegele, that the US section of OKH/Chi evolved the best technique of solving the M-208 and led the other German Signals Agencies in the work on this system.
Work on French traffic 1941-1944
French traffic from 1941-1944 was of two main types, Vichy France and Free France. Vichy French traffic which was under the direct control of the French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden was monitored by the French section of In 7/VI. By agreement with the vichy government, the French were to inform Germany of their code and cipher procedures, but wary watch was kept on their traffic. The work on Free French traffic which emanated during this period from Free French troops in Syria and in North, West and Equatorial Africa was carried out by OKH/Chi and the Sig. Int. Evaluation centres of KONA 4 in Athens where the traffic was easily intercepted.
In a list compiled by the director of the French section, of the Free French systems worked on by In 7/VI and NAAS 4, the following systems were mentioned as being used in Syria:
A 3-Letter system: code table with fortnightly key change. This system appeared from about 1942 to the middle of 1944 in Syria, but was not intercepted after this. Content is described as moderate to good.
A variant of the above code which passed technical details of wireless traffic. A 3-Letter system: code table with fortnightly key change. Appeared in 1943 to middle of 1944. Sometimes it was used for passing weekly changing call-signs.
Police systems which appeared rarely, according to Kühn, that were either 2-Figure substitution tables or simple transpositions.
A 4-Figure code with daily key change. Appeared in 1944 in the Syrian coastal network. Message traffic described ship movements in the coastal area.
From other sources may be added the de Gaullist's systems, two of which are named: Control Beduoin and Service Politique. These were initially read from traffic intercept at the French garrison at Bir Hakeim, but had proved impossible until the same cypher was used in Syria by the de Gaulle party. The work on French systems of KONA 4 was summarised by two members of KONA 4 who stated:All Syrian traffic was read and a complete picture obtained of the French armed forcesAmong the Free French systems from North Africa which were solved and read by the units were listed by Kühn:
5-Letter messages from a diagonal transposition system with monthly, later semi-monthly changes, used in West Africa from 1943 to 1945. It was later discovered from a captured document that this system has been in use from World War I, and was resurrected evidently for use in West Africa.
TTSF code. This was a 4-Letter code reciphered by letter substitution into 4 letter cipher text. The first group of the message was always TTSD; the last group the indicator. The code was used in North Africa from 1944-1945 for routine messages.
5-Letter messages from a diagonal transposition used in Equatorial Africa in 1943–1944.
5-Figure messages from a 4-Figure hatted code, designated ATM 43 Sonderführer Hans Wolfgang Kühn, who was Director of Referat 3 of OKH/Chi, notes that ATM 43 derived its name from the fact that it was possible to use the vocabulary of the pre-war French code, the ATM, in the reconstruction of this code.
4-Figure code with subtractor used towards the end of the war, on the Italian front.
3-Figure messages from a 4-Figure code with subtractor. This system was used in North Africa in 1944 for transport work.
A 5-Figure de Gaulle code was used in North, West, and Equatorial Africa, and later in France, which had not been solved by the end of the year despite efforts made by In 7/VI from 1941 to 1942. In 1041 Otto Buggisch stated that he worked on this code for Werner Kunze, a Pers Z S cryptanalyst. However, no success was obtained, until compromise revealed that the code was transposed with daily changing keys. No further headway was made with this system.
The French section had solved the C-36 and the B-211, the machine cipher similar to the Soviet K-37 cipher machine system, after the French campaign in 1940. When the de Gaullist troops in North Africa and Corsica began to use the C-36 machine for their traffic, the French section already had a solution and it was easily solved during 1943. When a new indicator system based on numbers was introduced in early 1944, a high percentage of the traffic continued to be solved through the use of cribs and statistics. The indicator system itself was broken in the autumn of 1944.
At the end of the TICOM homework written by Kühn, on the French systems treated by the French section of In 7/VI and KONA 4, Kühn stated that the French section was greatly aided by certain fundamental weaknesses in French cryptography, which lead to easy solutions of most of their systems. These weaknesses were described by Kühn, stated thus:
The extraordinary conservatism of the French regarding the construction of their code systems or reciphering methods. Systems which must have been used in World War I, were used in slightly modified form up to 1945, in West Africa. Reciphering methods are regularly of two types: either subtraction with finite subtractors or transposition with keywords taken from the code.
The habitual use by the French of stereotyped message beginnings and endings which facilitates breaking into the systems.
The idiosyncrasy of the French of communicating cipher matters or key changes by radio. For instance, through the diagonal system in West Africa, OKH/Chi was able on several occasions to break the key for the C-36 cipher machine and once a key change for the ATM 43 code was announced.
With these weaknesses, it was possible for the French section to read all or most of Free French traffic during the years 1941–1944. Their previous experience with the C-36 and B-211, provided In 7/VI with solutions to the cipher traffic as it was being used by the Charles de Gaulle party. No high grade traffic appears to have been passed by the French during this period.
Work on Swiss, Spanish and Portuguese and Brazilian traffic
From the 1941–1944, the French section of OKH/Chi had subsections for Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese and Brazilian traffic. As Kühn stated, the volume of traffic was small and unimportant. Otto Buggisch worked with Kunze of Pers Z S on the solution of the Swiss Enigma K. Although they worked on a theoretical solution of the machine, and applied the solution to trial enciphered text, created by Buggisch himself, the theory was never applied at In 7/VI to Swiss traffic, as the volume of traffic did not warrant the effort. Moreover, easy solution of the traffic was precluded by the fact that the Swiss did their own wiring of the Enigma wheels and changed these frequently.
Monitoring of Spanish, Portuguese and Brazilian traffic was coordinated by the French section of the unit, and was carried out by various KONA field units. From 1939–1942, Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA)#Feste 3, from 1942 to 1943, it was FAK 624 and from 1944, by FAK 624 and Feste 12. The amount of traffic read in these units was evidently small enough to be handled by the personnel stationed there. A Spanish military transposition code and a Spanish digit with variant codes were read. Of seven Brazilians systems known, five were read.
Work on Italian traffic 1941-1944
From the beginning of the war, the security of the Italian systems was a matter of constant concern to Germany. An Italian section under Captain Dr. Fiala was established in the unit to check the security of Italian traffic, particularly on the route from Italy to North Africa. Germany feared that Afrika Korps troop movements in North Africa, were being betrayed by the insecurity of the Italian codes and ciphers.
As early as 1941, Dr. Fiala paid a visit to Rome to notify the Italians of the weaknesses of their systems and to request greater security. The visit made little impression on the Italians who remained confident of their own systems.IF-1519 An attempt to improve Italian security as well as to demonstrate the use of IBM Hollerith machinery section of In 7/VI. Captain Bigi, who was a cryptanalyst of the Servizio Informazioni Militare, the cipher bureau of the Italian Army was sent, but his report did not result in any changes in Italian cryptography. Captain Bigi's next visit to Berlin met only with coldness on the part of OKH/Chi staff. By late 1942, the general impression among the Germans was that the Italians were incapable of improving their own systems, even with Inspectorate 7 monitoring them. The Italian section of the unit was disbanded in 1942 when a leader order () was issued by Hitler.
In June 1943, with the Armistice of Cassibile (Italy's defection from a German viewpoint) to the Allies, the work on the Italian Referat was restarted at OKH/Chi. The section consisted of small cadre, with Manaigo as section head. Heinz Wolfgang Herzfeld gave an account of this section's work to TICOM. Herzfeld worked on 400 messages that had been intercepted in May, to July 1943. Herzfeld worked on the material which consisted of 5-Figure messages. In the beginning of September 1943, an Italian recyphering table and some messages had been taken from the office of the Italian Commanantura in Athens, arrived in the section. When Benito Mussolini had been arrested, and the armistice had been signed, some German officers of KONA 4, stationed at the Neo Phaliron Velodrome, drove to the Commanantura on Amerikis Street in Athens, walked into the cipher office and started collecting material lying on the tables in the office, and packing it into a case, in front of Italian staff. When Italian officers came in, began shouting, and a scuffle started, the Germans left with the case. The recyphering table was used in the Ellade code and the Piave code.
In November 1943, the section was again dissolved, this time by Major Lechner. The decision to disband the section the second time, was justified such that after the fall of Leros, no more Italian wireless traffic was intercepted.
The two codes worked on by the section, in the later period was the Ellade and Piave codes. The enciphering tables captured in Italy enabled the Piave code to be reconstructed and enabled many messages to be captured from Northern Italy. The Ellade code was partly reconstructed when the section was dissolved from lack of current traffic.
At the end of the war, KONA 7 was ordered to cover the traffic of Italian bands in Northern Italy.
Work on Swedish traffic 1941-1944
Work on Swedish Army traffic from 1941 to 1944 was handled by a special detachment of Feste 9 called Out Station Halden, named from the fact that it was located in Halden. For administrative purposes the station was attached to the Halden Police. According to Bartel, a German cryptanalyst who worked on these systems, the following Swedish Army systems were worked on:
SRA 1, SRA 5: A revolving grille system. Numerous cases of compromises occurred and the systems continuously read. First broken in the spring or summer of 1943.
HGA grille: A more difficult system not read by NAA 11 or Feste 9 in Norway. This was worked on by Pers Z S but without success.
SC 2: read in May 1943. A simple field code like Slidex.
SC 3: read in April 1943. Simple, partly alphabetical 3-letter field code without reciphering.
SC 4: read in June 1943. 3-letter alphabetical code without recipher.
The first Swedish cipher machine () (abbr. SM1) was worked on in Norway in 1944 and was identified as similar to a small Hagelin cipher machine like the M-209. Messages were read at Halden with cribs, by errors in the cryptography, or by having two messages in the same key. The second machine (SM 2) was thought to be a large Hagelin machine. Two copies of the traffic on this machine were made, one for In 7/VI, and one for the station at Halden. A member of the station at Halden, thought during TICOM interrogation that SM 2 traffic was read. The intelligence gained from breaking of traffic of SM 1 and the simple field codes allowed Germany, during the spring manoeuvres of Feb-March 1945, to build up a complete tactical picture of the Swedish Army in two months. However, neither the high grade grille (HGA), nor the large Swedish machine was solved.
Work on Balkan (Southeastern) traffic 1941-1944
Southeastern cryptanalysis was handled at the unit by the Balkan section under the leadership of Rudolf Bailovic and in the field, by KONA. Kona had been stationed in the Balkans area during the entire period of the war, and in addition to its regular task of intercepting the traffic emanating from Syria and North Africa, it had been given the task of monitoring the traffic of the occupied countries in the Balkan area. The Balkan countries whose systems were worked on by the OKH/Chi unit and KONA 4 were: Greece, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Turkey and Bulgaria. The work done on the traffic of each of these countries is given below.
Work on Greek traffic 1941-1944
Dr Otto Karl Winkler provided the most information to TICOM regarding Greek ciphers and codes, from a single TICOM home work. Winkler was a translator and cryptanalyst with KONA 4 from the spring of 1941 to May 1945.
According to Winkler, work on Greek systems started in 1941 when KONA 4 was stationed in Bucharest. The first system was a Greek Air Force system which consisted of a single transposition send in 3-letter groups. Winkler stated that nearly all messages were read by the use of stereo-typed beginnings. Although the messages were of insignificant value, a continuous check on officer personalities, deliveries of stores and information concerning airfields contributed to tactical knowledge of the Greek forces.
KONA 4 worked at this time also on Greek Army and Navy messages, but without success until the conquest of Greece. At that time, Winkler stated Codes were captured which were used by Greeks during the attack on Crete.
The only other Greek system mentioned as having been attacked in 1941 was a 5-letter code with a cyclic recipherment which Buggisch says he worked on in the unit. Plaintext traffic was becoming rapid when the Greek campaign ended.
After KONA 4 moved its evaluation centre to Athens in May 1941, no more work was undertaken on these systems until NAAS 4 withdrew from Athens in autumn 1943. At the time, Greek Partisan traffic began to be intercepted. In the spring of 1944, KONA 4 gave Winkler the task of forming a small Greek unit to handle traffic of the traffic of the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS). The unit consisted of six people, chief among whom were called Strobl, a cryptanalyst who solved a double transposition system of ELAS while Winkler concentrated on translating the traffic already readable. The work became more important and the unit, now increased to 16 people, was attached to a Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoons NAZ G
Winkler stated that in the beginning the Greeks sent their traffic in two figure substitution with alternative groups. As few messages were sent on the same substitution, it took several days to break and read these codes. ELAS soon went over exclusively to letter traffic based on double transposition, which was successfully solved largely through the aid given by the carelessness of the Greek cryptographers.
Winkler estimated that 50-60% of the traffic tackled by NAZ G was solved. From these messages, the unit was able to build up an almost complete picture of the organisation and composition of the Greek People's Liberation Army and the National Liberation Front. The unit also compiled lists of leading Greek personalities and officers and informed the competent German political and military authorities about many planned military and political actions, acts of sabotage, ambushes, dynamiting and so on. In addition, the messages provided the exact location of Allied airfields in the Greek mountains, regarding the position, strength and activity of the Allied military missions and various British Commandos, about Greek internal and inter-allied crises and struggles, about the British tactics for the occupation of Greece.
Work on Greek systems ceased on 15 October 1944 when Naz G was transferred to Sarajevo.
Work on Hungarian traffic 1941-1944
The Hungarians used the commercial model of the Enigma cipher machine, and had the rotors for the machine made by the German firm of Konski and Krüger. This firm usually turned over the records of the rotor wirings to the Armed Forces Radio Communications Branch (Ag WNV/Fu) which in turn gave them to OKH/Chi. However, Hungarians connected with the firm took the rotors at night and changed the wirings enough to make the firm's records incorrect. No effort appears to have been made on the part of OKH/Chi to recover the wirings or to prevent the sabotage. It is difficult to suppose that the unit could have been so easily duped had they wished to press the matter. Evidently, they did not consider the traffic worth causing embarrassment to the Hungarians.
With the onset of the war, however, OKH/Chi grew more cautious, particularly with the movement of German soldiers through Hungary. During the spring and summer of 1941, the radio traffic of the Hungarian State Railways was monitored from a Feste in Tulin. The code being used at that time by the railways was a turning grille (Raster Code) with permanent squares which could be turned in four different positions, and reversed to give four additional positions. The code was solved by Dr S. Döring of the mathematical section of In 7/VI. After the check of the railway authorities had proved that they were dependable, interception was stopped.
Watch on Hungarian traffic was dropped from 1941 to 1943 due to the high priority given to Russian traffic. In 1943, however, interest again developed and a detail was sent from Feste 6, the former Army Fixed Intercept Station at Tulln, to Slovakia, near Bratislava (Pressburg) to monitor Hungarian traffic. Some tenseness in the relations of Germany and Hungary may be reflected by the fact that all members of the detail wore civilian clothing. Also at that time, OKH/Chi began to resume its work on Hungarian traffic. Count Esterhazy of the Balkan section began work on a Hungarian code and turning grille. Messages enciphered with a 2-figure substitution key were also worked on.
Work on Hungarian traffic was done by the Balkan section of OKH/Chi only when the Army thought it necessary to check up on the Hungarian allies, but the attempts that were made were apparently successful. The solution in 1941 by Dr. Döring of the Hungarian grille, while not of great strategic or tactical importance, was characterised by Otto Buggisch as brilliant.
Work on Rumanian traffic 1941-1944
Very little is known of the work of the Balkan section on Rumanian traffic from 1941 to 1944. According to Mettig, the monitoring of Rumanian traffic ceased in 1941, due to the high priority given to Russian traffic and the chronic shortage of staff. However, in 1941, monitoring appears to have resumed. In 7/VI stated that Rumanian traffic was completely monitored at that time, and that the Balkan section was reading a Transposition cipher which was decoded with comparative ease. Other references to Rumanian systems were found in Herzfelds brief statement that the cryptanalysts of the Balkan section were working on Rumanian diplomatic code consisting of 5 or 6 figure groups. KONA 4 evaluation centre while stationed in Belgrade from September to December 1944 worked on Rumanian traffic.
Work on Yugoslav traffic 1941-1944
With the insistence of the German government that Yugoslavia align itself with Nazi party policy in the spring of 1941, and the consequent wave of Yugoslav national resistance, the Balkan section of the unit and KONA 4 undertook the heavy burden on monitoring the various types of Yugoslav traffic.
These types were:
The traffic of the friendly (to Germany) Croatian Home Guard (World War II), (Domobrani) and the Ustaše military units of the puppet government established by Germany in 1941.
The traffic of the Chetniks under General Draža Mihailović in communication with the Yugoslav government in exile, who resisted German aggression.
The traffic of the Yugoslav Partisans under Marshall Josip Broz Tito.
The traffic of the Croatian Peasant Party led by Dr Vladko Maček.
When the German government established the puppet government of Croatia in 1941, the Croats were given the commercial model of the Enigma for use by the Army and Secret police (State Security Administration) The traffic of these units was read by the Balkan section currently without any delay. According to Buggisch, the solution of this traffic was not an outstanding cryptanalytic achievement for the following reasons:
The machine used was the Enigma K with three wheels and no stecker or Plugboard.
The wheels of the machine were wired for the Croats by the German firm of Konski and Krüger which habitually gave the wiring to the Armed Forces Radio Communications who gave them to OKH/Chi.
A single key was used throughout the entire Croat Army and area, and this consisted of a list of 100 settings per month.
The ring setting () (Enigma machine#Rotors) of the wheels remained at the position of AAA.
The wheel order 1,2,3 was always used.
Just to make sure, however, Buggisch added;the Germans paid for one of the first keys used, and with this decoded traffic were able to establish stereotypes and solve almost 100% of the traffic from the first.Although Buggisch did not recall the contents in details, he stated in interrogation that there were some interesting messages about actions against Tito. He also stated that Germany had intended equipping the Croats with the plugboard Enigma, but they had decided against this since they believed the corrupt Croats would continue to sell the keys to British agents. In that case, OKH/Chi would have to pay for the keys used by the Croats instead of solving them as they could with the commercial Enigma.
Rudolf Hentze of In 7/VI stated that the Balkan section was successful with the double transposition used by Croats but nothing is known of this system.
Herzfeld stated that the Dombrani and Ustaše used a 5-Figure code based on a former Yugoslav military code. Evidence is lacking about the actual results obtained but it is probable that the system was solved since the former code was known.
Solution of the systems of General Draža Mihailović and Marshall Josip Broz Tito was divided between a unit of KONA 4 in Belgrade and the Balkan section of OKH/Chi. The breaking of easy guerilla techniques, particularly the solution of daily recypherings, was carried on at Belgrade by a special detachment, NAZ W which had served in 1941 under Wollny as an evaluation centre for Section III Armed Forces Radio Communication Branch () (AgWNV/FU III). With the assumption by the unit of work against the enemies Tito and Mihailović, the detachment came under Army control and was attached to KONA 4.
The solution of the more difficult systems was carried on at OKH/Chi by the Balkan section under the immediate supervision of Rudolf Bailovic, who was a specialist in Slavic traffic, and a specialist in the systems of Mihailović and Tito.I-51 p. 5
Herzfeld, a member of the Balkan section of OKH/Chi from 1941 to the capitulation, had written two reports, or homework for TICOM, specifically I-52 and I-69, that has a full discussion of the Yugoslav systems worked on by that section. The traffic of Mihailović was entirely double transposition with fixed key length and key word. They were regularly, if slowly, solved at In 7/VI with the aid of stereotyped phrases, frequency charts, and other well known cryptanalytic methods. Herzfeld stated that it took one to three days to break a single message.
The systems of Tito were far more varied, most of them of Russian origin. In I-69, Herefels lists among the Tito systems broken at In 7/VI as:
A simple letter or 2-figure substitution system used for enciphering messages sent by brigades and partisan units to Tito divisions in 1944.
A simple substitution key with short reciphering set used below division level in 1944.
Simple 2-figure substitution key with nulls and short recyphering set used below division level in northern and western Yugoslavia and Bosnia in 1944, possibly also used in Serbia and Macedonia.
Multi-columnar substitution key used for traffic between divisions and brigades in Slovenia, western Croatia and western Bosnia in 1944.
An Albanian multiple substitution key used by Tito partisans of Albanian nationality (National Liberation Movement).
Variable substitution key with short reciphering set, the main cipher above division until June 1944.
The system which succeeded the variable substitution key with short reciphering set was called Tito's Novo Sifra. It was used after June 1944 above division level and was not broken by In 7/VI. Herzfeld claims that it could have been broken with sufficient traffic and close scrutiny.
For a while the new system proved secure but regional commands obviously found it cumbersome and reverted to old insecure systems. Thus the Germans could read a lot of Partisan traffic even after mid-1944. Marshall Tito had close relations with the Soviet Union and during the war he was in constant contact with Moscow through a radio link. This traffic obviously became a target for the Germans and they investigated it in 1944 without finding a theoretical solution.
In the autumn of 1944, work on Tito traffic was increased. Besides the unit stationed in Belgrade under Wollny, the Evaluation Centre of KONA 4 was moved from Athens to Belgrade and began work on Tito ciphers. NAZ G, which had been working on Greek Partisan traffic was also moved from Thessaloniki to Sarajevo to cover Yugoslav traffic.
The only reference to the work of the Balkan section of OKH/Chi on Croatian resistance movement ciphers was that they were cryptanalysed by KONA 4 and rechecked by the OKH/Chi Balkan section.
In general, it may be said that the work on Yugoslav ciphers and codes was successful. The ciphers of Tito and Mihailović formed the most important part of the work of that section with Rudolf Bailovic performing the bulk of the work.
Work on Turkish traffic 1941-1944
Both the intercept and decoding of Turkish traffic was handled largely by signal units subordinate to KONA 4. NAZ T, which was stationed in Graz, worked only in Turkish traffic. At first it had intercepted Turkish Navy and Merchant Marine traffic as well as Turkish Land Forces and Police traffic, but certain disagreements arose with the Kriegsmarine over the interception of the Navy and the Marine traffic and this was abandoned.
The police traffic of Turkey is described as:
Simple transposition used by the police departments of Ankara, Edirne, Istanbul, İzmir for police matters only
Two letter or figure code used for police counter-intelligence with police agents
Two or three letter code used for agent traffic
The Turkish Army codes were mainly transposition codes with a key word, sent in five letter groups preceded by a 4-figure number. All these systems were decoded by NAZ T and were set to OKH/Chi simply for the purpose of checking all work.
One special Turkish code is mentioned as having been read by either OKH/Chi or NAZ T, and that was the special code used by the President of Turkey İsmet İnönü, while sailing on the State Yacht, the Savarona. This code was used in 1943 for radio messages, while the President was on the yacht, and not used afterwards.
Sometime in 1942 to 1943, OKH/Chi received from the Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry (), the mission of solving certain Turkish diplomatic traffic. This the Balkan section did under the supervision of Bailovic, with the decoded traffic being sent to the Forschungsamt. The traffic was used by the military attaches for their reports from Russia, Bulgaria and Italy, and that it was read continually by In 7/VI. TICOM knew from other sources that this traffic proved to be a very valuable source of information concerning Russia. Mettig remembered a number of reports from the winter of 1943–1944 on the Russian military situation and the preparations for an offensive. Despite many warnings from British sources that the traffic was being read, Turkey failed to change the system, and the reading of Turkish diplomatic traffic remained a constant source of information.
Work on agents traffic 1941–1944
The Agents section of OKH/Chi was established in 1942. Before that time, the activities of this section which consisted of radio security inside Germany and monitoring of illegal transmissions had been carried out by Section III of the Armed Forces Signal Communication Group (AgWBNV), Radio Communication Group 3 () (AgWNV/FU III). The unit was subordinated to Generalleutnant Fritz Thiele. Thiele was succeeded by Wilhelm Gimmler when Thiele was hanged on piano wire on 4 September 1944 at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin. Gimmler was also later hanged on piano wire for the same event.
In 1942, however, it seemed necessary to establish a deciphering section specialising in agents' ciphers. Fu III wanted to set the unit up within it own organisation but the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Army High Command opposed the establishment of another cryptanalytic agency. As a result of their opposition, it was agreed to set up a section for agents' traffic with an existing cryptanalytic organisation. In 7/VI was chosen as OKW could not spare the personnel, in light of the fact that OKH/Chi had previously raided OKW/Chi for personnel to establish In 7. The agents section was thus attached to OKH/Chi although it appears to have maintained the close relation with Fu III, housing itself near FU III and moving with it, in November 1943 to Jüterbog.
The agents section was commonly called the Vauck section or Vauck Referat or Referat Vauck and named after its chief cryptanlayist Wilhelm Vauck. Mettig gave great credit to the work of Dr Vauck saying that this section achieved good results because of Vauck's leadership and his personnel cryptanalytic successes. The section was not large consisting of about 35 people in the main section, ten at outposts in Paris and Brussels, and other cities, with eight lent to the Polish section of OKW/Chi. Recognised traffic was decoded in the outstations, the rest was sent to Berlin. All traffic, moreover, was sent to Berlin in duplicate.
The cryptanalytic methods employed by the Vauck section differed from normal methods of solution because of the peculiar nature of the Agents' systems. When in spring 1942, when Referat Vauck started work on finding a solution to Allied agents' traffic, it was confronted with a completely new and difficult task. Success could not be achieved using the normal methods of cryptanalysis on Army or diplomatic ciphers. The peculiar construction of agents' ciphers and in particular the frequent changes of ciphers, demanded a new method of approach. Agent cryptographers had not only to be highly enthusiastic about their work and very flexible in their approach, but it was also desirable that a percentage, that was considerably higher than normal cryptography, had to be expert linguists.
The early research work of the Referat, carried out in close cooperation with the evaluation section of Fu III, was devoted to clarifying the use of Call signs, and to ascertaining systems of indicator groups and coding tables in different procedures. Material, in the shape of old messages which had been gathered in the past, was re-examined. Simultaneously a search began for possible source of compromise within the various ciphers under investigation.
To supplement this research work an arrangement was made with the appropriate agencies to allow representatives of Referat Vauck to take part in important arrests and in the interrogation of agents. Owing to a shortage of personnel in the Referat it was impossible to take full advantage of this concession. The concession was granted as it was recognised that when an agent was arrested and no cryptographer was present, cipher material, which was usually well camouflaged, was not recognised as such and therefore could not be properly utilised. Furthermore, the material was often not evaluated correctly and delays ensued in forwarding it. Sometimes ambitious amateurs wished to earn credit for themselves by exploiting cipher material. Another danger lay in the fact that when cipher experts were not present, agents might tend to give false or imaginary cipher information. In these cases the presence of an expert was of great value. Agents under interrogation who saw that their cipher methods had been compromised usually gave good signals information. Once the value of Dr Vauck's assistance was recognised, his section were frequently called in to assist the Abwehr and Gestapo in their work.
It became possible, with the advice of Referat Vauck, either to turn around more agents, or to play back the agent's wireless personality using German personnel. Errors occurred in this field when signals personnel were not present. Thus in the beginning of 1944, it was ascertained that two allied agents, who had been turned around by the Abwehr, were operating in a villa southeast of Bordeaux and were being handed clear messages for encipherment and transmission, without any supervision.
Work on Czech agents traffic
The Vauck section worked on Agents' traffic of the Czechoslovak Resistance movement. Mettig believed that the solving of the 1942-1943 of two links running to England made possible the arrest of British agents in Czechoslovakia, one of them a captain. The greatest success was achieved by intercepting the wireless communication of the Czechoslovak Resistance movement in London. This was the only case in which Mettig is certain that it was possible for the Vauck section to solve an agent network by purely cryptanalytic means, and this was largely through breaches of security on the part of the Czech chief. After the system had been solved, the book for enciphering was found and the key recovered. In September 1942, the Czechs were about to go over to a new system, but were foolish enough to name in the old system, the book to be used for enciphering in the new system. Contents of messages solved on this link were nearly always concerned with reports on the political situation and activities of the Czech Resistance Movement, and were so important that for a long time, the W/T traffic was allowed to continue unhindered.
Work on Yugoslav agents traffic
Work on Yugoslav Agents' traffic was carried on by a detachment in Belgrade under Lt. Wollny. This detachment had been under Group III of FU III but was attached in 1942 to KONA 4 because all fighting against hostile organisations such as Draža Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito was directed by the Army. Traffic which was not solved in this detachment was sent to the Balkan section of OKH/Chi for a solution.
Work on Southern France and Spain agents traffic
Agents' traffic in southern France and Spain emanated largely from the United States, Great Britain and Spanish Republican Army who were in radio contact with stations in Spain. To cope with this traffic, a camouflaged branch station was established in Madrid and the intercepted traffic passed to Referat Vauck for processing.
Work on Soviet Union Agents traffic
Mettig knew of three important Russian Agents' networks: The Red 3 (), the Schulze-Boysen case, named after its leader, Harro Schulze-Boysen and the two links running from Brussels. Mettig stated that these last named links were, as far as he knew, not solved. However it was known that this was the Red Orchestra (espionage)#The Trepper Group named after Leopold Trepper who eventually became a double agent, working against the Soviet Union. Mettig perhaps was not privy to this knowledge.
In addition to Mettig's account of the Red 3, two memoranda were written by Wilhelm Fenner, the chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi. Fenner reported that on 23 February 1943, his agency was asked by Vauck section to collaborate in work on certain messages of Soviet agents on the Red 2 net. By the end of March, the Vauck section had furnished Fenner's cryptanalysts, Peter Novopashenny, Trappe and Schmidt, with all the traffic in that system since September 1941 so that a start was made on a solution. Fundamental findings were communicated to OKH/Chi which enabled that organisation to solve the system roughly at the time, as did Fenner's group. After the initial solution, it was agreed that OKH/Chi should continue to work on the system, and Mettig stated that from this help the Vauck section discovered that the system was based on a book text. In the autumn of 1944, Vauck was reported to have told Mettig that the exact sending position of this net had been determined to be in Switzerland. A raid was planned but had to be cancelled as Swiss authorities had forestalled the Germans. The station, according to Metting, was evacuated and destroyed before the Germans could take action.
The story of the second Soviet net, the Shulze-Boysen net operating from Berlin in 1942, is equally dramatic. This net received its name from First lieutenant ) Harro Schulze-Boysen, whose house was the centre of a communist inspired espionage agency operating on a large scale. When the first inroad into this traffic was made by the Vauck section, Dr. Lenz, one of the members of Vauck's section, mentioned the name Schulze-Boysen to another member of the Vauck section named Haymann who frequented the Schulze-Boysen house. Haymann warned Mrs Schulze-Boysen. Subsequently, both Haymann and Dr. Lenz were arrested, and Haymann condemned to death. Lenz was released and transferred to an out-station in Paris. With the aid of knowledge obtained from decoded traffic, the Gestapo made arrests of from 79 to 80 people of whom 70 were condemned to death. The case was kept strictly secret because many of the accused were employed in various agencies and were betraying secrets to Russia.
Work on Polish resistance movement traffic
The most notable results in the Agents' section were achieved in the interception and solution of the systems used by the Polish Resistance Movement, particularly during the Polish uprising in Warsaw in 1944. From information passed on this system, the dispositions of the Polish liberation troops as well as friction between them and the Russians could be established. It was possible, moreover, to solve all wireless traffic which the Polish government in London carried on with its organisations in Poland. In order to preserve secrecy and to insure quicker delivery of the solved message traffic, eight members of the Vauck section were transferred in the autumn of 1943 to the Polish section of OKW/Chi for work there. The Plain text was published by the OKW/Chi as Reliable Reports, with an extremely restricted distribution. To ensure complete radio intercept coverage, OKW/Chi ordered its outstation at Lauf an der Pegnitz also to intercept the traffic. Schubert, a cryptanalyst at GdNA, wrote a brief account of the systems used by the Polish resistance movement in which he stated that systems 006, 117, 118 and 181 were broken and that others were worked on. Most of them were simple 2-figure substitutions used without an indicator, with some variations in development and the use of basic keys and key phrases.
Work on German traitors traffic
Mettig stated that he once saw a report concerning a German who transmitted, by wireless to England, details of a newly constructed signals shelter in Berlin urgently requesting that it be bombed. No details of these were known by TICOM.
Linguistic research 1941-1944
Linguistic research during the years 1941-1944 was carried on at the OKH/Chi, by the section designated as the Linguistic Research Department (). Oberst Metting listed this section as one of the twelve sections of the original unit in 1942. Köhler was named by Mettig to manage this section in 1942 and Köhler remained head of the unit throughout the war, until November 1944, when the section was transferred from the GdNA to the OKW/Chi. Mettig claimed that it was contemplated that the members of the linguistic research section would advise the cryptanalysts on language problems and direct all matters of the Armed Forces concerning foreign languages. Although the plans were never realised, the nature of the work of the section can be inferred from these plans. It was known that the section would have had an exceedingly well stocked cryptographic library, including foreign maps in a large number of scales, journals, transport time tables, foreign reference works, extensive biographies of the enemy and other important categories of information related to cryptography in a wide variety of sources.
Mathematical research 1941-1944
According to Metting, Dr. Hans Pietsch was the Director of the Mathematical Research section. Pietsch had managed to collect the best available cryptanalysts, i.e. the best mathematical brains. The work of this section was twofold:
The investigation of all unsolved traffic from the various sections of OKH/Chi so long as it was necessary to achieve an inroad by purely analytics means.
The investigation of the security of current German Army systems.
To achieve these purposes, three subsections were found necessary. Subsections F, 7 and 13 are described above in 5.6.1.
Cryptanalysis work on subsection F 1941-1944
Subsection F of the mathematical section appears to have done some excellent work in the solution of the more simple machine systems used by foreign countries. The following are examples of solutions:
The discovery of theoretical methods of solving traffic in the Russian K-37 cipher machine (a B-211 cipher machine, after capture of a model in 1941).
Development of a technique for converting the relative settings, recovered for wheels of Converter M-209 on days when such solution was possible through reading of some of the traffic, into absolute settings, thus making it possible to read all the traffic sent on those days.I-113 p. 6
The discovery in 1943 of theoretical methods of solving messages send in the French B-211 cipher machine.
The reading of the de Gaulle traffic enciphered by the C-36 cipher machine.
The solution in 1944 of the Swedish Hagelin, the BC-38 by Johannes Marquart and Hilburg.
Dr S. Döring's solution in 1941 of the Hungarian grille should be counted as one of the achievements of this section. As has been stated previously, this section had no success with the large cipher machines such as the British Typex, the USA SIGABA, or the large Swedish Hagelin machine. The outstanding men of this section were named by Buggisch as Fritz Hilburg, Willi Rinow and Wuenoche.
Use of IBM in cryptanalysis 1941-1944
The Hollerith (IBM) section of OKH/Chi was derived from the IBM section established in 1939-1940 by the In 7/VI, at the suggestion of the mathematicians and former actuaries of this section, who knew Hollerith methods from civil life. It was natural that in 1942, when the study of the security of the German Army system was transferred from In 7/IV to In 7/VI, the use of Hollerith (IBM) machinery for security studies was transferred to OKH/Chi and quickly adapted for cryptanalytic work on foreign systems. The machinery used by OKH/Chi was mostly of German make, although a number of captured French IBM machines were included in the unit. The Hollerith section grew considerably in the course of time, both in respect of the number of machines the unit had and of the personnel engaged. In 1943, there were perhaps 20-30 female punchers engaged and about 20-30 soldiers who were Hollerith mechanics and such like in civilian life. Baurat Schencke was in charge. Hentze stated that in 1944, there were 30 key punchers, and 2 tabulators.
Some of the bigger Hollerith machines were always being provided with special new wirings for special cryptanalytic purposes, e.g. for non-carrying addition and subtraction in codes work. Most of the tasks, however, consisted of the usual statistic (bigrams, trigrams, chain statistics (), column statistics () and of simple figure-calculations, e.g. in work on Hagelin machines. Buggisch stated that as a rule, no tasks were undertaken which could not have been carried out by hand by perhaps 100 people in a reasonable time.
New Hollerith section
The limited width of the Hollerith card was soon found to be inconvenient, particularly in counting out of repeats for the purpose of lining-up () 2-cipher texts. The obvious solution appeared to be in this case to work with perforated strips and a 5-unit alphabet. Orders were given at the beginning of 1943 for the construction of such a machine. As Group VI only had a completely inadequate workshop at its disposal, and by that time it was already impossible to get any more tools, etc., an agreement was made with the Hollerith firm that a few more rooms, together with workshop machines and tools, in the factory buildings in Lichterfelde Ost be placed at the disposal of Section VI. An engineer from the Hollerith firm was placed in charge of this new section, but was found to be unsuitable. The repeat counting machine was ready in the autumn of 1943. It worked by the electromechanical principle, its speed was not considered very high, around 40 pairs of letters a second, and there was an idling period () that was considered inconvenient. Buggisch stated that when the Hollerith section was completed, none of the specialist sections performing practical cryptanalysis had any use for it, so that the question was justifiably raised as to why such an apparatus had been built at all.
Mechanical aids
In late 1943 to early 1944, the workshop began to be engaged on the construction of various mechanical aids, that cannot be described as cryptanalytic machines. A machine was created that automatically punched on Hollerith Punched cards, the Soviet T/P traffic taken on perforated strips with a 5-unit alphabet. Plans were made in the spring of 1944 for machines which were to perform certain calculation tasks such as arose during work on Hagelin machines, that were considered special calculating machines. Buggisch stated that, in short, Ag N/NA (OKH/Chi) had until June 1944, when Buggisch moved to OKW/Chi, no cryptanalytic machine which could be used for the practical solution of any codes or ciphers.
Summary
The major success obtained was the work on the Soviet 5-figure traffic. In the early stages of the Soviet campaign, it was comparatively simple to establish depths in these messages without the use of IBM, but by 1943 IBM machinery was indispensable for location depths. Buggisch stated that the lack of Hollerith machinery spurred the analysts of OKW/Chi to the development of new and better types of analytic devices while the OKH/Chi remained content with the inferior adaptations of IBM machinery. The German Army's general attitude concerning IBM machinery is hinted at in Buggisch's statement that the Enigma could probably be solved by a large enough array of Hollerith machinery, but it never occurred to him, evidently, that such would be contemplated by the enemy.
Towards the end of the war, the Hollerith machinery were outworn, outmoded and irreplaceable. The factories which had been producing parts were bombed out, and as the machines wore out, their work became inaccurate. In some instances, work by machine was abandoned. Mettig cited an example, in late 1944–1945, when In 7/VI, now reorganised as the GdNA, was to provide units below regimental level with signal tables. The values were to be set up by the Hollerith section, but the machine was no longer working correctly. As a result, the trigrams were not being reciprocally enciphered, so other methods of producing them had to be developed. In early 1945, the Hollerith section was offered to OKW/Chi, but Mettig stated that matter was never settled due to the confusion at the end of the war.
German Army cryptanalysis effort 1945
With the establishment of the GDNA in late 1944, all operational cryptanalysis was carried on by sections 2,3,4 of Group IV of the GdNA. There is no record of any new or difficult systems being solved after late 1944. The main effort of the GdNA was apparently directed to the deciphering of systems already solved and to the simple necessity of finding a place to operate. From February 1945 until the capitulation, Group V of the GdNA was constantly on the move seeking refuge in the south from the Allied advance.
German Army cryptographic systems
Training
Liaison
Liaison with the OKW/Chi
The relations of the GdNA and the OKW/Chi were conditioned by a number of important facts.
The office of Chief Signal Officer of the Armed Forces () (OKW/WFSt/Chef WNV) and Chief Signal Officer Army () (OKH/Chef HNW) were combined from August 1939 to the capitulation. The close relationship which evolved from this combined office is outlined by a German officer, interrogated by Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CDSIC), who was aide de campe to General Albert Praun Chef WNV and Chef HNV, who held the position from September 1944 until the capitulation. As Chef WNV, General Praun and his predecessors was directly subordinated to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl of Armed Forces Operations Staff () (WFST) was responsible for all signal operations and policy from inter-service and policy from an inter-service point of view. As Chef HNW, Praun was responsible for signal operations and policy with the Field Army, and in this capacity was subordinate to Generaloberst Heinz Guderian.
The GdNA and the OKW/Chi stemmed from a common origin, the Code and Ciphers section of the German Defense Ministry, as explained in [Ref 5.1], [Ref 4]
The close inter-relationship of these three organisations is reflected in the relationship among the officers who controlled them. Colonel Fritz Boetzel, who was codenamed Olga, in the Lucy spy ring, and passed secrets to Soviet Russia and Chief of the GdNA, had been from 1934 to 1939 head of the Code and Cipher section of the Defense Ministry. Generaloberst Erich Fellgiebel, who had been head of the Code and Cipher section of the Defense Ministry from 1931 to 1932 held of the office of Chef HNW and Chief Signal Officer Armed Forces (Chef WNF) from 1939 until 20 July 1944. Colonel Hugo Kettler who ended the war as head of OKW/Chi had also been head of HLS Ost. Lt. Col. Mettig, second in command of OKW/Chi and Director of OKH/In 7/VI from November 1941 to June 1943
Close collaboration of OKW/Chi and the GdNA can be traced in a number of recorded instances from 1939 to the capitulation. In 1939, Dr Erich Hüttenhain, chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi was sent by that organisation to the Intercept Station of the Army at Frankfurt to collaborate with the Army on the solution of the new French Army system,[Ref Secion 8]. The most cordial relationship between the organisations is manifest in his memoranda on his visit to Frankfurt. He stated:
"When I was saying goodbye to the military head of the evaluation section of Army Group C at the termination of my attachment in Frankfurt. the head of the evaluation section expressed his regret to me that he could not present to me with some sign of outward recognition for work successfully carried out in Frankfurt. To that I replied that success attained was not due to the effort of an individual but was the result of development and common effort and that if outward recognition should reward this work, Herrn Trappe (Chi OKW), Schmidt (chi OKW) and Professor Dr. Ludwig Föppl should likewise be remembered. The head of the project thereupon told me that these gentlemen would be similarly distinguished. In the course of the conversation, I said that for us, the finest recognition, was the knowledge that important intelligence, which could serve as the basis for the further conduct of the war, had been sent to GHQ. The head of the project replied that he quite understood this attitute but he would like to make military departments appreciate our work at the full value, for up to now they have shown little understanding of the difficulties of such work. At the same time, the head of the project requested me to convey his thanks to the OKW/Chi for the assistance given to the military deciphering section and remarked that in his opinion such a large deciphering (deciphering) task could not be done by OKH either now or in the near future".
In 1942, OKW/Chi sent a special Soviet party to the HLS Ost to collaborate with cryptanalysts there in the solution of a Russian 5-figure code. Professor Dr. Peter Novopashenny who was Director of the party returned to Berlin in the autumn of 1943, but his cryptanalysts were absorbed into the unit at HLS Ost.
OKW/Chi also collaborated with the Agents section of OKH/Chi [Ref 8.2.7.7] on the solution of Soviet agent traffic. The memoranda of Wilhelm Fenner, chief linguist at OKW/Chi, give a detailed picture of the nature of this collaboration.
On 23 February 1943, Fenner's department was asked by Section III of the AgWNV, i.e. Radio Communication Group 3 (AgWNV/FU III) to collaborate with the Agents' section of OKH/Chi in work on certain Soviet agents' traffic. By the end of March In 7/VI had furnished Fenner's section with all traffic in that system intercepted since September 1941, so that a start was made on solution. Fundamental findings were communicated to In 7/VI, which enabled its Agents' section to break into the system roughly at the same time as did Fenner's group. After the initial solution, however, it was agreed that OKH/Chi should continue the work on this system, while the OKW/Chi started work on another system. From then on, relations became somewhat strained because of the non-cooperative traffic to Fenner's section. The basic cooperation of the two departments, however, is noteworthy.
One of the most striking instances of cooperation between the OKW/Chi and the GdNA and OKH/Chi its predecessors is manifest in the work of the two agencies on Polish Resistance Movement Systems. During the years of 1943 and 1944, the Agents' section of AgN/NA was able to intercept and solve the systems used by the Poles in their traffic with the Polish government-in-exile in London. From this traffic the disposition of the Polish liberation troops as well as the friction between them and the Soviets could be established. The traffic was considered so important that the 8 members of the Agents' section were transferred in the autumn 1943 to the Polish section of OKW/Chi to work on solving the systems. The Plaintext was published by the In 7/VI in bulletins with extremely restricted distribution. The OKH/Chi also cooperated by intercepting this traffic at their own station at Lauf in order to be certain that it was completely covered. Speed in solving the traffic was obtained by having the messages sent to the IBM (Hollerith) section of AgN/NA for sorting. The work on Polish traffic thus appears to have been as much a joint project as is possible for two separate agencies to attempt.
Long before the time of official Chi-conferences held by Generalleutnant Wilhelm Gimmler, chief of the Armed Forces Communications Branch () (Chef AgWNV), the Army and the Armed Forces, Signal Intelligence Services worked together on security studies of German cryptographic machines and issued joint resolutions concerning their investigations. Among the papers of Dr. Erich Hüttenhain of OKW/Chi are memoranda, describing this cooperation. As early as December 1942, OKH/Chi, OKW/Chi, and Wa Prüf 7 proposed issuing a statement concerning improvements for the teleprinter T-52c to be submitted to the big executive committee Although it is known specifically what is meant by the big executive committee, it is possible that it may have been composed of officials of these same organisations. Throughout 1943, Generalmajor Fritz Thiele, who held the position of Chief of the Army Communications Chief () (Chef AfHNW) called conferences of representatives of the various services concerning matters of security. Otto Buggisch who worked in OKH/Chi early in the war, was one of the mathematicians of In 7/VI mentions conferences at which Dr. Karl Stein and Dr. Gisbert Hasenjaeger both of OKW/Chi were both stated to be present. The minutes of one of these conferences, dated 13 December 1943, have been published. It should be noted regarding these conferences, they were called by In 7/VI, and was held in the office of that unit at Mathaikirchlatz 4, Berlin. Those who took part were Major Kempe, Fricke, Kehren, mathematicians of OKH/Chi, Hans Pietsch, Döring of AgN/NA; representatives of Wa Prüf 7 and Hüttenhain, Stein and Hasenjaeger, mathematicians of OKW/Chi. From this evidence, it was clear that the later Chi-conferences called by Gimmler in 1944 were only a formal exteriorisation of an already existing relationship. This was the reason that Buggisch and Hüttenhain were able to minimise the efforts of Gimmler.I-84 p. 4 Both observe that the conferences did not foster a closer relationship among the services. The cooperation of Army and Armed Forces had been one of the closest nature for many years, but the collaboration with other services was not improved.
At the formal Chi-conferences and at the official Army-Air-Naval conferences of 1944, the Armed forces could always depend upon the full cooperation of the Army. The completeness of this cooperation is illustrated by the fact that when OKW/Chi was ordered to take over the supervision of all duties of all security studies within the Armed Forces, on the order of Generaloberst Albert Praun, the Army compiled by transferring to OKW/Chi all personnel of In 7/VI and of the security sections of the Mathematical Section of AgN/NA.
In the field of machinery used for general cryptanalysis and security studies, the OKW/Chi (Armed Forces) and the In 7/VI (Army) appear to have informed each other fully concerning their respective developments although no exchange of machinery was made. As early as 1939 to 1940, the mathematicians and former actuaries who had been drawn (conscripted) into OKH/Chi suggested the use of Hollerith (IBM) equipment for statistical studies. This led to an extensive use of the kit for these types of studies. When the studies were transferred from the In 7/IV to OKW/Chi in 1942, the Hollerith machine kit was developed by the unit for both security studies and cryptanalytic work. It is not known whether the OKW/Chi (OKW/Chi Machinery) had its own Hollerith section separate from those of the Army or not.
Mettig and Buggisch both state that it had no Hollerith unit, but had a certain dependency on the In 7/IV unit. It was known later, that OKW/Chi had to build its own custom machinery, as it was unable to obtain sufficient Hollerith machinery. The In 7/IV unit Hollerith kit was used at the request of the OKW/Chi for instance, when for example, the preparation of 3-Letter codes for the use of Army, was performed at the Hollerith unit. In early 1945, the Hollerith unit was offered to OKW/Chi but was never carried out. It was known that the machinery was exceedingly out of calibration, and needing extensive repairs, that were never done due to severe lack of material and resources.
The relations of the OKW/Chi and GdNA could be summarised as complete cooperation. Although the problem domains of the two units were quite distinct, with OKW/Chi dealing specifically with diplomatic traffic, the GdNA with a variety of Army and Hand ciphers and codes, joint problems were dealt with by the two agencies, and in complete accord.
The general lack of collaboration between OKW/Chi and GdNA did not point to lack of coordination at senior administrative function, nor to professional jealously between the two agencies. Essentially the two agencies had two distinct operational foci. OKW/Chi was diplomatic and OKH/Chi was a military agency. Therefore, there was little need for detailed collaboration.
Liaison with the B-Dienst
The Signal Intelligence agency of the Kriegsmarine (navy) was B-Dienst of () III of the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM/4 SKL III) or colloquially as B-Dienst, appeared to have little liaison with the GdNA and its predecessors. Wilhelm Tranow, the chief cryptanalyst of B-Dienst, stated that the Navy cooperated with the Army until early 1944, but that thereafter the attempt at cooperation was given up since no results of value were obtained.
The collaboration, where it existed, between the two agencies dealt principally with, M-209 and Hollerith procedures. In both instances, it so happened that the Navy received more from the Army than it gave.
Collaboration between B-Dienst and In 7/VI began in 1943 when OKH/Chi passed over to the B-Dienst and Luftwaffe Luftnachrichten Abteilung 350, the technique of recovering true settings from relative settings in the M-209 solution. Thereafter, according to Lt. Müntz of B-Dienst there was considerable liaison between the three services in regard to M-209 and they all exchanged all techniques. Shulze another cryptanalyst with B-Dienst, stated that in his investigations of the M-209 he met Dr S. Steinberg of OKH/Chi and that they had a detailed discussion of the methods used by the German Army, Navy and Air Force for solution of this system. From these discussions, Shulze concluded that B-Dienst was superior in the matter of solving a trafficked message, the OKH/Chi in reconstructing the internal settings. This was primarily due to the OKH/Chi having more material to work on, and could depend upon having a few messages in depth, whereas the B-Dienst never got traffic with identical settings. Schulze persuaded the OKH/Chi to give B-Dienst some M-209 material in depth with which they could carry out experiments in OKM/4 SKL III to expedite the solution of the message.
In regard to collaboration of Hollerith procedures, Wilhelm Tranow readily admitted that the Army first conceived of using IBM Hollerith machinery for cryptanalysis. In March 1942, the B-Dienst, the Luftwaffe Luftnachrichten Abteiling 350 and Görings Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry (FA) visited the Hollerith section of In 7/VI in Berlin. Tranow stated:On this occasion, I came to the conclusion that there were enormous possibilities in the Hollerith system for our work alsoTranow immediately started working to obtain some of the Hollerith machinery for B-Dienst, but found it difficult at that time. From March to May 1942, B-Dienst sent work to the Naval Armaments Economic Section for processing. The Economic section agreed to do the work if Tranow could furnish his own staff. Here again Tranow had trouble, since B-Dienst had very few Hollerith specialists. Tranow was forced to approach OKW/Chi to obtain personnel in a like for like basis. By May 1942, Tranow stated that B-Dienst was able to carry out the task. According to Mettig, however, in June 1942, OKH/Chi undertook a considerable volume of Hollerith work for B-Dienst. It seems reasonable to suppose that this was true, and that Tranow conveniently forgot this favour on the part of the OKH/Chi. In September 1944, according to a Navy document, B-Dienst was still collaborating with the Army on Hollerith procedure. Tranow never considered the matter of obtaining Hollerith to be true collaboration as it did not involve any solution to B-Dienst ciphers.
As a matter of general policy, B-Dienst High Command disapproved of indiscriminate exchanges amongst the Military cipher bureaux. Lt Müntz stated that the Director of his section Franke, disapproved of contact with other agencies, and maintained contact with OKH/Chi regarding M-209 solution matters, due to it being seen as a security risk. Leutnant Schubert of GdNA stated that he personally could not bring about closer relations between the two agencies.I endeavoured to achieve cooperation between OKH/Chi and B-Dienst. This task was of no concern to me. A naval officer was detached for six weeks who looked at all Army systems originating in the west and east and I went with him to attempt some settlement. I tried to collaborate but later events upset things. There are practically no points of contact between the Army and NavyWilhelm Tranow of the B-Dienst knew Dr Schauffler slightly and they had once collaborated over Japanese intercepts, but Tranow never had the time to address them.
Tranow later stated that, with the Army, the Navy had few occasions to work with them. Their operational and tactical problem domains were too dissimilar to stimulate effective collaboration. Admiral Karl Dönitz, stated:[he] had no knowledge of the cryptanalytic bureau's maintained by the other services and departments... As for civil bureau's, he had never tried to find out, [as] they were of no use to him.
Liaison with the Luftwaffe Luftnachrichten Abteilung 350
Before the Luftwaffe established its own Signals Intelligence Agency, (OKL/LN Abt 350), in 1937, the Army fixed Intercept Station, the Feste associated with Army Groups, worked with the corresponding intercepted Air Signals Abteilingen, to intercept traffic. According to Ferdinand Feichtner of the Luftwaffe, the Army did not give air traffic sufficient attention as it was required, and the Luftwaffe became increasingly dissatisfied with the Army's work. In 1936, the Luftwaffe began the formation of its own Signal Intelligence Service, although for three years, it had a close relationship with the Army. Luftwaffe airmen underwent familiarisation training at Feste units and the first Luftwaffe intercept stations were established according to the Army's prototypes. By 1939, the dependence of OKL/LN Abt 350 on the Army was ended.
During the succeeding period (1939-1945) relations between the two agencies were particularly good in field operations. This was fostered by such means as unification of signal regulations, a regular exchange of liaison officers, working personnel, equipment, reports, raw traffic and cryptanalytic methods, between the two agencies.
Minutes from a Chi-conference held in October 1944, stated that the OKH/Chi and LN Abt 350 attempted to coordinate their signal regulations. According to the minutes preserved among the papers of Erich Hüttenhain, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Gimmler, Chef AgWNV, stated that one special difficulty in signal communications was the fact that the diverse parts of the Armed Forces used different wireless and cipher phraseology. In response to this, Lt. Col. Schulze of the Luftwaffe stated that by means of far-reaching assimilation of Heer and Luftwaffe regulations, the difficulties arising in those services from different wireless and cipher phraseology would soon be overcome. This attitude of cooperation between the Heer and the Luftwaffe is typical and extended to all echelons.
A regular exchange of liaison officers between the Heer and the Luftwaffe field units was maintained both on the eastern and western fronts. In the west, from 1942, a Luftwaffe liaison officer had been stationed with NAAS 5 of KONA 5 stationed at St. Germain. Major Hentze of KONA 5, stated that the two units worked closely together, and Hentze showed familiarity with the unit there, its complement and its work.
One of the chief duties of the OKH/Chi liaison officer at the Luftwaffe post was to keep the ground situation map up to date from Luftwaffe reports. Of the OKL/LN Abt 350 liaison officer at an OKH/Chi post, among other duties, they passed requests to Luftwaffe for support.
Friendly liaison between commanders and men of units of the Luftwaffe and Heer that were closely associated in the field was a source of contact. Oberst Muegge was commander of KONA 4 and Obsert Rosenkrantz, who was an old friend of Muegge had a Luftwaffe Signals station there. When Muegge moved to Italy in 1943 as commander of KONA 7, Rosenkrantz was also posted to the same location.
Much of the interchange of men and equipment between field units of the Luftwaffe and Heer was caused by the fact that the Heer had no very long distance-finding sets, and depended upon equipment and reports from the Luftewaffe to compensate for this deficiency. Major Franze Oelijeschläger, Chief of III/LN. Rgt. 4, the Signal Intelligence Service of Luftflotte 4 of the Luftwaffe, with about 800 personnel, stated that the KONA regiments willingly detached direction-finding parties to reinforce the Luftwaffe effort and the Luftwaffe was always open to receive Army requests for use of D/F equipment. Muegge told interrogators that as commander of KONA 7 in Italy, he borrowed two Luftwaffe D/F sets with long and short.
The field unit NAA 11 stationed in Finland relied on the D/F reports from the Luftwaffe.
Intelligence of all types were exchanged at every level. Army Group HQ received from the local Luftwaffe office the Immediate Reports, the Daily Reports and the Fortnightly Reports.I-130 p. 11
Liaison with Pers Z S
There were few examples of collaboration between the GdNA and Pers Z S at the senior administrative level. Dr Otto Buggisch, formerly of Inspektorate 7/VI and later OKW/Chi, gave the only available information to TICOM. Dr Buggisch worked in the French language group in OKH/Chi from November 1941 until August 1942 and during this period he collaborated with Dr Kunze on a five-digit DeGaulle code. He also worked with Kunze regarding the Swiss Enigma General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) stated he did not receive any decodes as they went directly to the Foreign minister, but knew in a general way Pers Z S professionalism and commitment. The general lack of collaboration between Pers Z S and In 7/Vi did not point to lack of coordination at senior administrative function, nor to professional jealously between the two agencies. Essentially the two agencies had two distinct operational foci. Pers Z S was diplomatic and OKH/Chi was a military agency. Therefore, there was little need for detailed collaboration.
Liaison with the Forschungsamt
Liaison between the Forschungsamt and In 7/VI was characterised in general by narrowness of approach and mutual animosity of feeling. This was true, apparently at every level. Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations of the Armed Forces, told interrogators that he knew little of Hermann Göring's Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry (Forschungsamt):
"..it was a large office and efficiently organised, but Göring's special affair, he only knew about it from conversation and indirect hearsay. There seemed to him to be a great deal of duplication going on."
Buggisch of In 7 stated that this was because Mettig, Director of In 7/VI from 1941 to 1943, was opposed to the Storm Trooper taint of the Research Bureau. Sauerbier of the RLM/Forschungsamt, claimed that narrowness of the Directors of the Forschungsamt, affected relations of that organisation with other bureaux, including the GdNA.
Whenever liaison did occur, it was via a single representative, and never involved any exchange of visits. Klautsche, who was the RLM/Forschungsamt liaison officer after 1943, maintained an office at the OKW/Chi and passed material to the B-Dienst, Luftwaffe and German Army. Klautsche is said to have passed on intelligence material to the Army General Staff, Western Armies Branch and Eastern Armies Branch.
The lack of contact between personnel of the Forschungsamt (FA) and the GdNA was very apparent from interrogations. Fricke, who was a prominent mathematician in OKH/Chi who was later transferred to OKW/Chi, stated that he had never seen any personnel from the Forschungsamt until the war was over and they turned up in prison camps. Kurt Sauerbier of the Forschungsamt stated under interrogation that he did not know a single person in another cipher bureau.
There are a few instances of cooperation between the two agencies, but Otto Buggisch insisted it was very rare.
Liaison with Finland
The main Finnish unit was the RTK, the Radio Telepgraf Kompanie. Liaison with Finland was always close, both at HLS Ost, and in the eastern field units. Formal liaison at HLS Ost was maintained by a Finnish liaison officer stationed there, in Giżycko (Lotzen). This officer from 1942 onwards was a Lt. Mikko, and he was succeeded by Oberleutnant Ohn. The Finnish General Staff is said to have passed a copy of the Soviet 5-Figure cipher book to Germany, that was used in the first year of the war. OKH/Chi had a high opinion of Finnish cryptanalysts. Alexis Dettman stated that he had visited Finland in 1942, and had a very high opinion of the cipher bureau. Dettman had exchanged technical letters ever since that time. Liaison in the field is known in some detail from the reports of NAA 11, when it was subordinated to a unit in Finland.I-106 The first German Liaison officer to Finland was Hauptmann Johannes Marquart, who would later be Director of Referat Ia of Group IV of the GdNA and was later succeeded by Oberleutnant Riemerschmidt, stationed at Sortavala. Riemerschmidt had a direct link to NAA 11.
Liaison on all cryptographic matters was excellent. The liaison between NAA 11 and the Finns was divided into several types, including traffic liaison, cryptographic liaison and technical liaison. Results were exchanged every two or three days and NAA 11 varied its cryptographic priorities to give full attention to any special links required by the Finns, the request coming via Riemerschmidt. The Finnish crypt personnel were considered outstanding and the exchange of great benefit to NAA 11. Riemerschmidt also passed to NAA 11 information and solutions received at Sortavala from the LNA itself, and on one occasion, (the captured RZ 18000 code), this was faster than the direct transmission from LNA to NAA 11. The Finns solved 3Z and 4Z code extensively with emphasis on NKWD material. The Finns has no success with 5Z traffic and never captured any copies of these codes.
Finnish traffic analysis () was rated less highly. It was thought that this was due to the Finnish success with solving codes. Although they had about 20 men in the sector, they did not work systematically nor were they adept at grasping intelligence from the analysis of small amounts of traffic. Thus NAA 11 was able to give more than they got in this respect.
Technical liaison was also handled by Riemerschmidt and was far more helpful to RTK than to NAA 11. Finnish equipment was mostly German, with some British and American receiver units. Germany gave the Finns much advice but no physical help. On one occasion they put their own apparatus and men at the disposal of a Russian offensive, but otherwise there was no pooling or sharing of equipment. Much of the Finnish equipment was pre-1939, and old Marconi D/F equipment.
Liaison with Italy
Liaison between Germany and Italy was negligible as Germany had a complete lack of confidence in the Italians.
Liaison with Japan
According to all evidence, there was very little liaison between the Army and Japan. In 1943, two Japanese officers visited HLS Ost at Giżycko (Lotzen) for about half a day. According to Lt. Alexis Dettmann, of Referat III of Group IV, they were given a polite reception but shown very little of anything and were give no hints as to what solutions the OKH/Chi had reached on Russian traffic. The Japanese officials stated that they had solved the Russian OKK 6 and OKK 7 but just what help they provided the OKH/Chi, on these systems was not mentioned. Buggisch emphatically stated that he had never seen any Japanese in the flesh'' and knew of no liaison with Japan.
At the end of the war, Germany had decided to send a cryptologic mission to Japan by submarine. Including among the officers were Major Opitz, a German intercept officer, Schubert of HLS Ost and Morgenroth, a B-Dienst cryptanalyst. How little they knew about the Japanese Intelligence agencies is shown by the fact that they did not know whom they were to contact when they arrived in Japan, but were to ask the German Counter Intelligence unit in Japan for further instructions. The plan was not carried out due to the end of the war.
Notes
References
Bibliography
The Target Intelligence Committee documents:
External links
German Radio Intelligence by Lieutenant-General Albert Praun
Cryptography organizations
History of telecommunications in Germany
Signals intelligence agencies
Signals intelligence of World War II
Research and development in Nazi Germany
Military history of Germany during World War II |
52282000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrey%20Rogachev | Andrey Rogachev | Andrey Rogachev (, born January 17, 1964, in Tula, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, USSR) — is a Russian entrepreneur. He was the first Russian dollar billionaire who made a fortune not from privatization or trading in natural resources, but from producing environmental instruments. Rogachev is called the father of Russian retail. Now co-owner of Food trading platform AGRO24 and retail chain Vernii. He was formerly the co-owner of electronic payment system Spacard, co-owner of retail chain Pyaterochka , one of the ex-co-owners and directors of X5 Retail Group.
Early life
Andrey Rogachev was born on January 17, 1964 in Tula. In 1981 he entered the Leningrad Hydrometeorology Institute, where he graduated in 1986, majoring in Hydrology.
Career
In 1989, he created the Environmental Control Laboratory (LEK).
In 1991 Rogachev created electronic payment system Spacard and software to make trading operations between companies. Including electronic messaging system, a cryptography system, the second crypto currency in the world, plastic card with a unique method of encryption and data protection, a billing center, cash registers and portable payment terminals.
In 1998, Andrey Rogachev and his partners registered Agrotorg LLC. In February 1999 the company opened the first Pyaterochka store in St Petersburg; 15 more stores were opened by year-end. In 2001 Pyaterochka entered Moscow.
Following the merger with retail chain Perekrestok in 2006, X5 Retail Group was created; their main shareholders are Alfa Financial Group; Pyaterocka founders received approximately 25% of the shares (mainly owned by Rogachev and Alexander Gidra). In 2008, Rogachev quit X5's Board. In 2011 he sold his 11.14% of X5 shares, for approximately $1.38 billion. From 2010 he mainly focused on real property investments and other food retail businesses.
In 2012, Rogachev founded Verny, a chain of discounter stores «Vernii». At the beginning of 2015, the chain contained more than 400 stores in the Central, North-Western and in the Urals Districts of Russia.
In 2017 Rogachev together with Alexander Volchek (the founder of the biggest entrepreneur society «Business Molodost») launched Food Trading Platform AGRO24. Rogachev and Volchek are the founders and owners of the AGRO24 trading platform. The platform brings together suppliers, retailers and dealers and allows to conduct commercial transactions between them. The AGRO24 business model most similar to Bloomberg and 1688.com, which is a part of the Alibaba Group and is designed for wholesale b2b-trade between producers and buyers. Trading technology is easily integrated with smart contracts based on blockchain, crypto-currencies and other complex systems.
There is another example: mobile application Meicai created bridge between small farmers and restaurants. Investors considered its total value is $2.8B. Rogachev is telling that this is aim for AGRO24 in 2019.
Family
Rogachev is divorced with two children.
References
1964 births
Living people |
52328268 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSNP | OpenSNP | openSNP is an open source website where users can share their genetic information. Users upload their genes, including gender, age, eye color, medical history, Fitbit data. With a focus on user patient-led research (PLR), there is potential to redefine the way health research is conducted. "It promises to be a vital supplement to standard research: it can focus on conditions that are neglected by standard research, such as rare diseases or side effects, and can draw on a broader range of data and deliver outcomes more rapidly. It can also be a way of realising valuable forms of social interaction and support in cases where members of a community conduct PLR together, for example, patients suffering from the same illness."The name of the project is inspired by single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), which is a DNA variation at a specific location on a strand. Scientists have discovered that there is a correlation between certain SNPs and genetic predispositions such as Mendelian disease.
The code of the project is on GitHub and the CSS is licensed under the Apache 2.0 license.
Potential risks
Since openSNP is an open-sourced social network that is readily available on the internet, there have been questions raised surrounding privacy issues and other risks. Though the sign-up page warns potential users of the record lasting forever, participants must decide for themselves whether the benefits outweigh the pitfalls. As health research continues to progress, more and more scientific analysis places a greater role on PLR, leading to increased demands for a new social contract to secure conditions for participants. Human participant research not only places subjects into potentially harmful situations, but also can lead to other risks such as exploitation and self-experimentation under non-controlled environments. There is also the risk of biases and distortions "arising from self-reporting and self-collected data". However, at this current state and time, the effects of genetic discrimination are unknown due to the lack of evidence. "Till date no systematic evaluation of the true value of anonymity with respect to the cost of genome information and insight has been assessed in real-life settings. This would require appropriate availability of information including caveats to whole genome assessment and analysis"Still with the rise of open genomic research, privacy protection frameworks need strengthened efforts beyond "traditional legal and organizational safeguards", technical solutions such as data encryption, and mutual understanding. In a study an article done through the University of San Diego School of Law, Sejin Ahn discovered that perhaps the most critical solution that needs to be strengthened is the legislative ban on re-identification and anti-discrimination protection. Ahn explains that these remedies must be addressed and updated in order to protect participants from privacy breaches.
A survey of users of the site found that while most respondents 'were well aware of the privacy risks of their involvement in open genetic data sharing and considered the possibility of direct, personal repercussions troubling, they estimated the risk of this happening to be negligible'.
Potential benefits
The website provides a proof-of-concept mechanism for allowing anyone to be involved in any stage of genomics research. This model allows partnerships to form which can be independent of governments, academia or for-profit organisations and is a way of creating the enabling conditions for anyone access, influence and get involved in every stage of the genomics research cycle. The model reflects the value that users of such sites attach to sharing data as 'contributing to the common good of research'.
The transparent open-source code arguably allows greater scrutiny and oversight than similar closed-source projects.
History
The website was founded by German biologist, Bastian Greshake. Currently, he is earning a PHD degree in Applied Bioinformatics at the University of Frankfurt in Germany. He has previously earned a Master's in Ecology and Evolution.
In 2012, Greshake sent a vial of his saliva to 23andMe, a genomics company, to study his own DNA. His results suggested that he was at risk of prostate cancer, and then recommended to his father to receive a medical examination as well. The doctor found a growing tumor in his father's prostate and was able to catch it early. After receiving his results, he posted them on GitHub, hoping to find other users willing to share their personal genetic makeup. Upon realizing that many people were unwilling or did not include a lot of information that was necessary for scientific research, Greshake created openSNP."Maybe there are people who are interested in publishing their genetic information on the web to make it available, but those people don’t have the opportunity,"Though Greshake acknowledges that there are services that allow people to test their own genes and discover inherent predispositions, they are often expensive, or difficult to access. In 2013, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forced company 23andMe to stop marketing their spit-box screening tests due to lack of scientific evidence. However, in 2015, the FDA eased their restrictions and stated that carrier screening tests would not have to undergo preliminary review.
Greshake hopes that by making openSNP accessible and simple, it will not only attract the general public to get interested in their genetic makeup, but also to take it down innovative avenues, such as turning openSNP data into music.
Timeline
September 2011 - openSNP is released.
September 2012 - Fitbit data inclusion feature added, seeing as obesity is correlated with specific SNPs.
May 2014 - The website reached 1000 genotypings.
September 2015 - Crowdfunding campaign started on Patreon platform.
February 2016 - Code of Conduct is created that outlines appropriate behavior and general guidelines.
August 2016 - openSNP was a participant of Google Summer of Code.
References
Genealogy websites
Genealogy databases |
52368984 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric%20tokenization | Biometric tokenization | Biometric tokenization is the process of substituting a stored biometric template with a non-sensitive equivalent, called a token, that lacks extrinsic or exploitable meaning or value. The process combines the biometrics with public-key cryptography to enable the use of a stored biometric template (e.g., fingerprint image on a mobile or desktop device) for secure or strong authentication to applications or other systems without presenting the template in its original, replicable form.
Biometric tokenization in particular builds upon the longstanding practice of tokenization for sequestering secrets in this manner by having the secret, such as user credentials like usernames and passwords or other Personally Identifiable Information (PII), be represented by a substitute key in the public sphere.
The technology is most closely associated with authentication to online applications such as those running on desktop computers, mobile devices, and Internet of Things (IoT) nodes. Specific use cases include secure login, payments, physical access, management of smart, connected products such as connected homes and connected cars, as well as adding a biometric component to two-factor authentication and multi-factor authentication.
Origins
With the September 9, 2014 launch of its Apple Pay service, Cupertino, Calif.-based Apple, Inc. initiated the conversation surrounding use biometricsupported tokenization of payment data for point of sale retail transactions. Apple Pay tokenizes mobile users’ virtualized bank card data in order to wirelessly transmit a payment, represented as a token, to participating retailers that support Apple Pay (e.g. through partnerships and supported hardware). Apple Pay leverages its proprietary Touch ID fingerprint scanner on its proprietary iPhone line with, aside from cryptography, the added security of its Apple A7 system on a chip that includes a Secure Enclave hardware feature that stores and protects the data from the Touch ID fingerprint sensor. Apple Pay then, at least for payments, is credited with innovating in the space of biometric tokenization even if the use case was limited to payment convenience and security, restricted to the company’s own hardware and software, and despite the fact that executives did not publicly utter the phrase “biometric tokenization” or speak about the underlying technology.
While biometric tokenization and Apple Pay are similar, biometric tokenization as it is known today and particularly using the term verbatim is an authentication feature that goes beyond payment convenience and security. Other distinctive features are that biometric tokenization can be implemented on other operating systems such as OSX, Microsoft Windows, Google Android for password-less login to desktop and mobile applications.
Mechanics
Biometric tokenization like its non-biometric counterpart, tokenization, utilizes end-to-end encryption to safeguard data in transit. With biometric tokenization, a user initiates his or her authentication first by accessing or unlocking biometrics such as fingerprint recognition, facial recognition system, speech recognition, iris recognition or retinal scan, or combination of these biometric modalities. The user’s unique qualities are generally stored in one of two ways, either on-device in a trusted execution environment (TEE) or trusted platform module (TPM), or on a server the way other data are stored.
Biometric tokenization champions typically prefer biometric templates to be encrypted and stored in TEEs or TPMs so as to prevent large-scale data breaches such as the June 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management one. Biometric tokenization when aided by on-device storage of user data also can preserve internet privacy because user data are stored individually inside single devices rather than aggregated on ostensibly vulnerable servers. Moving biometric user credentials either for two-factor authentication or unqualified authentication, for example, off of servers and onto devices is a tenet of the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance, an industry consortium concerned with replacing passwords with decentralized biometrics.
The next step in biometric tokenization after the unlocking of user credentials in the trusted area of their device is for the credentials to be tokenized, with the token containing the precise data required for the action (e.g. login or payment). This access token can be time-stamped as in the case of one-time passwords or session tokens so as to be useful for a specific time period, or they may not be. With biometric tokenization this token is then validated by means of joint client-side and server-side validation, which occurs through a challenge-response token exchange. The user is then logged in, authenticated, or otherwise granted access.
Information Security
In order to achieve the highest level of privacy and protection when calculating and transmitting sensitive information, biometric tokenization leverages existing encryption algorithms, authentication protocols, as well as hardware trust zones. Combining some or all of these methods maximizes the level of protection needed to uphold the integrity of the process and security of data that could otherwise expose users to a breach of trust on a mass scale.
Encryption Algorithms in Use
ECDSA
RSA
ange
White-box cryptography
Software Obfuscation
Authentication Protocols in Use
Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)
Universal Authentication Framework (UAF)
Temporary OTP
Hardware Trust Zones in Use
Trusted Execution Environment
ARM TrustZone
Secure Enclave
References
Data security
Biometrics |
52372857 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J.%20Alex%20Halderman | J. Alex Halderman | J. Alex Halderman (born January 1981) is professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan, where he is also director of the Center for Computer Security & Society. Halderman's research focuses on computer security and privacy, with an emphasis on problems that broadly impact society and public policy.
Education
Halderman was awarded the A.B. summa cum laude in June 2003, the M.A. in June 2005, and the Ph.D. in June 2009, all in Computer Science from Princeton University.
Academic career
As a student at Princeton, Halderman played a significant role in exposing flaws in Digital Rights Management software used on compact discs. In 2004, he discovered that a DRM system called MediaMax CD-3 could be bypassed simply by holding down the shift key while inserting a CD. The company behind the system briefly threatened him with a $10 million lawsuit, landing him on the front page of USA Today. Later, in 2005, he helped show that a DRM system called Extended Copy Protection functioned identically to a rootkit and weakened the security of computers in which audio CDs were played. The ensuing Sony BMG copy protection rootkit scandal led to the recall of millions of CDs, class action lawsuits, and enforcement action by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
In 2008, Halderman led the team that discovered the cold boot attack against disk encryption, which allows an attacker with physical access to a computer device to extract encryption keys or other secrets from its memory. The technique, which was initially effective against nearly every full-disk encryption product on the market, exploits DRAM data remanence to retrieve memory contents even after the device has been briefly powered off. One version of the technique involves cooling DRAM modules with freeze spray to slow data decay, then removing them from the computer and reading them in an external device. It has become an important part of computer forensics practice and has also inspired a wide variety of defensive research, such as leakage-resilient cryptography and hardware implementations of encrypted RAM. For their work developing the attack, Halderman and his coauthors received the Pwnie Award for Most Innovative Research and the Best Student Paper Award from the USENIX Security Symposium.
At the University of Michigan, Halderman and coauthors performed some of the first comprehensive studies of Internet censorship in China and in Iran, and of underground "street networks" in Cuba. In 2009, he led a team that uncovered security problems and copyright infringement in client-side censorship software mandated by the Chinese government. The findings helped catalyze popular protest against the program, leading China to reverse its policy requiring its installation on new PCs. In 2011, Halderman and his students invented Telex, a new approach to circumventing Internet censorship, partially by placing anticensorship technology into core network infrastructure outside the censoring country.
With support from the United States Department of State, which called the technique a "generational jump forward" in censorship resistance, Halderman led a multi-institutional collaboration that further developed the technology and deployed it at ISP-scale under the name Refraction Networking. In 2015, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power brought him to New York to demonstrate the technology at a meeting alongside the General Assembly.
In 2012, Halderman and coauthors discovered serious flaws in random number generators that weakened the public-key cryptography used for HTTPS and SSH servers in millions of Internet of things devices. They disclosed vulnerabilities to 60 device manufacturers and spurred changes to the Linux kernel. Their work received the Best Paper Award at the USENIX Security Symposium and was named one of the notable computing articles of the year by ACM Computing Reviews. Halderman played a significant role in fixing several major vulnerabilities in the TLS protocol. He was a co-discoverer of the Logjam and DROWN attacks, and conducted the first impact assessment of the FREAK attack. The three flaws compromised the security of tens of millions of HTTPS websites and resulted in changes to HTTPS server software, web browsers, and the TLS protocol. Since they worked by exploiting remnants of ways in which older versions of the protocol had been deliberately weakened due to 1990s-era restrictions on the export of cryptography from the United States, they carried lessons for the ongoing public policy debate about cryptographic back doors for law enforcement.
Halderman's Logjam work also provided a plausible explanation for a major question raised by the Edward Snowden revelations: how the National Security Agency could be decoding large volumes of encrypted network traffic. By extrapolating their results to the resources of a major government, the researchers concluded that nation-state attackers could plausibly break 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key exchange using a purpose-built supercomputer. For a cost on the order of a hundred million dollars, an intelligence agency could break the cryptography used by about two-thirds of all virtual private networks. Snowden publicly responded that he shared the researchers suspicions and blamed the U.S. government for failing to close a vulnerability that left so many people at risk. The work received the 2015 Pwnie Award for Most Innovative Research and was named Best Paper at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
In 2013, Halderman and his graduate students created ZMap, a free and open-source security scanning tool designed for information security research.
By making efficient use of network bandwidth, ZMap can scan the Internet's entire IPv4 address space in under an hour, allowing researchers to quantify vulnerable systems, track the adoption of security patches, and even measure the impact of natural disasters that disrupt Internet access. Halderman and collaborators used it to track the OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability and raised the global rate of patching by 50% by warning the operators of unpatched web servers. Their work won the Best Paper award at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. In partnership with Google, Halderman's research group used ZMap to study the security of email delivery, highlighting seven countries where more than 20% of inbound Gmail messages arrived unencrypted due to network attackers. To mitigate the problem, Gmail added an indicator to let users know when they receive a message that wasn't delivered using encryption, resulting in a 25% increase in inbound messages sent over an encrypted connection. Halderman and his collaborators were recognized with the 2015 IRTF Applied Networking Research Prize.
In order to accelerate the adoption of encryption by web servers, Halderman in 2012 partnered with Mozilla and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to found the Let's Encrypt HTTPS certificate authority. Let's Encrypt provides HTTPS certificates at no cost through an automated protocol, significantly lowering the complexity of setting up and maintaining TLS encryption. Since its launch in 2016, Let's Encrypt has grown to protecting more than 150 million web sites. Halderman and his students laid the foundation for the IETF-standard protocol that clients use to interface with the CA, the Automated Certificate Management Environment. He sits on the board of directors of the Internet Security Research Group, the non-profit that operates Let's Encrypt. He is also a co-founder and chief scientist of Censys, a network security company that he says aims to "change the way security works by making it more quantitative, more precise, and more accurate."
In 2015, Halderman was part of a team of proponents that included, Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Nadia Heninger, and Andrea M. Matwyshyn who successfully proposed a security research exemption to Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Halderman was awarded a Sloan Research Fellowship in 2015 by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and in 2019 he was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He was profiled in the November 2016 issue of Playboy.
Electronic voting
After the 2016 United States presidential election, computer scientists, including Halderman, urged the Clinton campaign to request an election recount in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania (three swing states where Trump had won narrowly, while Clinton won New Hampshire and Maine narrowly) for the purpose of excluding the possibility that the hacking of electronic voting machines had influenced the recorded outcome.
On 21 June 2017, Halderman testified before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The hearing, titled "Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election" focused on the federal government's role in safeguarding U.S. elections from outside interference. Halderman discussed his own research in computer science and cybersecurity. He discussed one instance where he tampered with a voting machine and demonstrated the ability to change the outcome of an election. He also made three policy recommendations to safeguard U.S. elections: upgrading and replacing obsolete and vulnerable voting machines; consistently and routinely checking that American elections results are accurate; and applying cybersecurity best practices to the design of voting equipment and the management of elections. Halderman fielded questions from the Senators about his research and policy recommendations. At the end of the hearing, Chairman Burr praised Halderman for his work and noted how important his research is.
Following the 2020 United States presidential election, Halderman stated that a software glitch during the unofficial vote tally was not caused by fraud, but rather by human error, and said the conspiracy theory that a supercomputer was used to switch votes from Trump to Biden was "nonsense".
References
External links
J. Alex Halderman homepage
1980s births
Living people
American computer scientists
Computer security academics
Princeton University alumni
University of Michigan faculty |
52391323 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berta%20Daniel | Berta Daniel | Berta Daniel (born Berta Dick: 20 November 1896 - 7 April 1981) was a German photographer and political activist (KPD).
During the 1920s and 1930s she worked for the illegal News Service of the Communist Party in Germany and for the Comintern as an "agent". In 1937, while in Moscow, she fell victim to the Stalin purges and was sentenced to eight years (subsequently increased) detention in a camp. She survived, but it was only in 1957 that she was rehabilitated and able to return to what had by now become the Soviet sponsored German Democratic Republic.
Life
Berta Dick was born in Ulm. She was her parents' youngest recorded child: her six elder siblings were all brothers, however. Her father, Robert Dick (1851-1928) was a master tailor and a prominent local politician. By the time of her birth he was a social democrat city councillor in Ulm. Back in 1875 he had been a delegate at the congress in Gotha which had agreed the unification of the General German Workers' Association ("Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter-Verein" / ADAV) and the Social Democratic Workers' Party ("Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands" / SDAP), paving the way for the creation of the unified Social Democratic Party. It is apparent that, unlike her six elder brothers, she inherited her father's political passion.
After she left school she learned about photography from her brother. In 1914 she joined the "Young Workers" ("Arbeiterjugend"). In 1916 she became a member of the Spartacus league which had started as an anti-war group within the Social Democratic Party, but was now emerging as an independent left-wing anti-war movement. In 1919 she joined the Young Free Socialists ("Freie sozialistische Jugend") and in 1923 the recently launched Communist Party of Germany.
Meanwhile, in 1919 she had married the architect, originally from Stuttgart, Richard Daniel, a man who co-founded the local (Ulm) branch of the Communist Party at the end of 1919. Their daughter, Lore (1920-2010), was born in Ulm on 17 May 1920.
Berta Daniel was, from its beginning, a member of the "Anti-Militarist Structure" ("AM-Apparat"), an illegal Communist Party intelligence service which existed in Germany till 1937. By Autumn 1923 she was also responsible for administering party finances in the Stuttgart and Munich regions.
The times were troubled. Richard Daniel was arrested in Ulm on 1 September 1923 and detained for preparing military insurrection. He was released after three months and returned to Stuttgart. Then in February 1924 Berta Daniel was arrested in Ulm. While she was in prison her husband came to visit her with their four-year-old daughter, Lore, who was permitted to give her the orange they had brought for her. According to her later recollections, Lore then delighted her parents by asking the supervising prison guard if she might sing a little song to her mother. The child, who was already well steeped in the culture of radical socialism, then discomforted prison officials by singing all the verses of "Brüder, zur Sonne, zur Freiheit" ("Brothers, to the Sun, to Freedom"), a popular revolutionary song of the time. Berta Daniel was released after her father provided a guarantee on her behalf, and "went underground", living illegally (i.e. unregistered) in Berlin and other cities, while their daughter stayed with their father until he was arrested because of his own activities, after which she was sent to a children's home run by International Red Aid ("Internationale Rote Hilfe" / "Международная организация помощи борцам революции" IRH/МОПР), a Soviet sponsored workers' welfare operation. It was in Berlin that Berta Daniel worked between 1924 and 1930 for the (illegal) central European head office of the (illegal in Germany) IRH operation. Comrades with whom she worked in the IRH included Lenin's former assistant, Elena Stasova, and her fellow "AM-Apparat" member, Eugen Schönhaar. In 1928 it was possible for her daughter to join her. They lived discretely for a time with fellow extremists Erich and Zenzl Mühsam in the Mühsam's apartment on the soutside of central Berlin.
In December 1931 the couple and their daughter relocated to the Soviet Union where they settled in Moscow. During the first part of the decade, till 1935, Berta Daniel was employed as an archivist in Moscow. She combined this with a covert senior role - probably involving responsibility for encryption - with the Comintern's Intelligence agency, also identified as the Comintern International Liaison Department ("Отдел международных связей Коминтерна" ОМС/OMS). The work involved a significant amount of foreign travel. Towards the end of 1935 she was arrested and sentenced in Vienna for a passport infringement. On her release a year later, she returned to Moscow in December 1936.
The Soviet capital was by now the scene of a major and sustained purge of actual and presumed enemies of the leadership, with intelligence workers and foreigners particularly vulnerable to denunciation. Berta Daniel was arrested by the NKVD in March 1937. She faced trial on 19 November 1937 and was sentenced to eight years in a labour camp. Richard Daniel, who worked in Moscow as a building engineer, would be arrested in February 1938 and die in a labour camp at Kotlas in June 1942. Her daughter, now aged 21, was able to pay her a two-hour visit in 1940. During 1942 Berta Daniel faced another trial, in Novosibirsk. Details are sparse, but the trial concluded with a sentence lasting a further ten years. She was released in Tayshet at the end of 1952 after spending 15 years and 9 months in a succession of labour camps and other centres of detention between Moscow and Vladivostok. She was forcibly persuaded to remain in Tayshet. At some stage, however, she was able to obtain permission to go and live with her daughter, who had grown up while Berta Daniel was in the labour camps, and was now living in Kazan in Tatarstan, still a considerable distance to the east of Moscow.
One member of the intelligence community who had not fallen foul of the Stalin purges was Elena Stasova, with whom Daniel had worked at the IRH in the 1920s. Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, and in October 1953 Daniel wrote a letter to Stasova which the latter received, even though it was simply addressed to "Elena Stasova, Moscow city". It appears that it was as a result of their ensuing communication that on 28 January 1957 Richard Daniel was posthumously rehabilitated by the appropriate Moscow military tribunal. A couple of months later, on 26 March 1957, Berta Daniel, still very much alive, was rehabilitated by the same Moscow tribunal.
Berta Daniel and her daughter arrived from the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic on 27 June 1957. She now made her home in East Berlin. She lost little time in joining the young country's unchallenged ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party ("Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands" / SED). It is believed that release from Soviet exile for Berta and Lore Daniel had been made possible because of the support of Elena Stasova.
In 1969 she was honoured, receiving the Patriotic Order of Merit in bronze. Berta Daniel died in East Berlin on 7 April 1981.
References
People from Ulm
Photographers from Baden-Württemberg
Communist Party of Germany members
Communists in the German Resistance
Great Purge victims from Germany
Foreign Gulag detainees
Socialist Unity Party of Germany members
Recipients of the Patriotic Order of Merit
German pacifists
German spies for the Soviet Union
1896 births
1981 deaths |
52393372 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SwellRT | SwellRT | SwellRT is a free and open-source backend-as-a-service and API focused to ease development of apps featuring real-time collaboration. It supports the building of mobile and web apps, and aims to facilitate interoperability and federation.
History
Origins
SwellRT has its origins in the work done within the GRASIA research team at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, as part of the EU-funded project P2Pvalue (2013-2016), in a team led by Samer Hassan. In 2014, the developer Pablo Ojanguren took the lead in forking Apache Wave, dropping several components, re-engineering it, and building a "Wave API" to build applications on top. In 2015, such Wave API became a standalone product named SwellRT.
Impact on Apache Wave project
In 2016, several discussions took place within the Apache Wave community, aiming to tackle the stagnation and crisis state of the project. The Apache Software Foundation mentor of Apache Wave, Upayavira, was concerned on the project stagnation, but framed SwellRT as Wave's potential savior:Once more Wave is on the brink of retirement. However, this time, an offer has been made of code from SwellRT, which is a fork of Wave itself, and a concall has been scheduled for interested parties to discuss whether it is a go-er. It is my (limited) understanding that many of the complexity issues in the Wave code that have prevented community development have been resolved in SwellRT. Eventually, Wave was approved to continue within Apache incubator program, and a copy of SwellRT codebase was placed in the Apache Wave repository in order to grant the Wave community access to it. In this regard, Intellectual Property of SwellRT was transferred to the Apache Foundation in 2017.
Recent recognition
In both 2016 and 2017, SwellRT participated in the Google Summer of Code as part of the set of projects from the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. In both years, the contributions were highly relevant. In 2016, SwellRT replaced its XMPP-based federation protocol (inherited from Apache Wave) for the Matrix.org federation protocol. In 2017, end-to-end encryption was implemented, following an innovative approach to encrypt communication in Operational Transformation collaborative documents.
SwellRT received international recognition within the fields of decentralized technologies and real-time collaboration. In the Decentralized Web Summit, organized by the Internet Archive in San Francisco, it was selected as one of the current innovative decentralization technologies. It was also selected by the Redecentralize advocacy group, as one of the redecentralization projects whose founders were interviewed, It launched an international contest to develop apps using SwellRT, which was awarded to free/open source developers in India. And the project was presented as invited talk in the Center for Research on Computation and Society at Harvard's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and in several international conferences. SwellRT was one of the first adopters of the Contributor Covenant code of conduct.
Technical approach
SwellRT is a fork from Apache Wave, inherits some of its architecture and technology stack. However, it grew beyond the limits of Wave, first presenting itself as a web framework and nowadays growing to a backend-as-a-service platform. Its current technical approach covers the following:
It is fully free/open source software.
It is developed in Java. GWT with JSInterop is used to generate JavaScript API reusing the same source code. Android client is also built from the same Java sources.
It provides an extensible and pluggable rich-text editor component for Web (only) supporting custom annotations and widgets.
Real-time data storage is based on Wave's Operational Transformations model, thus it is eventually consistent.
It is designed to maximize interoperability, and follows a federation approach similar to Apache Wave, using XMPP or Matrix.org communication protocol. It aims to support the creation of apps that are federated, i.e. rely on multiple interoperable servers, and objects shared across servers. This allows organizations to control their own data.
Collaborative objects
SwellRT provides a programming model based on collaborative objects. A collaborative object is a JSON-like object that can be shared by some users (or groups) that can make changes in real-time. Changes are propagated (and notified) in real-time to any user connected to the object.
A collaborative object can store properties of simple data types (string, integers, etc.) as well as rich-text and references to files or attachments. This approach is suitable to implement any document based collaborative application like text editors or spreadsheets.
Objects and participants are uniquely identified on the Internet enabling decentralized access from different federated servers.
Main features
Real-time storage (NoSQL)
User management
Event based integration
Federation (XMPP or Matrix.org)
Applications using SwellRT
SwellRT facilitates the development of mobile/web apps, and thus several apps have been built using this technology. Apart from the demos provided by SwellRT, third-parties developed other demo apps such as a Q&A site, an extension to extract keywords, a collaborative scrollbar, a political participation Android app, a Trello-SwellRT connector. Besides, two fully-fledged apps are currently using SwellRT technology:
JetPad, a GoogleDoc-like collaborative editor, free/open source and federated
Teem, a free/open source web/mobile app for the management of communities and collectives
See also
Apache Wave
Real-time text
Collaborative real-time editor
Operational transformation
Federated social network
References
External links
Official website
2015 software
Software using the Apache license
Rich web application frameworks
Collaborative real-time editors
Real-time technology
Real-time web
Collaborative software
Federated identity
Cross-platform free software
Free software programmed in Java (programming language)
Web development software
Android (operating system) development software
Application programming interfaces
Distributed computing projects
Open-source cloud applications |
52400294 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden%20Tear | Hidden Tear | Hidden Tear is the first open-source ransomware trojan that targets computers running Microsoft Windows The original sample was posted in August 2015 to GitHub.
When Hidden Tear is activated, it encrypts certain types of files using a symmetric AES algorithm, then sends the symmetric key to the malware's control servers. However, as Utku Sen claimed "All my malware codes are backdoored on purpose", Hidden Tear has an encryption backdoor, thus allowing him to crack various samples.
References
2015 in computing
Computer viruses
Trojan horses |
52462834 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu%20Budgie | Ubuntu Budgie | Ubuntu Budgie is an official community flavor of Ubuntu featuring the Budgie desktop. It combines the stable and thoroughly-tested Ubuntu core with a modern, lightweight and traditional-looking desktop developed by the Solus project.
The latest release is 21.10, released on October 14, 2021.
History
Ubuntu Budgie started out as an unofficial community flavor in parallel with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, referred to as budgie-remix. Budgie-remix 16.10 was later released by strictly following the time frame issued for Ubuntu 16.10.
It was eventually recognized as an official community flavor of Ubuntu, and was rebranded as Ubuntu Budgie.
Vincenzo Bovino was hired as the new brand and PR Manager.
Ubuntu Budgie 17.04 was released in April 2017, and was updated to version 17.10 in October 2017.
In Ubuntu Budgie 18.10, 32-bit support has been dropped. 32-bit support has also been dropped in Ubuntu MATE.
Releases
budgie-remix 16.04
budgie-remix 16.04 was released on April 25, 2016, four days after the release of Ubuntu 16.04.
The system contains Budgie Desktop 10.2.5. Has a window manager based on Mutter, a customizable panel, notification center settings. The Arc-GTK+ theme is used. Compared to Ubuntu 16.04, budgie-remix has Nautilus version 3.18, as at that time Ubuntu had a version of Nautilus 3.14. Also has a dock-panel Plank version 0.11.1, gedit version 3.18, GNOME 3.18 photos, gThumb 3.4.3, Rhythmbox 3.3, Totem 3.18, GNOME Terminal 3.18, LibreOffice 5.1.2, Mozilla Firefox 45.0, Transmission 2.84, GTK+ 3.18.9, Mesa 11.2.0, XOrg 1.18.3 and the Linux kernel 4.4.0.
budgie-remix 16.10
budgie-remix 16.10 was released on October 16, 2016, three days after the release of Ubuntu 16.10.
The system contains a shell Budgie Desktop 10.2.7, GTK+ 3.22, the Linux kernel 4.8. There are many new features implemented in this version, such as full disk encryption, home folder encryption, and support for multiple languages during installation. Has the theme of design Arc GTK+, a new theme icons Pocillo.
One of the developers of budgie-remix, David Mohammed, says:
Ubuntu Budgie 17.04
Ubuntu Budgie 17.04 was released on April 19, 2017. budgie-remix was renamed to this name after the distribution became official for the Ubuntu community.
The system contains the Budgie Desktop 10.2.9 shell, the Linux 4.10 kernel, Mesa 17.0.3, Xorg 1.19.3. Budgie-Welcome application was updated, support for application indicator appeared, sound applets were managed, GNOME 3.24 applications were enabled, GNOME Terminal was replaced with Termix and Chromium replaced Google Chrome , and GTK+ theme support for Qt was enabled. Use the theme of the design Arc GTK+, the theme of the icons Moka.
In the record about the release of this version, it was written as follows:
Ubuntu Budgie 17.10
Ubuntu Budgie 17.10 was released on October 19, 2017.
The system contains the Budgie Desktop 10.4 shell, the Linux 4.13 kernel. The Budgie 10.4 desktop environment is equipped with a set of native features that include a new stylish Alt-Tab, support for Spotify in Raven, support for switching window controls to the left or right, support for SMB files and encrypted volumes through the addition of applets and supports customizing the appearance of dates and times. In addition, there is support for left or right side panels in Budgie Desktop 10.4, support for converting panels in the dock, transparency and dynamic auto-image for all panels, and the ability to replenish the bottom panel to work without a terrible "jump" effect. Other noteworthy improvements in the release of Ubuntu Budgie 17.10 include Night Light and Caffeine tools, Tilix as the default terminal emulator instead of Termix, as well as support for Tilix Quake mode with the F12 key, updated panel icons and new wallpapers.
On December 20, 2017, Canonical withdrew the Ubuntu 17.10 distribution in October and hid the link on the site for downloading. The reason was a critical bug with BIOS damage on some Lenovo notebook models and one Acer model.
On January 12, 2018, version 17.10.1 was released, which contained the correction of a serious problem in version 17.10.
Ubuntu Budgie 18.04
Ubuntu Budgie was released on April 26, 2018.
The system includes the Linux 4.15 kernel. It became possible to install OpenVNC through network-manager. New applets have appeared, such as Quick Note for notes, DropBy for downloading and viewing data from USB devices, Hot Corners for moving windows to the corner of the screen, Windowpreviews for viewing open windows, Clockworks for viewing some time zones, Autoswitch for tying the keyboard layout to the application, Window Mover in order to quickly move the window to another virtual desktop. All GNOME applications have been updated to version 3.28, but Nautilus has version 3.26.
References
External links
Ubuntu derivatives
X86-64 Linux distributions
Linux distributions |
52467890 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebTorrent | WebTorrent | WebTorrent is a peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming torrent client written in JavaScript, from the same author, Feross Aboukhadijeh, of YouTube Instant, and the team at WebTorrent and on GitHub, for use in web browsers, as well as a WebTorrent Desktop stand alone version able to bridge WebTorrent and BitTorrent serverless networks.
History
Before creating WebTorrent, the developers first created PeerCDN (content delivery network) which was bought by Yahoo! in 2013.
The idea behind WebTorrent is to make a BitTorrent-like protocol that works on the web browser, maintaining as much compatibility with BitTorrent as possible. Any web browser should be able to connect to a peer-to-peer swarm, fetch content, verify that it is correct, and display it to the user – all as much as possible without centralized servers relying on a network entirely of people's browsers. WebTorrent uses the same protocol as BitTorrent but uses a different transport layer. WebTorrent primarily relies on WebRTC connections, while BitTorrent uses TCP connections and UDP datagrams directly.
WebTorrent Desktop
The WebTorrent Desktop bridges the two networks of WebRTC-based WebTorrent and TCP/UDP-based BitTorrent simultaneously. The BitTorrent client Vuze (formerly Azureus) less gracefully but adequately functionally incorporated WebTorrent adding simultaneous network bridging to their software. The developers used Electron that makes desktop apps using JavaScript with access to all the APIs from Chrome and Node.
Functionality
Online video is the core focus as that is where WebTorrent is most useful. It is less suited for smaller files or data sets but is ideal for larger files.
File availability, as with BitTorrents, is dependent on torrent seeding. If few users are sharing a file a HTTP server providing webseeding would be the fall back. There is no sharing without webseeding. However, this could have some positive implications. Rather than using a middleman upload site to share a large private file with another person, with WebTorrent you may directly connect without leaving traces somewhere or potentially being archived on some upload site. You simply drag and drop your file to create a magnet link you may share with your friend. Connections are already encrypted but you may add extra layers of encryption with keys to send another way. RAM limits may be managed with IndexDB.
Adoption
BitChute
Launched in 2017, BitChute is a video hosting service that used WebTorrent P2P technology. It claimed in order to ease bandwidth issues of centralized streaming. According to Fredrick Brennan, there is little evidence BitChute actually uses peer-to-peer technology. By April 2021, the option to host videos using WebTorrent on BitChute "appears to have been deprecated", according to Ars Technica.
Brave
Brave web browser and PopChest are "open source supporters" of WebTorrent, as displayed on WebTorrent's homepage.
Safari
The Safari web browser is incorporating WebRTC and data channel support, as it is going to be in iOS 11, however, it will be requesting permissions from users for access to webcams according to rumours.
Reception
See also
BitChute, formerly used WebTorrent
PeerTube, uses WebTorrent
libtorrent, implements WebTorrent
Comparison of BitTorrent clients
InterPlanetary File System
List of video hosting services
DailyMotion
Vidme
Vimeo
YouTube
"tube" sites of the MindGeek porn monopoly
YouTube Instant
References
External links
WebTorrent.io
Instant.io for WebTorrent magnets.
Demuxed - Ep. #5, WebTorrent: Bringing BitTorrent to the Web on YouTube, 2017-07-06, is an audio interview (not video) that starts as an excellent introduction to WebTorrent, drifts into past projects for context, then gets very technical about hacking streams, before concluding on vacuum frying banana chips.
PopChest.com, The Pop Network, "the hottest [new] video platform built on the Ethereum netowrk!"
2013 establishments in California
Anonymity networks
Application layer protocols
BitTorrent
Computer-related introductions in 2013
Distributed data storage
Distributed file systems
File sharing software
File transfer protocols
Free network-related software
Internet privacy software
Internet protocols
Internet properties established in 2013
Network protocols
Peer-to-peer software
Video hosting |
52502130 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David%20Gurle | David Gurle | David Gurle is a French entrepreneur and engineer, credited as one of the pioneers of IP communications. He is the founder and former CEO of Symphony Communication Services, LLC.
Early life and education
The son of a French diplomat, David spent his childhood between Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. His mother, a journalist for the BBC, also worked for the British secret service. His family settled in Cannes when he was 13. He studied engineering at ESIGETEL.
Career
In 2014, David Gurle was appointed CEO of Symphony, following the acquisition of Perzo, a start-up he founded in Palo Alto, California in late 2012. Perzo was a mobile and web messaging platform that encrypted every message end-to-end using a three-layer encryption system. Perzo's security model was based on customer-controlled encryption keys for businesses who need to maintain control and confidentiality over their communications. The platform also maintained compliance with privacy laws and various regulatory rules.
Prior to Symphony, David was General Manager and Vice President of Skype's Business unit.
In 2003 as Global Head of Collaboration Services at Reuters, David and his team transitioned Reuters Messaging into a unified communications service. David connected Reuters Messaging with other communities with the intention of improving workflow productivity of financial information workers.
After joining Microsoft in 1999, David Gurle founded Microsoft's Real Time Communications business unit, running it for three years. He oversaw the development of the company’s collaboration products including NetMeeting, Windows Messenger, Exchange IM, Exchange Conferencing Server, Live Communications Server and Office Communications Server. While at Microsoft, David co-authored several Internet Engineering Task Force standards for presence and instant messaging for SIP.
Honors
In 2016, David was ranked #97 on “The New Establishment,” Vanity Fair’s “annual ranking of Silicon Valley hotshots, Hollywood moguls, Wall Street titans, and cultural icons.”
Publications
2007
L'essentiel de la VoIP - 2ème édition
2005
IP Telephony: Packet-based Multimedia Communications Systems
IP Telephony: Deploying Voice-over-IP Protocols by Olivier Hersent (2005-03-11)
Beyond VoIP Protocols: Understanding Voice Technology and Networking Techniques for IP Telephony
L'essentiel de la VoIP
2004
La voix sur IP Codecs, H.323, SIP, MGCP, déploiement et dimensionnement
References
Living people
20th-century French businesspeople
21st-century French businesspeople
French chief executives
Businesspeople from California
1966 births
People from Palo Alto, California
Skype people |
52572062 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legion%20Hacktivist%20Group | Legion Hacktivist Group | Legion is a hacktivist group that has attacked some rich and powerful people in India by hacking their twitter handlers. The group claims to have access to many email servers in India and has the encryption keys used by Indian banks over the Internet.
History
India attacks (2019)
Legion came into news when it launched its series of attacks starting with Rahul Gandhi, the member of Indian National Congress.
Reports say that not only Rahul's Twitter handler was hacked but his mail server was also hacked. The very next day, INC's Twitter handler was also hacked and tweeted irrelevant content. The group then hacked Twitter handlers of Vijay Mallya, Barkha Dutt and Ravish Kumar.
Hacking of Russian government (2021).
Because the Russian government tried to censor Telegram in 2018-2020, the Legion Hacker group hacked a sub-domain belonging to Federal Antimonopoly Service. They didn't cause big harm, but they posted a message to the Russian government stating that "The vandalism and destruction Roskomnadzor has caused to internet privacy and Russian anonymity has made them a target of Legion." - This text document was removed after 16hours but it is still available via Wayback Machine.
References
Advocacy groups
Hacking (computer security)
Internet-based activism
Internet terminology
2000s neologisms
Culture jamming techniques
Hacker culture
Hacker groups |
52604693 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mailfence | Mailfence | Mailfence is an encrypted email service that offers OpenPGP based end-to-end encryption and digital signatures. It was launched in November 2013 by ContactOffice Group, which has been operating an online collaboration suite for universities and other organizations since 1999.
History
Development
In the midst of 2013, the Mailfence project was started by the founders of ContactOffice. In March 2016, a beta version of end-to-end encryption and digital signatures for emails was released.
In January 2021, Mailfence released progressive web application for mobile devices.
Block in Russia
On 5 March 2020, Mailfence reported that their SMTP servers are blocked by Russian based email services. This was in response to their refusal to submit a Notice of Commencement of Collaboration with Roskomnadzor’s (the Federal Supervision Agency for Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Communication) of the Russian government. Mailfence did not respond to this request, citing obligation to provide information about users, violating its Terms and the federal Belgian laws.
Features
Mailfence provides secure email features, with other functions such as Calendar, Contacts, Documents and Collaboration.
Encryption and Two-factor authentication are available in the free version of the product. Most other features are only available with paid subscriptions that start at 2,50 € per month.
Email
The service supports POP/IMAP and Exchange ActiveSync as well as vanity domains with SPF, DKIM, DMARC and catch-all address support. Users can send both plain and rich text emails, organize messages in folders and/or categorize them with tags, take notes by setting comment on each message and create default message signatures for every sender address. Different identities can also be managed using aliases and filters for incoming emails.
Contacts
The contacts support (CSV, vCard, LDIF) import, (vCard, PDF) export and can be accessed using CardDAV. Users organize them with tags and can also create contact lists.
Calendar
The calendar supports vCal/iCal import, export and can be accessed by using CalDAV. Users can share their calendars with group members and can also create polls.
Documents
The documents can be accessed using WebDAV or edited online. Users can drag and drop files in folders, categorize them with tags take notes by setting comment on each file.
Groups
Groups allow users to share mailboxes, documents, contacts, calendars and perform instant chatting with group members in a secure way. A group administrator manages the access rights of group members and can also set another group member as co-admin or the main admin of the group.
Web-based clients
The web-interface comes with an embedded IMAP, POP3, CalDAV, and WebDAV client. Users can add external accounts and manage them centrally in the web-interface.
User management
Account owners can create and manage user accounts using the admin console.
Server location
Since their servers are located in Belgium, they are legally outside of US jurisdiction. Mailfence is therefore not subjected to US gag orders and NSLs, notwithstanding extradition treaties with the US. Under Belgian law, all national and international surveillance requests must go through a Belgian court.
Security and privacy
Aside from conventional security and privacy features including managing access or generating specific password for web and non-web services, two-factor authentication, spam protection alongside of plus addressing, sender address blacklist and whitelist, Mailfence offers following features:
Transport security
The service supports HTTPS and uses TLS with ephemeral key exchange to encrypt all internet traffic between users and Mailfence servers. Their 4096-bit RSA SSL certificate is signed by Buypass AS and supports Certificate Transparency and Strict Transport Security. Mailfence.com holds an "A+" rating from Qualys SSL Labs and also supports DANE.
End-to-end encryption
The service uses an open-source implementation of OpenPGP (RFC 4880) for emails. OpenPGP keypair is generated in client-browser, encrypted (via AES256) with the user's passphrase, and then stored on Mailfence server. The server never sees the user's OpenPGP keypair passphrase.
The service also supports end-to-end encryption for emails using a shared password with the possibility of message expiration.
OpenPGP signatures
The service gives the choice between "signing", or "signing and encrypting" an email message with or without attachments.
Integrated Keystore
The service provides an integrated keystore to manage OpenPGP keys, and does not require any third-party add-on/plugin. OpenPGP keypairs can be generated, imported or exported. Public keys of other users can be imported through file or in-line text or can be downloaded directly from Public key servers.
Full OpenPGP interoperability
Users can communicate with any OpenPGP compatible service provider.
Warrant canary and transparency report
The service maintains an up-to-date transparency report and warrant canary.
See also
Comparison of mail servers
Comparison of webmail providers
References
External links
Webmail
Cross-platform software
Security software
Cryptographic software
Secure communication
Internet privacy software
Internet properties established in 2013
OpenPGP |
52606598 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wire%20%28software%29 | Wire (software) | Wire is an encrypted communication and collaboration app created by Wire Swiss. It is available for iOS, Android, Windows, macOS, Linux, and web browsers such as Firefox. Wire offers a collaboration suite featuring messenger, voice calls, video calls, conference calls, file-sharing, and external collaboration –all protected by a secure end-to-end-encryption. Wire offers three solutions built on its security technology: Wire Pro –which offers Wire's collaboration feature for businesses, Wire Enterprise –includes Wire Pro capabilities with added features for large-scale or regulated organizations, and Wire Red –the on-demand crisis collaboration suite. They also offer Wire Personal, which is a secure messaging app for personal use.
History
Skype's co-founder Janus Friis helped create Wire and many Wire employees previously worked for Skype. Wire Swiss GmbH launched the Wire app on 3 December 2014. In August 2015, the company added group calling to their app. From its launch until March 2016, Wire's messages were only encrypted between the client and the company's server. In March 2016, the company added end-to-end encryption for its messaging traffic, as well as a video calling feature. Wire Swiss GmbH released the source code of the Wire client applications in July 2016. In 2018, Wire launched its collaboration solution featuring end-to-end encrypted chat, conferencing, video calls and file-sharing on desktop and mobile for businesses.
Features
Wire offers end-to-end encrypted messaging, file-sharing, video and voice calls, and guest rooms for external communication.
The app allows group calling with up to twenty-five participants and video conferences support up to 12 people. A stereo feature places participants in "virtual space" so that users can differentiate voice directionality. The application adapts to varying network conditions.
The application supports the exchange of animated GIFs up to 5MB through a media integration with Giphy. The iOS and Android versions also include a sketch feature that allows users to draw a sketch into a conversation or over a photo.
Wire is available on mobile, desktop and web. The web service is called Wire for Web. Wire activity is synced on iOS, Android and web apps. The desktop version supports screen sharing.
Wire’s technology solution can be deployed either in the cloud, private cloud or on-premises.
One of the latest features rolled out by Wire is a secure external collaboration capability called 'guest room'. Wire’s secure guest rooms feature extends end-to-end encryption to conversations with external parties without requiring them to register, or even download anything.
Wire also includes a function for ephemeral messaging in 1:1 and group conversations.
Technical
Wire provides end-to-end encryption for all features. Wire's instant messages are encrypted with Proteus, a protocol that Wire Swiss developed based on the Signal Protocol. Wire's voice calls are encrypted with DTLS and SRTP. In addition to this, client-server communication is protected by Transport Layer Security.
Wire is currently in the midst of working to develop Messaging Layer Security (MLS), a new protocol designed to facilitate more secure enterprise messaging platforms under The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). In 2016, during the IETF meeting in Berlin, Wire proposed a standard that was protected by modern security properties and could be used by companies large and small. During an interview with Dark Reading, Raphael Robert, Head of Security at Wire, mentioned that Messaging Layer Security (MLS) should be ready to integrate into messaging platforms by 2021.
Wire's source code is accompanied by the GPLv3 but the readme file states that a number of additional restrictions specified by the Wire Terms of Use take precedence. Among other things, users who have compiled their own applications may not change the way it connects and interacts with the company's centralised servers.
Security
Wire implemented a security by design approach, with security and privacy as core values. Wire is 100% open source with its source code available on GitHub, independently audited, and ISO, CCPA, GDPR, SOX-compliant.
In December 2016, Wire's whitepapers were reviewed by a security researcher at the University of Waterloo. The researcher praised Wire for its open approach to security, but identified serious issues that still need addressing. These included a man-in-the-middle attack on voice and video communications, possible audio and video leakage depending on unspecified codec parameters, the fact that all user passwords are uploaded to Wire's servers, significant attack surface for code replacement in the desktop client, and the fact that the server was not open-sourced, at the time when that article was written. The researcher described the security of Wire as weak in comparison to Signal, but also depicted its problems as surmountable. Wire's developers announced the addition of end-to-end authentication to Wire's calls on 14 March 2017, and started open-sourcing Wire's server code on 7 April 2017. In March 2017, the review was updated with the conclusion that "the remaining issues with Wire are relatively minor and also affect many of its competitors." However, one major issue that remained was detailed as "the Wire client authenticates with a central server in order to provide user presence information. (Wire does not attempt to hide metadata, other than the central server promising not to log very much information.) The Wire whitepapers spend an unusual amount of space discussing the engineering details of this part of the protocol. However, the method of authentication is the same as it is on the web: the Wire client sends the unencrypted, unhashed password to the central server over TLS, the server hashes the plaintext password with scrypt, and the hash is compared to the hash stored by the server. This process leaks the user's password to the central server; the server operators (or anyone who compromises the server) could log all of the plaintext passwords as users authenticate."
On 9 February 2017, Kudelski Security and X41 D-Sec published a joint review of Wire’s encrypted messaging protocol implementation. Non-critical issues were found that had the potential of leading to a degraded security level. The review found that "invalid public keys could be transmitted and processed without raising an error." The report also recommended that other security improvements be implemented to address thread-unsafety risks and sensitive data in memory. Wire's developers have said that "the issues that were discovered during the review have been fixed and deployed on iOS and Android. Deployment is ongoing for Wire for Web and desktop apps."
In 2017, Wire published an article going over the implementation of its end-to-end encryption in a multi-device scenario in response to anonymous accounts on social media publishing misleading information about the app and its security.
In May 2017, Motherboard published an article saying that the Wire servers "keep a list of all the users a customer contacted until they delete their account". Wire Swiss confirmed that the statement was accurate, saying that they keep the data in order to "help with syncing conversations across multiple devices", and that they might change their approach in the future.
Awards
In July 2019, Wire won Capterra's Best Ease of Use award in the team communication software category for its B2B solution. Later that year in October, Wire was recognized by Cybersecurity Breakthrough Awards as the first-ever Secure Communications Solution of the Year awardee. In February 2020, Wire won the Cybersecurity Excellence Awards in the following categories: fastest-growing cybersecurity company, best start-up (EU), open-source security, encryption, and zero-trust security. Simultaneously, Cyber Defense Magazine announced Wire as the Best Messaging Security in an RSA 2020 special edition for the Cyber Defense Awards.
Privacy policy changes
In late 2019, Wire holding moved from Luxembourg to the US, which according to ThinkPrivacy and other critics made it unclear how much jurisdiction the United States will have over Wire data. Some people considered this especially problematic as Wire stores unencrypted meta data for every user. At the time of the transfer Wire also changed its privacy policy from "sharing user data when required by law" to "sharing user data when necessary", which was seen by critics as a more unclear determination that could also mean increasing profits, co-operation with law enforcement or any other reason.
The Wire Group Holding moved back to Germany as of 2020.
Business model
Wire Swiss GmbH receives financial backing from a firm called Iconical.
In July 2017, Wire Swiss announced the beta version of an end-to-end encrypted team messaging platform. In October 2017, Wire officially released the team messaging platform as a subscription-based communication solution for businesses and in 2019, announced that Ernst & Young chose Wire to develop a self-hosted, secure collaboration and communication platform.
See also
Comparison of instant messaging clients
Comparison of VoIP software
List of video telecommunication services and product brands
Gartner - Market Guide for Workstream Collaboration
The Forrester New Wave™: Secure Communications
References
Cross-platform software
IOS software
Free and open-source Android software
Free instant messaging clients
Instant messaging clients
Formerly proprietary software
Free security software
Free VoIP software
Cryptographic software
Secure communication
Internet privacy software
Swiss brands |
52646563 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rob%20O%27Hara | Rob O'Hara | Rob O'Hara (born August 22, 1973) is an American author, blogger, and podcaster.
Books
In 2006, O'Hara published Commodork: Sordid Tales from a BBS Junkie. Jason Scott, director of the BBS Documentary, dubbed Commodork "the world's first BBS memoir," stating the book "does what my film couldn't; go front to end on one boy's story to turning into a man online. And for that, I thank him, and I think a lot of others will too." Brett Weiss, author of the popular Classic Home Video Games book series, says he "recommends the book without reservation. Initially I wasn't sure what to expect, but it's obvious that (O'Hara) is a writer and a gamer, not just a gamer who happens to write. His style is clear and unpretentious, and the hilarious anecdotes alone are worth the price of admission."
O'Hara's second book, Invading Spaces: A Beginner's Guide to Collecting Arcade Games, is a beginner's introduction to the arcade collecting hobby. Earl Green from The Log Book stated "Rob O'Hara knows a couple of things about collecting arcade machines. Invading Spaces is where he shares that obvious wealth of knowledge with coin-op newbies like myself." Antique Week called the book an "amusing and informative tome."
In 2018, O'Hara published his first feature length fiction novel, The Human Library. The story was O'Hara's graduate project for his Master of Professional Writing degree at the University of Oklahoma. The Human Library currently has a 4.5 star rating on Amazon.
Published Articles, Essays, and Writing Positions
O'Hara began his career writing music, movie, and video game) reviews on websites such as Review to a Kill and Review-o-Matic.com. In 2000, O'Hara was paid to write several DVD reviews for IGN. Recently, O'Hara has expanded into writing and submitting fiction.
2600: The Hacker Quarterly (Contributor)
The Dead Mule School of Southern Literature (Contributor)
Digital Press E-Zine and Website (Staff Writer)
El Reno Light (Intern/Reporter)
El Reno Tribune (Intern/Reporter)
IGN.com (Paid Contributor, DVD Reviews)
Forever Retro (Paid Contributor)
Memoirs of a Virtual Caveman (Foreword and Article Contributor)
Minco Millennium (Columnist)
Retro Gaming Hacks (O'Reilly Books) (Paid Contributor)
Retroist.com (Staff Writer)
TheLogBook.com (Staff Writer)
Video Game Collector Magazine (Staff Writer)
Video Game Trader Magazine (Staff Writer)
Podcasts
O'Hara has hosted and currently hosts multiple podcasts. His first podcast, You Don't Know Flack, began in 2008 and currently has a 5-star rating on iTunes. In 2013, O'Hara co-founded the retro-themed podcast network Throwback Network with his Throwback Reviews co-host Sean Johnson. The network currently hosts more than two dozen retro-themed podcasts.
Current Podcasts
You Don't Know Flack (Retro/Stories)
Sprite Castle (Commodore 64)
Cactus Flack's (Arcade)
Multiple Sadness (Bad/B-Movies)
Throwback Reviews (80s Movies)
Former Podcasts
No Quarter Podcast (Arcade) (Episodes 126-136)
Rusted Metal (Heavy Metal)
Guest Appearances
Adventure Club Podcast (Episodes 59, 68, 72, 74, 75, 83)
Eight and a Half Bit (Episode 96)
Flux Capaci-Cast (Episodes 3, 13)
Retrobits Podcast (Episodes 71, 72)
Presentations
O'Hara is a subject matter expert on Commodore computers, vintage video and arcade games, and self-publishing, and has spoken at multiple conventions on these topics.
Def Con (2007): Self-Publishing in the Underground
Notacon (2009): The World of Free Book Publishing
Oklahoma Electronic Gaming Expo (2009): Collecting Arcade Machines
Oklahoma City Community College (2009): A History of Computer Games
Software
O'Hara has written and released several freeware programs, including:
GP32 Renamer: a Windows utilitiy that converts long filenames to 8.3 filenames for the GamePark 32 handheld console.
ShadowPrint: a Windows utility for getting text directory listings.
Batch-O-Matic: a Windows utility for processing batch files with external variable lists.
eCoder Ring: a Windows message encryption utility.
eCoder Ring included a coded message that users were challenged to crack. In 2008, O'Hara offered a cash reward of $100 to anyone who could crack the code. In the weeks following leaked information about the NSA's practices, eCoder Ring was downloaded an additional 3,000 times. The code remains unbroken. In her abstract titled A Summary of Hacking Organizations, Conferences, Publications, and Effects on Society, Alisha Cecil called eCoder Ring a "fun, friendly, easy to use program that allows two people to send secret messages to one another" that "is capable of producing nearly unbreakable ciphers."
Personal life
O'Hara currently resides in Yukon, Oklahoma with his wife, two children, and collection of vintage electronics.
Work
During the day, he works for the Federal Aviation Administration, where he has worked as a "Helpdesk/Technical Support Analyst, Computer Specialist/LAN Administrator, Senior Network Engineer, IT Security Specialist, member of the IT Communication Department, and Domain Admin/Enterprise Administrator."
Education
O'Hara graduated from Yukon High School in 1991. At Redlands Community College, O'Hara served as the editor of the school's newspaper and yearbook from 1991-1993. O'Hara graduated from Oklahoma City Community College in 2001 with an AA in Journalism, and earned a BS in Organizational Leadership from Southern Nazarene University in 2005. Most recently, O'Hara graduated from the Master of Professional Writing Program at the University of Oklahoma.
Hobbies
O'Hara refers to himself as a "collector of collections," and is working on a book with the same title. O'Hara frequently blogs about his Star Wars collection. In an interview with Oxford Karma, O'Hara discussed his collection of 30 arcade cabinets located in his home arcade. O'Hara was interviewed by the Associated Press about his arcade collecting hobby.
References
1973 births
Living people
American male writers
American men podcasters
American podcasters
People from Oklahoma |
52650651 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth%20%26%20Transparency%20Foundation | Truth & Transparency Foundation | Truth & Transparency Foundation (TTF; formerly MormonLeaks and originally Mormon WikiLeaks) is a whistleblowing organization inspired by WikiLeaks, which focuses on exposing documents from the leadership of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). It began in October 2016 as a leaked series of videos on the YouTube channel Mormon Leaks. In total, 15 videos were initially leaked via the Mormon Leaks channel from meetings of high-ranking LDS leaders including the Quorum of the Twelve. They discussed topics including the "homosexual agenda", the subprime mortgage crisis, and a debate over the sexual orientation of Chelsea Manning. Politicians featured in the videos included former Utah governor Mike Leavitt and former U.S. Senator from Oregon Gordon H. Smith.
Ryan McKnight, founder of TTF, was interviewed by The New York Times about his YouTube channel Mormon Leaks, and this led to contacts from Reddit who asked him for a secure way to send files. He set up a website to allow whistleblowers to protect their anonymity. The submission process ensures confidentiality, including erasure of IP addresses, asking leakers to use the privacy browser Tor, sending documents via SecureDrop, and additional encryption methods. Initial funding was raised through GoFundMe, and an official Twitter account was set up. The site's intent is to increase transparency of LDS Church leadership, and would not leak names of lower-level employees, instead focusing on the Quorum of the Twelve and the First Presidency.
University of Tampa professor Ryan Cragun said scholars were interested in finding out what documents would be revealed, noting there was a dearth of information available about the finances of the LDS Church. He said active Mormons were unlikely to view the leaked materials, but the material would have a more significant impact on those who were questioning or had already resigned their membership status. Mormon scholar and columnist Jana Riess gave a mixed assessment, criticizing their tactics regarding privacy while saying it could help to increase LDS Church leadership transparency. Utah attorney and Mormon blogger Steve Evans said the practice of leaking was criminal publication of stolen property, and said LDS Church employees who leaked material were likely violating a non-disclosure agreement.
Organization
Beginnings on YouTube
Ryan McKnight, the site's founder, had previously gained attention in October 2016 when he was interviewed by The New York Times about his YouTube channel Mormon Leaks, which released videos of top LDS leadership executive discussions. McKnight is a former Mormon, having resigned from the LDS Church in 2014, residing in Las Vegas, Nevada. The anonymous individual who sent him the videos via email, according to McKnight, had been holding onto them for a period of years but with the intention to do something with them eventually. Within a time span of under a month the YouTube channel had garnered 2,200 followers.
The LDS Church did not publicly question the veracity of the videos, which included top leadership debating the "homosexual agenda". Additional topics discussed by the high-level LDS Church leadership in the videos included marijuana, Islam, the subprime mortgage crisis, and a debate over the sexual orientation of Chelsea Manning. LDS Church spokesman Eric Hawkins provided an official response, which stated: "In these committee meetings, presentations are routinely received from various religious, political and subject matter experts on various topics. The purpose is to understand issues that may face the Church, and is in pursuit of the obligation Church leaders feel to be informed on and have open discussion about current issues. This is an informational forum, not a decision-making body." Hawkins pointed out the videos were from a timeframe of 2007 through 2012.
In total the 15 videos were published to YouTube on the last day of the October 2016 LDS General Conference. Most of the videos were from closed session events only attended by high-level LDS Church leadership. The majority of them depicted lectures given to the Quorum of the Twelve, the second-highest ranking leadership group within the LDS Church. Mike Leavitt, former governor of Utah, appeared in a video filmed in 2012 and gave a presentation on State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. Gordon H. Smith, former U.S. senator from Oregon, was shown in another video talking to the LDS Church leadership. Smith lectured the LDS Church leaders about the "inestimable power" yielded from being able to contact U.S. Senators whenever necessary for assistance. The lectures given to LDS Church leadership in this fashion were businesslike, with statistics and Microsoft PowerPoint presentations.
McKnight suddenly found himself the point-person on the Internet for those wishing to maintain anonymity and yet simultaneously publicize secret documents from the LDS Church. After the videos engendered debate and attention from Mormons and the wider Internet community, McKnight was asked to add more videos from people who messaged him on Reddit. After another anonymous user on Reddit asked him, he publicized documents from the LDS Church detailing a rules modification about homosexual partners. Reddit users asked him for a more secure means of submitting documents about the LDS Church.
Transition to dedicated website
McKnight decided to found TTF so whistleblowers could protect their anonymity. Since his increased attention from the October videos and the November policy change leaks, McKnight has been contacted by 25 sources inside and outside of the LDS Church with potential material to release. McKnight and his team spent six months planning creation of the organization. He estimated approximately a potential for between hundreds to thousands of additional invididuals who may wish to leak information through the site. The organization has no affiliation with Fred Karger or his website MormonTips.com, which also publicizes confidential documents from the LDS Church. MormonLeaks takes steps to protect confidentiality of their sources, including erasing all IP addresses from submissions and removing watermarks from submitted materials. The site asks users who wish to submit secret documents to use the Tor privacy browser to protect themselves. Users then send the documents to TTF via SecureDrop. Encryption methods are further incorporated to mask the identity of the whistleblowers. The motivation behind the organization is to increase transparency of LDS Church leadership.
The TTF website (then "MormonLeaks") launched on December 19, 2016. The organization was started with a website and accompanying Twitter page. The TTF team works to verify documents before posting them live. This fact-checking team includes five volunteers and an attorney. MormonLeaks does not take funding through advertising. Funds to start TTF itself were initially raised through donations from GoFundMe. The hope of its founder was that TTF would demonstrate the LDS Church's profitable nature as a business as opposed to its assertion of religious status. The founder said it was highly unlikely the LDS Church would voluntarily publicize more of its innermost proceedings, saying it "will never be voluntarily transparent, they have nothing to gain from it". The site's intention was to avoid publishing specific lists of names of membership, and instead focus on economic information and internal organization policies and procedures. The site intended to limit disclosure of actual people's names to high-ranking officials including the Quorum of the Twelve and the First Presidency.
The organization's first leaks appeared on December 19, 2016, in the form of LDS Church documents from 2010. It published four files onto its account on Facebook as of December 20, 2016. The first documents publicized by TTF included memos about legal procedures, a letter to the temple department's executive director regarding unsanctioned materials on the Internet, and an organizational chart for the intellectual property division of the LDS Church. TTF asserts to have been offered documents from two separate individuals who were employees of the LDS Church concerning tithing information of famous Mormons, including American football quarterback Steve Young.
After TTF (then "MormonLeaks") had posted a handful a number of LDS Church documents for four months, the Church sent a cease-and-desist letter alleging copyright infringement with regard to a leaked Church leadership PowerPoint presentation published by TTF in February 2017. The PowerPoint discussed societal pressures that the Church felt had led some LDS members to apostasy, which included pornography, the issues agitated for by Ordain Women, and questions regarding Mormon history such as those promoted in books by lawyer / Fundamentalist Mormon Denver Snuffer or in online postings by psychologist social critic John Dehlin. TTF pulled the offending document for a short while, until its attorney, Marc Randazza, sent the LDS Church a letter which said, "At this point, my client is willing to let bygones be bygones. If your client is willing to step back from the brink, and to cease efforts to censor this material, my client is willing to refrain from bringing a claim [of abusing copyright law]."
FaithLeaks
In 2018, McKnight and Dodge launched FaithLeaks, a similar website. FaithLeaks hosts documents in relation to transparency about the Jehovah's Witnesses. It initially published papers about an internal investigation of alleged sexual abuse. These exemplify attempted to deal with the cases through the congregation's internal disciplinary court. FaithLeaks was hoped to help highlight cases of corruption by religious organizations, and was particularly concerned with issues of finance, policies, procedures and sex abuse settlements. After a settlement with the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania all their copyrighted documents were removed and Truth & Transparency, and its founders, Ryan McKnight and Ethan Gregory Dodge, were forbidden to publish copyrighted material owned by the Watch Tower Society again.
Reception
WikiLeaks was aware of the foundation under the site's original name of MormonWikiLeaks, and sent them a message on Twitter asking them to change their name. The founder originally stated he would retain the name as MormonWikiLeaks, and said a trademark application was pending.
University of Tampa professor Ryan Cragun said academics were excited to discover more information about the economics behind the LDS Church, as members tithe 10 percent of their earnings and there was not much in the way of transparent documents available to research their holdings and finances. Cragun said it was unlikely active members of the LDS Church would end up viewing the leaked documents because they were "highly insulated". However, he notes documents would have a greater impact on someone who is considering leaving the LDS Church: "For someone in the middle of a faith transition, such information is more fuel for the fire."
Editor-in-chief of The Nonprofit Quarterly, Ruth McCambridge, wrote that the appearance of MormonLeaks was reflective of an increasing trend by individuals to use technology to force nonprofit organizations to be transparent and accountable to the public. MormonLeaks has an attorney on staff, which McCambridge notes may be beneficial given the prior litigation history where the LDS Church made a copyright infringement assertion against WikiLeaks for publishing the church's Handbook of Instructions.
Mormon scholar and columnist Jana Riess was critical of the organization's tactics, stating: "I am very concerned about privacy in our culture more generally. People in the workplace have the right to expect that intraoffice communication and their emails will stay private." She called MormonLeaks "disturbing" and said: "It is not good news for any of us." On a positive note, Riess said it could motivate the upper LDS Church leadership to increase its transparency.
Utah attorney and Mormon blogger Steve Evans called TTF (then "MormonLeaks") "a rebranding exercise of McKnight's existing practice of posting various confidential items." Evans said TTF had "an added layer of cybersecurity, which won't necessarily protect the leakers, depending on their methods of obtaining the various stolen documents, videos, etc." Evans was critical of McKnight's encouragement to those who choose to leak information to TTF: "the leakers are likely either church employees or consultants working for the church. In either of those situations, it's very likely that the leakers are violating their nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements with the church. McKnight is now publicly encouraging people to violate these agreements."
See also
Criticism of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Mormon Tips
Digital rights
Freedom of information
GlobaLeaks
Homosexuality and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Mormonism in the 21st century
Open society
Transparency (behavior)
References
External links
2016 establishments in Nevada
Applications of cryptography
Criticism of Mormonism
LGBT and Mormonism
Information sensitivity
Internet properties established in 2016
News leaks
Online archives of the United States
Online organizations
Organizations based in Nevada
Organizations established in 2016
Sexuality and Mormonism
Whistleblower support organizations
Whistleblowing in the United States
WikiLeaks |
52716809 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic%20privacy | Genetic privacy | Genetic privacy involves the concept of personal privacy concerning the storing, repurposing, provision to third parties, and displaying of information pertaining to one's genetic information. This concept also encompasses privacy regarding the ability to identify specific individuals by their genetic sequence, and the potential to gain information on specific characteristics about that person via portions of their genetic information, such as their propensity for specific diseases or their immediate or distant ancestry.
With the public release of genome sequence information of participants in large-scale research studies, questions regarding participant privacy have been raised. In some cases, it has been shown that it is possible to identify previously anonymous participants from large-scale genetic studies that released gene sequence information.
Genetic privacy concerns also arise in the context of criminal law because the government can sometimes overcome criminal suspects' genetic privacy interests and obtain their DNA sample. Due to the shared nature of genetic information between family members, this raises privacy concerns of relatives as well.
As concerns and issues of genetic privacy are raised, regulations and policies have been developed in the United States both at a federal and state level.
Significance of genetic information
In the majority of cases, an individual's genetic sequence is considered unique to that individual. One notable exception to this rule in humans is the case of identical twins, who have nearly identical genome sequences at birth. In the remainder of cases, one's genetic fingerprint is considered specific to a particular person and is regularly used in the identification of individuals in the case of establishing innocence or guilt in legal proceedings via DNA profiling. Specific gene variants one's genetic code, known as alleles, have been shown to have strong predictive effects in the occurrences of diseases, such as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutant genes in Breast Cancer and Ovarian Cancer, or PSEN1, PSEN2, and APP genes in Early-Onset Alzheimer's Disease. Additionally, gene sequences are passed down with a regular pattern of inheritance between generations, and can therefore reveal one's ancestry via genealogical DNA testing. Additionally with knowledge of the sequence of one's biological relatives, traits can be compared that allow relationships between individuals, or the lack thereof, to be determined, as is often done in DNA paternity testing. As such, one's genetic code can be used to infer many characteristics about an individual, including many potentially sensitive subjects such as:
Parentage / Non-paternity
Consanguinity
Adoptive Status
Ancestry
Propensity for Disease
Predicted Physical Characteristics
Sources of genetic information
Common specimen types for direct-to-consumer genetic testing are cheek swabs and saliva samples. One of the most popular reasons for at-home genetic testing is to obtain information on an individual's ancestry via genealogical DNA testing and is offered by many companies such as 23andMe, AncestryDNA, Family Tree DNA, or MyHeritage. Other tests are also available which provide consumers with information on genes which influence the risk of specific diseases, such as the risk of developing late-onset Alzheimer's disease or celiac disease.
Risks
Privacy Breaches
Studies have shown that genomic data is not immune to adversary attacks. A study conducted in 2013 revealed vulnerabilities in the security of public databases that contain genetic data. As a result, research subjects could sometimes be identified by their DNA alone. Although reports of premeditated breaches outside of experimental research are disputed, researchers suggest the liability is still important to study.
While accessible genomic data has been pivotal in advancing biomedical research, it also escalates the possibility of exposing sensitive information. A common practice in genomic medicine to protect patient anonymity involves removing patient identifiers. However, de-identified data is not subject to the same privileges as the research subjects. Furthermore, there is an increasing ability to re-identify patients and their genetic relatives from their genetic data.
One study demonstrated re-identification by piecing together genomic data from short tandem repeats (e.g. CODIS), SNPallele frequencies (e.g. ancestry testing), and whole-genome sequencing. They also hypothesize using a patient's genetic information, ancestry testing, and social media to identify relatives. Other studies have echoed the risks associated with linking genomic information with public data like social media, including voter registries, web searches, and personal demographics, or with controlled data, like personal medical records.
There is also controversy regarding the responsibility a DNA testing company has to ensure that leaks and breaches do not happen. Determining who legally owns the genomic data, the company or the individual, is of legal concern. There have been published examples of personal genome information being exploited, as well as indirect identification of family members. Additional privacy concerns, related to, e.g., genetic discrimination, loss of anonymity, and psychological impacts, have been increasingly pointed out by the academic community as well as government agencies.
Law Enforcement
Additionally, for criminal justice and privacy advocates, the use of genetic information in identifying suspects for criminal investigations proves worrisome under the Fourth Amendment—especially when an indirect genetic link connects an individual to crime scene evidence. Since 2018, law enforcement officials have been harnessing the power of genetic data to revisit cold cases with DNA evidence. Suspects discovered through this process are not directly identified by the input of their DNA into established criminal databases, like CODIS. Instead, suspects are identified as the result of familial genetic sleuthing by law enforcement, submitting crime scene DNA evidence to genetic database services that link users whose DNA similarity indicates a family connection. Officers can then track the newly identified suspect in person, waiting to collect discarded trash that might carry DNA in order to confirm the match.
Despite the privacy concerns of suspects and their relatives, this procedure is likely to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Much like donors of biological samples in cases of genetic research, criminal suspects do not retain property rights in abandoned waste; they can no longer assert an expectation of privacy in the discarded DNA used to confirm law enforcement suspicions, thereby eliminating their Fourth Amendment protection in that DNA. Additionally, the genetic privacy of relatives is likely irrelevant under current caselaw since Fourth Amendment protection is “personal” to criminal defendants.
Psychological Impact
In a systematic review of perspectives toward genetic privacy, researchers highlight some of the concerns individuals hold regarding their genetic information, such as the potential dangers and effects on themselves and family members. Academics note that participating in biomedical research or genetic testing has implications beyond the participant; it can also reveal information about genetic relatives. The study also found that people expressed concerns as to which body controls their information and if their genetic information could be used against them.
Additionally, the American Society of Human Genetics has expressed issues about genetic tests in children. They infer that testing could lead to negative consequences for the child. For example, if a child's likelihood for adoption was influenced by genetic testing, the child might suffer from self esteem issues. A child's well-being might also suffer due to paternity testing or custody battles that require this type of information.
Regulations
When the access of genetic information is regulated, it can prevent insurance companies and employers from reaching such data. This could avoid issues of discrimination, which oftentimes leaves an individual whose information has been breached without a job or without insurance.
In the United States
Federal Regulation
In the United States, biomedical research containing human subjects is governed by a baseline standard of ethics known as The Common Rule, which aims to protect a subject's privacy by requiring "identifiers" such as name or address to be removed from collected data. A 2012 report by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues stated, however, that "what constitutes 'identifiable' and 'de-identified' data is fluid and that evolving technologies and the increasing accessibility of data could allow de-identified data to become re-identified". In fact, research has already shown that it is "possible to discover a study participant's identity by cross-referencing research data about him and his DNA sequence … [with] genetic genealogy and public-records databases". This has led to calls for policy-makers to establish consistent guidelines and best practices for the accessibility and usage of individual genomic data collected by researchers.
Privacy protections for genetic research participants were strengthened by provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act (H.R.34) passed on 7 December 2016 for which the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) commended Congress, Senator Warren and Senator Enzi.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) protects the genetic privacy of the public, including research participants. The passage of GINA makes it illegal for health insurers or employers to request or require genetic information of an individual or of family members (and further prohibits the discriminatory use of such information). This protection does not extend to other forms of insurance such as life insurance.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) also provides some genetic privacy protections. HIPAA defines health information to include genetic information, which places restrictions on who health providers can share the information with.
State Regulation
Three kinds of laws are frequently associated with genetic privacy: those relating to informed consent and property rights, those preventing insurance discrimination, and those prohibiting employment discrimination. According to the National Human Genome Research Institute, forty-one states have enacted genetic privacy laws as of January 2020. However, those privacy laws vary in the scope of protection offered; while some laws "apply broadly to any person" others apply "narrowly to certain entities such as insurers, employers, or researchers."
Arizona, for example, falls in the former category and offers broad protection. Currently, Arizona's genetic privacy statutes focus on the need for informed consent to create, store, or release genetic testing results, but a pending bill would amend the state genetic privacy law framework to grant exclusive property rights in genetic information derived from genetic testing to all persons tested. In expanding privacy rights by including property rights, the bill would grant persons who undergo genetic testing greater control over their genetic information. Arizona also prohibits insurance and employment discrimination on the basis of genetic testing results.
New York State also has strong legislative measures protecting individuals from genetic discrimination. Section 79-I of the New York Civil Rights Law places strict restrictions on the usage of genetic data. The statute also outlines the proper conditions for consenting to genetic data collection or usage.
California similarly offers a broad range of protection for genetic privacy, but it stops short of granting individuals property rights in their genetic information. While currently enacted legislation focuses on prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, a piece of pending legislation would extend genetic privacy rights to provide individuals with greater control over genetic information obtained through direct-to-consumer testing services like 23andMe.
Florida passed House Bill 1189, a DNA privacy law that prohibits insurers from using genetic data, in July 2020.
On the other hand, Mississippi offers few genetic privacy protections beyond those required by the federal government. In the Mississippi Employment Fairness Act, the legislature recognized the applicability of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, which "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and employment."
Other
To balance data sharing with the need to protect the privacy of research subjects geneticists are considering to move more data behind controlled-access barriers, authorizing trusted users to access the data from many studies, rather than "having to obtain it piecemeal from different studies".
In October 2005, IBM became the world's first major corporation to establish a genetics privacy policy. Its policy prohibits using employees' genetic information in employment decisions.
Breaching techniques
According to a 2014 study genetic privacy breaching by Yaniv Erlich and Arvind Narayanan techniques fall into three categories:
Identity Tracing
Here the aim is to link between an unknown genome and the concealed identity of the data originator by accumulating quasi-identifiers − residual pieces of information that are embedded in the dataset − and to gradually narrow down the possible individuals that match the combination of these quasi-identifiers.
Attribute Disclosure Attacks via DNA (ADAD)
Here the adversary already has access to the identified DNA sample of the target and to a database that links DNA-derived data to sensitive attributes without explicit identifiers, for example a public database of the genetic study of drug abuse. The ADAD techniques match the DNA data and associate the identity of the target with the sensitive attribute
Completion Techniques
Here the adversary also knows the identity of a genomic dataset but has access only to a sanitized version without sensitive loci. The aim here is to expose the sensitive loci that are not part of the original data.
However, more recent studies have indicated new avenues for breaching genetic privacy:
Phenotype Inferences
Here, the goal is to use readily available phenotype information about an individual, such as physical features (or some combination thereof), to make genetic inferences. As genetic databases grow at unprecedented rates, providing larger and more comprehensive aggregates, the ability to make inferences with more probabilistic certainty greatly increases. Furthermore, the scope of potential inferences grows with expanding datasets.
See also
Genetic discrimination
Genetic exceptionalism
Gene theft
Maryland v. King
List of data breaches
Comparative genomics
DNA encryption
References
Further reading
The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know: Genetic Privacy and Responsibility,
External links
Genetic Information Privacy, EFF
Medical and Genetic Privacy, ACLU
Genetic Privacy Laws, NCSL
Information privacy
Human genetics
Privacy law |
52729212 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security%20level | Security level | In cryptography, security level is a measure of the strength that a cryptographic primitive — such as a cipher or hash function — achieves. Security level is usually expressed in "bits", where n-bit security means that the attacker would have to perform 2n operations to break it, but other methods have been proposed that more closely model the costs for an attacker. This allows for convenient comparison between algorithms and is useful when combining multiple primitives in a hybrid cryptosystem, so there is no clear weakest link. For example, AES-128 (key size 128 bits) is designed to offer a 128-bit security level, which is considered roughly equivalent to a RSA using 3072-bit key.
In this context, security claim or target security level is the security level that a primitive was initially designed to achieve, although "security level" is also sometimes used in those contexts. When attacks are found that have lower cost than the security claim, the primitive is considered broken.
In symmetric cryptography
Symmetric algorithms usually have a strictly defined security claim. For symmetric ciphers, it is typically equal to the key size of the cipher — equivalent to the complexity of a brute-force attack. Cryptographic hash functions with output size of n bits usually have a collision resistance security level n/2 and a preimage resistance level n. This is because the general birthday attack can always find collisions in 2n/2 steps. For example, SHA-256 offers 128-bit collision resistance and 256-bit preimage resistance.
However, there are some exceptions to this. The Phelix and Helix are 256-bit ciphers offering a 128-bit security level. The SHAKE variants of SHA-3 are also different: for a 256-bit output size, SHAKE-128 provides 128-bit security level for both collision and preimage resistance.
In asymmetric cryptography
The design of most asymmetric algorithms (i.e. public-key cryptography) relies on neat mathematical problems that are efficient to compute in one direction, but inefficient to reverse by the attacker. However, attacks against current public-key systems are always faster than brute-force search of the key space. Their security level isn't set at design time, but represents a computational hardness assumption, which is adjusted to match the best currently known attack.
Various recommendations have been published that estimate the security level of asymmetric algorithms, which differ slightly due to different methodologies. For the RSA cryptosystem at 128-bit security level, NIST and ENISA recommend using 3072-bit keys and IETF 3253 bits. Elliptic curve cryptography requires shorter keys, so the recommendations are 256-383 (NIST), 256 (ENISA) and 242 bits (IETF).
Typical levels
The following table are examples of typical security levels for types of algorithms as found in s5.6.1.1 of the US NIST SP-800-57 Recommendation for Key Management.
† DES was deprecated in 2003
Meaning of "broken"
A cryptographic primitive is considered broken when an attack is found to have less than its advertised level of security. However, not all such attacks are practical: most currently demonstrated attacks take fewer than 240 operations, which translates to a few hours on an average PC. The costliest demonstrated attack on hash functions is the 261.2 attack on SHA-1, which took 2 months on 900 GTX 970 GPUs, or US$1,100.
Aumasson draws the line between practical and impractical attacks at 280 operations. He proposes a new terminology:
A broken primitive has an attack taking ≤ 280 operations. An attack can be plausibility carried out.
A wounded primitive has an attack taking between 280 and around 2100 operations. An attack is not possible right now, but future improvements are likely to make it possible.
An attacked primitive has an attack that is cheaper than the security claim, but much costlier than 2100. Such an attack is too far from being practical.
Finally, an analyzed primitive is one with no attacks cheaper than its security claim.
References
Further reading
See also
Computational hardness assumption
40-bit encryption
Cipher security summary
Hash function security summary
Cryptography
Computational hardness assumptions |
52758825 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Targeted%20surveillance | Targeted surveillance | Targeted surveillance (or targeted interception) is a form of surveillance, such as wiretapping, that is directed towards specific persons of interest, and is distinguishable from mass surveillance (or bulk interception). Both untargeted and targeted surveillance is routinely accused of treating innocent people as suspects in ways that are unfair, of violating human rights, international treaties and conventions as well as national laws, and of failing to pursue security effectively.
A 2014 report to the UN General Assembly by the United Nations' top official for counter-terrorism and human rights condemned mass electronic surveillance as a clear violation of core privacy rights guaranteed by multiple treaties and conventions. The report also makes a distinction between "targeted surveillance" - which "depend[s] upon the existence of prior suspicion of the targeted individual or organization" — and "mass surveillance", by which "states with high levels of Internet penetration can [...] gain access to the telephone and e-mail content of an effectively unlimited number of users and maintain an overview of Internet activity associated with particular websites".
The United Kingdom's House of Lords also distinguishes between these two broad types of surveillance:
Mass surveillance is also known as “passive” or “undirected” surveillance. [...] It is not targeted on any particular individual but gathers images and information for possible future use. CCTV and databases are examples of mass surveillance.
Targeted surveillance is surveillance directed at particular individuals and can involve the use of specific powers by authorised public agencies. Targeted surveillance can be carried out overtly or covertly, and can involve human agents. Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), targeted covert surveillance is “directed” if it is carried out for a specific investigation or operation. By comparison, if it is carried out on designated premises or on a vehicle, it is “intrusive” surveillance. Targeting methods include the interception of communications, the use of communications “traffic” data, visual surveillance devices, and devices that sense movement, objects or persons.
Only targeted interception of traffic and location data in order to combat serious crime, including terrorism, is justified, according to a decision by the European Court of Justice.
Selection of targets
NSA's selector lists
The current approach of the NSA and its related organizations is attempting to collect all signals of everybody at all times without any prior selection. So any current selection is only used for targets of special interest, human review or special resource allocation.
Such selectors include searching the web for the privacy-enhancing software tools such as Tor.
A leaked document revealed that for the XKeyscore program, using languages that are out of place for the region one is in, using encryption, and searching the web for 'suspicious stuff', were suggested as selectors.
NSA and Germany's selector lists
In Operation Eikonal, German BND agents received "Selector Lists" − search terms for their dragnet surveillance. They contain IP addresses, mobile phone numbers and email accounts with the BND surveillance system containing hundreds of thousands and possibly more than a million such targets. These lists have been subject of controversy since in 2008 when it was revealed that they contained some terms targeting the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), the Eurocopter project as well as French administration, which were first noticed by BND employees in 2005. Other selectors were found to target the administration of Austria. After the revelations made by whistle-blower Edward Snowden the BND decided to investigate the issue whose October 2013 conclusion was that at least 2,000 of these selectors were aimed at Western European or even German interests which has been a violation of the Memorandum of Agreement that the US and Germany signed in 2002 in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. After reports emerged in 2014 that EADS and Eurocopter had been surveillance targets the Left Party and the Greens filed an official request to obtain evidence of the violations.
The BND's project group charged with supporting the NSA investigative committee in German parliament was set up in spring 2014. It reviewed the selectors and discovered 40,000 suspicious search parameters, including espionage targets in Western European governments and numerous companies. The group also confirmed suspicions that the NSA had systematically violated German interests and concluded that the Americans could have perpetrated economic espionage directly under the Germans' noses. The investigative parliamentary committee was not granted access to the NSA's selectors list as an appeal led by opposition politicians failed at Germany's top court. Instead, the ruling coalition appointed an administrative judge, Kurt Graulich, as a "person of trust" who was granted access to the list and briefed the investigative commission on its contents after analyzing the 40,000 parameters. In his almost 300-paged report, Graulich concluded that European government agencies were targeted massively and that Americans hence broke contractual agreements. He also found that German targets which received special protection from surveillance of domestic intelligence agencies by Germany's Basic Law (Grundgesetz) − including numerous enterprises based in Germany − were featured in the NSA's wishlist in a surprising plenitude. While the magnitude differs there have also been problematic BND-internal selectors which have been used until end of 2013 - around two thirds of 3300 targets were related to EU and NATO states. Klaus Landefeld, member of the board at the Internet industry association Eco International, has met intelligence officials and legislators to present suggestions for improvement, like streamlining the selector system.
Calls for targeted surveillance
Intelligence officials
Former NSA director and whistleblower William Binney testified that while targeted data collection operations could help prevent terror attacks, "overcollection" of mass data undermined security and had consistently cost lives because of "analysis paralysis". He said the British government should "redirect" intelligence agencies and law enforcement to targeted surveillance with it being "based on probable cause and developing knowledge about the targets and make sure they qualify for things like warrants". He also states that "retroactively analysing people, anybody you want, any time you want, that's certainly possible with bulk acquisition of data but that's certainly not what democracies are built on". According to him "that's what totalitarian states are built on".
In November 2016 whistleblower Edward Snowden stated:
Snowden also noted that the men who committed recent terrorist attacks in France, Canada and Australia were under surveillance but they weren't singled out.
In May 2015 The Intercept revealed that it obtained documents that showed that officials inside the NSA have criticized the 'collect it all'-approach as well with the documents having titles such as "Data Is Not Intelligence", "The Fallacies Behind the Scenes", "Cognitive Overflow?", "Summit Fever", "In Praise of Not Knowing", "Dealing With a 'Tsunami' of Intercept", "Overcome by Overload?" and "Too Many Choices".
The document's conclusions include:
The SIGINT mission is far too vital to unnecessarily expand the haystacks while we search for the needles. Prioritization is key.
We in the agency are at risk of a similar, collective paralysis in the face of a dizzying array of choices every single day
'Analysis paralysis' isn't only a cute rhyme. It's the term for what happens when you spend so much time analyzing a situation that you ultimately stymie any outcome [...] It's what happens in SIGINT when we have access to endless possibilities, but we struggle to prioritize, narrow, and exploit the best ones.
Politics
United Kingdom's Liberal Democrats have demanded that the Government end indiscriminate mass surveillance and introduce a more targeted and effective counter-terrorism policy that uses targeted surveillance of specific individuals who are suspected of wrongdoing. Liberal Democrats home affairs spokesperson Alistair Carmichael asks that, "mass spying on the British people should be replaced with targeted surveillance of specific individuals suspected of wrongdoing".
In the 2015 "Resolution 2045", the European Parliamentary Assembly "recognises the need for effective, targeted surveillance of suspected terrorists and other organised criminal groups" and states that "such targeted surveillance can be an effective tool for law enforcement and crime prevention", while at the same time "according to independent reviews carried out in the United States, mass surveillance does not appear to have contributed to the prevention of terrorist attacks, contrary to earlier assertions made by senior intelligence officials. Instead, resources that might prevent attacks are diverted to mass surveillance, leaving potentially dangerous persons free to act".
Organizations
Privacy campaigners argue that instead of "wasting resources gathering and sifting through the volume of data being accumulated through mass surveillance", resources would be better allocated in providing more personnel for targeted surveillance.
In an analysis of 10 recent terror attacks, Ryan Gallagher of The Intercept concludes that, "if any lesson can be learned from studying the perpetrators of recent attacks, it is that there needs to be a greater investment in conducting targeted surveillance of known terror suspects and a move away from the constant knee-jerk expansion of dragnet surveillance, which has simply not proven itself to be effective, regardless of the debate about whether it is legal or ethical in the first place".
After Privacy International launched a legal case against Britain's security services, Thomas de la Mare QC of the group states there is a danger that "de facto constant surveillance", such as the services' orders for bulk data from telecom companies on request, could become "the most potent instrument of repression", and argued during the hearing, that such non-targeted forms of surveillance have turned investigations on their head. The campaigners argue that whereas in the past, individual inquiries based on suspicion would throw up leads, it is now algorithmic processing of data providing those leads with that amounting to mass surveillance.
Civil rights group Liberty, which is challenging the legality of bulk collection in the European Court of Human Rights criticizes the "Report of the bulk powers review" by David Anderson QC for failing to answer whether information gathered via bulk powers was the "critical factor in preventing or detecting serious crime, and whether that information could have been obtained from smart, targeted surveillance instead".
Other
Lord Paddick comments the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, saying "as with any legislation, there is a significant risk that authorities will use powers in a way that parliament never intended" and called for proper oversight to ensure any surveillance is targeted and proportionate. Privacy campaigners say the bill clearly lays out the mass surveillance powers that would be at the disposal of the security services, and want it be amended so that the surveillance is targeted and based on suspicion. They argue that the powers are so sweeping, and the bill's language so general, that not just the security services but also government bodies will be able to analyze the records of millions of people even if they are not under suspicion.
Troy Wolverton notes that the documents leaked by Snowden revealed widespread abuses, both at home and abroad. He says that "instead of targeted surveillance of particular threats, the NSA had a motto and mentality of 'collect it all' on everybody, the privacy of anyone involved be damned".
Jo Glanville, editor of Index on Censorship and a member of the Ministry of Justice working party on libel reform, asserts that keeping the country safe does not entitle the government or the intelligence services to act without regards to our human rights and that "it is possible to conduct targeted surveillance with effective oversight while according respect to all our rights".
Software
Computer scientists at the University of Pennsylvania have developed an algorithmic framework for conducting targeted surveillance of individuals within social networks while protecting the privacy of "untargeted" digital bystanders that "outputs a list of confirmed targeted individuals discovered in the network, for whom any subsequent action (e.g., publication in a most-wanted list, further surveillance, or arrest in the case of terrorism; medical treatment or quarantine in the case of epidemics) will not compromise the privacy of the protected".
In January 2017 it was reported that German federal agencies are using a new program called "Radar", developed by the BKA and the University of Zürich, that aims to help evaluate the risk posed by persons. It includes a catalog of questions such as about the person's relationship to violence and access to weapons and takes into account data on past terrorists.
The crypto and security communities can make the Internet more secure by making population-wide surveillance technically or economically infeasible, understanding that modest amounts of targeted surveillance will always be technically and economically feasible.
Edward Snowden notes that "we're thwarting mass surveillance when we use encryption. We're not stopping targeted surveillance. Because even, again, if you have the most well-encrypted device in the world, if the government spends a million dollars to pay a hacker to exploit your phone personally, they will very likely succeed".
Attempts to legalize mass surveillance as targeted surveillance
The Electronic Frontier Foundation claims that the NSA and its defenders are trying to pass off their mass surveillance as being authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act as "targeted surveillance" even though it includes the collection of the content of hundreds of millions of communications annually and the real-time search of billions more which according to them fits the definition "mass surveillance" under Section 702.
Furthermore, the organization asks how the US government justified the Yahoo email scanning under FISA, asking whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has interpreted FISA – which authorizes targeted surveillance of certain foreigners' (such as spies or terrorists) communications – to mean that the government can conscript Yahoo into mass surveillance of all of its users' emails.
According to documents obtained from Edward Snowden and published by Glenn Greenwald, the NSA and GCHQ have been automating targeted operations, allowing for "industrial scale exploitation" that can potentially infect "millions" of machines with malware.
See also
Person of interest
Global surveillance disclosures (2013–present)
PRISM (surveillance program)
MYSTIC (surveillance program)
TURBINE (US government project)
XKeyscore
MUSCULAR (surveillance program)
Tempora
List of government mass surveillance projects
Upstream collection
Right to privacy
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Lawful interception
Social network analysis
Target acquisition
References
External links
Update of the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security services and report on the democratic oversight of signals intelligence agencies, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
The key to intelligence reform in Germany: Strengthening the G 10-Commission's role to authorise strategic surveillance
A new call for U.S. surveillance reform, AccessNow
Mass surveillance not effective for finding terrorists, New Scientist
Crime prevention
Counter-terrorism
Human rights
Law enforcement techniques
National security
Surveillance |
52768320 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain%20fronting | Domain fronting | Domain fronting is a technique for Internet censorship circumvention that uses different domain names in different communication layers of an HTTPS connection to discreetly connect to a different target domain than is discernable to third parties monitoring the requests and connections.
Due to quirks in security certificates, the redirect systems of the content delivery networks (CDNs) used as 'domain fronts', and the protection provided by HTTPS, censors are typically unable to differentiate circumvention ("domain-fronted") traffic from overt non-fronted traffic for any given domain name. As such they are forced to either allow all traffic to the domain front—including circumvention traffic—or block the domain front entirely, which may result in expensive collateral damage and has been likened to "blocking the rest of the Internet".
Domain fronting does not conform to HTTP standards that require the SNI extension and HTTP Host header to contain the same domain. Large cloud service providers, including Amazon and Google, now actively prohibit domain fronting, which has made it "largely non-viable" as a censorship bypass technique.
Technical details
Basis
The basis for domain fronting is using different domain names at different layers of communication with the servers (that supports multiple target domains; i.e. Subject Alternative Names) of a large hosting providers or a content delivery network (CDN). CDNs are used due to idiosyncrasies in how they route traffic and requests, which is what allows fronting to work.
Obfuscating requests
In an HTTPS request, the destination domain name appears in three relevant places: the DNS query, the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension, and the HTTPS Host header. Ordinarily the same domain name is listed in all three places.
In a domain-fronted HTTPS request, one domain appears on the “outside” of an HTTPS request in plain text—in the DNS request and SNI extension—which will be what the client wants to pretend they are targeting in the connection establishment and is the one that is visible to censors, while a covert domain appears on the “inside”—in the HTTPS Host header, invisible to the censor under HTTPS encryption—which would be the actual target of the connection.
# wget sends a dns query and connects to www.google.com but the http host header requests
# the www.youtube.com webpage, which it is able to fetch and display. Here www.youtube.com
# is essentially domain-fronted by www.google.com; that is, by blocking www.youtube.com
# but allowing www.google.com, a censor may be trivially bypassed using a domain-fronted request
wget -q -O - https://www.google.com/ --header 'Host: www.youtube.com' | grep -o '<title>.*</title>'
<title>YouTube</title>
Due to encryption of the HTTPS hosts header by the HTTPS protocol, circumvention traffic is indistinguishable from 'legitimate' (non-fronted) traffic. Implementations of domain fronting supplement HTTPS with using large content delivery networks (such as various large CDNs) as their front domains, which are relied on by large parts of the web for functionality. To block the circumvention traffic, a censor will have to outright block the front domain. Blocking popular content delivery networks is economically, politically, and diplomatically infeasible for most censors.
When Telegram was blocked in April 2018 following a court ruling in Russia through ISP-blocking of the CDNs Telegram used as a front to evade blocks on its own IP addresses, 15.8 million IP addresses associated with Google and Amazon's CDN were blocked collaterally. This resulted in a large scale network outages for major banks, retail chains, and numerous websites; the manner of blocking was criticised for incompetence.
Leveraging request forwarding
Domain fronting works with CDNs as—when served with two different domains in one request—they are (or historically speaking—they were; see §Disabling) configured to automatically fulfil a request to view/access the domain specified in the Hosts header even after finding the SNI extension to have a different domain. This behaviour was and is not universal across hosting providers; there are services that validate if the same domain is used in the different layers of an HTTP request. A variation of the usual domain fronting technique, known as domainless fronting may work in this case, which leaves the SNI field blank.
If the request to access the Hosts header domain succeeds, to the censor or third parties monitoring connections, it appears that the CDN has internally forwarded the request to an uninteresting page within its network; this is the final connection they typically monitor. In circumvention scenarios, the domain in the Hosts header will be a proxy. The Hosts header domain, being a proxy, would be blocked by the censor if accessed directly; fronting hides its address from the censor and allows parties to evade blocks and access it. No traffic ever reaches the front domain specified in the DNS request and SNI extension; the CDN's frontend server is the only third-party in this interaction that can decrypt the Hosts header and know the true destination of the covert request. It is possible to emulate this same behaviour with host services that don't automatically forward requests, through a "reflector" web application.
As a general rule, web services only forward requests to their own customers' domains, not arbitrary ones. It is necessary then for the blocked domains, that use domain fronting, to also be hosted by the same large provider as the innocuous sites they will be using as a front in their HTTPS requests (for DNS and STI).
Usage
Internet censorship circumvention
Signal
Signal, the secure messaging service, deployed domain fronting in builds of their apps from 2016 to 2018 to bypass blocks of direct connections to their servers from Egypt, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Tor Browser
The Tor anonymity network uses an implementation of domain fronting called 'meek' in its official web browser to bypass blocks to the Tor network.
Telegram
Telegram used Amazon Web Services as a domain front to resist attempts to block the service in Russia.
GreatFire
The anti-Chinese censorship organisation GreatFire used domain fronting at one point.
Cyberattacks
Domain fronting has been used by private, and state-sponsored individuals and groups to cover their tracks and discreetly launch cyberattacks and disseminate malware.
Cozy Bear
The Russian hacker group Cozy Bear, classed as APT29, has been observed to have used domain fronting to discreetly gain unauthorised access to systems by pretending to be legitimate traffic from CDNs. Their technique used the meek plugin—developed by the Tor Project for its anonymity network—to feign detection.
Disabling
The endurance of domain fronting as a method for censorship circumvention has been likened to the expensive collateral damage that blocking it comes with—as to block domain fronting, one must block all traffic to and from their fronts (CDNs and large providers) which by design are often relied on by countless other web services. The Signal Foundation drew the analogy that to block one domain fronted site you "have to block the rest of the Internet as well."
Cloudflare disabled domain fronting in 2015. In April 2018, Google and Amazon both disabled domain fronting from their content delivery services by removing the idiosyncrasies in redirect schemes that allowed fronting to happen. Google broke domain fronting by removing the ability to use 'google.com' as a front domain by changing how their CDN was structured. When requested to comment they said domain fronting had "never been a supported feature" and that the changes made were long-planned upgrades. Amazon claimed fronting was "already handled as a breach of AWS Terms of Service" and implemented a set of changes that prohibited the obfuscation that allowed sites to masquerade as and use CloudFront domains of other websites as fronts.
Reactions
Various publications speculated that the effort by both Google and Amazon was in part due to pressure from the Russian government and its communications authority Roskomnadzor blocking millions of Google and Amazon domains, in April 2018 as well, due to Telegram using them as fronts.
Digital rights advocates have commented that the move undermines peoples ability to access and transmit information freely and securely in repressive states.
According to Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, Google management came to question whether they wanted to act as a front for sites and services entire nation states wanted to block as domain fronting gained popular attention with apps like Signal implementing it. He called fronting as a circumvention tool "now largely non-viable" in the countries it was needed.
See also
Collateral freedom
Telex (anti-censorship system)
Encrypted SNI
Notes
References
External links
David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, Vern Paxson, 2015: Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting
Computer security
Secure communication
Internet censorship |
52770134 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateral%20freedom | Collateral freedom | Collateral freedom is an anti-censorship strategy that attempts to make it economically prohibitive for censors to block content on the Internet. This is achieved by hosting content on cloud services that are considered by censors to be "too important to block," and then using encryption to prevent censors from identifying requests for censored information that is hosted among other content, forcing censors to either allow access to the censored information or take down entire services.
See also
Domain fronting
Lantern (software)
Telex (anti-censorship system)
Refraction networking
References
Computer security
Secure communication
Internet censorship |
52871204 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naozaburo%20Okabe | Naozaburo Okabe | was a General in the Imperial Japanese Army, who commanded the Japanese Sixth Area Army from November 1944 until the end of World War II.
Biography
Okabe was born in Hiroshima city and attended military preparatory schools as a youth. He graduated from the 18th class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, where his classmates included Tomoyuki Yamashita and Korechika Anami. He subsequently graduated from the 27th class of the Army Staff College. In 1918, with the rank of captain, he was sent to the Vladivostok Special Operations Office during the Japanese intervention in Siberia, and as a major in 1922, he was sent as a military attache to Poland. During his time in Poland, he acquired the latest code encryption technology from one of his contacts in the Polish General Staff.
After his return to Japan, Okabe served as an instructor at the Staff College from December 1928 to April 1930, during which time he was promoted to colonel. In April 1934, he received command of the 1st Field Artillery Regiment. In February 1932, he was assigned to the staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army in the midst of the First Shanghai Incident, and he served in Shanghai until December of that year. After his return to Japan, he was assigned to research and training within the Staff College and was promoted to major general in August 1934. In August 1937, he was assigned as chief-of-staff of the newly-formed Northern China Area Army was responsible for direction and coordination of the Japanese military activity in all of north China, He was promoted to lieutenant general in December of the same year. In July 1938, Okabe was assigned command of the Manchukuo-based IJA 1st Division. which he led during the disastrous Nomonhan Incident. He was subsequently transferred to command the Mongolia Garrison Army in September 1939, where his forces suffered a defeat against the Chinese during the Battle of Wuyuan.
In September 1940, Okabe was recalled to Japan and attached to the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff. In 1940, he was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun and the Order of the Golden Kite, 2nd class. From December, he was head of the Army Technical Headquarters and became a member of the Supreme War Council from October 1942. Simultaneously, he was also appointed as commandant of the Staff College. He was promoted to general in February 1943.
In October 1943, Okabe returned to the field as the commander of the newly-formed Japanese Third Area Army under the control of the Kwantung Army. This was a military reserve and garrison force to maintain security and public order in southern Manchukuo as many veteran divisions of the Kwantung Army were transferred to the various southern fronts in the Pacific War and was based in Mukden. In August 1944, he was transferred to command the Northern China Area Army based in Beijing, and in November of the same year, became commander of the newly-formed Japanese Sixth Area Army. This was also a reserve and garrison force for the occupation of the central provinces of China between the Yangtze River and the Yellow River. At the surrender of Japan, he surrendered his forces to the Republic of China Army at Hankou on September 2, 1945. Okabe was taken as a prisoner of war to Shanghai, where he was to be tried for unspecified war crimes, but he died in prison due to illness of November 28, 1946 before he could come to trial.
References
External links
Valka.cz
1887 births
1946 deaths
Military personnel from Hiroshima
Japanese generals
Japanese military attachés
People of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Japanese military personnel of World War II
Prisoners who died in Chinese detention
Grand Cordons of the Order of the Rising Sun
Recipients of the Order of the Golden Kite, 2nd class |
52894890 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF24%20Creator | PDF24 Creator | PDF24 Creator is an application software by Geek Software GmbH for the creation of PDF files from any application and for converting files to the PDF format. The application is released under a proprietary freeware license.
The software has been developed in Germany since 2006 and is actively developed. It is available in 32 languages, including English and German.
Functions and features
PDF24 Creator is installed as a virtual printer via a device driver in the operating system. This allows PDF files to be created directly from any application that provides a printing function. The commands sent are then used to create a PDF file. PDF24 Creator uses the free PDF interpreter Ghostscript, which is automatically installed as a private instance for the PDF24 Creator. After printing a document on the PDF printer, a wizard opens automatically, where the created PDF file can be edited or further worked on.
The PDF24 Creator is also able to merge multiple documents to one PDF file and to extract pages. Compressing PDF files to shrink the file size is also possible. Since version 10.0.0 an added toolbox is present as well.
Some features of the software include, but are not limited to:
Merge multiple PDF into one file
Rotating, extracting, inserting pages
Integrated preview for PDF editing
PDF encryption, decryption and signing
Change PDF information (author, title, etc.)
Compress and shrink PDF files
Add a watermark or stamp a PDF file
Combine pages with a digital paper
Convert to and from PDF
Multiple PDF printers for different purposes since 7.7.0
Full featured and lightweight PDF reader since version 8.7.0
Tesseract OCR engine since version 8.8.0
Blackening of PDF files since version 10.0.0
Distribution and fields of application
PDF24 Creator is credited with more than 5 million downloads within the top 3 (2017-01-17) in the category "PDF Software" on the German site Chip.de.
See also
List of PDF software
List of virtual printer software
References
External links
Andrea Trinkwalder: "Portable Dokuments. PDF-Creators: Office-Export, Office-Add-ins and universal PDF-Printer" in: c't. 25/2014, p. 140 ff. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
PDF software
Windows-only freeware |
52925512 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John%20Launchbury | John Launchbury | John Launchbury is an American and British computer scientist who is currently Chief Scientist at Galois, Inc. Previously, he directed one of DARPA’s technical offices, where he oversaw nation-scale scientific and engineering research in cybersecurity, data analysis, and artificial intelligence. He is known for research and entrepreneurship in the implementation and application of functional programming languages. In 2010, Launchbury was inducted as a Fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery.
Education
Launchbury received first-class honors in mathematics from Oxford University in 1985, and an M.Sc. in computation in 1986. He holds a Ph.D. in computing science from the University of Glasgow. In 1991, the Cambridge University Press published his thesis, Projection Factorizations in Partial Evaluation, after it won the British Computer Society's distinguished dissertation prize.
Career and research
As a lecturer at the University of Glasgow, Launchbury focused his early research on the semantics and analysis of lazy functional languages and was one of the contributing designers of the Haskell programming language.
In 1993, Launchbury provided a formal description of lazy evaluation, addressing challenges in analyzing a program’s storage requirements. The operational semantics is widely cited in later research on Haskell. In the context of the Glasgow Haskell Compiler team, Launchbury established an effective partnership with Simon L. Peyton Jones to write a number of papers that dramatically influenced the design of Haskell. Their 1995 paper on State in Haskell introduced the “IO monad” as a mathematically-clean practical way of expressing effects on the external world, and solidified the “do-notation” Launchbury had introduced earlier. Their papers on unboxed values and removal of intermediate data structures addressed many of the efficiency challenges inherent in lazy evaluation.
In 1994, Launchbury relocated to the West Coast of the United States, becoming a full professor at the Oregon Graduate Institute in 2000. His research there addressed the creation and optimization of domain-specific programming languages (DSLs) ranging from fundamental research in combining disparate semantic elements, through embedding DSLs in Haskell, to applied research for modeling and reasoning about very-large scale integration (VLSI) micro-architectures.
Launchbury founded Galois Inc. in 1999 to address challenges in information assurance through the application of functional programming and formal methods. He served as the company’s CEO and Chief Scientist from 2000 to 2014. Under Launchbury’s direction, Galois Inc. developed the Cryptol domain-specific language for specifying and verifying cryptographic implementations. Originally designed for use by the National Security Agency, the language was made available to the public in 2008.
Launchbury is the holder of two patents on cryptographic structures in data storage and one on effective mechanisms for configuring programmable cryptographic components.
In 2014, Launchbury joined DARPA, initially as a program manager, and then as director of the Information Innovation Office (I2O) in 2015. Launchbury led programs in homomorphic cryptography (PROCEED), cybersecurity for vehicles and other embedded systems (HACMS), and data privacy (Brandeis).
In 2017, Launchbury rejoined Galois as Chief Scientist.
Other publications
Launchbury published a theological perspective on the Moral Exemplar interpretation of the doctrine of atonement, entitled Change Us, Not God: Biblical Meditations on the Death of Jesus.
References
British emigrants to the United States
Alumni of the University of Oxford
Alumni of the University of Glasgow
Oregon Graduate Institute people
Fellows of the Association for Computing Machinery
Programming language researchers
Living people
Year of birth missing (living people)
Place of birth missing (living people) |
52949872 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalyna%20%28cipher%29 | Kalyna (cipher) | Kalyna (Ukrainian: Калина, Viburnum opulus) is a symmetric block cipher. It supports block sizes of 128, 256 or 512 bits; the key length is either equal to or double the block size.
Kalyna was adopted as the national encryption standard of Ukraine in 2015 (standard DSTU 7624:2014) after holding Ukrainian national cryptographic competition. Kalyna is a substitution–permutation network and its design is based on the Rijndael (AES) encryption function having quite different key schedule, another set of four different S-boxes and increased MDS matrix size.
Kalyna has 10 rounds for 128-bit keys, 14 rounds for 256-bit keys and 18 rounds for 512-bit keys. Independent researchers proposed some attacks on reduced-round variants of Kalyna, but all of them have a very high complexity and none of them are practical.
References
Roman Oliynykov, Ivan Gorbenko, Oleksandr Kazymyrov, Victor Ruzhentsev, Oleksandr Kuznetsov, Yurii Gorbenko, Oleksandr Dyrda, Viktor Dolgov, Andrii Pushkaryov, Ruslan Mordvinov, Dmytro Kaidalov. A New Encryption Standard of Ukraine: The Kalyna Block Cipher. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, p650 (2015) https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/650
Roman Oliynykov, Ivan Gorbenko, Viktor Dolgov and Viktor Ruzhentsev. Results of Ukrainian national public cryptographic competition. Tatra Mt. Math. Publ. 47 (2010), 99–113. DOI: 10.2478/v10127-010-0033-6 https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/tmmp.2010.47.issue-1/v10127-010-0033-6/v10127-010-0033-6.xml
Roman Oliynykov. Kalyna block cipher presentation (in English) http://www.slideshare.net/oliynykov/kalyna-english
Akshima, Donghoon Chang, Mohona Ghosh, Aarushi Goel, Somitra Kumar Sanadhya. Single Key Recovery Attacks on 9-Round Kalyna-128/256 and Kalyna-256/512. Volume 9558 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 119–135. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-30840-1_8
Riham Altawy, Ahmed Abdelkhalek, Amr M. Youssef. A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b. IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems, Vol. E99-D, No.4, pp. 1246–1250. http://search.ieice.org/bin/summary.php?id=e99-d_4_1246
External links
Reference implementation of the Kalyna block cipher (DSTU 7624:2014)
K |
52953373 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware%20backdoor | Hardware backdoor | Hardware backdoors are backdoors in hardware, such as code inside hardware or firmware of computer chips. The backdoors may be directly implemented as hardware Trojans in the integrated circuit.
Hardware backdoors are intended to undermine security in smartcards and other cryptoprocessors unless investment is made in anti-backdoor design methods. They have also been considered for car hacking.
Severity
Hardware backdoors are considered highly problematic because:
They can’t be removed by conventional means such as antivirus software
They can circumvent other types of security such as disk encryption
They can be injected at manufacturing time where the user has no degree of control
Examples
Around 2008 the FBI reported that 3,500 counterfeit Cisco network components were discovered in the US with some of them having found their way into military and government facilities.
In 2011 Jonathan Brossard demonstrated a proof-of-concept hardware backdoor called "Rakshasa" which can be installed by anyone with physical access to hardware. It uses coreboot to re-flash the BIOS with a SeaBIOS and iPXE benign bootkit built of legitimate, open-source tools and can fetch malware over the web at boot time.
In 2012, Sergei Skorobogatov (from the University of Cambridge computer laboratory) and Woods controversially stated that they had found a backdoor in a military-grade FPGA device which could be exploited to access/modify sensitive information. It has been said that this was proven to be a software problem and not a deliberate attempt at sabotage that still brought to light the need for equipment manufacturers to ensure microchips operate as intended.
In 2012 two mobile phones developed by Chinese device manufacturer ZTE were found to carry a backdoor to instantly gain root access via a password that had been hard-coded into the software. This was confirmed by security researcher Dmitri Alperovitch.
U.S. sources have pointed the finger of suspicion at Huawei hardware since at least 2012, suggesting the possibility of the presence of backdoors in Huawei products, without ever providing any evidence to back this claim.
In 2013 researchers with the University of Massachusetts devised a method of breaking a CPU's internal cryptographic mechanisms by introducing specific impurities into the crystalline structure of transistors to change Intel's random-number generator.
Documents revealed from 2013 onwards during the surveillance disclosures initiated by Edward Snowden showed that the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees intercepted servers, routers, and other network gear being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance to install covert implant firmware onto them before delivery. These tools include custom BIOS exploits that survive the reinstallation of operating systems and USB cables with spy hardware and radio transceiver packed inside.
In June 2016 it was reported that University of Michigan Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science had built a hardware backdoor that leveraged "analog circuits to create a hardware attack" so that after the capacitors store up enough electricity to be fully charged, it would be switched on, to give an attacker complete access to whatever system or device − such as a PC − that contains the backdoored chip. In the study that won the "best paper" award at the IEEE Symposium on Privacy and Security they also note that microscopic hardware backdoor wouldn't be caught by practically any modern method of hardware security analysis, and could be planted by a single employee of a chip factory.
In September 2016 Skorobogatov showed how he had removed a NAND chip from an iPhone 5C - the main memory storage system used on many Apple devices - and cloned it so that he can try out more incorrect combinations than allowed by the attempt-counter.
In October 2018 Bloomberg reported that an attack by Chinese spies reached almost 30 U.S. companies, including Amazon and Apple, by compromising America's technology supply chain.
Countermeasures
Skorobogatov has developed a technique capable of detecting malicious insertions into chips.
New York University Tandon School of Engineering researchers have developed a way to corroborate a chip's operation using verifiable computing whereby "manufactured for sale" chips contain an embedded verification module that proves the chip's calculations are correct and an associated external module validates the embedded verification module. Another technique developed by researchers at University College London (UCL) relies on distributing trust between multiple identical chips from disjoint supply chains. Assuming that at least one of those chips remains honest the security of the device is preserved.
Researchers at the University of Southern California Ming Hsieh Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Photonic Science Division at the Paul Scherrer Institute have developed a new technique called Ptychographic X-ray laminography. This technique is the only current method that allows for verification of the chips blueprint and design without destroying or cutting the chip. It also does so in significantly less time than other current methods. Anthony F. J. Levi Professor of electrical and computer engineering at University of Southern California explains “It’s the only approach to non-destructive reverse engineering of electronic chips—[and] not just reverse engineering but assurance that chips are manufactured according to design. You can identify the foundry, aspects of the design, who did the design. It’s like a fingerprint.” This method currently is able to scan chips in 3D and zoom in on sections and can accommodate chips up to 12 millimeters by 12 millimeters easily accommodating an Apple A12 chip but not yet able to scan a full Nvidia Volta GPU. "Future versions of the laminography technique could reach a resolution of just 2 nanometers or reduce the time for a low-resolution inspection of that 300-by-300-micrometer segment to less than an hour, the researchers say."
See also
Clipper chip
FBI–Apple encryption dispute
Hardware security
Hardware security bug
Hardware Trojan
Zombie Zero
Open hardware
Code signing
Intel Management Engine
AMD Platform Security Processor
References
Further reading
External links
The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies Bloomberg, 2018
Espionage techniques
Computer hardware
Surveillance
Cryptographic attacks
Cyberwarfare
Malware |
52980173 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social%20policy%20of%20Donald%20Trump | Social policy of Donald Trump | This is an article about the social policy of Donald Trump prior to and during his presidency.
, Trump described himself as pro-life with some exceptions: rape, incest, and circumstances endangering the life of the mother. He said he was committed to appointing justices who may overturn the ruling in Roe v. Wade.
Before his presidency, Trump made contradictory comments on same-sex marriage. Whereas, as a candidate, he largely avoided commenting on LGBT issues, his administration rolled back many LGBT protections.
Trump supported a broad interpretation of the Second Amendment and said he was opposed to gun control in general, although his views have shifted over time.
Trump supported removing the federal government from determining the legality of recreational marijuana and supported states that have legalized medical marijuana.
He favored capital punishment as well as the use of waterboarding.
Law enforcement and justice
Capital punishment
Trump has long advocated for capital punishment in the United States. In May 1989, shortly after the Central Park jogger case received widespread media attention, Trump purchased a full-page ad in four New York City newspapers with the title "BRING BACK THE DEATH PENALTY!" Five defendants (the "Central Park Five") were wrongfully convicted in the case and were subsequently exonerated. By October 2016, Trump still maintained the "Central Park Five" were guilty.
In December 2015, in a speech accepting the endorsement of the New England Police Benevolent Association, Trump said that "One of the first things I do [if elected President] in terms of executive order if I win will be to sign a strong, strong statement that will go out to the country, out to the world, that... anybody killing a police officer—death penalty. It's going to happen, O.K.?" However, under the current U.S. legal system, these prosecutions usually take place in state court under state law, and the president has no authority over such cases. Furthermore, 19 states have abolished the death penalty, and mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional, as held by the Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976).
On September 3, 2020, Michael Forest Reinoehl—suspected in the killing of a member of a far-right group in Portland, Oregon a week earlier— initiated a shootout with law enforcement which wanted to arrest him; he was fatally shot. On September 12, Fox News aired an interview in which Trump endorsed the police shooting of Reinoehl. "There has to be retribution when you have a crime like that,” Trump said, referring to the killing of the far-right activist, a crime for which Reinoehl had not been tried. “This guy was a violent criminal, and the U.S. marshals killed him, and I will tell you something, that’s the way it has to be."
First Amendment and defamation law
Trump has called for police to arrest those who protest at his rallies, saying that fear of an "arrest mark" that would "ruin the rest of their lives" would be a deterrent and that then "we're not going to have any more protesters, folks." Geoffrey R. Stone, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, notes that opponents and disruptive individuals may be removed from Trump rallies consistent with the First Amendment, but opponents have a First Amendment right to protest Trump outside the venue. Stone writes that it is unclear whether it would be consistent with the First Amendment for Trump to "order the removal of those who oppose his candidacy from his political rallies if he does not announce in advance that they are open only to his supporters", noting that the answer to this question depends not on the First Amendment, but on the nature of open invitations in the law of trespass.
Trump has said that if elected, he would loosen defamation laws so that when journalists write "purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money." The Associated Press reported that this proposal to weaken the First Amendment protections for the press is at odds with "widely held conceptions of constitutional law". The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and other First Amendment advocates condemned Trump's proposal, which would make it easier to win lawsuits accusing newspapers of libel.
Trump has expressed support for adopting English-style defamation laws in the U.S.; under UK law, it is easier for plaintiffs to sue newspapers and other media outlets. In 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA)'s committee on media law created a report that was critical of Trump's support for expansive defamation laws and his use of libel suits in the past. The committee concluded that Trump was "a 'libel bully' who had filed many meritless suits attacking his opponents and had never won in court". The ABA's leadership blocked the report from being issued; the organization did not contest the committee's conclusions, but expressed concern about the possibility of being sued by Trump.
On the campaign trail in 2015 and 2016, Trump has frequently "railed against" the press, referring to the media as "the most dishonest people" and "absolute scum". The Trump campaign has barred reporters (from Politico, The New York Times, The Des Moines Register, The Huffington Post, and Univision, among others) from its campaign events, "often in the wake of critical coverage". In October 2016, NBC News reportedly held off on airing a video of Trump making lewd and disparaging remarks about women due to concerns that Trump would sue the network.
At a rally in June 2020, he said he believed that people who burn the American flag should be jailed for at least a year, though he acknowledged that this would potentially violate "freedom of speech."
Privacy, encryption, and electronic surveillance
On National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance, Trump says he "tends to err on the side of security" over privacy. Trump supports bringing back now-expired provisions of the Patriot Act to allow for the NSA to collect and store bulk telephone metadata. Trump said: "I assume that when I pick up my telephone, people are listening to my conversations anyway."
In February 2016, Trump urged his supporters to boycott Apple Inc. unless the company agrees to build a custom backdoor for the FBI to unlock the password-protected iPhone connected to one of the perpetrators of the 2015 San Bernardino shooting, a move that Apple argues would threaten the security and privacy of its users. Trump himself still used his iPhone to send out tweets.
In May 2020, Trump reversed his stance, stating that "warrantless surveillance of Americans is wrong", and threatening to veto reauthorization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Rights of the accused
In a 1989 interview with Larry King Trump said, "The problem with our society is the victim has absolutely no rights and the criminal has unbelievable rights" and that "maybe hate is what we need if we're gonna get something done."
In 2016, Trump decried the fact that Ahmad Khan Rahami, a U.S. citizen charged in connection with the bombings in New York and New Jersey, would be provided with medical treatment and the right to counsel, calling this "sad".
At the second presidential debate, which took place in October 2016, Trump said that if he was "in charge of the law of our country", rival presidential contender Hillary Clinton would "be in jail".
In the same debate, Trump also pledged that if elected he would direct his attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor to "look into" Clinton. Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook called the remark "chilling" and said: "Trump thinks that the presidency is like some banana republic dictatorship where you can lock up your political opponents." The remark was viewed as part of "a litany of statements [Trump] has made during the campaign that many legal specialists have portrayed as a threat to the rule of law". The remark was condemned by a number of prominent Republican lawyers, such as Paul K. Charlton, Marc Jimenez, and Peter Zeidenberg, as well as David B. Rivkin and Michael Chertoff. Trump campaign manager Kellyanne Conway said the "jail" comment was merely "a quip".
Later that October, Trump spoke fondly of the "lock her up" chants at his rally, saying "Lock her up is right." He also said Clinton's legal representatives "have to go to jail". However, in November, after winning the election, Trump told reporters from the New York Times he would not recommend prosecution of Clinton, saying it was "just not something (he) feel(s) very strongly about" and suggesting that Clinton had "suffered greatly". He repeated this stance in public at a rally in Michigan the following month, responding to "Lock her up" chants from the crowd by saying: "That plays great before the election—now we don't care, right?"
Trying U.S. citizens in military tribunals
In August 2016, Trump said he "would be fine" with trying U.S. citizens accused of terrorism in military tribunals at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Under current federal law (specifically, the Military Commissions Act of 2006), trying U.S. citizens at military commissions is illegal; only "alien unlawful enemy combatants" may be tried in such commissions.
Use of torture to procure information
In February 2016, Trump said he approved of the use of waterboarding and "a hell of a lot worse". He said that "torture works" and called waterboarding a "minor form" of torture. Speaking with Sean Hannity on Fox News on January 26, 2017, Trump termed
waterboarding "just short of torture", and said, "I will tell you, though, it works. And I just spoke to people who told me it worked, and that's what they do." However, he said he would rely on the advice of his defense secretary, James Mattis and others and, "If they don't wanna do, that's fine. If they do wanna do, then I will work for that end."
Voter fraud
Trump opposes same-day voter registration, supports voter identification laws, has asserted that Obama won in 2012 due to voter fraud, has charged that the election system would be rigged against him in the 2016 race, and has equivocated on whether he would accept the outcome of the 2016 election.
Trump has asserted that America's "voting system is out of control", alleging that "you have people, in my opinion, that are voting many, many times," even though the number of cases of voter fraud in the U.S. is minuscule. Trump opposes same-day voter registration, alleging that this allows non-citizens to vote in U.S. elections and that voting laws should prevent people from "[sneaking] in through the cracks". PolitiFact ruled Trump's claim about voter fraud false, noting that according to experts, "there is no additional risk of noncitizens casting ballots in states with same-day voter registration, nor is there any evidence that this occurs."
While he has repeatedly charged during his candidacy that the election system is rigged against him, Trump's statements became bolder and more specific in August 2016. He alleged that he would lose Pennsylvania only if "cheating goes on", and that voters will cast their ballots "15 times" for Clinton without voter ID laws. The Wall Street Journal noted that several voter ID laws have been struck down in several states recently, with courts ruling that they unfairly discriminate against minority voters, and that "there is no evidence of widespread voter fraud occurring in recent U.S. elections." According to Dartmouth political scientist Brendan Nyhan, Trump's rhetoric "threatens the norms of American elections and could provoke a damaging reaction among his supporters".
In the September 2016 presidential debate, when asked if he would honor the outcome of the election, Trump said he "absolutely" would. Four days later, Trump appeared to have reconsidered his statement from the debate, saying "We're going to have to see. We're going to see what happens. We're going to have to see." In early- and mid-October 2016, Trump repeatedly claimed the election was "rigged" and alleged that the media coordinated with the Clinton campaign, citing Alec Baldwin's portrayal of him on Saturday Night Live. In October 2016, after early voting and voting by mail had begun in many states, Trump claimed, without evidence, that the election was being rigged "at many polling places". That same month, Trump asserted, also without evidence, that the federal government was allowing illegal immigrants to come into the U.S. so they can vote. PolitiFact found Trump's claim of "large scale voter fraud" false, giving it a "Pants-on-fire" rating.
Trump has claimed that "dead people voted for President Obama" and that "dead voters... helped get President Obama elected." and alleged that voting machines were "switching" votes for the Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, to votes for Obama. On election night 2012, Trump expressed skepticism about Obama's victory, saying, among other things, "This election is a total sham and a travesty. We are not a democracy!" Additionally, when it seemed like Mitt Romney may have gained the popular vote but lost the electoral college vote, Trump called the electoral college system "a disaster for democracy", calling for "a revolution in this country".
Since his election in November 2016—in which he won the electoral college but received 2.8 million fewer votes nationally than Clinton—Trump has repeatedly insisted, without evidence, that he actually won the popular vote if one excludes "three to five million illegal votes" cast for his opponent. This claim is false. After taking office, Trump said he would launch a major investigation into these unsubstantiated allegations, and appointing his vice president, Mike Pence, to head a White House commission to do so. Trump eventually followed through with that promise, announcing the creation of a commission to investigate voter fraud via an executive order on May 11, 2017. On June 29, 2017, the vice-chairman of Trump's voter fraud commission, former Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, instructed the secretaries of state for all 50 states to provide the commission with voter roll data, though most refused to provide some voter information, citing concerns of privacy. This prompted President Trump to remark on Twitter, "Numerous states are refusing to give information to the very distinguished VOTER FRAUD PANEL. What are they trying to hide?".
Religion
Trump, a self-described Presbyterian who was described by CNN as "unique among modern American presidents for his seeming lack of deep religious orientation", has considered the support of evangelical voters as instrumental to his election. In the 2016 election, 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for him.
Trump attended Marble Collegiate Church, a congregation of the Reformed Church in America, for more than 50 years. In 2015, the church announced that he was not an "active member", and Trump acknowledged that he hadn't attended in several years. In a 2011 interview, after Sean Hannity asked, "How important is your faith?" Trump replied, "Very important," but he added, "I'm also busy." Trump's third marriage, to Melania Knauss, was performed at Bethesda-by-the-Sea Episcopal Church in 2005.
He has vowed to end the Johnson Amendment, an IRS rule that prohibits section 501(c) tax-exempt organizations from endorsing candidates or participating in partisan campaigns. He said the rule undermines Christian influence in U.S. politics, adding "we have more Christians than we have men or women in our country and we don't have a lobby because they're afraid to have a lobby because they don't want to lose their tax status... So I am going to work like hell to get rid of that prohibition and we're going to have the strongest Christian lobby and it's going to happen." In his February 2017 address at the National Prayer Breakfast Trump said, "I will get rid of and totally destroy the Johnson Amendment."
Trump claims that there is discrimination against American Christians. For instance, during his campaign in early 2016, he stated that "Christianity is under tremendous siege" and suggested that he would have an easier time banning Christian immigrants than Muslim ones. He suggested that the IRS has targeted him for audit because he is "a strong Christian". He has also lent his voice to the claim—originally promulgated in the United States through Fox News commentator Bill O'Reilly in the early 2000s—that there is a "War on Christmas" led by department stores that do not use the name of the holiday. During his campaign, Trump promised: "I'll tell you one thing: I get elected president, we're going to be saying 'Merry Christmas' again. Just remember that." Less than nine months after taking office, in the month of October, he declared that "We're saying 'Merry Christmas' again."
Travel ban
The Trump travel ban denotes a series of executive actions which restricted entry of travellers from select countries. Executive Order 13769 sought to restrict travel from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Executive Order 13780 removed Iraq from the list of targeted countries and allowed more exemptions. Then on September 24, Presidential Proclamation 9645 aimed at more permanently establishing travel restrictions on those countries except Sudan, while adding North Korea and Venezuela which had not previously been included.
Critics described the order as a "Muslim ban" for targeting Muslim-majority countries and prioritizing minority-religion refugees. President Trump, however, stated that, "this is not a Muslim ban, as the media is falsely reporting," while Rudy Giuliani, who said he helped write the order, called it a legal alternative to a religious ban targeting Muslims.
Health
Funding for health agencies and programs
Pandemic preparedness
In May 2018, John Bolton disbanded the National Security Council's office for pandemic preparation.
In January 2020, U.S. intelligence agencies began issuing classified warnings to the Trump administration and to Congress that the novel coronavirus would likely become a pandemic. An anonymous official said: "They just couldn't get him to do anything about it." Amid the coronavirus pandemic, at a press conference on February 26, Trump said that the number of cases "within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero". At that same event, however, Trump implied that the government was assembling a response team. In response to a reporter's question about whether he regretted cuts to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—during his first two years in office, the CDC workforce had shrunk by five percent—Trump responded: "Some of the people we cut, they haven't been used for many, many years... I'm a business person; I don't like having thousands of people around when you don't need them. When we need them, we can get them back very quickly. For instance, we're bringing some people in tomorrow that are already in this great government that we have, and very specifically for this."
Other health programs
Trump's proposed 2021 budget includes a $1.9 trillion cut to anticipated future health care spending over the next ten years, including a $920 billion cut to Medicaid and a $451 billion cut to Medicare. The Republicans' idea is to reduce these programs' anticipated annual growth from 5.4 percent to 3.1 percent.
Trump's proposed 2021 budget would cut 19 percent of the overall CDC budget compared to the previous year.
Embryonic stem-cell and fetal tissue research
In 2016, The Atlantic asked President-elect Trump his position on embryonic stem-cell research, but his team did not respond with a comment. Trump had not taken a public position on the issue. President Trump selected Dr. Francis Collins, who supports federally funded embryonic stem-cell research, to continue serving as director of the National Institutes of Health. The Trump administration, as of January 19, 2018, and as of September 4, 2020 had not cut funding to embryonic stem-cell research.
In June 2019, the Trump administration banned federal government scientists from using fetal tissue in research, but the ban does not apply to privately funded research. The Trump administration approved new restrictions on federal funding for grants for research by private researchers, but did not ban the research on fetal tissue completely. The Washington Post reported that the new requirements to qualify for federal grants involving research with fetal tissue are difficult to meet. Private funding for research is unaffected.
Illegal drugs
Trump's views on drug policy have shifted dramatically over time. At a luncheon hosted by the Miami Herald in April 1990, Trump told a crowd of 700 people that U.S. drug enforcement policy was "a joke", and that: "We're losing badly the war on drugs. You have to legalize drugs to win that war. You have to take the profit away from these drug czars." In his campaign for the presidency in 2015 and 2016, however, Trump adopted "drug warrior" positions and sought advice from William J. Bennett, who served as the U.S. first "drug czar" in the 1980s "and remains a proponent of harsh 1980s-style drug war tactics".
Trump stated at CPAC in June 2015 that he "feel[s] strongly" opposed to marijuana legalization. However, when asked about Colorado (where recreational use of marijuana is legal), Trump softened his previously expressed views and essentially said that states should be able to legalize recreational marijuana.
Trump claims to have never personally used controlled substances.
Medical marijuana
Trump has voiced support for medical marijuana, saying he is "a hundred percent in favor" because "I know people that have serious problems... and... it really, really does help them."
LGBT
Before and during presidential candidacy
Before launching a campaign, and while considering a run for the Presidency in the GOP primary, Donald Trump was invited in 2011 by GOProud, a PAC for LGBT conservatives, to speak at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and he accepted the invitation, making this his first time speaking at CPAC. During his presidential campaign, Trump largely avoided and did not emphasize issues related to the LGBT community and their rights, and, when asked, he often gave ambiguous answers. As a result of this communications strategy, he was often viewed as having a relatively tolerant view of LGBT people compared to other Republican candidates. Rea Carey, the executive director of the National LGBTQ Task Force, described his public statements on LGBT issues during the campaign as "confusing and conflicting".
Orlando nightclub shooting
On June 13, 2016, Trump gave a speech framed around the threat of "radical Islamic terrorists," referring to a recent mass shooting at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando. He asked rhetorically who LGBT people could count on as a "friend": "Donald Trump with actions or Hillary Clinton with her words?" Terrorists, he said, "murder gays. I don’t want them in our country." He said that Democratic policies like those of his rival, Clinton, would "bring people in in vast numbers who reject our values." His speech did not propose any domestic policy that would directly help LGBT people.
Although he was the first Republican presidential nominee to use the term "LGBTQ" in his acceptance speech at the July 2016 Republican National Convention, this was, again, in the context of mentioning the Orlando shooting; his comment opposed "the violence and oppression of the hateful foreign ideology" perpetrated by this "Islamic terrorist." Though he promised to "protect our LGBTQ citizens" from this ideological threat, he did not elaborate on any specific challenges faced by LGBTQ people nor did he describe specifically what he would do to support their safety. Consequently, many observed that this comment primarily served to demonize Islam rather than to endorse or meaningfully support LGBT rights.
Pride flag photo op
Nine days before the 2016 US presidential election, at a campaign rally in Greeley, Colorado, an audience member presented Trump with a rainbow flag with the handwritten message, "LGBT for Trump". Trump held it onstage for a photo opportunity and then handed the flag back to the audience member.
Public comments on LGBT discrimination
In an October 1999 appearance on Meet the Press, Trump said gays openly serving in the military was "not something that would disturb me".
In a February 2000 interview with The Advocate, in response to the murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Trump said he wanted a more "tolerant society". He agreed with amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and would "absolutely" support hate crime legislation covering race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, notably the Matthew Shepard Act.
Trump has offered qualified support for the First Amendment Defense Act, which aims to protect those who oppose same-sex marriage based on their religious beliefs from action by the federal government, such as revocation of tax-exempt status, grants, loans, benefits, or employment. Trump said, "If Congress considers the First Amendment Defense Act a priority, then I will do all I can to make sure it comes to my desk for signatures and enactment."
In April 2015, when asked about the Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Trump responded that Indiana Governor (and future running mate) Mike Pence "didn't do a good job. He wasn't clear in what he said." Trump then asserted that religious freedom and nondiscrimination aren't "mutually exclusive".
Same-sex marriage
In 2000, Trump stated his belief that "marriage is between a man and a woman." Despite this, as a candidate running in the Reform Party in 1999–2000, Trump included support for civil unions in his campaign platform. Trump congratulated singer Elton John on his civil partnership to his same-sex partner in 2005, writing, "It's a marriage that's going to work... If two people dig each other, they dig each other." Trump did not indicate whether he had changed his political position on marriage or civil unions.
In early 2011, Trump told Greta Van Susteren on Fox News, "I'm probably as conservative as anybody on your show... I'm Republican, a very conservative Republican... I'm not in favor of gay marriage." A month later, when asked by the Des Moines Register if gay couples should receive the same benefits as married couples, he said his "attitude on it has not been fully formed" but then responded simply "no."
At the beginning of his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump continued to oppose same-sex marriage. In June 2015, when asked about the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling in which the Supreme Court guaranteed the right to same-sex marriage nationwide, he said he personally supported "traditional marriage". He added: "I would have preferred states, you know, making the decision...But they [the Supreme Court] made the decision... So, at a certain point you have to be realistic about it."
In January 2016, when asked about the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges which had legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, Trump said he would "strongly consider" appointing conservative Supreme Court justices who would overturn the ruling, arguing that it was a matter that should be left for states to decide instead. The Advocate, an American LGBT-interest magazine, characterized Trump's proposed Supreme Court nominees as "LGBT-unfriendly", noting that "not all have ruled in LGBT rights cases, but those who have are largely unsympathetic, and some have the backing of anti-LGBT activists." A month before the election, Trump wrote to the president of CatholicVote.org to express support for legislation that would protect the religious liberty of Christians who oppose same-sex marriage.
However, in November 2016, a few days after he was elected president, Trump suggested that he did not, after all, plan to nominate justices who would overturn the Obergefell ruling. He told Lesley Stahl on 60 Minutes his personal view on same-sex marriage was "irrelevant," that he was "fine with" same-sex marriage, and that the Obergefell decision had "settled" the matter
In 2019, his counselor and spokeswoman Kellyanne Conway claimed that he approves of same-sex marriage.
For the 2020 presidential election, the Republican Party did not write a new platform, saying only that they would support Trump's reelection. The existing platform from 2016 had opposed same-sex marriage. On Trump's campaign website, the campaign included a page for "Trump Pride," claiming that Donald Trump decided "to openly support the LGBT community." The "Trump Pride" coalition of the 2020 campaign also stated that Trump supports same-sex marriage. This campaign coalition and its claims were met with criticism by some LGBTQ advocacy and activist groups pointing out that the Trump administration banned trans people from the military and rescinded healthcare protections for LGBTQ patients.
Transgender rights
In 2012, prior to running for the presidency, Trump called for the exclusion of trans women from beauty pageants. He did not want Jenna Talackova to compete in the Miss USA pageants.
At a rally in October 2016, Trump called the open military service of transgender Americans a result of a "political correct military". He said he would seek new recommendations from military leaders on the topic of transgender personnel and would "very strongly" defer to those recommendations.
In April 2016, Trump criticized North Carolina's North Carolina House Bill 2, which eliminated all private employment and public accommodation anti-discrimination laws that were stricter than statewide law and required that, in government buildings, individuals may use only restrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates. The bill was controversial because it prevented transgender people who do not or cannot alter their birth certificates from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity. Trump said: "North Carolina did something that was very strong and they're paying a big price.... You leave it the way it is. There have been very few complaints the way it is. People go, they use the bathroom they feel is appropriate, there has been so little trouble, and the problem with what happened in North Carolina is the strife, and the economic punishment that they're taking." He also said: "I fully understand if they [North Carolina] want to go through, but they are losing business and they are having a lot of people come out against." Later that month, however, Trump expressed the opposite position that states have the right to enact such legislation and that the federal government should not become involved. He did not express an opinion on whether the law was right or wrong. In July 2016, Trump again emphasized a states' rights approach regarding HB2, saying, "The state, they know what's going on, they see what's happening and generally speaking I'm with the state on things like this. I've spoken with your governor, I've spoken with a lot of people and I'm going with the state."
Presidency
"Minutes after Donald Trump was sworn into office," GLAAD says, "any mention of the LGBTQ community was erased from White House, Department of State, and Department of Labor websites." He went on to roll back a number of protections for LGBT individuals, such as those for transgender schoolchildren and transgender members of the military. GLAAD identified over 130 anti-LGBT political attacks made by the Trump administration during its first three years.
LGBT anti-discrimination laws
On January 30, 2017, Donald Trump said he would keep in place a 2014 executive order from the Obama administration which created federal workplace protections for LGBT people. The White House released a statement saying the President was "respectful and supportive of LGBTQ rights" and noted that he was the first Republican nominee to raise the issue (in his acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention).
However, in March 2017, the Trump administration rolled back key components of the Obama administration's workplace protections for LGBT people. The Trump administration rescinded requirements that federal contractors prove they are complying with the LGBT workplace protections, which makes it difficult to tell if a contractor had refrained from discriminatory practices against LGBT individuals. LGBT advocates have argued that this is a signal that the Trump administration would not enforce workplace violations against LGBT people.
On July 26, 2017, the Department of Justice argued in court that federal civil rights law does not ban employers from discriminating against employees based on sexual orientation. The Obama administration had decided that it did. In March 2017, the Trump administration rolled back efforts to collect data on LGBT Americans. The Health and Human Services removed a question about sexual orientation in a survey of the elderly. The U.S. Census Bureau, which had planned to ask about sexual orientation and gender identity in the 2020 Census and the American Community Survey, scrapped those plans in March 2017.
In 2019, the Trump administration argued to the Supreme Court that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not include sexual orientation or gender identity. The Trump administration removed the phrase "sexual orientation" from anti-discrimination guidelines from the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Near the end of Trump's term, on December 7, 2020, the administration finalized a rule allowing faith-based employers to discriminate against LGBT employees in their contracts with the federal government.
Judicial appointments
Trump made three Supreme Court nominations:
On January 31, 2017, the Trump administration formally nominated Neil Gorsuch to be a Supreme Court Justice. The LGBT rights organization Lambda Legal called Gorsuch "hostile" to LGBT rights after he voted with the majority on the 10th Circuit Court on the Hobby Lobby case in June 2013 and underscored it by penning an opinion. Gorsuch was confirmed and sworn in on April 7, 2017. In June 2020 Gorsuch wrote the Supreme Court majority opinion affirming that gay and transgender persons are included in the protection from discrimination by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
On July 9, 2018, the Trump administration formally nominated Brett Kavanaugh to be a Supreme Court Justice. At the time, Kavanaugh's position on LGBT rights was unclear. Less than a year earlier, Kavanaugh had praised former Chief Justice William Rehnquist for "stemming the general tide of freewheeling judicial creation of unenumerated rights that were not rooted in the nation's history and tradition". Kavanaugh was confirmed and sworn in on October 6, 2018. Kavanaugh dissented from the majority opinion of June 2020 that included gay and transgender persons in the protection from discrimination by Title VII, arguing the decision should be left to Congress.
On September 26, 2020, the Trump administration formally nominated Amy Coney Barrett to be a Supreme Court Justice. Barrett's position on LGBT rights was unclear.
By September 2020, Trump had appointed over 200 federal judges. At least two are openly gay; however, this suggests that LGBTQ judges are underrepresented among his nominees.
Mary Rowland, who is openly lesbian, was Trump's first LGBTQ judicial nominee to be confirmed by the Senate. She is a judge on the U.S. District Court of Northern Illinois.
Patrick Bumatay, who is openly gay, was subsequently confirmed by the Senate to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A more significant effect is that one-third of Trump's judicial nominees have anti-LGBTQ history. For example:
Allison Jones Rushing, who has associated with the conservative organization Alliance Defending Freedom, was confirmed as a U.S. Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. She was nominated on August 27, 2018, and was confirmed with the support of all 53 Republican senators on March 5, 2019. Sharon McGowan, Legal Director and Chief Strategy Officer of Lambda Legal, noted Rushing's "denunciation of the Supreme Court's marriage equality decision in United States v. Windsor, and her commitment to ADF's mission to recriminalize homosexuality and sterilize the transgender community".
HIV prevention and treatment
On January 20, 2017, the day Trump was inaugurated, it was reported that the White House Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP), formed in 1993, no longer had a webpage. ONAP's director, anticipating that the office might be disbanded, had tweeted farewell two weeks earlier. She asked people to continue following @aidsgov on Twitter, but that Twitter handle no longer exists either. In June 2017, six members of the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) resigned, saying the President made their job difficult or pointless. The remaining members of the council were fired in a letter that arrived two days after Christmas. PACHA had no members and no activity throughout 2018, but reconvened in 2019 with new members.
Trump issued annual proclamations for World AIDS Day in each year of his presidency; none of the four proclamations mentioned LGBT people. Similarly, Vice President Mike Pence gave a speech for World AIDS Day 2018 without mentioning LGBT people.
In Trump's State of the Union address on February 5, 2019, he devoted a few words to announcing a new program by scientists in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that hopes to reduce new HIV infections by 90% in ten years. On May 9, 2019, HHS announced that pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences would donate pre-exposure prophylaxis medication to prevent HIV infection for up to 200,000 Americans until at least 2025 and possibly 2030.
Trump's 2019 budget request "completely eliminates funding for the AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETCs) and Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS), which are both programs run under the auspices of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program."
Trump's 2020 budget request included $300 million in new funds for HIV programs within the United States. This consisted of $140 million for prevention through the CDC (an increase over the previous year), $70 million for the Ryan White Health Care Program, and $75 million for screenings and prophylactics. In the same budget, Trump sought to reduce funding for HIV research through the NIH and for global programs like PEPFAR, but Congress rejected those cuts.
Trump's 2021 budget request included $716 million for the second year of HHS's initiative to end HIV in the United States (an increase of $450 million over the program's actual 2020 budget). At the same time, however, it would have cut the overall HHS budget by 9%. Additionally, it would have cut the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) budget by 15%, including cutting Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS (HOPWA) from $410 million in 2020 to $330 million in 2021.
Transgender soldier exclusion
On July 26, 2017, Trump announced on Twitter that transgender people would not be allowed to serve in the military "in any capacity", saying American forces could not afford the "tremendous medical costs and disruption" of transgender service members. However, a RAND study of 18 countries that allow transgender individuals to serve in the military found "little or no impact on unit cohesion, operational effectiveness, or readiness". Also, according to the Scientific American, studies have shown that the medical costs for transgender service members would be "minimal". Pentagon officials expressed dismay that Trump's tweets could open them up to lawsuits and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said the policy on who is allowed to serve would not change until the White House sends the Defense Department new rules and the secretary of defense issues new guidelines. On August 25 Trump signed a memo prohibiting transgender individuals from joining the armed services unless the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security recommend otherwise. The departments of Defense and Homeland Security are directed to determine what to do about currently serving transgender individuals.
The policy change faced legal challenges. Following a challenge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, on October 30, 2017, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly blocked enforcement of the ban, writing that as far as could be seen, "all of the reasons proffered by the president for excluding transgender individuals from the military in this case were not merely unsupported, but were actually contradicted by the studies, conclusions and judgment of the military itself." In March 2018, Trump announced a new policy on transgender service members, namely a ban on those with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which would effectively be a ban on most transgender service members. The new policy was challenged in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. On April 13, 2018, Judge Marsha J. Pechman blocked enforcement of the policy, ruling that the administration's updated policy essentially repeated the same issues as its predecessor order from 2017, and that transgender service members (and transgender individuals as a class) were a protected class entitled to strict scrutiny of adverse laws (or at worst, a quasi-suspect class), and ordered that matter continue to a full trial hearing on the legality of the proposed policy. On January 21, 2019, the Supreme Court—with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Clarence Thomas forming the majority for the 5-4 opinion—allowed Trump's policy to go into effect while challenges in lower courts are adjudicated. On March 12, 2019, acting Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist signed a directive to allow Trump's policy to take effect in 30 days.
Other transgender issues
In February 2017, Trump's Justice Department withdrew a motion that had previously been filed by the Justice Department, "seeking to allow transgender students in public schools to use the restroom with which they identify". The move, which occurred within two days of Jeff Sessions becoming U.S. Attorney General, was condemned by the Human Rights Campaign, an LGBT rights advocacy group.
In October 2018 it was reported that the Trump administration is considering a definition of a person's gender as based on their genitalia at birth and not changeable later in life, in effect defining transgender out of existence. Responding to protests against the move, Trump said gender issues are in flux and he aims to "protect the country".
On November 23, 2018, the administration officials removed the Office of Personnel Management guidance intended to protect transitioning employees against adverse actions.
Lady Gaga has called Trump administration's definition of gender as an "immutable condition" transphobic.
On May 24, 2019, the Trump administration proposed a regulation to remove gender identity protections by the Department of Health.
On October 12, 2019, Trump spoke at the Values Voters Summit in Washington, D.C. The day had begun with a plenary session that included three speakers on the topic of "Transgender Movement: Separating Facts from Fiction(s)". Those speakers were KathyGrace Duncan, identified as a "transgender survivor"; Lynn Meagher; and Dr. Andre Van Mol of the American College of Pediatricians.
On October 16, 2019, the Justice Department held a ceremony for the 10th anniversary of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. law against hate crimes. Matthew Shepard's parents were invited but could not attend. A staff member of the Matthew Shepard Foundation read aloud the parents' written statement: "We find it interesting and hypocritical that he [Attorney General William Barr] would invite us to this event commemorating a hate crime law named after our son and Mr. Byrd, while, at the same time, asking the Supreme Court to allow the legalized firing of transgender employees." The audience responded with a standing ovation.
Pride Month
Trump did not acknowledge LGBT Pride Month in 2017, 2018, or 2020.
On May 31, 2019, Trump made a two-tweet statement on Twitter that was reproduced on a government website the next day as a "Statement from the President". "As we celebrate LGBT Pride Month," the tweet began, we must "stand in solidarity with the many LGBT people who live in dozens of countries worldwide that punish, imprison, or even execute individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation." He cited his administration's "global campaign to decriminalize homosexuality" (a reference to a meeting that had been recently hosted by Ambassador Richard Grenell). It was the first time since taking office that Trump had ever tweeted the acronym "LGBT," and some counted this tweet as an official presidential recognition of Pride Month. However, Trump's statement had apparently not been coordinated with any LGBT advocacy groups, nor did he attend any Pride events. Days later, the Trump administration mixed its message by ordering U.S. embassies not to fly the Pride flag.
In 2019, the Trump Make America Great Again Committee began selling "LGBTQ for Trump" T-shirts. In 2020, it was instead selling shirts with the slogan "Make America Great Again" printed in a rainbow font, which the product description claimed would "show your support for the LGBT community." These shirts fundraise for the Trump campaign, not for LGBT causes.
On October 13, 2020, the Trump campaign hosted an event they called "Trump Pride" in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania. The event was hosted by Lara Trump (the wife of Donald Trump's son, Eric) and Richard Grenell (the former U.S. ambassador to Germany). Tiffany Trump (Donald Trump's daughter) and Richard Grenell spoke at similar "Trump Pride" events in Tampa, Florida later that week and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on November 1. The events were branded with the word "PRIDE" in rainbow colors. Donald Trump did not appear at these events. As of October 23, 2020, a "Trump Pride" section on Trump's campaign website stated briefly that Trump "openly support[ed] the LGBT community since his first day in office," entered office "in support of marriage equality," made a "bold plan to end the HIV epidemic," and has a "global campaign to decriminalize homosexuality in the 69 nations where it is illegal." No additional policies, details, or statuses were provided on the website. The "Trump Pride" co-chairs were named as Richard Grenell, Jill Homan, Charles Moran, and Bill White, and the other 19 advisory board members were Michael Baker, Chris Barron, Martina Bolano, Matthew Craffey, Jamie Ensley, Stephen Gale, Bryan Eure, Dan Innis, Bob Kabel, "Brokeback Patriot," William McLaughlin, "The Gay Who Strayed," Ernest Olivias, Ashton T. Randle, Rebecca Schiff, Shane Shannon, Rob Smith, Andre Soriano, and Ed Williams.
Amplifying anti-LGBT voices
After the LGBT Center in Greenwich Village canceled a planned public event in March 2019 that was to feature three gay men and a transgender woman who had left the Democratic Party and become Trump supporters, one of the men, Brandon Straka, founder of the WalkAway campaign, sued the LGBT Center for $20 million. On the morning of July 14, 2019, Trump tweeted 22 times within 15 minutes in support of Straka.
On August 3, 2019, Trump retweeted Robert Jeffress, saying simply that Jeffress and his wife are "A great couple!" Jeffress is a Southern Baptist who believes all other religions (including Catholicism and Mormonism) lead to spiritual damnation. He has described gay sexuality as "miserable" and "filthy", transgender identity as an "emotional disorder", sex outside of "one man and one woman in a marriage" as "a deviation from God's original plan", and support for same-sex marriage as "paving the way for the Antichrist".
Ralph Drollinger, a pastor who leads a Bible study group for Trump's Cabinet members (though Trump himself does not attend), wrote on his Capitol Ministries blog on March 21, 2020, that "a proclivity toward lesbianism and homosexuality indicates an abandonment of God that will provoke God's wrath."
Human rights
After Trump's inauguration, the State Department initially kept U.S. diplomat Randy W. Berry in his position as the State Department's Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons, a post created in 2015 under the Obama administration. This decision surprised pro-LGBT rights groups such as GLAAD and initially seemed to be a defeat for Christian right groups such as the Family Research Council, which "implored Trump to launch a major purge of pro-LGBT diplomats inside Foggy Bottom". However, in November 2017, Berry was reassigned to serve as a "deputy assistant secretary" for the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, while supposedly the "role and responsibilities" of the Special Envoy were being covered by the same bureau's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scott Busby. The position of Special Envoy remains vacant as of July 2019. A State Department webpage viewed in March 2019 said "this position is currently vacant," but that URL no longer even indicates there is a position to fill, as it now redirects to an archived page from the Obama administration. In 2018, the Trump administration denied visas to the same-sex partners of foreign diplomats if they were not married and even if they were from countries which recognize only civil partnership or which ban same-sex marriage.
On July 8, 2019, the State Department announced the creation of a new commission to examine human rights in foreign policy. The Commission on Unalienable Rights will have eight men and four women. Working off a preliminary list of the expected members of the commission, the LGBTQ rights organization GLAAD found that seven of those people (Mary Ann Glendon, Peter Berkowitz, Hamza Yusuf Hanson, Jacqueline Rivers, Meir Soloveichik, Christopher Tollefsen, and F. Cartwright Weiland) had previously made anti-LGBTQ remarks. The remaining five members were Russell Berman, Paolo Carozza, Kiron Skinner, Katrina Lantos Swett, and David Tse-Chien Pan; however, Skinner left the State Department in August 2019.
In November 2019, it was reported that Merritt Corrigan, a former RNC employee who once tweeted that the "LGBT agenda" is "tyrannical" and that the US was a "homo-empire," had begun a new job at the Hungarian embassy in Washington. She was later made the deputy White House liaison to USAID but lost that job in 2020 after making more anti-LGBTQ tweets.
On prejudice
On February 13, 2020, journalist Geraldo Rivera asked Trump: "Would Americans vote for a gay man to be president?" This was in reference to one of the leading Democratic candidates. Trump paused before responding that Pete Buttigieg's sexual orientation "doesn't seem to be hurting" him in the primaries. He pronounced Buttigieg's name with emphasis, adding, "as you say, as you would call him". Trump said he would not count himself among Americans who would refuse to vote for someone simply because of their sexual orientation: "I would not be in that group."
After Presidency
On November 6, 2021, former President Trump welcomed the Log Cabin Republicans to host their "Spirit of Lincoln Gala" at Mar-a-Lago in Florida, and Melania Trump was given the organization's "Spirit of Lincoln Award" for supporting the Log Cabin Republicans interests; it was then announced that the organization would partner with the RNC to create the "RNC Pride Coalition" to promote outreach to LGBTQ voters.
On January 3, 2022, Trump said he extended his “complete support” to Hungary’s far-right, anti-LGBTQ prime minister, Viktor Orban.
Pornography
Prior to his candidacy and presidency, Donald Trump participated in soft-core pornography advertisements and promotions for PlayBoy, "the soft porn magazine," and his PlayBoy cover appearance was featured in a 2016 campaign post. He also "appeared in at least two soft core porn videos" for PlayBoy in 1994 and in 2001. Trump signed a pledge in July 2016 that he would work to combat both legal pornography and illegal pornography, such as child pornography. In the pledge, put forth by the anti-pornography group Enough Is Enough, Trump promised to "give serious consideration to appointing a Presidential Commission to examine the harmful public health impact of Internet pornography on youth, families and the American culture and the prevention of the sexual exploitation of children in the digital age." Trump's opponent in the race, Hillary Clinton, wrote a letter of support for the pledge in lieu of signing, citing a campaign policy of abstaining from signing election pledges.
Race relations
Donald Trump is consistent in finding no fault on the part of law enforcement when it clashes with racial minorities and in dismissing contrary evidence. In April 2017, Trump was accused of being Islamophobic while presenting Executive Order 13769, which blocked people from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States.
Trump has criticized the Black Lives Matter movement and accused former President Obama of "dividing America". Speaking to Bill O'Reilly during his presidential campaign, Trump said he may direct his Attorney General to look into the Black Lives Matter movement for criminal charges. When asked if he believes there to be a racial divide in America, Trump answered, "Sadly, there would seem to be... and it's probably not been much worse at any time." When asked if he believes police treat African Americans differently than whites, Trump answered, "It could be." Trump describes the police killings of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile as "tough to watch" and criticized the "terrible, disgusting performance" by police. Trump said he could relate to the systemic bias African Americans faced against whites, saying, "even against me the system is rigged when I ran... for president." When asked if he could understand the experience of being African American, Trump replied, "I would like to say yes, but you really can't unless you are African American. You can't truly understand what's going on unless you are African American. I would like to say yes, however."
On November 19, 2015, a week after the November 2015 Paris attacks, when asked if he would implement a database system to track Muslims in the United States, Trump said: "I would certainly implement that. Absolutely. There should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. We should have a lot of systems." On November 21, Trump clarified that he does not support any registry of Muslims and that his earlier supportive remarks for surveilling them were due to efforts by news media to entrap him. However, he said he would order "surveillance of certain mosques" to combat "Islamic extremism", alluding to the New York Police Department's use of informants in mosques after the September 11 attacks. Trump also spoke in favor of a database on Syrian refugees without clarifying how it would be different from the records already kept by federal agencies. Trump's support for a database of American Muslims "drew sharp rebukes from his Republican presidential rivals and disbelief from legal experts". Trump justified his proposals by repeatedly saying he recalled "thousands and thousands of people... cheering" in Jersey City, New Jersey, when the World Trade Center towers fell. PolitiFact noted that this statement was false and gave it a "Pants on Fire" rating. It reported that the rating was based on some debunked rumors and also that there were only eight people (suggested by unproven media reports) purported to be seen cheering, as opposed to Trump's claim of "thousands and thousands". Jersey City Mayor Steve Fulop called Trump's claim "absurd" and said Trump "has memory issues or willfully distorts the truth".
In September 2020, Trump directed federal government agencies to discontinue anti-bias and racial sensitivity training for its employees. Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought said in a memo, Trump instructed him to cancel funding for what it calls "divisive, anti-American propaganda". Federal agencies were instructed to "begin to identify all contracts or other agency spending related to any training on 'critical race theory,' 'white privilege,' or any other training or propaganda effort that teaches or suggests either (1) that the United States is an inherently racist or evil country or (2) that any race or ethnicity is inherently racist or evil." Conservative media had criticized critical race theory shortly before the memo was published. Afterward, Trump posted on Twitter that critical race theory was "a sickness that cannot be allowed to continue." He also posted on twitter, "Not any more!" in response to a comment that "critical race theory is the greatest threat to western civilization and it's made its way into the US federal government."
White supremacy
In June 2017, the Department of Homeland Security dropped a planned 400,000 dollar grant to "Life After Hate", a program which was intended to de-radicalize Neo-Nazis and stop white extremism. The change came following a review of priorities, begun during the Obama administration, with regards to a 10 million dollar DHS umbrella grant program for "Countering Violent Extremism".
In August 2017, Trump condemned violence "on many sides" after a car plowed into counter-protesters during a gathering of hundreds of white nationalists in Charlottesville, Virginia the previous day, on August 12. Trump did not expressly mention Neo-Nazis, white supremacists, the alt-right movement, or counter protesters in his remarks. Whereas Republican and Democratic elected officials condemned the violence and hatred of white nationalists, neo-Nazis and alt-right activists, The New York Times noted that Trump was the only national political figure to spread blame for the "hatred, bigotry and violence" that resulted in a death to "many sides". Two days later, Trump condemned "the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups". Then the next day, he returned to his initial comments, blaming "both sides". Trump came under criticism from world leaders and politicians, as well as a variety of religious groups and anti-hate organizations for his remarks, which were seen as muted and equivocal.
Native American relations
On March 27, 2020, the Department of the Interior revoked the status of the Mashpee Wampanoag tribe, removing its 321-acre Massachusetts reservation from federal trust. The reservation had been placed into federal trust in 2015.
The Mashpee Wampanoag people had proposed running a casino. This casino would have competed for business with two casinos in Rhode Island that have ties to Trump. Those two casinos are owned by Twin River Worldwide Holdings. George Papanier, formerly a finance executive for the Trump Plaza casino hotel in Atlantic City, is Twin River's president. Matt Schlapp, chairman of the Conservative Political Action Committee (and husband of White House strategic communications director Mercedes Schlapp), is a lobbyist for Twin River casinos. In 2019, Trump had opposed legislation to protect the Mashpee Wampanoag land; he called it a "special interest casino bill".
Women's rights
Abortion
Before 2016
Trump's views on abortion have changed significantly.
In 1999, Trump described himself as "very pro-choice" and said "I believe in choice." Although he said he hated the "concept of abortion," he said he would not ban it, nor the specific procedure sometimes called "partial-birth abortion". That year, he gave interviews describing himself as "totally pro-choice" and claiming that abortion should be "removed from politics. I believe it is a personal decision that should be left to the women and their doctors."
In his 2016 presidential campaign, by contrast, he described himself as "pro-life" (more specifically as "pro-life with exceptions"); suggested that women who have abortions should face some sort of punishment (a view he quickly retracted); and pledged to appoint pro-life justices to the Supreme Court.
2016 presidential campaign
While campaigning for the presidency in 2016 Trump said, "I'm pro-life and I've been pro-life a long time" and acknowledged that he had "evolved" on the issue. CNN reported that Trump "dodged questions testing the specificity of those views". In August 2015, Trump said he supported a government shutdown over federal funding for Planned Parenthood (which receives federal funding for the health services it provides to 2.7 million people annually, but is barred by federal law from using federal funds for abortion-related procedures). In March 2016, Trump said Planned Parenthood should not be funded "as long as you have the abortion going on", but he acknowledged that "Planned Parenthood has done very good work for many, many—for millions of women." Planned Parenthood said the "Trump presidency would be a disaster for women" and criticized Trump's claim that he would "be great for women while in the same breath pledging to block them from accessing care at Planned Parenthood."
In an interview later that month, Trump acknowledged that there must be "some form" of punishment for women if abortion were made illegal in the U.S. He issued a statement later that day reversing his position from earlier by saying, "the doctor or any other person performing this illegal act upon a woman would be held legally responsible, not the woman." Trump has said that abortion should be legal in cases involving "rape, incest or the life of the mother being at risk".
In May 2016, when asked if he would appoint Supreme Court justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade, Trump said: "Well, they'll be pro-life. And we'll see about overturning, but I will appoint judges that will be pro-life." In the same interview he said of the pro-life movement, "I will protect it, and the biggest way you can protect is through the Supreme Court." The Susan B. Anthony List, an pro-life feminist group, praised Trump's list of potential Supreme Court nominees as "exceptionally strong", while the pro-abortion rights group NARAL Pro-Choice America called the candidates on the list "a woman's worst nightmare". Trump has also pledged to sign legislation from Congress banning abortion at the 20-week mark.
Presidency
In his first interview following his designation as president-elect, Trump affirmed his pledge to appoint pro-life Supreme Court justices. He said that if Roe v. Wade were overturned, the issue would be returned to the states, and that if some states outlawed abortion, a woman would "have to go to another state" to get one.
On January 24, days after being sworn in, Trump issued an executive order reinstating the Mexico City policy (also called the "global gag rule"). Under the policy, international non-governmental organizations that "offer or promote abortions as part of their family planning services" are barred from receiving funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
In January 2018, Trump spoke at the March for Life in Washington, D.C., becoming the first president to directly address the annual pro-life rally, albeit through satellite.
On May 3, 2018, he signed an executive order entitled, "Establishment of a White House Faith and Opportunity Initiative" that aims to prevent funding for abortion.
On several occasions Trump has asserted that Democrats advocate "executing" newborn babies. In February 2019 he tweeted, "The Democrat position on abortion is now so extreme that they don't mind executing babies AFTER birth..." The assertion became a staple at his rallies, including in April 2019 when he said, "The baby is born. The mother meets with the doctor. They take care of the baby. They wrap the baby beautifully. And then the doctor and the mother determine whether or not they will execute the baby."
In June 2019, the Trump administration was allowed by a federal court of appeals to implement, while legal appeals continue, a policy restricting taxpayer dollars given to family planning facilities through Title X. The policy requires that companies receiving Title X funding must not mention abortion to patients, provide abortion referrals, or share space with abortion providers. As a result, Planned Parenthood, which provides Title X birth control services to 1.5 million women, is withdrawing from the program.
Family leave
In October 2015, Trump was cautious regarding paid family leave, as he thought it may adversely impact the country's competitiveness. In September 2016, he announced a policy proposal created in part by his daughter Ivanka, to guarantee six weeks of paid maternity leave to mothers who do not already receive similar benefits from their employers. This policy was the first paid maternity leave plan from a Republican presidential nominee. Trump's proposals were criticized by opponents as hypocritical in light of Trump's previous comments on women, and for being sexist in assuming that women were their children's sole caregivers. Josh Levs in Time magazine wrote that "Policies that only allow women time off end up hurting women by pushing women to stay home and men to stay at work, reinforcing our anachronistic Mad Men-era work cultures."
In 2019 Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 which contained a amendement which guaranteed 12 weeks of paid leave for most civilian federal employees after the birth, adoption or fostering of a child for births or placements occurring on or after October 1, 2020. In a letter released after signing the bill Trump fully embraced the provision.
During the 2020 State of the Union Address Trump expressed support for paid family leave becoming the first republican president to do so and signaled support for a bipartisan Child tax credit bill that would enable new parents to collect a portion of their future child tax credits early and receive a smaller child tax credit for the next 10 to 15 years.
Women in the military
In 2013, Trump questioned the wisdom of allowing women to serve, linking gender-integrated forces with higher rates of sexual assault "26,000 unreported sexual assaults in the military-only 238 convictions. What did these geniuses expect when they put men & women together?" In 2014, Trump said it was "bedlam" to bring women into the army. In August 2015, Trump said he would support women in combat roles "because they're really into it and some of them are really, really good".
Women in the workplace
According to the Chicago Tribune, Trump did not address the gender pay gap in his 2016 presidential bid. According to the Tribune, "Trump's past statements on women in the workplace have included calling pregnancy 'an inconvenience' and telling a voter in New Hampshire last year that women will receive the same pay as men 'if they do as good a job'."
On March 27, 2017, Trump revoked an executive order from the Obama administration that had been intended to protect women in the workplace. The 2014 Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces order had demanded that companies with federal contracts comply with 14 labor and civil rights laws.
In August 2017, the Office of Management and Budget under the Trump administration announced that it would end a requirement for companies to collect data about wage gaps. Companies with over 100 employees had been required to collect wage data by gender, race, and ethnicity. The Obama administration had proposed the data collection in 2014 to support the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and the new data collection rule had taken effect in 2016.
References
Policies of Donald Trump
Trump, Donald
Transgender law in the United States
Trumpism |
53027714 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz%20Menzer | Fritz Menzer | Ostwin Fritz Menzer (* 6 April 1908 in Herrndorf near Niederschöna in Saxony between Chemnitz and Dresden † died 25 October 2005 in Bad Homburg vor der Höhe) was a German cryptologist, who before and during World War II, worked in the In 7/VI, the Wehrmacht signals intelligence agency, later working in (OKW/ Chi) that was the cipher bureau of the supreme command of the Nazi party, and later in Abwehr, the military intelligence service of the Wehrmacht. He was involved in the development and production of cryptographic devices and procedures, as well as the security control of their own methods.
Life
At the age of 18, he joined the Reichswehr as a mechanic and was assigned to a motorized battalion with a location in Leipzig. Menzer had already developed an interest in cryptography and was granted a patent for a "combined measuring apparatus for angles and lengths, the data [from which was] expressed in an enciphered form in a four-place combination of letters". After 12 years in the Signals Corps, where he had risen to the rank of Oberfunkmeister (a senior NCO rank), where his duties were to lick and seal hundreds of envelopes daily, he was eventually sent to OKW/Chi for testing. After his inclination and aptitude test for cryptanalysis work had been recognized at the Army Signal School, he was transferred to the Cipher Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW/Chi) in May 1933, where he was taught cryptanalysis techniques, among others by the head of the main group B, Wilhelm Fenner. A year later, in 1936, in a team led by Otto Buggisch, he had developed cryptanalytic methods to break the C-36, a rotor-key cipher machine of the Sweden Boris Hagelin type. In addition, he developed a cryptanalytic method for breaking the Wehrmacht's own machine, the Enigma machine. Subsequently, he was commissioned to lead his own unit within OKW/Chi, which had to deal with the cryptanalysis of foreign cryptographic methods, as well as the development and security check of own procedures and construction of new cryptanalytic aids. Thus, at the age of 28, Fritz Menzer became the Chief of Communications Security for the German Army. Menzer stated at the time:
Since the troops and their command, because of their ignorance of the scientific status of cryptanalytic methods, regarded encipherment as a drag on modern communications technique; I often had to overcome great difficulties to put through my ideas.
His service as a soldier ended on 32 May 1938 with a rank of Senior Radio Technician. He stayed with the OKW/Chi as civilian. Two years later, in 1940, he was promoted as a government () inspector, and was entrusted with the management of Unit IIc of OKW/Chi, dealing with the development and manufacture of special encryption for government agencies such as Reich Security Main Office and Abwehr, as well as for the German industry. On 1 April 1940, he was promoted to the rank of Superior Government Inspector. With the increased emphasis on cryptographic security and long range communications, in early 1942, Menzer's section was broken up into three functional subsections. Later in 1942, Admiral Canaris, gave Menzer the responsibility of testing the security of the Abwehr cryptographic systems.
To what extent Fritz Menzer can actually be regarded as an inventor of various, partly innovative key machines, such as the key machine 39 and the key device 41, also Hitlermühle is controversial "Always the firearms" and not OKW/Chi. However, he was probably at least involved in the design of the machines and entrusted with their technical review.
Later in 1942, Canaris commissioned Menzer to carry out security checks on their own cryptographic procedures. Menzer recognized blatant cryptographic weaknesses of the methods used, and in the summer of 1943 reworked all the manual methods used by the Abwehr. He introduced the ABC Schlüssel, Procedure 62 and Procedure 40, which were all double transposition (Transposition cipher) and substitution systems, as well as the Schlüsselrad or Cipher Wheel, a hand cranked autoclave.
He remained as an adviser cryptologist in the defense until the end of the war, which he did not experience in Berlin, but together with part of the OKW/Chi under the direction of Wilhelm Fenner in the south of the Reich, in Werfen. On 23 April 1945, OKW/Chi was officially disbanded and the staff was assigned to the General der Nachrichtenaufklärung (GdNA) Just before the American army reached its location about 40 km south of Salzburg, they burned their documents or threw them into the Salzach. With the capitulation of the Wehrmacht on 8 May 1945, the service was terminated for all former members of the OKW. Menzer was captured and interned at the US camp Neufeld near Munich.
On 17 June, he was released and travelled to the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ), first to the city of Leipzig, and on 22 September to Zschopau, where he worked as a teacher from January 1946. Shortly afterwards, due to his past in the Wehrmacht he was unsuccessfully dismissed. In the turmoil of the beginning of the Cold War he again came in contact with the US-Americans in Berlin on 8 September 1947 and was taken to Camp King in Oberursel near Frankfurt. Menzer was released and returned Zschopau on 12 September. He was arrested on 20 September by the Soviet Russians and imprisoned in Dresden and interrogated with regard to his contacts with the Americans. Finally, on 13 March 1948, he was released after he had consented to spy for the Soviets. In April 1949, he decided to flee from the Soviet Zone and travelled over West Berlin to the western occupation zones (Allied-occupied Germany). His name last appeared in 1951 in documents.
A death notice from the Frankfurt area shows his death at the age of 97 years. Accordingly, he was buried on 5 November 2005 in Bad Homburg
Menzer's inventions
During Menzer's service with the OKW/Chi and the Abwehr between 1935 and 1945, he was responsible for a number of advances in the machine cryptography science. His technique was to adapt the use of Hagelin pin wheels to provide for irregular wheel motion in cryptographic machinery.
Before World War II, there were two types of cipher machinery used by Germany. These were the Enigma cipher machine and those of Hagelin type cryptographic machinery. In the latter, all wheels stepped once with each encipherment with the cycle extended by the use of different length wheels. For the Enigma, motion was of the odometer-type, with the only variation being the starting point of the cycle on each rotors. Fritz Menzer's inventions were designed to make such motions unpredictable.
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan=5 style="background:LightSteelBlue"|Device types and description
|-
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |German Device Name
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Translation
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Year Invented
! style="text-align: center;background:#ccc" |Notes on Device
|-
| Lückenfüllerwalze
| Gap-filling wheel
| February 1943
| In a normal Enigma rotor, on the left side, it had a movable (with respect the rotor) ring with a single drive notch, and on the right a fixed 26 notched blocking wheel that regulated the drive. When the drive notch on one rotor reached the reading position, the next subordinate rotor would advance one position. For the Lückenfüllerwalze, the notch ring was fixed on the rotor and had 26 drive notches, any of which could be filled in to make them inactive, thus providing for irregular stepping of the subordinate rotor. Dr Walter Fricke was responsible for initial design of the device.
|-
| Schlüsselgerät 39 (SG-39)
| Key device 39
| 1939
|
|-
| M40
| Device 40
| February 1940
| This was a machine designed by Menzer in 1940 and never put into use. The machine was mechanical in operation. It was a cylinder, with about 30 slots for cipher alphabets. These slots were rotated by a hand crank, and might move from 0 to 3 slots after each letter. The plain text alphabet was mixed and was in a fixed horizontal slot. The plain text was enciphered by reading from this plain text alphabet to the cipher alphabet which had been brought next to it. Otto Buggisch described the principles as that of the Trittheim Table, a historic cryptographic principle from the 17th century.
It was a form of Polyalphabetic cipher. The motion was governed by 3 (or possibly 4) with positive and negative lug settings as with the Hagelin machines. The motion was the sum of the positive settings, subject to an overlap principle, similar in principle to the M-209 device. Otto Buggisch did not know the cycle of the motion of the wheels, or the details of the construction by which they acted to vary the motion when the crank was turned.
Additional security was provided by using only 36 strips at one time, leaving about 4 slots blank. When these slots reached the enciphering position, a random letter was chosen and inserted in the cipher text, and the plain text letter was enciphered by the next strip that came to the enciphering position.
No ideas were ever formulated on the total number of strips to be used, or the frequency of settings changes. Preliminary tests by Dr Doering and Otto Buggisch, gave the machine a high security rating. However it was just as bulky as the Enigma cipher device, and could not print letters, which was then the chief improvement desired. For these reasons it was rejected, and only a lab model was ever built.
|-
| Schlüsselgerät 41 (SG-41)
| Key Device 41
| 1941
|
This cipher machine was based on Hagelin encipherment, but included a mechanism for variable stepping the Hagelin wheels. The device had six pin wheels which were mutually prime. The first five of these wheels had kicks of 1,2,4,8 and 10 respectively. The sixth wheel made these kicks positive and negative. The enciphering cycle of one letter, consisted of three elements:
This took place if, and only if, the sixth wheel had an active pin the motion index position. If this was the case, then all the following occurred: Wheel 1 moved one step. Each of the remaining four wheels moved one step unless the wheel to its left had an active pin in the motion index position in which case it would move two steps.
A key kick was generated which was the sum of all the kicks of wheels which had active pins in the kick index position. However, if the sixth wheel had an active pin in kick index position, the key kick would be 25 minus the sum of all the other kicks. Under such a circumstance, the key would complement itself.
Identical to step 1, except when it occurred whether or not Wheel 6 had an active pin in the motion index position. In this step, Wheel 6 also stepped one or two positions, depending on the state of Wheel 5.
The original specifications called for a lightweight, durable machine to be used by units forward of the division. Menzer designed it to provide a cipher tape, being keyboard operated in order to improve encryption speed. As a result of the keyboard operation, he was able to redesign the arrangement of letters on the print wheels to flatten the cipher frequency count.
During the war there was shortages of aluminum and magnesium resulting in the machine weighing between 12 and 15 kilograms, which was too heavy for field use. Removal of the keyboard would have made the machine lighter, but the design of the print wheels prevented their being directly used for encipherment. Production stopped because no one knew what to do. About 1000 machines were built and these were distributed to the Abwehr, which began using them in 1944. The Luftwaffe supposedly used these for 10 figure traffic, which was possibly for weather reports.
|-
| Schlüsselkasten
| Key case, Cipher Box
|
| The Cipher Box was a mechanical cipher device making use of the principles of sliding strips. Basically, it was a 3/4 pound aluminum box containing three Hagelin pin wheels and a coil spring which determined the stepping of a sliding strip or ''slide rule on the top of the box."
Two alphabets were written on the slide rule, 13 characters of each on the fixed base, and 13 characters of each on the top and the bottom of the sliding strip. The latter were so written that only one alphabet at a time was in phase. Alphabets could be changed as often as required.
In use, the slide was pulled to the right until it stopped, winding the spring that drove the mechanism. Pressing a button released the slide to move left. When at either or both of reading positions, , the pinks were all inactive, the slide stopped and the encipherment took place. If the step came from alone, or and together, the slide took an additional step. When the slide stopped, either the top or the bottom alphabet would be in phase and the cipher value could be read off. Pressing the button again would allow the strip to slide left to its next stop.
Many Enigma devices were planned to be replaced with the Schlüssselkasten. It had a fairly high level of security. Given the alphabets on the side rule, it was possible to recover the pin patterns with a crib of about 30 letters. Without the crib, computer assistance would have been necessary and large quantities of cipher would have been required to recover the alphabets. A modification was considered in which two 26-character alphabets were slid against one another, rather than the 13 character segments. This would have increased the device security considerably, since more text would have been required to recover the alphabets. It would, however, have simplified recovery of the pin pattern after alphabet recovery. The solution of a single message was most unlikely
|-
| Schlüsselscheibe
| Lock washer
|
| This was designed by Menzer for use by agents. The principle of operation was similar to the Schlüssselkasten. Three resettable but permanently notched wheels were used. For encryption, the inner disk was rotated to wind the spring. Pressing the key would release the inner disk and allow it to rotate until stopped by the notched rings. If the inner disk stopped in a position were its letters were in phase with those of the outer disk, the cipher value would be read directly. If the stop was in an intermediate position, the number of the line opposite the plain value would be read, and the cipher value taken from the cell with that number.
|-
| Schlüssselrad
| Key Wheel
|
| The Schlüssselrad was a hand-operated cipher device also designed for agent use. It was made up of two disks. The lower disk had 52 notches or holes around its edge, into which a pencil or stylus could be inserted to turn a disk. On the face of the disk were 52 cells into which a keyboard-mixed alphabet could be inscribed twice, clockwise. The upper disk had a direct standard alphabet inscribed clockwise on one half of its periphery, next to a semicircle windows that, when two disks were assembled concentrically, revealed 26 characters of mixed sequence on the lower disk. The upper disk also had a notch into its edges which exposed ten of the holes on the lower disk. This notch had the digits 0 to 9 inscribed next to it, in a counterclockwise direction so that when the exposed holes were lined up with the numbers, the letters on the lower disk were lined up with the letters on the upper disk.
Various methods of key generation were used. On Chilean links, an 11-letter key word was numbered as for a transposition key, with the first digit of a two-digit numbers dropped. This key was extended by appending a two-digit group count and a four-digit time group:
A N T O F O G A S T A
1 6 0 7 4 8 5 2 9 1 3 1 2 1 4 4 0
On other links, a Fibonacci sequence of 100-125 digits would be generated through various manipulations of date, time and a secret number. If a message were longer that the key, it would be reversed as many as times as necessary. Key generation tables were also used.
In use, the key constituted the input to an autoclave. After aligning the alphabets according to a prearranged system or according to an indicator in the message, a stylus was inserted into the hole corresponding to the first key digit, and the lower disk was rotated clockwise until the stylus was stopped by the end of the notch. The plain text was then found on the upper disk and its cypher value read off the lower disk. The stylus was then placed in the whole corresponding to the second digit of the key, and the same procedure was repeated for the second letter of the text. Thus, the true key at any point in the same cypher was equal to the sum of all previous key inputs (mod 26).
|}
References
20th-century German inventors
German cryptographers
1908 births
2005 deaths
German military personnel of World War II
History of telecommunications in Germany
Telecommunications in World War II
Reichswehr personnel |
53060219 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleanor%20Ireland | Eleanor Ireland | Eleanor D. L. Ireland (née Outlaw, born 7 August 1926) was an early British computer scientist and member of the Women's Royal Naval Service.
Early life
Eleanor Ireland was born on 7 August 1926 in Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire, England. She had one sibling, a brother, who was in the Royal Air Force, and later worked for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries as a statistician. Her father worked as a civil servant. Ireland attended Berkhamsted School for Girls from when she was ten, until she left at seventeen. At school, Ireland received distinctions in English language, English literature, French, and Biology.
After she finished school, Ireland moved to London in hopes of studying architecture. Despite being accepted into Regent Street School of Architecture, she ultimately did not attend because of World War II. Ireland believed it would be a waste of money to attend architecture school and risk being sent to war. She instead chose to work at a friend's philatelic shop on Chancery Lane until 1944. It was this year that she joined the Women's Royal Naval Service.
Career
Prior to World War II, Eleanor Ireland worked for a philatelist. Ireland volunteered for the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) in the spring of 1944, and received a letter on August 2, 1944 that she was accepted into the WRNS. Once accepted into the Women's Royal Naval Service, Ireland was kept at Tullichewan Castle, located near Loch Lomond, Scotland. For the first portion of time she was with the WRNS completing lower level work such as cleaning and food preparation. Next, Ireland was transported to Bletchley Park and was informed she was a part of PV Special Duties X. Like other women who wanted a job with the new machines, she had to score highly on a placement test. The work Ireland was involved with was top secret, and she, along with the other women she worked with, were told not to tell anyone any information regarding the work they were doing. The women were all required to sign the Official Secrets Act, promising not to divulge any information regarding their work. Ireland spent the rest of her time with the Women's Royal Naval Service living in Woburn Abbey. After the war, she was an artist.
After the war, she thought about going into interior decoration, but a "very formidable aunt" who taught art at a grammar school in Wolverhampton, persuaded her to study art at Regent Street Polytechnic School of Art, where she spent five years, and then found work doing book illustrations. After her sons grew up, she worked teaching art to adults.
Working on the Colossus
Ireland and Jean Beech, another WRNS employee, worked with a mathematician codebreaker while she was residing in Woburn Abby. She worked with the Colossus II to try to break different combinations of coded messages during World War II that the Germans were transmitting. Colossus had to break the daily encryption settings to solve Tunny code. She had to log all the tapes being sent to her by recording the date and time messages were received and when they were taken off, and then she would load them into the Colossus II. She operated Colossus computers using copper-nickel plated pins and tape. The paper tape would burst during the high speed runs and the workers would use glue to piece all the bits back together.
Personal life
She married Dennis Ireland, a microbiologist who worked in research for Glaxo, and they had two sons, Robin and Toby.
References
Sources
1926 births
Possibly living people
People from Berkhamsted
British philatelists
Women philatelists
Royal Navy personnel of World War II
Bletchley Park women
Bletchley Park people
Women's Royal Naval Service ratings |
53097679 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenny%20Paterson | Kenny Paterson | Kenneth G. "Kenny" Paterson (born 2 March 1969) is a professor in the Institute of Information Security at ETH Zurich, where he leads the Applied Cryptography Group. Before joining ETH Zurich in April 2019, he was a professor in the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London and an EPSRC Leadership Fellow. He is a cryptographer with a focus on bridging the gap between theory and practice and recently became the Editor in Chief for the IACR's Journal of Cryptology and a 2017 fellow of the IACR.
Education
Paterson obtained a BSc in 1990 from the University of Glasgow and a PhD from the University of London in 1993, both in Mathematics.
Career
Paterson was a Royal Society Fellow at Institute for Signal and Information Processing at ETH Zurich from 1993 to 1994. In 1996, he joined Hewlett-Packard Laboratories Bristol. He then joined the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway in 2001, becoming a Reader in 2002 and Professor in 2004. From March 2010 to May 2015, he was an EPSRC Leadership Fellow working on a project entitled "Cryptography: Bridging Theory and Practice". In May 2015, he returned to working as a professor. He became the Editor in Chief for the IACR's Journal of Cryptology.
Research
Paterson is notable for attacks on the Encapsulating Security Payload in IPSec, the Lucky 13 attack on TLS, attacks on the use of RC4 in TLS and on use of CBC mode in the SSH protocol. He also worked on improved security models proving protocols secure against such attacks.
Awards
Distinguished Paper Award for work with Nadhem AlFardan presenting plaintext recovery attacks against DTLS published at NDSS 2012
Applied Networking Research Prize from the IRTF for work with Nadhem AlFardan on the Lucky 13 attack
Award for Outstanding Research in Privacy Enhancing Technologies for work with Mihir Bellare and Phil Rogaway on the Security of symmetric encryption against mass surveillance published at CRYPTO 2014.
Best Paper Award at ACM CCS 2016 for work with Martin Albrecht, Jean Paul Degabriele and Torben Hansen on symmetric encryption in SSH
References
British cryptographers
1969 births
Living people
Fellows of the Royal Society
Alumni of the University of London
Alumni of the University of Glasgow
Academics of Royal Holloway, University of London |
53155253 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenKeychain | OpenKeychain | OpenKeychain is a free and open-source mobile app for the Android operating system that provides strong, user-based encryption which is compatible with the OpenPGP standard. This allows users to encrypt, decrypt, sign, and verify signatures for text, emails, and files. The app allows the user to store the public keys of other users with whom they interact, and to encrypt files such that only a specified user can decrypt them. In the same manner, if a file is received from another user and its public keys are saved, the receiver can verify the authenticity of that file and decrypt it if necessary.
K-9 Mail Support
Together with K-9 Mail, it supports end-to-end encrypted emails via the OpenPGP INLINE and PGP/MIME formats. The developers of OpenKeychain and K-9 Mail are trying to change the way user interfaces for email encryption are designed. They propose to remove the ability to create encrypted-only emails and hide the case of signed-only emails. Instead, they focus on end-to-end security that provides confidentiality and authenticity by always encrypting and signing emails together.
Reception
OpenKeychain is listed on the official OpenPGP homepage and the well-known developer collective Guardian Project recommends it instead of APG to encrypt emails. TechRepublic published an article about it and conclude that "OpenKeychain happens to be one of the easiest encryption tools available for Android (that also happens to best follow OpenPGP standards)." The publisher Heise reviewed it in their c't Android magazine 2016 and discussed OpenKeychain's backup mechanism. The academic community uses OpenKeychain for experimental evaluations: It has been used as an example where cryptographic operations could be executed in a Trusted Execution Environment. Furthermore, modern alternatives for public key fingerprints have been implemented by other researchers. In 2016, the German Federal Office for Information Security published a study about OpenPGP on Android and evaluated OpenKeychain's functionality. OpenKeychain has been adapted to work with smartcards and NFC rings resulting in a usability study published on Ubicomp 2017.
Funding
The OpenKeychain developers participated in 3 Google Summer of Code programs with a total of 6 successful students. In 2015, one of the main developers got a one-year funding to improve the OpenPGP support in K-9 Mail paid by the Open Technology Fund.
History
OpenKeychain has been created as a fork of Android Privacy Guard (APG) in March 2012. Between December 2010 and October 2013 no new version of APG was released. Thus, OpenKeychain has been started with the intention of picking up the development to improve the user interface and API. A first version 2.0 has been released in January 2013. After three years without updates, APG merged back security fixes from OpenKeychain and some months later rebased an entire new version on OpenKeychain’s source code. However, this process stopped in March 2014, while the OpenKeychain developers continued to regularly release new versions. A number of vulnerabilities found by Cure53 have been fixed in OpenKeychain. These are still not fixed in APG since its last release in March 2014. Since K-9 Mail version 5.200, APG is no longer supported as a cryptography provider.
References
External links
Website of OpenKeychain
GitHub repository of OpenKeychain
Free and open-source Android software
OpenPGP
Cryptographic software |
53156251 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pocketbook%20%28application%29 | Pocketbook (application) | Pocketbook is a Sydney-based free budget planner and personal finance app launched in 2012. The app helps users setup and manage budgets, track spending and manage bills. Pocketbook is the first personal finance app in Australia to offer users the ability to manage their money through linking their bank accounts. As of 2016 Pocketbook claims to support over 250,000 Australians, in January 2018 that number was 435,000.
History
Pocketbook is founded by Alvin Singh and Bosco Tan in 2012. It was conceived in 2011 in a Wolli Creek apartment as a tool for Alvin and Bosco to take control of their money. The app has been featured on CNET, Business Insider and other popular media outlets. In September 2016, Pocketbook was acquired by ZIP Co Ltd ().
Features
The app syncs with the bank account of users and organizes spending into different categories. Users of the app can be reminded of bill payments, analyse spending and set spending limits. They can also be alerted of fraudulent transactions and deductions. The app employs security measures like end to end encryption, CloudFlare protection, fraud detection, identity protection etc. Pocketbook is available via web and mobile version.
Funding rounds
Pocketbook has raised $500,000 from technology fund Tank Stream Ventures which is co-founded and backed by Markus Kahlbetzer. Other investors include TV personality David Koch, Geoff Levy, David Shein and Peter Cooper. In September 2016 Digital retail finance and payment industry player zipMoney (ASX:Z1P) bought Pocketbook in a $7.5m deal
Awards
Personal Finance Innovator of the Year by Fintech Business Awards 2017
Innovator of the Year by OPTUS MyBusiness Awards 2017
Best Finance App of 2016 by Australian Fintech
Best Personal Finance App: Pocketbook won the 2016 Finder Innovation Awards, presented at a gala dinner hosted by media personality and The New Inventors presenter James O'Loghlin.
Best Mobile App of the Year Winner: StartCon hosted the first annual Australasian Startup Awards. Over 200 nominations in 14 categories and an overall winner were reviewed, and winners were determined by public voting, with over 63,000 votes in total.
Best New Startup 2014 by StartupSmart.
Finalist in the SWIFT Innotribe startup competition in Dubai in 2013.
References
External links
iPhone Pocketbook app
Android Pocketbook app
Mobile applications
IOS software
Mobile software
Android (operating system) software |
53176203 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obash | Obash | Obash is a bash script obfuscator written in the C programming language. obash encodes and encrypts bash shell scripts into executable binaries much like shc, the project that inspired it, but uses AES-256 encryption and the key and initialization vector are retrieved from the hardware instead of being hard coded into the binary itself. The obash project was started to address some of the issues that affect shc, the main one being able to see the original shell script source by simply issuing ps -ef. Although the objectives are the same, obash shares no code with shc and was built from scratch from the ground up, any code similarities are purely accidental and dictated by the shared objectives.
Obash is still a work in progress but the master branch on GitHub generally has usable sources while the testing branch may be in a transition state at any given time.
How it works internally
Obash takes the input script and AES-256 encrypts it, and also base64 encodes the AES cipertext so that it can be used to declare an unsigned char array.
It then produces an intermediate C file which is basically the interpreter (see interpreter.c), functions, text array containing the ciphertext, the optional key and IV for reusable binaries (not bound to the hardware) and the main. The intermediate C file is then compiled into an executable.
The intermediate C file is built in the following manner (see mk_sh_c function in functions.c):
includes block from interpreter.h
crypted_script variable containing the AES-256 encrypted script encoded via base64
serial and uuid variables (empty if non reusable)
functions block from interpreter.h
main_body block from interpreter.h
See recreate_interpreter_header script for details on how interpreter.h is created from interpreter.c.
Key and initialization vector for AES-256 encryption
The key and IV are not hard-coded into the binary (unless you decide to build a reusable static binary with the -r flag) but are retrieved each time from the hardware (hence binding it to a machine). In case of a reusable static binary (built with the -r flag) then the uuid and serial are in the binary itself but will be manipulated anyway by makekey and makeiv so that they are not usable immediately should anyone ever inspect the binary itself.
Although the whereabouts from where the serial and uuid are retrieved is traceable and is not a secret (machine uuid and serial number for non reusable and random hex digits for reusable) these should be then manipulated in a way that they are not directly usable as is. In the code there is a comment suggesting where this should be done (see makekey and makeiv functions in functions.c): each and every one of you using obash is encouraged to do so or it would be fairly easy to extract the script source from the obfuscated binary.. In the distributed code, as an example, the "-" are stripped from the uuid and the serial is padded to reach the suggested length for the cipher used.
Alternatives
CCsh
shellcrypt
shc
References
External links
https://github.com/louigi600/obash
Unix software
Software obfuscation |
53189095 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confide | Confide | Confide is an encrypted instant messaging application for most major operating systems. It was first released in 2013 on iOS, and is known for its self-destructing messaging system that deletes messages immediately after reading. The platform offers both free and paid features for individuals and businesses.
In 2017, the news outlet Axios reported that it had gained popularity among, “numerous senior GOP operatives and several members of the Trump administration.” After receiving more media attention, there were concerns about the security of the app, as it is closed source and an independent review by Kudelski Security indicated it may use an older, less secure version of OpenSSL. The app's first full security audit found multiple critical vulnerabilities including impersonating another user by hijacking an account session or by guessing a password, learning the contact details of Confide users, becoming an intermediary in a conversation and decrypting messages, and potentially altering the contents of a message or attachment in transit without first decrypting it. WIRED reported that the encryption in Confide was based on the "PGP standard," and used Transport Layer Security.
In January 2018, Confide, Inc. developers announced their newly developed ScreenShieldKit SDK (Software Development Kit) which was originally intended only for the Confide application. The API allows developers to incorporate the same screenshot-proof functionality of Confide into their own applications by simply importing the SDK replacing UITextView and UIImageView - two commonly used iOS development components used to display data to end users. The SDK prevents screenshots by blanking out the data and supports protection from a variety of capture methods including screenshots, screen recordings, screen mirrorings, and even screenshots from Apple's Xcode (the main development platform for iOS).
Confide was referred to as an application that was used during communications between an accuser and a boss during the scandal surrounding the then governor in New York in 2021.
See also
Comparison of instant messaging clients
Signal
Wire
References
External links
Cryptographic software
Secure communication
IOS software
Internet privacy software |
53204867 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PacStar | PacStar | PacStar (Pacific Star Communications, Inc.), part of Curtiss-Wright Corporation's Defense Solutions Division, is a developer and manufacturer of tactical communication and information technology infrastructure hardware and software based in Portland, Oregon. The company was founded in 2000 in Oregon as a reseller of advanced networking and communication equipment and in 2005 began manufacturing communications systems of its own design. The company has multi-million dollar deals with several branches of the US military and also supplies rugged networking equipment to commercial industries. The formerly privately held company was acquired by Curtiss-Wright in late 2020.
History
PacStar started out reselling IT communications equipment to various branches of the U.S. military and focused on establishing customer and vendor relationships. The company first accepted outside funding in 2005 and completed another round in 2007 bringing total external investment at the time to $18.2 million. The company worked with Cisco Systems, Inc. to develop ruggedized systems to meet military specifications and for use by emergency response organizations.
In the ensuing years, the company developed a range of lightweight ruggedized systems based on certified and accredited commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and IQ-Core Software that simplifies common network management tasks. In July, 2010, Bob Dunn was named CEO and elected to the Board of Directors.
In 2011, PacStar won a contract valued at $12.2 million to deliver 225 of its tactical communication units to US forces in Afghanistan. At the time, it was the largest contract in the company’s history.
In 2012, PacStar was awarded the TacSat Nano contract by the 6th Contracting Squadron, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. TacSat Nano is a lightweight, compact, and flexible package for multiband voice, ViaSat messaging services, and Radio-over-Internet protocol in a single case.
In 2013, PacStar won a $9 million contract under the WIN-T Increment 1 program to supply the US Army with PacStar IQ-Core Software. The company also won an $8.4 million Expeditionary Command and Control Suite program of record contract to provide multi-network PacStar 4100 kits to the US Marine Corps System Command. After four years leading PacStar as CEO, Mr. Dunn resigned from PacStar.
In October 2016 PacStar completed delivery of 6,000 licenses of PacStar IQ-Core Software to the US Army for the WIN-T Increment 1 program. The network management software is reported to reduce system management complexity.
In 2016, the company tripled the size of its manufacturing facilities and was named “2016 Manufacturer of the Year” by the Portland Business Journal for companies with 51-100 employees. It expected $100 million in orders in the next five years. The company also formed a partnership with Oceaneering, Inc. to help oil and gas companies deliver data from offshore to onshore monitoring facilities.
In September 2017, PacStar won a $10 million contract to provide rugged communications system to the US Marine Corps for its Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) program. PacStar 400-Series equipment will be installed into tactical ground vehicles and can be dismounted and used in command posts without the use of tools.
In January 2018, the U.S. Army announced it would move forward with full rate production on communications modules from PacStar under the Transportable Tactical Command Communications (T2C2) program. In February 2018, the company introduced the PacStar Tactical Fidelis Cybersecurity System to protect in-theater, executive vehicle-mounted and forward operating base communications. Also in February, CEO Peggy Miller was named a winner of the Portland Business Journal’s 2018 Women of Influence award. In May 2018, the Technology Association of Oregon named PacStar Company of the Year for growth. In June 2018, PacStar was named one of the fastest-growing companies in Oregon by the Portland Business Journal and named to the 2018 CRN Solution Provider 500 list. In October 2018, PacStar secured a $20 million-plus contract with the U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Brigade and said it expects to double staff over the next few years. The company also introduced the PacStar Modular Data Center (MDC) that enables deployment of data-center class computing at the edge of tactical networks.
In March 2019, PacStar won a deal worth up to $48 million with the US Marine Corps System Command and in June announced that it had won a major deal to supply equipment to the US Army Project Manager Tactical Network program. The two deals for wireless command post networking equipment are worth up to $300 million combined over five to seven years. In June 2019, PacStar was again named to the Portland Business Journal's list of the fastest growing private 100 companies in Oregon and southwest Washington. In September 2019, PacStar's secure wireless command post received a Government Innovation Award from Washington Technology.
During 2019, PacStar CEO Peggy Miller won the Gold Stevie Award in the Executive of the Year – Business Products category in the 16th annual Stevie Awards for Women in Business and was also presented the Athena Award for her excellence in leadership. On November 5, 2019 PacStar was awarded US Patent Number 10,469,268 for its invention in management and setup of network encryption systems embodied in PacStar IQ-Core Crypto Manager using public key infrastructure. Also in November 2019, PacStar launched Enterprise CSfC Solutions (ECS), a suite of enterprise gateway services designed for classified networks using COTS products.
In February 2020, CEO Peggy Miller was named Executive of the Year 2020 by the Portland Business Journal and she also won the 2020 Sam Blackman Award (previously called Technology Executive of the Year Award) from the Technology Association of Oregon. Both award programs cited Miller’s leadership and long track record of driving operational and financial success at PacStar. In October 2020, Miller won the EY Entrepreneur Of The Year Award in the Pacific Northwest region.
On Sept. 24, 2020, Curtiss-Wright Corporate announced intentions to acquire PacStar for $400 million in cash. The acquisition was completed on Nov. 2, 2020 and PacStar joined its parent organizations’ defense business segment.
See also
List of companies based in Oregon
References
Companies based in Portland, Oregon
Electronics companies established in 2000
Privately held companies based in Oregon
2000 establishments in Oregon
Telecommunications equipment vendors
American companies established in 2000 |
53208178 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuitive%20Password | Intuitive Password | Intuitive Password is a proprietary freemium password manager and secure digital wallet that stores users' passwords and confidential data. It was launched in 2013 by the Australian company Intuitive Security Systems. Intuitive Password received mixed reviews. Neil J. Rubeking wrote in PC Magazine in 2013 that Intuitive Password's not having automated password capture like some of its competitors was a significant downside.
History
The program was developed by an Australian company, Intuitive Security Systems Pty. Ltd., and uses Advanced Encryption Standard-256. It was launched in mid-2013.
Product
To create a free Intuitive Password account, users supply an email address, a master password, and a self-populated security question and answer. In the program's "Logins category", users can save website, database, and server logins. In the "Accounts category", users can store their credentials for email accounts, instant messaging accounts, and wireless routers. In the "Wallets" category, users can store their credit card information. In the "Licenses" category, users can store credentials for their software and hunting license. In the "Identifications" category, users can store IDs like library cards.
Intuitive Password lets clients use two kinds of two-factor authentication. The first factor is a master password. The second factor is either an authentication code sent through text message to a user's cellphone or Google Authenticator. It has configurable options to email users for every log in or to block different countries from logging in. Very confidential information can be protected by a second master password. Intuitive Password permits users to safely share authentication details with others who are using it. For logging in to public computers, users can generate a single-use password for authentication.
Features
AES-256 encryption
Automatic logins and password capturing
Password generator
Security dashboard
Two-factor authentication
Auto logout
Emergency access mode
Custom folder management
Offline access mode
Reception
In a 2013 Softpedia review, Gabriela Vatu said Intuitive Password was "an easy-to-use app, with a clean interface and what looks like strong security in place to protect user data".
In a 2013 PC Magazine review, Neil J. Rubeking rated the program as "Fair" and wrote, "the lack of automated password capture and replay will be a deal-breaker for many users". In a 2015 PC Magazine review, Rubeking rated the program as "Good".
See also
Comparison of password managers
Cryptography
List of password managers
Password manager
References
External links
Password managers
Cross-platform software
IOS software
Android (operating system) software
Universal Windows Platform apps
MacOS software |
53230593 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quest%20Red | Quest Red | Quest Red is a British free-to-air television channel in the United Kingdom broadcasting factual, lifestyle, crime and reality programming aimed at a female audience. The channel is operated by Discovery, Inc. and runs as a sibling to Discovery's established Freeview channel Quest, launched in 2009.
History
In mid-February 2017, shortly after the completion of an eleventh-hour carriage deal with Sky to retain a presence on the satellite platform for its current and future channels, Discovery Communications head David Zaslav told a corporate conference call that a second Freeview channel, to sit alongside Quest, would launch during 2017.
The following day, more details of the channel were confirmed, including its name and branding (which will include a red version of the Quest 'Q' channel symbol), content (some of which will be shared with sibling channels such as ID and TLC), and launch date of 15 March.
The station will be available as a free-to-air channel on the Freeview platform (and, by extension, to users of the BT and TalkTalk YouView platforms), and on the subscription satellite and cable platforms operated by Sky and Virgin Media UK and Republic of Ireland.
At launch, the channel was, like Quest, encrypted on satellite and thus not available on Freesat. Quest and Quest Red removed their encryption and began broadcasting free-to-air over satellite in June 2017, and were added to the Freesat guide early in July.
A full one-hour timeshifted variant of Quest Red was launched on the Sky platform in tandem with the launch of the principal channel. From 14 June 2017, Quest Red +1 was made available to Freeview users for three hours a day in the early morning, taking over the capacity vacated by the earlier relocation of Quest +1 to a different, longer slot. On 28 November 2017, Quest Red +1 launched on Freesat.
Unlike Sky, Freeview & Freesat, Quest Red +1 is not on Virgin Media
At launch, Quest Red wasn't available to Sky Ireland and Northern Ireland viewers due to a carriage agreement with Raidió Teilifís Éireann that allowed RTÉ One and RTÉ2 to be available on the EPG in Northern Ireland and also that the channel was channel 162 in the British guide. As part of Sky's major EPG reshuffle on 1 May 2018, Quest Red (and +1) became available to both Ireland and Northern Ireland customers, in addition to moving to 149 for Great Britain customers, a slot they acquired from ITV Digital Channels Ltd, who previously had ITVBe on that slot apart from regions where STV is on channel 103.
Launch
Advance listings information indicated that the first programme screened on the channel would be an episode of Homes Under the Hammer. Ahead of broadcast, this was changed: Extreme Couponing, which had initially been due to follow HUtH in the schedule, was brought forward to 10am, with HUtH following at 11am.
A placeholder for Quest Red was made available on the Virgin Media platform early in the morning of 15 March, ahead of the channel's launch; the new channel was added to the Sky programme guide at approximately 10:45am on launch day in Great Britain only, and to Freeview from noon. A number of other changes to services on the Freeview platform were made simultaneously with the addition of Quest Red, including a reduction in the broadcast hours of Quest +1, which also moved down the programme guide to release LCN 38 to Quest Red.
Programming
60 Minute Makover with Peter Andre
Animal Cops
Bondi Vet
Cake Boss
Disappeared
Evil Lives Here
Extreme Couponing
Forbidden: Dying for Love
Ghost Asylum
Jo Frost: Nanny On Tour
Katie Price: My Crazy Life
Long Lost Family US
Gypsy Brides US
Homes Under the Hammer
House of Horrors: Kidnapped
Is O.J. Innocent? The Missing Evidence
Leah Remini: Scientology and the Aftermath
Long Island Medium
Martin Kemp's Detective
My Naked Secret
My 600-lb Life
Nightmare Next Door
The Nolans Go Cruising
Paranormal Lockdown
Salvage Hunters
Say Yes to the Dress
Scorned: Love Kills
Southern Fried Homicide
True Crime with Aphrodite Jones
Vogue Williams Investigates
See also
Quest
References
External links
Discovery Communications news release on the launch of Quest Red, 2017-02-16
Television channels and stations established in 2017
English-language television stations in the United Kingdom
Discovery Networks
2017 establishments in the United Kingdom |
53230626 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mask%20generation%20function | Mask generation function | A mask generation function (MGF) is a cryptographic primitive similar to a cryptographic hash function except that while a hash function's output has a fixed size, a MGF supports output of a variable length. In this respect, a MGF can be viewed as a single-use XOR function: it can accept input of any length and process it to produce output of any length. Mask generation functions are completely deterministic: for any given input and any desired output length the output is always the same.
Definition
A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of the desired length. There may be restrictions on the length of the input and output octet strings, but such bounds are generally very large. Mask generation functions are deterministic; the octet string output is completely determined by the input octet string. The output of a mask generation function should be pseudorandom, that is, if the seed to the function is unknown, it should be infeasible to distinguish the output from a truly random string.
Applications
Mask generation functions, as generalizations of hash functions, are useful wherever hash functions are. However, use of a MGF is desirable in cases where a fixed-size hash would be inadequate. Examples include generating padding, producing one-time pads or keystreams in symmetric-key encryption, and yielding outputs for pseudorandom number generators.
Padding schemes
Mask generation functions were first proposed as part of the specification for padding in the RSA-OAEP algorithm. The OAEP algorithm required a cryptographic hash function that could generate an output equal in size to a "data block" whose length was proportional to arbitrarily sized input message.
Random number generators
NIST Special Publication 800-90A defines a class of cryptographically secure random number generators, one of which is the "Hash DRBG", which uses a hash function with a counter to produce a requested sequence of random bits equal in size to the requested number of random bits.
Examples
Perhaps the most common and straightforward mechanism to build a MGF is to iteratively apply a hash function together with an incrementing counter value. The counter may be incremented indefinitely to yield new output blocks until a sufficient amount of output is collected. This is the approach used in MGF1.
MGF1
MGF1 is a mask generation function defined in the Public Key Cryptography Standard #1 published by RSA Laboratories:
Options
hash function ( denotes the length in octets of the hash function output)
Input
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string
intended length in octets of the mask, at most
Output
mask, an octet string of length ; or "mask too long"
Steps
Example code
Below is Python3 code implementing MGF1:
import hashlib
def i2osp(integer: int, size: int = 4) -> str:
return b"".join([chr((integer >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF).encode() for i in reversed(range(size))])
def mgf1(input_str: bytes, length: int, hash_func=hashlib.sha1) -> str:
"""Mask generation function."""
counter = 0
output = b""
while len(output) < length:
C = i2osp(counter, 4)
output += hash_func(input_str + C).digest()
counter += 1
return output[:length]
Example outputs of MGF1:
Python 3.10.0 (tags/v3.10.0:b494f59, Oct 4 2021, 19:00:18) [MSC v.1929 64 bit (AMD64)] on win32
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license()" for more information.
>>> from mgf1 import mgf1
>>> from binascii import hexlify
>>> from hashlib import sha256
>>> hexlify(mgf1('foo', 3))
'1ac907'
>>> hexlify(mgf1('foo', 5))
'1ac9075cd4'
>>> hexlify(mgf1('bar', 5))
'bc0c655e01'
>>> hexlify(mgf1('bar', 50))
'bc0c655e016bc2931d85a2e675181adcef7f581f76df2739da74faac41627be2f7f415c89e983fd0ce80ced9878641cb4876'
>>> hexlify(mgf1('bar', 50, sha256))
'382576a7841021cc28fc4c0948753fb8312090cea942ea4c4e735d10dc724b155f9f6069f289d61daca0cb814502ef04eae1'
References
Cryptography
Cryptographic primitives
Cryptographic hash functions
Theory of cryptography |
53250438 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LogicLocker | LogicLocker | LogicLocker, is a cross-vendor ransomware worm that targets Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS). First described in a research paper released by the Georgia Institute of Technology, the malware is capable of hijacking multiple PLCs from various popular vendors. The researchers, using a water treatment plant model, were able to demonstrate the ability to display false readings, shut valves and modify Chlorine release to poisonous levels using a Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 and an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400 PLC. The ransomware is designed to bypass weak authentication mechanisms found in various PLCs and lock out legitimate users while planting a logicbomb into the PLC. As of 14 February 2017, it is noted that there are over 1,400 of the same PLCs used in the proof-of-concept attack that were accessible from the internet as found using Shodan.
Attack method
The attack method used with LogicLocker employs five stages. Initial infection, Horizontal and Vertical movement, locking, encryption and negotiation. Initial infection can take place through various vulnerability exploits. As ICS devices are typically in an always on state, this gives Cyber-criminals ample time to attempt the compromise of the PLC. PLCs generally do not have strong authentication mechanisms in place to assist in protecting themselves from potential attack. Initial infection could take place through a users clicking of a potentially malicious email attachment. Upon initial infection of the PLC, horizontal or vertical movement can be achieved from the PLC to the corporate network depending on the capabilities of the PLC. The next stage of the attack is locking in which the attacker locks out legitimate users to inhibit or prevent restoration efforts. This can be done through password changes, OEM Locking, over-utilization of PLC resources or changing IP/Ports. These different locking methods offer varying degrees of success and strengths. To further ensure a successful attack Encryption is employed to follow traditional cryptoransomware practices for future negotiations. Lastly, negotiations are conducted between the attacker and victim for service restoration. Some PLCs contain an email capability that can be used to send the ransom message as was the case with the MicroLogix 1400 PLC used in the proof-of-concept attack.
Defense strategies
To assist in defense and vulnerability mitigation efforts there are several strategies that can be employed.
Endpoint security
Endpoint security techniques such as password changes, disabling of unused ports and protocols and implementation of Access Control Lists (ACL), maintaining proper backups and firmware updates should be used. This can significantly reduce the attack surface presented cyber-criminals.
Network security
Increased and vigilant network monitoring should be used to detect abnormalities. Protocol whitelisting on firewalls, network segmentation and automated backups can provide additional security and provide decreased restoration time provided the backups are not compromised in the attack.
Policy
The training of employees to properly identify phishing emails, prohibition of USB devices and incorporating a comprehensive incident response plan should be used to assist in countering this threat.
See also
Pin control attack
Stuxnet
References
Computer worms
Ransomware
2017 in computing
Cryptographic attacks |
53296282 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloudbleed | Cloudbleed | Cloudbleed was a Cloudflare buffer overflow disclosed by Project Zero on February 17, 2017. Cloudflare's code disclosed the contents of memory that contained the private information of other customers, such as HTTP cookies, authentication tokens, HTTP POST bodies, and other sensitive data. As a result, data from Cloudflare customers was leaked to all other Cloudflare customers that had access to server memory. This occurred, according to numbers provided by Cloudflare at the time, more than 18,000,000 times before the problem was corrected. Some of the leaked data was cached by search engines.
Discovery
The discovery was reported by Google's Project Zero team. Tavis Ormandy posted the issue on his team's issue tracker and said that he informed Cloudflare of the problem on February 17. In his own proof-of-concept attack he got a Cloudflare server to return "private messages from major dating sites, full messages from a well-known chat service, online password manager data, frames from adult video sites, hotel bookings. We're talking full https requests, client IP addresses, full responses, cookies, passwords, keys, data, everything."
Similarities to Heartbleed
In its effects, Cloudbleed is comparable to the 2014 Heartbleed bug, in that it allowed unauthorized third parties to access data in the memory of programs running on web servers, including data which had been shielded while in transit by TLS. Cloudbleed also likely impacted as many users as Heartbleed since it affected a content delivery network serving nearly two million websites.
Tavis Ormandy, first to discover the vulnerability, immediately drew a comparison to Heartbleed, saying "it took every ounce of strength not to call this issue 'cloudbleed'" in his report.
Reactions
Cloudflare
On Thursday, February 23, 2017, Cloudflare wrote a post noting that:The bug was serious because the leaked memory could contain private information and because it had been cached by search engines. We have also not discovered any evidence of malicious exploits of the bug or other reports of its existence. The greatest period of impact was from February 13 and February 18 with around 1 in every 3,300,000 HTTP requests through Cloudflare potentially resulting in memory leakage (that’s about 0.00003% of requests).Cloudflare acknowledged that the memory could have leaked as early as September 22, 2016. The company also stated that one of its own private keys, used for machine-to-machine encryption, has leaked.
It turned out that the underlying bug that caused the memory leak had been present in our Ragel-based parser for many years but no memory was leaked because of the way the internal NGINX buffers were used. Introducing cf-html subtly changed the buffering which enabled the leakage even though there were no problems in cf-html itself.
John Graham-Cumming, Cloudflare CTO, noted that Cloudflare clients, such as Uber and OkCupid, weren't directly informed of the leaks due to the security risks involved in the situation. “There was no backdoor communication outside of Cloudflare — only with Google and other search engines,” he said.
Graham-Cumming also said that "Unfortunately, it was the ancient piece of software that contained a latent security problem and that problem only showed up as we were in the process of migrating away from it." He added that his team has already begun testing their software for other possible issues.
Google Project Zero team
Tavis Ormandy initially stated that he was "really impressed with Cloudflare's quick response, and how dedicated they are to cleaning up from this unfortunate issue." However, when Ormandy pressed Cloudflare for additional information, "They gave several excuses that didn't make sense," before sending a draft that "severely downplays the risk to customers."
Uber
Uber stated that the impact on its service was very limited. An Uber spokesperson added "only a handful of session tokens were involved and have since been changed. Passwords were not exposed."
OKCupid
OKCupid CEO Elie Seidman said: "CloudFlare alerted us last night of their bug and we've been looking into its impact on OkCupid members. Our initial investigation has revealed minimal, if any, exposure. If we determine that any of our users has been impacted we will promptly notify them and take action to protect them."
Fitbit
Fitbit stated that they had investigated the incident and only found that a "handful of people were affected". They recommended that concerned customers should change their passwords and clear session tokens by revoking and re-adding the app to their account.
Remediation
Many major news outlets advised users of sites hosted by Cloudflare to change their passwords, as even accounts protected by multi-factor authentication could be at risk. Passwords of mobile apps too could have been impacted. Researchers at Arbor Networks, in an alert, suggested that "For most of us, the only truly safe response to this large-scale information leak is to update our passwords for the Web sites and app-related services we use every day...Pretty much all of them."
Inc. Magazine cybersecurity columnist, Joseph Steinberg, however, advised people not to change their passwords, stating that "the current risk is much smaller than the price to be paid in increased 'cybersecurity fatigue' leading to much bigger problems in the future."
References
External links
List of domains using Cloudflare DNS on GitHub
Simple website that lets you check for affected domains quickly
A Chrome extension that checks bookmarks against potentially affected domains
Cloudbleed explained-How the biggest web cache leak on internet happened
Quantifying the impact of CloudBleed bug
Internet security
Software bugs
2017 in computing
Cloud infrastructure attacks & failures
Cloudflare |
53310289 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheryl%20L.%20Shavers | Cheryl L. Shavers | Cheryl L. Shavers (born December 26, 1953, San Marcos, Texas) is an American chemist, engineer, and businesswoman. After gaining a degree in chemistry, she worked as an engineer at Motorola. Shavers returned to university for a few years, gaining a PhD in solid state chemistry, before returning to private industry. Shavers worked at increasingly senior levels in Silicon Valley, at Hewlett Packard and Intel. She served as Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology in the Clinton Administration (1999-2001), and is a registered patent agent in the US Patent and Trademark Office. After leaving government service in 2001, she established a consultancy and strategy business, Global Smarts Inc. Shavers was inducted into the Women In Technology International (WITI) Hall of Fame and the Hall of Fame of the Arizona State University's College of Liberal Arts and Sciences.
Early life and education
Shavers' mother, Erna Mae Caldwell, was a maid, who brought her and her sister up alone in South Phoenix in financial hardship. She attended South Mountain High School. When she was a young teenager, a sex worker in her neighborhood was murdered. Watching the police investigators at the scene gave her the ambition of working in forensic science, which required a chemistry degree.
Shavers was awarded a scholarship to Mesa Community College, and gained a chemistry (Associate Arts) degree. She transferred to the Bachelor of Science program at the Arizona State University, majoring in chemistry and paying for tuition by working at night in a data processing center. Shavers successfully applied for an internship in the Phoenix Police Department's crime lab, working with a team developing a method for separating enzymes trace materials (enzyme typing). When the lab director reassigned her to menial tasks a few months short of completing her degree, she resigned in distress and changed career course. Shavers graduated in 1976. She has described an encounter as a graduate student with Nobel Laureate, Linus Pauling, at a conference" “He went over some of my work and it all became real". However, she has said she did not want an academic career: "That wasn't for me. I wanted to get going, get back to industry where I could make things happen."
Career
In 1976, Shavers began working in Motorola's Semiconductor Sector in Phoenix. Motorola encouraged new graduates to undertake postgraduate studies, and she studied thermodynamics in ASU's chemistry department.
In 1978, she left Motorola for Arizona State University, returning to industry after gaining her PhD in solid state chemistry in 1981. Her dissertation was titled "Theoretical and experimental studies in crystal chemistry", and also published on oxides and nitrides.
Her next step was to Hewlett Packard in California, first as a semiconductor process development engineer. At Hewlett Packard, she moved to the Technical Legal Department, and became a patent agent in the US Patent and Trademark Office, and spent four years working towards a law degree at night. However, she found the work boring, and decided to go back to science and technology, taking an entry-level managerial position in the diode microelectronics lab at the Wilton company. When the company moved, she remained and worked in thin films applications research at Varian Associates.
Shavers was recruited by Intel and rose quickly in the corporation to senior management. She also had a weekly "Women in Technology" column for the San Jose Mercury News. In 1999, she was nominated by President Bill Clinton to serve as the Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology. In 2001, she left government service and formed a consultancy and strategy company, called Global Smarts. Shavers has also produced and hosted radio talk programs, and served on the board of directors of several technology companies.
Government office
Shavers was confirmed by the US Senate as Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology in 1999, serving till 2001.
The role of the Under Secretary included overseeing the Commerce Department's Technology Administration (TA) and the Office of Technology Policy (OTP), as well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and the Office of Space Commercialization.
As well as providing advice and participating in policy development, she worked on encryption standards and digital signatures to support the development of web commerce during her tenure.
In her capacity as Under Secretary, Shavers also represented the Department of Commerce in a variety of science and technology forums, including serving as Co-Chair of the Technology Subcommittee under the U.S.-Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth.
Honors
Hall of Fame, Women in Technology International (1996)
Hall of Fame, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (1997)
Personal life
Shavers is married to Joseph C Agu. She lives in Santa Clara, California with her husband, daughter, and twin sons. In a 2000 interview with Ebony magazine, she said, "I have a 4-year-old daughter and I have a responsibility to children between her age and myself to ensure that the trail I'm blazing gets wider and wider".
External links
Video of Cheryl L. Shaver's induction into the Women in Technology Information (WITI) Hall of Fame (with her baby daughter) on YouTube.
References
1953 births
21st-century American chemists
Arizona State University alumni
American women chemists
African-American women engineers
American women engineers
African-American engineers
American women computer scientists
American computer scientists
Living people
Academics from Texas
Henry Crown Fellows
21st-century women engineers
American chemical engineers
21st-century American women
United States Under Secretaries of Commerce
Clinton administration personnel |
53339243 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connected%20toys | Connected toys | Connected toys are internet-enabled devices with Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or other capabilities built in. These toys, which may or may not be smart toys, provide a more personalized play experience for children through embedded software that can offer app integration, speech and/or image recognition, RFID functionality, and web searching functions. A connected toy usually collects information about the users either voluntarily or involuntarily, which raises concerns on the topic of privacy. The data collected by the connected toys are usually stored in a database, where companies that produce connected toys can use the data for their own purposes, provided they do so in line with the protections outlined in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).
Information collection
Types of information that can be collected
Different information can be collected by children's connected toys, including information from both parents and children.
Information that can be collected from children includes:
Birthdate, name, and gender
Profile pictures
Voice messages, chat messages, and photos sent by children
Account passwords
Physical location
Chat history and Internet browsing history
Information that can be collected from parents includes:
Email address and mailing address
Gender
Profile pictures
Voice messages, chat messages, and photos sent by parents
Account passwords and password retrieval questions
Credit card information
Phone number
Wi-Fi passwords and IP addresses
Common ways of collection
The collection of information by the connected toys can happen either voluntarily or involuntarily. Common ways of information collection include:
Information filled out by the users when creating an account
Interaction with the toys
Connection to Wi-Fi or cellular networks
Privacy related issues
There are concerns that children's information is not secured properly due to previous data breaches. Information collected by the toy companies are usually accessible by the public with little encryption on the system due to the lack of awareness of information privacy.
Previous data breaches
Connected toys have been at the center of several high-profile data breaches, which has raised concerns over the methods that toy companies use to protect children's information.
CloudPets data leak
In 2017, CloudPets toys by the company Spiral Toys have experienced a significant data leak on its database. CloudPets stores all its information collected from the stuffed toys in an online database. According to cybersecurity expert Troy Hunt, more than 820, 000 user accounts were exposed and over 2.2 million voice messages, from both children and parents, were leaked during the severe CloudPets data breach. The cause of the data leak was because of the insecure database that Spiral Toys used in order to store the information collected. The database was easily accessible by the general public before the data leak happened.
Although the database is not publicly accessible anymore, Spiral Toys have not informed their users regarding the data leak, which is a violation of the security breach notification law in California.
VTech data breach
In November 2015, VTech has suffered a severe data breach on their information storing system, where the hackers used SQL injection, which is “an injection attack wherein an attacker can execute malicious SQL statements (also commonly referred to as a malicious payload) that control a web application’s database server (also commonly referred to as a Relational Database Management System – RDBMS),” to get full authorization to the database where he can access children and parents’ personal data.
According to VTech's public data release, around 4.8 million parent accounts and approximately 6.4 million children related profiles were leaked worldwide in several of their products. Data that were compromised during the breach included name, email address, password, secret question and answer for password retrieval, IP address, mailing address and download history; no credit card information or social security numbers were stored in the same database. The United States suffered the most due to the data breach, with 2.2 million parent accounts and 2.9 million children profiles registered in the United States, followed by France, United Kingdom, and Germany. A 21-year-old man from Berkshire was arrested for the hack.
Data sharing
Data sharing between toy producers and other companies have raised concern over the privacy of personal data collected by connected toys. Conversations and interactions between children and the toys are usually recorded by the toys and sent to the cloud server of the toy producer.
The toy company that produced My Friend Cayla and i-Que Intelligent Bot, Genesis Toys, shares its voice data collected by the toys with Nuance Communications in order to improve their speech recognition technology. Nuance Communications have the record of selling biometric solutions to military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, which is put into consideration of privacy issues regarding connected toys.
Similarly, Hello Barbie produced by Mattel, Inc. uses voice recognition technologies provided by ToyTalk based in California. The data collected by Hello Barbie are actively shared between Mattel and ToyTalk.
Data retention
Data retention of information collected by the connected toys is also a problem to consider. According to Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, "an operator of a Web site or online service shall retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected. The operator must delete such information using reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to, or use of, the information in connection with its deletion."
The Norwegian Consumer Council did an investigation on the terms of use and privacy policies on My Friend Cayla and i-Que Intelligent Bot in 2016. They found that the privacy policies do not specifically mention how long the data will be retained after the users stop using the service or deleting the account. Specifically, My Friend Cayla's privacy policy mentions that "it is not always possible to completely remove or delete all of your information from our databases without some residual data because of backups and other reasons."
Ban on My Friend Cayla in Germany
In early 2017, Germany's Federal Network Agency, Bundesnetzagentur, has placed a ban on the sale and possession of the connected toy My Friend Cayla produced by Genesis Toys, claiming the toy to be an unsafe and unauthorized information transmission device. My Friend Cayla is the first connected toy that got banned by Germany. The agency further states that any toy that transmits data, including features such as recording video and voice, without detection is banned in Germany. It is concerned about the potential use of the toy as a surveillance device. The president of Bundesnetzagentur, Jochen Homann, states that "items that conceal cameras or microphones and that are capable of transmitting a signal, and therefore can transmit data without detection, compromise people's privacy. This applies in particular to children's toys. The Cayla doll has been banned in Germany. This is also to protect the most vulnerable in our society."
The agency is conducting further investigations in other connected toys. No action has been made towards the families that have the toy. The Federal Network Agency advised the parents to immediately destroy the toy to avoid potential risk in comprising personal data privacy.
Laws related to connected toys
Federal laws that are commonly associated with connected toys including the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Both acts are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission regarding the data collection of children's personal information.
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
Toys that are able to connect to the internet in various ways are subject to regulation from the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). COPPA gives parents control over what information is collected from their children online. Websites are required to ask for verifiable permissions from parents before receiving any personal information online from children under the age of 13. If the data is transferred to a third party, the third party is required to proceed the same steps to protect the data. Violation against COPPA is subject to civil penalties up to $40,654 per incident.
Concerns have been raised regarding COPPA protection for connected toys, as toys that are bought in retail stores do not directly subject to the law protection of COPPA.
Other sources of concern relate to the compliance of connected toys companies regarding COPPA. The Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, the Center for Digital Democracy, and Consumers Union submitted a complaint to the Federal Trade Commission regarding how My Friend Cayla and I-Que Intelligent Bot produced by Genesis Toys have violated the laws of COPPA. The complaint mentioned the data sharing between Genesis Toys and Nuance Communications. In addition, it concerns with how Nuance Communications does not directly mention compliance with COPPA.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
"Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" are declared unlawful by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission has used its section 5 to protect consumers' privacy and personal data. The companies of connected toys could potentially violate the FTC Act by inappropriately collecting, protecting, and misusing data and information collected by the toys.
See also
Smart toy
My Friend Cayla
Chatbot
Toys-to-life
References
Electronic toys
Toy controversies
Virtual assistants |
53339439 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism%20of%20Dropbox | Criticism of Dropbox | Criticism of Dropbox, an American company specializing in cloud storage and file synchronization and their flagship service of the same name, centers around various forms of security and privacy controversies. Issues include a June 2011 authentication problem that let accounts be accessed for several hours without passwords; a July 2011 privacy policy update with language suggesting Dropbox had ownership of users' data; concerns about Dropbox employee access to users' information; July 2012 email spam with reoccurrence in February 2013; leaked government documents in June 2013 with information that Dropbox was being considered for inclusion in the National Security Agency's PRISM surveillance program; a July 2014 comment from NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden criticizing Dropbox's encryption; the leak of 68 million account passwords on the Internet in August 2016; and a January 2017 accidental data restoration incident where years-old supposedly deleted files reappeared in users' accounts.
April 2011 user authentication file information
Dropbox has been criticized by the independent security researcher Derek Newton, who wrote in April 2011 that Dropbox stored user authentication information in a file on the computer that was "completely portable and is not tied to the system in any way". In explaining the issue, Newton wrote: "This means that if you gain access to a person's config.db file (or just the host_id), you gain complete access to the person's Dropbox until such time that the person removes the host from the list of linked devices via the Dropbox web interface." He updated his post in October 2011 to write that "Dropbox has release version 1.2.48 that utilizes an encrypted local database and reportedly puts in place security enhancements to prevent theft of the machine credentials." A report from The Next Web featured a comment from Dropbox, in which they disagreed with Newton that the topic was a security flaw, explaining that "The researcher is claiming that an attacker would be able to gain access to a user's Dropbox account if they are able to get physical access to the user's computer. In reality, at the point an attacker has physical access to a computer, the security battle is already lost. [...] this 'flaw' exists with any service that uses cookies for authentication (practically every web service)."
May 2011 data deduplication and employee access
In May 2011, a complaint was filed with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission alleging Dropbox misled users about the privacy and security of their files. At the heart of the complaint was the policy of data deduplication, where the system checks if a file has been uploaded before by any other user, and links to the existing copy if so; and the policy of using a single AES-256 key for every file on the system so Dropbox can (and does, for deduplication) look at encrypted files stored on the system, with the consequence that any intruder who gets the key (as well as potential Dropbox employees) could decrypt any file if they had access to Dropbox's backend storage infrastructure. In a response on its blog, Dropbox wrote that "Like most major online services, we have a small number of employees who must be able to access user data when legally required to do so. But that's the exception, not the rule. We have strict policy and technical access controls that prohibit employee access except in these rare circumstances. In addition, we employ a number of physical and electronic security measures to protect user information from unauthorized access." In response to the FTC complaint, Dropbox spokeswoman Julie Supan told InformationWeek that "We believe this complaint is without merit, and raises issues that were addressed in our blog post on April 21."
June 2011 account access without password
On June 20, 2011, TechCrunch reported that all Dropbox accounts could be accessed without password for four hours. In a blog post, co-founder Arash Ferdowsi wrote that "Yesterday we made a code update at 1:54pm Pacific time that introduced a bug affecting our authentication mechanism. We discovered this at 5:41pm and a fix was live at 5:46pm. A very small number of users (much less than 1 percent) logged in during that period, some of whom could have logged into an account without the correct password. As a precaution, we ended all logged in sessions." He wrote that a "thorough investigation" was being conducted, and that "This should never have happened. We are scrutinizing our controls and we will be implementing additional safeguards to prevent this from happening again." Julianne Pepitone, writing for CNNMoney, wrote that "It's the security nightmare scenario: A website stuffed with sensitive documents leaves all of its customer data unprotected and exposed", and featured a comment from Dave Aitel, president and CEO of security firm Immunity Inc., saying "Any trust in the cloud is too much trust in the cloud -- it's as simple as that. [...] It's pretty much the standard among security professionals that you should put on the cloud only what you would be willing to give away."
July 2011 Privacy Policy update
In July 2011, Dropbox updated its Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, and Security Overview agreements. The new Privacy Policy sparked criticism, as noted by Christopher White in a Neowin post, in which he wrote that "They attempted to reduce some of the tedious legalese in order to make it easier for normal people to understand. It appears that they have succeeded in that mission and in the process have taken ownership of every file that uses their service". Citing a paragraph in the updated Privacy Policy that Dropbox needed user permission to "use, copy, distribute, prepare derivative works (such as translations or format conversions) of, perform, or publicly display" user's data, White wrote that "This broad terminology is frightening for end users because it clearly lets Dropbox take a person’s work, whether it is photographs, works of fiction, or scientific research, and gives the company the right to do whatever they want with no recourse from the original owner". After users expressed concerns about the change, Dropbox once again updated its policy, adding "This license is solely to enable us to technically administer, display, and operate the Services." White concluded by writing that "While this is a step in the right direction, it still makes no sense as to why a product that is used to move files from one computer to another needs the ability to "prepare derivative works of" anyone's files."
July 2012 email spam and February 2013 reoccurrence
In July 2012, Dropbox hired "outside experts" to figure out why some users were receiving e-mail spam from Dropbox. In a post on its blog, Dropbox employee Aditya Agarwal wrote that "usernames and passwords recently stolen from other websites were used to sign in to a small number of Dropbox accounts. We've contacted these users and have helped them protect their accounts." However, Agarwal also noted that "A stolen password was also used to access an employee Dropbox account containing a project document with user email addresses. We believe this improper access is what led to the spam. We're sorry about this, and have put additional controls in place to help make sure it doesn't happen again." One of the additional controls implemented was the introduction of two-factor authentication. In February 2013, users reported additional spam, with the company stating that "At this time, we have not seen anything to suggest this is a new issue", and blamed the earlier e-mail spam issue from the past July.
June 2013 PRISM program
In June 2013, The Guardian and The Washington Post publicized confidential documents suggesting Dropbox was being considered for inclusion in the National Security Agency's classified PRISM program of Internet surveillance.
January 2014 outage
On January 11, 2014, Dropbox experienced an outage. A hacker group called The 1775 Sec posted on Twitter that it had compromised Dropbox's site "in honor of Internet activist and computer programmer Aaron Swartz, who committed suicide a year ago". However, Dropbox itself posted on Twitter that "Dropbox site is back up! Claims of leaked user info are a hoax. The outage was caused during internal maintenance. Thanks for your patience!" In a blog post detailing the issue, Dropbox's Akhil Gupta wrote that "On Friday at 5:30 PM PT, we had a planned maintenance scheduled to upgrade the OS on some of our machines. During this process, the upgrade script checks to make sure there is no active data on the machine before installing the new OS. A subtle bug in the script caused the command to reinstall a small number of active machines. Unfortunately, some master-replica pairs were impacted which resulted in the site going down." Gupta also noted that "Your files were never at risk during the outage".
April 2014 Condoleezza Rice appointment to board of directors
In April 2014, Dropbox announced that Condoleezza Rice would be joining their board of directors, prompting criticism from some users who were concerned about her appointment due to her history as United States Secretary of State and revelations of "widespread wiretapping on US citizens during her time in office". RiceHadleyGates, a consultancy firm consisting of Rice, former US national security adviser Stephen Hadley, and former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, had previously advised Dropbox.
May 2014 disabled shared links
In May 2014, Dropbox temporarily disabled shared links. In a blog post, the company detailed a web vulnerability scenario where sharing documents containing hyperlinks would cause the original shared Dropbox link to become accessible to the website owner if a user clicked on the hyperlink found in the document. Some types of shared links remained disabled over the next few weeks until Dropbox eventually made changes to the functionality.
July 2014 Snowden comment
In a July 2014 interview, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden called Dropbox "hostile to privacy" because its encryption model enables the company to surrender user data to government agencies, and recommended using the competing service SpiderOak instead. In response, a Dropbox spokeswoman stated that "Safeguarding our users' information is a top priority at Dropbox. We've made a commitment in our privacy policy to resist broad government requests, and are fighting to change laws so that fundamental privacy protections are in place for users around the world".
October 2014 account compromise hoax
In October 2014, an anonymous user on Pastebin claimed to have compromised "almost seven million" Dropbox usernames and passwords, gradually posting the info. However, in a blog post, Dropbox stated "Recent news articles claiming that Dropbox was hacked aren't true. Your stuff is safe. The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. [...] A subsequent list of usernames and passwords has been posted online. We've checked and these are not associated with Dropbox accounts."
December 2014 and on, Dropbox share links force upgrade to paid data plan
A long string (750+ comments) of commentaries on Dropbox' own support forum was begun in December 2014, when dropbox introduced 1 TB data storage plans. The string title, "Can we have plans that are smaller than 1 TB?", has a long line of Dropbox users voice concerns that they are not able to grow their plan from the 2 GB free plan by other increments than 1 TB. 2020 the minimum paid data storage account is 2 TB making the incremental increase from the free account to the minimum paid plan 2 TB, and comments requesting smaller plans are still coming in.
In the string more experienced commentators explain that the prize for the minimum 2 TB data plan does not reflect the amount of data storage, but rather the sum of data handling services offered. This prompts criticism from users having been on Dropbox for so long that migrating to another cloud service is made virtually impossible by a large number of outbound shared files via Dropbox links from their Dropbox folder, one of the initial services offered, thus tying users down to either the free 2 GB account or the paid minimum 2 TB plan, if they want to maintain public access to their files from Dropbox links already shared on the internet.
August 2016 password leak
In August 2016, email addresses and passwords for 68 million Dropbox accounts were published online, with the information originating from the 2012 email spam issue. Independent security researcher Troy Hunt checked the database against his data leak website, and verified the data by discovering that both the accounts belonging to him and his wife had been disclosed. Hunt commented that "There is no doubt whatsoever that the data breach contains legitimate Dropbox passwords, you simply can't fabricate this sort of thing". In a blog post, Dropbox stated: "The list of email addresses with hashed and salted passwords is real, however we have no indication that Dropbox user accounts have been improperly accessed. We're very sorry this happened and would like to clear up what's going on." The company outlined details that the information was "likely obtained in 2012", with the company first hearing about the list two weeks earlier, at which time they immediately started an investigation. "We then emailed all users we believed were affected and completed a password reset for anyone who hadn't updated their password since mid-2012. This reset ensures that even if these passwords are cracked, they can't be used to access Dropbox accounts."
January 2017 accidental data restoration
In January 2017, Dropbox restored years-old supposedly deleted files and folders in user accounts. In one example, a user reported that folders from 2011 and 2012 returned. In explaining the issue, a Dropbox employee wrote on its forum that "A bug was preventing some files and folders from being fully deleted off our servers, even after users had deleted them from their Dropbox accounts. While fixing the bug, we inadvertently restored the impacted files and folders to those users' accounts. This was our mistake; it wasn't due to a third party and you weren't hacked. Typically, we permanently remove files and folders from our servers within 60 days of a user deleting them. However, the deleted files and folders impacted by this bug had metadata inconsistencies. So we quarantined and excluded them from the permanent deletion process until the metadata could be fixed".
July 2018 anonymized data analysis
In July 2018, researchers at Northwestern University published an article in Harvard Business Review on the analysis of the habits of tens of thousands of scientists using anonymized data provided by Dropbox. The data used was over the period from May 2015 to May 2017 from all scientists using the platform across 1000 universities. Personal names attached to the data was removed by Dropbox, but according to Casey Fiesler, researcher at Colorado University, the folder titles and file structures that were provided could be used to identify individuals. Dropbox, later in a blog post, said that the reverse identification of the data was impossible. The data was provided without the express consent of the 16 thousand people whose information was accessed.
February 2021 allegations by former employees of gender discrimination
In February 2020, a document containing interviews with 16 current and former Dropbox employees claimed to be victims of gender discrimination was obtained by VentureBeat. The subjects of the report alleged discrimination point to examples such as "changing standards for promotions, unequal compensation, being set back in their careers after maternity leave, and experiencing retribution when they take their cases to HR". The report also detailed instances of alleged harassment and demotion after employees filed a complaint with Dropbox HR or returned to work following maternity leave.
References
Dropbox |
53401031 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA%20Conference | RSA Conference | The RSA Conference is a series of IT security conferences. Approximately 45,000 people attend one of the conferences each year. It was founded in 1991 as a small cryptography conference. RSA conferences take place in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the United Arab Emirates each year. The conference also hosts educational, professional networking, and awards programs.
History
Early history
The name RSA refers to the public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc., which was founded in 1982. The abbreviation stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, the inventors of the technique. The idea for the first RSA conference was conceived in 1991 in a phone call between then RSA Security CEO Jim Bidzos and the Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. The first conference had just one panel, called "DES and DSS: Standards of Choice." It focused on why attendees should not adopt DSS, a standard that was expected to challenge RSA Security's status as the de facto standard for digital signatures.
The event steadily grew and in 1993 it attracted more than 200 attendees. Known for many years as the RSA Data Security Conference, it eventually became just the RSA Conference. Over time the conference grew more business-oriented with an older demographic and more vendors, which led to competitive issues for a time in the 1990s; European competitors to RSA Security sometimes could not get a booth, so they hired people to pass out flyers at the RSA conference encouraging attendees to visit them at hotels nearby. In 1995 the conference criticized the Clipper Chip. If implemented, the chip would have given the U.S. government direct access to evidence on telecommunications devices with the chip installed. The conference put up posters with "Sink Clipper" in big letters. By 1997 the conference had grown to 2,500 attendees. The first European RSA Conference took place in 2000 and started with just 5 tracks.
According to Network World the conference's focus expanded from cryptography into a broader IT security conference with larger attendance in 2005, when Microsoft CEO Bill Gates did the keynote presentation. According to Bidzos, the purpose of the conference became "for all kinds of things: drive standards, organize some opposition to government policies, promote the RSA name, [and] give all of our customers an opportunity". By 2008 the conference had 17,000 attendees and 375 participating IT security vendors. It had 18 tracks and 230 sessions.
Recent history
At the 2010 RSA conference, the Obama administration publicly revealed the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), which was created in 2008 and formerly kept a secret. In 2011, a California-based IT security company, HBGary, withdrew from speaking and exhibiting at the RSA conference, citing safety concerns. The company announced plans to reveal the identities of some members of the hacktivist group Anonymous and received retaliatory threats and hacks. In 2014, 8 speakers boycotted the RSA conference after its sponsor, RSA Security, was accused of adding a backdoor to its products, so the National Security Agency could monitor users of RSA Security technology. The boycott began with then F-Secure Chief Technology Officer Mikko Hyppönen. He wanted RSA Security to apologize, whereas the company's statement was that the allegations were not true. Some noted that the RSA conference and RSA Security company are only loosely connected. Discussion at that year's conference was focused heavily on leaks by Edward Snowden and NSA involvement with American technology companies.
The first RSA Conference in the Asia-Pacific was introduced in 2013. This was followed by the inaugural United Arab Emirates conference two years later. In 2015 the conference added a clause to exhibitor contracts effectively prohibiting "booth babes" by requiring professional attire on the exhibitor floor. The policy was implemented in response to feedback that booth babes made the conference feel unprofessional. Fortune Magazine called the widespread practice of having booth babes at professional conferences "outdated" and unwelcoming to female attendees. The following year, the RSA conference was focused on the FBI–Apple encryption dispute, regarding attempts by the government to gain access to iPhones containing evidence in criminal investigations.
As of 2017, the conference has an estimated 40,000–43,000 attendees in the United States.
On November 10, 2020, RSA announced that the 2021 conference, will for the first time, be held 100% virtually, due to concerns about Covid.
Content
The RSA Conference is an international conference series on IT security that takes place in the United States, Europe, Asia/Japan, and the United Arab Emirates. It also provides internet safety education for consumers and children, a security scholar program for IT security students, and operates award programs typically bestowed at conferences. For example, one award is the Innovation Sandbox contest, which involves ten startups that present their technology to a panel of judges.
The 2017 conference in the U.S. had 15 keynotes, 700 speakers, 500 sessions, and 550 exhibitors. An analysis of session keywords at the conference suggest that early conferences were focused on cryptography and commerce, but the topical focus of conferences transitioned to cloud and cybersecurity in the early 2000s. Each conference has a theme, a practice that began in 1995. Additionally, there are typically one or two IT security topics that the conference organizers pick to focus on each year.
Speaking positions at the RSA conference are highly competitive, with thousands of submissions for a few hundred speaking positions.
RSA Conference Awards
The RSA conference provides annual awards to recognize outstanding people and organizations in the following areas by the following awards:
RSA Award for Excellence in Mathematics (officially called The RSA Conference Award for Excellence in Mathematics)
Information Security
Public Policy
Humanitarian Service
Winners are announced at the opening keynote sessions of the conference in April each year. Recent winners include Tim Jenkin, Michael Assante, Professor Ran Canetti, Professor Rafail Ostrovsky and Admiral Michael Rogers.
References
External links
Official website
Computer security conferences |
53410378 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koombea | Koombea | Koombea INC is an American digital product development company, established in 2007. The company specializes in mobile and web applications based on the open-source tool Ruby on Rails. The firm has offices in San Francisco and New York City in the US and Barranquilla in Colombia, and is headquartered in Miami, Florida. It was founded by Jonathan Tarud, who currently acts as the CEO of the company.
The company has developed Software development tools for sales, team and marketing management.
Among them is Saasler, a tool that focuses on native integration to enhance product sales and promote brand loyalty. The application also includes several integration intelligence features, such as refreshing expired tokens, API throttling, security and data encryption, and a range of analytic. Convergely is a virtual assistant developed by Koombea, which works through integration with chat apps, like Slack and HipChat. The company has also developed Dashable, an app which builds up on the concept of time tracking.
References
Software companies of Colombia
American companies established in 2007
Software companies established in 2007
Software companies based in Florida
Software companies of the United States |
53412768 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vault%207 | Vault 7 | Vault 7 is a series of documents that WikiLeaks began to publish on 7 March 2017, detailing the activities and capabilities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency to perform electronic surveillance and cyber warfare. The files, dating from 2013 to 2016, include details on the agency's software capabilities, such as the ability to compromise cars, smart TVs, web browsers (including Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera), and the operating systems of most smartphones (including Apple's iOS and Google's Android), as well as other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, macOS, and Linux. A CIA internal audit identified 91 malware tools out of more than 500 tools in use in 2016 being compromised by the release.
History
During January and February 2017, the United States Justice Department was negotiating through Julian Assange's attorney Adam Waldman for immunity and safe passage for Assange to leave the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and to travel to the United States both to discuss risk minimization of future WikiLeaks releases including redactions and to testify that Russia was not the source for the WikiLeaks releases in 2016. In mid February 2017, Waldman, who was pro bono, asked Senator Mark Warner who was co chairman of the United States Senate Intelligence Committee if he had any questions to ask Assange. Warner abruptly contacted FBI Director James Comey and told Waldman "stand down and end the negotiations with Assange," with which Waldman complied. However, David Laufman who was Waldman's counterpart with the Justice Department replied, "That's B.S. You're not standing down and neither am I." According to Ray McGovern on 28 March 2017, Waldman and Laufman were very near an agreement between the Justice Department and Assange for “risk mitigation approaches relating to CIA documents in WikiLeaks’ possession or control, such as the redaction of Agency personnel in hostile jurisdictions,” in return for “an acceptable immunity and safe passage agreement” but a formal agreement was never reached and the very damaging disclosure about “Marble Framework” was released by WikiLeaks on 31 March 2017.
In February 2017, WikiLeaks began teasing the release of "Vault 7" with a series of cryptic messages on Twitter, according to media reports. Later on in February, WikiLeaks released classified documents describing how the CIA monitored the 2012 French presidential election. The press release for the leak stated that it was published "as context for its forthcoming CIA Vault 7 series."
In March 2017, US intelligence and law enforcement officials said to the international wire agency Reuters that they have been aware of the CIA security breach, which led to Vault 7, since late-2016. Two officials said they were focusing on "contractors" as the possible source of the leaks.
In 2017, federal law enforcement identified CIA software engineer Joshua Adam Schulte as a suspected source of Vault 7.
On 13 April 2017, CIA director Mike Pompeo declared WikiLeaks to be a "hostile intelligence service." In September 2021, Yahoo! News reported that in 2017 in the wake of the Vault 7 leaks, the CIA planned to assassinate Assange, spy on associates of WikiLeaks, sow discord among its members, and steal their electronic devices. After many months of deliberation, all proposed plans had been scrapped due to a combination of legal and moral objections. Per the 2021 Yahoo News article, a former Trump national security official stated, "We should never act out of a desire for revenge".
Publications
Part 1 - "Year Zero"
The first batch of documents named "Year Zero" was published by WikiLeaks on 7 March 2017, consisting of 7,818 web pages with 943 attachments, purportedly from the Center for Cyber Intelligence, which already contains more pages than former NSA contractor and leaker, Edward Snowden's NSA release. WikiLeaks did not name the source, but said that the files had "circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive." According to WikiLeaks, the source "wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons" since these tools raise questions that "urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the C.I.A.'s hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of the agency."
WikiLeaks redacted names and other identifying information from the documents before their release, while attempting to allow for connections between people to be drawn via unique identifiers generated by WikiLeaks. It also said that it would postpone releasing the source code for the cyber weapons, which is reportedly several hundred million lines long, "until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature of the C.I.A.'s program and how such 'weapons' should be analyzed, disarmed and published." WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange claimed this was only part of a larger series.
The CIA released a statement saying, "The American public should be deeply troubled by any WikiLeaks disclosure designed to damage the Intelligence Community's ability to protect America against terrorists or other adversaries. Such disclosures not only jeopardize US personnel and operations, but also equip our adversaries with tools and information to do us harm."
In a statement issued on 19 March 2017, Assange said the technology companies who had been contacted had not agreed to, disagreed with, or questioned what he termed as WikiLeaks' standard industry disclosure plan. The standard disclosure time for a vulnerability is 90 days after the company responsible for patching the software is given full details of the flaw. According to WikiLeaks, only Mozilla had been provided with information on the vulnerabilities, while "Google and some other companies" only confirmed receiving the initial notification. WikiLeaks stated: "Most of these lagging companies have conflicts of interest due to their classified work with US government agencies. In practice such associations limit industry staff with US security clearances from fixing holes based on leaked information from the CIA. Should such companies choose to not secure their users against CIA or NSA attacks users may prefer organizations such as Mozilla or European companies that prioritize their users over government contracts".
Part 2 - "Dark Matter"
On 23 March 2017 WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 2 "Dark Matter". The publication included documentation for several CIA efforts to hack Apple's iPhones and Macs. These included the "Sonic Screwdriver" malware that could use the thunderbolt interface to bypass Apple's password firmware protection.
Part 3 - "Marble"
On 31 March 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 3 "Marble". It contained 676 source code files for the CIA's Marble Framework. It is used to obfuscate, or scramble, malware code in an attempt to make it so that anti-virus firms or investigators cannot understand the code or attribute its source. According to WikiLeaks, the code also included a de-obfuscator to reverse the obfuscation effects.
Part 4 - "Grasshopper"
On 7 April 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 4 dubbed "Grasshopper". The publication contains 27 documents from the CIA's Grasshopper framework, which is used by the CIA to build customized and persistent malware payloads for the Microsoft Windows operating systems. Grasshopper focused on Personal Security Product (PSP) avoidance. PSPs are antivirus software such as MS Security Essentials, Symantec Endpoint or Kaspersky IS.
Part 5 - "HIVE"
On 14 April 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 5, titled "HIVE". Based on the CIA top-secret virus program created by its "Embedded Development Branch" (EDB). The six documents published by WikiLeaks are related to the HIVE multi-platform CIA malware suite. A CIA back-end infrastructure with a public-facing HTTPS interface used by CIA to transfer information from target desktop computers and smartphones to the CIA, and open those devices to receive further commands from CIA operators to execute specific tasks, all the while hiding its presence behind unsuspicious-looking public domains through a masking interface known as "Switchblade". Also called Listening Post (LP) and Command and Control (C2).
Part 6 - "Weeping Angel"
On 21 April 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 6, code-named "Weeping Angel", a hacking tool co-developed by the CIA and MI5 used to exploit a series of smart TVs for the purpose of covert intelligence gathering. Once installed in suitable televisions with a USB stick, the hacking tool enables those televisions' built-in microphones and possibly video cameras to record their surroundings, while the televisions falsely appear to be turned off. The recorded data is then either stored locally into the television's memory or sent over the internet to the CIA. Allegedly both the CIA and MI5 agencies collaborated to develop that malware and coordinated their work in Joint Development Workshops. As of this part 6 publication, "Weeping Angel" is the second major CIA hacking tool which notably references the British television show, Doctor Who, alongside "Sonic Screwdriver" in "Dark Matter".
Part 7 - "Scribbles"
On 28 April 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 7 "Scribbles". The leak includes documentation and source code of a tool intended to track documents leaked to whistleblowers and journalists by embedding web beacon tags into classified documents to trace who leaked them. The tool affects Microsoft Office documents, specifically "Microsoft Office 2013 (on Windows 8.1 x64), documents from Office versions 97-2016 (Office 95 documents will not work!) and documents that are not locked, encrypted, or password-protected". When a CIA watermarked document is opened, an invisible image within the document that is hosted on the agency's server is loaded, generating a HTTP request. The request is then logged on the server, giving the intelligence agency information about who is opening it and where it is being opened. However, if a watermarked document is opened in an alternative word processor the image may be visible to the viewer. The documentation also states that if the document is viewed offline or in protected view, the watermarked image will not be able to contact its home server. This is overridden only when a user enables editing.
Part 8 - "Archimedes"
On 5 May 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 8 "Archimedes". According to U.S. SANS Institute instructor Jake Williams, who analyzed the published documents, Archimedes is a virus previously codenamed "Fulcrum". According to cyber security expert and ENISA member Pierluigi Paganini, the CIA operators use Archimedes to redirect local area network (LAN) web browser sessions from a targeted computer through a computer controlled by the CIA before the sessions are routed to the users. This type of attack is known as man-in-the-middle (MitM). With their publication WikiLeaks included a number of hashes that they claim can be used to potentially identify the Archimedes virus and guard against it in the future. Paganini stated that potential targeted computers can search for those hashes on their systems to check if their systems had been attacked by the CIA.
Part 9 - "AfterMidnight" and "Assassin"
On 12 May 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 9 "AfterMidnight" and "Assassin". AfterMidnight is a malware installed on a target personal computer and disguises as a DLL file, which is executed while the user's computer reboots. It then triggers a connection to the CIA's Command and Control (C2) computer, from which it downloads various modules to run. As for Assassin, it is very similar to its AfterMidnight counterpart, but deceptively runs inside a Windows service process. CIA operators reportedly use Assassin as a C2 to execute a series of tasks, collect, and then periodically send user data to the CIA Listening Post(s) (LP). Similar to backdoor Trojan behavior. Both AfterMidnight and Assassin run on Windows operating system, are persistent, and periodically beacon to their configured LP to either request tasks or send private information to the CIA, as well as automatically uninstall themselves on a set date and time.
Part 10 - "Athena"
On 19 May 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 10 "Athena". The published user guide, demo, and related documents were created between September 2015 and February 2016. They are all about a malware allegedly developed for the CIA in August 2015, roughly one month after Microsoft released Windows 10 with their firm statements about how difficult it was to compromise. Both the primary "Athena" malware and its secondary malware named "Hera" are similar in theory to Grasshopper and AfterMidnight malware but with some significant differences. One of those differences is that Athena and Hera were developed by the CIA with a New Hampshire private corporation called Siege Technologies. During a Bloomberg 2014 interview the founder of Siege Technologies confirmed and justified their development of such malware. Athena malware completely hijacks Windows' Remote Access services, while Hera hijacks Windows Dnscache service. Also both Athena and Hera affect all current versions of Windows including, but not limited to, Windows Server 2012 and Windows 10. Another difference is in the types of encryption used between the infected computers and the CIA Listening Posts (LP). As for the similarities, they exploit persistent DLL files to create a backdoor to communicate with CIA's LP, steal private data, then send it to CIA servers, or delete private data on the target computer, as well as Command and Control (C2) for CIA operatives to send additional malicious software to further run specific tasks on the attacked computer. All of the above designed to deceive computer security software. Beside the published detailed documents, WikiLeaks has not provided any evidence suggesting the CIA used Athena or not.
Part 11 - "Pandemic"
On 1 June 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 11 "Pandemic". This tool serves as a persistent implant affecting Windows machines with shared folders. It functions as a file system filter driver on an infected computer, and listens for Server Message Block traffic while detecting download attempts from other computers on a local network. "Pandemic" will answer a download request on behalf of the infected computer. However, it will replace the legitimate file with malware. In order to obfuscate its activities, "Pandemic" only modifies or replaces the legitimate file in transit, leaving the original on the server unchanged. The implant allows 20 files to be modified at a time, with a maximum individual file size of 800MB. While not stated in the leaked documentation, it is possible that newly infected computers could themselves become "Pandemic" file servers, allowing the implant to reach new targets on a local network.
Part 12 - "Cherry Blossom"
On 15 June 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 12 "Cherry Blossom".
Part 13 - "Brutal Kangaroo"
On 22 June 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 13 "Brutal Kangaroo".
Part 14 - "Elsa"
On 28 June 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 14 "Elsa".
Part 15 - "OutlawCountry"
On 29 June 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 15 "OutlawCountry".
Part 16 - "BothanSpy"
On 6 July 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 16 "BothanSpy".
Part 17 - "Highrise"
On 13 July 2017, WikiLeaks published Vault 7 part 17 "Highrise".
Part 18 - "UCL / Raytheon"
UCL / Raytheon - 19 July 2017
Part 19 - "Imperial"
Imperial - 27 July 2017
Part 20 - "Dumbo"
Dumbo - 3 August 2017
Part 21 - "CouchPotato"
CouchPotato - 10 August 2017
Part 22 - "ExpressLane"
WikiLeaks publishes secret documents from the "ExpressLane" project of the CIA. These documents show one of the cyber operations the CIA conducts against liaison services—which includes among many others the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The OTS (Office of Technical Services), a branch within the CIA, has a biometric collection system that is provided to liaison services around the world—with the expectation for sharing of the biometric takes collected on the systems. But this 'voluntary sharing' obviously does not work or is considered insufficient by the CIA, because ExpressLane is a covert information collection tool that is used by the CIA to secretly exfiltrate data collections from such systems provided to liaison services.
ExpressLane is installed and run with the cover of upgrading the biometric software by OTS agents that visit the liaison sites. Liaison officers overseeing this procedure will remain unsuspicious, as the data exfiltration disguises behind a Windows installation splash screen.
The core components of the OTS system are based on products from Cross Match, a US company specializing in biometric software for law enforcement and the Intelligence Community. The company hit the headlines in 2011 when it was reported that the US military used a Cross Match product to identify Osama bin Laden during the assassination operation in Pakistan.- 24 August 2017
Part 23 - "Angelfire"
Angelfire - 31 August 2017
Part 24 - "Protego"
Protego - 7 September 2017
Authenticity
When asked about their authenticity, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Hayden replied that the organization does "not comment on the authenticity or content of purported intelligence documents." However, speaking on condition of anonymity, current and former intelligence officials said that the documents appear to be genuine. Edward Snowden tweeted shortly after the documents' release that they looked authentic. Robert M. Chesney, a law professor at the University of Texas and Director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), likened the Vault 7 to NSA hacking tools disclosed in 2016 by a group calling itself The Shadow Brokers.
On 15 March 2017, President Donald Trump stated during an interview that "the CIA was hacked, and a lot of things taken". The following day in a statement, Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff, the Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee, wrote in a news release, "In his effort to once again blame Obama, the President appeared to have discussed something that, if true and accurate, would otherwise be considered classified information." Schiff also said that the president has the power to declassify whatever and whenever he wants.
Organization of cyber warfare
WikiLeaks said that the documents came from "an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI) in Langley, Virginia." The documents allowed WikiLeaks to partially determine the structure and organization of the CCI. The CCI reportedly has an entire unit devoted to compromising Apple products.
The cybersecurity firm Symantec analyzed Vault 7 documents and found some of the described software closely matched cyberattacks by "Longhorn," which it had monitored since 2014. Symantec had previously suspected that "Longhorn" was government-sponsored and had tracked its usage against 40 targets in 16 countries.
Frankfurt base
The first portion of the documents made public on 7 March 2017, Vault 7 "Year Zero", revealed that a top secret CIA unit used the German city of Frankfurt as the starting point for hacking attacks on Europe, China and the Middle East. According to the documents, the U.S. government uses its Consulate General Office in Frankfurt as a hacker base for cyber operations. WikiLeaks documents reveal the Frankfurt hackers, part of the Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe (CCIE), were given cover identities and diplomatic passports to obfuscate customs officers to gain entry to Germany.
The chief Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe Peter Frank announced on 8 March 2017 that the government was conducting a preliminary investigation to see if it will launch a major probe into the activities being conducted out of the consulate and also more broadly whether people in Germany were being attacked by the CIA. Germany's foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel from the Social Democratic Party responded to the documents of Vault 7 "Year Zero" that the CIA used Frankfurt as a base for its digital espionage operations, saying that Germany did not have any information about the cyber attacks.
UMBRAGE
The documents reportedly revealed that the agency had amassed a large collection of cyberattack techniques and malware produced by other hackers. This library was reportedly maintained by the CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group, with examples of using these techniques and source code contained in the "Umbrage Component Library" git repository. According to WikiLeaks, by recycling the techniques of third-parties through UMBRAGE, the CIA can not only increase its total number of attacks, but can also mislead forensic investigators by disguising these attacks as the work of other groups and nations. Among the techniques borrowed by UMBRAGE was the file wiping implementation used by Shamoon. According to PC World, some of the techniques and code snippets have been used by CIA in its internal projects, whose end result cannot be inferred from the leaks. PC World commented that the practice of planting "false flags" to deter attribution was not a new development in cyberattacks: Russian, North Korean and Israeli hacker groups are among those suspected of using false flags.
According to a study by Kim Zetter in The Intercept, UMBRAGE was probably much more focused on speeding up development by repurposing existing tools, rather than on planting false flags. Robert Graham, CEO of Errata Security told The Intercept that the source code referenced in the UMBRAGE documents is "extremely public", and is likely used by a multitude of groups and state actors. Graham added: "What we can conclusively say from the evidence in the documents is that they're creating snippets of code for use in other projects and they're reusing methods in code that they find on the internet. ... Elsewhere they talk about obscuring attacks so you can't see where it's coming from, but there's no concrete plan to do a false flag operation. They're not trying to say 'We're going to make this look like Russia'."
False flag theories
On the day the Vault 7 documents were first released, WikiLeaks described UMBRAGE as "a substantial library of attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation," and tweeted, "CIA steals other groups virus and malware facilitating false flag attacks." A conspiracy theory soon emerged alleging that the CIA framed the Russian government for interfering in the 2016 U.S. elections. Conservative commentators such as Sean Hannity and Ann Coulter speculated about this possibility on Twitter, and Rush Limbaugh discussed it on his radio show. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that Vault 7 showed that "the CIA could get access to such 'fingerprints' and then use them."
Cybersecurity writers, such as Ben Buchanan and Kevin Poulsen, were skeptical of those theories. Poulsen wrote, "The leaked catalog isn't organized by country of origin, and the specific malware used by the Russian DNC hackers is nowhere on the list."
Marble framework
The documents describe the Marble framework, a string obfuscator used to hide text fragments in malware from visual inspection. As part of the program, foreign languages were used to cover up the source of CIA hacks. According to WikiLeaks, it reached 1.0 in 2015 and was used by the CIA throughout 2016.
In its release, WikiLeaks described the primary purpose of "Marble" as to insert foreign language text into the malware to mask viruses, trojans and hacking attacks, making it more difficult for them to be tracked to the CIA and to cause forensic investigators to falsely attribute code to the wrong nation.<ref>Sam Varghese: WikiLeaks releases third tranche of CIA files, iTWire', 1 April 2017</ref> The source code revealed that Marble had examples in Chinese, Russian, Korean, Arabic and Persian. These were the languages of the US's main cyber-adversaries – China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
Analysts called WikiLeaks' description of Marble's main purpose inaccurate, telling The Hill its main purpose was probably to avoid detection by antivirus programs.
Marble also contained a deobfuscator tool with which the CIA could reverse text obfuscation.
Security researcher Nicholas Weaver from International Computer Science Institute in Berkeley told the Washington Post: "This appears to be one of the most technically damaging leaks ever done by WikiLeaks, as it seems designed to directly disrupt ongoing CIA operations."Wikileaks releases code that could unmask CIA hacking operations, Ars Technica, 2 April 2017
Compromised technology and software
CDs/DVDs
HammerDrill is a CD/DVD collection tool that collects directory walks and files to a configured directory and filename pattern as well as logging CD/DVD insertion and removal events. v2.0 adds a gap jumping capability that injects a trojan into 32-bit executables as they are being burned to disc by Nero. Additionally, v2.0 adds a status, termination and an on-demand collection feature controlled by HammerDrillStatus.dll, HammerDrillKiller.dll and HammerDrillCollector.dll. The logging now also fingerprints discs by hashing the first two blocks of the ISO image, which enables unique identification of multi-sessions discs even as data is added and removed. The log also logs anytime a HammerDrill trojaned binary is seen on a disc.
Apple products
After WikiLeaks released the first installment of Vault 7, "Year Zero", Apple stated that "many of the issues leaked today were already patched in the latest iOS," and that the company will "continue work to rapidly address any identified vulnerabilities."
On 23 March 2017, WikiLeaks released "Dark Matter", the second batch of documents in its Vault 7 series, detailing the hacking techniques and tools all focusing on Apple products developed by the Embedded Development Branch (EDB) of the CIA. The leak also revealed the CIA had been targeting the iPhone since 2008, a year after the device was released. These EDB projects attacked Apple's firmware, meaning that the attack code would persist even if the device was rebooted.WikiLeaks CIA files: New 'Dark Matter' release details how US 'hacked into Apple products', The Independent, 23 March 2017 The "Dark Matter" archive included documents from 2009 and 2013. Apple issued a second statement assuring that based on an "initial analysis, the alleged iPhone vulnerability affected iPhone 3G only and was fixed in 2009 when iPhone 3GS was released." Additionally, a preliminary assessment showed "the alleged Mac vulnerabilities were previously fixed in all Macs launched after 2013".
Cisco
WikiLeaks said on 19 March 2017 on Twitter that the "CIA was secretly exploiting" a vulnerability in a huge range of Cisco router models discovered thanks to the Vault 7 documents.http://www.securityweek.com/cisco-finds-zero-day-vulnerability-vault-7-leak The CIA had learned more than a year ago how to exploit flaws in Cisco's widely used internet switches, which direct electronic traffic, to enable eavesdropping. Cisco quickly reassigned staff from other projects to turn their focus solely on analyzing the attack and to figure out how the CIA hacking worked, so they could help customers patch their systems and prevent criminal hackers or spies from using similar methods.
On 20 March, Cisco researchers confirmed that their study of the Vault 7 documents showed the CIA had developed malware which could exploit a flaw found in 318 of Cisco's switch models and alter or take control of the network.
Cisco issued a warning on security risks, patches were not available, but Cisco provided mitigation advice.
Smartphones/tablets
The electronic tools can reportedly compromise both Apple's iOS and Google's Android operating systems. By adding malware to the Android operating system, the tools could gain access to secure communications made on a device.
Messaging services
According to WikiLeaks, once an Android smartphone is penetrated the agency can collect "audio and message traffic before encryption is applied". Some of the agency's software is reportedly able to gain access to messages sent by instant messaging services. This method of accessing messages differs from obtaining access by decrypting an already encrypted message. While the encryption of messengers that offer end-to-end encryption, such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Signal, wasn't reported to be cracked, their encryption can be bypassed by capturing input before their encryption is applied, by methods such as keylogging and recording the touch input from the user. Commentators, among them Snowden and cryptographer and security pundit Bruce Schneier, observed that Wikileaks incorrectly implied that the messaging apps themselves, and their underlying encryption, had been compromised - an implication which was in turn reported for a period by the New York Times and other mainstream outlets.
Vehicle control systems
One document reportedly showed that the CIA was researching ways to infect vehicle control systems. WikiLeaks stated, "The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations." This statement brought renewed attention to conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Michael Hastings.
Windows
The documents refer to a "Windows FAX DLL injection" exploit in Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7 operating systems. This would allow a user with malicious intents to hide its own malware under the DLL of another application. However, a computer must have already been compromised through another method for the injection to take place.
Commentary
On 7 March 2017, Edward Snowden commented on the importance of the release, stating that it reveals the United States Government to be "developing vulnerabilities in US products" and "then intentionally keeping the holes open", which he considers highly reckless.
On 7 March 2017, Nathan White, Senior Legislative Manager at the Internet advocacy group Access Now, writes:
On 8 March 2017, Lee Mathews, a contributor to Forbes'', wrote that most of the hacking techniques described in Vault 7 were already known to many cybersecurity experts.
On 8 March 2017, some note that the revealed techniques and tools are most likely to be used for more targeted surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden.
On 8 April 2017, Ashley Gorski, an American Civil Liberties Union staff attorney called it "critical" to understand that "these vulnerabilities can be exploited not just by our government but by foreign governments and cyber criminals around the world." Justin Cappos, professor in the Computer Science and Engineering department at New York University asks "if the government knows of a problem in your phone that bad guys could use to hack your phone and have the ability to spy on you, is that a weakness that they themselves should use for counterterrorism, or for their own spying capabilities, or is it a problem they should fix for everyone?".
On 8 April 2017, Cindy Cohn, executive director of the San Francisco-based international nonprofit digital rights group Electronic Frontier Foundation, said: "If the C.I.A. was walking past your front door and saw that your lock was broken, they should at least tell you and maybe even help you get it fixed." "And worse, they then lost track of the information they had kept from you so that now criminals and hostile foreign governments know about your broken lock." Furthermore, she stated that the CIA had "failed to accurately assess the risk of not disclosing vulnerabilities. Even spy agencies like the CIA have a responsibility to protect the security and privacy of Americans." "The freedom to have a private conversation – free from the worry that a hostile government, a rogue government agent or a competitor or a criminal are listening – is central to a free society". While not as strict as privacy laws in Europe, the Fourth Amendment to the US constitution does guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
On 12 May 2017 Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith wrote "This is an emerging pattern in 2017. We have seen vulnerabilities stored by the CIA show up on WikiLeaks," In other words, Smith expressed concern about the fact that the CIA have stockpiled such computer vulnerabilities, which in turn were stolen from them, while they failed to inform Microsoft in a timely fashion about their security breach, as a result the privacy and security of their customers around the world were potentially negatively affected for an extended period and caused widespread damage.
See also
Notes
References
External links
Vault 7 at WikiLeaks
Julian Assange Press Conference and Q&A on CIA/Vault7/YearZero, Thursday 9 March 2017, the official WikiLeaks YouTube channel
2017 in the United States
Central Intelligence Agency domestic surveillance operations
Central Intelligence Agency controversies
Computer surveillance
Cyberwarfare
Hacking in the 2010s
Information published by WikiLeaks
Instant messaging
March 2017 events in the United States
Computer security exploits
Works about security and surveillance |
53455140 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahlon%20E.%20Doyle | Mahlon E. Doyle | Mahlon E. Doyle (June 14, 1921 – March 4, 2017) was an American cryptologist, inventor, innovator, and author. He enjoyed a three decade career at the National Security Agency and its predecessor organizations.
Biography
He was born in North Baltimore, to Carl and Flossie (née Michener) Doyle. He married Lana Starner on August 10, 1946. During World War II, Doyle served in the Army, working on the SIGSALY voice encryption system.
Doyle's career began in 1949 as a cryptanalyst studying electronic key generators. He used mathematical notation to describe the motion of key generators and applied mathematical techniques to analyze them.
In 1956, Doyle joined COMSEC Research and Development as a cryptomathematician. By 1961, he had risen to Chief of his division, a position he held until 1977, when he was named Senior Cryptographer. The division was responsible for designing the cryptographic algorithms used by the U.S. and its Allies to protect classified information and the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System.
Doyle designed the cryptologics for major COMSEC systems used by the United States government for four decades. From the 1960s onward, most U.S. government COMSEC equipment used cryptologics that were either designed by Doyle or designed by others based on his research. He designed key management schemes that caused a huge decrease in the amount and cost of physically distributing key material.
Personal life and death
Doyle's personal life was marked by tragedy. He wed Lana Starner on August 10, 1946. She died on February 2, 2012. The couple had two daughters, Dr. Laurie Doyle and Mrs. Nancy Shields, both of whom predeceased their father. Mahlon E. Doyle died in Silver Springs, Maryland on March 4, 2017, aged 95. He was survived by two grandchildren, Kathleen and Joshua. He was interred in Benton Cemetery, Crawford County, Ohio.
References
1921 births
2017 deaths
20th-century American mathematicians
American cryptographers
Modern cryptographers
National Security Agency cryptographers
People from Wood County, Ohio
United States Army personnel of World War II |
53461338 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ortiz%20Morales | Ortiz Morales | Ortíz Morales, Jesús Manuel, also known as Ommalaga (born 24 January 1959), is a Spanish composer.
Career
Morales is an experimental and noise musician, audiovisual producer and academic researcher. He directs the Contemporary Music of CSMM, directs the digital lab ATI-Gabirol Lab and founded kinematic ensemble KinematikoM. He has a PhD in Audiovisual Communication, with specialization in the reconstruction of sonorous contexts of audiovisual synchronism, futuristic and Dadá. His thesis was on archeotechnology (El synchrociné de Charles Delacommune, UMA2012) and another on cinematic reconstructions (El ballet mecanique y el synchrociné, UMA2008). He has been professor int. in the superior Conservatories of Cordoba, Granada and Málaga (Harmony, Musical Forms and of Contemporary Music Workshops).
He began as a rock musician (in Tabletom and Veneno). He became a symphonic and minimalist musician (with the young orchestra CSMM and later with the Málaga Symphonic orchestra). From approximately 1998 to the present, he worked in the styles of electroacoustic and noise and concrete music.
He was included by SGAE in the anthology of electroacoustic authors 2002-2003 for his work Kish. He has been an independent producer since 1982 with the alternative production company Ommalaga Productions, dedicated to experimental media and pedagogy. He has performed works or tunings for various media such as RTVE series, RNE, RTVA, Canal SUR or Metro-Málaga.
He developed some computer software (among others, the Rameau digital music encryption system). He developed works in reconstructive computer graphics. He is in possession of one of the Eduardo Ocón prizes of the Diputación de Málaga. He produced works for RCA, Nuevos Medios and CBS, notably the albums Mezclalina, and Si tu, si yo. He produced an audiovisual reconstruction of the film of 1924 Ballet mécanique.
Discography
Sirrush (2016)
Ea (2015)
Ki (2010)
Dilmún (2007)
Abzu (2005)
Antologia Electroacústica (2003)
Música contemporánea (2000)
Pequeño salvaje (1987)
Algo tuyo (1985)
Rayya (1982)
Recuerdos del futuro (1981)
Mezclalina (1980)
References
Ommalaga: Organization chart,
Ortiz Morales: Discography,
La Opinión Newspaper
1959 births
Living people
Experimental musicians
Noise musicians |
53461699 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James%20Lind%20%28naturalist%29 | James Lind (naturalist) | James Lind FRS FRSE FRCPE (1736–1812) was a Scottish natural philosopher and physician.
Life
James Lind was born in Gorgie, Edinburgh on 17 May 1736.
He studied medicine at Edinburgh University under William Cullen and Joseph Black, and graduated in 1768. In 1766, he then joined the East India Company as surgeon. In 1768 he received his doctorate (MD) from Edinburgh upon completing a dissertation on marsh fever (malaria) in Bengal. On 6 November 1770 he was admitted a Fellow of the College of Physicians, Edinburgh. Lind was also a corresponding member of the Lunar Society.
Personality
Lind is widely regarded as having an eccentric personality, and considered to be reckless with spending money as captured by the following dialogue: "Why, Dr. Lind, you spend a whole seas of gold", to which Lind replied, "Madam, 'tis true, my very name, behold, Begins with pounds and ends, alas, with pence"
Charles Burney described Lind as extremely thin, tall, with grey hair as seen around age 70 ('a mere lath'). Dr. Fanny Burney wrote that Lind was generally acknowledged to have a sweet disposition. She also cast doubt whether he obtained much of a private medical practice: "his taste for trickes, conundrums and queer things makes people fearful of his trying experiments on their constitutions, and think of him a better conjuror than a physician; though I don't know why the same man should not be both".
Percy Shelley said Lind to be, "...exactly what an old man ought to be. Free, calm-spirited, full of benevolence, and even of youthful ardor: his eye seemed to burn with supernatural spirit beneath his brow, shaded by his venerable white locks, he was tall, vigorous, and healthy in his body; tempered, as it had ever been, by his amiable mind. I owe to that man far, ah! far more than I owe to my father: he loved me, and I shall never forget our long talks, where he breathed the spirit of the kindest tolerance and the purest wisdom,"
In A Sketch of My Life, Lind's son Alexander Frances Lind wrote: "Would that my feeble pen could render better justice to my father's memory; and would that I had been older to have profited by the instructions he was so peculiarly fitted to afford. I have been told, and I believe it, that few men existed of more universal knowledge; and that very few could be met, whose conversation was do instructive, and whose life and manners were more gently, and unassuming."
Family
James Lind was the son of Alexander Lind of Gorgie, FRSE, (son of George Lind of Gorgie, Sheriff Deputy of Edinburgh, and Jean Montgomery of Smithton)
The surname Lind is derived from Lynne of Ayrshire in Scotland. Synonymous variations include Lynne, Linn and Lind used by free Barons from the earliest of recorded history. There were Linns of that Ilk in Ayrshire, and Linns of Pitmade in Perthshire. James Lind is descended from the Linds of Ayrshire. King John Balliol mentions William de Lynne of that Ilk in a donation, who is a direct forefather in the Lind lineage.
Lind's mother, Helen Allardice (1697-1746) was daughter of Sir George Allardice, Member of Parliament and Master of the Mint of Scotland. Through maternal Allardice lineage, James Lind was 10th in descent from James II of Scotland, 15th in descent from Robert the Bruce as well as 16th in descent from Edward I of England (Robert the Bruce supported William Wallace's revolt against Edward I 'Longshanks' as portrayed in the film Braveheart), and Lind was 17th in descent from Henry III of England. The roots may have included Banquo.
Lind married Ann Elizabeth Mealy on 07 Nov 1778. She is mentioned in Burney's Diary, she mentioned his wife as "a fat handsome wife who is as tall as himself and about six times as big". Charlotte Papendiek referred to her as "needlewoman and everything to the Duchess of Portland at Bulstrode". Mealy was daughter of John Mealy of S. George's Middlesex, gent. and Elizabeth Parry of Perveddgoed; descendants of Rev. Richard Parry, M.A. of Perfeddgoed, Bangor, Rector of Llanddeiniolen. The Parrys of Perfeddgoed are descendants of Jestyn ap Gwrgant which traces to Bran. The pedigree of Ann Elizabeth Mealy through the Parrys includes direct lineage from David Daron who was the dean of Bangor in 1399 (also known as the Archdeacon of Bangor in William Shakespeare's works on Henry IV) in whose house Owen Glyndwr, Hotspur, Worcester and Mortimer met regarding the Tripartite Indenture. Ann died at the age of 48 from an apoplectic fit.
Ann Elizabeth Mealy and Lind had at least four children:
Anne Amelia Lind (1780-1783), died from swallowing a thimble, shares a grave with Ann Elizabeth Mealy Lind in the Old Windsor Churchyard
Lucy Maria Lind (1783-1858), married Markham Eeles Sherwill, and they had three sons (Markham Eeles, Walter Stanhope and James) and five daughters (Ariana Maria, Julia Sophia, Lucy Maria, Anne Elizabeth and Helen Matilda). As Lucy Maria Sherwill, she was known as a profilist notably profiling Princess Amelia.
Dorothea Sophia Banks Lind (1786-1863), Lind married Isaac Gosset (1782–1855); and was mother of Helen Dorothea or Dorothy Gosset, who married William Driscoll Gosset.
Anne Elizabeth Lind (1787-1866), married William Burnie in 1806.
Alexander Francis Lind B.C.S. (1797-1832), recommend for nomination by Lord Ailesbury at the request of Queen Charlotte in 1811; Judge and Magistrate of Mirzapur at time of death. Alexander Francis married Anna Maria Macan (1802-1862) in 1817 (daughter of Robert Macan (1774-1820) of Ballinahone House, Armagh; High Sheriff of Armagh in 1814). Alexander Francis fathered eight children.
Extended family
Lind's great-grandfather was John Lind IV (son of John Lind III and Mary Boyd of Pittfinde) and Isabel Boyd of Forgil. The earliest documentation of John Lind I dates as early as 1532. The Lind family motto was Semper Virescit Virtus.
John Lind IV and Isabel had five children:
George Lind (grandfather)
Married to Ms. Cockbarn of Langton
Magdalene, married John Keir
James Keir
Grizel Dickie
Married to Jean Montgomery (grandmother)
Alexander Lind (father), married Helen Allardice (mother)
James Lind was an only child. Lind may have four siblings: George Lind, Elisabeth Lind, Ann Lind, and Charles Lind.
George Lind (lord-provost of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Member of Parliament).
Colonel John Lind
Married Anne Semple of Fullwood family, had one son, Major General John Lind (1733-1795)
Married Mary Crawford
Captain Francis Lind, M.D., married Elizabeth Farrer
Catherine Lind, married Robert Mowbray
Anne Lind, married Richard Cooper
John Lind V
Robert Lind
James Lind
James Lind of Haslar (1716–1794) the distinguished naval physician credited with curing scurvy, conducting the first controlled clinical trial, and namesake of the James Lind Alliance,
Sir James Lind, captain in the Royal Navy.
Adam Lind
Charlies Lind
John Lind (barrister)
Lind was also cousin to Sir James Grant.
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein
Lind taught at Eton College while in semi-retirement. Around 1809, he tutored Percy Bysshe Shelley, husband of Mary Shelley. Percy alluded to Lind in two poems from 1817, the old man who rescues Laon in The Revolt of Islam, and Prince Athanase, where he appears as the wise old teacher magus Zonoras.
Percy was fascinated with Lind's experiments and demonstrations of galvanism (e.g. using electricity to animate the muscles of dead frogs causing them to jump, or causing the jerking of reptile muscles), hence Lind has been suggested to have been an inspirational origin of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Specifically, it is thought Mary Woolstoncraft Shelley had a nightmare while staying with Percy Shelley at Byron's House in Lake Geneva due to Percy reminiscing about Lind's bizarre experiments. Lind is also thought to be the source for the character of the blind old man, De Lacey, as well as Doctor M. Waldman in the novel Frankenstein.
Lind is also thought to be a trace influential origin of Dracula.
Freemasonry
Lind was a Scottish Freemason. He was Initiated in Lodge Canongate Kilwinning, No. 2, on 2 August 1758. He was also active in the affairs of the Grand Lodge of Scotland and was Senior Grand Warden 1769–1771.
Death
Late in life, a portrait of Lind was painted by John Keenan in 1807.
Lind died at the house of his son-in-law, William Burnie, in Russell Square, London, on 17 October 1812. Alexander Francis Lind indicated the cause of death was, "of a suppression of urine, which for nearly five years before his death kept him in ceaseless agony". He is buried in at St George's Church on Bloomsbury Way, London in the crypt, coffin 6084.
Career
In addition to medicine, Lind was interested in a variety of sciences (botany, astronomy, meteorology, geology, chemistry, etc.), collected antiques and drawings, and was a silhouette artist and played the bassoon and flute. He was an expert in Pliny and Lucretius.
As a member of the Lunar Society, Lind was closely acquainted with many prominent scientists of his era exemplified by James Watt. Watt confided in Lind in discussing his steam engine, and in Watt's publication, Description of a New Perspective Machine, he opens by referring to Lind: "The perspective machine was invented about 1765, in consequence of my friend Dr. James Lind having brought from India a machine [...] invented by Mr. Hurst."
Career highlights
Astronomy and Naval Voyages
In astronomy, Lind utilized a telescope to observe the transit of Venus from Hawkhill and reported his account to the Royal Society in 1769, and printed with remarks from Nevil Maskelyne. Lord Alemore had built Lind an observatory at his house in Hawkhill for this purpose (as noted in a letter from Lord Loudoun) also known as "the observatory of Hawk-hill westward". Lind likewise observed an eclipse of the moon at the same location, the account of which was likewise read to the Royal Society. Lind kept up a correspondence with Patrick Wilson about William Herschel's astronomical works. Lind also traveled with Caroline Herschel to view a comet in Slough. Like William Herschel, Lind believed in cosmic pluralism and recently has been suggested to have observed a UFO at Windsor.
Lind's wife, Ann Elizabeth Mealy, was suggested to have been the first to observed volcanic activity on the moon despite Herschel receiving credit for the observation. The red flashes they observed were later determined to not be volcanic.
As a naturalist, Lind collected plant specimens during voyages aboard Drake (1762-1763) and Hampshire (1765-1767) with significant collections made at the Cape and the Comoros en route to India and south-east Asia. Lind visited:
China in 1766 (having brought back a specimen of lemon grass that was sampled in tea), later in 1789 Lind also visited Soho Square to draft an important spreadsheet that cross-referenced Chinese plants from Chinese texts and Latin texts (Lind also spoke Chinese, in addition to his knowledge of Latin previously used to write his dissertation) which enabled botanists to place accurate orders of exotic flora. Lind also contributed to Fanny Burney's efforts to develop a chapter on Chinese music in the fifth volume of the History of Music. Lind's witty sarcasm is showcased as he told Pieter Camper "the Chinese do not wish to bring up their children, but drown them in the river". Lind was later requested to join the Macartney Embassy in China in 1792 but Lind declined.
Iceland in 1772 with Joseph Banks, Uno von Troil and Daniel Solander where they were among the first to reach the summit of Hekla volcano, and Lind measured the height of Geysir in Haukadalur with a quadrant.
South Africa in 1779.
The Icelandic expedition of 1772 took place after initial unsuccessful plans for both Banks and Lind to sail with James Cook on his second voyage as mentioned in A Voyage Round the World; Lind was to be hired as astronomer and to receive £4000 for the voyage. Consistent with the misidentification of the James Lind cousins, some sources credit the cousin James Lind (1716-1794) as the astronomer candidate for Cook's second voyage, however there is no doubt regarding the identity of James Lind (1736-1812) as noted in his son's memoirs A Sketch of My Life, and supported with the following excerpts from the Society minutes: Dr James Lind is recommended to the Board of Longitude ‘as a person who will be extremely useful in the intended voyage for discoveries in remote parts; on account of his skill and experience in his profession, and from his great Knowledge in Mineralogy, Chemistry, Mechanics, and various branches of Natural Philosophy; and also from his having spent several years in different climates, in the Indies'.-R.S., It was not really Cook but Joseph Banks who wanted Lind as part of his large entourage, and after Banks had failed to get his will with regards to the expedition ships of Cook's second voyage and decided not to go, they went to Iceland, the Hebrides and the Orkney Islands together instead in 1772.
Lind is likewise credited with first discovering the latitude of Islay, and developed a map of the island which was accepted by the geographical authority of era; Lind gave the map to Thomas Pennant. In reference to intellectual curiosity and government funding opportunities, Lind said, " [...] I am turned Longitude mad and I have go a most novel Sextant made by my friend Ramsden, which altho only Six inches Radius it is divided to half seconds. A magnifier magnifies the nonius and Telescope magnifies the Observation."
In 1774, Lind applied to professorship at Edinburgh competing against Andrew Duncan, William Buchan, Daniel Rutherford and others, but Lind was not selected for the position.
Lind invented the Lind Type Tube Anemometer (portable wind gauge) in 1775, a prototype of which he had sent to Sir John Pringle. Lind also designed a rain gauge as well as a barometer which he took to the summit of Arthur's Seat in collaboration with William Roy.
Military
In 1776, Lind and Captain Alexander Blair developed the first riffled canon. It fired a special one pound led shot and was equipped with a telescopic sight. It was not successfully adopted, although the technologies described became widely used in future weapons.
Windsor
Lind was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London 18 December 1777. Around the same time he seems to have settled at Windsor, where he later became physician to the royal household for King George III. Lind lived on Park Street, Mayfair and was a neighbor of Jean-André Deluc.
Among miscellaneous tasks the King had assigned to Lind, in Jan 1782 Lind planted at cabbage garden intended to protect hares over winter. Lind also advised Joseph Banks, who was George III's adviser for the Royal Botanic Gardens, and Major William Price on agricultural projects such as growing mangelwurzel and lima beans.
Lind was interested in forensics. When the coffin of Edward IV was opened and remains examined at Windsor in 1789 or 1799, Lind made an analysis of the remains and liquid found in it, noting: "The appearance of this liquor was very much like that of walnut-pickle. A dark brown colour, which was rendered very dense by a quantity of matter, principally consisting of very small particles of a woody substance [...] It was inodorous and tasteless, excepting a small degree of roughness or astringency; just like water which has remains some time in a rotten wooden vessel".
Publishing
While at Windsor, Lind also had a private press where he published numerous works including Sir Robert Douglas's Peerage of Scotland and The Genealogy of the Families of Lind and the Montgomeries of Smithson, as well as miscellaneous other books, pamphlets, and experimented with typography. Lind also wrote several mysterious encrypted books in characters regarded as "Lindian Ogham" which was suggested by Charles Knight (whose father was acquainted with Lind) to have been an encryption for Illuminati correspondence. Furthermore, Lind collected autographs and may have been interested in phantasmagoria.
Lind communicated extensively with Cavallo. For example, Lind communicated with Cavallo on the art of silhouette making and made silhouette portraits of George III, Queen Charlotte, and others using the 'Lind process'.
Scientific and medical experiments
Lind suggested the use of electroshock therapy to treat insanity (particularly in the context of treating George III’s mental illness) as he had extensively studied and experimented with galvanism, and communicated with Tiberius Cavallo on the subject. In one correspondence, Lind reported successful treatment of a condition similar to postpartum femoral neuropathy (leg paralysis after birth) using 'medical electricity'. Lind may have designed a primitive cardiopulmonary resuscitation machine to revive a patient. In a letter to James Watt, Lind references an electric machine that treats ophthalmia. Lind also believed "animal electricity" was a vital life force.
Lind had also invented the "Thunder House" which repeated and verified Benjamin Franklin's lightening rod experiments, and he also attached a long rod to his chimney with a long chain connected to the ground, with a wire connected to the chain entering him room to charge electric Layden jars and also to make to bells ring. The relationship between Lind and Franklin is documented in letters to James Watt, as well as letters between David Hume and Franklin where Lind is referred to as Brother Lin. Lind also experimented with Franklin's sparking electrostatic machine to animate reptile muscles.
Lind constructed an earthquake machine (seismograph) which Hugh Davies Griffith of Chester inquired if Lind detected seismic activity after an 1801 earthquake.
Lind also experimented with distillation. He conducted "Experiments upon the Waters at His Majesty's Dog-Kennel".
In 1787, Lind experimented in treating inflammation and gastrointestinal disorders with mercury. He also invented a "plaster for the cure of White-Swelling" among other medical advancements.
In a letter written in 1796 to Cavallo (originating from Windsor) and published in Cavallo's An Essay on the Medicinal Properties of Factitious Airs (1798), Lind recognized the therapeutic potential of carbon monoxide as hydrocarbonate for treating lung inflammation, the mechanism of which was recently elucidated in 2000 via the mitogen-activated protein kinase pathway and remains a focus of pharmaceutical development efforts. Lind's discovery for the beneficial effects of carbon monoxide to treat inflammation is regarded as a piece of historical irony since Lind is considered to be the inspiration of Dr. Frankenstein, yet, throughout the 1920's (due to widespread cases of carbon monoxide poisoning from civilization's expanding industrial activities, illuminating gas leaks, automobile exhaust exposure, etc.) several medical scientists condemned carbon monoxide as "Frankenstein's monster". Lind's discovery is a significant origin for the field of gasotransmitters in the context of carbon monoxide's neurotransmitter properties and pharmaceutical development of carbon monoxide therapeutics. In the same work, Lind designed a novel inhaler for delivery of hydrocarbonate therapeutic gas.
Inspired by Cavallo, Lind was also interested in ballooning and aerial flight in the late 1790s. Along these lines, in 1783 George III also sent Lind with Jean-André Deluc to Barnet to inspect a "Machine in the shape of a Bird, which was supposed to be capable of carrying a weight of 800 lbs. thro' the air".
Retirement
Lind taught at Eton College while in semi-retirement in the early 1800s where he was acquainted with Shelley and introduced him to science and the writings of Plato, Voltaire, Franklin, Condorcet, Albertus Magnus, Paracelsus, and others.
Honors
1770 - elected fellow of Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh
1777 - elected fellow of the Royal Society (18 Dec 1777)
1783 - elected fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (03 Nov 1783)
Appointed physician-in-ordinary to the Royal Household
Publications
1762 - Lind's inaugural dissertation, De Febre Remittente Putrida Paludum quæ grassabatur in Bengalia
1768 - dissertation published at Edinburgh.
1768 - An Essay on diseases incidental to Europeans in hot climates, with the method of preventing their fatal consequences.
1772 - Lind produced a translation of dissertation, Treatise on the Fever of 1762 at Bengal.
1769 - In three papers for the Royal Society, Lind discussed: the 1769 transit of Venus observed at Hawkhill, near Edinburgh; an eclipse of the moon, same place and year, with remarks by Nevil Maskelyne
1775 - portable wind gauge.
1776 - A description of rifled ordnance; Fitted with Sectors, Telescopes, &c. In which is contained, an Account of the Nature and Properties of rifles in general.
1787 - An Account of the Efficacy of Mercury in the Cure of Inflammatory Diseases, and the Dysentery.
1789 - A catalogue of such Chinese and Japanese plants whose Chinese characters are known and are botanically described.
1798 - A letter from Lind appears in Tiberius Cavallo's An Essay on the Medicinal Properties of Factitious Airs.
1800 - A Sketch for medical education, emphasized importance of mathematics
1803 - Copy of a Letter to the late Thomas Pennant of Downing on Typhus Fevers
Letters
"Unpublished Remains of Eminent Persons", p. 239-246, "Thirteen letters, never before published, from the late James Watt, esq. FRS, the celebrated Mechanician, to Dr. James Lind, FRS of Windsor." The Monthly Magazine, Volume 50, Part 2, 1820.
"A Letter from Dr. James Lind to Mr. Cavallo", p. 475-476, 1784.
"A bag of gravel is a history to me", p.56, letter from James Hutton to James Lind, 1772
"a new machine to pump water", letter from George Dempster of Dunnichen to Lind, 1787
Miscellaneous letters between Lind and residents of Birmingham, such as John Carmichael of Birmingham General Hospital (who was formerly engaged to Anne Boulton), are stored in the archives of the Library of Birmingham
Miscellaneous
"The Real Shelley: New Views of the Poet's Life, Volume 1", alternative perspective on Lind's mischievous behavior and use of profanity, p. 94-113.
"Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, Volume 12", account disputing Lind's appointment as physician to George III, potentially case of mistaken identity with James Lind M.D. of Haslar, 1817, p. 214
"James Lind, M.D., of Windsor", biography; clarifies distinction from James Lind M.D. of Haslar, p. 626-628.
Account suggesting Lind was injured by George III
Notes
External links
jameslind.co.uk, site by Christopher Goulding
Lodge Canongate Kilwinning, No.2
Grand Lodge of Scotland
1736 births
1812 deaths
18th-century Scottish medical doctors
British East India Company Marine personnel
Fellows of the Royal Society
Naval surgeons
Scottish Freemasons
Scottish surgeons |
53565137 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David%20Anderson%2C%20Baron%20Anderson%20of%20Ipswich | David Anderson, Baron Anderson of Ipswich | David William Kinloch Anderson, Baron Anderson of Ipswich, (born 5 July 1961) is a British barrister and life peer, who was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2017. On 8 June 2018 it was announced that he would be introduced to the House of Lords as a cross-bench (non-party) working peer. On the same day he was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE), for services to national security and civil liberties, in the Queen's 2018 Birthday Honours.
His father was Sir Eric Anderson, former Headmaster of Eton College, who taught Prince Charles, Tony Blair, David Cameron and Boris Johnson.
Career
Legal practice
Anderson came to the English Bar after spells in Washington DC (1985-86) at Covington and Burling and in Brussels (1987-88) in the private office of Lord Cockfield, the European Commissioner tasked with completing the Internal Market.
As a practitioner since 1988 at Brick Court Chambers in London and Queen's Counsel since 1999, Anderson is best known for his 150 cases in the Court of Justice of the European Union, including his appearances for the applicants in the landmark constitutional cases Factortame (supremacy of EU law:1988-2000) and Kadi (UN/EU terrorist sanctions: 2005–2010). He also practises in the full range of English courts, where he contested the free speech case ProLife Alliance v BBC. Among more than 30 cases that he has presented to the European Court of Human Rights are Bowman v UK (free speech and election spending), McGonnell v UK (separation of powers), Hatton v UK (environmental rights), Demopoulos v Turkey (post-invasion property rights) and Gaunt v UK (journalistic freedom of expression).
Anderson is a Bencher of Middle Temple, sat as a Recorder of the Crown Court from 2004 to 2013, and has since 2014 been a Judge of the Courts of Appeal of Guernsey and Jersey, where he was also the Investigatory Powers Commissioner between 2017 and 2020. Among other professional honours, Anderson was described as the UK's "Legal Personality of the Year" in 2015, and as one of London's 1000 most influential people in 2017.
National security
Anderson succeeded Lord Carlile of Berriew CBE QC as the UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in February 2011. He stepped down after two three-year terms as Independent Reviewer, and was succeeded in post by Max Hill QC on 1 March 2017. All but one of his 20 reports as Independent Reviewer were laid before Parliament and published in full.
Counter-terrorism law
Both Government and opposition credited Anderson for his influence on the Justice and Security Act 2013, which governs the use of closed material procedures in UK courts. His reports and evidence to Parliament also influenced the law governing Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs, the successors to control orders), which were reformulated in accordance with his recommendations in 2015; the scope of the power to stop and detain travellers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000; and the practice of asset-freezing. Other reports concerned the deprivation of citizenship and the practice of deportation with assurances.
The UK Supreme Court referred to Anderson's work with approval in R v Gul (2013) and Beghal v DPP (2015), as did the European Court of Human Rights in Beghal v UK (2019). He wrote in 2014 and 2017 on the channels by which the Independent Reviewer may hope to influence the law and policy of counter-terrorism. Some broader reflections on terrorism and the law were published in 2013 and 2018, and on reporting terrorism in 2019.
Surveillance
"A Question of Trust", Anderson's June 2015 report of his Investigatory Powers Review, described the obscurity of the then law as "undemocratic, unnecessary and – in the long run – intolerable". Its 125 recommendations aimed to replace it with "a clear, coherent and accessible scheme, adapted to the world of internet-based communications and encryption". The report has been described in an opinion piece by an editor at The Guardian as "the turning point that policymakers have looked for and missed ever since 9/11", and was a blueprint for the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Following publication of the report, Anderson was shortlisted in 2015 by ISPA for its "Internet Hero of the Year" award.
In August 2016 followed the report of Anderson's Bulk Powers Review, with 60 case studies, which examined the operational case for the bulk retention of data by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ and is a significant factual resource for debates on "mass surveillance". Both these reports were relied upon by the European Court of Human Rights in its "fulltext":["Big Brother Watch"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-186048"]} Big Brother Watch judgment of September 2018. Anderson's expert evidence in the Irish High Court on police use of communications data was relied upon by the Supreme Court in its Dwyer judgment of February 2020.
Counter-extremism
Anderson has criticised the UK's broad definition of terrorism, and warned in September 2015 of potential dangers in the Government's proposed Counter-Extremism Bill, subsequently shelved. He published a lecture on "Extremism and the Law" in 2019. He has also written and broadcast on the Prevent strategy, and on human rights as an aid to the fight against terrorism and extremism. He was a member of the Expert Group advising the Counter-Extremism Commission from July 2018 to July 2019.
Intelligence-handling
On 28 June 2017, after stepping down from the post of Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Anderson was commissioned by Home Secretary Amber Rudd to provide independent assurance of the detailed review work commissioned by MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Police into their handling of intelligence prior to the four terrorist attacks in London and Manchester between March and June 2017. His report, which quality-assured the conclusions and operational improvements arrived at by MI5 and the police with his input, was published in December 2017, with a follow-up in June 2019.
House of Lords
Having applied to be a "people's peer", Anderson was nominated for a life peerage by the independent House of Lords Appointments Commission in June 2018. He was created Baron Anderson of Ipswich, of Ipswich in the County of Suffolk, on 10 July, and sits as a cross-bencher. He gave his maiden speech on 19 July 2018 in a debate on the impact of referendums on parliamentary democracy. Since then he has been active on a wide range of Bills and other issues, ranging from national security and internet safety to constitutional and EU-related matters. He moved the amendment in July 2019 that limited the Government's scope to prorogue Parliament, and has spoken and written against the dangers of populism and of a no-deal Brexit. He was a member of the EU Justice Sub-Committee of the House of Lords, and since 2020 has served on the EU Security and Justice Sub-Committee.
Anderson's parliamentary speeches and questions are collected here.
Professional and charitable interests
Since 2000 Anderson has at various times been a trustee or a member of the advisory/editorial board of legal and educational institutions including the Centre of European Law at the Dickson Poon School of Law, the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe, the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, the Slynn Foundation, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, the European Human Rights Law Review and the UCL European Institute, whose advisory board he currently chairs. He is the author of References to the European Court (Sweet & Maxwell 1995, 2002) and numerous articles in learned journals. He has also written for publications including The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Evening Standard, Prospect and The Literary Review. Anderson has been since 1999 a Visiting Professor at King's College London and is a former General Editor of the OUP's Oxford European Union Law Library. Between 2000 and 2004 he was appointed by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to monitor and report on the freedom of the media in Georgia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Since July 2019 he has chaired Inter Mediate, a charity engaged in mediation and negotiation whose CEO is Jonathan Powell, and which focuses on some of the most difficult, dangerous and complex conflicts worldwide.
Auld Alliance Trophy
A native of Edinburgh, Anderson was the co-promoter, (with Patrick Caublot of Amiens Rugby Club) of the Auld Alliance Trophy. First awarded (to Scotland) in February 2018, and presented every year at the Six Nations rugby international between Scotland and France, the solid silver trophy commemorates the rugby players of both nations who lost their lives in the First World War. It bears the names of Anderson's great-great-uncle Eric Milroy (Scotland's captain in 1914, killed at Delville Wood in July 1916) and of his French counterpart, the aviator Marcel Burgun.
Bibliography
Anderson, David, References to the European Court (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995; 2nd edn. with Marie Demetriou, 2002)
Anderson, David, A Question of Trust (HMSO, 2015)
Anderson, David, Report of Bulk Powers Review (Cm 9326, 2016)
Anderson, David, Compilation of writings on counter-terrorism, surveillance and extremism, 2011-2017
Film of David Anderson QC's work from The Daily Politics, BBC2, 16 March 2016:
Rozenberg, Joshua interview with David Anderson, Law in Action, BBC Radio 4, 3 November 2016 (Terrorism, Extremism and the Law: podcast)
Anderson, David, Op-Ed on the Prevent strategy, Evening Standard, 15 February 2017
Oborne, Peter, Terrorism: A History of Violence (profile of David Anderson), Middle East Eye, 17 February 2017
Anderson, David "Not for wimps: the pragmatic case for human rights", HuffPost UK, 7 June 2017
Anderson, David "Understanding Prevent", BBC Radio 4, 25 July 2017 podcast
Anderson, David personal website (2017-)
References
External links
Living people
British barristers
1961 births
People's peers
English Queen's Counsel
Queen's Counsel 2001–
Knights Commander of the Order of the British Empire
Life peers created by Elizabeth II |
53585937 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum%20coin%20flipping | Quantum coin flipping | Quantum coin flipping uses the principles of quantum mechanics to encrypt messages for secure communication. Unlike other types of quantum cryptography, quantum coin flipping is a protocol used between two users who do not trust each other. Because of this, both users (or players) want to win the coin toss and will attempt to cheat in various ways.
Quantum coin flipping and other types of quantum cryptography communicate information through the transmission of qubits. The accepting player does not know the information in the qubit until he performs a measurement. Information about each qubit is stored on and carried by a single photon. Once the receiving player measures the photon, it is altered, and will not produce the same output if measured again. Since a photon can only be read the same way once, any other party attempting to intercept the message is easily detectable.
Although quantum coin flipping is a secure means of communicating in theory, it is difficult to accomplish.
History
Manuel Blum introduced coin flipping as part of a classical system in 1983 based on computational algorithms and assumptions. Blum's version of coin flipping answers the following cryptographic problem:
Alice and Bob are recently divorced, living in two separate cities, and want to decide who gets to keep the car. To decide, Alice wants to flip a coin over the telephone. However, Bob is concerned that if he were to tell Alice heads, she would flip the coin and automatically tell him that he lost.
Thus, the problem with Alice and Bob is that they do not trust each other; the only resource they have is the telephone communication channel, and there is not a third party available to read the coin. Therefore, Alice and Bob must be either truthful and agree on a value or be convinced that the other is cheating.
In 1984, quantum cryptography emerged from a paper written by Charles H. Bennett and Giles Brassard. In this paper, the two introduced the idea of using quantum mechanics to enhance previous cryptographic protocols such as coin flipping. Since then, many researchers have applied quantum mechanics to cryptography as they have proven theoretically to be more secure than classical cryptography, however, demonstrating these protocols in practical systems is difficult to accomplish.
As published in 2014, a group of scientists at the Laboratory for Communication and Processing of Information (LTCI) in Paris have implemented quantum coin flipping protocols experimentally. The researchers have reported that the protocol performs better than a classical system over a suitable distance for a metropolitan area optical network.
Coin flipping protocol
Quantum coin flipping is when random qubits are generated between two players that do not trust each other because both of them want to win the coin toss, which could lead them to cheat in a variety of ways. The essence of coin flipping occurs when the two players issue a sequence of instructions over a communication channel that then eventually results in an output.
A basic quantum coin flipping protocol involves two people: Alice and Bob.
Alice sends Bob a set number of Κ photon pulses in the quantum states . Each of these photon pulses is independently prepared following a random choice by Alice of basis αi and bit ci where i = 1, 2, 3...Κ.
Bob then measures the pulses from Alice by identifying a random basis βi. Bob records these photons and then reports back the first successfully measured photon j to Alice along with a random bit b.
Alice reveals the basis and bit that she used at the basis Bob gave her. If the two bases and bits match, then both parties are truthful and can exchange information. If the bit reported by Bob is different than that of Alice's, one is not being truthful.
A more general explanation of the above protocol is as follows:
Alice first chooses a random basis (such as diagonally) and a sequence of random qubits. Alice then encodes her chosen qubits as a sequence of photons following the chosen basis. She then sends these qubits as a train of polarized photons to Bob through the communication channel.
Bob chooses a sequence of reading bases randomly for each individual photon. He then reads the photons and records the results in two tables. One table is of the rectilinear (horizontal or vertical) received photons and one of the diagonally received photons. Bob may have holes in his tables due to losses in his detectors or in the transmission channels. Based on this table, Bob makes a guess as to which basis Alice used and announces his guess to Alice. If he guessed correctly, he wins and if not, he loses.
Alice reports whether he won or not by announcing what basis she used to Bob. Alice then confirms the information by sending Bob her entire original qubit sequence that she used in step 1.
Bob compares Alice's sequence with his tables to confirm that no cheating occurred on Alice's part. The tables should correspond to Alice's basis and there should be no correlation with the other table.
Assumptions
There are a few assumptions that must be made for this protocol to work properly. The first is that Alice can create each state independent of Bob, and with an equal probability. Second, for the first bit that Bob successfully measures, his basis and bit are both random and completely independent of Alice. The last assumption, is that when Bob measures a state, he has a uniform probability to measure each state, and no state is easier to be detected than others. This last assumption is especially important because if Alice were aware of Bob's inability to measure certain states, she could use that to her advantage.
Cheating
The key issue with coin flipping is that it occurs between two distrustful parties. These two parties are communicating through the communication channel some distance from each other and they have to agree on a winner or loser with each having a 50 percent chance of winning. However, since they are distrustful of one another, cheating is likely to occur. Cheating can occur in a number of ways such as claiming they lost some of the message when they do not like the result or increasing the average number of photons contained in each of the pulses.
For Bob to cheat, he would have to be able to guess Alice's basis with a probability greater than ½. In order to accomplish this, Bob would have to be able to determine a train of photons randomly polarized in one basis from a train of photons polarized in another basis.
Alice, on the other hand, could cheat in a couple of different ways, but she has to be careful because Bob could easily detect it. When Bob sends a correct guess to Alice, she could convince Bob that her photons are actually polarized the opposite of Bob's correct guess. Alice could also send Bob a different original sequence than she actually used in order to beat Bob.
Detecting a third-party
Single photons are used to pass the information from one player to the other (qubits). In this protocol, the information is encoded in the single photons with polarization directions of 0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees, non-orthogonal quantum states. When a third party attempts to read or gain information on the transmission, they alter the photon's polarization in a random way that is likely detected by the two players because it does not match the pattern exchanged between the two legitimate users.
Implementation
Experimental
As mentioned in the history section, scientists at the LTCI in Paris have experimentally carried out a quantum coin flipping protocol. Previous protocols called for a single photon source or an entangled source to be secure. However, these sources are why it is difficult for quantum coin flipping to be implemented. Instead, the researchers at LTCI used the effects of quantum superposition rather than a single photon source, which they claim makes implementation easier with the standard photon sources available.
The researchers used the Clavis2 platform developed by IdQuantique for their protocol, but needed to modify the Clavis2 system in order for it to work for the coin flipping protocol. The experimental setup they used with the Clavis2 system, involves a two-way approach. Light pulsed at 1550 nanometres is sent from Bob to Alice. Alice then uses a phase modulator to encrypt the information. After encryption, she then uses a Faraday mirror to reflect and attenuate the pulses at her chosen level and sends them back to Bob. Using two high quality single photon detectors, Bob chooses a measurement basis in his phase modulator to detect the pulses from Alice.
They replaced the detectors on Bob's side because of the low detection efficiencies of the previous detectors. When they replaced the detectors, they were able to show a quantum advantage on a channel for over . A couple of other challenges the group faced was reprogramming the system because photon source attenuation was high and performing system analyses to identify losses and errors in system components. With these corrections, the scientists were capable of implementing a coin flipping protocol by introducing a small honest abort probability, the probability that two honest participants cannot obtain a coin flip at the end of the protocol, but at a short communication distance.
Classical analogy
Classical Coin Flip
In 2012, a pair of physicists in the US claimed that all classical probabilities can be collapsed into quantum probabilities. They concluded that fluid interactions on a microscopic scale can amplify minute quantum fluctuations, which can then propagate to macroscopic scales. In essence, something that seems probabilistically simple (e.g. a coin toss) actually relies on a cascading series of processes with a nearly exponentially growing level of uncertainty. So any time someone flips a coin they are, in some capacity, performing a Schrödinger's cat experiment where the coin can be considered simultaneously both heads and tails.
References
Quantum cryptography
Communication |
53632037 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bengt%20Beckman | Bengt Beckman | Bengt Beckman (30 September 1925 – 13 March 2012) was a Swedish mathematician, university professor and bestselling author.
He has worked as a research engineer at Tandem laboratory in Uppsala, Sweden. As an author, he has written about cryptography in Sweden, particularly about Arne Beurling.
Publications
Some of his books and papers are:
Swedish cryptography achievements, Bonniers, 1996,
The world's first encryption machine - Gripenstiernas cipher-Machine 1786, the National Defense Radio Establishment, Bromma, 1999
Thus the Z machine was broken - reconstruction of the Lorenz SZ40 / 42, the National Defense Radio Establishment, Bromma, 1999
Swedish Signal Intelligence: 1900-1945, Frank Cass Publishers, 2002,
In front of your eyes - drawings and comments, Johanneshov, 2010
References
External links
https://web.archive.org/web/20170330083226/http://katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=XX2103
1925 births
2012 deaths
20th-century Swedish mathematicians
Uppsala University faculty
Swedish cryptographers |
53634810 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017%20Broadband%20Consumer%20Privacy%20Proposal%20repeal | 2017 Broadband Consumer Privacy Proposal repeal | On 28 March 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res 34) to overturn the Broadband Consumer Privacy Proposal privacy law by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and was expected to be approved by United States' President Donald Trump. It was passed with 215 Republican votes against 205 votes of disapproval.
The repealed privacy protections, once approved in 2016, sought to regulate what companies can do with data of customers' browsing habits, communication contents, app usage history, location data and social security numbers and safeguard customer data against hackers and thieves.
Supporters of the vote argued that the privacy regulations stifle innovation by forcing Internet providers to abide by unreasonably strict guidelines.
Due to the repeal Internet service providers (ISP) like Comcast, AT&T and Verizon may sell Web browsing histories and other sensitive data directly to marketers, financial firms and other companies without consumers' consent. Furthermore, the FCC will be forbidden from issuing similar rules in the future.
Background
Internet providers have historically generated their revenue from selling access to the Internet and are now looking to increase their revenue by tapping the data their customers generate as they make use of the Internet.
The industry with its profit motive favors an interpretation of privacy that does not consider browsing history or app usage data to be sensitive and protected — the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) interpretation. However the FTC is unable to enforce its own guidelines without new authority from Congress.
On 16 March 2017 CTIA claims that "Web browsing and app usage history are not 'sensitive information'" in a filing with the FCC.
History
On 27 October the FCC imposed new privacy rules that were scheduled to take effect by the end of 2017 that would have required ISPs to get opt-in consent from consumers before sharing Web browsing data and other private information with advertisers and other third parties The FCC final rules were titled "Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunication Services," 81 Fed. Reg. 87274 (December 2, 2016).
On 15 February 2017 Senator Jeff Flake confirmed that he plans to introduce a resolution that would roll back the FCC's broadband privacy rules via the Congressional Review Act.
On 7 March 2017 Senator Jeff Flake and 23 Republican co-sponsors introduced the resolution.
From 21 March to the resolution's passage more than 15,000 calls against the measure were made into the Capitol.
On 22 March 2017 advocacy groups including Free Press, Demand Progress, and the ACLU went to Congress to deliver nearly 90.000 petitions to "save broadband privacy".
On 23 March 2017 the United States Senate passes the resolution with the votes of 50 Republicans against 48.
On 28 March 2017 the United States House of Representatives passes resolution "S.J.Res 34"
On 28 March 2017 the White House releases a statement according to which the administration strongly supports House passage of S.J.Res. 34 and the President's advisors would recommend that he sign the bill into law.
Reception
Many of the privacy advocates who oppose ISP data sharing also oppose tracking by ad networks and technology companies such as Google but find ISP tracking extra worrisome as ISPs have access to all of one's browsing data − not just data from specific sites that share their data with particular ad networks, and as disabling cookies or adblockers can't prevent this sort of tracking.
Jeffrey Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy states that the vote means that "Americans will never be safe online from having their most personal details stealthily scrutinized and sold to the highest bidder".
Senator Brian Schatz states that "if this [resolution] is passed, neither the FCC nor the FTC will have clear authority when it comes to how Internet service providers protect consumers' data privacy and security. Regardless of politics, allowing ISPs to operate in a rule-free zone without any government oversight is reckless".
According to Anna Eshoo the consequences of the resolution's passage are clear: "broadband providers like AT&T, Comcast, and others will be able to sell your personal information to the highest bidder without your permission".
Michael Copps, a former member of the Federal Communications Commission, called the bill a "perversion of what the internet was supposed to be".
Dallas Harris, an attorney who specializes in broadband privacy and a policy fellow at consumer advocacy group Public Knowledge notes that ISPs might be able to figure out where you bank, your political views, and your sexual orientation based on what sites you visit and asserts that "the level of information that they can figure out is beyond what even most customers expect". Various information can be extracted from Internet traffic − for instance "the fact that you're looking at a website can reveal when you're home, when you're not home" and according to her "you don't need to see the contents of every communication to develop efficient ad tracking mechanisms".
Senator Ed Markey states that "President Trump may be outraged by fake violations of his own privacy, but every American should be alarmed by the very real violation of privacy that will result [from] the Republican roll-back of broadband privacy protections".
Cable lobby group NCTA says that they "appreciate today's Senate action to repeal unwarranted FCC rules that deny consumers consistent privacy protection online and violate competitive neutrality".
Michael Capuano asks "What the heck are you thinking? What is in your mind? Why would you want to give out any of our personal information to a faceless corporation for the sole purpose of them selling it?".
Evan Greer, campaign director of digital rights group Fight for the Future states that "today Congress proved once again that they care more about the wishes of the corporations that fund their campaigns than they do about the safety and security of their constituents". She also states that:
Craig Aaron, Free Press Action Fund President and CEO writes in a statement:
SearchInternetHistory.com is a crowdfunding campaign trying to raise $1 million to buy the browsing history of Republican officeholders like Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and then Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and FCC Chair Ajit Pai.
Management
Consumers may switch to ISPs with better privacy protections. However this could be difficult for some as many Americans only have a choice of one or two broadband companies in their area according to federal statistics. Senator Ron Wyden states that thus their only choice may be between "giving up their browsing history for an Internet provider to sell to the highest bidder or having no Internet at all". Furthermore, the existence of such ISPs is not guaranteed and Jeremy Gillula, a senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation notes that it's "unclear if they would even have to tell you they were doing it".
VPN can be used to protect one's data from ISPs. However good VPNs generally cost money, take some effort and minor technical skills to set up, and will slightly degrade the connection speed.
Furthermore, the Tor browser can be used to surf anonymously. This would however significantly slow down connection speed and not be adequate in most cases.
Also ISPs can't look into the encrypted traffic of sites that use TLS whose URLs starts with "HTTPS" but only the domain name. The HTTPS Everywhere browser extension allows for better protection via HTTPS.
Also apps that use end-to-end encryption can be used to protect communication contents.
Some consumers might assume that they can protect their browsing histories by deleting them or by using privacy modes of browsers such as Chrome's "incognito mode" which is not the case.
See also
References
External links
SearchInternetHistory.com
The 265 members of Congress who sold you out to ISPs, and how much it cost to buy them, The Verge
S.J.Res.34, OpenSecrets
Five Creepy Things Your ISP Could Do if Congress Repeals the FCC’s Privacy Protections, EFF
Your browsing history may be up for sale soon. Here's what you need to know, The Guardian
Acts of the 115th United States Congress
Privacy law in the United States
Internet law in the United States |
53741333 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citrix%20ADC | Citrix ADC | Citrix ADC is a line of networking products owned by Citrix Systems. The products consist of Citrix ADC, an application delivery controller (ADC), NetScaler AppFirewall, an application firewall, NetScaler Unified Gateway, NetScaler Management & Analytics System, and NetScaler SD-WAN, which provides software-defined wide-area networking management. NetScaler was initially developed in 1997 by Michel K Susai and acquired by Citrix in 2005. Citrix consolidated all of its networking products under the NetScaler brand in 2016.
Overview
The NetScaler line of products are part of Citrix Systems' networking business. It includes NetScaler ADCs, NetScaler Unified Gateway, NetScaler AppFirewall, NetScaler SD-WAN, and NetScaler Management & Analytics System. The products can work in conjunction with other Citrix offerings, including its Xen line of products.
NetScaler is integrated with OpenStack as part of Citrix Systems' sponsorship of the Openstack Foundation.
Products
Citrix ADC is Citrix Systems' core networking product. It is an application delivery controller (ADC), a tool that improves the delivery speed and quality of applications to an end user. The product is aimed at business customers and it performs tasks such as traffic optimization, L4-L7 load balancing, and web app acceleration while maintaining data security.
Citrix ADC monitors server health and allocates network and application traffic to additional servers for efficient use of resources. It also performs several kinds of caching and compression. It can be made a server proxy, process SSL requests, and offers VPN and micro-app VPN operations. It also includes NetScaler application firewall and SSL encryption capabilities. NetScaler ADC can manage traffic during DDoS attacks, making sure traffic gets to critical applications. Additionally, Netscaler's logs of network activity feed into Citrix's cloud-based analytics service and are used to analyze and identify security risks.
There are four versions of Citrix ADC: NetScaler MPX, a hardware-based appliance for use in data centers; NetScaler SDX, a hardware-based appliance intended for service providers that provides virtualization delivering multitenancy for virtual and cloud-based data centers; NetScaler VPX, a software-based application that is implemented as a virtual machine and intended for small business use; and NetScaler CPX, a NetScaler ADC packaged in a container and designed for cloud and microservices applications.
In addition, the NetScaler line of products include Citrix SD-WAN, formerly CloudBridge SD-WAN, which provides software-defined wide-area networking and branch networking. NetScaler Unified Gateway offers secure remote access of virtual desktops and a variety applications from a single point of entry and with single sign-on (SSO).
The NetScaler Management and Analytics System is a platform designed for the organization and automation of policy management across devices and applications. The tool is intended for IT professionals to manage the various NetScaler products from a single dashboard. The platform also provides real-time analytics.
History
Entrepreneur Michel K. Susai founded NetScaler in 1997 in San Jose, California. He created NetScaler as a solution for reducing infrastructure during the growth of the Internet in the late 1990s. The company repositioned NetScaler as a security and optimization tool in 2001.
By 2005, NetScaler estimated 75 percent of Internet users used its systems through clients including Google and Amazon. Citrix acquired NetScaler in 2005 for approximately $300 million in cash and stock.
Citrix released NetScaler MPX, a faster and more power efficient NetScaler ADC model, in 2008. It introduced the VPX edition the following year. In 2011, Citrix launched NetScaler SDX.
In 2016, Citrix transitioned all of its delivery products under the NetScaler brand. Citrix CloudBridge SD-WAN became NetScaler SD-WAN. The company also introduced “NetScaler Management and Analytics System”, a console for users to manage all NetScaler products, including the ADCs and SD-WAN, and a containerized version of NetScaler called NetScaler CPX. Citrix released a free developer version of NetScaler CPX called NetScaler CPX Express in August 2016.
Reception
Reviewing NetScaler ADC in 2007, InfoWorld gave it a score of 8.6 out of 10. The reviewer noted that it was easy to set up and administer, and provided performance improvements in load balancing and Web application speed. However, there were variable results with features such as TCP session buffering and TCP session consolidation, as these would depend on other factors. As well, InfoWorld said that NetScaler is best suited for "organizations making corporate applications available over the Web for internal or external customers" and "large, heavily trafficked Web sites" but was more costly than other available solutions for a "small, three-node Web farm that will be lightly loaded".
GCN wrote in 2011 that NetScaler is "much more than a load balancer; it’s really an all-in-one Web application delivery system". The site gave NetScaler an A+ rating for features, B- for ease of use, A+ for performance and a C for value. The same article noted that it was difficult to learn and expensive.
, annual net revenue from sales of NetScaler products and services was .
References
External links
Citrix Systems
Load balancing (computing)
Cloud applications
Servers (computing)
Networking hardware
Network management
Configuration management |
53762405 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander%20Aigner | Alexander Aigner | Alexander Aigner (18 May 1909 – 2 September 1988) was number theorist and a full university professor for mathematics at the Karl Franzens University in Graz, Austria. During World War II he was part of a group of five mathematicians, which was recruited by the military cryptanalyst Wilhelm Fenner, and which included Ernst Witt, Georg Aumann, Oswald Teichmueller and Johann Friedrich Schultze, to form the backbone of the new mathematical research department in the late 1930s, which would eventually be called Section IVc of Cipher Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. (abbr. OKW/Chi). The group was led by the German professor of mathematics Wolfgang Franz.
Life
Alexander Aigner was the son of noted medical doctor Oktavia Aigner-Rollett and anatomist Walter Aigner (1878–1950). He is the grandson of noted physiologist and histologist of Alexander Rollett. He studied mathematics and physics in at the University of Graz. In 1936, he was put forward by Dr. Karl Brauner for promotion to Dr. Phil, with Dr. Tonio Rella advising, with a thesis titled: Mathematical treatment of the hermit game in the plane and in space. About the possibility of in square bodies (German: Mathematische Behandlung des Einsiedlerspieles in der Ebene und im Raume. Über die Möglichkeit von in quadratischen Körpern). He was offered a position as assistant at the 2nd Chair (Lehrkanzel) for Mathematics at Karl Franzens University. Aigner published articles in the journal Deutsche Mathematik. During World War II, he was recruited along with a number of other mathematicians to make up the backbone of a new cipher bureau for the German Army. He would eventually work at the mathematical research department IV/Section IVc of OKW/Chi under Erich Hüttenhain in the deciphering of complex foreign encryption systems.
In 1947 he qualified as a professor at the Karl Franzens University in Graz, where he received an assistant position from Georg Kantz. In 1957, he became an extraordinary professor (Academic ranks in Germany) and finally a full professor. Even after becoming professor emeritus in 1979 he continued to give lectures about number theory, his primary focus. In addition to his professional activities, he also developed a literary interest. He was a member of the Styrian Writers' Union and the confederation of Styrian home poets. After two volumes of poetry, in 1978 he published a collection of cheerful mathematical poems titled Tangents to the Frohsinn (Tangenten an den Frohsinn), a special edition of the reports of the Mathematical-Statistical Section at the Research Center Graz.
Publications
Kriterien zum 8. und 16. Potenzcharakter der Reste 2 und -2, Deutsche Mathematik, Vol. 1939, p. 44.
Mathematische Behandlung des Einsiedlerspieles in der Ebene und im Raume, Deutsche Mathematik, Vol. 1940, p. 12.
Die Zerlegung einer arithmetischen Reihe in summengleiche Stücke, Deutsche Mathematik, Vol. 1941, p. 77.
Literature from and about Alexander Aigner in the catalog of the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.
Alexander Aigner: Number theory. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter 1975; .
Alexander Aigner: Tangents to the joy. Graz, 1978. Special number of the reports of the Mathematical-Statistical Section at the Research Center Graz.
References
1909 births
1988 deaths
Austrian mathematicians
Austrian cryptographers
University of Graz faculty
20th-century mathematicians
Number theorists
People from Graz |
53764660 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto-shredding | Crypto-shredding | Crypto-shredding is the practice of 'deleting' data by deliberately deleting or overwriting the encryption keys.
This requires that the data have been encrypted. Data comes in these three states: data at rest, data in transit and data in use. In the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability all three states must be adequately protected.
Getting rid of data at rest like old backup tapes, data stored in the cloud, computers, phones, and multi-function printers can be challenging when confidentiality of information is of concern; when encryption is in place it allows for smooth disposal of data. Confidentiality and privacy are big drivers of encryption.
Motive
The motive for deleting data can be: defective product, older product, no further use for data, no legal right to use or retain data any more, etc. Legal obligations can also come from rules like: the right to be forgotten, the General Data Protection Regulation, etc.
Use
In some cases everything is encrypted (e.g. harddisk, computer file, database, etc.) but in other cases only specific data (e.g. passport number, social security number, bank account number, person name, record in a database, etc.) is encrypted. In addition, the same specific data in one system can be encrypted with another key in another system.
The more specific pieces of data are encrypted (with different keys) the more specific data can be shredded.
Example: iOS devices use crypto-shredding when activating the "Erase all content and settings" by discarding all the keys in 'effaceable storage'. This renders all user data on the device cryptographically inaccessible.
Best practices
Storing encryption keys securely is important for shredding to be effective. There is no effect when a symmetric or asymmetric encryption key is shredded when it has already been compromised (copied). A Trusted Platform Module addresses this issue. A hardware security module is one of the safest ways to use and store encryption keys.
Bring your own encryption refers to a cloud computing security model to help cloud service customers to use their own encryption software and manage their own encryption keys.
Salt: Hashing can be inadequate for confidentiality, because the hash is always the same. For example: The hash of a specific social security number can be reverse engineered by the help of rainbow tables. Salt addresses this problem.
Security considerations
Encryption strength can be weaker over time when computers get faster or flaws are found.
Brute-force attack: If the data is not adequately encrypted it is still possible to decrypt the information through brute force. Quantum computing has the potential to speed up a brute force attack in the future. However, quantum computing is less effective against symmetric encryption than public-key encryption. Assuming the use of symmetric encryption, the fastest possible attack is Grover's algorithm, which can be mitigated by using larger keys.
Data in use. For example: the (plaintext) encryption keys temporarily used in RAM can be threatened by cold boot attacks, hardware advanced persistent threats, rootkits/bootkits, computer hardware supply chain attacks, and physical threats to computers from insiders (employees).
Data remanence: For example: When data on a harddisk is encrypted after it has been stored there is a chance that there is still unencrypted data on the harddisk. Encrypting data does not automatically mean it will overwrite exactly the same location of the unencrypted data. Also bad sectors cannot be encrypted afterwards. It is better to have encryption in place before storing data.
Hibernation is a threat to the use of an encryption key. When an encryption key is loaded into RAM and the machine is hibernated at that time, all memory, including the encryption key, is stored on the harddisk (outside of the encryption key's safe storage location).
The mentioned security issues are not specific to crypto-shredding, but apply in general to encryption. In addition to crypto-shredding, data erasure, degaussing and physically shredding the physical device (disk) can mitigate the risk further.
References
Data security
Cryptography
Key management
Public-key cryptography
Security |
53770851 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber%20self-defense | Cyber self-defense | In cybersecurity, cyber self-defense refers to self-defense against cyberattack. While it generally emphasizes active cybersecurity measures by computer users themselves, cyber self-defense is sometimes used to refer to the self-defense of organizations as a whole, such as corporate entities or entire nations. Surveillance self-defense is a variant of cyber self-defense and largely overlaps with it. Active and passive cybersecurity measures provide defenders with higher levels of cybersecurity, intrusion detection, incident handling and remediation capabilities. Various sectors and organizations are legally obligated to adhere to cyber security standards.
Background
Organizations may conduct a penetration test via internal team or hire a third-party organization to audit the organization's systems. Larger organizations may conduct internal attacker-defender scenarios with a "red team" attacking and a "blue team" defending. The defenders, namely threat hunters, system administrators, and programmers, proactively manage information systems, remediate vulnerabilities, gather cyber threat intelligence, and harden their operating systems, code, connected devices, and networks. Blue teams may include all information and physical security personnel employed by the organization. Physical security may be tested for weaknesses, and all employees may be the target of social engineering attacks and IT security audits. Digital and physical systems may be audited with varying degrees of knowledge of relevant systems to simulate realistic conditions for attackers and for employees, who are frequently trained in security practices and measures. In full-knowledge test scenarios, known as white box tests, the attacking party knows all available information regarding the client's systems. In black box tests, the attacking party is provided with no information regarding the client's systems. Gray box tests provide limited information to the attacking party.
Cybersecurity researcher Jeffrey Carr compares cyber self-defense to martial arts as one's computer and network attack surface may be shrunk to reduce the risk of exploitation.
Measures
Authentication
Enable multi-factor authentication.
Minimize authentication risk by limiting the number of people who know one's three common authentication factors, such as "something you are, something you know, or something you have." Unique information is characterized as possessing a particular degree of usefulness to a threat actor in gaining unauthorized access to a person's information.
Reduce one's social media footprint to mitigate risk profile.
Regularly check one's social media security and privacy settings.
Create strong and unique passwords for each user account and change passwords frequently and after any security incident.
Use a password manager to avoid storing passwords in physical form. This incurs a greater software risk profile due to potential vulnerabilities in the password management software, but mitigates the risk of breaches if one's password list were stolen or lost and in the case keyloggers were present on machine.
Pay attention to what information one might accidentally reveal in online posts.
Change default passwords to programs and services to prevent default credential vulnerability exploitation techniques.
Appropriately use password brute force attack prevention software such as Fail2ban or an effective equivalent.
Never give out logins or passwords to anyone unless absolutely necessary and if so, change them immediately thereafter.
Use security questions and answers that are impossible for anybody else to answer even if they have access to one's social media posts or engage in social engineering.
Anti-social engineering measures
Do not plug in found external storage devices, such as external hard drives, USB flash drives, and other digital media.
Beware of social engineering techniques and the six key principles, reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity.
Beware of shoulder surfing, wherein threat actors collect passwords and authentication information by physically observing the target user.
Beware of piggybacking (tailgating) wherein a threat actor closely follows an authorized personnel into a secure facility.
Beware of wardriving, wherein threat actors use mobile hacking stations to gain unauthorized access to WiFi. Wardriving might also consist of the use of parabolic microphones to gather acoustic data, such as passwords and personally identifiable data.
Be cautious when browsing and opening email attachments or links in emails, known as phishing.
Refrain from interacting with fake phone calls voice fishing, also known as "vishing".
Scan links to malicious websites with Google Transparency Report to check for known malware.
Preventative software measures
Use, but do not rely solely on antivirus software, as evading it is trivial for threat actors. This is due to its reliance on an easily altered digital signature, a form of applied hash, of the previously known malicious code.
Use an antimalware product, such as Malwarebytes Anti-Malware, in conjunction with an antivirus with vulnerability scanning features.
Update and upgrade all of one's software and programs — including, but not limited to a user's operating system, firmware, software drivers, and device drivers. Use dedicated updating-software and enable automated update features.
Encrypt one's computer and phone.
Regularly create backups of one's data.
Uninstall insecure software such as Adobe Flash on one's operating system. Refrain from accessing web pages and related plugins within one's web browser.
Only run software when necessary to reduce attack surface.
Refrain from rooting one's phone or internet-facing device.
Network and information security measures
Using a firewall on Internet-connected devices.
Not running programs, services, or browsers with a super-user or privileged user account, such as root in Linux and Unix ) or as Administrator (Windows), unless one understands the security risks of such an action.
Avoiding free WiFi and not logging into any accounts while using it.
Appropriately using privacy and anonymity software such as Tor (anonymity network) for anonymous web browsing, given that this attracts some attention.
Appropriately using HTTP and various Internet Protocol proxies and security measures, such as disabling HTTP header fields, filtering, and relaying traffic with proxy servers such as Squid Proxy, proxychains, socks4, and socks5.
Publishing public keys for PGP authentication for being able to prove one's identity.
Using the strongest encryption method one's router offers and updating router firmware.
Using an intrusion detection system(IDS) or a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management System) to alert as to indicators of compromise, such as configuration changes in the operating system, privilege escalation, network security breaches, and unauthorized remote logins.
Using a demilitarized zone to reduce the number of systems and services openly facing the internet.
Using a virtual private network with IPsec to secure traffic at the transport layer of the OSI model to harden the IP stack.
Reporting breaches and incidents
Gather evidence and document security and data breaches (intrusions).
Contact relevant authorities, administrators or organizations in the case of a cyberattack.
Beware of website data breaches wherein stored passwords and personally identifiable information are publicized.
Refer to a state's statute on security breach notification laws.
"Hacking back"
Legal theorists and policy makers are increasingly considering authorizing the private sector to take active measures by "hacking back" (also known as hackbacks). In contrast to active attack measures, passive defense measures present a reduced risk of cyberwarfare, legal, political, and economic fallout.
A contemporary topic in debate and research is the question of 'when does a cyber-attack, or the threat thereof, give rise to a right of self-defense?'
In March 2017, Tom Graves proposed the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act (ACDC) that would enhance the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) to allow individuals and the private sector to use certain tools currently restricted under the CFAA to identify attackers and prevent attacks by hacking them. This presents a "chicken or the egg" problem, wherein if everyone were allowed to hack anyone, then everyone would hack everyone and only the most skilled and resourced would remain.
Brad Maryman warns of unintended consequences, stating that in his view "the notion that we should legislate and accept a level of undocumented and unmonitored cyber actions by anyone who thinks they have been hacked is unfathomable".
See also
Proactive cyber defence
CryptoParty
Information security
Internet security
References
External links
Cybersecurity self-defense, Slate
Surveillance Self-Defense, EFF
Paul Carugati: Cyber Self-Defense, TED talk
Self-defense
Computer security |
53772790 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juerg%20Leuthold | Juerg Leuthold | Juerg Leuthold is a full professor at ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
Biography
Leuthold was born in 1966 in Switzerland. He received a Ph.D. degree in physics from ETH Zurich for work in the field of integrated optics and all-optical communications.
From 1999 to 2004 Leuthold was affiliated with Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies in Holmdel, USA, where he performed device and system research with III/V semiconductor and silicon optical bench materials for applications in high-speed telecommunications.
From 2004 to 2013 Leuthold was a full professor at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, where he headed the Institute of Photonics and Quantum Electronics and the Helmholtz Institute of Microtechnology. Since March 2013 he has been a full professor at ETH Zurich, where he heads the Institute of Electromagnetic Fields.
Affiliations
Leuthold is a fellow of the Optical Society of America and of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. When he was a professor at Karlsruhe, he was a member of the Helmholtz Association Think Tank and a member of the Heidelberg Academy of Science. He served on the board of directors of the Optical Society of America. Leuthold has been and is serving the community as general chair and in many technical program committees.
Research Interests
Leuthold interests are in the fields of photonics, terahertz and communications. His current activities are centered around"
High-speed optical communications and sensing
Microwave photonics and terahertz technologies
Plasmonics
Integrated optics
Atomic Scale Technologies (Memristive device research)
Research
Direct conversion of an RF signal to an optical signal by means of plasmonic-antenna
Plasmonic detection with 100 GHz and beyond bandwidth and high responsivity
The demonstration of the smallest and most compact plasmonic modulators
Demonstration of single atom plasmonic switches (i.e. switches, where relocating a single atom performs optical switching operation in the order o 10 dB)
Record Encoding of 26 Tbit/s of OFDM data onto a single laser and Nyquist encoding of 30 Tbit/s of data onto a single laser
Record nonlinear conversion in a short silicon slot waveguide
First 100 Gbit/s single carrier wireless transmission demonstration
Development of DPSK Transmission system
Record all-optical signal processing: Most compact and fast 100 Gbit/s all-optical wavelength converter, and demonstration of 1'000'000 km transmission
Theory and demonstration of "most perfect" semiconductor-optical amplifier (SOA) based all-optical signal wavelength conversion scheme
Contributions to the development of Multimode-Interference (MMI) Couplers: Introduction of higher-order mode converters, spatial mode filters realized by MMIs, or MMI couplers with tunable splitting ratios
Awards and Honors
2018 Doron Prize
2015 ERC Advanced Research Grant
2013 Elevated to the rank of a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers for contributions to high-speed optical communications
2011 Hector Fellow Research Price
2010 Member of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences
2009 for achievements in silicon nanotechnology. This is the highest funded research prize of a German state and entitles to an extra research fund worth €100,000.
2009 Elevation to the rank of Fellow of the Optical Society (OSA)
2007 Election to "Top five Innovators in the field of Optics in Germany of the year 2007" by the German VDI
2002 Central Bell Labs Teamwork Awards" for the development of the "RZ-DPSK System"
1999 Award of the "1999 Lucent President's Award for Team Excellence" (In recognition of the first fully integrated 100 Gbit/s InP optic chip for data encryption)
External links
integrated optics
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology,
List of Publications
Institute of Electromagnetic Fields.
References
ETH Zurich faculty
Fellow Members of the IEEE
Fellows of the Optical Society
1966 births
Living people
Optical engineers
20th-century Swiss physicists
21st-century Swiss physicists |
53888422 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinalCode | FinalCode | FinalCode, Inc. is a multi-national software company that provides data-centric security and information rights management (IRM) to help enterprises mitigate data leakage and meet compliance requirements. FinalCode allows users to securely collaborate and share files using any communication channel, including existing Enterprise Content Management (ECM), Cloud Storage and collaboration applications.
FinalCode is privately held and headquartered in San Jose, California, with additional offices in Singapore, Japan, Australia and United Kingdom.
History
FinalCode, Inc was founded in 2014.
As part of an international expansion FinalCode opened a regional headquarters in Singapore in May 2016.
In September 2016 an additional regional headquarter was opened in London, UK, to cover the EMEA region.
FinalCode also has additional offices and presence in Japan and Australia.
Features
FinalCode provides AES-256 encryption, granular permission sets, corporate and user policy templates, file lifecycle activity analytics, dynamic policy modification, and the ability to remotely delete files after they have been shared.
Patented Technology
FinalCode’s patented CryptoEase™ technology adds a layer of file protection that remains persistent whether the file circulates internally or outside an organization. Offering a comprehensive file-based Information Rights Management (IRM) that allows organizations and file owner retains comprehensive file control and auditing capability with the means recipients and usage permissions or delete files remotely.{{
Industry Standards
FinalCode achieved Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) certification for FinalCode Crypto Module and FinalCode Crypto Module for Mobile.
FinalCode is also Suite-B compliant.
These standards are integrated into the current FinalCode solution.
Awards and recognition
In 2017, FinalCode was named "Hot Product" at RSA Conference 2017. In 2016, FinalCode earned Ovum "on the radar" award.
Gartner designated FinalCode as a "Cool Vendor" in 2015.
References
External links
Official Website
Software companies based in California
Technology companies based in the San Francisco Bay Area
Data security
Companies based in Silicon Valley
Software companies of the United States |
53906209 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CCMP | CCMP | CCMP or ccmp may refer to:
CCMP (cryptography), an encryption protocol used in Wi-Fi
CCMP Capital, a private equity investment firm
cyclic CMP (cCMP), a cyclic nucleotide |
53970875 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AnyDesk | AnyDesk | AnyDesk is a closed source remote desktop application distributed by AnyDesk Software GmbH. The proprietary software program provides platform independent remote access to personal computers and other devices running the host application. The software is currently installed on over 500 million devices across multiple platforms. It offers remote control, file transfer, and VPN functionality.
Company
AnyDesk Software GmbH was founded in 2014 in Stuttgart, Germany and has gone worldwide, with subsidiaries in the US and China.
In May 2018, AnyDesk secured 6.5 million Euros of funding in a Series A round led by EQT Ventures. Another round of investment in January 2020 brings AnyDesk to over 20 million Dollars of combined funding.
Software
AnyDesk uses a proprietary video codec "DeskRT" that is designed to allow users to experience higher-quality video and sound transmission while reducing the transmitted amount of data to the minimum.
With its three megabyte total program size, AnyDesk is noted as an especially lightweight application.
Features
Availability of features is dependent upon the license of the individual user. Some main features include:
Remote access for multiple platforms (Windows, Linux, macOS, iOS, Android, etc.)
File transfer and manager
Remote Print
VPN
Unattended access
Whiteboard
Auto-Discovery (automatic analysis of local network)
Chat-Function
REST-API
Custom-Clients
Session protocol
Two-Factor-Authentication
Individual host-server
Security
AnyDesk uses TLS-1.2 with authenticated encryption. Every connection between AnyDesk-Clients is secured with AES-256. When a direct network connection can be established, the session is endpoint encrypted and its data is not routed through AnyDesk servers. Additionally, whitelisting of incoming connections is possible.
Abuses
AnyDesk can be optionally installed on computers and smartphones with full administrative permissions, if the user chooses to do so. This provides the host user with full access to the guest computer over the Internet, and, like all remote desktop applications, is a severe security risk if connected to an untrusted host.
Mobile access fraud
In February 2019, Reserve Bank of India warned of an emerging digital banking fraud, explicitly mentioning AnyDesk as the attack channel. The general scam procedure is as follows: fraudsters get victims to download AnyDesk from the Google Play Store on their mobile phone, usually by mimicking the customer service of legitimate companies. Then, the scammers convince the victim to provide the nine-digit access code and to grant certain permissions. After permissions are obtained and if no other security measures are in place, the scammers usually transfer money using the Indian Unified Payment Interface. A similar scam took place in 2020 according to Kashmir Cyber police. The same method of theft is widely used internationally on either mobile phones or computers: a phone call convinces a person to allow connection to their device, typically from a caller claiming to be a service provider to "solve problems with the computer/phone", warning that Internet service will otherwise be disconnected, or from a caller claiming to be a financial institution because "there have been suspicious withdrawal attempts from your account".
Bundling with ransomware
In May 2018, the Japanese cybersecurity firm Trend Micro discovered that cybercriminals bundled a new ransomware variant with AnyDesk, possibly as an evasion tactic masking the true purpose of the ransomware while it performs its encryption routine.
Technical support scams
Scammers have been known to use AnyDesk and similar remote desktop software to obtain full access to the victims' computer by impersonating a technical support person. The victim is asked to download and install AnyDesk and provide the attackers with access. When access is obtained, the attackers can control the computer and move personal files and sensitive data.
In 2017, the UK based ISP TalkTalk banned Teamviewer and similar software from all its networks after scammers cold called victims and talked them into giving access to their computer. The software was removed from the blacklist after setting up a scam warning.
See also
Comparison of remote desktop software
Virtual Network Computing
References
External links
Software companies of Germany
Remote desktop
Remote administration software
Windows remote administration software
MacOS remote administration software
Linux remote administration software
Portable software
Proprietary cross-platform software
Virtual Network Computing
Web conferencing |
53971612 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carmen%20Sandiego%20%28TV%20series%29 | Carmen Sandiego (TV series) | Carmen Sandiego is an animated action-adventure streaming on Netflix, a series with educational elements, based on the media franchise of the same name created by Broderbund. The series is produced by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt with WildBrain serving as the production company, and contains a "serialized look at Carmen's backstory that is told from her perspective". Serving as an origin story for the fictional thieving villain of the same name, it is the fourth Carmen Sandiego television show after the PBS game shows Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego? and Where in Time is Carmen Sandiego?, and the Fox animated series Where on Earth is Carmen Sandiego?; it is also the first Carmen Sandiego related show since the end of Where on Earth is Carmen Sandiego in 1999.
The series sees many characters drawn from the franchise's 35-year history: Carmen Sandiego herself who debuted in the original World video game; The Chief who took her current form in the World game show; Player, Zack, and Ivy who were featured in the Earth animated series, Chase Devineaux who debuted in Word Detective, and Julia Argent who was featured in Treasures of Knowledge.
The first season was released on January 18, 2019 on Netflix. A second season was released on October 1, 2019. A third season was renewed in an announcement on April 24, 2020 and was released on October 1. On October 2, 2020, it was announced that it was renewed for a fourth season, which was later announced to be the final season, which was released on January 15, 2021.
Premise
An orphan girl codenamed Black Sheep was found on the side of a road in Buenos Aires, Argentina roughly 20 years ago and is raised and trained to become a master thief by a group of villains who double as the faculty at V.I.L.E. Academy, a school for thieves and secret criminal underworld organization, located on the Isle of V.I.L.E. in the Canary Islands. Black Sheep considers the island and faculty her home and family until she learns the organization's true nature. After seeing how much harm V.I.L.E causes, she goes rogue, escapes the island and adopts the name Carmen Sandiego, and seeks to take down V.I.L.E. by stealing things they have already stolen, returning them to their rightful place or owner and stopping their future heists and plans from being executed. Carmen's friends and team are white-hat hacker Player, who works as recon tech support, and Boston siblings Zack and Ivy, who help her on-site and often act as distractions or operate the various get-away vehicles. She treats each one of them with care and together, they set out to thwart V.I.L.E.'s schemes for global conquest all while on the run from the mysterious secret government agency, A.C.M.E., who have set their sights on arresting V.I.L.E and Carmen.
A recurring theme is that both V.I.L.E. and A.C.M.E. make mistaken assumptions about Carmen's actions and intentions.
In season one, Carmen is a modern-day Robin Hood, traveling the globe, stealing from V.I.L.E. and giving back to its victims. Cloaked in red, she is accompanied by her hacker Player, and her best friends Zack and Ivy. Carmen is publicly perceived as a master criminal by most law enforcement agencies due to the sheer scale and theatricality of her heists. We follow her escapades and get to determine not only where in the world but “who” is Carmen Sandiego?.
In season two, Carmen seeks answers about her past, while V.I.L.E. attempts to keep their finances from plummeting even further into the red. The Faculty attempt to find a new fifth member after Shadowsan joins Carmen. Thanks to Julia's encouragement, Carmen and the Chief make a loose alliance to take down V.I.L.E.
In season three, Carmen has been off the grid for months, looking for clues to her mother's identity. Julia quits A.C.M.E., after Chief has become too blinded by distrust toward Carmen, for stealing intel on her father from them, to see that she isn't stealing from anyone. V.I.L.E. sets up base in Scotland, sending new agents after Carmen who were specifically trained to capture her.
In season four, after several failed attempts to claim gold, including the lost hidden treasures stolen by the past generations of the organization, V.I.L.E. has been pushed to its limits and they start using robot operatives. They eventually capture and brainwash Carmen, who then quickly rebuilds their funds and gains the Faculty's favor. However, Graham helps A.C.M.E. bring the real Carmen back while selling out V.I.L.E. in the process. Carmen finally tracks down and meets her mother. Shadowsan retires, while Zack and Ivy join A.C.M.E. in crime-fighting. After the downfall of V.I.L.E., A.C.M.E. chases down its leftover members, with the occasional help from Carmen.
Characters
Main
Carmen Sandiego / "Black Sheep" (voiced by Gina Rodriguez) – The eponymous protagonist and heroine seeking to dissolve V.I.L.E. and donate their stolen funds to humanitarian causes (the proceeds go through Carmen's charity Black Sheep Inc, as a subtle taunt to V.I.L.E.); this Carmen is notably different than previous incarnations, who were leaders of V.I.L.E. and lady thieves. The story she knew was that she was found as an abandoned baby on the roadside of Buenos Aires, Argentina 20 years ago. At a young age, she used to be a student at V.I.L.E. Academy until she left when she didn't want to take the life of anyone who gets in her way after stowing away on a mission and seeing what really goes on in V.I.L.E. She takes her name from the brand name tag in the hat she used in her escape disguise (which she stole from V.I.L.E. accountant; Cookie Booker). She is also nicknamed "Carm" by Zack & Ivy and "Red" by Player. By the end of the second season, Carmen learns of her true heritage as the daughter of former V.I.L.E. Faculty Member Dexter Wolfe, who was killed by the mysterious Chief of A.C.M.E. during an ambush by Interpol and assassination attempt by V.I.L.E. and that her mother may still be alive, thus making it her new secondary objective to find her mother.
Player (voiced by Finn Wolfhard) – A white-hat hacker from Niagara Falls, Ontario who helps Carmen plan her heists, gives her intel about the places she visits and keeps her updated on the local authorities, V.I.L.E. activity, or any possibilities she may have missed. Player is inspired by the live-action character of the same name from Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?, who in turn is a reference to people playing the video games—this version, however, has met Carmen physically, having met her in person for the first time during season 4. He is Carmen's best friend and with whom she has a close relationship and has been in contact with her since her school days on the isle. He cares for Carmen as a friend and helps Shadowsan uncover The Chief's identity. In Season 4, his last name is revealed to be Bouchard.
Zack (voiced by Michael Hawley) and Ivy (voiced by Abby Trott) – Siblings from South Boston helping Carmen after they met during a Donut shop heist which was a V.I.L.E. front; they are inspired by the A.C.M.E. detectives of the same names from Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?, voiced by Scott Menville and Jennifer Hale respectively. Ivy, the older of the two, often runs interference for Carmen, either through disguises or her engineering skills; she also is much more well-read than Zack, who habitually makes mistakes about their discoveries and is less experienced with going undercover (almost giving himself away when tricking the Countess), hence why he more often serves as Carmen's wheelman/getaway driver.
Shadowsan / Suhara (voiced by Paul Nakauchi; main – season 2) – A Japanese master thief, skilled swordsman, assassin, and a former member of the Faculty of V.I.L.E. teaching stealth and covert thievery. He gave a test where students had to find and steal a dollar from his coat when Carmen was still in school and emptied his coat so she wouldn't be able to find the dollar, which caused Carmen's need to outdo Tigress. In the season one finale, Shadowsan revealed that he was really on Carmen's side all her life and that he was the one who found her in Argentina when she was a baby. He emptied his coat in order to protect her from joining V.I.L.E. He is a secret member of Carmen's team as well, providing her with a new drive on V.I.L.E.'s financial data at the end of the season. By season 2, his betrayal is revealed and he becomes an enemy of V.I.L.E. while helping Carmen foil their plans. In "The Daisho Caper", his real name is revealed to be Suhara, having stolen his katana from his brother decades earlier and regretting the life he chose. In the season 2 finale, he reveals to Carmen that he was sent to kill her father Dexter Wolfe, a.k.a. The Wolf, a V.I.L.E. Faculty member, but witnessed his death by Tamara Fraser who then became Chief of A.C.M.E. He joins Carmen's search to find her mother, who went into hiding just before Wolfe's death. While he's not stated it, Shadowsan sees Carmen's team as family. In the 1994 animated series, Suhara was the name of a great Japanese detective who mentored Carmen when she was an A.C.M.E. agent.
A.C.M.E.
A.C.M.E. (short for Agency to Classify & Monitor Evildoers) is the secret law enforcement agency that often combats V.I.L.E. and the anti-heroes of the series. In this iteration, they seek out finding proof leading to the dissolution of the criminal organization through the means of finding and capturing Carmen and her crew for intel on them.
The Chief / Tamara Fraser (voiced by Dawnn Lewis) – Head of A.C.M.E. and supervises all of the organization; she is inspired by the Chief from the PBS game shows, played by Lynne Thigpen. She has only appeared via hologram in most of the series but believes Carmen may be a lead to helping A.C.M.E. prove the existence and downfall of V.I.L.E. By the end of season 2, it is revealed that her name is Tamara Fraser and that she was the one who killed Carmen's father, Dexter Wolfe, the night she was taken in by Shadowsan; it's possible that due to her error in judgment that caused Wolfe's death, The Chief does not tolerate incompetence and issues agents with capture only gear, despite her own assumptions about and eventually mistaken obsession with Carmen. The Chief has also been obsessed in her pursuit of finding evidence on V.I.L.E.'s existence ever since killing Wolfe, for as yet unknown motivations.
Chase Devineaux (voiced by Rafael Petardi) – A French Interpol inspector turned A.C.M.E. recruit; he is inspired by the A.C.M.E. agent of the same name from Carmen Sandiego Word Detective. He, along with Julia, is one of the only two agents to get close enough to see Carmen's face. He is inept, arrogant, pompous, and constantly overestimating his own abilities. By the end of the first season, Chase is put into mental strain caused by a device Brunt and Shadowsan used to force him to answer their questions. In season 2, after waking up from his coma, he provides a lead but is dismissed and returned to Interpol with a desk job, only to be fired for going off the grid in pursuit of Carmen and finds the Isle of V.I.L.E. only after it was destroyed. By the season 2 finale, A.C.M.E. rehires him after Carmen steals from their databanks. At the end of Season 3, Chase realized Julia was right about Carmen; he decides to help her stop V.I.L.E. subtly.
Julia Argent (voiced by Charlet Chung) – An Interpol agent turned A.C.M.E. recruit, Chase's partner and opposite: she usually does the logistics and fact-finding that Chase would otherwise overlook or disregard; is more highly intelligent, competent and perceptive; and is the most open to believing Carmen is instead stealing from other thieves (which is even given the option of exploitation in the interactive special To Steal or Not to Steal). She is inspired by the A.C.M.E. detective of the same name from Where in the World Is Carmen Sandiego? Treasures of Knowledge. In season 2, Julia actively tries to recruit Carmen as an A.C.M.E. agent despite being undermined by the Chief's focus to outright arrest Carmen to gain intel on V.I.L.E. She, along with Chase Devineaux, is one of the only two officers to get close enough to see Carmen's face. She is also the only A.C.M.E. agent to visibly keep her job for the whole of both seasons until season 3, when she quit due to the Chief's mistaken assumptions with Carmen.
Zari (voiced by Sharon Muthu; main – season 2) – A longtime pursuant of Carmen Sandiego's, who becomes Argent's partner in season 2. While focused and efficient, her loyalty is shown to lie with the Chief and not her partner, as seen in Stockholm when her team swarmed Carmen in talks with Argent to secure loyalty after Zari realized she was following a decoy (Ivy). She is later partnered with Devineaux in season 3.
V.I.L.E.
V.I.L.E. (short for Villains' International League of Evil (undercover as Valuable Imports, Lavish Exports) is a shadowy international criminal organization of thieves and the main antagonists of the series. They make their headquarters on one of the Canary Islands and use the academy there to train their new recruits for a one-year semester. As of the end of Season 2, V.I.L.E. Island was destroyed after the V.I.L.E. Faculty believed that A.C.M.E. had found their location. V.I.L.E. was then relocated to a castle in Scotland in Season 3.
The Faculty
A council of five masterminds who are the leaders of V.I.L.E., the instructors of V.I.L.E. Academy, and the primary antagonists of the series who Carmen considered the only family she knew before betraying them. They each have equal authority, and reach decisions by a majority vote; thus they try to ensure an odd number is always present.
Professor Gunnar Maelstrom (voiced by Liam O'Brien) – A Swedish-Norwegian psychiatrist and teacher of psychological manipulation. Sinister and quite psychotic, often the classic Machiavellian type villain and coming off as creepy to the V.I.L.E. graduates and faculty. He also likes classical music, as shown in the Season 4 episode, "The Himalayan Rescue Caper", when he enthusiastically waves around like a conductor to a piece of classical music. Unlike his 1994 series counterpart, he is part of V.I.L.E. itself, often acting as the leader, mediator, and head spokesperson for the faculty as a group.
Coach Brunt (voiced by Mary Elizabeth McGlynn) – A Texan coach and teacher of combat and physical training. She was Carmen's favorite teacher, and the two had soft spots for each other. Carmen always thought that Coach Brunt was the one who found her, so the two shared a good relationship. Brunt, like the other faculty members, was quite upset over Carmen's betrayal. However, it seems that Carmen still has a soft spot for Coach Brunt, despite her true motivations. This was thought when Carmen gets altitude sickness and mistakes Dr. Pilar as Coach Brunt, saying that she always knew it was Coach Brunt who found her as a baby (however, that honor is revealed to go to Shadowsan). She sports green hair, a possible nod to Eartha Brute from the World game show.
Countess Cleo (voiced by Toks Olagundoye) – An Egyptian wealthy debutant and teacher of culture, class, and forgery, possibly a reference to the Contessa, a recurring villain from the World gameshow. She seems to not really care that much about Carmen, and always tries to use her etiquette lessons to get rid of Carmen's rebellious streak. Her crimes deal with obtaining fine art and fashion which she keeps for short periods before selling them off.
Dr. Saira Bellum (voiced by Sharon Muthu) – An Indian mad scientist and V.I.L.E.'s master inventor; teacher of technology and science and much like her 1994 animated series counterpart, is the main technical expert, responsible for creating all of the many gadgets and tools V.I.L.E. uses in their heists and schemes. She is shown to be slightly more reasonable than the other faculty, though still willing to destroy the food supply of Indonesia just to shill in a market for an artificial commercial brand; she also has trouble understanding metaphors. She tends to multitask even during council meetings, focusing on numerous screens of information, much to Maelstrom's annoyance. It is shown on multiple occasions that she is a cat lover.
Roundabout / Nigel Braithwaite (voiced by Trevor Devall) – A senior V.I.L.E. operative and British MI6 double-agent who takes the place of Shadowsan at the end of season 2. He utilizes his influence in British Intelligence to give V.I.L.E. a leg up on any law enforcement that may zero in on their operations, as well as divert attention away with proper diversionary substance. Like his namesake, he speaks in the manner of one who received a prodigious education but also uses that vernacular to imply something without saying so and leading people into how he wants them. By the end of Season 3, he is revealed to be a talented fencer and was exposed to the rest of the world as a criminal for stealing the Crown Jewels thanks to Player by uploading a video of him stealing them. He was arrested, but the Cleaners rescued him. However, by season 4, he is given a second chance along with Neal, but failed in "The Beijing Bullion Caper" and was thrown in the dungeon for the rest of the season while Neal escaped and by the end of season 4, he was arrested along with rest of the Faculty.
Operatives
Tigress / Sheena (voiced by Kari Wahlgren) – A spy with a literal catsuit and mask to match her namesake, who is particularly antagonistic toward Carmen, even while at the Academy. She is based on the character of the same name from the original 1994 animated series; though, unlike the original, who was nothing more than a disguise donned by Ivy, Tigress is a separate person in the 2019 continuum. She is the longest-running combatant against Carmen, who felt like she needed to prove she was better than Tigress at pick-pocketing due to Tigress acing a test set by Shadowsan that Carmen failed (however, this is only because Shadowsan cheated so Carmen could fail). Tigress also dislikes Paper Star. In the interactive special, it is shown that in spite of her dislike of Carmen, Tigress is still capable of returning the favor if Carmen helps her out, showing that she has a sense of honor.
El Topo / Antonio (voiced by Andrew Pifko) and Le Chevre / Jean Paul (voiced by Bernardo de Paula) – A pair of V.I.L.E. operatives who used to be in Carmen's group of friends before she left. El Topo is a wisecracking Spanish spy with streamlined powerful digging gauntlets, while Le Chevre is a no-nonsense French spy with incredible parkour skills. In the interactive special, if Carmen works with El Topo, he holds no hostility towards her, stating his belief they are just pawns in the game of life; Le Chevre, on the other hand, will taunt her. With the destruction of V.I.L.E. at the end of season 4, they open a food truck together.
Paper Star (voiced by Kimiko Glenn) – A psychopathic master of origami weapons, she is Maelstrom's favorite pupil. While on the contrary, Shadowsan rightfully believes Paper Star to be too psychotic to carry out orders, as Paper Star refused to hand over the stolen goods to Le Chevre per V.I.L.E. protocol. Paper Star has little combat experience outside of her origami techniques; whenever they have been negated, Carmen has gained the upper hand.
Mime Bomb – A silent mute, spy and snitch; dresses as a mime artist for public camouflage. He is usually used by the faculty to spy on the students, which is also how the faculty found out that Carmen had stowed away. However, they sometimes wonder if it was a good idea to hire a mime as a spy since they can't really understand what he's trying to say though he does communicate through charades or sign language.
The Cleaners / Vlad and Boris (voiced by Liam O'Brien) – Two men who not just have janitorial duties as the cleaning crew at V.I.L.E. but they are also the men-in-black who are deployed to extricate V.I.L.E. members who have failed their missions by being apprehended and "Scrub" any evidence of V.I.L.E.'s existence. The duo rarely speaks but are diligent in their jobs. They work quickly, quietly, and without complaint. As Shadowsan notes, they are without fear. Vlad is shorter than Boris and has brown hair and eyebrows with a sharper chin than him. He possesses a more tired expression as well. His hair is revealed to be balding. Boris's chin is more square and blunt than Vlad's and is taller than him. His hair and eyebrows are black and tilted. They both have somewhat wrinkly faces with their hair cut short. Their attire changes depending on their part in missions but they mainly wear pale green-grey shirts and pants with a black belt. During a costume party in the episode "The Haunted Bayou Caper", Boris dresses as Frankenstein, and Vlad as Count Dracula. They are based on Rick and Nick ICK, commonly known as The ICK Brothers, a pair of V.I.L.E. henchmen who had similar jobs, seen in the 1996 edition of Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?, who were assigned to "clean up" the evidence of V.I.L.E.'s whereabouts. However, the brothers' incompetence always ends up creating more messes for V.I.L.E.'s members as ACME's detectives continue to pursue them.
Cookie Booker (voiced by Rita Moreno) – V.I.L.E.'s bookkeeper and financier; she believes in white collar crime above other forms. Rita Moreno was the voice of Carmen Sandiego in the 1994 animated series, a connection subtly referenced when Carmen steals her trademark outfit from Booker as a kind of "passing of the torch."
Dash Haber (voiced by Troy Baker) – Countess Cleo's executive courier and personal assistant. Dash Haber's main weapon is his hat, which is embellished with razor-sharp blades and can be thrown and retrieved through magnets in his gloves. His name is a pun of the word haberdasher.
Lady Dokuso (voiced by Sumalee Montano) – a veteran V.I.L.E. operative who is a prominent poison expert stationed in Tokyo, where she runs a nightclub frequented by Yakuza and noted to be a woman of great skill. She has excellent reflexes, having been able to effectively repel an attack from Paper Star using only an umbrella. She also displayed skillful acrobatics during fights with Shadowsan.
Neal the Eel (voiced by Rhys Darby) – A New Zealand thief that wears a wet suit allowing him to slip through vents, tight spaces, and anyone that attempts to grab him. He mostly works for Dr. Bellum and rarely teams up with another agent. His offensive weapons are a pair of tasers.
Spin Kick (voiced by Dante Basco) – A member of V.I.L.E. Academy's newest graduated class that specializes in kickboxing and partnered with Fly Trap. Carmen simply avoids him as they are too evenly matched.
Fly Trap (voiced by Sarah-Nicole Robles) – A member of V.I.L.E. Academy's newest graduated class that wields a pair of bolas and partnered with Spin Kick. Carmen outwits her by using the bolas in ricochet attacks to catch Fly Trap off guard.
The Troll (voiced by Osric Chau) – A Korean skilled computer tech and internet hacker who is like an evil counterpart to Player. Though it is unknown if The Troll is also a white-hat hacker, he has demonstrated as high proficiency in encryption breaking, hacking and data collection as Player. The Troll hates it when people call him simply "Troll", though he admits that it's not always best to pronounce it that way.
Former
Graham Calloway (voiced by Michael Goldsmith) – Also known as Gray or Crackle, Graham is an Australian electrician, an Ex-V.I.L.E. operative and Carmen's former best friend at V.I.L.E. Academy. However, after a failed mission, Graham had his memories erased by Bellum. He returned to Australia where he met up with Carmen once again (only this time, he didn't remember her) and asked her out on a date. However she left before she even got there, because she thought that Gray had a chance to start over, and that Carmen Sandiego would ruin that chance. In "The Crackle Goes Kiwi Caper", Carmen recruits him to help her infiltrate Dr. Bellum's New Zealand lab, but upon his realizing Carmen's true mission, he helps destroy Bellum's experiment; they then finally have that date and talk more. By the end of season 3, it's revealed that Graham has been spied on by A.C.M.E. since then, acknowledging that he is the last and only link they have to Carmen, and it is hinted they intend to bring him in.
Dexter Wolfe / The Wolf – Carmen's late father and Shadowsan's predecessor as both a member of the V.I.L.E. Faculty and Stealth 101 Professor at V.I.L.E. Academy, he was a master thief who was often allowed to leave V.I.L.E. Island due to his expertise, though he preferred stealing for the thrill rather than for selfish gain. However, when Carmen was born, the rest of the faculty realized that he was planning to leave the organization and sent Shadowsan to assassinate him. By this point, he was attempting to make his escape with Baby Carmen to be reunited with his wife "Vera Cruz" but was accidentally killed instead by the current Chief of A.C.M.E. after hiding Carmen in the closet, leaving her to be taken to V.I.L.E. Island by Shadowsan.
Episodes
Series Overview
Season 1 (2019)
Season 2 (2019)
Special (2020)
Season 3 (2020)
Season 4 (2021)
Production
On April 14, 2017, Hollywood insider information site The Tracking Board reported that they had exclusively learned of an animated Carmen Sandiego project at Netflix, with Gina Rodriguez as the voice of the titular character. The site reported that the 20-episode series would aim to be "as educational as it is entertaining", in keeping with the style of the franchise. It was later confirmed that the series would be called Carmen Sandiego. Rodriguez confirmed the story via her Twitter feed the following day in response to a Hypable story, which compared the news to that of a Kate McKinnon-led revival of The Magic School Bus. Carmen Sandiego was set to appeal to a wider audience (ages 6–11), plus the parents of those kids and fans of the original series. On April 18 and 19, the news began to be published by reputable news sites, where it was confirmed that Netflix had rebooted the franchise on TV by ordering twenty 22-minute episodes of Carmen Sandiego, which would premiere in 2019 and with Gina Rodriguez in the starring role. Rotoscopers noted that this was "more than most Netflix Originals receive". The Hollywood Reporter noted that Rita Moreno, who voiced Carmen in the FOX animated series Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?, had recently guest-starred on Rodriguez's show Jane the Virgin. The new series was described as having "thrilling adventure and intrigue", while offering an "intimate look into Carmen's past" and what inspired her career choices, essentially answering the question "Who in the world is Carmen Sandiego?" while simultaneously following her on her thieving escapades.
Caroline Fraser, Head of HMH Productions, is the Executive Producer of the series. Duane Capizzi, known for Transformers: Prime and The Batman, is the showrunner and Co-Executive Producer. Kevin Dart serves as visual designer. It is a production by DHX Media, providing production work, and Chromosphere, providing the design work. Animation services are outsourced to Top Draw Animation in the Philippines. DHX Media is the current owner of the library of DIC Entertainment, the animation studio which produced the Earth animated series. The series is produced by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, who own the rights to the franchise after their corporate predecessor Riverdeep acquired the property in 2002. The Hollywood Reporter wrote that the series followed in the wake of Bill Nye Saves the World and Julie's Greenroom. Finn Wolfhard signed on to lend his voice to the character Player, who is described as Carmen's chief accomplice and friend. Another character called "Player" was featured in Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?, but this character was a fourth wall-breaking live action boy who bookended the show and interacted with Carmen, implied to be the player of a video game featuring her. E! Online reported that the new series would be called, simply, "Carmen Sandiego".
Rodriguez, who had first learned about the series through the PBS game show Where in the World Is Carmen Sandiego?, asserted that the new Carmen Sandiego origin series was "tight", "well written", "really, really good", and "unbelievable". She mentioned that Netflix was a home for great programming and that the show had partnered with talented illustrators. She added that despite being entertaining, the show would still provide geographic and historical education. In another interview, she said that she loved the art and story of the animated series, and praised the show's executive producer, Duane Capizzi, for making the world that Carmen inhabits in the show itself.
Andy Yeatman, Netflix director of global kids content, explained “We think there's a huge benefit of having a program that parents remember fondly and grew up with. We are giving them the opportunity to introduce it to their kids and spark a conversation", explaining that while the service pitched reboots of many '80s and '90s shows, Carmen Sandiego was one that "made sense" and "really stood out". They responded to the fact that this is not a show that is perennially rebooted, as the last Carmen Sandiego series ended 20 years before this new series would premiere, and that there are interesting ways to retell the story. In addition to Yeatman's comments, Amy Dunkin, Houghton Mifflin's the chief marketing officer, noted that many had "fond memories" of Carmen Sandiego, and added that there are many ways "you can go with Carmen just based on what she stands for."
In March 2018, Netflix also ordered a live-action film of Carmen Sandiego, once again with Rodriguez as the titular character.
On February 15, 2019, it was announced that Netflix had renewed the series for a second season.
On April 24, 2020, Netflix announced it had renewed the series for a third season.
On October 2, 2020, Netflix announced it had renewed the series for a fourth season, which was later announced to be the final season.
Reception
Pre-release
The announcement saw a positive response by the media, who appreciated the throwback, and a return for the Carmen Sandiego franchise to the small screen. TVShowsOnDVD wrote "It's awesome to see this franchise return to television". The Rolling Stone thought the TV series' origin story subject matter offers what was once one of "golden age of television's favorite thematic trappings". Commenting "children of the 90's rejoice", Maxim suggested that Netflix enlist the talents of World game show theme song performers Rockapella to provide music for the show. ScreenRant noted that "those who still hold fond memories of the property" would be intrigued as to what type of shape the new series will take; adding that it has a "storied legacy" to live up to and will likely take some inspiration from Earth. Dark Horizons expressed sadness that the show was two years away. Toonzone wondered if the new show would maintain the established backstory of the red fedora-wearing villain, which in mid-to-late ‘90s canon involved Carmen Sandiego beginning as an A.C.M.E. agent before finding the work too easy so wanting to outsmart her former colleagues. Gizmodo thought the new series would "bring the character's trademark blend of edutainment to new audiences". Mashable said "fans demanding the series NOW". Pedestrian thought the trend toward series such as this was a sign that producers were aiming to " trap people in a downwards vortex of nostalgia ". Fortune suggested that the new show offered Netflix "huge merchandizing potential", and that the company could follow in the footsteps of Disney by creating a merchandising arm to support its shows. Rom-Game saw this as a sign that Netflix was "indirectly interested in gaming heritage". MiscRave mentioned how much potential the franchise with its interactive edutainment in a compelling package it previously had. NerdHQ noted that the new series offered an opportunity to resuscitate the "once-dormant" and "dying" franchise. Apart from these media reviews, various Latina women across the United States were excited and energized by the show's release.
Post-release
The show currently holds a 93% approval rating on Rotten Tomatoes, based on 14 reviews, with the site's consensus reading, "Vivid animation and creative reconstruction of the Carmen Sandiego backstory elevates this property beyond its edutainment roots." Other reviewers are more critical. Renaldo Matadeen of CBR, for instance, critically reviewed the series. He argued that the second season ended on a "very intense note," while noting the family history themes in the show, and stated that the final episode of the third season remixes all the movies of the Ocean's franchise. In a review of all the episodes of the third season, he wrote that there is a "lot packed in" the third season, predicting the revenge of the villainous Roundabout, saving Gray, a face-off between The Chief and Carmen, and the continued search for Carmen's mom in the show's next season.
At the same time, Martha Sorren of Bust also predicted that the fourth season could explore the relationship between Carmen and her mother. Apart from these reviewers, Megan Summers of ScreenRant highlighted Wolfhard's role as Player, calling it one of his best roles, and Prabhdeep Dhaliwal in The Peak stated that while the show is "geared towards a younger demographic," adults can still be entertained by it. He also stated that the show has sympathetic characters and an "overarching theme of good winning over evil." Katherine Smith of Paste took a different tack. While stating that Carmen Sandiego has returned to relevance with the Netflix series, she also highlights how animated projects "hustle their employees out of sight," contrasting the gains in visible representation with "very plausible worker exploitation." She cites an example of Filipino company, Top Draw (working on the animation), which fired a whistleblower who demanded proper compensation. She concludes by saying that in the current series, Carmen Sandiego is a female thief who "steals only from thieves now," and worries about where her character has gone, compared to the original story.
Awards and nominations
References
External links
2010s American animated television series
2020s American animated television series
2010s Canadian animated television series
2020s Canadian animated television series
2019 American television series debuts
2021 American television series endings
2019 Canadian television series debuts
2021 Canadian television series endings
2019 animated television series debuts
American children's animated action television series
American children's animated adventure television series
American children's animated education television series
American children's animated mystery television series
American flash animated television series
Animated detective television series
Animated series based on video games
Animated television series reboots
Annie Award winners
Canadian children's animated action television series
Canadian children's animated adventure television series
Canadian children's animated education television series
Canadian children's animated mystery television series
Canadian flash animated television series
Carmen Sandiego TV shows
English-language television shows
English-language Netflix original programming
Television series by DHX Media
Animated television series by Netflix |
54027815 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry%20ransomware%20attack | WannaCry ransomware attack | The WannaCry ransomware attack was a worldwide cyberattack in May 2017 by the WannaCry ransomware cryptoworm, which targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system by encrypting data and demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. It propagated through EternalBlue, an exploit developed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for older Windows systems. EternalBlue was stolen and leaked by a group called The Shadow Brokers at least a year prior to the attack. While Microsoft had released patches previously to close the exploit, much of WannaCry's spread was from organizations that had not applied these, or were using older Windows systems that were past their end-of-life. These patches were imperative to organizations' cyber security but many were not implemented due to ignorance of their importance. Some have claimed a need for 24/7 operation, aversion to risking having formerly working applications breaking because of patch changes, lack of personnel or time to install them, or other reasons.
The attack began at 07:44 UTC on 12 May 2017 and was halted a few hours later at 15:03 UTC by the registration of a kill switch discovered by Marcus Hutchins. The kill switch prevented already infected computers from being encrypted or further spreading WannaCry. The attack was estimated to have affected more than 200,000 computers across 150 countries, with total damages ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. Security experts believed from preliminary evaluation of the worm that the attack originated from North Korea or agencies working for the country.
In December 2017, the United States and United Kingdom formally asserted that North Korea was behind the attack.
A new variant of WannaCry forced Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to temporarily shut down several of its chip-fabrication factories in August 2018. The virus spread to 10,000 machines in TSMC's most advanced facilities.
Description
WannaCry is a ransomware cryptoworm, which targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system by encrypting (locking) data and demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. The worm is also known as WannaCrypt, Wana Decrypt0r 2.0, WanaCrypt0r 2.0, and Wanna Decryptor. It is considered a network worm because it also includes a transport mechanism to automatically spread itself. This transport code scans for vulnerable systems, then uses the EternalBlue exploit to gain access, and the DoublePulsar tool to install and execute a copy of itself. WannaCry versions 0, 1, and 2 were created using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0.
EternalBlue is an exploit of Microsoft's implementation of their Server Message Block (SMB) protocol released by The Shadow Brokers. Much of the attention and comment around the event was occasioned by the fact that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) (from whom the exploit was likely stolen) had already discovered the vulnerability, but used it to create an exploit for its own offensive work, rather than report it to Microsoft. Microsoft eventually discovered the vulnerability, and on Tuesday, 14 March 2017, they issued security bulletin MS17-010, which detailed the flaw and announced that patches had been released for all Windows versions that were currently supported at that time, these being Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, and Windows Server 2016.
DoublePulsar is a backdoor tool, also released by The Shadow Brokers on 14 April 2017. Starting from 21 April 2017, security researchers reported that there were tens of thousands of computers with the DoublePulsar backdoor installed. By 25 April, reports estimated that the number of infected computers could be up to several hundred thousand, with numbers increasing every day. The WannaCry code can take advantage of any existing DoublePulsar infection, or installs it itself. On 9 May 2017, private cybersecurity company RiskSense released code on GitHub with the stated purpose of allowing legal white hat penetration testers to test the CVE-2017-0144 exploit on unpatched systems.
When executed, the WannaCry malware first checks the kill switch domain name; if it is not found, then the ransomware encrypts the computer's data, then attempts to exploit the SMB vulnerability to spread out to random computers on the Internet, and laterally to computers on the same network. As with other modern ransomware, the payload displays a message informing the user that their files have been encrypted, and demands a payment of around US$300 in bitcoin within three days, or US$600 within seven days, warning that "you have not so enough time." Three hardcoded bitcoin addresses, or wallets, are used to receive the payments of victims. As with all such wallets, their transactions and balances are publicly accessible even though the cryptocurrency wallet owners remain unknown.
Several organizations released detailed technical write-ups of the malware, including a senior security analyst at RiskSense, Microsoft, Cisco, Malwarebytes, Symantec and McAfee.
Attack
The attack began on Friday, 12 May 2017, with evidence pointing to an initial infection in Asia at 07:44 UTC. The initial infection was likely through an exposed vulnerable SMB port, rather than email phishing as initially assumed. Within a day the code was reported to have infected more than 230,000 computers in over 150 countries.
Organizations that had not installed Microsoft's security update from March were affected by the attack. Those still running unsupported versions of Microsoft Windows, such as Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 were at particularly high risk because no security patches had been released since April 2014 for Windows XP (with the exception of one emergency patch released in May 2014) and July 2015 for Windows Server 2003. A Kaspersky Lab study reported, however, that less than 0.1 percent of the affected computers were running Windows XP, and that 98 percent of the affected computers were running Windows 7. In a controlled testing environment, the cybersecurity firm Kryptos Logic found that it was unable to infect a Windows XP system with WannaCry using just the exploits, as the payload failed to load, or caused the operating system to crash rather than actually execute and encrypt files. However, when executed manually, WannaCry could still operate on Windows XP.
Defensive response
Experts quickly advised affected users against paying the ransom due to no reports of people getting their data back after payment and as high revenues would encourage more of such campaigns. As of 14 June 2017, after the attack had subsided, a total of 327 payments totaling US$130,634.77 (51.62396539 XBT) had been transferred.
The day after the initial attack in May, Microsoft released out-of-band security updates for end of life products Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and Windows 8; these patches had been created in February of that year following a tip off about the vulnerability in January of that year. Organizations were advised to patch Windows and plug the vulnerability in order to protect themselves from the cyber attack. The head of Microsoft's Cyber Defense Operations Center, Adrienne Hall, said that "Due to the elevated risk for destructive cyber-attacks at this time, we made the decision to take this action because applying these updates provides further protection against potential attacks with characteristics similar to WannaCrypt [alternative name to WannaCry]".
Researcher Marcus Hutchins discovered the kill switch domain hardcoded in the malware. Registering a domain name for a DNS sinkhole stopped the attack spreading as a worm, because the ransomware only encrypted the computer's files if it was unable to connect to that domain, which all computers infected with WannaCry before the website's registration had been unable to do. While this did not help already infected systems, it severely slowed the spread of the initial infection and gave time for defensive measures to be deployed worldwide, particularly in North America and Asia, which had not been attacked to the same extent as elsewhere. On 14 May, a first variant of WannaCry appeared with a new and second kill-switch registered by Matt Suiche on the same day. This was followed by a second variant with the third and last kill-switch on 15 May, which was registered by Check Point threat intelligence analysts. A few days later, a new version of WannaCry was detected that lacked the kill switch altogether.
On 19 May, it was reported that hackers were trying to use a Mirai botnet variant to effect a distributed denial-of-service attack on WannaCry's kill-switch domain with the intention of knocking it offline. On 22 May, Hutchins protected the domain by switching to a cached version of the site, capable of dealing with much higher traffic loads than the live site.
Separately, researchers from University College London and Boston University reported that their PayBreak system could defeat WannaCry and several other families of ransomware by recovering the keys used to encrypt the user's data.
It was discovered that Windows encryption APIs used by WannaCry may not completely clear the prime numbers used to generate the payload's private keys from the memory, making it potentially possible to retrieve the required key if they had not yet been overwritten or cleared from resident memory. The key is kept in the memory if the WannaCry process has not been killed and the computer has not been rebooted after being infected. This behaviour was used by a French researcher to develop a tool known as WannaKey, which automates this process on Windows XP systems. This approach was iterated upon by a second tool known as Wanakiwi, which was tested to work on Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 as well.
Within four days of the initial outbreak, new infections had slowed to a trickle due to these responses.
Attribution
Linguistic analysis of the ransom notes indicated the authors were likely fluent in Chinese and proficient in English, as the versions of the notes in those languages were probably human-written while the rest seemed to be machine-translated. According to an analysis by the FBI's Cyber Behavioral Analysis Center, the computer that created the ransomware language files had Hangul language fonts installed, as evidenced by the presence of the "\fcharset129" Rich Text Format tag. Metadata in the language files also indicated that the computers that created the ransomware were set to UTC+09:00, used in Korea.
A security researcher initially posted a tweet referencing code similarities between WannaCry and previous malware. The cybersecurity companies Kaspersky Lab and Symantec have both said the code has some similarities with that previously used by the Lazarus Group (believed to have carried out the cyberattack on Sony Pictures in 2014 and a Bangladesh bank heist in 2016—and linked to North Korea). This could also be either simple re-use of code by another group or an attempt to shift blame—as in a cyber false flag operation; but a leaked internal NSA memo is alleged to have also linked the creation of the worm to North Korea. Brad Smith, the president of Microsoft, said he believed North Korea was the originator of the WannaCry attack, and the UK's National Cyber Security Centre reached the same conclusion.
On 18 December 2017, the United States Government formally announced that it publicly considers North Korea to be the main culprit behind the WannaCry attack. Then-President Trump's Homeland Security Advisor, Tom Bossert, wrote an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal about this charge, saying "We do not make this allegation lightly. It is based on evidence." In a press conference the following day, Bossert said that the evidence indicates that Kim Jong-un had given the order to launch the malware attack. Bossert said that Canada, New Zealand and Japan agree with the United States' assessment of the evidence that links the attack to North Korea, while the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office says it also stands behind the United States' assertion.
North Korea, however, denied being responsible for the cyberattack.
On 6 September 2018, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) announced formal charges against Park Jin-hyok for involvement in the Sony Pictures hack of 2014. The DoJ contended that Park was a North Korean hacker working as part of a team of experts for the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau. The Department of Justice asserted this team also had been involved in the WannaCry attack, among other activities.
Impact
The ransomware campaign was unprecedented in scale according to Europol, which estimates that around 200,000 computers were infected across 150 countries. According to Kaspersky Lab, the four most affected countries were Russia, Ukraine, India and Taiwan.
One of the largest agencies struck by the attack was the National Health Service hospitals in England and Scotland, and up to 70,000 devices – including computers, MRI scanners, blood-storage refrigerators and theatre equipment – may have been affected. On 12 May, some NHS services had to turn away non-critical emergencies, and some ambulances were diverted. In 2016, thousands of computers in 42 separate NHS trusts in England were reported to be still running Windows XP. In 2018 a report by Members of Parliament concluded that all 200 NHS hospitals or other organizations checked in the wake of the WannaCry attack still failed cybersecurity checks. NHS hospitals in Wales and Northern Ireland were unaffected by the attack.
Nissan Motor Manufacturing UK in Tyne and Wear, England, halted production after the ransomware infected some of their systems. Renault also stopped production at several sites in an attempt to stop the spread of the ransomware. Spain's Telefónica, FedEx and Deutsche Bahn were hit, along with many other countries and companies worldwide.
The attack's impact is said to be relatively low compared to other potential attacks of the same type and could have been much worse had Hutchins not discovered that a kill switch had been built in by its creators or if it had been specifically targeted on highly critical infrastructure, like nuclear power plants, dams or railway systems.
According to cyber-risk-modeling firm Cyence, economic losses from the cyber attack could reach up to US$4 billion, with other groups estimating the losses to be in the hundreds of millions.
Affected organizations
The following is an alphabetical list of organisations confirmed to have been affected:
Reactions
A number of experts highlighted the NSA's non-disclosure of the underlying vulnerability, and their loss of control over the EternalBlue attack tool that exploited it. Edward Snowden said that if the NSA had "privately disclosed the flaw used to attack hospitals when they found it, not when they lost it, the attack may not have happened". British cybersecurity expert Graham Cluley also sees "some culpability on the part of the U.S. intelligence services". According to him and others "they could have done something ages ago to get this problem fixed, and they didn't do it". He also said that despite obvious uses for such tools to spy on people of interest, they have a duty to protect their countries' citizens. Others have also commented that this attack shows that the practice of intelligence agencies to stockpile exploits for offensive purposes rather than disclosing them for defensive purposes may be problematic. Microsoft president and chief legal officer Brad Smith wrote, "Repeatedly, exploits in the hands of governments have leaked into the public domain and caused widespread damage. An equivalent scenario with conventional weapons would be the U.S. military having some of its Tomahawk missiles stolen." Russian President Vladimir Putin placed the responsibility of the attack on U.S. intelligence services, for having created EternalBlue.
On 17 May 2017, United States bipartisan lawmakers introduced the PATCH Act that aims to have exploits reviewed by an independent board to "balance the need to disclose vulnerabilities with other national security interests while increasing transparency and accountability to maintain public trust in the process".
On 15 June 2017, the United States Congress was to hold a hearing on the attack. Two subpanels of the House Science Committee were to hear the testimonies from various individuals working in the government and non-governmental sector about how the US can improve its protection mechanisms for its systems against similar attacks in the future.
Marcus Hutchins, a cybersecurity researcher, working in loose collaboration with UK's National Cyber Security Centre, researched the malware and discovered a "kill switch". Later globally dispersed security researchers collaborated online to develop open source tools that allow for decryption without payment under some circumstances. Snowden states that when "NSA-enabled ransomware eats the Internet, help comes from researchers, not spy agencies" and asks why this is the case.
Adam Segal, director of the digital and cyberspace policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations, stated that "the patching and updating systems are broken, basically, in the private sector and in government agencies". In addition, Segal said that governments' apparent inability to secure vulnerabilities "opens a lot of questions about backdoors and access to encryption that the government argues it needs from the private sector for security". Arne Schönbohm, president of Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), stated that "the current attacks show how vulnerable our digital society is. It's a wake-up call for companies to finally take IT security [seriously]".
United Kingdom
The effects of the attack also had political implications; in the United Kingdom, the impact on the National Health Service quickly became political, with claims that the effects were exacerbated by Government underfunding of the NHS; in particular, the NHS ceased its paid Custom Support arrangement to continue receiving support for unsupported Microsoft software used within the organization, including Windows XP. Home Secretary Amber Rudd refused to say whether patient data had been backed up, and Shadow Health Secretary Jon Ashworth accused Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt of refusing to act on a critical note from Microsoft, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the National Crime Agency that had been received two months previously.
Others argued that hardware and software vendors often fail to account for future security flaws, selling systems that − due to their technical design and market incentives − eventually won't be able to properly receive and apply patches.
The NHS denied that it was still using XP, claiming only 4.7% of devices within the organization ran Windows XP. The cost of the attack to the NHS was estimated as £92 million in disruption to services and IT upgrades.
After the attack, NHS Digital refused to finance the estimated £1 billion to meet the Cyber Essentials Plus standard, an information security certification organized by the UK NCSC, saying this would not constitute "value for money", and that it had invested over £60 million and planned "to spend a further £150 [million] over the next two years" to address key cyber security weaknesses.
See also
References
External links
Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt at Microsoft Malware Protection Center
, a Twitterbot tracking the ransom payments
2017 in computing
Cyberattacks
Cybercrime
Hacking in the 2010s
May 2017 crimes
Ransomware
Computer security exploits
Windows malware
2010s internet outages |
54058395 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud%20access%20security%20broker | Cloud access security broker | A cloud access security broker (CASB) (sometimes pronounced cas-bee) is on-premises or cloud based software that sits between cloud service users and cloud applications, and monitors all activity and enforces security policies. A CASB can offer services such as monitoring user activity, warning administrators about potentially hazardous actions, enforcing security policy compliance, and automatically preventing malware.
Definition
First defined in 2012 by Gartner, a cloud access security broker (CASB) is defined as: [An] on-premises, or cloud-based security policy enforcement points, placed between cloud service consumers and cloud service providers to combine and interject enterprise security policies as the cloud-based resources are accessed. CASBs consolidate multiple types of security policy enforcement. Example security policies include authentication, single sign-on, authorization, credential mapping, device profiling, encryption, tokenization, logging, alerting, malware detection/prevention and so on.
Types
CASBs deliver security and management features. Broadly speaking, "security" is the prevention of high-risk events, whilst "management" is the monitoring and mitigation of high-risk events.
CASBs that deliver security must be in the path of data access, between the user and the cloud provider. Architecturally, this might be achieved with proxy agents on each end-point device, or in agentless fashion without configuration on each device. Agentless CASBs allow for rapid deployment and deliver security on both company-managed and unmanaged BYOD devices. Agentless CASB also respect user privacy, inspecting only corporate data. Agent-based CASBs are difficult to deploy and effective only on devices that are managed by the corporation. Agent-based CASBs typically inspect both corporate and personal data.
References
Cloud applications |
54074489 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum%20image%20processing | Quantum image processing | In computer science, quantum image processing (QIP) is primarily used in quantum computing and quantum information processing to create and work with quantum images.
Due to some of the properties inherent to quantum computation, notably entanglement and parallelism, it is anticipated that QIP technologies will offer capabilities and performances that surpass their traditional equivalents, in terms of computing speed, security, and minimum storage requirements.
Background
A. Y. Vlasov's work in 1997 focused on the use of a quantum system to recognize orthogonal images. This was followed by efforts using quantum algorithms to search specific patterns in binary images and detect the posture of certain targets. Notably, more optics-based interpretation for quantum imaging were initially experimentally demonstrated in and formalized in after seven years.
In 2003, Salvador Venegas-Andraca and S. Bose presented Qubit Lattice, the first published general model for storing, processing and retrieving images using quantum systems. Later on, in 2005, Latorre proposed another kind of representation, called the Real Ket, whose purpose was to encode quantum images as a basis for further applications in QIMP. Furthermore, in 2010 Venegas-Andraca and Ball presented a method for storing and retrieving binary geometrical shapes in quantum mechanical systems in which it is shown that maximally entangled qubits can be used to reconstruct images without using any additional information.
Technically, these pioneering efforts with the subsequent studies related to them can be classified into three main groups:
Quantum-assisted digital image processing (QDIP): These applications aim at improving digital or classical image processing tasks and applications.
Optics-based quantum imaging (OQI)
Classically-inspired quantum image processing (QIP)
A survey of quantum image representation has been published in. Furthermore, the recently published book Quantum Image Processing provides a comprehensive introduction to quantum image processing, which focuses on extending conventional image processing tasks to the quantum computing frameworks. It summarizes the available quantum image representations and their operations, reviews the possible quantum image applications and their implementation, and discusses the open questions and future development trends.
Quantum image manipulations
A lot of the effort in QIP has been focused on designing algorithms to manipulate the position and color information encoded using flexible representation of quantum images (FRQI) and its many variants. For instance, FRQI-based fast geometric transformations including (two-point) swapping, flip, (orthogonal) rotations and restricted geometric transformations to constrain these operations to a specified area of an image were initially proposed. Recently, NEQR-based quantum image translation to map the position of each picture element in an input image into a new position in an output image and quantum image scaling to resize a quantum image were discussed. While FRQI-based general form of color transformations were first proposed by means of the single qubit gates such as X, Z, and H gates. Later, Multi-Channel Quantum Image-based channel of interest (CoI) operator to entail shifting the grayscale value of the preselected color channel and the channel swapping (CS) operator to swap the grayscale values between two channels have been fully discussed.
To illustrate the feasibility and capability of QIMP algorithms and application, researchers always prefer to simulate the digital image processing tasks on the basis of the QIRs that we already have. By using the basic quantum gates and the aforementioned operations, so far, researchers have contributed to quantum image feature extraction, quantum image segmentation, quantum image morphology, quantum image comparison, quantum image filtering, quantum image classification, quantum image stabilization, among others. In particular, QIMP-based security technologies have attracted extensive interest of researchers as presented in the ensuing discussions. Similarly, these advancements have led to many applications in the areas of watermarking, encryption, and steganography etc., which form the core security technologies highlighted in this area.
In general, the work pursued by the researchers in this area are focused on expanding the applicability of QIMP to realize more classical-like digital image processing algorithms; propose technologies to physically realize the QIMP hardware; or simply to note the likely challenges that could impede the realization of some QIMP protocols.
Quantum image transform
By encoding and processing the image information in quantum-mechanical systems, a framework of quantum image processing is presented, where a pure quantum state encodes the image information: to encode the pixel values in the probability amplitudes and the pixel positions in the computational basis states.
Given an image , where represents the pixel value at position with and , a vector with elements can be formed by letting the first elements of be the first column of , the next elements the second column, etc.
A large class of image operations is linear, e.g., unitary transformations, convolutions, and linear filtering. In the quantum computing, the linear transformation can be represented as with the input image state and the output image state . A unitary transformation can be implemented as a unitary evolution.
Some basic and commonly used image transforms (e.g., the Fourier, Hadamard, and Haar wavelet transforms) can be expressed in the form , with the resulting image and a row (column) transform matrix .
The corresponding unitary operator can then be written as . Several commonly used two-dimensional image transforms, such as the Haar wavelet, Fourier, and Hadamard transforms, are experimentally demonstrated on a quantum computer, with exponential speedup over their classical counterparts. In addition, a novel highly efficient quantum algorithm is proposed and experimentally implemented for detecting the boundary between different regions of a picture: It requires only one single-qubit gate in the processing stage, independent of the size of the picture.
See also
Quantum computing
Quantum image
References
Quantum computing
Image processing |
54108248 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotet | Emotet | Emotet is a malware strain and a cybercrime operation believed to be based in Ukraine. The malware, also known as Heodo, was first detected in 2014 and deemed one of the most prevalent threats of the decade. In 2021 the servers used for Emotet were disrupted through global police action in Germany and Ukraine and brought under the control of law enforcement.
First versions of the Emotet malware functioned as a banking trojan aimed at stealing banking credentials from infected hosts. Throughout 2016 and 2017, Emotet operators, sometimes known as Mealybug, updated the trojan and reconfigured it to work primarily as a "loader," a type of malware that gains access to a system, and then allows its operators to download additional payloads. Second-stage payloads can be any type of executable code, from Emotet's own modules to malware developed by other cybercrime gangs.
Initial infection of target systems often proceeds through a macro virus in an email attachment. The infected email is a legitimate-appearing reply to an earlier message that was sent by the victim.
It has been widely documented that the Emotet authors have used the malware to create a botnet of infected computers to which they sell access in an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) model, referred in the cybersecurity community as MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service), Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS), or Crimeware. Emotet is known for renting access to infected computers to ransomware operations, such as the Ryuk gang.
As of September 2019, the Emotet operation ran on top of three separate botnets called Epoch 1, Epoch 2, and Epoch 3.
In July 2020, Emotet campaigns were detected globally, infecting its victims with TrickBot and Qbot, which are used to steal banking credentials and spread inside networks. Some of the malspam campaigns contained malicious documents with names such as "form.doc" or "invoice.doc". According to security researchers, the malicious document launches a PowerShell script to pull the Emotet payload from malicious websites and infected machines.
In November 2020, Emotet used parked domains to distribute payloads.
In January 2021, international action coordinated by Europol and Eurojust allowed investigators to take control of and disrupt the Emotet infrastructure. The reported action was accompanied with arrests made in Ukraine.
On 14 November 2021, new Emotet samples emerged that were very similar to the previous bot code, but with a different encryption scheme that used elliptic curve cryptography for command and control communications. The new Emotet infections were delivered via TrickBot, to computers that were previously infected with TrickBot, and soon began sending malicious spam email messages with macro-laden Microsoft Word and Excel files as payloads.
Noteworthy infections
Allentown, Pennsylvania, city located in Pennsylvania, United States (2018)
Heise Online, publishing house based in Hanover, Germany (2019)
Kammergericht Berlin, the highest court of the state of Berlin, Germany (2019)
Humboldt University of Berlin, university in Berlin, Germany (2019)
Universität Gießen, university in Germany (2019)
Department of Justice of the province of Quebec (2020)
Lithuanian government (2020)
References
Windows trojans
Botnets
Hacking in the 2010s
Hacking in the 2020s |
54117441 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web%20Cryptography%20API | Web Cryptography API | The Web Cryptography API is the World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C) recommendation for a low-level interface that would increase the security of web applications by allowing them to perform cryptographic functions without having to access raw keying material. This agnostic API would perform basic cryptographic operations, such as hashing, signature generation and verification and encryption as well as decryption from within a web application.
Description
On 26 January 2017, the W3C released its recommendation for a Web Cryptography API that could perform basic cryptographic operations in web applications. This agnostic API would utilize JavaScript to perform operations that would increase the security of data exchange within web applications. The API would provide a low-level interface to create and/or manage public keys and private keys for hashing, digital signature generation and verification and encryption and decryption for use with web applications.
The Web Cryptography API could be used for a wide range of uses, including:
Providing authentication for users and services
Electronic signing of documents or code
Protecting the integrity and confidentiality of communication and digital data exchange
Because the Web Cryptography API is agnostic in nature, it can be used on any platform. It would provide a common set of interfaces that would permit web applications and progressive web applications to conduct cryptographic functions without the need to access raw keying material. This would be done with the assistance of the SubtleCrypto interface, which defines a group of methods to perform the above cryptographic operations. Additional interfaces within the Web Cryptography API would allow for key generation, key derivation and key import and export.
Vision for using the Web Cryptography API
The W3C’s specification for the Web Cryptography API places focus on the common functionality and features that currently exist between platform-specific and standardized cryptographic APIs versus those that are known to just a few implementations. The group’s recommendation for the use of the Web Cryptography API does not dictate that a mandatory set of algorithms must be implemented. This is because of the awareness that cryptographic implementations will vary amongst conforming user agents because of government regulations, local policies, security practices and intellectual property concerns.
There are many types of existing web applications that the Web Cryptography API would be well suited for use with.
Multi-factor authentication
Today multi-factor authentication is considered one of the most reliable methods for verifying the identity of a user of a web application, such as online banking. Many web applications currently depend on this authentication method to protect both the user and the user agent. With the Web Cryptography API, a web application would have the ability to provide authentication from within itself instead of having to rely on transport-layer authentication to secret keying material to authenticate user access. This process would provide a richer experience for the user.
The Web Cryptography API would allow the application to locate suitable client keys that were previously created by the user agent or had been pre-provisioned by the web application. The application would be able to give the user agent the ability to either generate a new key or re-use an existing key in the event the user does not have a key already associated with their account. By binding this process to the Transport Layer Security that the user is authenticating through, the multi-factor authentication process can be additionally strengthened by the derivation of a key that is based on the underlying transport.
Protected document exchange
The API can be used to protect sensitive or confidential documents from unauthorized viewing from within a web application, even if they have been previously securely received. The web application would use the Web Cryptography API to encrypt the document with a secret key and then wrap it with public keys that have been associated with users who are authorized to view the document. Upon navigating to the web application, the authorized user would receive the document that had been encrypted and would be instructed to use their private key to begin the unwrapping process that would allow them to decrypt and view the document.
Cloud storage
Many businesses and individuals rely on cloud storage. For protection, remote service provide might want their web application to give users the ability to protect their confidential documents before uploading their documents or other data. The Web Cryptography API would allow users to:
Choose to select a private or secret key
Derive an encryption key from their key if they wish
Encrypt their document/data
Upload their encrypted document/data using the service provider’s existing APIs
Electronic document signing
The ability to electronically sign documents saves time, enhances the security of important documents and can serve as legal proof of a user’s acceptance of a document. Many web applications choose to accept electronic signatures instead of requiring written signatures. With the Web Cryptography API, a user would be prompted to choose a key that could be generated or pre-provisioned specifically for the web application. The key could then be used during the signing operation.
Protecting data integrity
Web applications often cache data locally, which puts the data at risk for compromise if an offline attack were to occur. The Web Cryptography API permits the web application to use a public key deployed from within itself to verify the integrity of the data cache.
Secure messaging
The Web Cryptography API can enhance the security of messaging for use in off-the-record (OTR) and other types of message-signing schemes through the use of key agreement. The message sender and intended recipient would negotiate shared encryption and message authentication code (MAC) keys to encrypt and decrypt messages to prevent unauthorized access.
JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
The Web Cryptography API can be used by web applications to interact with message formats and structures that are defined under JOSE Working Group. The application can read and import JSON Web Signature (JWK) keys, validate messages that have been protected through electronic signing or MAC keys and decrypt JWE messages.
Conformance to the Web Cryptography API
The W3C recommends that vendors avoid using vendor-specific proprietary extensions with specifications for the Web Cryptography API. This is because it could reduce the interoperability of the API and break up the user base since not all users would be able to access the particular content. It is recommended that when a vendor-specific extension cannot be avoided, the vendor should prefix it with vendor-specific strings to prevent clashes with future generations of the API’s specifications.
References
External links
Web Crypto API on MDN Web Docs
Cryptography standards
XML-based standards
World Wide Web Consortium standards |
54139490 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media%20pluralism | Media pluralism | Media pluralism defines the state of having a plurality of voices, opinions and analyses on media system (internal pluralism) or the coexistence of different and diverse types of medias and media support (external pluralism).
Media pluralism is often recognized by international organizations and non-governmental organizations as being an essential part of a democratic state, Reporters Without Borders considers "access to a plurality of editorial lines and analyses [as] essential for citizens to be able to confront ideas, to make their own informed choices and to conduct their life freely".
Expanded access to the Internet and the digital switch-over has enabled an increased availability of media content, largely through sharing and user-generated content on social media, in addition to the digital channels to which individuals have access across television and radio. The diversity of content is however accompanied by what Hallin and Mancini call polarized pluralism in a media system.
According to the UNESCO report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development, a sharper division in the way we use news is coming up due to the interaction between consumption habits, changing economic models and technical systems. This signifies that even if multiple kinds of information and programming are available, each segmented group may only ingest one branch of the whole. The increase of Internet penetration and reliance on online sources for news is thought of to producing siloed debates.
At the infrastructural level, ‘zero rating’— in which Internet or mobile service providers allow users to access specific content or applications without counting towards the user's data ‘cap’— expands in parallel to mobile uptakes, particularly in emerging countries. Traditional business models for the news media continue to be disrupted, leading to vertical and horizontal concentration and introduction of new types of ownership. Challenges to media funding introduce new types of economic models such as pay-walls and crowd-funding initiatives.
Gender is a part of media pluralism and is characterized by the under-representation of women in the media workforce, in decision-making and in media content. People with disabilities are also under-represented in the media system.
Understanding media pluralism
Pluralism means choice for media consumption and production, as distinct from monopolization of offerings and opportunities.
Pluralism involves sensitivity to a variety of economic ownership models and a technical architecture of delivery in which multichannel and multi-platform distribution is available.
Pluralism often resonates with strong commitments on behalf of governments to public service and community media to provide for diversity.
Jakubowicz focuses on "provisions" or "supply" of media content and the impact of available information in a society. Evaluations of media pluralism have commonly explored the number of media outlets available; how comprehensively media outlets represent different groups and interests in society; and who owns or is able to influence the media. The explosion of access to media through the Internet, the increasingly common practice for users to consume information across a variety of platforms, and the rise of algorithmic profiling bring to the fore questions about users and how they access—or are shielded from accessing—a plurality of sources.
Access
Access to information, as the ability for an individual to seek, receive and impart information effectively, is an aspect of media pluralism. It can include or allow "scientific, indigenous, and traditional knowledge; freedom of information, building of open knowledge resources, including open Internet and open standards, and open access and availability of data; preservation of digital heritage; respect for cultural and linguistic diversity, such as fostering access to local content in accessible languages; quality education for all, including lifelong and e-learning; diffusion of new media and information literacy and skills, and social inclusion online, including addressing inequalities based on skills, education, gender, age, race, ethnicity, and accessibility by those with disabilities; and the development of connectivity and affordable ICTs, including mobile, the Internet, and broadband infrastructures".
Michael Buckland defines six types of barriers that have to be overcome for access to information to be achieved: identification of the source, availability of the source, price of the user, cost to the provider, cognitive access, acceptability. While "access to information", "right to information", "right to know" and "freedom of information" are sometimes used as synonyms, the diverse terminology does highlight particular (albeit related) dimensions of the issue.
Internet and mobile
According to the UNESCO report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development, access to all types of media has increased between 2012 and 2017, but this is especially true for access to the Internet. International commitments such as the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the work of the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development and the Internet Governance Forum’s intersessional work on ‘Connecting the Next Billion’ testify of this.
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), by the end of 2017, an estimated 48 per cent of individuals regularly connect to the internet, up from 34 per cent in 2012. Despite the significant increase in absolute numbers, however, in the same period the annual growth rate of Internet users has slowed down, with five per cent annual growth in 2017, dropping from a 10 per cent growth rate in 2012.
Limitations
Mobile Internet connectivity has an impact in expanding access. The number of unique mobile cellular subscriptions increased from 3.89 billion in 2012 to 4.83 billion in 2016, two-thirds of the world's population, with more than half of subscriptions located in Asia and the Pacific. The number of subscriptions is predicted to rise to 5.69 billion users in 2020. As of 2016, almost 60 per cent of the world's population had access to a 4G broadband cellular network, up from almost 50 per cent in 2015 and 11 per cent in 2012. Unlike the open web affords explorations beyond a user’s immediate range of interests, Mobile Internet has the singularity of creating siloed information spaces predisposing mobile users to access only a limited portion of the available information. Censorship and surveillance are also factors of media pluralism as they cause different experiences for users accessing the Internet in different States.
Zero-rating
The limits that users face on accessing information via mobile applications coincide with a broader process of fragmentation of the Internet. Zero-rating, the practice of internet providers allowing users free connectivity to access specific content or applications for free, has offered some opportunities for individuals to surmount economic hurdles, but has also been accused by its critics as creating a ‘two-tiered’ internet. To address the issues with zero-rating, an alternative model has emerged in the concept of ‘equal rating’ and is being tested in experiments by Mozilla and Orange in Africa. Equal rating prevents prioritization of one type of content and zero-rates all content up to a specified data cap. Some countries in the region had a handful of plans to choose from (across all mobile network operators) while others, such as Colombia, offered as many as 30 pre-paid and 34 post-paid plans.
A study led by the Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI) of eight countries in the Global South found that zero-rated data plans exist in every country, although there is a great range in the frequency with which they are offered and actually used in each. Across the 181 plans examined, 13 per cent were offering zero-rated services. Another study, covering Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, found Facebook's Free Basics and Wikipedia Zero to be the most commonly zero-rated content.
Broadcast media
In Western Europe and North America, the primacy of television as a main source of information is being challenged by the internet, while in other regions, such as Africa, television is gaining greater audience share than radio, which has historically been the most widely accessed media platform. In the Arab region, geopolitical interests has contributed to the growing reach of state-owned global news broadcasters and has determined the launching of Arabic-language channels.
Generational trends
Age plays a profound role in determining the balance between radio, television and the Internet as the leading source of news. According to the 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, in 36 countries and territories surveyed, 51 per cent of adults 55 years and older consider television as their main news source, compared to only 24 per cent of respondents between 18 and 24. The pattern is reversed when it comes to online media, chosen by 64 per cent of users between 18 and 24 as their primary source, but only by 28 per cent of users 55 and older. According to the Arab Youth Survey, in 2016, 45 per cent of the young people interviewed considered social media as a major source of news.
Digital transition
Digital transition is the process in which older analog television broadcasting is converted to and replaced by digital television. The International Telecommunication Union has been mapping the progress in digital switchovers across the globe. According to them, the switch from analogue television to digital television has been completed in 56 countries in 2017, and was ongoing in 68, steadily increasing the range of channels to which individuals have access.
Expansion strategies
Satellite television has continued to add global or transnational alternatives to national viewing options for many audiences. Global news providers such as the BBC, Al Jazeera, Agence France-Presse, RT (formerly Russia Today) and the Spanish-language Agencia EFE, have used the internet and satellite television to better reach audiences across borders and have added specialist broadcasts to target specific foreign audiences.
Reflecting a more outward looking orientation, China Global Television Network, the multi-language and multi-channel grouping owned and operated by China Central Television, changed its name from CCTV-NEWS in January 2017.
After years of budget cuts and shrinking global operations, in 2016 BBC announced the launch of 12 new language services (in Afaan Oromo, Amharic, Gujarati, Igbo, Korean, Marathi, Pidgin, Punjabi, Telugu, Tigrinya, and Yoruba), branded as a component of its biggest expansion ‘since the 1940s’.
Also expanding access to content are changes in usage patterns with non-linear viewing, as online streaming is becoming an important component of users’ experience. Since expanding its global service to 130 new countries in January 2016, Netflix experienced a surge in subscribers, surpassing 100 million subscribers in the second quarter of 2017, up from 40 million in 2012. The audience has also become more diverse with 47 per cent of users based outside of the United States, where the company began in 1997.
Newspaper industry
The Internet has challenged the press as an alternative source of information and opinion but has also provided a new platform for newspaper organizations to reach new audiences. Between 2012 and 2016, print newspaper circulation continued to fall in almost all regions, with the exception of Asia and the Pacific, where the dramatic increase in sales in a few select countries has offset falls in historically strong Asian markets such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. Between 2012 and 2016, India’s print circulation grew by 89 per cent. As many newspapers make the transition to online platforms, revenues from digital subscriptions and digital advertising have been growing significantly. How to capture more of this growth remains a pressing challenge for newspapers.
Advertising issues
Print media is continuously affected by changing trends in advertising: in 2012 its share of total news media revenues globally dropped below 50 per cent and continued falling to 38 per cent in 2016. Newspapers transition to online platforms increase the volume of revenues from digital subscriptions and digital advertising. The main challenge that newspapers face, according to Cecilia Campbell, is how to capture more of the digital subscriptions and advertising growth.
European Union
The Media Pluralism Monitor developed by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) and co-funded by the European Union was first implemented in 2014 and 2015 with subsequent pilot projects. In 2016, 2017 and 2020 the CMPF measured media pluralism within the EU, including some candidate countries with a methodology based on 4 areas, including: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, Political Independence and Social Inclusiveness.
Economic models
Media systems are built from a variety of economic models including mixes of market, public service, community and state entities. A plurality of media owners and economic models serves as an essential element of external pluralism, guaranteed by competition in the market. Nonprofit public service and community media can help achieve internal pluralism by incorporating social and cultural diversity in the content they produce. Community media, drawing especially on volunteers, can be a unique source of local dialogue and information exchange. The lack of adaption and of efficient economic strategies from traditional media has led to proliferation of privately owned media. This involves a diversification of newspapers but may also affects quality journalism and media independence, especially with the financial contributions from "backers".
Pluralism in media ownership
State-owned media
In 2012, the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) counted 1,230 television stations broadcasting via Arab and international satellites, of which 133 were state-owned and 1,097 private. The reduction of government owned channels in the media sector is paralleled by a growth in outlets with a sectarian agenda. In some countries, private media outlets often maintain close ties to governments or individual politicians, while media houses owned by politically non-aligned individuals have struggled to survive, often in the face of advertising boycotts by state agencies. According to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), public service broadcasting tend to struggle with funding and to decline since 2012.
Controlled liberalization
Media privatization and the lessening of the State dominance over media content is a global trend, according to the UNESCO report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development.
Establishing profitable models of state-owned but relatively independent papers is part of the controlled liberalization process and is a common practice in the Asia Pacific region.
State owned papers are top selling in Africa and the Arab region but often lack in reflecting society's plurality.
Vertical integration and concentration in mature markets are found in Central and Eastern Europe, but they tend to lack transparency on ownership and of institutional safeguards with regard to pluralism (e.g. monitoring of concentration and regulatory intervention).
Limits to concentration are clearly set out in Western Europe but they face lobbies from media actors who are able to loosen norms and the enforcement of the law.
New types of cross-ownership
Cross-ownership is a method of reinforcing business relationships by owning stock in the companies with which a given company does business. Drawing the line between the media and other industries is a challenge for new types of cross-ownership. The acquisition of the Washington Post by the founder of online retailer Amazon raised concerns about the newspaper independence, the newspaper has significantly increased its standing in the online media—and print—and introduced significant innovations.
Community-centered media ownership model
Most common in isolated, rural or disadvantaged areas community-centered media ownership is also mostly pertaining to radio. Through this model, not-for-profit media outlets are run and managed by the communities. They are also characterized as "independent and governed by and in the service of the communities they serve" and represent what UNESCO calls the "third pillar" of the media with commercial and public broadcasters.
Advertising, between old and new models
One of the challenges to traditional media is advertisement, which has evolved since 2010. According to the UNESCO report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development, between 2012 and 2016, revenues from advertisement in print have decreased by 27 percent in 2012, print advertising's share of total news advertising revenue was 48 per cent, falling to 38 per cent by 2016. Circulation of digital versions of traditional newspapers and digital advertisements have grown significantly, but have not been sufficient to offset losses in print. Once the transitioning phase from old media to digital media is over, revenues from digital advertisement tend to increase. This phenomenon pushed advertisers to pay premium prices to quality publications.
Tauel Harper considers that with the rise of big data, media have been seen to lose the "advertising subsidy" for journalistic content, through which "private" advertising paid for "public journalism". Big data analytics place their ads in front of individual media consumers regardless of the particular content they are consuming. This includes political advertising, which sometimes serves to bypass the significance of news in election contexts.
New platforms and business models
The New York Times in the United States, or the Mail & Guardian in South Africa use extensions or variations of existing schemes such as pay-walls created by publications considered to be of particularly high quality or addressing a particular niche.
The Guardian uses Wikipedia's borrowed strategy of frequently asking readers for donations in support to quality journalism or free content.
In various sectors, the number of crowdfunded journalism projects has increased significantly. While in 2012, 88 projects received funding through the platform, in 2015, the number of projects rose to 173, scattered across 60 countries (even if North America continues to register the majority of funded projects). The funds collected grew from $1.1 million in 2012 to $1.9 million in 2015.
Economic models also depend on larger structural reconfiguration of the market. While in 2012 advertising revenues from mobile represented a tiny portion of the market in the United States, in 2016 they surpassed revenues from all other platforms.
Media actors have also started testing new formats and technologies of journalism, experimenting with how virtual reality or gaming can facilitate immersive experiences of relatively distant events. In 2015 for example, the New York Times opened its Virtual Reality Lab, seeking to provide original perspectives on issues ranging from the war in Iraq, to the conflict in South Sudan, to the thinning of the ice cap in Antarctica. The Virtual reality app proved the most downloaded in the history of interactive applications launched by the paper. Awareness raising video games have also been developed such as Games for Social Change, which involve students.
Content
According to Cisco Systems, in 2016 an average of 96,000 petabytes was transferred monthly over the Internet, more than twice as many as in 2012. In 2016, the number of active websites surpassed 1 billion, up from approximately 700 million in 2012.
User-generated content
Reaching two billion daily active users in June 2017, Facebook has emerged as the most popular social media platform globally. Other social media platforms are also dominant at the regional level such as: Twitter in Japan, Naver in the Republic of Korea, Instagram (owned by Facebook) and LinkedIn (owned by Microsoft) in Africa, VKontakte (VK) and Odnoklassniki in Russia and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, WeChat and QQ in China.
However, a concentration phenomenon is occurring globally giving the dominance to a few online platforms that become popular for some unique features they provide, most commonly for the added privacy they offer users through disappearing messages or end-to-end encryption (e.g. WhatsApp, Snapchat, Signal, and Telegram), but they have tended to occupy niches and to facilitate the exchanges of information that remain rather invisible to larger audiences.
Production of freely accessible information has been increasing since 2012. In January 2017, Wikipedia had more than 43 million articles, almost twice as many as in January 2012. This corresponded to a progressive diversification of content and increase in contributions in languages other than English. In 2017, less than 12 per cent of Wikipedia content was in English, down from 18 per cent in 2012. Graham, Straumann, and Hogan say that increase in the availability and diversity of content has not radically changed the structures and processes for the production of knowledge. For example, while content on Africa has dramatically increased, a significant portion of this content has continued to be produced by contributors operating from North America and Europe, rather than from Africa itself.
Algorithms, echo chambers and polarization
The proliferation of online sources represents a vector leading to an increase in pluralism but algorithms used by social networking platforms and search engines to provide users with a personalized experience based on their individual preferences represent a challenge to pluralism, restricting exposure to differing viewpoints and news feed. This is commonly referred to as "eco-chambers" and "filter-bubbles".
With the help of algorithms, filter bubbles influence users choices and perception of reality by giving the impression that a particular point of view or representation is widely shared. Following the 2016 referendum of membership of the European Union in the United Kingdom and the United States presidential elections, this gained attention as many individuals confessed their surprise at results that seemed very distant from their expectations. The range of pluralism is influenced by the personalized individualization of the services and the way it diminishes choice.
Research on echo chambers from Flaxman, Goel, and Rao, Pariser, and Grömping suggest that use of social media and search engines tends to increase ideological distance among individuals.
Comparisons between online and off-line segregation have indicated how segregation tends to be higher in face-to-face interactions with neighbors, co-workers, or family members, and reviews of existing research have indicated how available empirical evidence does not support the most pessimistic views about polarization. A study conducted by researchers from Facebook and the University of Michigan, for example, has suggested that individuals’ own choices drive algorithmic filtering, limiting exposure to a range of content. While algorithms may not be causing polarization, they could amplify it, representing a significant component of the new information landscape.
Fake news
The term "fake news" gained importance with the electoral context in Western Europe and North America. It is determined by fraudulent content in news format and its velocity. According to Bounegru, Gray, Venturini and Mauri, fake news is when a deliberate lie "is picked up by dozens of other blogs, retransmitted by hundreds of websites, cross-posted over thousands of social media accounts and read by hundreds of thousands" that it then effectively becomes "fake news".
The evolving nature of online business models encourages the production of information that is "click-worthy" independently of its accuracy.
The nature of trust depends on the assumptions that non-institutional forms of communication are freer from power and more able to report information that mainstream media are perceived as unable or unwilling to reveal. Declines in confidence in much traditional media and expert knowledge have created fertile grounds for alternative, and often obscure sources of information to appear as authoritative and credible. This ultimately leaves users confused about basic facts.
Internet companies with threatened credibility tend to develop new responses to limit fake news and reduce financial incentives for its proliferation.
Marginalized groups
The media covering of marginalized groups such as refugees tend to be influenced by and influence the political and social perceptions. While a large proportion of the European press initially articulated a sympathetic and empathetic response towards the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict in Syria, according to Georgiou and Zaborowski, this sentiment was gradually replaced by suspicion and, in some cases, hostility towards refugees and migrants. Both the quality and tabloid press tended to employ ‘established, stereotyped narratives’ of security threats and economic costs. Gábor and Messing consider that a portion of the press, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, turned to systematic hostility towards migrants and refugees.
News players
Gate-keeping mechanisms continue to influence not only what is being communicated, but also who is given the opportunity to frame events. Citizens’ voices have indeed increased in new stories, individuals included in these stories tend to be treated, not as agents capable of asserting their world views and their interpretation of events, but rather as vox-pol, employed to add color to a narrative. Harlow and Johnson consider that in the case of protests, demonstrations or conflicts, established institutions and elites tend to prevail as news sources. Although novel media operations and actors have had a smaller impact on mainstream reporting, they have been instrumental in animating intermediate spaces, which aggregate content in ways that can reach broader audiences.
As users increasingly move from broadcast to online media to access information, the same large media institutions tend to predominate online spaces, even if filtered and mediated in much of their social media presence. A decade later, the majority of the most visited and viewed news websites remain traditional media outlets (CNN, New York Times, the Guardian, Washington Post, BBC), although news aggregation websites such as Reddit and Google News have emerged among the top five sites with the highest web traffic.
Media and information literacy
Authors Frau-Meigs, Velez, and Michel (2017) and Frau-Meigs and Torrent (2009) consider diversity in media can also be enhanced by media and information literacy (MIL). They argue that it can be useful in understanding the consequences of algorithms on modes of diffusion. Many types of MIL exist from information literacy, media literacy, news literacy, advertising literacy, digital literacy, media education, to digital and media literacy. A few initiatives already exist in the field:
UNESCO launched in 2013 the Global Alliance for Partnerships on Media and Information Literacy (GAPMIL), as an "effort to promote international cooperation to ensure that all citizens have access to media and information competencies".
The recent annual yearbook by the International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media focuses on trends and opportunities for MIL in the Arab region.
There have also been efforts to embed media and information literacy initiatives and requirements into legislation in countries such as Serbia, Finland, Morocco, the Philippines, Argentina, Australia and several states in the US have passed laws that address MIL.
Education initiatives have been proliferating online reflecting a growth of MOOCs or massive online courses. Available on platforms such as Coursera and edX, as well as by public service broadcasters, these courses target both students and consumers of media, as well as teachers.
There have also been a growing number of initiatives launched by internet companies to combat online hate speech or the proliferation of ‘fake news’, largely built on users’ inputs and support in flagging content that appears to not comply with a platform's terms of service.
Gender equality
Tuchman, Daniels, and Benoit (1978) use the term "symbolic annihilation" (originally credited to George Gerbner) to describe women's relationship to and visibility in mass media. According to the Global Media Monitoring Project, women's visibility in newspaper, television and radio increased by only seven percentage points between 1995 (17 per cent) and 2015 (24 per cent).
Regional and international organizations also recognize gender and media pluralism as often being problematic:
In 2010, UNESCO developed a comprehensive set of Gender-Sensitive Indicators for Media, aimed at encouraging media organizations to benchmark themselves against equality criteria.
In 2013, the Council of the European Parliament adopted the recommendation made by the European Institute for Gender Equality, that the media industry should adopt and implement gender equality indicators relating to women in decision-making, gender equality policies and women on boards.
In 2016, UN Women launched a new partnership with major media organizations to draw attention to and act on eradicating all forms of inequalities. The Step it Up for Gender Equality Media Compact comprises a coalition of media outlets from around the globe.
The media workforce
According to Byerly, in many countries, as many women as men are graduating from media, journalism and communication degree programmes and entering the industry. In 1995, when the first substantial analysis of women media professionals across 43 nations was produced, women constituted around 40 per cent of the media workforce. A Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) 2015 report found that 31 per cent of stories on politics and 39 per cent of stories about the economy have female by-lines. Researchers from the US, Harp, Bachmann, and Loke, show that while women journalists are writing on a wider range of topics, they are still a minority of columnist at the major dailies. In terms of presenting on broadcast news, the 2015 GMMP found that the global proportion of women was 49 per cent, the same as in 2000 and two percentage points below the 1995 finding. Since 2005, the number of women working as reporters in broadcast news has dropped by four percentage points in television and radio.
Closer analysis shows that women were more numerous on television (57 per cent), for example, and less numerous on radio (41 per cent), where ‘looks’ are obviously far less important. The majority of younger presenters were women, but that trend reversed for older presenters, nearly all of whom were men. There were almost no women reporters recorded as older than 65. Part of this is likely due to recent improvements that have allowed more young women to enter the field, but it could also relate to the differences in how aging is perceived between men and women, as well as limitations in career advancement.
The Women's Media Center (WMC) 2017 report on women and the media in the USA shows that at 20 of the nation's top news outlets, women produced 37.7 per cent of news reports, an increase of 0.4 percentage points compared to 2016. In broadcast news, women’s presence as anchors, reporters and field journalists actually declined by nearly seven percentage points between 2015 and 2016.
Women and decision-making
The Global Report on the Status of Women in the News Media found that women in media occupied just over a quarter of the jobs in top management (27 per cent) and governance (26 per cent) positions. The regions that fared best for women representation were Central (33 per cent) and Eastern Europe (43 per cent) and the Nordic countries (36 per cent). Elsewhere, women comprised only about a fifth of governance positions and held less than 10 per cent of top management jobs in Asia and the Pacific region. A major European project funded by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) found very similar findings: men held most of the senior management positions and board membership in 99 media houses across the European Union.
In the Asia and Pacific region, a joint report by the UNESCO Office in Bangkok, UN Women and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) Asia Pacific found women were significantly under-represented in decision-making roles. In Southern Africa, a Gender Links study found that women constitute 40 per cent of media employees and 34 per cent of media managers. The study also revealed that sexual harassment remains a key issue for women: just under 20 per cent of women media professionals said that they had personal experience of sexual harassment and the majority of those women said that the perpetrator was a senior colleague.
Representation
The 2015 GMMP made a comparison across 20 years of women's representation in the media and assessed that between 1995 (17 percent) and 2015 (24 percent), female appearances in television, radio and print rose by only seven percentage points. Sarah Macharia highlights the fact that where women most often appear in media, it is when they speak from personal experience (representing 38 per cent), while only 20 per cent of spokespersons and 19 per cent of experts featured in stories are women. Women featured in stories as 32 per cent of experts interviewed in North America, followed by the Caribbean (29 per cent) and Latin America (27 per cent). In the southern African region, Gender Links’ 2016 Gender and Media Progress Study covered 14 countries and found that women's views and voices accounted for a mere 20 per cent of news sources across Southern Africa media.
The picture of women in media
Women have won only a quarter of Pulitzer Prizes for foreign reporting and only 17 per cent of awards of the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism. In 2015 the African Development Bank began sponsoring a category for Women's rights in Africa, designed to promote gender equality through the media, as one of the prizes awarded annually by One World Media.
Created in 1997, the UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize is an annual award that honors a person, organization or institution that has made a notable contribution to the defense and/or promotion of press freedom anywhere in the world. Nine out of 20 winners have been women.
The Poynter Institute since 2014 has been running a Leadership Academy for Women in Digital Media, expressly focused on the skills and knowledge needed to achieve success in the digital media environment.
The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA), which represents more than 18,000 publications, 15,000 online sites and more than 3,000 companies in more than 120 countries, leads the Women in the News (WIN) campaign together with UNESCO as part of their Gender and Media Freedom Strategy. In their 2016 handbook, WINing Strategies: Creating Stronger Media Organizations by Increasing Gender Diversity, they highlight a range of positive action strategies undertaken by a number of their member organizations from (Germany) to Jordan to Colombia, with the intention of providing blueprints for others to follow.
Sources
References
Freedom of expression
User-generated content |
54229175 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacOS%20High%20Sierra | MacOS High Sierra | macOS High Sierra (version 10.13) is the fourteenth major release of macOS, Apple Inc.'s desktop operating system for Macintosh computers. macOS High Sierra was announced at the WWDC 2017 on June 5, 2017 and was released on September 25, 2017. The name "High Sierra" refers to the High Sierra region in California. Following on from macOS Sierra, its iterative name also alludes to its status as a refinement of its predecessor, focused on performance improvements and technical updates rather than user features. This makes it similar to previous macOS releases Snow Leopard, Mountain Lion and El Capitan. Among the apps with notable changes are Photos and Safari.
System requirements
macOS High Sierra is supported on the following Macintosh computers:
iMac: Late 2009 or later
MacBook: Late 2009 or later
MacBook Pro: Mid 2010 or later
MacBook Air: Late 2010 or later
Mac Mini: Mid 2010 or later
Mac Pro: Mid 2010 or later
macOS High Sierra requires at least 2 GB of RAM and 14.3 GB of available disk space.
It is possible to install High Sierra on many older Macintosh computers that are not officially supported by Apple. This requires using a patch to modify the install image.
Changes
System
Apple File System
Apple File System (APFS) replaces HFS Plus as the default file system in macOS for the first time with High Sierra. It supports 64‑bit inode numbers, is designed for flash memory, and is designed to speed up common tasks like duplicating a file and finding the size of a folder's contents. It also has built‑in encryption, crash‑safe protections, and simplified data backup on the go.
Metal 2
Metal, Apple's low-level graphics API, has been updated to Metal 2. It includes virtual-reality and machine-learning features, as well as support for external GPUs. The system's windowing system, Quartz Compositor, supports Metal 2.
Media
macOS High Sierra adds support for High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC), with hardware acceleration where available, as well as support for High Efficiency Image File Format (HEIF). Macs with the Intel Kaby Lake processor offer hardware support for Main 10 profile 10-bit hardware decoding, those with the Intel Skylake processor support Main profile 8-bit hardware decoding, and those with AMD Radeon 400 series graphics also support full HEVC decoding. However, whenever an Intel IGP is present, the frameworks will only direct requests to Intel IGP. In addition, audio codecs FLAC and Opus are also supported, but not in iTunes.
HEVC hardware acceleration requires a Mac with a sixth-generation Intel processor or newer (late 2015 27-inch iMac, mid 2017 21.5-inch iMac, early 2016 MacBook, late 2016 MacBook Pro or iMac Pro).
Other
Kernel extensions ("kexts") will require explicit approval by the user before being able to run.
The Low Battery notification and its icon were replaced by a flatter modern look.
The time service ntpd was replaced with timed for the time synchronization.
The FTP and telnet command line programs were removed.
Caching Server, File Sharing Server, and Time Machine Server, features that were previously part of macOS Server, are now provided as part of the OS.
The screen can now be locked using the shortcut Cmd+Ctrl+Q. The ability to lock screen using a menu bar shortcut activated in Keychain Access preferences has now been removed.
The 10.13.4 update added support for external graphics processors for Macs equipped with Thunderbolt 3 ports. The update discontinued support for external graphics processors in 2015 or older Macs, equipped with Thunderbolt 1 and 2 ports.
Starting with 10.13.4, when a 32-bit app is opened, users get a one-time warning about its future incompatibility with the macOS operating system.
Applications
Final Cut Pro 7
Apple announced the original Final Cut Studio suite of programs will not work on High Sierra. Media professionals that depend on any of those programs were advised to create a double boot drive to their computer.
Photos
macOS High Sierra gives Photos an updated sidebar and new editing tools.
Photos synchronizes tagged People with iOS 11.
Mail
Mail has improved Spotlight search with Top Hits. Mail also uses 35% less storage space due to optimizations, and Mail's compose window can now be used in split-screen mode.
Safari
macOS High Sierra includes Safari 11. Safari 11 has a new "Intelligent Tracking Prevention" feature that uses machine learning to block third parties from tracking the user's actions. Safari can also block auto playing videos from playing. The "Reader Mode" can be set to always-on. Safari 11 also supports WebAssembly. The last version of Safari that High Sierra supports is 13.1.2. This version has known security issues.
Notes
The Notes app includes the ability to add tables to notes, and notes can be pinned to the top of the list. The version number was incremented to 4.5.
Siri
Siri now uses a more natural and expressive voice. It also uses machine learning to understand the user better. Siri synchronizes information across iOS and Mac devices so the Siri experience is the same regardless of the product being used.
Messages
The release of macOS High Sierra 10.13.5 (and iOS 11.4) introduced support for Messages in iCloud. This feature allows messages to sync across all devices using the same iCloud account. When messages are deleted they are deleted on each device as well, and messages stored in the cloud do not take up local storage on the device anymore. In order to use the feature, the user has to enable two-factor authentication for their Apple ID.
Other applications found on macOS 10.13 High Sierra
AirPort Utility
App Store
Archive Utility
Audio MIDI Setup
Automator
Bluetooth File Exchange
Boot Camp Assistant
Calculator
Calendar
Chess
ColorSync Utility)
Console
Contacts
Dictionary
Digital Color Meter
Disk Utility
DVD Player
FaceTime
Font Book
Game Center
GarageBand (may not be pre-installed)
Grab
Grapher
iBooks (now Apple Books)
iMovie (may not be pre-installed)
iTunes
Image Capture
Ink (can only be accessed by connecting a graphics tablet to your Mac)
Keychain Access
Keynote (may not be pre-installed)
Migration Assistant
Numbers (may not be pre-installed)
Pages (may not be pre-installed)
Photo Booth
Preview
QuickTime Player
Reminders
Script Editor
Stickies
System Information
Terminal
TextEdit
Time Machine
VoiceOver Utility
X11/XQuartz (may not be pre-installed)
Reception
In his September 2017 review of High Sierra, Roman Loyola, the senior editor of Macworld, gave it a provisionally positive review, calling it an "incremental update worthy of your time, eventually." Loyola expressed that the product's most significant draw was its security features, and that beyond this, the most beneficial changes lay in its future potential, saying it "doesn't have a lot of new features that will widen your eyes in excitement. But a lot of the changes are in the background and under the hood, and they lay a foundation for better things to come."
Problems
macOS High Sierra 10.13.0 and 10.13.1 have a critical vulnerability that allowed an attacker to become a root user by entering "root" as a username, and not entering a password, when logging in. This was fixed in the Security Update 2017-001 for macOS High Sierra v10.13.1.
When it was first launched, it was discovered that the WindowServer process had a memory leak, leading to much slower graphics performance and lagging animations, probably due to some last-minute changes in Metal 2. This was fixed in macOS 10.13.1.
macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 had an error that caused DisplayLink to stop working for external monitors, allowing only one monitor to be extended. When using two external monitors, they could only be mirrored. Alban Rampon, the Senior Product Manager for DisplayLink, stated on December 24, 2018 that the company was working with Apple to resolve the issue.
Release history
References
External links
– official site
macOS High Sierra download page at Apple
13
X86-64 operating systems
2017 software
Computer-related introductions in 2017 |
54232438 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special%20Envoy%20on%20Intelligence%20and%20Law%20Enforcement%20Data%20Sharing | Special Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing | The Special Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing is a British creation of the diplomatic corps at Cabinet level to report on, and facilitate dialogue between the executive branch of government and technology firms, often global in nature, that provide service in the internet realm.
Summary
In July 2014, then-Prime Minister David Cameron expressed frustration with American communications providers for "severely constraining" the tasks of the GCHQ over jurisdiction issues. At the time, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIP) was required, according to Cameron, to "preserve" surveillance schemes used in the UK by state officials. The post was conceived at that time.
Former Ambassador to the US (2007 to 2012) Sir Nigel Sheinwald was appointed to the post on 19 September 2014, shortly before the Rifkind report on the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby had been issued to public view. This role was announced by the PM David Cameron when he set out the government’s plans to introduce emergency legislation to preserve data retention and investigation powers (the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014) in July 2014, however, no mention is made of the post in the legislation.
The post, which is based in the Cabinet Office and reports to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, through the Cabinet Secretary, has as its "overarching objective ... to lead discussions with governments, other key international partners and Communications Service Providers (CPSs) [sic] on ways to improve access to and sharing of law enforcement and intelligence data in different jurisdictions." The Special Envoy regularly updates the Prime Minister and ministerial colleagues on the progress of these discussions and provides comprehensive advice on how best to handle these difficult issues. A public two-page report resulted in June 2015. Sheinwald described his work thus:
Sheinwald remarked on the trouble with the US Wiretap and Stored Communications Acts, and seemed to feel that EU's Mutual Legal Assistance Convention and the US/UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) would be a partial solution to data sharing and jurisdictional problems. He also suggested a "new international framework" to allow "certain democratic countries—with similar values and high standards of oversight, transparency and privacy protection" to act on urgent counter-terrorism requests.
Sheinwald said that the British still struggled to obtain access to data, but since he was appointed, cooperation on the most urgent requests, "particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism and other threat-to-life and child-protection cases" with the US companies had increased. He remarked: "The companies' assistance in these cases has improved, showing the value of active engagement with them. Cooperation remains incomplete, and the companies and governments concerned agree that we need to work on longer term solutions."
One newspaper characterised the report as saying that existing international laws will never be enough to persuade US internet companies to hand over their customers’ personal data to the British police in urgent counter-terrorism cases. Concerns were raised in Parliament over the issue, and Theresa May remarked that her then-forthcoming bill, which subsequently was passed as the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, would strike a fine balance.
Also on 25 June 2015, an unpublished report from the Special Envoy recommended that a new bilateral treaty be negotiated to force the cooperation of U.S. internet companies, in order to provide a legal, front-door alternative to the Snooper's Charter surveillance scheme. At the time, it was thought that this bilateral would scrap the need to revive the snooping powers from the 2012 communications data bill which was to require British ISPs to share data from US firms passing over their networks, and so to enforce their compliance. The report had been classified as top secret by the Cabinet Office because it details each company’s operations. The MLAT process was described as slow, and concerns were raised about the efficacy of the 2014 DRIPA.
Bilateral treaties and the role of the Special Envoy were also discussed in the 2015 report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.
One report noted that, due to the Edward Snowden uproar and WikiLeaks-NSA fallout that had occurred contemporaneously, Apple CEO Tim Cook had "taken a moral stance in defence of individual privacy" over end-to-end encryption. Said Cook:
References
Further reading
The General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR Security Regulations
Home Office (United Kingdom)
United Kingdom privacy law
Internet in the United Kingdom |
54340116 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile%20phone%20based%20sensing%20software | Mobile phone based sensing software | Mobile phone–based sensing software is a class of software for mobile phones that uses the phone's sensors to acquire data about the user. Some applications of this software include mental health and overall wellness monitoring. This class of software is important because it has the potential of providing a practical and low-cost approach to deliver psychological interventions for the prevention of mental health disorders, as well as bringing such interventions to populations that have no access to traditional health care. A number of terms are used for this approach, including "personal sensing", "digital phenotyping", and "context sensing". The term "personal sensing" is used in this article, as it conveys in simple language the aim of sensing personal behaviors, states, and conditions.
General information
This article presents a comparison of mobile phone software that can acquire users' sensor data (in a passive manner without users' explicit intervention) and administer questionnaires (or micro-surveys triggered by sensor events). The software described below helps quantify behaviors known to be related to mental health and wellness. The list below includes both commercial and free software. To be included in this list, a software product must be able to acquire data from at least one phone sensor, and provide a minimum level of security for storage and transmission of acquired data. This list excludes software that focuses solely on collecting participant data from surveys and questionnaires.
Software table
The following table contains general information about each mobile-based sensing software, such as who the developers are, when it was last updated, whether it is open or closed source, and the programming language and database they are based on.
Target audience
The following table shows the target audience for each piece of software included in this article. Software packages that target developers assume a high level of skill in creating code and/or modifying third-party source code. Software packages that target researchers have at least one component that can be used in scientific studies with human subjects. Software packages that target individuals allow at least one component to be downloaded and installed by an end-user with no programming skills. Please note that some packages target more than one type of user.
Mobile OS support
The following table shows the type of mobile phone on which each software package can be deployed.
Installation
In addition to deploying mobile-based sensing software to smart phones, a control dashboard has to be either installed on a local computer or provided through the web. Some of the packages provide a web server so that one is able to have a remote dashboard. The table below shows the server platform and/or web server required for each piece of software.
Sensor (and other) data that can be captured (part 1)
The following table shows the types of mobile sensors from which each software package is capable of collecting sensor data. Note that the type of data collected depends on availability of the appropriate sensor hardware on a specific smartphone. Some software packages collect raw sensor data (e.g. Beiwe) whereas others collect summaries of such data (e.g. ResearchKit).
Sensor and data that can be captured (part 2)
The following table shows the types of mobile sensors from which each software package is capable of collecting passive data. Note that the type of data collected depends on availability of the appropriate sensor on the smartphone.
Support for behavioral studies
The following table contains information regarding availability of functions, within each software package, that support behavioral experiments for scientific purposes.
Battery management
The following table contains information relative to battery management for each software package. As passive data collection from smartphone sensors is a battery-intensive process, methods to maximize battery performance are important for this type of software.
Software maintenance and support
The following table contains information relative to maintenance and support for each software package. The information provided in this table gives an idea of the likelihood of a package to be supported in the future.
Security and privacy
The following table contains information relative to encryption and secure transfer of data collected from smartphone sensors. This information is very important for a data collection app due to privacy concerns over the handling of phone data.
Cost
The following table contains information relative to whether a software package is free or non-free.
See also
MHealth
Quantifield self (QS)
Ecological momentary assessment (EMA)
Event sampling methodology (ESM)
Diary studies
Digital phenotyping
Notes and references
Mobile software |
54350964 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas%20Jennewein | Thomas Jennewein | Thomas Jennewein is an Austrian physicist who conducts research in quantum communication and quantum key distribution. He has taught as an associate professor at the University of Waterloo and the Institute for Quantum Computing in Waterloo, Canada since 2009. He earned his PhD under Anton Zeilinger at the University of Vienna in 2002, during which time he performed experiments on Bell's inequality and cryptography with entangled photons. His current work at the Institute for Quantum Computing focuses on satellite-based free space quantum key distribution, with the goal of creating a global quantum network.
He is also an affiliate of the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, a fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, and CEO and co-founder of quantum optics measurement device company UQDevices alongside physicist Raymond Laflamme.
Education and earlier work
Thomas Jennewein obtained an engineering degree in physics from HTL Anichstraße in 1991, his master's degree in experimental physics from the University of Innsbruck in 1997, and earned his doctoral degree at the University of Vienna in 2002. He then worked as a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information within the Austrian Academy of Sciences from 2004 until 2009 and as a visiting research fellow at the University of Queensland from 2007 to 2008.
Current work
Since 2009, Jennewein has held an associate professorship position at the University of Waterloo and Institute for Quantum Computing where he is the leader of the Quantum Photonics Laboratory. He is currently "working with partners in industry and academia to advance a proposed microsatellite mission called QEYSSat through a series of technical studies funded initially by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and subsequently by the Canadian Space Agency (CSA)." In April 2017, the Canadian government announced funding of $80.9 million to the Canadian Space Agency for funding of two projects, one of which is for the "demonstration of the applications of quantum technology in space" with the goal of positioning "Canada as a leader in quantum encryption".
In December 2015, Jennewein, with researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Joint Quantum Institute at the University of Maryland, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology among others, closed two loopholes (namely, the locality and detection loopholes) in a Bell test experiment by using entangled photons to obtain a Bell inequality violation by seven standard deviations.
In April 2017, Jennewein and researchers from the Institute for Quantum Computing, the University of Innsbruck, the University of Paderborn, and the University of Moncton experimentally observed "three-photon interference that does not originate from two-photon or single photon interference" by following a "theoretical recipe proposed by Daniel Greenberger, Michael Horne, and Anton Zeilinger in 1993". The experiment later received one of the ten Physics World 2017 Breakthrough of the Year awards.
In June 2017, Jennewein and his colleagues published findings that showed the first demonstration of quantum key distribution from a ground transmitter to a "receiver prototype mounted on an airplane in flight", reporting optical links with distances between 3-10km and the generation of secure keys up to 868 kilobytes in length.
References
Quantum physicists
Austrian physicists
University of Waterloo faculty
University of Vienna alumni
Year of birth missing (living people)
Living people |
54362192 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relinquishment%20of%20United%20States%20nationality | Relinquishment of United States nationality | Relinquishment of United States nationality is the process under federal law by which a U.S. citizen or national voluntarily and intentionally gives up that status and becomes an alien with respect to the United States. Relinquishment is distinct from denaturalization, which in U.S. law refers solely to cancellation of illegally procured naturalization.
explicitly lists all seven potentially expatriating acts by which a U.S. citizen can relinquish that citizenship. Renunciation of United States citizenship is a legal term encompassing two of those acts: swearing an oath of renunciation at a U.S. embassy or consulate in foreign territory or, during a state of war, at a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services office in U.S. territory. The other five acts are: naturalization in a foreign country; taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country; serving in a foreign military; serving in a foreign government; and committing treason, rebellion, or similar crimes. Beginning with a 1907 law, Congress had intended that mere voluntary performance of potentially expatriating acts would automatically terminate citizenship. However, a line of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s, most notably Afroyim v. Rusk (1967) and Vance v. Terrazas (1980), held this to be unconstitutional and instead required that specific intent to relinquish citizenship be proven by the totality of the individual's actions and words. Since a 1990 policy change, the State Department no longer proactively attempts to prove such intent, and only issues a Certificate of Loss of Nationality (CLN) when an individual "affirmatively asserts" their relinquishment of citizenship.
People who relinquish U.S. citizenship generally have lived abroad for many years, and nearly all of them are citizens of another country. Unlike most other countries, the U.S. does not prohibit its citizens from making themselves stateless, but the State Department strongly recommends against it, and very few choose to do so. Since the end of World War II, no individual has successfully relinquished U.S. citizenship while in U.S. territory, and courts have rejected arguments that U.S. state citizenship or Puerto Rican citizenship give an ex-U.S. citizen the right to enter or reside in the U.S. without the permission of the U.S. government. Like any other foreigner or stateless person, an ex-U.S. citizen requires permission from the U.S. government, such as a U.S. visa or visa waiver, in order to visit the United States.
Relinquishment of U.S. citizenship remains uncommon in absolute terms, but has become more frequent than relinquishment of the citizenship of most other developed countries. Between three thousand and six thousand U.S. citizens have relinquished citizenship each year since 2013, compared to estimates of anywhere between three million and nine million U.S. citizens residing abroad. The number of relinquishments is up sharply from lows in the 1990s and 2000s, though only about three times as high as in the 1970s. Lawyers believe this growth is mostly driven by accidental Americans who grew up abroad and only became aware of their U.S. citizenship and the tax liabilities for citizens abroad due to ongoing publicity surrounding the 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. Between 2010 and 2015, obtaining a CLN began to become a difficult process with high barriers, including nearly year-long waitlists for appointments and the world's most expensive administrative fee, as well as complicated tax treatment. Legal scholars state that such barriers may constitute a breach of the United States' obligations under international law, and foreign legislatures have called upon the U.S. government to eliminate the fees, taxes, and other requirements, particularly with regard to accidental Americans who have few genuine links to the United States.
Terminology
In general, "loss of citizenship" is a blanket term which may include both voluntary (citizen-initiated) and involuntary (government-initiated) termination of citizenship, though it is not always easy to make a clean distinction between the two categories: automatic loss of citizenship due to an initial action performed voluntarily could be seen either as "voluntary loss" or "involuntary loss". Citizen-initiated termination of citizenship may be referred to as "renunciation", "relinquishment", or "expatriation", while the term "denationalization" refers to government-initiated termination.
In U.S. law, "relinquishment" and "renunciation" are terms used in Subchapter III, Part 3 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (). The term "expatriation" was used in the initial version of that act (, 268) up until the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, when it was replaced by "relinquishment". The State Department continues to use both the terms "expatriation" and "relinquishment", and refers to the acts listed in as "potentially expatriating acts". "Renunciation" specifically describes two of those acts: swearing an oath of renunciation before a U.S. diplomatic officer outside of the United States, or before a U.S. government official designated by the Attorney-General inside the United States during a state of war. "Relinquishment" refers to all seven acts including renunciation, but some sources use it contrastively to refer solely to the other five acts besides renunciation. In contrast, "denaturalization" is distinct from expatriation: that term is used solely in Subchapter III, Part 2 of the 1952 INA () to refer to court proceedings for cancellation of fraudulently procured naturalization.
Relinquishment of United States nationality encompasses relinquishment of United States citizenship. "Nationality" and "citizenship" are distinct under U.S. law: all people with U.S. citizenship also have U.S. nationality, but American Samoans and some residents of the Northern Mariana Islands have U.S. nationality without citizenship. Both citizens and non-citizen nationals may undertake the process of relinquishment of United States nationality. A citizen who undertakes that process gives up both citizenship and nationality. It is not possible to relinquish U.S. citizenship while retaining U.S. nationality.
People who relinquish U.S. citizenship are called "relinquishers", while those who specifically renounce U.S. citizenship are called "renunciants". The informal term "last-generation Americans", wordplay on terminology for immigrant generations (such as "first-generation Americans" or "second-generation Americans"), is also used. The terms "expatriation" or "expatriates" may lead to some confusion, as in modern parlance an "expatriate" ("expat") is simply a person who resides abroad, without any implication of giving up citizenship.
Numbers
From 2014 to 2016, an average of about five thousand U.S. citizens gave up their citizenship each year. These numbers have risen by nearly ten times between 2005 and 2015, though they remain only about three times the annual numbers in the 1970s.
In absolute terms, few people relinquish U.S. citizenship or citizenship of any other developed country; in almost all countries, the number of people who give up citizenship each year is small relative to the total number of citizens abroad, let alone the total number of citizens in that country. In a 2017 study of citizenship relinquishments in twenty-eight countries, mostly OECD members, the U.S. came in sixth place in relative terms (i.e. relinquishers as a proportion of citizens abroad), behind Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Estonia, and Japan; and second in absolute numbers behind South Korea. The study author noted that emotional factors and prohibitions on dual citizenship may affect the rates of citizenship relinquishment, and that military conscription may explain the high rates in the other top countries besides the United States. Peter Spiro notes that most countries with military conscription provide exemptions for non-resident citizens. Regardless of the reasons, even for South Korea, the top country, only about 0.7% of citizens abroad relinquish each year, while for the U.S. the rate is only about 0.1%, though in both cases unreliability of population figures for citizens abroad means the rates are open to question. One former Foreign Service Officer, noting that State Department estimates of the population of U.S. citizens abroad have grown from 3.2 million in 2004 to 9 million in 2017, cautions that these estimates were "generated to justify consular assets and budget" and so "may be self-serving".
The graph above presents statistics on relinquishment of U.S. citizenship from three sources. The blue bars are State Department statistics from 1962 to 1994 obtained by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). During that period, a total of 37,818 U.S. citizens renounced or abandoned their citizenship. It is not clear which of these statistics refer solely to renunciants or include other relinquishers as well; the JCT stated that there were inconsistencies between the definitions used for the statistics for 1962 to 1979 and for 1980 to 1994. The green bars reflect the number of records of people who have renounced U.S. citizenship added each year to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (2006–present). This series includes renunciants and not other relinquishers (see below). The FBI added a large backlog of entries in 2012, so figures from that year may not be comparable to other years. The red bars reflect the number of entries in the Internal Revenue Service's Quarterly Publication of Individuals Who Have Chosen to Expatriate (1996–present). Statistics for 1996 and 1997 may not be comparable to later years. Lawyers disagree whether this publication includes the names of all former citizens, or just some (see below).
The proportion of renunciations or other individual expatriating acts among the total number of relinquishments has been reported on occasion. A Los Angeles Times article stated that between 1951 and 1973, a total of 10,000 Americans renounced their citizenship, while another 71,900 lost it "either unknowingly or deliberately, by acquiring a foreign passport". Law journal articles in 1975 and 1976 stated that there were 95,000 "administrative determinations of voluntary abandonment of United States citizenship" from 1945 to 1969, including 40,000 on grounds of voting in a foreign election. In the 1980s, renunciations accounted for about one-fifth of all relinquishments of citizenship, according to State Department statistics: there were roughly 200 to 300 renunciations per year, among a total of between 800 and 1,600 relinquishments per year. In 2015, the State Department forecast that there would be 5,986 renunciations and 559 non-renunciatory relinquishments during that fiscal year.
Process
Overview
A person who performs a potentially expatriating act with the intention of giving up U.S. citizenship loses U.S. citizenship from the time of that act. The State Department will issue such a person with a Certificate of Loss of Nationality (CLN) upon request. U.S. nationality law does not require an ex-citizen to notify the State Department nor obtain a CLN, but obtaining one may be helpful to prove one's status as a non-U.S. citizen to other governments or private parties, and U.S. tax laws since 2004 ignore relinquishment of citizenship until the person notifies the State Department.
Obtaining a CLN to demonstrate relinquishment of U.S. citizenship has become a lengthy process with high barriers. The total cost of renouncing U.S. citizenship for a person in France, including the cost of preparing the related tax paperwork, has been reported to be €10,000-20,000 on average. Allison Christians of McGill University and Peter Spiro of Temple University have suggested that the complexity and cost of the process, especially the $2,350 State Department fee and the potential penalties for failure to file related tax forms, may constitute a breach of the U.S.' obligation not to impose arbitrary barriers to change of nationality, particularly when applied to accidental Americans who have few genuine links to the United States. Such an obligation can be found in municipal law (the Expatriation Act of 1868), in international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in general state practice. The difficulty of the process led to a proposal by members of France's National Assembly that the French government should negotiate with the U.S. government for French citizens to enjoy a simplified procedure for renouncing U.S. citizenship that did not require payment of such fees, and subsequently a June 2018 resolution in the European Parliament calling on the European Commission to carry out similar negotiations in respect of all accidental Americans who were citizens of the European Union.
Tax filing is not a legal prerequisite to giving up U.S. citizenship, although there are various negative tax consequences if one fails to file U.S. taxes before giving up citizenship, or fails to file tax forms specific to ex-citizens in the year following relinquishment. The U.S. State Department instructs officers not to answer any inquiries about the tax treatment of ex-citizens, and refers all such inquiries to the IRS.
Interview and processing fee
Obtaining a CLN by renouncing citizenship requires two interviews by U.S. consular officers; the first interview may be held by telephone, but State Department policy requires that the second must be in person. Obtaining a CLN through other forms of relinquishment, where the individual informs the consulate that he or she had the requisite intent when performing a potentially expatriating act, requires the individual to complete a questionnaire and return it to the consulate, after which the consular officer may request a follow-up interview, either by telephone or in person. In Canada, one of the countries with a high volume of relinquishments of U.S. citizenship, initial intake and review of the questionnaire prior to assignment of an appointment reportedly took 60 days in 2016.
Interviews are normally conducted on an individual basis, but in 2011 the U.S. Consulate in Toronto held a group appointment for twenty-two people in an apparent attempt to address scheduling difficulties. By 2014, backlogs had lengthened, and subsequently the Toronto consulate was reported to have a 10-month waiting list for appointments in 2015, while the U.S. Embassy in Dublin stated in April 2016 that no more appointments were available until December 2016. The appointment does not have to be conducted at the diplomatic post in the relinquisher's country of residence, but can be held at a post in another country instead.
After the second interview, the person signs a statement confirming that they understand the rights they are giving up, and must pay a fee of $2,350. The fee was raised from its previous level of $450 in 2014. This fee is believed to be the world's highest for giving up citizenship, more than twice the fee in the next highest country (Jamaica), and roughly twenty times the average fee charged by other developed countries.
Waiting for a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
Wait time to receive a CLN varies. Cuban spy René González received his CLN within days of renouncing. Others have reported wait times of as long as a year. The loss of citizenship is deemed to take legal effect on the date of the actual relinquishing act, rather than the date of approval of the CLN. While approval of the CLN is pending, the State Department will not issue a U.S. visa to a person who has relinquished citizenship, meaning that in general the person cannot travel to the United States. In exceptional cases, the State Department says that it can permit a relinquisher with an "urgent need to travel" to the U.S. while the CLN is pending to use a U.S. passport.
Following confirmation by State Department officials in Washington, DC, the consulate provides a copy of the CLN to the former citizen, and returns his or her U.S. passport after cancelling it. The State Department also forwards copies of the CLN to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security (more specifically Citizenship and Immigration Services), and the Internal Revenue Service.
Legal elements
Voluntariness and intent
Beginning with the Expatriation Act of 1907, Congress began to define concrete acts from which the intent to give up citizenship would be inferred, in what Nora Graham describes as the start of "the process of the government transforming voluntary expatriation into denationalization". The constitutional basis for this was not the Naturalization Clause, as Supreme Court dicta limited the scope of this power. Rather, the government successfully argued for decades, beginning in Mackenzie v. Hare, that this arose from the inherent power of sovereignty in foreign relations. The Nationality Act of 1940 greatly expanded the list of acts regarded as criteria for a finding of voluntary expatriation.
The Supreme Court eventually rejected this argument in Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), ruling that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress lacked the power to deprive a native-born or naturalized citizen of U.S. citizenship, and that loss of citizenship required the individual's assent. Then in Vance v. Terrazas (1980), the court further clarified that mere performance of expatriating acts could not be taken as "conclusive evidence" of assent to loss of citizenship, but rather that the trier of fact must also find an intent to relinquish citizenship either "in words" or "as fair inference from proven conduct". Finally, in 1990, the State Department adopted an administrative presumption that U.S. citizens who performed three categories of potentially expatriating acts (naturalizing in a foreign state, making a "routine" oath of allegiance to a foreign country, or serving in a non-policy-level position in a foreign government) intended to retain U.S. citizenship, unless the person "affirmatively asserts" otherwise to a consular officer. An attempt in 2005 to force the State Department to revise this policy died in committee in the House of Representatives. Though cases restricting government-initiated termination of U.S. citizenship were seen as civil rights victories by people who hoped to regain or retain U.S. citizenship, in practice they have also resulted in involuntary retroactive restoration of U.S. citizenship, without notification, to people who were unwilling to have their citizenship restored.
In general, the Department of Justice takes the position that renunciation pursuant to a plea bargain is voluntary and demonstrates intent to give up U.S. citizenship. However, the Office of Legal Counsel outlined some circumstances under which a court might regard such a renunciation as involuntary, including "physical or mental intimidation", material misrepresentation of the plea agreement, or withholding material evidence. In at least one case prior to 1984, a State Department official refused to certify that a renunciation under such a plea bargain was voluntary.
Some cases from the late 1950s and 1960s held that a potentially expatriating act could not actually cause loss of citizenship absent awareness that one had citizenship. Later case law modulated this: in Breyer v. Meissner (2000), the Third Circuit stated in dicta that voluntary service in the Waffen-SS during World War II would constitute "unequivocal renunciation of American citizenship whether or not the putative citizen [was] then aware that he has a right to American citizenship".
Burden of proof and standard of evidence
places the burden of proof for relinquishment of citizenship "upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the evidence", and establishes the presumption that a potentially expatriating act was performed voluntarily. Thus, when an individual citizen asserts that it was his or her intent to relinquish citizenship, the burden of proof is on the individual to prove that intent.
This provision, recommended by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), passed into law in 1961. HUAC chairman Francis E. Walter first introduced bills with this provision in February 1960 and January 1961, and it was eventually inserted into a Senate-originated bill on war orphans in August 1961. The House Judiciary Committee report on that bill stated that the burden of proof "would rest on the Government", whereas HUAC's later annual report noted that the burden of proof was on "the party claiming that such loss occurred". In the committee report on the bill, Walter described this provision as "forestall[ing] further erosion of the statute designed to preserve and uphold the dignity and priceless value of U.S. citizenship with attendant obligations".
The standard of preponderance of the evidence means that "it was more likely than not that the individual intended to relinquish citizenship at the time of the expatriating act"; the intent must be contemporaneous with the act. Prior to the enactment of 1481(b), the Supreme Court had held in Nishikawa v. Dulles that, in the absence of any Congressionally enacted standard of evidence, expatriation cases required the same standard of clear and convincing evidence as in denaturalization cases. Decades after the enactment of 1481(b), the Supreme Court upheld the new standard of evidence in Vance v. Terrazas in January 1980.
Abandonment of right of U.S. residence
In general, requires that an individual be outside of the United States and its outlying possessions in order to relinquish citizenship, except when the relinquishing act is renunciation during a state of war or commission of treason, rebellion, or similar crimes. Additionally, relinquishment of citizenship requires giving up the right to enter and reside in the United States. This does not mean that ex-citizens are banned from the country; the State Department routinely issues visas to ex-citizens. However, aside from limited exceptions for some indigenous peoples of the Americas, entry into the United States is a privilege for which ex-citizens must apply, rather than a right which they can exercise freely, and they can be denied entry or deported just like any other alien. Though it might be possible that an alien could be a citizen of a U.S. state without obtaining or even being eligible for U.S. citizenship, state citizenship cannot provide any rights to enter or remain in the United States. Pseudo-legal arguments about U.S. citizenship by members of the sovereign citizen movement, such as that a person can declare himself a "free-born citizen of a state" rather than a U.S. citizen and then continue to reside in the U.S. without being subject to federal law, have been found frivolous by courts. Courts have also addressed other assertions of residual rights to U.S. residence by ex-citizens on the basis of sub-national citizenship at least twice in recent years.
Garry Davis, who renounced U.S. citizenship in 1948 at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, attempted to return to the United States in 1978 without a visa, and was granted parole into the U.S. but not legal admission. In an appeal against deportation, he argued that he had only renounced United States citizenship but not the citizenship of the state of Maine where he was born. He further argued that the U.S. Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause meant that as a citizen of Maine he could not be denied the privilege of living in New Hampshire which New Hampshire citizens enjoyed. Judge Thomas Aquinas Flannery of the DC District Court did not address the first argument but rejected the second, writing that while the state of New Hampshire could not restrict Davis' travel or access there, under the Constitution's Naturalization Clause Congress has sole and absolute authority to make laws regarding the entry and deportation of people other than United States citizens.
In 1998, the DC District Court considered another case involving a renunciant who returned to the United States without a visa. In the mid-1990s, a number of Puerto Rican independence supporters, including Alberto Lozada Colón and Juan Mari Brás, renounced U.S. citizenship at U.S. embassies in nearby countries and then returned to Puerto Rico almost immediately while they were waiting to receive CLNs. In 1998, the State Department formally refused to issue a CLN to Lozada Colón, stating that his continued assertion of the right to reside in the United States without obtaining a visa demonstrated his lack of intent to relinquish United States citizenship. Lozada Colón petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the State Department to issue his CLN, arguing that he could relinquish U.S. citizenship while keeping Puerto Rican citizenship and thus the right to return to his homeland of Puerto Rico. Judge Stanley Sporkin rejected the argument that a non-U.S. citizen had the right to enter Puerto Rico, noting that Puerto Rico was part of the United States for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and so aliens required documentation from the U.S. government in order to enter and reside there. Sporkin further ruled that the court was not an appropriate venue to decide the political question of whether Puerto Rican citizenship could stand separately from U.S. citizenship. Following the ruling, the State Department also revoked Mari Brás' CLN.
Other citizenship recommended but not required
The United States is not a signatory to either the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. As such, the United States permits citizens to relinquish their citizenship even when those citizens have no other citizenship, without regard to the conventions' attempts to prevent statelessness from occurring as a result of voluntary relinquishment of nationality. The State Department warns that "severe hardship" could result to individuals making themselves stateless, that even those with permanent residence in their country "could encounter difficulties continuing to reside there without a nationality", and that a foreign country might deport stateless ex-U.S. citizens back to the United States. However, "[i]n making all these points clear to potentially stateless renunciants, the Department of State will, nevertheless, afford them their right to expatriate."
There are several known cases in which former U.S. citizens made themselves stateless voluntarily. Henry Martyn Noel moved to Allied-occupied Germany in the aftermath of World War II and voluntarily made himself stateless to protest "a climax of nationalism" he saw rising around him in the United States. Thomas Jolley renounced U.S. citizenship in 1967 after acquiring landed immigrant status in Canada (but not citizenship there) in order to avoid being drafted to serve in the Vietnam War. Raffi Hovannisian renounced U.S. citizenship in April 2001 and made himself stateless to protest a decade-long delay in the processing of his application for Armenian citizenship; he was subsequently granted Armenian citizenship by presidential decree about four months later. Garry Davis and Mike Gogulski made themselves stateless because they felt that their respective political philosophies precluded allegiance to any one country.
One case in which a stateless ex-U.S. citizen was deported back to the United States, as warned of by the State Department, was that of Joel Slater. Slater, motivated by opposition to the foreign policy of the Ronald Reagan administration, renounced in Perth, Australia, in 1987. After Australia deported him back to the United States, he subsequently proceeded to Canada en route to the French overseas territory of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, but failed to secure permission to remain there, and was deported from Canada back to the United States as well. In other cases, renunciation of U.S. citizenship forestalled or prevented the stateless individual's deportation. Clare Negrini renounced U.S. citizenship in Italy in 1951 and made herself stateless in an effort to prevent Italy from expelling her back to the United States; she later married an Italian citizen and acquired Italian citizenship through him. Harmon Wilfred renounced U.S. citizenship in New Zealand in 2005 and made himself stateless after Immigration New Zealand (INZ) denied his application for a visa extension to remain in the country. In 2011 INZ ordered Wilfred deported, but the State Department refused to issue travel documents to allow Wilfred entry to the U.S., and in February 2018 INZ withdrew the deportation order against him.
No relinquishment by parent or guardian
In early U.S. legal history, the Supreme Court recognized the expatriation of a minor by his father's action in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor (1830). In that case, the plaintiff had been born in New York City, but the success of his action to recover real estate turned on the legal question of his citizenship. It was not clear whether he was born before or after the United States Declaration of Independence, but it was common ground that his loyalist father took him to Nova Scotia after the 1783 British evacuation of New York. Justice Smith Thompson, writing the majority opinion, held that the father's action constituted election to be a British subject under the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and that decision extended to the plaintiff as well.
In the early 20th century, the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service clashed on the question of whether parental action could result in loss of citizenship of minor children. Though the Attorney-General favored the State Department's view that it could, in 1939 the Supreme Court held in Perkins v. Elg that a citizen born in the U.S. did not lose her own citizenship when her parents, both naturalized Americans of Swedish origin, returned to Sweden and her father renounced his American citizenship. In the 2010s, the U.S. Consulate in Calgary ruled that Carol Tapanila, an American-born Canadian woman who had renounced her own U.S. citizenship, could not renounce on behalf of her developmentally disabled son; the son was also ruled unable to renounce on his own due to his inability to understand the concept of citizenship or renunciation, thus leaving him permanently subject to U.S. taxation and reporting requirements on gains in his Canadian government-funded Registered Disability Savings Plan.
The statutory definition of some potentially expatriating acts, namely foreign naturalization, foreign oath of allegiance, and foreign government service, requires that the person performing them have been eighteen years or older at the time in order to relinquish citizenship through those acts. There is no statutory age restriction on renunciation before a U.S. diplomatic officer abroad; nevertheless, the State Department often refuses to accept renunciations by minors, and carefully scrutinizes cases involving even individuals who have recently attained the age of majority, on the theory that they may be subject to ongoing influence by their parents.
Reasons for relinquishing citizenship
Foreign prohibitions on multiple citizenship
Although the U.S. government has removed most restrictions on dual or multiple citizenship from its nationality laws, some other countries retain such restrictions, and U.S. citizens in such countries may choose to give up U.S. citizenship to comply with those restrictions.
Some foreign countries do not permit their citizens to hold other citizenships at all. Bars on dual citizenship take a variety of forms, but two common provisions in such countries' laws are that a foreigner seeking to become a citizen of the country generally must obtain release from any other citizenships according to the laws of those other countries (a provision seen for example in South Korea and Austria), and that a person who was born with dual citizenship must choose whether to retain the local citizenship or the foreign citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (e.g. in Japan). In the 1990s, a large proportion of individuals relinquishing citizenship were naturalized citizens returning to their countries of birth; for example, the State Department indicated to the JCT that many of the 858 U.S. citizens who renounced in 1994 were former Korean Americans who returned to South Korea and resumed their citizenship there, which under South Korean nationality law required them to give up their U.S. citizenship. By the late 1990s, the number of relinquishments had fallen to about 400 per year. The State Department speculated that the 1997 Asian financial crisis resulted in "fewer people renounc[ing] their U.S. citizenship as a condition of employment in an Asian country".
Even countries which permit dual citizenship may bar dual citizens from government positions. Section 44 of the Constitution of Australia for example forbids dual citizens to stand for election to Parliament, while Article 28 of Taiwan's Public Servants Employment Act bars dual citizens from most public-sector positions. Diplomatic and consular positions present additional difficulties. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations state that a country may refuse to receive a diplomat or consular officer who holds the citizenship of the receiving country. Based on this, the State Department does not receive U.S. citizens and non-citizen nationals as diplomats representing a foreign country to the United States. The State Department permits such individuals to represent a foreign country in its diplomatic mission at United Nations Headquarters in New York City, but while in such positions they enjoy only official acts immunity and not diplomatic immunity. Thus, an individual wishing to assume a diplomatic or consular position in the United States may choose to relinquish U.S. citizenship. One early example of this, which was described at the time as the first such case in U.S. diplomatic history, was Oskar R. Lange's decision to renounce citizenship in 1945 to become the Polish ambassador to the United States.
Tax compliance difficulties for U.S. citizens abroad
The United States is the only country which taxes the foreign income of citizens residing abroad permanently. The United States first imposed taxes on overseas citizens during the Civil War, and has done so continuously since the Revenue Act of 1913 up to the present. During that period, the small number of other countries with similar practices all repealed such laws and moved to taxing based on residence, to the extent that residence-based taxation might now be regarded as a norm of customary international law; Allison Christians has stated that the U.S. might be regarded as a persistent objector to the emergence of this new norm, though she notes that the U.S.' sporadic efforts to enforce its system over the years in which this norm formed might not rise to the level of "persistent".
The U.S. foreign tax credit and Foreign Earned Income Exclusion reduce double taxation but do not eliminate it even for people whose income is well below the exclusion threshold, particularly in the case of self-employment tax. The treatment of foreign-currency loans can result in U.S. income tax owed even when there has been no income in real terms, which causes difficulties for those who obtained a mortgage to purchase a home in their country of residence. Foreign government-sponsored savings plans or structures may face complicated reporting requirements under United States anti-offshoring laws; for example the Canadian Registered Disability Savings Plan may be a foreign trust for U.S. tax purposes, while non-US mutual funds may be Passive Foreign Investment Companies. The forms for reporting such assets are time-consuming to complete, often requiring expensive professional assistance, and penalties of $10,000 per form can be imposed for failure to file. Furthermore, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) imposed additional compliance burdens on non-U.S. banks, making them increasingly unwilling to extend anything beyond basic banking services to customers with U.S. citizenship. One scholar described the sum total of these requirements as "an attack on ordre public".
The rise in relinquishments in the 2010s appears to have been driven by increased awareness of the tax and reporting burdens on U.S. citizens in other countries; in particular, many relinquishers are believed to be accidental Americans who only learned about their citizenship and these burdens due to enforcement of and publicity about FATCA. Some legal scholars interpret the number of U.S. citizenship relinquishers as indicating acceptance of the tax and reporting burdens by those who do not relinquish. Others believe that the number of people giving up citizenship remains small only because some de jure dual citizens, particularly those born abroad, remain unaware of their status or are able to hide from the U.S. government more effectively than those born in the United States.
U.S. military service
In 1972, one commentator described Selective Service registration and military service as the "primary obligation" of U.S. citizen men living abroad, aside from taxation. In a 1995 report, the Joint Committee on Taxation attributed the high number of people who gave up U.S. citizenship in the 1960s and 1970s to the Vietnam War.
Other reasons
Other individual ex-citizens have expressed a variety of reasons for giving up U.S. citizenship.
Vincent Cate, an encryption expert living in Anguilla, chose to renounce his U.S. citizenship in 1998 to avoid the possibility of violating U.S. laws that may have prohibited U.S. citizens from "exporting" encryption software.
Some individuals have given up U.S. citizenship as part of plea bargains, in order to receive reduced penalties for certain crimes. Examples include Arthur Rudolph and Yaser Esam Hamdi. The State Department notes that "some would liken [this] to banishment when a citizen at birth is involved".
Relinquishing acts since 1978
U.S. law explicitly lists the acts by which one may relinquish U.S. citizenship at , and previously in other sections of the same subchapter. The list itself was last amended in 1978 to delete the provisions on loss of citizenship for draft evasion, desertion, failure to reside in the United States by naturalized citizens, voting in foreign elections, and failure to reside in the United States by citizens born abroad. The former four had already been struck down by the Supreme Court a decade earlier or more in Trop v. Dulles (1958), Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), Schneider v. Rusk (1964), and Afroyim v. Rusk (1967). The final provision had been upheld in Rogers v. Bellei (1971), but the State Department favored its repeal. The conditions for relinquishment under some potentially expatriating acts were modified by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, which also inserted the general requirement of "intention to relinquish" in conformance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Vance v. Terrazas (1980). The last amendment to this section was contained in the Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, which extended the requirement of intention to relinquishing acts prior to the effective date of the 1986 amendments.
Naturalization in a foreign country
provides for relinquishment through "obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application or upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent". The U.S. government did not recognize unequivocally that a U.S. citizen could choose to give up citizenship by becoming a citizen of a foreign country until the passage of the Expatriation Act of 1868, and instead treated them as continuing to be U.S. citizens regardless of their intent, for example in the Supreme Court case Talbot v. Janson (1795). Beginning in 1868, the State Department regarded foreign naturalization as effecting expatriation in nearly all cases, again without regard to the citizen's intent.
The State Department continued to regard foreign naturalization as demonstrating intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship even after Vance v. Terrazas. As late as 1985, in Richards v. Secretary of State, the Ninth Circuit upheld a State Department finding of expatriation against a man who had naturalized in Canada, despite his protests that he did not wish to give up U.S. citizenship and that he had only naturalized in order to keep his job with Scouts Canada. Similar rulings by the State Department's Board of Appellate Review can be found as late as March 1990. This policy ended in April 1990, when the State Department began applying a presumption of intent to retain U.S. citizenship to most potentially expatriating acts, including naturalization in a foreign country.
The State Department used to assert that acquisition of Israeli citizenship by operation of the Law of Return after moving to Israel on an oleh's visa could not trigger loss of citizenship under 1481(a)(1) even if the citizen stated that it was his or her intent to relinquish. In Fox v. Clinton (2012), the plaintiff challenged this policy and won recognition of his relinquishment on appeal to the DC Circuit Court.
Oath of allegiance to a foreign country
provides for relinquishment through "taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof". This provision was first found in Section 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907, and was re-enacted in Section 401(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940.
In various cases before the Board of Immigration Appeals up to 1950, oaths which were held as not establishing expatriation included an oath required for employment by a Canadian government-owned airline, an ordination oath in the Church of England, and an admission oath in the German Bar Association. State Department officials also held that the oath should be required by the laws of the foreign state and sworn before an officer of its government. In Gillars v. United States (1950), an appeal in the treason trial of Mildred Gillars, the DC Circuit Court rejected Gillars' contention that a letter she signed in the aftermath of a workplace dispute expressing allegiance to Germany resulted in her expatriation because it was informal in nature, not signed before any German government official, and not connected to German regulations or legal procedures. In the 1950s and 1960s, courts rejected government contentions that individuals had expatriated themselves by subscribing to the oath of allegiance on the application form for a Philippine passport, or making the statement of allegiance to King George V contained in the oath of admission to the Canadian Bar Association. Finally, in Vance v. Terrazas (1980), the Supreme Court held that even when an oath sworn to a foreign government contains language specifically renouncing allegiance to the United States, the government cannot use the oath itself as evidence of intent to relinquish citizenship, but must establish such intent independently.
In 2017, the State Department added four criteria to the Foreign Affairs Manual regarding what would be considered a "meaningful oath" for purposes of this provision. The fourth criterion required that "making and receipt of the oath or affirmation alters the affiant’s legal status with respect to the foreign state", giving the example that a citizen of a foreign country could not expatriate him or herself by taking an oath of allegiance to that same country, unless the oath gave the person a "new citizenship status ... such as a retention of citizenship that might otherwise be lost".
Serving in a foreign military
provides for relinquishment through "entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state" if either the person serves "as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer" or "such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States". 1481(a)(3) does not require that the person have attained the age of eighteen years. The State Department's 1990 presumption of intent to retain U.S. citizenship does not apply to service in the military of a foreign country engaged in hostilities against the United States.
When the Supreme Court considered the Nationality Act of 1940's predecessor to this provision in Nishikawa v. Dulles (1958), the majority struck down the government's contention that plaintiff-appellant Mitsugi Nishikawa's service in the Imperial Japanese Army during WWII could serve to effect his expatriation under this provision, because he had been conscripted. The minority objected that by the time the provision had been written, "conscription and not voluntary enlistment had become the usual method of raising armies throughout the world, and it can hardly be doubted that Congress was aware of this fact."
Serving in a foreign government
provides for relinquishment through "accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof", if the person "has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state" or "if an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is required".
Though the State Department's 1990 presumption of intent to retain U.S. citizenship applies only to non-policy-level employment in a foreign government, even policy-level employment typically does not result in loss of citizenship if the individual says that he or she did not intend to give up citizenship. However, the State Department has expressed some reservations whether serving as a foreign head of state, head of government, or minister of foreign affairs is compatible with maintaining United States citizenship, due to the absolute immunity from U.S. jurisdiction which individuals in such positions should enjoy at customary international law. One case in which the State Department made an ex post facto finding that a foreign head of government had previously relinquished US citizenship was that of Grenadian prime minister Keith Mitchell, who was determined in October 2001 to have relinquished citizenship as of June 1995. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed retained his U.S. citizenship during his whole term as prime minister of Somalia in 2010 and the first two years of his term as president of Somalia beginning in 2017; during his term as president, he avoided traveling to the U.S. for diplomatic functions such as the general debates of the 72nd and 73rd sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in what some Somali news reports stated was an attempt to avoid any issues of immunity that might arise, and he then renounced U.S. citizenship in mid-2019.
Under the respective Compacts of Free Association, service with the governments of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or Palau is not an expatriating act.
Renunciation at a U.S. diplomatic mission abroad
provides for renunciation "before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State". The text of the oath is found in Form DS-4080. The 1990 presumption of intent to retain U.S. citizenship does not apply to swearing an oath of renunciation before a U.S. diplomatic officer. The State Department describes renunciation as "the most unequivocal way in which someone can manifest an intention to relinquish U.S. citizenship". A major legal distinction between renunciation and other forms of relinquishment is that "[i]t is much more difficult to establish a lack of intent or duress for renunciation".
A large-scale case in which renunciations of U.S. citizenship were later overturned was that of the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. In the early 1980s, at least 700 members of the community who had settled in Israel renounced their U.S. citizenship in the hopes that statelessness would prevent their deportation back to the United States, though their children tended to retain citizenship. Groups of four to six per week came to the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to renounce citizenship, over a period of years. Around 1990, the community began negotiating with the Israeli government in an effort to regularize their immigration status; one condition of the mass grant of residence permits was for the community members to re-acquire U.S. citizenship, so that the small number of criminals who had tried to hide in their community could be deported back to the United States. The State Department accepted community leaders' argument that the earlier renunciations had been made under duress due to the social and political environment at the time, and were thus involuntary and did not meet the legal requirements to terminate citizenship.
Renunciation within U.S. territory
provides for renunciation from within U.S. territory "in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense". It was intended to encourage militants among Japanese American internees to renounce U.S. citizenship so that they could continue to be detained if internment were to be declared unconstitutional. About five thousand individuals, mostly at Tule Lake, renounced citizenship for a variety of reasons, including anger at the U.S. government for the internment and the desire to remain with non-citizen family members whom they feared would be deported to Japan. After the war, civil rights lawyer Wayne M. Collins helped many fight legal battles in the courts to regain their citizenship, while some such as Joseph Kurihara accepted deportation to Japan and lived out the rest of their lives there.
1481(a)(6) became inoperative after World War II, and was thought to have remained so during the Vietnam War. There were later some pro se lawsuits regarding 1481(a)(6) due to what Judge Bernice B. Donald derided as a "popular myth among prisoners" that renouncing citizenship would allow early release in exchange for deportation to another country. Courts consistently ruled that 1481(a)(6) was inoperative because the U.S. was not in a "state of war", until 2008 when James Kaufman of Wisconsin won a ruling from the DC District Court that the U.S. was indeed in a "state of war" and that the Department of Homeland Security was responsible for administering 1481(a)(6). The Department of Justice abandoned its appeal against this ruling for unstated reasons. Further attempts by prisoners to renounce under 1481(a)(6) continued to be stymied by a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services policy that applicants had to attend an in-person interview and demonstrate that they could leave the U.S. immediately upon approval of renunciation. By 2018, Kaufman had been released from prison but remained unable to renounce due to the second requirement, though on appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that USCIS was incorrect as a matter of law to conclude, from Kaufman's failure to establish foreign residency or citizenship prior to his attempt at renunciation, that Kaufman lacked the requisite intent to renounce citizenship.
Treason, rebellion, or similar crimes
provides that commission of certain crimes may be regarded as a relinquishing act, if one is convicted of those crimes. The original list in Section 349(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 included only treason, bearing arms against the U.S., or attempting to overthrow the U.S. by force. The Expatriation Act of 1954, motivated by fears of communism in the United States, added additional crimes to this list, namely the crime of advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government as defined by the Smith Act of 1940, as well as the crimes of seditious conspiracy and rebellion or insurrection as proscribed by the Crimes Act of 1909. This provision is known to have been applied to Tomoya Kawakita, whose conviction for treason was upheld by the Supreme Court in Kawakita v. United States (1952). Kawakita had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment in 1953, and in 1963 received a conditional pardon in exchange for his deportation to Japan. As of 1991, the constitutionality of this provision had not been tested in the courts. In the 2000s and 2010s, there were proposals to add additional terrorism-related crimes to the list of those causing loss of citizenship, such as the Enemy Expatriation Act in 2011, but these failed to pass.
Legal treatment of former citizens
Taxation
Special tax provisions began targeting former U.S. citizens in the 1960s. The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, which provided that foreigners who invested in the United States would not have to pay capital gains tax, denied this tax break to people who had relinquished U.S. citizenship within the past ten years and whom the IRS determined to have relinquished for the purpose of avoiding U.S. taxation. This was intended to ensure that U.S. citizens did not relinquish citizenship for the purpose of accessing those tax breaks.
These provisions were rarely enforced due to their vagueness. In the early 1990s an article in Forbes magazine sparked renewed public interest in the issue of wealthy individuals giving up citizenship in order to avoid U.S. taxation, who were estimated to make up roughly a dozen of the one thousand individuals per year giving up U.S. citizenship. As a result, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) enacted concrete criteria under which an ex-citizen would be presumed a "covered expatriate" who gave up U.S. status for tax reasons, based on the person's income and assets, (), and required such citizens to file additional tax forms to certify their compliance with the new provisions (). Dual citizens at birth and young people who relinquished citizenship before the age of 18½ were exempt from "covered expatriate" status, subject to some restrictions including limited physical presence in the United States. The law also extended the expatriation tax to cover ex-permanent residents as well.
Discretionary exceptions to this tax, in particular the system of obtaining a private letter ruling (PLR) that one's relinquishment of citizenship was not motivated by taxation, fueled perceptions that it was ineffective at addressing tax-motivated relinquishment of citizenship, and sparked further amendments in the 2000s. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 terminated the PLR exception to the tax on covered expatriates and taxed those who stayed in the U.S. for more than thirty days in any of the first ten years following relinquishment as though they remained a U.S. citizen for that year, while also classifying as "covered expatriates" people who relinquished citizenship or permanent residence but could not certify compliance with their tax filing and payment obligations for the past five years. Then, the Heroes Earnings Assistance Relief Tax Act (HEART Act) of 2008 repealed the ten-year system and imposed new taxes relating to covered expatriates, consisting of a one-time tax on worldwide accrued capital gains, calculated on a mark-to-market basis, and an inheritance tax on bequests from covered expatriates to U.S. persons (equivalent to estate tax with the exemption amount drastically lowered from $5.5 million to $13,000). The HEART Act also modified the criteria for dual citizens and people below the age of 18½ to be exempted from "covered expatriate" status. The new certification requirement to avoid covered expatriate status means that even the poorest individuals renouncing citizenship could become subject to these taxes. As a result, though tax filing is not a legal prerequisite to relinquishment of citizenship, this new exit tax system imposed significant disadvantages on people who relinquished citizenship without filing taxes.
Publication of names
In addition to the tax law changes, HIPAA included a provision to make the names of people who give up U.S. citizenship part of the public record by listing them in the Federal Register. The sponsor of this provision, Sam Gibbons (D-FL), stated that it was intended to "name and shame" the people in question. The list contains numerous errors and does not appear to report the names of all people who give up U.S. citizenship, though tax lawyers disagree whether that is because the list is only required to contain "covered expatriates", or due to unintentional omissions or other reasons. Other countries such as Vietnam and South Korea also have provisions requiring publication of renunciation decisions in their respective government gazettes.
Visas
Two provisions of U.S. immigration law make some former citizens inadmissible, though only a small number of people are actually found inadmissible under those provisions each year. A finding of inadmissibility prevents a person from entering the U.S. either temporarily (under the Visa Waiver Program or a visitor or other visa) or permanently (as a lawful permanent resident), unless the person obtains a Waiver of Inadmissibility.
The Reed Amendment (), which became law as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, attempted to make people who had renounced citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation by the United States inadmissible. The Department of Homeland Security indicated in a 2015 report that, due to laws protecting the privacy of tax information, the provision was effectively impossible to enforce unless the former citizen "affirmatively admits" his or her reasons for renouncing citizenship to an official at DHS or the State Department. Bipartisan efforts in the 2000s and 2010s to amend the tax information privacy laws to address this limitation all failed. According to the State Department, no person was denied a U.S. visa due to inadmissibility under the Reed Amendment until Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, in which a total of three visa applications were denied due to a finding of inadmissibility. In two of those cases, the applicant was able to overcome the finding of inadmissibility and obtain a visa.
Another provision () makes inadmissible anyone who left the U.S. "to avoid or evade training or service in the armed forces" during a war or national emergency. The State Department regards a conviction as unnecessary for a finding of inadmissibility under this provision. Only people who were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents upon their departure are ineligible for non-immigrant visas under this provision. President Carter's 1977 pardon means that this provision is not applied to Vietnam War draft evaders. The State Department interprets the pardon as not applying to deserters. From 2000 to 2014, 120 people were found ineligible for non-immigrant visas under this provision, among whom 83 were able to overcome this ineligibility.
Regaining citizenship through naturalization
There is no specific provision of law which prevents a person who relinquished U.S. citizenship from regaining it again through naturalization, though conversely such individuals enjoy no special provisions to make the process easier either. They generally must qualify for lawful permanent resident (LPR) immigration status through the same process as any other alien, and must comply with the same requirements for naturalization. Special exceptions apply to women who lost citizenship under the Expatriation Act of 1907 by marrying a non-citizen, and to people who lost citizenship through service in Allied armed forces during World War II: such people can obtain special LPR status (under SC-1 and SC-2 visas) and apply for renaturalization without any required period of residence. The State Department has not issued any SC-1 or SC-2 visas at least since 2000.
Levi Ying stated that the process of regaining U.S. citizenship through naturalization was not very difficult. Ying, a Taiwanese American lawyer who renounced U.S. citizenship to take political office in Taiwan, subsequently re-immigrated to the United States on a petition by his wife (who had remained a U.S. citizen), and applied for naturalization again for the sake of convenience. In contrast, some former Korean Americans who renounced U.S. citizenship to go into politics in South Korea, including Chris Nam and Chang Sung-gill, stated that while they were able to regain LPR status in the U.S. easily through sponsorship by spouses or children who had retained U.S. citizenship, they faced difficulties in the naturalization process.
Firearms and explosives
One provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (codified at 18 U.S. Code § 922(g)) criminalizes firearms purchases by, and firearms sales to, people who have renounced United States citizenship. This provision, along with similar treatment for people adjudged mentally defective or dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces, and a restriction on mail-order firearms sales, was aimed at preventing a repeat of the circumstances which allowed Lee Harvey Oswald to obtain the rifle which he used to assassinate President Kennedy. Oswald had never actually renounced his citizenship; he went to the U.S. embassy in Moscow one Saturday in 1959 intending to do so, but in order to delay him, Richard Edward Snyder requested that he come back on a weekday to complete the paperwork and swear the formal oath of renunciation, which Oswald never did.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) interprets the word "renounced" in this provision of law to apply only to persons who swore an oath of renunciation U.S. citizenship before a designated U.S. government official, and not those who committed other relinquishing acts. ATF further stated that a court appeal which reverses a renunciation also removes firearms disabilities, but that a renunciant who subsequently obtains United States citizenship again through naturalization would continue to be barred from purchasing firearms. Under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, individuals who are barred from purchasing firearms due to this provision or other provisions of the same law have their names entered into the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.
The Safe Explosives Act (a portion of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) expanded the list of people who may not lawfully transport, ship, receive or possess explosive materials to include people who have renounced their U.S. citizenship. In 2003, ATF promulgated regulations under that act providing for a definition of renunciation of citizenship consistent with that under the regulations to the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Brady Act of 1993.
Social Security benefits
In general, ex-U.S. citizens are treated like any other aliens for purposes of Social Security retirement benefits. Those who have earned qualifying wages for at least forty quarters are eligible to receive benefits, while those who have not are ineligible. "Qualifying wages" excludes wages paid abroad by a non-U.S. employer, so in general people who have resided abroad for their entire working lives did not pay into Social Security and are not eligible for benefits, regardless of their citizenship.
Additionally, aliens face restrictions on eligibility for payments based on their country of citizenship or residence, whereas U.S. citizens do not. Residents of countries which have a totalization agreement with the United States, as well as citizens of 53 other countries, can receive Social Security payments indefinitely while residing outside of the United States. Otherwise, Social Security benefit payments will stop after the alien has spent six full calendar months outside of the United States, and cannot be resumed until the alien spends one full calendar month inside of the United States and is lawfully present for that entire month. U.S. citizens, in contrast, can receive Social Security payments outside of the U.S. regardless of their length of residence abroad.
Other government benefits
Relinquishment of U.S. citizenship does not result in loss of Medicare benefits if one was eligible prior to relinquishing. Medicare does not cover medical treatment outside of the U.S. for either citizens or non-citizens, meaning that Medicare beneficiaries would have to travel to the U.S. in order to use their benefits. Furthermore, Medicare beneficiaries who wish to retain their Part B benefits must continue to pay Part B premiums even while living outside of the United States.
Retired members of the United States Armed Forces who cease to be U.S. citizens may lose their entitlement to veterans' benefits, if the right to benefits is dependent on the retiree's continued military status.
Under Department of Energy guidelines, an action that shows allegiance to a country other than the United States, such as a declaration of intent to renounce U.S. citizenship or actual renunciation of citizenship, demonstrates foreign preference and thus is a ground to deny a security clearance.
Notable people
Below is a gallery of some individuals who relinquished United States citizenship, listed by their other citizenship (dependent territories listed with the country in parentheses afterwards).
Notes
References
External links
Advice about Possible Loss of U.S. Nationality and Dual Nationality, from the U.S. State Department
The Consulate Report Directory, a collection of personal accounts about experiences reporting relinquishment of citizenship and obtaining CLNs at various U.S. consulates
United States nationality law
International taxation
American emigration |
54406327 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petya%20and%20NotPetya | Petya and NotPetya | Petya is a family of encrypting malware that was first discovered in 2016. The malware targets Microsoft Windows–based systems, infecting the master boot record to execute a payload that encrypts a hard drive's file system table and prevents Windows from booting. It subsequently demands that the user make a payment in Bitcoin in order to regain access to the system. The Petya malware had infected millions of computers during its first year of its release.
Variants of Petya were first seen in March 2016, which propagated via infected e-mail attachments. In June 2017, a new variant of Petya was used for a global cyberattack, primarily targeting Ukraine. The new variant propagates via the EternalBlue exploit, which is generally believed to have been developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), and was used earlier in the year by the WannaCry ransomware. Kaspersky Lab referred to this new version as NotPetya to distinguish it from the 2016 variants, due to these differences in operation. In addition, although it purports to be ransomware, this variant was modified so that it is unable to actually revert its own changes. The NotPetya attacks have been blamed on the Russian government, specifically the Sandworm hacking group within the GRU Russian military intelligence organization, by security researchers, Google, and several governments.
History
Petya was discovered in March 2016; Check Point noted that while it had achieved fewer infections than other ransomware active in early 2016, such as CryptoWall, it contained notable differences in operation that caused it to be "immediately flagged as the next step in ransomware evolution". Another variant of Petya discovered in May 2016 contained a secondary payload used if the malware cannot achieve administrator-level access.
The name "Petya" is a reference to the 1995 James Bond film GoldenEye, wherein Petya is one of the two Soviet weapon satellites which carry a "Goldeneye"—an atomic bomb detonated in low Earth orbit to produce an electromagnetic pulse. A Twitter account that Heise suggested may have belonged to the author of the malware, named "Janus Cybercrime Solutions" after Alec Trevelyan's crime group in GoldenEye, had an avatar with an image of GoldenEye character Boris Grishenko, a Russian hacker and antagonist in the film played by Scottish actor Alan Cumming.
On 30 August 2018, a regional court in Nikopol in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast of Ukraine convicted an unnamed Ukrainian citizen to one year in prison after pleading guilty to having spread a version of Petya online.
2017 cyberattack
On 27 June 2017, a major global cyberattack began (Ukrainian companies were among the first to state they were being attacked), utilizing a new variant of Petya. On that day, Kaspersky Lab reported infections in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but that the majority of infections targeted Russia and Ukraine, where more than 80 companies were initially attacked, including the National Bank of Ukraine. ESET estimated on 28 June 2017 that 80% of all infections were in Ukraine, with Germany second hardest hit with about 9%. Russian president Vladimir Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, stated that the attack had caused no serious damage in Russia. Experts believed this was a politically-motivated attack against Ukraine, since it occurred on the eve of the Ukrainian holiday Constitution Day.
Kaspersky dubbed this variant "NotPetya", as it has major differences in its operations in comparison to earlier variants. McAfee engineer Christiaan Beek stated that this variant was designed to spread quickly, and that it had been targeting "complete energy companies, the power grid, bus stations, gas stations, the airport, and banks".
It was believed that the software update mechanism of —a Ukrainian tax preparation program that, according to F-Secure analyst Mikko Hyppönen, "appears to be de facto" among companies doing business in the country—had been compromised to spread the malware. Analysis by ESET found that a backdoor had been present in the update system for at least six weeks prior to the attack, describing it as a "thoroughly well-planned and well-executed operation". The developers of M.E.Doc denied that they were entirely responsible for the cyberattack, stating that they too were victims.
On 4 July 2017, Ukraine's cybercrime unit seized the company's servers after detecting "new activity" that it believed would result in "uncontrolled proliferation" of malware. Ukraine police advised M.E.Doc users to stop using the software, as it presumed that the backdoor was still present. Analysis of the seized servers showed that software updates had not been applied since 2013, there was evidence of Russian presence, and an employee's account on the servers had been compromised; the head of the units warned that M.E.Doc could be found criminally responsible for enabling the attack because of its negligence in maintaining the security of their servers.
Operation
Petya's payload infects the computer's master boot record (MBR), overwrites the Windows bootloader, and triggers a restart. Upon startup, the payload encrypts the Master File Table of the NTFS file system, and then displays the ransom message demanding a payment made in Bitcoin. Meanwhile, the computer's screen displays text purportedly output by chkdsk, Windows' file system scanner, suggesting that the hard drive's sectors are being repaired.
The original payload required the user to grant it administrative privileges; one variant of Petya was bundled with a second payload, Mischa, which activated if Petya failed to install. Mischa is a more conventional ransomware payload that encrypts user documents, as well as executable files, and does not require administrative privileges to execute. The earlier versions of Petya disguised their payload as a PDF file, attached to an e-mail. United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) released Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) about Petya on 30 June 2017.
The "NotPetya" variant used in the 2017 attack uses EternalBlue, an exploit that takes advantage of a vulnerability in Windows' Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. EternalBlue is generally believed to have been developed by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA); it was leaked in April 2017 and was also used by WannaCry. The malware harvests passwords (using tweaked build of open-source Mimikatz) and uses other techniques to spread to other computers on the same network, and uses those passwords in conjunction with PSExec to run code on other local computers. Additionally, although it still purports to be ransomware, the encryption routine was modified so that the malware could not technically revert its changes. This characteristic, along with other unusual signs in comparison to WannaCry (including the relatively low unlock fee of US$300, and using a single, fixed Bitcoin wallet to collect ransom payments rather than generating a unique ID for each specific infection for tracking purposes), prompted researchers to speculate that this attack was not intended to be a profit-generating venture, but to damage devices quickly, and ride off the media attention WannaCry received by claiming to be ransomware.
Mitigation
It was found that it may be possible to stop the encryption process if an infected computer is immediately shut down when the fictitious chkdsk screen appears, and a security analyst proposed that creating read-only files named perf.c and/or perfc.dat in the Windows installation directory could prevent the payload of the current strain from executing. The email address listed on the ransom screen was suspended by its provider, Posteo, for being a violation of its terms of use. As a result, infected users could not actually send the required payment confirmation to the perpetrator. Additionally, if the computer's filesystem was FAT based, the MFT encryption sequence was skipped, and only the ransomware's message was displayed, allowing data to be recovered trivially.
Microsoft had already released patches for supported versions of Windows in March 2017 to address the EternalBlue vulnerability. This was followed by patches for unsupported versions of Windows (such as Windows XP) in May 2017, in the direct wake of WannaCry. Wired believed that "based on the extent of damage Petya has caused so far, though, it appears that many companies have put off patching, despite the clear and potentially devastating threat of a similar ransomware spread." Some enterprises may consider it too disruptive to install updates on certain systems, either due to possible downtime or compatibility concerns, which can be problematic in some environments.
Impact
In a report published by Wired, a White House assessment pegged the total damages brought about by NotPetya to more than $10 billion. This was confirmed by former Homeland Security adviser Tom Bossert, who at the time of the attack was the most senior cybersecurity focused official in the US government.
During the attack initiated on 27 June 2017, the radiation monitoring system at Ukraine's Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant went offline. Several Ukrainian ministries, banks and metro systems were also affected. It is said to have been the most destructive cyberattack ever.
Among those affected elsewhere included British advertising company WPP, Maersk Line, American pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Russian oil company Rosneft (its oil production was unaffected), multinational law firm DLA Piper, French construction company Saint-Gobain and its retail and subsidiary outlets in Estonia, British consumer goods company Reckitt Benckiser, German personal care company Beiersdorf, German logistics company DHL, United States food company Mondelez International, and American hospital operator Heritage Valley Health System. The Cadbury's Chocolate Factory in Hobart, Tasmania, is the first company in Australia to be affected by Petya. On 28 June 2017, JNPT, India's largest container port, had reportedly been affected, with all operations coming to a standstill. Princeton Community Hospital in rural West Virginia will scrap and replace its entire computer network on its path to recovery.
The business interruption to Maersk, the world's largest container ship and supply vessel operator, was estimated between $200m and $300m in lost revenues.
The business impact on FedEx is estimated to be $400m in 2018, according to the company's 2019 annual report.
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary-General, pressed the alliance to strengthen its cyber defenses, saying that a cyberattack could trigger the Article 5 principle of collective defense.
Mondelez International's insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company, has refused to pay out a claim for cleaning up damage from a Notpetya infection, on the grounds that Notpetya is an "act of war" that is not covered by the policy. Mondelez is suing Zurich American for $100 million.
Reaction
Europol said it was aware of and urgently responding to reports of a cyber attack in member states of the European Union. The United States Department of Homeland Security was involved and coordinating with its international and local partners. In a letter to the NSA, Democratic Congressman Ted Lieu asked the agency to collaborate more actively with technology companies to notify them of software vulnerabilities and help them prevent future attacks based on malware created by the NSA.
On 15 February 2018, the Trump administration blamed Russia for the attack and warned that there would be "international consequences". The United Kingdom and the Australian government also issued similar statements.
In October 2020 the DOJ named further GRU officers in an indictment.
At the same time, the UK government blamed GRU's Sandworm also for attacks on the 2020 Summer Games.
Other notable low-level malware
CIH (1998)
Stuxnet (2010)
WannaCry (2017)
See also
References
Further reading
2017 in computing
2017 in Ukraine
Cyberattacks
Cybercrime
Hacking in the 2010s
June 2017 crimes
Ransomware |
54426201 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unique%20homomorphic%20extension%20theorem | Unique homomorphic extension theorem | The unique homomorphic extension theorem is a result in mathematical logic which formalizes the intuition that the truth or falsity of a statement can be deduced from the truth values of its parts.
The lemma
Let A be a non-empty set, X a subset of A, F a set of functions in A, and the inductive closure of X under F.
Let be B any non-empty set and let G be the set of functions on B, such that there is a function in G that maps with each function f of arity n in F the following function in G (G cannot be a bijection).
From this lemma we can now build the concept of unique homomorphic extension.
The theorem
If is a free set generated by X and F, for each function there is a single function such that:
For each function f of arity n > 0, for each
Consequence
The identities seen in (1) e (2) show that is an homomorphism, specifically named the unique homomorphic extension of . To prove the theorem, two requirements must be met: to prove that the extension () exists and is unique (assuring the lack of bijections).
Proof of the theorem
We must define a sequence of functions inductively, satisfying conditions (1) and (2) restricted to . For this, we define , and given then shall have the following graph:
First we must be certain the graph actually has functionality, since is a free set, from the lemma we have when , so we only have to determine the functionality for the left side of the union. Knowing that the elements of G are functions(again, as defined by the lemma), the only instance where and for some is possible is if we have for some and for some generators and in .
Since and are disjoint when this implies and . Being all in , we must have .
Then we have with , displaying functionality.
Before moving further we must make use of a new lemma that determines the rules for partial functions, it may be written as:
(3)Be a sequence of partial functions such that . Then, is a partial function.
Using (3), is a partial function. Since then is total in .
Furthermore, it is clear from the definition of that satisfies (1) and (2). To prove the uniqueness of , or any other function that satisfies (1) and (2), it is enough to use a simple induction that shows and work for , and such is proved the Theorem of the Unique Homomorphic Extension.
Example of a particular case
We can use the theorem of unique homomorphic extension for calculating numeric expressions over whole numbers. First, we must define the following:
where
Be
Be he inductive closure of under and be
Be
Then will be a function that calculates recursively the truth-value of a proposition, and in a way, will be an extension of the function that associates a truth-value to each atomic proposition, such that:
(1)
(2) (Negation)
(AND Operator)
(OR Operator)
(IF-THEN Operator)
References
Theorems in analysis |
54452801 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum%20supremacy | Quantum supremacy | In quantum computing, quantum supremacy or quantum advantage is the goal of demonstrating that a programmable quantum device can solve a problem that no classical computer can solve in any feasible amount of time (irrespective of the usefulness of the problem). Conceptually, quantum supremacy involves both the engineering task of building a powerful quantum computer and the computational-complexity-theoretic task of finding a problem that can be solved by that quantum computer and has a superpolynomial speedup over the best known or possible classical algorithm for that task. The term was coined by John Preskill in 2012, but the concept of a quantum computational advantage, specifically for simulating quantum systems, dates back to Yuri Manin's (1980) and Richard Feynman's (1981) proposals of quantum computing. Examples of proposals to demonstrate quantum supremacy include the boson sampling proposal of Aaronson and Arkhipov, D-Wave's specialized frustrated cluster loop problems, and sampling the output of random quantum circuits.
A notable property of quantum supremacy is that it can be feasibly achieved by near-term quantum computers, since it does not require a quantum computer to perform any useful task or use high-quality quantum error correction, both of which are long-term goals. Consequently, researchers view quantum supremacy as primarily a scientific goal, with relatively little immediate bearing on the future commercial viability of quantum computing. Because this goal, of building a quantum computer that can perform a task that no other existing computer feasibly can, can become more difficult if classical computers or simulation algorithms improve, quantum supremacy may be temporarily or repeatedly achieved, placing claims of achieving quantum supremacy under significant scrutiny.
Background
Quantum supremacy in the 20th century
In 1936, Alan Turing published his paper, “On Computable Numbers”, in response to the 1900 Hilbert Problems. Turing's paper described what he called a “universal computing machine”, which later became known as a Turing machine. In 1980, Paul Benioff utilized Turing's paper to propose the theoretical feasibility of Quantum Computing. His paper, “The Computer as a Physical System: A Microscopic Quantum Mechanical Hamiltonian Model of Computers as Represented by Turing Machines“, was the first to demonstrate that it is possible to show the reversible nature of quantum computing as long as the energy dissipated is arbitrarily small. In 1981, Richard Feynman showed that quantum mechanics could not be simulated on classical devices. During a lecture, he delivered the famous quote, “Nature isn't classical, dammit, and if you want to make a simulation of nature, you'd better make it quantum mechanical, and by golly it's a wonderful problem, because it doesn't look so easy.” Soon after this, David Deutsch produced a description for a quantum Turing machine and designed an algorithm created to run on a quantum computer.
In 1994, further progress toward quantum supremacy was made when Peter Shor formulated Shor's algorithm, streamlining a method for factoring integers in polynomial time. Later on in 1995, Christopher Monroe and David Wineland published their paper, “Demonstration of a Fundamental Quantum Logic Gate”, marking the first demonstration of a quantum logic gate, specifically the two-bit "controlled-NOT". In 1996, Lov Grover put into motion an interest in fabricating a quantum computer after publishing his algorithm, Grover's Algorithm, in his paper, “A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search”. In 1998, Jonathan A. Jones and Michele Mosca published “Implementation of a Quantum Algorithm to Solve Deutsch's Problem on a Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Quantum Computer”, marking the first demonstration of a quantum algorithm.
Progress in the 21st century
Vast progress toward quantum supremacy was made in the 2000s from the first 5-qubit Nuclear Magnetic Resonance computer (2000), the demonstration of Shor's theorem (2001), and the implementation of Deutsch's algorithm in a clustered quantum computer (2007). In 2011, D-Wave Systems of Burnaby in British Columbia became the first company to sell a quantum computer commercially. In 2012, physicist Nanyang Xu landed a milestone accomplishment by using an improved adiabatic factoring algorithm to factor 143. However, the methods used by Xu were met with objections. Not long after this accomplishment, Google purchased its first quantum computer.
Google had announced plans to demonstrate quantum supremacy before the end of 2017 with an array of 49 superconducting qubits. In early January 2018, Intel announced a similar hardware program. In October 2017, IBM demonstrated the simulation of 56 qubits on a classical supercomputer, thereby increasing the computational power needed to establish quantum supremacy. In November 2018, Google announced a partnership with NASA that would “analyze results from quantum circuits run on Google quantum processors, and... provide comparisons with classical simulation to both support Google in validating its hardware and establish a baseline for quantum supremacy.” Theoretical work published in 2018 suggests that quantum supremacy should be possible with a "two-dimensional lattice of 7×7 qubits and around 40 clock cycles" if error rates can be pushed low enough. On June 18, 2019, Quanta Magazine suggested that quantum supremacy could happen in 2019, according to Neven's law. On September 20, 2019, the Financial Times reported that "Google claims to have reached quantum supremacy with an array of 54 qubits out of which 53 were functional, which were used to perform a series of operations in 200 seconds that would take a supercomputer about 10,000 years to complete". On October 23, Google officially confirmed the claims. IBM responded by suggesting some of the claims are excessive and suggested that it could take 2.5 days instead of 10,000 years, listing techniques that a classical supercomputer may use to maximize computing speed. IBM's response is relevant as the most powerful supercomputer at the time, Summit, was made by IBM.
In December 2020, a group based in the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) led by Jian-Wei Pan reached quantum supremacy by implementing gaussian boson sampling on 76 photons with their photonic quantum computer Jiuzhang. The paper states that to generate the number of samples the quantum computer generates in 20 seconds, a classical supercomputer would require 600 million years of computation.
In October 2021, teams from USTC again reported quantum advantage by building two supercomputers called Jiuzhang 2.0 and Zuchongzhi. The light-based Jiuzhang 2.0 implemented gaussian boson sampling to detect 113 photons from a 144-mode optical interferometer and a sampling rate speed up of — a difference of 37 photons and 10 orders of magnitude over the previous Jiuzhang. Zuchongzhi is a programmable superconducting quantum computer that needs to be kept at extremely low temperatures to work efficiently and uses random circuit sampling to obtain 56 qubits from a tunable coupling architecture of 66 transmons — an improvement over Google's Sycamore 2019 achievement by 3 qubits, meaning a greater computational cost of classical simulation of 2–3 orders of magnitude. A third study reported that Zuchongzhi 2.1 completed a sampling task that "is about 6 orders of magnitude more difficult than that of Sycamore" "in the classic simulation".
Computational complexity
Complexity arguments concern how the amount of some resource needed to solve a problem (generally time or memory) scales with the size of the input. In this setting, a problem consists of an inputted problem instance (a binary string) and returned solution (corresponding output string), while resources refers to designated elementary operations, memory usage, or communication. A collection of local operations allows for the computer to generate the output string. A circuit model and its corresponding operations are useful in describing both classical and quantum problems; the classical circuit model consists of basic operations such as AND gates, OR gates, and NOT gates while the quantum model consists of classical circuits and the application of unitary operations. Unlike the finite set of classical gates, there are an infinite amount of quantum gates due to the continuous nature of unitary operations. In both classical and quantum cases, complexity swells with increasing problem size. As an extension of classical computational complexity theory, quantum complexity theory considers what a theoretical universal quantum computer could accomplish without accounting for the difficulty of building a physical quantum computer or dealing with decoherence and noise. Since quantum information is a generalization of classical information, quantum computers can simulate any classical algorithm.
Quantum complexity classes are sets of problems that share a common quantum computational model, with each model containing specified resource constraints. Circuit models are useful in describing quantum complexity classes. The most useful quantum complexity class is BQP (bounded-error quantum polynomial time), the class of decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time by a universal quantum computer. Questions about BQP still remain, such as the connection between BQP and the polynomial-time hierarchy, whether or not BQP contains NP-complete problems, and the exact lower and upper bounds of the BQP class. Not only would answers to these questions reveal the nature of BQP, but they would also answer difficult classical complexity theory questions. One strategy for better understanding BQP is by defining related classes, ordering them into a conventional class hierarchy, and then looking for properties that are revealed by their relation to BQP. There are several other quantum complexity classes, such as QMA (quantum Merlin Arthur) and QIP (quantum interactive polynomial time).
The difficulty of proving what cannot be done with classical computing is a common problem in definitively demonstrating quantum supremacy. Contrary to decision problems that require yes or no answers, sampling problems ask for samples from probability distributions. If there is a classical algorithm that can efficiently sample from the output of an arbitrary quantum circuit, the polynomial hierarchy would collapse to the third level, which is generally considered to be very unlikely. Boson sampling is a more specific proposal, the classical hardness of which depends upon the intractability of calculating the permanent of a large matrix with complex entries, which is a #P-complete problem. The arguments used to reach this conclusion have been extended to IQP Sampling, where only the conjecture that the average- and worst-case complexities of the problem are the same is needed, as well as to Random Circuit Sampling, which is the task replicated by the Google and UTSC research groups.
Proposed experiments
The following are proposals for demonstrating quantum computational supremacy using current technology, often called NISQ devices. Such proposals include (1) a well-defined computational problem, (2) a quantum algorithm to solve this problem, (3) a comparison best-case classical algorithm to solve the problem, and (4) a complexity-theoretic argument that, under a reasonable assumption, no classical algorithm can perform significantly better than current algorithms (so the quantum algorithm still provides a superpolynomial speedup).
Shor's algorithm for factoring integers
This algorithm finds the prime factorization of an n-bit integer in time whereas the best known classical algorithm requires time and the best upper bound for the complexity of this problem is . It can also provide a speedup for any problem that reduces to integer factoring, including the membership problem for matrix groups over fields of odd order.
This algorithm is important both practically and historically for quantum computing. It was the first polynomial-time quantum algorithm proposed for a real-world problem that is believed to be hard for classical computers. Namely, it gives a superpolynomial speedup under the reasonable assumption that RSA, today's most common encryption protocol, is secure.
Factoring has some benefit over other supremacy proposals because factoring can be checked quickly with a classical computer just by multiplying integers, even for large instances where factoring algorithms are intractably slow. However, implementing Shor's algorithm for large numbers is infeasible with current technology, so it is not being pursued as a strategy for demonstrating supremacy.
Boson sampling
This computing paradigm based upon sending identical photons through a linear-optical network can solve certain sampling and search problems that, assuming a few complexity-theoretical conjectures (that calculating the permanent of Gaussian matrices is #P-Hard and that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse) are intractable for classical computers. However, it has been shown that boson sampling in a system with large enough loss and noise can be simulated efficiently.
The largest experimental implementation of boson sampling to date had 6 modes so could handle up to 6 photons at a time. The best proposed classical algorithm for simulating boson sampling runs in time for a system with n photons and m output modes. BosonSampling is an open-source implementation in R. The algorithm leads to an estimate of 50 photons required to demonstrate quantum supremacy with boson sampling.
Sampling the output distribution of random quantum circuits
The best known algorithm for simulating an arbitrary random quantum circuit requires an amount of time that scales exponentially with the number of qubits, leading one group to estimate that around 50 qubits could be enough to demonstrate quantum supremacy. Bouland, Fefferman, Nirkhe and Vazirani gave, in 2018, theoretical evidence that efficiently simulating a random quantum circuit would require a collapse of the computational polynomial hierarchy. Google had announced its intention to demonstrate quantum supremacy by the end of 2017 by constructing and running a 49-qubit chip that would be able to sample distributions inaccessible to any current classical computers in a reasonable amount of time. The largest universal quantum circuit simulator running on classical supercomputers at the time was able to simulate 48 qubits. But for particular kinds of circuits, larger quantum circuit simulations with 56 qubits are possible. This may require increasing the number of qubits to demonstrate quantum supremacy. On October 23, 2019, Google published the results of this quantum supremacy experiment in the Nature article, “Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor” in which they developed a new 53-qubit processor, named “Sycamore”, that is capable of fast, high-fidelity quantum logic gates, in order to perform the benchmark testing. Google claims that their machine performed the target computation in 200 seconds, and estimated that their classical algorithm would take 10,000 years in the world's fastest supercomputer to solve the same problem. IBM disputed this claim, saying that an improved classical algorithm should be able to solve that problem in two and a half days on that same supercomputer.
Criticisms
Susceptibility to error
Quantum computers are much more susceptible to errors than classical computers due to decoherence and noise. The threshold theorem states that a noisy quantum computer can use quantum error-correcting codes to simulate a noiseless quantum computer assuming the error introduced in each computer cycle is less than some number. Numerical simulations suggest that that number may be as high as 3%. However, it is not yet definitively known how the resources needed for error correction will scale with the number of qubits. Skeptics point to the unknown behavior of noise in scaled-up quantum systems as a potential roadblock for successfully implementing quantum computing and demonstrating quantum supremacy.
Criticism of the name
Some researchers have suggested that the term 'quantum supremacy' should not be used, arguing that the word "supremacy" evokes distasteful comparisons to the racist belief of white supremacy. A controversial Nature commentary signed by thirteen researchers asserts that the alternative phrase 'quantum advantage' should be used instead. John Preskill, the professor of theoretical physics at the California Institute of Technology who coined the term, has since clarified that the term was proposed to explicitly describe the moment that a quantum computer gains the ability to perform a task that a classical computer never could. He further explained that he specifically rejected the term 'quantum advantage' as it did not fully encapsulate the meaning of his new term: the word 'advantage' would imply that a computer with quantum supremacy would have a slight edge over a classical computer while the word 'supremacy' better conveys complete ascendancy over any classical computer. In December 2020, Nature's Philip Ball wrote that the term 'quantum advantage' has "largely replaced" the term 'quantum supremacy'.
See also
Gottesman–Knill theorem
List of quantum processors
Sycamore processor
Jiuzhang (quantum computer)
References
Quantum computing
Computational complexity theory |
54462890 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidential%20Advisory%20Commission%20on%20Election%20Integrity | Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity | The Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (PEIC or PACEI), also called the Voter Fraud Commission, was a Presidential Commission established by Donald Trump that ran from May 11, 2017 to January 3, 2018. The Trump administration said the commission would review claims of voter fraud, improper registration, and voter suppression. The establishment of the commission followed Trump's false claim that millions of illegal immigrants had voted in the 2016 presidential election, costing him the popular vote. Vice President Mike Pence was chosen as chair of the commission and Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach was its vice chair and day-to-day administrator.
On June 28, 2017, Kobach, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, asked every state for personal voter information. The request was met with significant bipartisan backlash; 44 states and the District of Columbia declined to supply some or all of the information, citing privacy concerns or state laws.
Trump's creation of the commission was criticized by voting rights advocates, scholars and experts, and newspaper editorial boards as a pretext for, and prelude to, voter suppression. At least eight lawsuits were filed accusing the Commission of violating the law.
On January 3, 2018, Trump abruptly disbanded the commission; he repeated his baseless claims of election fraud and citing many states' refusal to turn over information as well as the pending lawsuits. The commission found no evidence of voter fraud. At that time, Trump asked that the investigation be transferred to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which already holds much of the requested state voter data and oversees immigration records. The acting DHS press secretary said that Kobach would not be advising or working with DHS, and the White House said it would destroy all the state voter data collected by the Commission.
Background
2016 campaign
During his campaign for President, Trump made numerous claims of voter fraud occurring in the United States.
In the weeks before the election, Trump urged his supporters to volunteer as poll watchers on Election Day, saying they were needed to guard against "voter fraud" and a "rigged" outcome. The rhetoric was seen by some as a call to intimidate minority voters or challenge their credentials to prevent them from voting. Numerous organizations, including the Democratic Party officials and affiliates sued Trump accusing him of voter intimidation, in violation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act.
Post-election
On November 8, 2016, Trump won the 2016 United States presidential election, but lost the popular vote to opponent Hillary Clinton by about 2.9 million votes. Trump falsely claimed that he won the popular vote "if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally" and that three to five million people voted illegally in the 2016 election.
Kris Kobach proposal
On November 22, 2016, Kobach met with then President-elect Trump in his Trump National Golf Club in Bedminster, New Jersey in consideration for Secretary of Homeland Security position. The Associated Press photographed Kobach taking into his meeting with Trump a document entitled "Department of Homeland Security, Kobach Strategic Plan for First 365 Days" referencing a possible amendment to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
The American Civil Liberties Union, representing plaintiffs in a voting rights case, asked the federal judge to prevent Kobach from withholding from the public documents he presented to Trump by virtue of marking them "confidential". The plaintiffs demanded the public release of those documents that had been prepared with state funds, claiming Kobach "made statements to the public, the Court, and the President, suggesting that noncitizen registration fraud is a serious, widespread problem," while at the same time trying to hide those same documents that reject his claim, to prevent having to testify in open court about those materials. In June 2017, the federal magistrate judge found that Kobach had made "patently misleading representations" to the court in the course of the document dispute. Kobach was fined $1,000 for "deceptive conduct and lack of candor" and ordered to submit to questioning under oath by the ACLU about the documents and about a draft amendment to the National Voter Registration Act "which would have added a line to the federal voter law that said states could request any information from voters they deem necessary."
Voter irregularities in the United States
Voter impersonation
Only US citizens have the right to vote in federal elections. While the United States Congress has jurisdiction over laws applying to federal elections, it has deferred the making of most aspects of election laws to the states. Therefore, the administration of voter registration requirements, voting requirements, and elections vary widely across jurisdictions.
Voter impersonation (also sometimes called in-person voter fraud) is a form of electoral fraud in which a person who is eligible to vote in an election votes more than once, or a person who is not eligible to vote does so by voting under the name of an eligible voter. In the United States, voter ID laws have been enacted in a number of states since 2010 with the aim of preventing voter impersonation. Research has shown that voter impersonation is extremely rare. There is no evidence that in-person voter fraud has changed the result of any election.
In a few cases, permanent residents ("green card" holders) have registered to vote and have cast ballots without realizing that doing so was illegal. Non-citizens convicted in criminal court of having made a false claim of citizenship for the purpose of registering to vote in a federal election can be fined and imprisoned for up to a year. Deportation and removal proceedings have resulted from several such cases.
In an analysis by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law looked at 42 jurisdictions, focusing on ones with large population of noncitizens. Of 23.5 million votes surveyed, election officials referred an estimated 30 incidents of suspected noncitizen voting for further investigation, or about 0.0001% of votes cast. Douglas Keith, the counsel in the Brennan Center's Democracy Program and co-author of the analysis, said, "President Trump has said repeatedly that millions of people voted illegally in 2016, but our interviews with local election administrators made clear that rampant noncitizen voting simply did not occur. Any claims to the contrary make their job harder and distract from progress toward needed improvements like automatic voter registration."
Voter registration irregularities
Voter registration is the process of collecting applications to vote, adjudicating those applications, and maintaining the rolls of qualified voters. The process of voter registration is generally left to the states. In an effort to increase voter turnout, a state may adopt less restrictive policies, including motor voter registration and same day registration. In an effort to decrease in-person voter fraud, a state may adopt more strict policies for registration, including proof of citizenship at the time of registration. Federal elections do not require proof of citizenship, only a statement on the signed application.
Voter rolls have high rates of inaccuracy. Voters move, die, and are incarcerated. Voter rolls may include erroneous superfluous entries as a result of fraudulent registration or failure to purge the roll when a voter dies, moves, or is sent to prison. A qualified voter may be legally registered in only one precinct. This is a matter of state law. In 2012, the Pew Trust estimated that 24 million voter records were inaccurate or invalid, including approximately 1.8 million records of deceased people who remained on voter rolls. In October 2016, Trump conflated these irregularities with voter fraud and wrongly cited the Pew report as evidence that 1.8 million people were fraudulently voting against him. Voting twice is a third degree felony in most states. Superfluous entries on a voter roll do not affect elections.
Erroneous deletions from a voter roll can potentially affect an election outcome by preventing qualified voters from casting ballots. In November 2016, the New York City Board of Elections was ordered by a federal judge to make affidavit ballots available to people who believed their registrations were improperly purged. A computer analysis by The Palm Beach Post found that at least 1,100 eligible voters were wrongly purged from the Florida Central Voter File before the 2000 US presidential election, causing some eligible voters to be turned away at polling stations. Some commentators and courts have concluded that improperly conducted purges affect political parties differently and disenfranchise racial minorities. For instance, the 2000 Florida purge led to thousands of voters being wrongly disenfranchised, a disproportionate number of them black.
Commission
The Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity was a temporary commission established by President Donald Trump's executive order (E.O. 13799, 82 FR 22389) on May 11, 2017. White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said the commission would provide the president with a report on their findings by 2018.
Provisions:
Vice President shall chair the Commission
President appoints members to the Commission, the Vice President may select the Vice Chair
The Commission will report on laws, rules, policies, activities, strategies, and practices that enhance and undermine people's confidence in the integrity of the voting processes used in Federal elections
The report should also identify voting systems and practices used for Federal elections that could lead to improper voter registrations and improper voting, including fraudulent voter registrations and fraudulent voting
The Commission will terminate 30 days after it submits its report to the President
Members
Commission members at time of disbandment
Chair: Mike Pence, Republican, Vice President of the United States, former Governor of Indiana
Vice Chair: Kris Kobach, Republican, Secretary of State of Kansas, Of Counsel, Immigration Reform Law Institute
J. Christian Adams, Republican, former Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorney
Ken Blackwell, Republican, former Ohio Secretary of State and previously state Treasurer
Matthew Dunlap, Democrat, Secretary of State of Maine
Bill Gardner, Democrat, New Hampshire Secretary of State
Alan Lamar King, Democrat, probate judge of Jefferson County, Alabama
Connie Lawson, Republican, Secretary of State of Indiana
Christy McCormick, Republican, Commissioner of the Election Assistance Commission
Mark Rhodes, Democrat, Wood County, West Virginia county clerk
Hans von Spakovsky, Republican, former member Federal Election Commission, Senior Legal Fellow, Heritage Foundation; Director, Public Interest Legal Foundation.
Commission who left prior to disbandment
Luis Borunda, Republican, Maryland deputy secretary of state, resigned July 3, 2017 (prior to the commission's first meeting, but after the controversial letter by Kris Kobach to election officials in the different states)
David K. Dunn, Democrat, former Arkansas state representative, died October 17, 2017
Vice President Pence has been described as the titular head of the Commission on Voter Integrity with Kris Kobach, who also serves on the elections committee of the National Secretaries of States Association (NSOS), as its operational leader. According to the executive order, the commission can have up to sixteen members.
Dunlap and Gardner, the two Democratic secretaries of state on the commission, said they hoped the commission would look into Russian interference in the 2016 election, but Kobach said he did not think that the commission's investigation would go in that direction.
Unlike past presidential commissions on elections and voting (such as the Carter-Baker in 2001, Carter-Ford in 2004, and Bauer-Ginsburg in 2013), the leadership of the panel is not bipartisan and the makeup of the panel is not evenly split. Rather, Pence and Kobach, the chair and vice chair of the commission, are both Republicans, and Republicans hold a 7 to 5 (originally 8 to 5) advantage in membership for the commission as a whole. The ratio favoring the Republicans increased to 7 to 4 when David K. Dunn died in October 2017. Also in October 2017, two of the four Democrats on the commission, Dunlap and King, sent separate letters to commission staff complaining that they are not being kept informed of commission activities.
Commission member Hans von Spakovsky, the director of the Heritage Foundation's Election Law Reform Initiative, is said to have promoted "the myth that Democratic voter fraud is common, and that it helps Democrats win elections" according to a magazine article in The New Yorker. He has supported his claims about the extent of voter fraud by citing a 2000 investigation by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, which purported to find 5400 instances of deceased people in Georgia voting in the last twenty years. The Journal-Constitution later revised its findings, noting that it had no evidence of even a single ballot purportedly being cast by a deceased person and that the vast majority of the instances in question were due to clerical errors. In an interview with the New Yorker, von Spakovsky cited two scholars who he said could substantiate that voter-impersonation fraud was rampant: Robert Pastor of American University and Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia. Pastor and Sabato both said they would only support voter ID laws if those IDs were issued without cost to the voters, and acquired without substantial difficulty. It is Sabato's belief that voter impersonation is "relatively rare today," yet in a 2011 Heritage Foundation article, von Spakovsky referred to Sabato once more as a researcher whose studies established the existence of widespread voter fraud. He also has cited conservative columnist John Fund's Stealing Elections, a book whose assertions of election fraud have been extensively debunked. Fund also co-authored a book with von Spakovsky. In an email, von Spakovsky urged Trump's Attorney General Jeff Sessions not to appoint any Democrats, "moderate Republicans and/or academics" to the Commission. According to Richard L. Hasen, an election-law expert at the University of California at Irvine, "there are number of people who have been active in promoting false and exaggerated claims of voter fraud and using that as a pretext to argue for stricter voting and registration rules. And von Spakovsky is at the top of the list." Hasen said that Trump's appointment of Spakovsky's was "a big middle finger" to people who are "serious about fixing problems with our elections."
One of Trump's appointees to the commission, Ken Blackwell, was Ohio Secretary of State for two terms beset with controversy, lawsuits, and accusations that he had created impediments to voting. During the 2004 presidential election, Blackwell attempted to throw out voter registrations in Ohio that were not printed on "white, uncoated paper of not less than 80-pound text weight" (a heavy card-stock paper) and the 2004 election in the state was marred by "controversies over topics ranging from voting devices to long lines on Election Day." Blackwell revoked the order after county clerks said it was unnecessary, and voting rights advocates called in any attempt at voter suppression. Also in 2004, Blackwell ordered clerks to toss out provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct, a policy criticized by voting rights advocates but ultimately permitted by a federal appeals court. In March 2006, Blackwell's office also inadvertently released the Social Security numbers of 5.7 million voters.
Commission activity
2017 request for voter information
First request
On June 28, 2017, Kris Kobach, in his capacity as vice chair of the Commission, wrote a letter along with the Department of Justice to the top election official in every state requesting they turn over voter data ostensibly to aid a countrywide search for evidence of election irregularities. Besides information such as the names, addresses and party affiliations of all registered voters, Kobach sought birth dates, felony conviction records, voting histories for the past decade and the last four digits of all voters' Social Security numbers. Many states' election officials claim they never received the request and some said they only forward the request from another state's secretary of state.
The letter was not made public, and it became publicly known only after Vanita Gupta, president and CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, tweeted out an image of the letter the day after the letter was written. Along with the image of the letter, she wrote "Pence and Kobach are laying the groundwork for voter suppression, plain & simple." A few hours after Gupta's tweet, Kobach confirmed to The Kansas City Star that the letter was authentic.
Kobach provided an e-mail address and a website for the election official to electronically submit the personal voter data. The e-mail address lacked basic encryption technology and was found to be insecure.
The request may have violated the federal Paperwork Reduction Act because it was not submitted to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) prior to being made to the states. The submission to the OIRA would have required a justification and an explanation of how the data would be used and protected. Additionally, the request did not come with an estimate of how many hours it would take the states to respond. Regulatory experts opined that the consequence of a violation would be that states would not be required to respond.
In January 2018, it was reported that the Commission had, in its requests for Texas voter data, specifically asked for data that identifies voters with Hispanic surnames.
Second request
On July 25, Kobach told the Kansas City Star that he intended to send another request for voter data, after receiving a favorable ruling in a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center. The court had ruled against the Center's motion to stop the commission from trying to collect the data, stating that the commission had only made a request, not a demand or an attempt to force. The letter was sent the following day, and it differed from the first request by the addition "if state law allows [the] information to be public". The California Secretary of State announced that it would refuse to comply with the second request.
State responses
There was an immediate bipartisan backlash and rejection of the inquiries with a majority of states quickly rejecting the requests. Notably, commissioners Kobach, Dunlap, and Lawson (who also serve as the secretaries of state for Kansas, Maine, and Indiana respectively, with Indiana being Mike Pence's home state) indicated that their state laws forbade them from complying. Some states offered to only provide information that is already made public or available for purchase. No state has said they will fully comply with the list of demands. In response, President Trump made a statement on Twitter, "Numerous states are refusing to give information to the very distinguished VOTER FRAUD PANEL. What are they trying to hide?"
Impact on voter registration
In Colorado, the Secretary of State confirmed that 3,394 voters (0.09 percent of all registered voters in Colorado) cancelled their voter registration in response to the request for voter registration information sent out by Kris Kobach. After receiving a few requests for voter registration cancellations, election officials in Flagler County, Florida published an open letter to voters urging voters not to cancel their registration in response to the commission's request for voter information. In Arkansas, an alderwoman in Eureka Springs requested to cancel her voter registration, but then re-registered within 24 hours because the law requires her to be a registered voter in order to serve in an elected office.
First official meeting, July 19, 2017
The committee held its first official meeting on July 19, 2017 in Washington D.C. Breaking with tradition of open meetings for such commissions, the meeting was not open to the public, but it was live streamed in lieu. Trump addressed the commission at its inaugural meeting and criticized states that did not comply with the request for data issued by Kobach (saying "One has to wonder what they're worried about"). The committee members talked largely of voter fraud, and mentioned themes included 'One Citizen, One Vote', anecdotes about specific incidents of election misconduct, and additional funding for voting equipment.
New Hampshire meeting, September 12, 2017
On August 24, 2017 the White House announced that the commission would meet on September 12, 2017 at St. Anselm College near Manchester, New Hampshire. In February, President Trump had told a meeting of senators that he lost New Hampshire because thousands of people had been brought in from Massachusetts on buses to vote, a claim disputed by the state's two senators, an FEC commissioner, and Bill Gardner, New Hampshire's secretary of state and later a member of the integrity commission. On September 7, Kobach alleged in his Breitbart News column that voter fraud had "likely" swung the election in the New Hampshire 2016 presidential race and 2016 Senate race. Kobach wrote that while "anecdotally" it was well known that out-of-state voters take advantage of New Hampshire's same-day registration law to come in on Election Day and vote, "Now there's proof": of the 6,540 voters who had registered to vote on Election Day using out-of-state driver's licenses as identification, only 1,014 of those voters had obtained a New Hampshire driver's license by August 30, 2017. The rest never obtained a New Hampshire license and only a few had registered vehicles in the state, leaving 5,513, "a big number -
more than enough to swing two very important elections." Kobach, calling all 5,513 of the votes "fraudulent votes", wrote that in the senate race, "if 59.2% or more of them went for Hassan, then the election was stolen by voter fraud" and "if 74.8% of the fraudulent votes were cast for Clinton, then the presidential election was tipped as well." Another commission member, J. Christian Adams, published a similar op-ed at PJ Media on the same day, stating that "the overwhelming majority of them [the 5,513 voters] can no longer be found in New Hampshire." Kobach and Adams based the allegations on statistics reported by Shawn Jasper, Republican speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives. The statistics were released to Jasper by Secretary of State Gardner and the commissioner of the state department of safety in response to his request. A spokesman for the speaker said that the statistics were raw data and that Jasper "did not know which states issued the 6,540 licenses and acknowledged that the numbers could include some college students." The Washington Post, noting that Kobach apparently had not tried to contact voters with out-of-state ID for his Breitbart article, was able to quickly contact three voters who did not obtain New Hampshire driver's licenses. The three said that they were college students and had used the driver's licenses from their home states as their identification. The day after Kobach's op-ed was published, the New Hampshire congressional delegation unanimously urged Gardner to resign, so as to deny the commission the appearance of credibility. Gardner said it was his civic duty to remain.
The meeting was hosted by Gardner and chaired by Vice Chair Kobach, since the chairman, Mike Pence, would not be in attendance. At the meeting, both Gardner and fellow commissioner and Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap rejected the allegation that voter fraud affected the election in New Hampshire in 2016. Dunlap called the charge "reckless" and pointed out that voters in New Hampshire need not be residents of the state to vote, as it is sufficient to be "domiciled" in the state. Dunlap said, "I think it's really reckless to make an allegation like that based on how I know licenses are issued around the country and how elections are conducted. It's an amazing leap to make."
The meeting continued for six hours, during which time Kobach answered questions for thirty minutes. He told reporters, "If you drive in and then drive out on the same day, that is fraudulent....My point is that among the 5,313, you can probably assume that at least one of those individuals" voted fraudulently. When reminded that he had written "Now there's proof", he said, "I think when you have 5,300 cases, it's virtual proof that at least one of those individuals probably didn't stay." He added, "Let's just get the numbers and see where the numbers take us, and I certainly don't have any preconceived notions about that issue or a whole host of issues."
John Lott, president of the Crime Prevention Research Center, made a presentation to the commission, proposing that the National Instant Criminal Background Check System be used for voter verification. Dunlap responded by saying the system "was never intended to be used as an elections tool" and using it as such would have "unintended consequences".
Response
Rick Hasen of the University of California, Irvine, an expert on election law, stated that the commission was "a pretext to pass legislation that will make it harder for people to register to vote" and that there could be no confidence in whatever the committee produced. In a June 2017 editorial, Hasen ridiculed the commission as a "faux commission".
Lawsuits
At least eight lawsuits were filed challenging the commission, alleging that its activities violated the law. Five of the plaintiffs in the different lawsuits were non-profit organizations that included: the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU v. Trump and Pence and Joyner v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity), the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, NAACP (NAACP v. Trump), Public Citizen, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center. The lawsuits by the first two groups involved the lack of transparency of the commission's meetings, whereas the lawsuits by the last two groups involved the collection by the commission of personal private data. In addition to the lawsuits, complaints have been filed with federal agencies against two of the commission's members.
<p id="EPIC">In response to the lawsuit filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the commission abandoned plans to accept responses through the Department of Defense safe access file exchange website and announced plans to use an existing White House system. The commission asked states to refrain from submitting data while the case was pending. The commission also stated its intention of deleting voter information from Arkansas, the only state to officially submit voter data on the Department of Defense website. On July 24, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly denied EPIC's request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the commission, ruling that the commission was not required to conduct a privacy review before gathering data. On August 29, the government's attorney told the judge that confusion at the Department of Justice had resulted in the failure to disclose relevant documents to the plaintiffs, and Kollar-Kotelly ordered the government to provide a list of documents it wanted to withhold, and how it would comply with disclosure rules.
<p id="Dunlap">In November 2017, Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap, a Democratic member of the commission, said that Kobach was refusing to share working documents and scheduling information with him and the other Democrats on the commission. He filed suit, and in December a federal judge ordered the commission to hand over the documents. Two weeks later, in January 2018, Trump disbanded the commission, and his administration informed Dunlap that it would not obey the court order to provide the documents because the commission no longer existed. On August 3, 2018, Dunlap wrote that the documents available to him did not support claims of widespread voter fraud. He described the investigation as the "most bizarre thing I've ever been a part of....After reading this, I see that it wasn't just a matter of investigating President Trump's claims that three to five million people voted illegally, but the goal of the commission seems to have been to validate those claims."
<p id="Joyner">In January 2018, in the Joyner case, the Department of Justice disclosed that the White House would not be turning over any state voter data to the Department of Homeland Security, despite the White House's and Kris Kobach's earlier statements to the contrary.
Calls for defunding and disbandment
On June 22, 2017, Representative Marc Veasey of Texas's 33rd congressional district introduced H.R. 3029 to deny funding for the commission. In August 2017, Senate Minority leader Chuck Schumer wrote an editorial calling on Trump to disband the commission. He also threatened that if Trump did not disband the commission, he would try to deny the commission money in a funding bill.
Disbanding
On January 3, 2018, two weeks after the court order instructing the commission to share its working documents with its Democratic members, the Trump administration disbanded the commission. The panel disbanded without making any findings of fraud.
In announcing that he had dissolved the Commission, Trump blamed states for not handing over requested voter information to the commission, and still maintained that there was "substantial evidence of voter fraud". Press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said in a statement that "rather than engage in endless legal battles at taxpayer expense," Trump abolished the panel and turned the matter over to the Department of Homeland Security. Election integrity experts argued that the commission was disbanded because of the lawsuits, which would have led to greater transparency and accountability in the commission and thus prevented the Republican members of the commission from producing a sham report to justify restrictions on voting rights, and that oversight by a cabinet-level agency such as DHS could preclude open meetings and requests for compliance with public records laws.
Transfer to Department of Homeland Security
After Trump shut down the Commission, Kobach pointed out in an interview that "DHS knows the identity of everyone who has green cards" and temporary visas, and that to compare those names to state voter rolls would be "immensely valuable." He stated, "This is a tactical shift by the president who remains very committed to finding the scope of voter fraud." He told several interviewers that he would "be working closely with the White House and DHS to ensure the investigations continue," but the acting DHS press secretary said that Kobach would not be advising or working with the Department. On January 9, the director of White House information technology stated, in a declaration appended to a motion in Commissioner Dunlap's suit against the Commission, that the state voter data the Commission had collected would not be sent to DHS or any other agency except the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), pursuant to federal law and pending the outcome of lawsuits, and that pursuant to federal law and upon consultation with NARA the White House intended to destroy all the state voter data held by the dissolved Commission. The DHS already has access to the state voter data the commission requested from the states. Voting rights and civil rights advocates were alarmed at moves by the Trump administration to task the DHS with fighting "voter fraud" despite multiple studies showing that voter fraud is virtually nonexistent in the U.S., fearing that Trump's directive would give impetus to purges of eligible voters from the voter rolls.
See also
Voter registration in the United States
Voting rights in the United States
Voter suppression in the United States
Notes
References
External links
E.O. 13799 (Wikisource)
United States national commissions
United States Presidential Commissions
Mike Pence
Electoral fraud
Organizations associated with Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections
Government agencies established in 2017
Government agencies disestablished in 2018
Executive orders of Donald Trump
Voter suppression
Election commissions in the United States
Trump administration controversies
2017 establishments in the United States
2018 disestablishments in the United States
United States election controversies |
54488402 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National%20Intelligence%20Agency%20%28Thailand%29 | National Intelligence Agency (Thailand) | The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) () is a counter-intelligence and security agency of Thailand. It serves as part of the Office of the Prime Minister. Its headquarters is in Paruskavan Palace, Bangkok.
History
The government established the Department of Administrative Intelligence under the Cabinet of Thailand on 1 January 1954. Phao Sriyanond was appointed as its first director. On 2 December 1959 it was renamed the Department of Central Intelligence and renamed again as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) during the government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda.
In 1985, the "National Intelligence Act, B.E. 2528 (1985)" made the NIA the lead Thai intelligence agency. The reality as of 2016 was that seven Thai intelligence agencies—the NIA, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Supreme Command Headquarters' Intelligence, Special Branch Bureau, and National Security Command Headquarters—mostly function independently of one another. In 2017, a plan was hatched to consolidate the efforts of 27 separate Thai intelligence agencies.
News reports appearing in early 2020 indicate that Thailand was a customer of Crypto AG, a Swiss company secretly owned by the US CIA and West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) that manufactured compromised encryption machines. Use of the devices may have allowed its coded messages to be deciphered.
Budget
The FY2019 budget of the NIA is 717.8 million baht.
References
Thai intelligence agencies
Government departments of Thailand
Office of the Prime Minister (Thailand) |
54586572 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuval%20Elovici | Yuval Elovici | Yuval Elovici is a computer scientist. He is a professor in the Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), where he is the incumbent of the Davide and Irene Sala Chair in Homeland Security Research. He is the director of the Cyber Security Research Center at BGU and the founder and director of the Telekom Innovation Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University. In addition to his roles at BGU, he also serves as the lab director of Singapore University of Technology and Design’s (SUTD) ST Electronics-SUTD Cyber Security Laboratory, as well as the research director of iTrust. In 2014 he co-founded Morphisec, a start-up company, that develops cyber security mechanisms related to moving target defense.
Biography
Yuval Elovici was born in Beer-Sheva, Israel in 1966. He received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in computer and electrical engineering from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in 1989 and 1991, respectively (thesis title: Multi-Target Tracking Implementation onto a Parallel Multiprocessor System based on Transputers). He received his Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University’s Faculty of Management's information systems program (dissertation title: Information Technology Evaluation, Investment Decisions and Benefits to the Organization over Time).
Career
Elovici began his academic career at BGU in 1998, where he served as a Senior Teaching Assistant/Instructor in the Department of Industrial Engineering and Management while pursuing his Ph.D. at Tel Aviv University. In 2000 he became a Lecturer in BGU's Department of Information Systems Engineering. In 2006 he advanced to Senior Lecturer, and he received academic tenure in 2007. From 2010 through 2012 Elovici was an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Systems Engineering, and in 2012 he became a full Professor in this department which was recently renamed the Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering. He has held a variety of positions in academic administration at BGU as well. Since 2014 Elovici has served as the Director of BGU's Cyber Security Research Center, and since 2005 he has been the Director of Telekom Innovation Laboratories at BGU. In the past, he has served as Head of the Software Engineering Program at BGU.
Research
Elovici's research interests include Privacy and Anonymity in the Electronic Society, Malware Detection, Mobile Phone Security, and Web Intelligence and Social Network Security. Elovici has published over 75 academic papers, and he has been awarded 20 patents. He is a co-author of the book, A Survey of Data Leakage Detection and Prevention Solutions and co-editor of another book, Security and Privacy in Social Network.
Privacy and Anonymity in the Electronic Society
Although surfing the World Wide Web (hereafter: the Web) feels as if it is a bilateral private interaction, this impression is far from being accurate, as users leave identifiable digital tracks at every website they visit, and Elovici's research aims to address this. Elovici has demonstrated how a collaborative attack on the anonymity of Web users can be performed by analyzing only a small number of Internet routers. The computer security community has concentrated on improving users’ privacy by concealing their identities on the Web. However, users may want or need to identify themselves on the Web in order to receive certain services, while retaining the privacy of their interests, needs, and intentions. PRAW, the privacy model developed by Elovici, is aimed at hiding users’ navigation tracks, in an attempt to prevent eavesdroppers from inferring their profiles, while still allowing them to be identified. Securing data at rest stored in a database is a very challenging privacy-related task, and Elovici has developed a new database encryption scheme, SPDE, which preserves the structure of the database and encrypts its content, such that even the DBA cannot view or modify the database cells’ content.
Bridging the Air-Gap
Air-gapped networks in which the computer network is separated physically from other networks, specifically those that are less secure, are widely used to protect the networks of military defense systems and critical infrastructure. The air-gap isolation was once thought to be a means of successfully preventing sensitive data from leaking from critical networks; however, some of Elovici's recent research has challenged this, exposing techniques that enable attackers to leak data from these networks via covert channels, including electromagnetic, ultrasonic, thermal, optical channels. In each case, new types of attacks that can bridge the air-gap have been demonstrated.
Malware Detection
Malware detection is a central component of cyber security and the focus of the Telekom Innovation Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University's flagship project: Net Centric Security, which is aimed at purifying NSP networks of malware. As Director of the laboratories, Elovici developed methods based on machine learning techniques for detecting whether a suspected file is malicious or benign. The methods were based on static code analysis and dynamic code analysis, where the suspected file activity was monitored in a sandbox. One of the challenges associated with this research was the synthesis of powerful malware signatures yielding a low false positive detection rate. The issues of detection scalability and performance were addressed in by employing the complex network theory to pinpoint the most influential set of routers for employing monitoring and filtering devices. This research was extended (including a simulator), to find the optimal places for deploying a scribing center for mitigating the denial of service attack launched via botnets.
Mobile Phone Security
Before Android-based mobile devices were introduced into the market for the first time by T-Mobile USA, Elovici was asked to study Android vulnerabilities, threats, and security mechanisms. The findings were summarized in several publications. Following this analysis, he developed several security mechanisms for the Android platform, demonstrating how to secure Android mobile devices using SELinux and developing several prototypes of an intrusion detection system (IDS) for strengthening Android-based devices based on various techniques, such as temporal reasoning and anomaly detection. In addition, an efficient, collaborative application-monitoring scheme was developed for mobile devices that allow the devices to detect malicious applications without relying on a central authority.
Web Intelligence and Social Network Security
Terrorist groups use the Web as their infrastructure for various purposes. Elovici designed the advanced terrorist detection system (ATDS) which analyzes the content of information accessed by Web users in order to track down online access to abnormal content, including terrorist-generated sites; ATDS was developed and evaluated using real users and terror-related data. In other research, he hypothesized that a new type of information security threat may involve a class of malware that does not have the goal of corrupting and taking control of the machines it infects or stealing specific information stored on them. This research focused on malware aimed at stealing social network and behavioral information through data collection and network science inference techniques. Elovici referred to this type of attack as the stealing-reality attack, and he demonstrated how such an attack can propagate in real social networks. Link prediction in social networks is one of the key tools in Web intelligence, and Elovici developed a very accurate link prediction algorithm to detect fake profiles in social networks which was evaluated on several large social networks. Fake profiles which proliferate on social networks may be used for good as well as malicious purposes, and the link prediction algorithm may allow identifying a connection between terrorists that does not exist in a social graph. Elovici also developed the Social Network Protector, software based on advanced detection mechanisms that can help teenagers identify suspicious members in their social network. The Social Network Protector Facebook app was installed by more than 3000 users.
References
External links
BGU Hebrew newspaper - Yuval Elovici
1966 births
Living people
Israeli Jews
Israeli scientists |
54602233 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM%20z14%20%28microprocessor%29 | IBM z14 (microprocessor) | The z14 is a microprocessor made by IBM for their IBM Z mainframe computers, announced on July 17, 2017. Manufactured at GlobalFoundries' East Fishkill, New York fabrication plant. IBM stated that it is the world's fastest microprocessor by clock rate at 5.2 GHz, with a 10% increased performance per core and 30% for the whole chip compared to its predecessor the z13.
Description
The Processor Unit chip (PU chip) has an area of 696 mm2 (25.3 × 27.5 mm) and consists of 6.1 billion transistors. It is fabricated using GlobalFoundries' 14 nm FinFET silicon on insulator fabrication process, using 17 layers of metal and supporting speeds of 5.2 GHz, which is higher than its predecessor, the z13. The PU chip has 10 cores but can have 7–10 cores (or "processor units" in IBM's parlance) enabled depending on configuration. The z14 cores support two-way simultaneous multithreading for more applications than previously available.
The PU chip is packaged in a single-chip module, which is the same as its predecessor, but a departure from previous designs which were mounted on large multi-chip modules. A computer drawer consists of six PU chips and one Storage Controller (SC) chip containing the L4 cache.
The cores implement the CISC z/Architecture with a superscalar, out-of-order pipeline. New in z14 is a cryptographic coprocessor, called CPACF, attached to each core, used for random number generation, hashing, encryption and decrypting and compression. Further enhancements include an optimization of the core's pipeline, doubling the on-chip caches, better branch prediction, a new decimal arithmetic SIMD engine designed to boost COBOL and PL/I code, a "guarded storage facility" that helps Java applications during garbage collection, and other enhancements that increase the cores' performance compared to the predecessors.
The instruction pipeline has an instruction queue that can fetch 6 instructions per cycle; and issue up to 10 instructions per cycle. Each core has a private 128 KB L1 instruction cache, a private 128 KB L1 data cache, a private 2 MB L2 instruction cache, and a private 4 MB L2 data cache. In addition, there is a 128 MB shared L3 cache implemented in eDRAM.
The z14 chip has on board multi-channel DDR4 RAM memory controller supporting a RAID-like configuration to recover from memory faults. The z14 also includes two GX bus as well as two new Gen 3 PCIe controllers for accessing host channel adapters and peripherals. The PU chips has three X-buses for communications to three neighboring PU chips and the SC chip.
Storage Controller
A compute drawer consists of two clusters. Each cluster comprises either two or three PU chips. The two clusters share a single Storage Controller chip (SC chip). Even though each PU chip has 128 MB L3 cache shared by the 10 cores and other on-die facilities, the SC chip adds 672 MB off-die eDRAM L4 cache shared by the six PU chips in the drawer. The SC chips also handle the communications between the sets of three PU in the drawer as well as communications between drawers using the A-Bus. The SC chip is manufactured on the same 14 nm process as the z14 PU chips, has 17 metal layers, similarly measures 25.3 × 27.5 mm (696 mm2), but consists of 9.7 billion transistors due to amount of L4 memory and runs at half the clock frequency of the PU chip.
See also
z/Architecture
IBM System z
Mainframe computer
References
z14
z14
Computer-related introductions in 2017 |
54611355 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hansa%20%28market%29 | Hansa (market) | Hansa was an online darknet market which operated on a hidden service of the Tor network.
On July 20, 2017, it was revealed that it had been compromised by law enforcement for several weeks before closing shortly following AlphaBay as a culmination of multinational law enforcement cooperation in Operation Bayonet.
Compromise
Dutch police discovered the true location of the site after a 2016 tip from security researchers who had discovered a development version. The police quickly began monitoring all actions on the site, and discovered that the administrators had left behind old IRC chat logs including their full names and even a home address, and they began to monitor them. Although the administrators soon moved the site to another unknown host, they got another break in April 2017 by tracing bitcoin transactions, which allowed them to identify the new hosting company, in Lithuania.
On June 20, 2017, German police arrested the administrators (two German men) and the Dutch police were able to take complete control of the site and to impersonate the administrators. Their plan, in coordination with the FBI, was to absorb users coming over from the upcoming AlphaBay shutdown. The following changes were made to the Hansa website to learn about careless users:
All user passwords were recorded in plaintext (allowing police to log into other markets if users had re-used passwords).
Vendors and buyers would communicate via PGP-encrypted messages. However, the website provided a PGP encryption convenience feature which the police modified to record a plaintext copy.
The website's automatic photo metadata removal tool was modified to record metadata (such as geolocation) before being stripped off by the website.
Police wiped the photo database, which enticed vendors to re-upload photos (now capturing metadata).
Multisignature bitcoin transactions were sabotaged, which at shutdown would allow police to confiscate a larger amount of illicit funds.
Police enticed users to download a Microsoft Excel file (disguised as a text file) that, when opened, would attempt to ping back to a police webserver and unmask the user's IP address.
Shutdown
AlphaBay was then shut down on July 4, and as expected a flood of users came to Hansa, until its shutdown on July 19/20. During this time, the police allowed the Hansa userbase (then growing from 1000 to 8000 vendors per day) to make 27000 illegal transactions in order to collect evidence for future prosecution of users. Local cybercrime prosecutor Martijn Egberts claimed to have obtained around 10,000 addresses of Hansa buyers outside of the Netherlands.
After shut down, the site displayed a seizure notice and directed users to their hidden service to find more information about the operation.
References
Defunct Tor hidden services
Defunct darknet markets |
54667777 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BackSlash%20Linux | BackSlash Linux | BackSlash Linux was an Ubuntu and Debian-based operating system developed in India by Kumar Priyansh for AMD64 and Intel x64-based personal computers. It was based on free software and every release of the operating system is named after the characters of the Disney film franchise Frozen. Since the third major release, BackSlash Linux Olaf, BackSlash Linux used its own custom version of KDE, called the BackSlash Shell, as the default user desktop.
Design
BackSlash Linux's design was very hybrid. It resembles macOS at first glance, with KDE at its bottom, but instead of being a KDE-based distribution, it ships with many GNOME-based applications. Moreover, the buttons on the title bar resemble macOS but are arranged in a Windows-like manner. The top bar resembles GNOME at first glance, but after any app is opened, it displays the Universal Menu Bar, looking similar to macOS or Unity.
Development
Development of BackSlash Linux was started in mid 2016. Being Ubuntu-based, it is compatible with its repositories and packages and uses Discover Software Center to handle installation/removal of software. Its user interface aims at being intuitive for new users without consuming too many resources.
BackSlash Linux is based on Ubuntu's Long Term Support releases, which its developer actively maintains for bugs and security for years even as development continues on the next release.
Pre-release Versions
Three pre-release versions, codenamed as Alpha, Beta and Gamma were released before the first stable release. These were still available to download until May 2017 but now have been taken off from the website.
Anna
The first stable version of BackSlash Linux was BackSlash Linux Anna published on 2 November 2016 and based on Ubuntu 14.04 and ran on Linux Kernel 4.2. It ran on the Cinnamon Desktop Environment with some extra plugins and the Plank dock to provide it a new look. The support and download option for this version is still available on BackSlash Linux's Website. An article was also published on Linux.com introducing BackSlash Linux. BackSlash Linux Anna was a complete system in itself providing the end-users with all types of needed daily use software. Some notable applications included Font Viewer, PDF Reader, Simple Scan, Deluge BitTorrent Client, Dropbox, Google Chrome, Google Earth, Pidgin IM, Skype, WPS Office, VLC Media Player, Clementine, Screen Reader and GDebi Package Manager. Wine was pre-installed in order to support Windows based applications and games.
Elsa
The second release of BackSlash Linux was published on 20 December 2016 and was called BackSlash Linux Elsa. Elsa was built atop the Ubuntu "long-term support" release — Ubuntu 16.04 and ran on the flagship desktop environment of elementary OS, Pantheon. Lot of applications used in BackSlash Linux Anna were dropped in this release to cut down the ISO size but It also added a lot of additional applications besides the core applications shipped with elementary OS and replaced the Epiphany browser by Google Chrome. Many additional utilities, like Skype, Wine, Deluge BitTorrent Client and Dictionary were also shipped out-of-the-box. Inclusion of GNOME Boxes for virtualisation of Desktops was another time-saver. BackSlash Linux Elsa embarked the inclusion of many utilities like Backups, DVD Burner, TeamViewer and Synaptic Package Manager. Pidgin IM was replaced by Empathy IM and it also included Firewall and full LibreOffice suite. Addition of Modem Manager was noticed, which was helpful while managing external Modem cards. Albert was present as a search companion in BackSlash Elsa which can be easily activated using Meta+Space shortcut key. Tweaking the desktop by changing themes, colors and cursors was also present in the desktop which is not present in Pantheon by default. It also introduced an active desktop with right-click options in the Pantheon Desktop.
Olaf
BackSlash Linux Olaf is the third major and the current release of BackSlash Linux. It was published on 9 May 2017 and introduced 150+ new features over the last versions of BackSlash Linux. It was based on Ubuntu 16.04 and ran BackSlash Shell - a customised KDE Desktop. Due to its heavily modified beautiful Desktop, it gained much attention and received much praise than its earlier versions. This version of BackSlash Linux removed some of the applications to cut down the ISO size and also brought many refinements. Google Chrome was replaced by the Open-Source Chromium and Wine was upgraded to version 2.0.1.
Applications like Skype, Firewall, Modem Manager, DVD Burner, Dropbox, Empathy IM, GNOME Boxes, TeamViewer, Deluge and Dictionary which were present in earlier version of BackSlash Linux were dropped in this version. Albert Search Companion was replaced by KRunner Search. LibreOffice lost its position and WPS Office was back in the BackSlash Linux Series by the release of Olaf.
Thunderbird was also included in this version for better email experience and the simple idea was to include the best apps available instead of KDE-specific apps. This is the reason we see GNOME apps like Calendar, Disks, and Maps in this release.
BackSlash Linux Olaf also introduced a full-screen "AppLauncher" which resembled the "Launchpad" of macOS which was a fork of the discontinued application, "Slingshot".
Reviewing BackSlash Linux Olaf, Souris from ProCambodian, said "For me I think this is the best build distro, it feels more complete and you don’t need much time to config it, cause’ everything is working out of the box."
Kristoff
BackSlash Linux Kristoff was released as a public beta on 13 August 2017, adding features like Fingerprint and HWE Kernel Support to the Linux Distro world which was followed up Deepin Linux, which also added fingerprint support to Deepin 15.5, released on 30 November, 2017. Stable release of BackSlash Linux Kristoff was made on Christmas, December 25, 2017.
It builds upon the previous release of BackSlash Linux, Olaf, fixing almost all the bugs and also introduces the BackSlash Shell v2.0. Performance improvements have been highly worked on and it also introduces a new app called MultiView and a system optimizer. Installer issues have been fixed and UI has been redesigned. GTK+ support has been greatly worked on and BackSlash Linux Kristoff also supports Fingerprint Recognition for Lockscreen, Terminal Authentication and other App Authentications. Multitouch gesture support has been also implemented in addition with Wine. Redshift (Night Light) is also introduced with better temperature controls. Additional Components include a sidebar, better notification, audio and network management, Hardware-Enabled (HWE) Kernel.
It includes support for snaps, a new login screen with video background and also cover flow task Switcher. I also includes Desktop Cube animation for switching to multiple virtual desktops.
Applications included are Geary, Apache OpenOffice, GParted, Dolphin File Manager, Modem Manager, Synaptic Package Manager, VLC Media Player and others.
Discontinuation
BackSlash Linux's developer, Kumar Priyansh, posted a message on the website as of Sep 15, 2021 regarding the discontinuation of the project due to his personal opinions about the Linux kernel. He also stated that he is working on a UNIX/BSD based operating system and will be releasing it in place of BackSlash Linux.
Version Summary table
Security
Security of BackSlash was based on Ubuntu and all the Security and Software updates are provided by Canonical Ltd. by default, the programs run with standard user privileges, but administrator privileges are given whenever required. For increased security, the sudo tool is used to assign temporary privileges for performing administrative tasks, which allows the root account to remain locked and helps prevent inexperienced users from inadvertently making catastrophic system changes or opening security holes. Most network ports are closed by default to prevent hacking. A built-in firewall allows end-users who install network servers to control access. A GUI is available to configure it. BackSlash compiles its packages using GNU Compiler Collection features such as Position-independent code and buffer overflow protection to Hardening (computing) its software. BackSlash supports full disk encryption, as well as encryption of the home and Private directories.
Installation
BackSlash Linux's installation is simple and is fully Graphical. BackSlash Linux can be booted and run from a USB flash drive on any PC capable of booting from a USB drive, with the option of saving settings to the flash drive. A Ubuntu Live USB creator program is available to install an Ubuntu-based Distribution on a USB drive.
The Windows program "UNetbootin" allows BackSlash Linux USB burning.
Installation supports a Logical Volume Manager (LVM) with automatic partitioning only, and disk encryption. UTF-8, the default character encoding, supports a variety of non-Roman type Script (Unicode).
System requirements
A x64 Intel or AMD64 processor
2 GB random-access memory
20 GB hard disk drive space (or USB flash drive memory card or external drive)
Radeon, Intel HD and Iris Graphics or Nvidia Graphics processing unit with 256 MB shared memory for visual effects
Video Graphics Array (VGA) compatible screen
Either an optical disc drive or a USB for the installer media
Internet access is helpful for downloading updates while installing
Flavours and Server Edition
BackSlash Linux also released two official flavours - MATE and GNOME and also a Server Edition of the Operating System. Soon, the development and support for these versions (Flavous and Server Edition) was discontinued and the development was focused on the mainstream release.
References
Linux
Ubuntu derivatives |
54692968 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network%20eavesdropping | Network eavesdropping | Network eavesdropping, also known as eavesdropping attack, sniffing attack, or snooping attack, is a method that retrieves user information through the internet. This attack happens on electronic devices like computers and smartphones. This network attack typically happens under the usage of unsecured networks, such as public wifi connections or shared electronic devices. Eavesdropping attacks through the network is considered one of the most urgent threats in industries that rely on collecting and storing data.
A typical network eavesdropper may be called a Black-hat hacker and is considered a low-level hacker as it is simple to network eavesdrop successfully. The threat of network eavesdroppers is a growing concern. Research and discussions are brought up in the public's eye, for instance, types of eavesdropping, open-source tools, and commercial tools to prevent eavesdropping. Models against network eavesdropping attempts are built and developed as privacy is increasingly valued. Sections on cases of successful network eavesdropping attempts and its laws and policies in the National Security Agency are mentioned. Some laws include the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Types of attacks
Types of network eavesdropping include intervening in the process of decryption of messages on communication systems, attempting to access documents stored in a network system, and listening on electronic devices. Types include electronic performance monitoring and control systems, keystroke logging, man-in-the-middle attacks, observing exit nodes on a network, and Skype & Type.
Electronic performance monitoring and control systems (EPMCSs)
Electronic performance monitoring and control systems are used by employees or companies and organizations to collect, store, analyze, and report actions or performances of employers when they are working. The beginning of this system is used to increase the efficiency of workers, but instances of unintentional eavesdropping can occur, for example, when employees' casual phone calls or conversations would be recorded.
Keystroke logging
Keystroke logging is a program that can oversee the writing process of the user. It can be used to analyze the user's typing activities, as keystroke logging provides detailed information on activities like typing speed, pausing, deletion of texts, and more behaviors. By monitoring the activities and sounds of the keyboard strikes, the message typed by the user can be translated. Although keystroke logging systems do not explain reasons for pauses or deletion of texts, it allows attackers to analyze text information. Keystroke logging can also be used with eye-tracking devices which monitors movements of the user's eyes to determine patterns of the user's typing actions which can be used to explain the reasons for pauses or deletion of texts.
Man-in-the-middle attack (MitM)
A Man-in-the-middle attack is an active eavesdropping method that intrudes on the network system. It can retrieve and alter the information sent between two parties without anyone noticing. The attacker hijacks the communication systems and gains control over the transport of data, but cannot insert voice messages that sound or act like the actual users. Attackers also create independent communications through the system with the users acting as if the conversation between users is private.
The “man-in-the-middle” can also be referred to as lurkers in a social context. A lurker is a person who rarely or never posts anything online, but the person stays online and observes other users' actions. Lurking can be valuable as it lets people gain knowledge from other users. However, like eavesdropping, lurking into other users' private information violates privacy and social norms.
Observing exit nodes
Distributed networks including communication networks are usually designed so that nodes can enter and exit the network freely. However, this poses a danger in which attacks can easily access the system and may cause serious consequences, for example, leakage of the user’s phone number or credit card number. In many anonymous network pathways, the last node before exiting the network may contain actual information sent by users. Tor exit nodes are an example. Tor is an anonymous communication system that allows users to hide their IP address. It also has layers of encryption that protect information sent between users from eavesdropping attempts trying to observe the network traffic. However, Tor exit nodes are used to eavesdrop at the end of the network traffic. The last node in the network path flowing through the traffic, for instance, Tor exit nodes, can acquire original information or messages that were transmitted between different users.
Skype & Type (S&T)
Skype & Type (S&T) is a new keyboard acoustic eavesdropping attack that takes advantage of Voice-over IP (VoIP). S&T is practical and can be used in many applications in the real world, as it does not require attackers to be close to the victim and it can work with only some leaked keystrokes instead of every keystroke. With some knowledge of the victim’s typing patterns, attackers can gain a 91.7% accuracy typed by the victim. Different recording devices including laptop microphones, smartphones, and headset microphones can be used for attackers to eavesdrop on the victim's style and speed of typing. It is especially dangerous when attackers know what language the victim is typing in.
Tools to prevent eavesdropping attacks
Computer programs where the source code of the system is shared with the public for free or for commercial use can be used to prevent network eavesdropping. They are often modified to cater to different network systems, and the tools are specific in what task it performs. In this case, Advanced Encryption Standard-256, Bro, Chaosreader, CommView, Firewalls, Security Agencies, Snort, Tcptrace, and Wireshark are tools that address network security and network eavesdropping.
Advanced encryption standard-256 (AES-256)
It is a cipher block chaining (CBC) mode for ciphered messages and hash-based message codes. The AES-256 contains 256 keys for identifying the actual user, and it represents the standard used for securing many layers on the internet. AES-256 is used by Zoom Phone apps that help encrypt chat messages sent by Zoom users. If this feature is used in the app, users will only see encrypted chats when they use the app, and notifications of an encrypted chat will be sent with no content involved.
Bro
Bro is a system that detects network attackers and abnormal traffic on the internet. It emerged at the University of California, Berkeley that detects invading network systems. The system does not apply as detection of eavesdropping by default, but can be modified to an offline analyzing tool for eavesdropping attacks. Bro runs under Digital Unix, FreeBSD, IRIX, SunOS, and Solaris operating systems, with the implementation of approximately 22,000 lines of C++ and 1,900 lines of Bro. It is still in the process of development for real-world applications.
Chaosreader
Chaosreader is a simplified version of many open-source eavesdropping tools. It creates HTML pages on the content of when a network intrusion is detected. No actions are taken when an attack occurs and only information such as time, network location on which system or wall the user is trying to attack will be recorded.
CommView
CommView is specific to Windows systems which limits real-world applications because of its specific system usage. It captures network traffic and eavesdropping attempts by using packet analyzing and decoding.
Firewalls
Firewall technology filters network traffic and blocks malicious users from attacking the network system. It prevents users from intruding into private networks. Having a firewall in the entrance to a network system requires user authentications before allowing actions performed by users. There are different types of firewall technologies that can be applied to different types of networks.
Security agencies
A Secure Node Identification Agent is a mobile agent used to distinguish secure neighbor nodes and informs the Node Monitoring System (NMOA). The NMOA stays within nodes and monitors the energy exerted, and receives information about nodes including node ID, location, signal strength, hop counts, and more. It detects nodes nearby that are moving out of range by comparing signal strengths. The NMOA signals the Secure Node Identification Agent (SNIA) and updates each other on neighboring node information. The Node BlackBoard is a knowledge base that reads and updates the agents, acting as the brain of the security system. The Node Key Management agent is created when an encryption key is inserted to the system. It is used to protect the key and is often used between Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), which are underwater robots that transmit data and nodes.
Snort
Snort is used in many systems, and it can be run in an offline mode using stream4. Stream4 reassembles preprocessors with another stream option. The snort-reply patch feature is often used to reconstruct executions. It is currently developed by Cisco and acts as a free network intrusion detection system.
Tcptrace
Tcptrace is used to analyze pcap-based network intercepts, which is a packeting capture network application that detects network traffic. It has an important feature that monitors eavesdropping attacks and can reconstruct captured TCP streams.
Wireshark
Wireshark, or also named Ethereal, is a widely used open-source eavesdropping tool in the real world. Most of the features in Ethereal are packet-oriented and contain a TCP reassembly option for experiments on tracking intrusion attempts.
Models against the attacks
Models are built to secure system information stored online and can be specific towards certain systems, for example, protecting existing documents, preventing attacks on the processing of instant messages on the network, and creating fake documents to trace malicious users.
Beacon-bearing decoy documents
Documents containing fake but private information such as made-up social security numbers, bank account numbers, and passport information will be purposely posted on a web server. These documents have beacons that will be triggered when a user attempts to open them, which then alarms another site that records the time accessed of the documents and IP address of the user. The information collected from the beacons is then regularly be sent to Tor exit nodes which then the user will be caught in the malicious act.
Butterfly encryption scheme
The Butterfly encryption scheme uses timestamps and updates pseudorandom number generators (PRNG) seeds in a network system to generate authentication keys and parameters for encrypted messages to be sent out. This scheme can perform in entities that are searching for a relatively low cost but efficient security scheme, and can work in different systems as it has a simple design that is easy to modify for specific purposes. The Butterfly encryption scheme is effective because it uses a changing parameter and has an unpredictable timestamp that creates a high-level security system.
Crypto phones (Cfones)
Cfones is a model built to protect VoIP communications. It uses Short Authenticated Strings (SAS) protocol that requires users to exchange keys to ensure no network intruders are in the system. This is specific to communication systems that involve both voice messages and text messages. In this model, a string is given to actual users, and to connect with another user, strings have to be exchanged and have to match. If another user tries to invade the system, the string will not match, and Cfones blocks attackers from entering the network. This model is specific to preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
Friendly-jamming schemes (DFJ and OFJ)
Friendly-jamming schemes (DFJ and OFJ) are models that can decrease the eavesdropping risk by purposely interfering the network when an unknown user is near the area of the protected area. The models are tested by the probability of eavesdrop attacks in a testing environment, and are found that there is a lower probability of attacks compared to a system with no friendly-jamming schemes installed. A feature of the DFJ and OFJ schemes is that the models offer a large coverage secure area that is protected from eavesdroppers effectively.
Honey encryption scheme (HE)
A honey encryption scheme is used to strengthen the protection of private information of instant messaging systems, including WhatsApp and Snapchat, as well as tracking down the eavesdropper’s information. HE contains fake but similar plaintext during the decryption phase of the process of instant messaging with an incorrect key. This makes messages that the eavesdropper is trying to decrypt to be gibberish messages. HE schemes are used in specific systems not limited to instant messaging systems, passwords, and credit cards. However, applying it to other systems is still a difficult task as changes inside the scheme have to be made to fit the system.
Internet of Things framework (IoT)
The Internet of Things framework involved four layers of security measures that are management layer, cloud layer, gateway layer, and IoT device layer. The management layer handles web and mobile applications. The cloud layer looks over the service and resource management. It acts as an access point for users to connect to other internet services. The gateway layer manages the packet filtering module. It links the endpoint network of the services, processes the documents or information, and contains security tasks including authentication, authorization, and encryption. The two main tasks of the gateway layer are to detect users and perform filtering of the actual user and malicious users. The IoT device layer looks over the gateway layer’s performance and double-checks whether all malicious users are removed from the network, specifically, attestation is a mechanism to measure the end-point integrity and removes nodes from the network if necessary.
Cases of network eavesdropping
Completely trusting network devices or network companies can be risky. Users of devices are oftentimes unaware of the threats on the internet and choose to ignore the importance of protecting their personal information. This paves the way for malicious hackers to gain access to private data that users may not be aware of. A few cases of network eavesdropping discussed include Alipay and Cloud computing.
Alipay
Private information from a user of mobile payment apps, in this case, Alipay, is retrieved using a hierarchical identification specific to mobile payment apps. The system first recognizes the app used from traffic data, then categorizes the user’s distinct actions on the app, and lastly distinguishes comprehensive steps within each action. Distinct actions on mobile payment apps are generalized in a few groups including making a payment, transfer money between banks, scanning checks, and looking at previous records. By classifying and observing the user’s specific steps within each group of actions, the attacker intercepts the network traffic using and obtains private information of app users. Strategies to prevent incidents are made such as fingerprint or facial identification, and email or text confirmation of actions performed on the app.
Cloud computing
Cloud computing is a computing model that provides access to many different configurable resources, including servers, storage, applications, and services. The nature of the Cloud makes it vulnerable to security threats, and attackers can easily eavesdrop on the Cloud. Particularly, an attacker can simply identify the data center of the Virtual Machine used by cloud computing, and retrieve information on the IP address and domain names of the data center. It becomes dangerous when the attacker gains access to private cryptographic keys for specific servers which they may get data stored in the cloud. For example, the Amazon EC2 platform based in Seattle, Washington, WA, USA, was once at risk of such issues but has now used Amazon Web Service (AWS) to manage their encryption keys.
Medical records
Sometimes users can choose what they put online and should be responsible for their actions, including whether or not a user should take a photo of their social security number and send it through a messaging app. However, data like medical records or bank accounts are stored in a network system in which companies are also responsible for securing user’s data. Medical records of patients can be stolen by insurance companies, medical laboratories, or advertising companies for their interests. Information such as name, social security number, home address, email address, and diagnosis history can be used to track down a person. Eavesdropping reports of a patient’s medical history is illegal and is dangerous. To deal with network threats, many medical institutes have been using endpoint authentication, cryptographic protocols and data encryption.
Related laws and policies
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
In Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), it states that it is a “federal crime to engage in wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; to possess wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment; to use to disclose information obtained through illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, or to disclose information secured through court-ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, to obstruct justice.” Federal and state law enforcement officials may be allowed to intercept with the wire, oral, and electronic communications if and only if a court order is issued, consent of the parties, or when a malicious user is trying to access the system. If the law is violated, there may be a criminal penalty, civil liability, administrative and professional disciplinary action, and or exclusion of evidence. A general penalty is not more than five years of imprisonment and no more than $250,000 for individuals and not more than $500,000 for organizations. If damages are created, there may be a $100 fine per day of violation or $10,000 in total.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act gives out court orders for “electronic surveillance, physical searches, installation, and use of pen registers and traps and trace devices, and orders to disclose tangible items.” Court orders issued on electronic surveillance allow the federal officials to use electronic surveillance which includes eavesdropping without violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or Title III specifically.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
A guideline to protecting the privacy of data of health patients is issued by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The policy states that individual patient data or personal data should be secure, and patients will not face any arbitrary losses related to invading their personal information or health conditions. The policy acts as a minimum standard for eHealth usages and it should be followed by all medical institutes for protecting the privacy of patient’s data.
See also
Black hat (computer security)
Crowdsensing
Eavesdropping
Endpoint detection and response
Endpoint security
Intrusion detection system
Packet analyzer
Security hacker
Van Eck phreaking
References
Computer networking
Computer security |
54737875 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Index%20of%20articles%20related%20to%20terms%20of%20service%20and%20privacy%20policies | Index of articles related to terms of service and privacy policies | This is a list of articles about terms of service and privacy policies. These are also called terms of use, and are rules one must agree to, in order to use a service. The articles fall in two main categories: descriptions of terms used for specific companies or products, and descriptions of different kinds of terms in general. Articles on companies vary widely in the amount of detail they give on terms of service. Annotations show what is available in the article on each company, and need to be updated as those articles are improved.
Terms of service are regularly the subject of news articles throughout the English-language press, such as in the US, UK, Africa, India, Singapore, and Australia. Terms of service are also addressed in a widely reviewed documentary, academic research, and legal research.
Articles which describe specific companies' terms of service
Social media
Comparison: Privacy concerns with social networking services – Partially compares privacy policies, data retention, geo-tagging, data releases
Comparison: Comparison of Q&A sites – Compares topics allowed, copyright, and licensing of user contributions
Comparison: Death and the Internet - Compares rules on access after death
Facebook Addresses privacy settings and enforcement
Instagram Partly addresses commercial re-use of members' posts, and geo-tagging
Pinterest Addresses sales of user data and tracking of users on other websites which have a Pinterest button
Tencent Partly addresses user security
Twitter Addresses privacy, data dissemination, security breaches, legal jurisdiction, deletion to comply with national laws and survivors' requests
Search engines
Comparison: Privacy-focused search engines/browsers – Partially compares location of servers and hiding IP addresses
DuckDuckGo Addresses lack of tracking
Google Addresses privacy and indemnification
Browsers
Comodo Dragon Addresses arbitration, tracking, disclosures, liability, and use of the information for advertising
Google Chrome Addresses tracking of users, and insecurity with VPNs
Safari Addresses tracking, disclaimers, and disclosing unique device identifiers "for any purpose"
Transport
Comparison: Credit card damage waivers – Compares credit cards' limits on rental car damages
Comparison: Diminution in value – Compares rental car companies' terms about charging for diminution in value
Air passengers and freight Montreal Convention 119 states and the EU; Warsaw Convention 152 states
Road freight: CMR Convention Europe and Asia; Uniform Bill of Lading Act USA
Sea freight Hague–Visby Rules applied in US by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; newer are Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules
Trains in Europe (CIV) Partly addresses guarantee of arrival and connections, baggage, compensation
Trains in UK National Rail Conditions of Travel Addresses compensation for delays; links to other issues
Lyft Addresses indemnification (user payment of company's legal bills)
Southwest Airlines Partly addresses difficulties beyond the airline's control
Uber Addresses indemnification (user payment of company's legal bills)
Credit cards
American Express Addresses limits on rental car damages
Discover Addresses limits on rental car damages
Mastercard Addresses limits on rental car damages
Visa Partly addresses terms imposed on merchants, and limits on rental car damages
Email
Comparison: Death and the Internet - Compares rules on access after death
Utility software
CCleaner Addresses tracking of users and their software, matching with outside sources of information, use of the information for advertising, data retention, liability
GeForce (graphics processing units from Nvidia) Addresses liability, and user data provided to Nvidia, to social media and to advertisers
Malwarebytes Addresses arbitration, tracking of users and all software they run, their clickstreams, locations, data retention, and use of the information for advertising
Microsoft account (formerly Passport or Live ID) Partly addresses privacy and allegations of deceptive practices
Other software
Comparison: List of commercial software with available source code – Compares copyright, open source, copyright licensing
Comparison: List of commercial video games with available source code – Compares copyright licensing
Online file storage and hosting
Comparison: Comparison of file hosting services - Compares limits on size, bandwidth, expiration
Comparison: Comparison of online backup services - Compares limits on size, bandwidth, server locations, security key management
Comparison: Comparison of free and open-source software licenses
Comparison: Death and the Internet - Compares rules on access after death
Amazon Drive Addresses file sizes and commercial use
Baidu Wangpan Partly addresses country of storage
Dropbox Partly addresses privacy, ownership of data and deletion
Google Drive Partly addresses privacy and intellectual property
ICloud Partly addresses encryption
OneDrive Partly addresses privacy and usage prohibitions
SpiderOak Partly addresses encryption
SecureSafe Addresses digital inheritance
Tresorit Addresses encryption
Website hosts
Comparison: Comparison of free blog hosting services – Compares limits on size, bandwidth, e-commerce
Google Sites Addresses limits on file sizes, e-commerce, scripting, countries
Jimdo Addresses limits on e-commerce, languages, location of data storage
Tripod Addresses storage, e-commerce, scripting
Weebly Partly addresses storage, e-commerce
Wix.com Partly addressed e-commerce
WordPress.com Partly addresses ads, paid upgrades
Yola Partly addresses limits on storage, web pages
Broad comparisons across categories
Death and the Internet – Compares terms on retention and access after an account holder dies
Indemnity – requirements that users pay companies' legal bills
Articles which discuss terms of service in general
Acceptable use policy
Click wrap
Contract of carriage
Community standards
Disclaimer
Email privacy
End-user license agreement
Free license
Free software license
Free web hosting service
Internet privacy
License compatibility
Multi-licensing
Open-source license
Privacy concerns with social networking services
Privacy policy
Proprietary software
Public domain equivalent license
Service-level agreement
Shrink wrap contract
Site license
Software license
Standard form contract
Terms and Conditions May Apply
Terms of service
Terms of Service; Didn't Read
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
References
Computer law
Contract law
Information technology management
Internet law
Software licenses
Terms of service
Companies' terms of service
Wikipedia indexes
Online services comparisons |
54754786 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yan%20Zhu | Yan Zhu |
Yan Zhu () is a security engineer, open web standards author, technology speaker, and open source contributor. In 2015 she was recognized as one of Forbes 30 Under 30.
Education
Yan Zhu is a high school dropout who earned a B.S. in physics at MIT. She enrolled as a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow at Stanford University in experimental cosmology but dropped out after four months.
Employment
Zhu worked for Yahoo as a security engineer in 2014 and 2015, is a fellow at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and is currently the chief security officer at Brave Software.
W3C participation
Zhu is the editor of two W3C documents: the Secure Contexts web standard and End-to-End Encryption and the Web, a W3C TAG finding that supports the use of end-to-end encryption for web communications. Zhu served on the W3C Technical Architecture Group in 2015.
Other work
Zhu served on the board of directors of the Zcash Foundation from July 2017 to June 2018 and Noisebridge in 2013.
In July 2018, Zhu interviewed whistleblower Chelsea Manning at the Circle of HOPE conference in New York City.
Zhu has contributed to open source works including:
Brave
HTTPS Everywhere
SecureDrop
Privacy Badger for Firefox
Tor Browser Bundle
References
External links
Yahoo nomination statement for W3C TAG
"Mapping the Journey" interview
Yan Zhu personal web site
Yan Zhu on Quora
Living people
1991 births |
54953515 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAML%20metadata | SAML metadata | The SAML metadata standard belongs to the family of XML-based standards known as the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) published by OASIS in 2005. A SAML metadata document describes a SAML deployment such as a SAML identity provider or a SAML service provider. Deployments share metadata to establish a baseline of trust and interoperability.
Introduction to SAML metadata
To securely interoperate, partners share metadata in whatever form and by whatever means possible. In any case, at least the following metadata must be shared:
Entity ID
Cryptographic keys
Protocol endpoints (bindings and locations)
Every SAML system entity has an entity ID, a globally-unique identifier used in software configurations, relying-party databases, and client-side cookies. On the wire, every SAML protocol message contains the entity ID of the issuer.
For authentication purposes, a SAML message may be digitally signed by the issuer. To verify the signature on the message, the message receiver uses a public key known to belong to the issuer. Similarly, to encrypt a message, a public encryption key belonging to the ultimate receiver must be known to the issuer. In both situations—signing and encryption—trusted public keys must be shared in advance.
Once the message is signed and encrypted, the issuer sends the message to a trusted protocol endpoint, the location of which must be known in advance. Upon receipt, the message receiver decrypts the message (using its own private decryption key) and verifies the signature (using a trusted public key in metadata) before mapping the entity ID in the message to a trusted partner.
The previous scenario requires each party to know the other in advance. To establish a baseline of trust, parties share metadata with each other. Initially, this may be as simple as sharing information via email. Over time, as the number of SAML partners grows, the natural tendency is to automate the metadata sharing process.
To fully automate the metadata sharing process, a standard file format is needed. To this end, the SAML V2.0 Metadata specification defines a standard representation for SAML metadata that simplifies the configuration of SAML software and makes it possible to create secure, automated processes for metadata sharing.
Metadata-driven interoperability
As SAML technology has matured, the importance of SAML metadata has steadily increased. Today an implementation that supports SAML web browser requires a schema-valid SAML metadata file for each SAML partner. (See the SAML V2.0 Profiles specification for more information about SAML web browser SSO.)
Static metadata configuration
The term static metadata refers to a metadata file that is configured directly into the SAML application by an administrator. In doing so, the administrator becomes responsible for the maintenance of the metadata regardless of how the metadata was obtained in the first place. Thus static metadata contributes to the overall static configuration of the SAML application.
Unfortunately, SAML metadata is inherently non-static as illustrated by the following typical scenario between a SAML identity provider (IdP) and a SAML service provider (SP). Suppose an IdP owner obtains SAML metadata from an SP partner. Perhaps the SP metadata is transmitted to the IdP owner via email, or maybe the IdP owner logs into a protected web app and downloads the SP metadata via a browser. Regardless of how the metadata is obtained, the end result is the same: The IdP owner configures the SP metadata directly into the IdP software.
Now suppose the SP metadata contains a public encryption key. Presumably, the corresponding private decryption key is configured into the SP software. If the private decryption key is compromised (or otherwise needs to be replaced), the public encryption key in the SP metadata is no longer trustworthy and must be replaced as well.
Since the SP metadata is statically configured in the IdP software, only the IdP owner can replace the public encryption key in the SP metadata. In this sense, the IdP owner is responsible for the SP metadata. This mismatch leads to interoperability issues.
The same is true on the SP side. By statically configuring IdP metadata into the SP software, the SP owner implicitly accepts the responsibility to maintain the IdP metadata when something changes. Since an IdP (or SP) typically has many partners, static metadata configuration clearly does not scale, and moreover, change management associated with static metadata is difficult at best.
Dynamic metadata exchange
Not surprisingly, metadata sharing processes yearn to be automated. Every metadata file that is statically configured into the SAML application by an administrator incurs technical debt. The accumulation of this debt prevents the SAML deployment from scaling to its potential.
To avoid excessive technical debt, the metadata sharing process must be automated. One approach is to enlist the help of a trusted third party whose responsibility it is to collect, curate, and distribute metadata across the network. Curated metadata is consistently formatted, more likely to be free of vulnerabilities (intentional or otherwise), and therefore safe to use.
In the case of SAML metadata, this trusted third party is called a SAML federation. The community of SAML deployers comprising the federation willingly conform to one or more profiles of SAML to promote interoperability and trust. To that end, federation participants often share a central infrastructure for metadata sharing, which allows the federation to scale to thousands of interoperable SAML deployments.
A history of SAML metadata
Now let's retrace some of the steps that led to the publication of the SAML V2.0 Metadata specification in March 2005. A turning point occurred on 14 November 2003—our story starts there.
Historical origins
In response to Microsoft Passport, the Liberty Alliance conceived the Identity Federation Framework, a federation technology developed over a three-year period between 2002 and 2004. (The previously mentioned history of SAML provides context for ID-FF.) On 14 November 2003, Liberty contributed ID-FF 1.2 to OASIS. The contribution included a document entitled Liberty Metadata Description and Discovery Specification Version 1.0, which included the following design goals:
"whois for SAML federations" (based on the Organization and ContactPerson elements in metadata)
dynamic discovery of metadata (with resolution via DNS and Well-Known Location)
document-level security using XML Signature
As it turns out, all of those goals were preserved in the OASIS SAML V2.0 Metadata Standard described later in this article.
The schema document included with the legacy Liberty ID-FF 1.2 archive is identified as Liberty Metadata Version 1.1 whereas Liberty Metadata Version 1.0 was contributed to OASIS. The apparent contradiction was explained by the schema's author. (Peter Davis, Personal Communication) Between November 2003 (when Version 1.0 was contributed to OASIS) and December 2004 (when Version 1.1 was completed by Liberty), development of the Liberty metadata specification continued in parallel with the OASIS work stream. See the chart below for a visual representation. The arrows in the chart indicate dependencies while the dashed lines indicate equivalencies.
Relevant references into the Liberty work stream are given at the end of this article. The original metadata schema contributed to OASIS is listed in its entirety in section 7 of the Liberty Metadata Version 1.0 specification. Similarly, the specification for Liberty Metadata Version 1.1 includes a listing of the Version 1.1 schema. Both the Version 1.0 schema and the Version 1.1 schema are linked here courtesy of the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine.
Post-November 2003
Over the next thirteen months, from November 2003 to December 2004, the OASIS Security Services (SAML) Technical Committee (SSTC) molded the Liberty metadata specification into what eventually became known as SAML Metadata. During that time, the SSTC generalized the metadata specification to include support for multiple protocols (including non-SAML protocols) but more importantly, the Liberty metadata schema was retrofitted with numerous extension points. Historically, the extensibility of SAML Metadata has had important consequences, as we shall see.
By March 2004, most of the Liberty contribution was incorporated into the OASIS work stream. From that point onward, the Liberty and OASIS work streams progressed concurrently (but not independently since the same people were working on both specifications). Between March and July 2004, the fledgling SAML Metadata specification underwent significant churn.
In July 2004, the SSTC issued a public call for comments covering a complete set of SAML V2.0 draft specifications. Included in that specification set was a working draft of a newly forged SAML V2.0 Metadata specification.
In retrospect, it appears as though the bulk of the SAML V2.0 Metadata specification was developed between March and July 2004, but clearly the SAML V2.0 Metadata Standard sprung from the loins of the Liberty Alliance, specifically Liberty Metadata Version 1.0. Consequently, to understand the origins of SAML Metadata, one must study the provenance of Liberty metadata.
The remaining history of SAML Metadata is mostly OASIS administrative process. After the final Committee Draft was published in November 2004, the SSTC began the standardization process in January 2005. Finally, on 5 March 2005, OASIS announced the newly ratified SAML V2.0 Standard.
The V2.0 specification set (see the References section for a complete list) included the final SAML V2.0 Metadata specification. A decade later, in September 2015, OASIS published a revised SAML Metadata specification with errata. As a result, the original metadata specification was deprecated, as were the other documents in the original 2.0 specification set.
During the intervening decade, between 2005 and 2015, the SSTC developed a number of "Post-V2.0" draft specifications. Some of these draft documents became Committee Specifications. A select subset of these Committee Specifications are listed in the References section at the end of this article.
Pre-November 2003
As it turns out, the influence of the Liberty Identity Federation Framework on SAML Metadata predates the contribution of ID-FF 1.2 in November 2003. Apparently the SSTC was dabbling in metadata in parallel with the Liberty Alliance. An excerpt from a draft metadata specification published in September 2003 bears this out:
This document defines metadata that describe the elements and attributes required to use the SAML Web Browser SSO Profiles. Since the Liberty Alliance Web SSO Profiles are directly based on the SAML Web SSO Profiles, the metadata defined in this document borrows extensively from the metadata definitions in the draft Liberty Alliance 1.2 specifications. (Excerpted from "Metadata for SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profiles")
The revision history at the end of that draft document gives the following characterization of itself: "Initial draft based on Draft 07 of SAML 1.1 Metadata specification." In other words, earlier draft documents were published. Indeed, the revision history at the end of the previous draft shows a trail of metadata specifications dating back to November 2002.
Following the document trail, the influence of Liberty ID-FF on SAML metadata can be traced to a draft specification published in April 2003. This is the first known OASIS document that references Liberty ID-FF, specifically, Liberty Metadata Version 1.0-06, an early version of the Liberty Metadata specification about which little is known. It is, however, clear that "Metadata for SAML 1.1 Web Browser Profiles" was intended to be a companion to the SAML V1.1 Standard but of course we know that V1.1 does not specify the use of metadata. See the next section for relevant conjecture.
Two early metadata schema may be of interest:
In June 2002, barely a month after the SSTC completed its work on what was to become the SAML V1.0 Standard, the Shibboleth project developed a metadata schema consisting of <OriginSite> and <DestinationSite> elements. This schema would drive the initial versions of the Shibboleth IdP software.
In February 2003, the SSTC released a draft schema for a metadata specification entitled "Metadata for SAML 1.0 Web Browser Profiles." That schema remains a curiosity, however, since the very next version of that document stream (and all subsequent versions) would exhibit the Liberty metadata syntax.
There is no evidence to suggest that either of these early attempts to define a metadata schema had any appreciable effect on the development of the Liberty metadata schema.
Historical summary
We know that metadata standards for SAML V1.0 or SAML V1.1 were never published. We also know that the necessary IPR for Liberty Metadata was not in place until November 2003. With that, we offer the following summary and conjecture:
A draft specification entitled "Metadata for SAML 1.0 Web Browser Profiles" was the first known SAML metadata specification. The document is dated 12 November 2002, which is one week after the SAML V1.0 Standard was announced, which is curious. In any case, the metadata syntax used in that document is completely different from what we now know as SAML Metadata. That document was never published and its origins remain a mystery.
A draft specification entitled "Metadata for SAML 1.1 Web Browser Profiles" was the first known SAML metadata specification based on Liberty ID-FF. It was completed in April 2003. The title of the draft specification makes it clear that the SSTC knew that SAML V1.1 was coming and moreover SAML metadata was to be included in the SAML V1.1 Standard.
Unfortunately that did not happen since the necessary IPR was not in place when the SAML V1.1 Standard was announced. Indeed, the formal contribution of Liberty ID-FF 1.2 to OASIS occurred two months after the announcement of the SAML V1.1 Standard in September 2003.
In September 2003, less than two weeks after the announcement of the SAML V1.1 Standard, the SSTC set its sights on SAML V2.0 by forking the document stream and renaming the draft document: "Metadata for SAML 2.0 Web Browser Profiles."
SAML Metadata came to life between March and July 2004. The SSTC issued a public call for comments that included a candidate SAML Metadata specification.
The final SAML Metadata specification was included in the SAML V2.0 Standard specification set announced in March 2005.
For the next 10 years, the specification documents evolved (but the schema remained stable). A specification for SAML V2.0 Metadata with Errata (SAMLMeta20Errata) was published in September 2015.
Post-V2.0 specifications
As mentioned earlier, the SAML V2.0 Metadata Schema has numerous extension points. This feature led to a proliferation of "Post-V2.0" specifications that extended the standard in several directions. The more popular metadata extensions are listed below for convenience (see the examples for specific use cases):
SAML V2.0 Metadata Extensions for Registration and Publication Information Version 1.0.
SAML V2.0 Metadata Extension for Entity Attributes.
SAML V2.0 Metadata Extensions for Login and Discovery User Interface Version 1.0.
Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile.
Service Provider Request Initiation Protocol and Profile Version 1.0.
SAML V2.0 Metadata Profile for Algorithm Support Version 1.0.
An important "Post-V2.0" specification is the SAML V2.0 Metadata Interoperability Profile, which builds on the premise that a formal public key infrastructure (PKI) can be extremely complex and in some cases intractable (it is well known, for example, that browser-facing TLS certificate revocation is broken). In essence, the Metadata Interoperability Profile is an attempt to provide a workable key revocation mechanism for SAML federations.
Since its publication in August 2009, the Metadata Interoperability Profile has been a particularly influential document, especially in higher education (see, for example, the certificate-related requirements for deployers in one large R&E federation). Metadata interoperability plays a key role in a formal implementation profile published by the Kantara Initiative:
Indeed, the key feature that distinguishes a scalable SAML implementation (from one that is not) is metadata interoperability.
SAML metadata examples
In this section we give concrete examples of the SAML entity descriptor, the basic unit of policy and interoperability in SAML metadata. Each of the examples includes the following metadata bits:
Entity ID and entity attributes
Role descriptor (describing either a SAML identity provider or a SAML service provider)
User interface elements
Signing keys or encryption keys
Single sign-on protocol endpoints
Registration and publication info
Organization and contact info (for human readers)
In the examples below, a particular URI in metadata (such as an entityID or an endpoint location) maps to a responsible party via the URI's domain component:
The organization that owns domain example.info is responsible for an unspecified SAML entity (such as an identity provider or a service provider)
The organization that owns domain example.org is responsible for a SAML identity provider
The organization that owns domain example.com is responsible for a SAML service provider
The organization that owns domain example.net is a trusted 3rd party responsible for metadata registration and publication
Note that SAML metadata describes all parties involved in metadata-driven SAML Web Browser SSO except the browser user. (See the SAML V2.0 Profiles specification for more information about SAML web browser SSO.)
Entity metadata
The following code sample illustrates the common technical features of a SAML <md:EntityDescriptor> element:
<md:EntityDescriptor entityID="https://sso.example.info/entity" validUntil="2017-08-30T19:10:29Z"
xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
xmlns:mdrpi="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:rpi"
xmlns:mdattr="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:attribute"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<!-- insert ds:Signature element (omitted) -->
<md:Extensions>
<mdrpi:RegistrationInfo registrationAuthority="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdrpi:PublicationInfo creationInstant="2017-08-16T19:10:29Z" publisher="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdattr:EntityAttributes>
<saml:Attribute Name="http://registrar.example.net/entity-category" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml:AttributeValue>https://registrar.example.net/category/self-certified</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
</mdattr:EntityAttributes>
</md:Extensions>
<!-- insert one or more concrete instances of the md:RoleDescriptor abstract type (see below) -->
<md:Organization>
<md:OrganizationName xml:lang="en">...</md:OrganizationName>
<md:OrganizationDisplayName xml:lang="en">...</md:OrganizationDisplayName>
<md:OrganizationURL xml:lang="en">https://www.example.info/</md:OrganizationURL>
</md:Organization>
<md:ContactPerson contactType="technical">
<md:SurName>SAML Technical Support</md:SurName>
<md:EmailAddress>mailto:[email protected]</md:EmailAddress>
</md:ContactPerson>
</md:EntityDescriptor>
Note the following details about this general entity descriptor:
The entityID attribute is the unique identifier of the entity. Note well that the entityID is an immutable name for the entity, not a location.
The validUntil attribute gives the expiration date of the metadata.
The <ds:Signature> element (which has been omitted for simplicity) contains a digital signature that ensures the authenticity and integrity of the metadata. The signatory is assumed to be a trusted 3rd party called a metadata registrar.
The <mdrpi:RegistrationInfo> extension element asserts an identifier for the metadata registrar.
The <mdrpi:PublicationInfo> extension element asserts the metadata publisher (which happens to be the same as the registrar). The creationInstant attribute gives the precise instant the metadata was created. Comparing the value of the creationInstant attribute to the value of the validUntil attribute, we see that the metadata is valid for two weeks.
The <mdattr:EntityAttributes> extension element includes a single entity attribute. The entity attribute claims that the entity is "self-certified," a presumably desirable quality.
The organization identified in the <md:Organization> element is "responsible for the entity" described by the entity descriptor (section 2.3.2 of SAMLMeta). The <md:Organization> element contains one or more language-qualified child elements of each type.
The contact information in the <md:ContactPerson> element identifies a technical contact responsible for the entity. Multiple contacts and contact types are possible. See section 2.3.2.2 of SAMLMeta.
The all-important role descriptor has been omitted from this initial example for brevity. The SAML metadata specification defines numerous concrete instances of the md:RoleDescriptor abstract type (section 2.4.1 of SAMLMeta). The two most important roles are described by the <md:IDPSSODescriptor> element and the <md:SPSSODescriptor> element. Each of these role descriptors is illustrated in the subsections below.
Identity provider metadata
A SAML identity provider manages a Single Sign-On Service endpoint that receives authentication requests from service providers. The entity descriptor for an identity provider in that role contains an <md:IDPSSODescriptor> element, which itself contains at least one <md:SingleSignOnService> endpoint. The following example illustrates two such endpoints:
<md:EntityDescriptor entityID="https://sso.example.org/idp" validUntil="2017-08-30T19:10:29Z"
xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
xmlns:mdrpi="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:rpi"
xmlns:mdattr="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:attribute"
xmlns:mdui="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:ui"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<!-- insert ds:Signature element (omitted) -->
<md:Extensions>
<mdrpi:RegistrationInfo registrationAuthority="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdrpi:PublicationInfo creationInstant="2017-08-16T19:10:29Z" publisher="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdattr:EntityAttributes>
<saml:Attribute Name="http://registrar.example.net/entity-category" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml:AttributeValue>https://registrar.example.net/category/self-certified</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
</mdattr:EntityAttributes>
</md:Extensions>
<md:IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<md:Extensions>
<mdui:UIInfo>
<mdui:DisplayName xml:lang="en">Example.org</mdui:DisplayName>
<mdui:Description xml:lang="en">The identity provider at Example.org</mdui:Description>
<mdui:Logo height="32" width="32" xml:lang="en">https://idp.example.org/myicon.png</mdui:Logo>
</mdui:UIInfo>
</md:Extensions>
<md:KeyDescriptor use="signing">
<ds:KeyInfo>...</ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/Redirect"/>
<md:SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST" Location="https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/POST"/>
</md:IDPSSODescriptor>
<md:Organization>
<md:OrganizationName xml:lang="en">Example.org Non-Profit Org</md:OrganizationName>
<md:OrganizationDisplayName xml:lang="en">Example.org</md:OrganizationDisplayName>
<md:OrganizationURL xml:lang="en">https://www.example.org/</md:OrganizationURL>
</md:Organization>
<md:ContactPerson contactType="technical">
<md:SurName>SAML Technical Support</md:SurName>
<md:EmailAddress>mailto:[email protected]</md:EmailAddress>
</md:ContactPerson>
</md:EntityDescriptor>
The content of the <md:IDPSSODescriptor> element describes the Single Sign-On Service at the identity provider. Note the following details about this element:
The <mdui:UIInfo> container contains a set of language-qualified extension elements used to build dynamic user interfaces at the service provider. The most important user interface at the service provider is the identity provider discovery interface.
The identity provider software is presumably configured with a private SAML signing key. The corresponding public key is included in the <md:KeyDescriptor use="signing"> element. In the above example, the key material has been omitted from the key descriptor for brevity.
The Binding attributes of the <md:SingleSignOnService> elements are standard URIs specified in the SAML 2.0 Binding specification (SAMLBind).
The values of the md:SingleSignOnService/@Location attributes in identity provider metadata are used by a service provider to route SAML messages, which minimizes the possibility of a rogue identity provider orchestrating a man-in-the-middle attack.
Service provider metadata
A SAML service provider manages an Assertion Consumer Service endpoint that receives authentication assertions from identity providers. The entity descriptor for a service provider in that role contains an <md:SPSSODescriptor> element, which itself contains at least one <md:AssertionConsumerService> endpoint. The following example illustrates such an endpoint:
<md:EntityDescriptor entityID="https://sso.example.com/portal" validUntil="2017-08-30T19:10:29Z"
xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
xmlns:mdrpi="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:rpi"
xmlns:mdattr="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:attribute"
xmlns:mdui="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:ui"
xmlns:idpdisc="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:profiles:SSO:idp-discovery-protocol"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<!-- insert ds:Signature element (omitted) -->
<md:Extensions>
<mdrpi:RegistrationInfo registrationAuthority="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdrpi:PublicationInfo creationInstant="2017-08-16T19:10:29Z" publisher="https://registrar.example.net"/>
<mdattr:EntityAttributes>
<saml:Attribute Name="http://registrar.example.net/entity-category" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<saml:AttributeValue>https://registrar.example.net/category/self-certified</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
</mdattr:EntityAttributes>
</md:Extensions>
<md:SPSSODescriptor WantAssertionsSigned="true" protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<md:Extensions>
<mdui:UIInfo>
<mdui:DisplayName xml:lang="en">Example.com Vendor Service</mdui:DisplayName>
<mdui:InformationURL xml:lang="en">https://service.example.com/about.html</mdui:InformationURL>
<mdui:PrivacyStatementURL xml:lang="en">https://service.example.com/privacy.html</mdui:PrivacyStatementURL>
<mdui:Logo height="32" width="32" xml:lang="en">https://service.example.com/myicon.png</mdui:Logo>
</mdui:UIInfo>
<idpdisc:DiscoveryResponse index="0" Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:profiles:SSO:idp-discovery-protocol" Location="https://service.example.com/SAML2/Login"/>
</md:Extensions>
<md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption">
<ds:KeyInfo>...</ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
<md:NameIDFormat>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient</md:NameIDFormat>
<md:AssertionConsumerService index="0" Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST" Location="https://service.example.com/SAML2/SSO/POST"/>
<md:AttributeConsumingService index="0">
<md:ServiceName xml:lang="en">Example.com Employee Portal</md:ServiceName>
<md:RequestedAttribute isRequired="true"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
Name="urn:oid:1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.1.1.13" FriendlyName="eduPersonUniqueId"/>
<md:RequestedAttribute
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3" FriendlyName="mail"/>
</md:AttributeConsumingService>
</md:SPSSODescriptor>
<md:Organization>
<md:OrganizationName xml:lang="en">Example.com Inc.</md:OrganizationName>
<md:OrganizationDisplayName xml:lang="en">Example.com</md:OrganizationDisplayName>
<md:OrganizationURL xml:lang="en">https://www.example.com/</md:OrganizationURL>
</md:Organization>
<md:ContactPerson contactType="technical">
<md:SurName>SAML Technical Support</md:SurName>
<md:EmailAddress>mailto:[email protected]</md:EmailAddress>
</md:ContactPerson>
</md:EntityDescriptor>
The content of the <md:SPSSODescriptor> element describes the Assertion Consumer Service at the service provider. Note the following details about this element:
The WantAssertionsSigned attribute on the <md:SPSSODescriptor> element declares that the service provider wants the <saml:Assertion> element to be digitally signed. This attribute causes a metadata-aware identity provider to auto-configure itself at run time.
The <mdui:UIInfo> extension element contains a set of language-qualified extension elements used to build dynamic user interfaces at the identity provider. Two important user interfaces at the identity provider are the login page and the user consent interface.
The <idpdisc:DiscoveryResponse> extension element defines an endpoint used in conjunction with identity provider discovery.
The service provider software is presumably configured with a private SAML decryption key. A public SAML encryption key is included in the <md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption"> element. In the above example, the key material has been omitted from the key descriptor for brevity.
The <md:NameIDFormat> element gives the desired format of the <saml:NameID> element in the SAML assertion. The presence of this element causes a metadata-aware identity provider to auto-configure itself at run time.
The index attribute of an <md:AssertionConsumerService> element is used as the value of the AssertionConsumerServiceIndex attribute in a <samlp:AuthnRequest> element.
The Binding attribute of the <md:AssertionConsumerService> element is a standard URI specified in the SAML 2.0 Binding specification (SAMLBind).
The <md:AttributeConsumingService> element is used by the identity provider to formulate an <saml:AttributeStatement> element that is pushed to the service provider in conjunction with SAML Web Browser SSO.
The index attribute of the <md:AttributeConsumingService> element is used as the value of the AttributeConsumingServiceIndex attribute in a <samlp:AuthnRequest> element.
The value of the md:AssertionConsumerService/@Location attribute in service provider metadata is used by an identity provider to route SAML messages, which minimizes the possibility of a rogue service provider orchestrating a man-in-the-middle attack.
Metadata-driven SAML web browser
The following SAML protocol flow is intended to illustrate the use of metadata at various stages of SAML web browser SSO. (See the SAML V2.0 Profiles specification for more information about SAML web browser SSO.)
Trusted SAML metadata ensures a secure transaction between a SAML identity provider (IdP) and a SAML service provider (SP). Before metadata, trust information was encoded into the implementation in a proprietary manner. Now the sharing of trust information is facilitated by standard metadata. The SAML 2.0 Metadata Standard provides a well-defined, interoperable metadata format that entities can use to bootstrap the trust process.
The following sequence illustrates the use of SAML metadata to drive the SAML protocol flow.
1. Request the target resource at the SP
A browser user requests a web application resource protected by a SAML service provider:
https://sp.example.com/myresource
If a valid security context for the user principal already exists at the service provider, skip steps 2–13.
2. Redirect to the Discovery Service
Before the service provider can initiate the SAML protocol flow at step 6, the browser user's preferred identity provider must be known. There are numerous ways to do this. For illustration purposes, the service provider will use a local Discovery Service that conforms to the Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile.
The service provider redirects the browser user to the Discovery Service:
302 Redirect
Location: https://ds.example.com/idpdisc?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fsso.example.org%2Fportal
Note that the SP entityID is included in the redirect URL as specified by the discovery protocol.
3. Request the Discovery Service
The browser user requests the Discovery Service by virtue of the redirect:
GET /idpdisc?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fsso.example.org%2Fportal HTTP/1.1
Host: ds.example.com
(Discover the user's preferred IdP)
The Discovery Service discovers the browser user's preferred identity provider by unspecified means.
4. Redirect to the Discovery Response endpoint at the SP
The Discovery Service now redirects the browser user to a Discovery Response endpoint at the service provider:
302 Redirect
Location: https://sp.example.com/SAML2/Login?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fsso.example.org%2Fidp
Note that the IdP entityID is included in the redirect URL as specified by the discovery protocol.
5. Request the Discovery Response endpoint at the SP
The browser user requests the Discovery Response endpoint at the service provider by virtue of the redirect:
GET /SAML2/Login?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fsso.example.org%2Fidp HTTP/1.1
Host: sp.example.com
The Discovery Response endpoint at the service provider conforms to the Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile.
6. Redirect to SSO Service at the IdP
The service provider generates a relevant <samlp:AuthnRequest> element, encodes a SAML Request in an URL query string, and then redirects the browser user to the Single Sign-On Service at the identity provider:
302 Redirect
Location: https://idp.example.org/SAML2/SSO/Redirect?SAMLRequest=request&RelayState=token
For an outline how to construct the query string, see the corresponding SAML protocol flow in the SAML 2.0 article. Refer to SAMLCore for details.
7. Request the SSO Service at the IdP
The browser user requests the Single Sign-On Service endpoint at the identity provider by virtue of the redirect:
GET /SAML2/SSO/Redirect?SAMLRequest=request&RelayState=token HTTP/1.1
Host: idp.example.org
8. Respond with the login page
The identity provider returns a login page to the user's browser. The login page contains an HTML form similar to the following:
<form method="post" action="https://idp.example.com/login-response" ...>
Username:<br>
<input type="text" name="username"><br>
Password:<br>
<input type="password" name="password">
...
<input type="submit" value="Submit" />
</form>
9. Submit the login form
The browser user submits the HTML form to the identity provider:
POST /login-response HTTP/1.1
Host: idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: nnn
username=username&password=password
(Issue a SAML Assertion for the user)
At this point, the identity provider knows the identity of the user principal and so the identity provider constructs a SAML Assertion on behalf of the user principal. For a concrete example of such an Assertion, see the corresponding SAML protocol flow in the SAML 2.0 article. As always, refer to SAMLCore for details.
The <saml:NameID> element in the SAML Assertion encodes an identifier for the user principal. In this case, the identity provider includes a SAML2 Transient NameID (SAMLCore) in the SAML Assertion.
The identity provider includes two user attributes in the SAML Assertion: eduPersonUniqueId and mail.
Operationally, the identity provider digitally signs and encrypts the SAML Assertion, wraps the Assertion in a SAML Response, and then signs the Response object as well. Typically the identity provider signs the Response alone but in this case both the Assertion and the Response are digitally signed.
10. Respond with the SAML Response page
The identity provider returns an XHTML document to the user's browser. The document contains a SAML Response encoded in an XHTML form as follows:
<form method="post" action="https://sp.example.com/SAML2/SSO/POST" ...>
<input type="hidden" name="SAMLResponse" value="response" />
<input type="hidden" name="RelayState" value="token" />
...
<input type="submit" value="Submit" />
</form>
11. Request the Assertion Consumer Service at the SP
The XHTML form is automatically submitted by the browser (due to a small bit of JavaScript on the page):
POST /SAML2/SSO/POST HTTP/1.1
Host: sp.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: nnn
SAMLResponse=response&RelayState=token
12. Redirect to the target resource
The service provider creates a security context for the user principal and redirects the browser user to the original web application resource:
302 Redirect
Location: https://sp.example.com/myresource
13. Request the target resource at the SP again
Finally the browser user requests the target resource at the service provider by virtue of the redirect:
https://sp.example.com/myresource
14. Respond with requested resource
Since a security context exists, the service provider returns the resource to the browser user agent as requested.
See also
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
SAML 2.0
XML (eXtensible Markup Language)
XML Schema (W3C)
XML Signature
XML Encryption
References
Liberty metadata specifications
Note: The Liberty metadata schema are listed verbatim in the specification documents listed below. Since the direct link to the Version 1.1 XSD document on the Liberty web site is broken, a copy of the XSD document for Liberty Metadata Version 1.1 has been uploaded to the web. That document is also included in the legacy Liberty ID-FF 1.2 archive.
SAML metadata specifications pre-2005
SAML standards
The original SAML V2.0 standards published in March 2005 have been deprecated in favor of the revised specifications with errata listed further below.
S. Cantor et al. Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS Standard, March 2005. Document ID saml-core-2.0-os http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
S. Cantor et al. Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS Standard, March 2005. Document ID saml-bindings-2.0-os http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf
J. Hughes et al. Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS Standard, March 2005. Document ID saml-profiles-2.0-os http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf
S. Cantor et al. Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS Standard, March 2005. Document ID saml-metadata-2.0-os http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf
Except for historical references to the original SAML V2.0 Metadata Standard, the following footnotes point to SAML V2.0 specifications with errata. The latter specifications are fully inclusive of all errata approved by the OASIS Security Services (SAML) Technical Committee since the SAML V2.0 standards were published in March 2005. Please refer to the OASIS SAML Wiki for the most recent version of any SAML specification.
Committee specifications post-2005
This is a small subset of the "Post-V2.0" committee specifications published by the OASIS Security Services (SAML) Technical Committee. Please refer to the OASIS SAML Wiki for the most recent version of any SAML specification.
Miscellaneous
XML-based standards
Metadata standards |
55053350 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicko%20van%20Someren | Nicko van Someren | Dr. Nicholas Nicko van Someren PhD, FREng, FBCS (born 1967) is a British computer scientist, cryptographer and entrepreneur. He is known for having founded ANT Software, and nCipher, as well as for previous roles as chief security architect at Juniper Networks and chief technology officer at Good Technology and the Linux Foundation, where he ran the Core Infrastructure Initiative. He is currently the chief technology officer at Absolute Software Corporation.
Education and early life
Van Someren attended King College Choir School in Cambridge, UK before receiving a scholarship to Oakham School in Rutland. He went on to study as an undergraduate in Computer Science at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he subsequently earned a PhD.
Van Someren credits his interest in business to his father, who ran a business from their home when he was young. While still at school van Someren took summer jobs with Acorn Computers and acquired an interest in cryptography by reading about public key encryption in Scientific American.
Businesses
In 1992 Nicko van Someren and his brother Alex van Someren, along with two friends, founded ANT Software to build networking hardware. While with ANT, van Someren wrote the first version of the Fresco web browser which helped the company move from being primarily a hardware company to a software company. ANT went public on the London Alternative Investments Market in March 2005. In February 2013 ANT was acquired by Espial Group.
In 1996 van Someren, along with his brother Alex co-founded nCipher to build high speed cryptographic accelerators and hardware security modules. nCipher went public on the London Stock Exchange on October 2000, at the time valuing the company at around £450 million. In October 2008 nCipher was acquired by Thales Group.
Van Someren joined Good Technology as CTO in 2011, and remained with Good until its acquisition by BlackBerry Limited in 2015.
In 2019, van Someren joined Absolute Software Corporation as CTO.
Accomplishments
In 2008 Dr. van Someren was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering in the UK.
Work in computer security
Van Someren has published numerous papers in the field of computer security. In 1998 he co-authored a paper with Adi Shamir introducing the concept of key finding attacks. A statistical key finding attack was used by van Someren to locate the signature verification keys used by Microsoft to validate the signatures on MS-CAPI plug-ins. One of these key was later discovered to be referred to as the NSAKEY by Microsoft, sparking some controversy.
References
1967 births
Living people
British computer scientists
Modern cryptographers
Members of the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
Fellows of the Royal Academy of Engineering
Alumni of Trinity College, Cambridge |
55178730 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use%20of%20social%20media%20by%20the%20Islamic%20State%20of%20Iraq%20and%20the%20Levant | Use of social media by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant | The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is a militant group and a former unrecognised proto-state. The group sophisticatedly utilizes social media as a tool for spreading its message and for international recruitment. The Islamic State is widely known for its posting of disturbing contents, such as beheading videos, on the internet. This propaganda is disseminated through websites and many social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube. By utilizing social media, the organization has garnered a strong following and successfully recruited tens of thousands of followers from around the world. In response to its successful use of social media, many websites and social media platforms have banned accounts and removed content promoting the Islamic State from their platforms.
Target audience
ISIS targets a variety of different groups both in the Middle East and Western Countries. There are a wide variety of motives for why fighters may be prompted to join ISIS. Researches from Quantum cite nine attributes characteristic of a fighter looking to join ISIS: status seeking, identity seeking, revenge, redemption, thrill, ideology, justice, and death.
The standard ISIS recruit, both from the Middle East and Western countries, is relatively young. The average age of ISIS fighters is around 26 years old, with 86% of recruits being male. Middle Eastern recruits come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds in Northern Iraq. Recent destruction in the Iraq War and Syrian Civil War has created hatred of Western Powers in the region.
Western recruits are often second or third-generation immigrants. Computer scientists Zeeshan ul-hassan Usmani also found that the majority of the Western recruits do not feel "at home" in their home country. As a result, these fighters often have desires to go abroad and escape conditions in their home country.
In addition to recruitment, ISIS's social media presence is also meant to intimidate and spread terror around the world. ISIS's posting of beheadings and other execution videos primarily target the Western world.
Content and messages
ISIS produces propaganda videos that range from video executions to full-length documentaries. The videos have a high production quality and incorporate montages, slow motion scenes, and are often accompanied by a short dialogue. ISIS has a dedicated team of over 100 media insurgents dedicated to recording these videos.
The ISIS executions typically consist of beheadings or mass shootings in retaliation to western intervention in ISIS territory. The particular videos that ISIS often post include executions of "enemies of the Caliphate," which often consist of westerners or Jordanian nationals. Most infamously, an executioner named Jihadi John was seen in many of these videos prior to his death in 2015. Jihadi John is notorious for executing many US, UK, and Japanese citizens such as Steven Sotloff, David Haines, and Alan Henning.
In many of the videos and materials produced by ISIS, there is the theme of inclusion and brotherhood. Additionally, the videos also focus on three main messages:
Convey narrative of global war and ultimate victory
Radicalize populations globally
Encourage international lone state actor and small cell attacks in support of ISIS
These messages can be seen throughout all content produced by the Islamic State such as war documentaries, execution videos, and Rumiyah (magazine).
Social media usage
From 2013 to 2014, the organization primarily used mainstream platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. In 2014, these large social media platforms removed ISIS content. Since then, ISIS has chosen to utilize social media platforms that either protect their content or allow for content to quickly be reposted. These platforms of choice are Telegram, Justpaste.it, and Surespot.
ISIS also implements marketing initiatives like “Jihadist Follow Friday,” which encourages users to follow new ISIS-related accounts each Friday. This specific hashtag mirrors commonly used hashtags such as #motivation monday or #. To augment their online presence and popularity, the organization encourages their followers to use a plethora of Arabic hashtags, which translate to #theFridayofSupportingISIS, and #CalamityWillBefalltheUS. This allows them to gain followers each week while promoting their community and message on a weekly basis.
Twitter
During 2014, there were an estimated 46,000 to 90,000 Twitter accounts that advocated for ISIS or were run by supporters of the group. In 2015, Twitter reported that it banned 125,000 ISIS sympathetic accounts. In 2016, it published an update of 325,000 deleted accounts.
Though many accounts have been suspended, ISIS supporters often create new accounts. Twitter defines those who recreate accounts as “resurgents” and explains that these are often difficult accounts to remove completely, since they tend to pop back up in alternate forms. It is estimated that approximately 20% of all ISIS affiliated Twitter accounts can be traced back to fake accounts created by the same user. Many of these accounts are traced back to the “Baqiya family,” which is an online network of thousands of ISIS followers. Many of these accounts are active during important ISIS military victories. During the ISIS march on Mosul, there were about 42,000 tweets on Twitter supporting the invasion.
Telegram
During 2014, ISIS became very active on Telegram after many major social media platforms banned ISIS content and sympathetic accounts. Telegram is an encrypted messaging application. The platform by nature is created as an end-to-end user encryption platform. Further, it also has special features such as the self-destruct timer which erase all evidence and messages. The app has a user data protection policy because violating this policy could potentially damage the app’s brand of customer privacy. Government agencies have been unable to break Telegram's encryption technology.
On Telegram, ISIS often uses the hashtag #KhilafahNews to attract their users. Telegram is used by ISIS to plan social media campaigns on alternate platforms. The organization also uses Telegram as an anchor platform to connect with their user base when their other accounts are banned on Twitter and Facebook.
On 28 February 2016 a video was uploaded threatening to expose the najaasah and shoot the hesitates. Produced by Ibn-Altayb and distributed by Al-Hayat, the video shows footage of Bruxelles attacks and the victims.
In July 2017, Telegram came under scrutiny from the media and news media outlets. It has been documented that ISIS gunmen have used this app to maintain contact with ISIS leaders in Raqqa days before terror attacks in Turkey, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. Despite concerns from Western media, there has been little to no action taken against ISIS accounts on Telegram.
In April 2019 a video was uploaded in which they urged lone wolves to attempt to attack during the Holy Week in Sevilla and Málaga. In Sevilla, a jihadist who intended to perform a lone wolf attack was arrested.
TikTok
In October 2019, it was reported that ISIS recruitment content was discovered on TikTok. Approximately two dozen accounts were subsequently shut down in response.
Justpaste.it
Justpaste.it, an anonymous photo and text sharing website, has also been utilized heavily. With the option to lock images, the website allows anonymous users to send and receive content without registration. For this reason, ISIS members have shared photos of countless murders, executions, and battlegrounds onto the app to be disseminated to other applications.
There have been calls to shut down the site to prevent its usage by ISIS or other extremist groups. However, founder Mariusz Żurawek has resisted doing so. He stated, "I do not want to interfere with any type of conflict and stay on one side. Justpaste.it has many users. I cannot focus on a single group. I don’t see any reason why they should shut down the service. Should they shut down Twitter, too?"
In 2014, Justpaste.it removed graphic content from the website—this prompted ISIS to launch their own content-sharing pages. These sites included Manbar.me in 2014, Nasher.me in January 2015, and Alors.ninja, in July 2015. ISIS social media offices relied most heavily on Manbar.me to distribute propaganda photos of battles and city raids. In 2016, ISIS introduced PasteMaker and Sharetext, which mirrored the encrypted messages of Justpaste.it. Despite creating their own platforms periodically, they were considerably more difficult to navigate; thus ISIS returned to using Justpaste.it.
The Dawn of Glad Tidings smartphone application
ISIS created The Dawn of Glad Tidings, an Arabic-language application. This app shares many of the tweets, pictures, and videos from ISIS sympathetic Twitter accounts. Additionally, it allowed users to see and monitor hashtags, tweets, images, videos, and comments that were posted on their accounts. The application was originally intended for ISIS followers to have a private online forum to communicate. This app was downloaded several hundred times on the Google Play app store before being taken down.
Offline impact
As the November 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrate, ISIS also resorts to old-fashioned methods of communication and propaganda. Lewis notes that the attacks in Paris represent a 'propaganda of the deed', a method developed by 19th century anarchists in Europe. The November 2015 ISIS attacks were perpetrated without prior warning, largely because the operatives met face-to-face and used other non-digital means of communication. Additionally, it is common for ISIS to claim responsibility of many terror attacks around the world such as the Paris Attacks, the Pulse night club shooting, and the Las Vegas attack.
Usage of the dark web
ISIS’s activities on the surface web are subject to scrutiny and regulations by corporations, government agencies, and hackers. ISIS has been forced to look for a new online safe haven. ISIS also posts a variety of content on the Dark Web. They also actively publish a variety of their content on the dark web as well as their own internally generated platforms. ISIS's usage of dark web has made anti-terrorism work more difficult.
Using the dark web, ISIS has made their own platform to increase their ability to spread their message. Without the intervention of corporate actors or government entities, ISIS has been able to freely spread their messages on their own platforms and websites. In 2017, Europol, the European Police, was able to uncover 52 unique online ISIS networks on the dark web. These 52 unique networks contained over 2,000 unique extremist items.
Relevant impact of the ISIS social media usage
ISIS social media posts have mobilized ordinary citizens throughout the world and other radical jihadists groups to act upon their digitized demands. Their methods have worked to effectively recruit younger individuals to join their groups in a consolidated setting. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube are more impressionable mediums, especially on a younger demographic. For this reason, ISIS strategically places their polished messages on these platforms to attract potential new members from an early age. A study about the repercussions of social media demonstrated that there were approximately 1,264 cases that could be categorized as “violent-inciting” examples; in these cases, ISIS social media experts have deliberately posted threatening propaganda to provoke offline aggression. Many “call for action” verbs that have a positive connotation have also been utilized to establish feelings of justification towards any pertinent violence.
A 2022 study found that ISIS online "propaganda conveying the material, spiritual, and social benefits of joining ISIS increased online support for the group, while content displaying brutal violence decreased endorsement of ISIS across a wide range of videos."
Critiques of movement and backlash
Both national governments and corporations have taken a stand against ISIS in both the physical and virtual spheres.
The U.S. Department of State announced an international coalition in 2014, in which they list five lines of effort to expose ISIS. They include:
Providing military support to partners
Impeding the flow of foreign fighters
Stopping financing and funding
Addressing humanitarian crises in the region
Exposing true nature
Companies are also taking action to hinder ISIS social media recruitment attempts. Google’s ThinkTank, Jigsaw, launched a collaboration with YouTube in July, 2017 to redirect any potential recruits using the Redirect Method. After facing growing pressure from the government leaders, Facebook announced that the company is using Artificial Intelligence to detect terrorism related contents, their effort would extend to other Facebook owned platforms such as WhatsApp.
“The Redirect Method uses Adwords targeting tools and curated YouTube videos uploaded by people all around the world to confront online radicalization. It focuses on the slice of ISIS’ audience that is most susceptible to its messaging, and redirects them towards curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. This open methodology was developed from interviews with ISIS defectors, respects users’ privacy and can be deployed to tackle other types of violent recruiting discourses online.”
By using this tactic, Jigsaw catches slogans that manifest any positive ISIS sentiments, like ('Remaining and Expanding'), and , which includes , a sign of respect.
Lastly, Anonymous declared war against ISIS in November 2015, attempting to thwart the social media recruitment efforts by targeting ISIS's communication networks.
References
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Terrorism tactics
Politics of the Middle East
Social media |
55181525 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big%20data%20ethics | Big data ethics | Big data ethics also known as simply data ethics refers to systemizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct in relation to data, in particular personal data. Since the dawn of the Internet the sheer quantity and quality of data has dramatically increased and is continuing to do so exponentially. Big data describes this large amount of data that is so voluminous and complex that traditional data processing application software is inadequate to deal with them. Recent innovations in medical research and healthcare, such as high-throughput genome sequencing, high-resolution imaging, electronic medical patient records and a plethora of internet-connected health devices have triggered a data deluge that will reach the exabyte range in the near future. Data Ethics is of increasing relevance as the quantity of data increases because of the scale of the impact.
Big data ethics is different from information ethics because the focus of information ethics is more concerned with issues of intellectual property and concerns relating to librarians, archivists, and information professionals, while big data ethics is more concerned with collectors and disseminators of structured or unstructured data such as data brokers, governments, and large corporations.
Principles
Data ethics is concerned with the following principles:
Ownership - Individuals own their own data.
Transaction transparency - If an individuals personal data is used, they should have transparent access to the algorithm design used to generate aggregate data sets
Consent - If an individual or legal entity would like to use personal data, one needs informed and explicitly expressed consent of what personal data moves to whom, when, and for what purpose from the owner of the data.
Privacy - If data transactions occur all reasonable effort needs to be made to preserve privacy.
Currency - Individuals should be aware of financial transactions resulting from the use of their personal data and the scale of these transactions.
Openness - Aggregate data sets should be freely available
Ownership
Who owns data? Ownership involves determining rights and duties over property. The concept of data ownership is linked to one's ability to exercise control over and limit the sharing of their own data. If one person records their observations on another person who owns those observations? The observer or the observed? What responsibilities do the observer and the observed have in relation to each other? Since the massive scale and systematisation of observation of people and their thoughts as a result of the Internet, these questions are increasingly important to address. Slavery, the ownership of a person, is outlawed in all recognised countries. The question of personal data ownership falls into an unknown territory in between corporate ownership, intellectual property, and slavery. Who owns a digital identity?
European laws, the General Data Protection Regulation, indicate that individuals own their own personal data.
Personal data refers to data sets describing a person ranging from physical attributes to their preferences and behaviour. Examples of personal data include: Genome data, GPS location, written communication, spoken communication, lists of contacts, internet browsing habits, financial transactions, supermarket spending, tax payments, criminal record, laptop and mobile phone camera lens recording, device microphone recordings, driving habits via car trackers, mobile and health records, fitness activity, nutrition, substance use, heartbeat, sleep patterns and other vital signs. The collective of one individual's personal data forms a digital identity (or perhaps digital alter ego is more fitting). A digital identity encompasses all of our personal data shadowing, representing and connected to our physical and ideological self. The distinction between data categories is not always clear cut. For example, health data and banking data are intertwined because behaviour and lifestyle can be inferred through banking data and is hugely valuable for predicting risk of chronic disease. Therefore, banking data is also health data. Health data can indicate how much an individual spends on healthcare, therefore health data is also banking data. These overlaps exist in between other data categories too, for example, location data, Internet browsing data, tax data are essentially all about individuals.
The protection of the moral rights of an individual is based on the view that personal data is a direct expression of the individual's personality: the moral rights are therefore personal to the individual, and cannot be transferred to another person except by testament when the individual dies. Moral rights include the right to be identified as the source of the data and the right to object to any distortion or mutilation of the data which would be prejudicial to his or her honour or reputation. These moral rights to personal data are perpetual.
A key component of personal data ownership is unique and controlled access i.e. exclusivity. Ownership implies exclusivity, particularly with abstract concepts like ideas or data points. It is not enough to simply have a copy of one's own data. Others should be restricted in their access to what is not theirs. Knowing what data others keep is a near-impossible task. The simpler approach would be to cloak oneself in nonsense information. To ensure that corporations or institutions do not have a copy, it is possible to send noise to confuse the data that they have. For example, a robot could randomly search terms that are usually used making the data obtained by the search engine useless through confusion (see: Track Me Not by New York University).
Ownership puts emphasis on the ability to conveniently move data from one service to another i.e. portability.
When personal data is owned by the individual they have the option to simply remove it and take it to another site if they become dissatisfied with the service. Individuals should be offered a high degree of convenient portability allowing one to switch to alternatives without losing historic data collections describing product preferences and personal conversations. For example, one may choose to switch to an alternative messaging app, and this should be possible without losing the record of previous conversations and contacts. Giving individuals the option to switch services without the inconveniences of losing historical data means that the services need to keep customers happy by providing good services rather than locking them in by means of incompatibility with alternatives.
For portability, data expression must be standardised in such a way that this can happen seamlessly. For example, describing the unit as "kilograms" rather than "kg" means that robots recognise them as different, although they are the same. These small variations can result in messy data that cannot easily be combined or transferred into a new system that cannot recognise them. Currently, Apple states that they provide privacy services, however, it is difficult to extract data from Apple systems making it difficult to migrate to an alternative. In the personal data trading framework, the data expression would be standardised for easy portability with the click of a button. Standardisation would also facilitate the setting up of mechanisms to clean data necessary to install checks and balances validating the quality of the data. By joining multiple sources, one would be able to identify erroneous or falsely entered data.
Who owns data today? Today data is being controlled, and therefore owned by the owner of the sensors. The individual making the recording or the entity owning the sensor controls what happens to that data by default. For example, banks control banking data, researchers control research data, and hospitals control health record data. Due to historical reasons, the current scenario is such that research institutions hold data about a fragment of data describing part of an individual. Health research data in Europe exist in a fragmented manner controlled by different institutions. Data categories often describe more about who controls that data and where it is stored rather than what the data is describing or the application it could be applied to. While the Internet is not owned by anyone, corporations have come to control much of the personal data, creating value by making use of data collection, search engines and communication tools. By default, as a side effect to owning the intellectual property making up the Internet tools, these corporations have been collecting our digital identities as raw material for the services delivered to other companies at a profit. Most of the data collected via Internet services is personal data describing individuals. Traditionally, medicine organises data around the individual because it enables an understanding of health. When studying epidemiology, the data of groups is still organised around the individual. Many of the processes that are being made more efficient concern individuals and group dynamics. However, data is not necessarily organised around the individual, rather, data is being controlled by the owner of the sensors.
In China, the government largely owns data. In one Chinese province data was used to generate a social index score per person based on online and offline individual behaviour, such as jaywalking and amount of toilet paper used in a public lavatory. The social index determines access to particular public services.
Transaction transparency
Concerns have been raised around how biases can be integrated into algorithm design resulting in systematic oppression. The algorithm design should be transparently disclosed. All reasonable efforts should be made to take into account the differences between individuals and groups, without losing sight of equality. Algorithm design needs to be inclusive.
In terms of governance, big data ethics is concerned with which types of inferences and predictions should be made using big data technologies such as algorithms.
Anticipatory governance is the practice of using predictive analytics to assess possible future behaviours. This has ethical implications because it affords the ability to target particular groups and places which can encourage prejudice and discrimination For example, predictive policing highlights certain groups or neighbourhoods which should be watched more closely than others which leads to more sanctions in these areas, and closer surveillance for those who fit the same profiles as those who are sanctioned.
The term "control creep" refers to data that has been generated with a particular purpose in mind but which is repurposed. This practice is seen with airline industry data which has been repurposed for profiling and managing security risks at airports.
In regard to personal data, the individual has the right to know:
Why the data is being collected?
How it is going to be used?
How long it will be stored?
How it can be amended by the individual concerned?
Examples of ethical uses of data transaction include:
Statutory purposes: All collection and use of personal data by the state should be completely transparent and covered by a formal license negotiated prior to any data collection. This civil contract between the individual and the responsible authorities sets out the conditions under which the individual licenses the use of his/her data to responsible authorities, in accordance with the above transparency principles
Social purposes: All uses of individual data for social purposes should be opt-in, not opt-out. They should comply with the transparency principles.
Crime: For crime prevention an explicit set of general principles for the harvesting and use of personal data should be established and widely publicised. The governing body of the state should consider and approve these principles.
Commerce: Personal data used for commercial purposes belongs to the individual and may not be used without a license from the individual setting out all permitted uses. This includes data collected from all websites, page visits, transfers from site to site, and other Internet activity. Individuals have the right to decide how and where and if their personal data is used for commercial purposes, on a case-by-case or category basis.
Research: personal data used for research purposes belongs to the individual and must be licensed from the user under the terms of a personal consent form which fulfils all the transparency principles outlined above.
Extra-legal purposes: Personal data can only be used for extra-legal purposes with the explicit prior consent of the rights holder.
Consent
If an individual or legal entity would like to use personal data, one needs informed and explicitly expressed consent of what personal data moves to whom, when, and for what purpose from the subject of the data. The subject of the information has the right to know how their data has been used.
The data transaction cannot be used as a bargaining chip for an unrelated or superfluous issue of consent, for example, improve marketing recommendations while trying to ring contact a relative. While there are services in which data sharing is needed, these transactions should not be exaggerated and should be held within context. For example, an individual needs to share data to receive adequate medical recommendations, however, that medical data does not automatically need to go to a health insurance provider. It is ultimately come down upon the individual to make the decision about their data. These are separate data transactions which should be dealt with as such. Implied consent of accepting the transfer of data ownership because a chat application is used is not considered valid.
The full scope and extent of the transaction needs to be explicitly detailed to the individual who has to be given a reasonable opportunity to engage in the process of evaluating whether they would like to engage. Timing is critical. i.e.. these issues should be dealt with in a calm moment with time to reflect, not in the moment an urgent purchase is being made or a medical emergency is occurring.
The permission needs to be given in a format that is explicit, not implied. Just because an application has been chosen to chat does not mean that access to a list of contacts is needed. The button that is clicked to give permission should not be designed in such a way that the automatic behaviour is opting in. For example, in binary choices if one button is smaller than the other, or if one button is hidden in the design and the other jumps out, or if one button requires multiple clicks whereas the other is a single click.
While a person could give consent on a general topic to be continuous, it should always be possible to retract that permission for future transactions. Similarly, to consent for sexual activity, retraction of past consent for data transactions is not feasible. For example, it would be possible for an individual to give consent to use their personal data for any cause advancing the treatment of cardiovascular disease until further notice. Until the human changes their mind, these transactions can continue to occur seamlessly without the involvement of the human.
Dynamic consent in the context of health and genomic research might provide a more appropriate consent approach than once-off or broad informed consent, in terms of the issues outlined above.
Privacy
If data transactions occur all reasonable effort needs to be made to preserve privacy.
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
- United Nations Declaration of Human Rights Article 12.
Why does privacy matter? Data is useful to make systems more efficient; however, defining the end goal of this efficiency is essential in assessing how ethical data usage is.
The use of data monitoring by government to observe citizens needs explicit authorization by appropriate judicial process. Possibly it would even be more efficient to observe the relatively small number of criminals manually rather than track the relatively large population. Blanket observation of inhabitants by national governments and corporations is a slippery slope to an Orwellian style of governance. Privacy is a not about keeping secrets, it is about choice, human rights, freedom, and liberty. For example, sharing medical data with a doctor under the understanding that it will be used to improve health is ethically sound, even when the doctor reveals that data to another doctor. However, when that same data is shared with a marketing agency as just happened with the British national health system and Google's DeepMind artificial intelligence company the ethical implications are more uncertain (Google DeepMind and healthcare in an age of algorithms by Julia Powles and Hal Hodson). Privacy is about choosing the context; what data is shared, with who, for which purpose, and when. Privacy is currently not being implemented possibly because the personal power and wealth gain from not doing so is acting as a disincentive for both private companies and governments. Also, using data to measure actual social impact could reveal inefficiency which would be inconvenient to the politicians involved or the companies’ claims.
The public debate on privacy is often unfairly obscured to an over-simplistic binary choice between privacy and scientific progress. The marketing campaigns have even dismissed critics of centralized data collection as resisting progress and holding on to the past. However, the benefits from scientific progress through data can be achieved in a manner consistent with privacy values as has historically been the case in epidemiological research. The extraction of value from data without compromising identity privacy is certainly possible technologically; e.g., by utilizing homomorphic encryption and algorithmic design which makes reverse engineering difficult.
Homomorphic encryption allows the chaining together of different services without exposing the data to each of the services. Even the software engineers working on the software would not be able to override the user. Homomorphic encryption schemes are malleable by design meaning they can be used in a cloud computing environment while ensuring the confidentiality of processed data. The technique allows analytical computations to be carried out on cipher text, therefore generating encrypted results which, when decrypted, match the results of operations performed in plain-text.
The results of analytics can be presented in such a way as to be fit for purpose without compromising identity privacy. For example, a data sale stating that "20% of Amsterdam eats muesli for breakfast" would transmit the analytical value of data without compromising privacy, whereas saying that "Ana eats muesli for breakfast" would not maintain privacy. Algorithmic design and the size of the sample group is critical to minimize the capacity to reverse engineer statistics and track targeted individuals. One technical solution to reverse engineering of aggregate metrics is to introduce fake data points that are about made up people which do not alter the end result, for example the percentage of a group that eats muesli.
Privacy has been presented as a limitation to data usage which could also be considered unethical. For example, the sharing of healthcare data can shed light on the causes of diseases, the effects of treatments, an can allow for tailored analyses based on individuals' needs. This is of ethical significance in the big data ethics field because while many value privacy, the affordances of data sharing are also quite valuable, although they may contradict one's conception of privacy. Attitudes against data sharing may be based in a perceived loss of control over data and a fear of the exploitation of personal data. However, it is possible to extract the value of data without compromising privacy.
Some scholars such as Jonathan H. King and Neil M. Richards are redefining the traditional meaning of privacy, and others to question whether or not privacy still exists. In a 2014 article for the Wake Forest Law Review, King and Richard argue that privacy in the digital age can be understood not in terms of secrecy but in term of regulations which govern and control the use of personal information. In the European Union, the Right to be Forgotten entitles EU countries to force the removal or de-linking of personal data from databases at an individual's request if the information is deemed irrelevant or out of date. According to Andrew Hoskins, this law demonstrates the moral panic of EU members over the perceived loss of privacy and the ability to govern personal data in the digital age. In the United States, citizens have the right to delete voluntarily submitted data. This is very different from the Right to be Forgotten because much of the data produced using big data technologies and platforms are not voluntarily submitted.
Currency
The business models driving tech giants have uncovered the possibility of making the human identity the product to be consumed. While the tech services including search engines, communication channels and maps are provided for free, the new currency that has been uncovered in the process is personal data.
There is a variety of opinion about whether it is ethical to receive money in exchange for having access to personal data. Parallels have been drawn between blood donations, where the rate of infectious blood donated decreases when there is no financial transaction for the blood donor. Additional questions arise around who should receive the profit from a data transaction?
How Much is Data Worth?
What is the exchange rate of personal data to money? Data is valuable because it allows users to act more efficiently than when they are guessing or operating using trial and error. There are two elements of data that have value: trends and real-time. Build-up of historical data allows us to make future predictions based on trends. Real-time data gives value because actions can be made instantaneously.
How much are tech services such as a search engine, a communications channel and a digital map actually worth, for example in dollars? The difference in value between the services facilitated by tech companies and the equity value of these tech companies is the difference in the exchange rate offered to the citizen and the 'market rate' of the value of their data. Scientifically there are many holes to be picked in this rudimentary calculation: the financial figures of tax-evading companies are unreliable, would revenue or profit be more appropriate, how is a user defined, a large number of individuals are needed for the data to be valuable, would there be a tiered price for different people in different countries, not all Google revenue is from Gmail, etc. Although these calculations are undeniably crude, the exercise serves to make the monetary value of data more tangible. Another approach is to find the data trading rates in the black market. RSA publishes a yearly cybersecurity shopping list that takes this approach.
The examples given only cover specific cases, but if we extend profits from data sales to other areas such as healthcare the monthly profit per individual would increase.
This raises the economic question of whether free tech services in exchange for personal data is a worthwhile implicit exchange for the consumer. In the personal data trading model, rather than companies selling data, an owner can sell their personal data and keep the profit. Personal data trading is a framework that gives individuals the ability to own their digital identity and create granular data sharing agreements via the Internet. Rather than the current model which tolerates companies selling personal data for profit, in personal data trading, individuals would sell their personal data to known parties of their choice and keep the profit. At the core is an effort to re-decentralise the Internet. Rather than the current model which tolerates companies selling personal data for profit, in personal data trading, individual human beings would directly own and consciously sell their personal data to known parties of their choice and keep the profit. Personal data trading adds a fourth mechanism for wealth distribution, the other three being salaries via jobs, property ownership, and company ownership. The ultimate goals of the personal data trading model are: More equitable global resource distribution and a more balanced say in allocation of global resources. Personal data trading by individuals in the proposed framework would result in distributed profits amongst the population but also can have radical consequences on societal power structures. It is now widely acknowledged that the current centralised data design exacerbates ideological echo chambers and has far-reaching implications on seemingly unrelated decision-making processes such as elections. The data exchange rate is not only monetary, it is ideological. Do institutional processes have to be compromised by the centralised use of communication tools guided by freely harvested personal data?
While initially it is realistic to assume that data would be traded for money, it is possible to imagine a future where data would be traded for data. The "I’ll show you yours if you show my mine" scenario could replace money altogether. Importantly, this is a future scenario and the first step is to focus on exchanging personal data for existing monetary currency.
Openness
The idea of open data is centred around the argument that data should be freely available and should not have restrictions that would prohibit its use, such as copyright laws. many governments had begun to move towards publishing open datasets for the purpose of transparency and accountability. This movement has gained traction via "open data activists" who have called for governments to make datasets available to allow citizens to themselves extract meaning from the data and perform checks and balances themselves. King and Richards have argued that this call for transparency includes a tension between openness and secrecy.
Activists and scholars have also argued that because this open-sourced model of data evaluation is based on voluntary participation, the availability of open datasets has a democratizing effect on a society, allowing any citizen to participate. To some, the availability of certain types of data is seen as a right and an essential part of a citizen's agency.
The Open Knowledge Foundation (OKF) lists several dataset types that should be provided by governments in order for them to truly be open. The OFK has a tool called The Global Open Data Index (GODI) which is a crowd-sourced survey for measuring the openness of governments, according to the Open Definition. The aim of the GODI is to provide a tool for providing important feedback to governments about the quality of their open datasets.
Willingness to share data varies from person to person. Preliminary studies have been conducted into the determinants of the willingness to share data. For example, some have suggested that baby boomers are less willing to share data than millennials.
The role of institutions
Nation states
Data sovereignty refers to a government's control over the data that is generated and collected within a country. The issue of data sovereignty was heightened when Edward Snowden leaked US government information about a number of governments and individuals whom the US government was spying on. This prompted many governments to reconsider their approach to data sovereignty and the security of their citizens' data.
J. De Jong-Chen points out how the restriction of data flow can hinder scientific discovery, to the disadvantage of many but particularly, developing countries. This is of considerable concern to big data ethics because of the tension between the two important issues of cybersecurity and global development.
Banks
The banks hold a position in society as the keeper of value. Their data policy should not compromise the trust relationship with their clients as keeper of value. For example, in a bank shares data about one butcher with another butcher, this could compromise their trust relationship due to the revelation of data to competitors.
Relevant news items about data ethics
The Edward Snowden revelations on June 5, 2013 marked a turning point in the data ethics public debate. The ongoing publication of leaked documents has revealed previously unknown details of global surveillance apparatus run by the United States NSA in close cooperation with three of its Five Eyes partners: Australia's ASD, the UK's GCHQ, and Canada's CSEC.
In the Netherlands, ING Bank made a public statement about their intentions around data usage.
The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal involves the collection of personal data of up to but most possibly more than 87 million Facebook users in an attempt to influence voter opinion. Both the 2016 Brexit vote and the 2015/6 campaigns of US politicians Donald Trump and Ted Cruz paid Cambridge Analytica to use information from the data breach to influence voter opinion.
Relevant legislation about data ethics
On 26 October 2001 the Patriot Act came into force in the US, in response to the broad concern felt among Americans from the September 11 attacks. Broadly speaking the Patriot Act laid the path for allowing security forces to surveil citizens suspected of involvement with terrorist acts.
On 25 May 2018 the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) came into effect across the European Union. GDPR addresses issues of transparency from data controllers towards individuals, referred to as data subjects, and a need for permission from data subjects to handle their personal data.
See also
Dynamic Consent
The Open Knowledge Foundation
Footnotes
References
Hoskins, A. (November 4, 2014). "Digital Memory Studies". www.memorystudies-frankfurt.com. Retrieved 2017-11-28.
Kitchin, R. The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures and Their Consequences, (pp. 165–183). SAGE Publications. Kindle Edition.
Big data
Data
Ethics
Internet privacy |
55204104 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QuintessenceLabs | QuintessenceLabs | QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. (or QuintessenceLabs) is a cybersecurity company headquartered in Canberra, Australia with offices in San Jose, California. QuintessenceLabs produces encryption key and policy management products that conform to the Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP), as well as a hardware random number generator, development of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, and other encryption solutions that include automatic key zeroization.
The company was founded in 2008 by Dr Vikram Sharma, following research on quantum technology conducted at The Australian National University by Sharma, Thomas Symul, Andrew Lance and Ping Koy Lam.
Westpac Group, a major investor, extended two rounds of funding to QuintessenceLabs in 2015 and 2017, respectively.
In July 2017, QuintessenceLabs received a grant of AU$3.26M from the Australian Department of Defence's Innovation Hub to develop a free-space quantum key distribution system.
References
External links
Company website
Quantum key to unbreakable cryptography
First Look: QuintessenceLabs Trusted Security Foundation (TSF)
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s Address to SINET61
The random number generator powered by the quantum 'crackle in the universe’
KMIP Implementations known to the KMIP TC
The Future of Cybersecurity Is in High-Speed Quantum Encryption
IBM warns of instant breaking of encryption by quantum computers
Time to invest in skills for quantum computing revolution
Quantum cryptography
Software companies of Australia
Random number generation |
55214552 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless%20onion%20router | Wireless onion router | A wireless onion router is a router that uses Tor to connect securely to a network. The onion router allows the user to connect to the internet anonymously creating an anonymous connection. Tor works using an overlaid network which is free throughout the world, this overlay network is created by using numerous relay points created using volunteer which helps the user hide personal information behind layers of encrypted data like layers of an onion. Routers are being created using Raspberry Pi adding a wireless module or using its own inbuilt wireless module in the later versions.
This router provides encryption at the seventh layer (application layer) of the OSI model, which makes it transparent encryption, the user does not have to think about how the data will be sent or received. The encrypted data includes the destination and origin IP address of the data and the current relay point only knows the previous and the next hop of the encrypted packet. These relay points are selected in a random order and can only decrypt a single layer before forwarding it to the next hop where is the procedure is followed unless it is the destination point.
Applications
A wireless router which can use the onion router network can be used to keep the user safe from hackers or network sniffers. The data captured by them won't make any sense as it will only look like messed up text. These are small and handy which will give the user a freedom to carry this tool and connect to the network from anywhere. This setup does not require installation of Tor browser on the work station. Whistle blowers and NGO workers use this network to pass information or to talk to their family without disclosing any information. The applications of wireless onion router are common to a normal router, it provides access that allows it to be placed at a site and users can get connected.
Tor can be used in security focused Operating Systems, messengers, browsers. These can be anonymised using Tor network.
Weaknesses
A wireless onion router works on the Tor network and shares the same weaknesses, as mentioned in the Tor page. The University of Michigan has created a scanner capable of scanning almost 90% of bridges that are live in a single scan. The packets that transferred using Tor also are slow because of the increased amount of hops with encryption and decryption.
Anonymous System (Eavesdropping)
Anonymous systems if exists on both ends of the network, exit relay and entry relay can sniff the packets and statistically correlate the traffic which can point out the destination or the source address of the packet. This also includes eavesdropping at the exit nodes of the network. The data that is between the exit node and the destination server is not encrypted. These data packets can be captured easily. This captured data can reveal the source information, and as suggested by Egersta these nodes are costly to run and require a lot of bandwidth which could suggest that some intelligence agencies might be running them. There have been tested techniques with one third of control nodes to compromise the Tor network.
Traffic Analysis
Articles have been proposed which with some partial knowledge of the network give away which nodes are being used to relay the packets which reduces the anonymity provided by the network. Another techniques which shows relations between streams and then can be linked back to the initiator are available, this technique however does not reveal the source.
IP Exposing Protocols
Some protocols can be used to expose the IP address using tor dissimulation procedures. Some of the examples are Inspection of control messages of BitTorrent, Hijacking responses of the trackers, exploitation of distributed hash tables.
References
External links
Dark Web Markets
Computer networking
Hardware routers
Routers (computing)
Tor (anonymity network) |
55251966 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA%20encryption | DNA encryption | DNA encryption is the process of hiding or perplexing genetic information by a computational method in order to improve genetic privacy in DNA sequencing processes. The human genome is complex and long, but it is very possible to interpret important, and identifying, information from smaller variabilities, rather than reading the entire genome. A whole human genome is a string of 3.2 billion base paired nucleotides, the building blocks of life, but between individuals the genetic variation differs only by 0.5%, an important 0.5% that accounts for all of human diversity, the pathology of different diseases, and ancestral story. Emerging strategies incorporate different methods, such as randomization algorithms and cryptographic approaches, to de-identify the genetic sequence from the individual, and fundamentally, isolate only the necessary information while protecting the rest of the genome from unnecessary inquiry. The priority now is to ascertain which methods are robust, and how policy should ensure the ongoing protection of genetic privacy.
History
In 2003, the National Human Genome Research Institute and its affiliated partners successfully sequenced the first whole human genome, a project that took just under $3 billion to complete. Four years later, James Watson – one of the co-discoverers of the structure of DNA – was able to sequence his genome for less than $1.5 million. As genetic sequencing technologies have proliferated, streamlined and become adapted to clinical means, they can now provide incredible insight into individual genetic identities at a much lower cost, with biotech competitors vying for the title of the $1,000 genome. Genetic material can now be extracted from a person's saliva, hair, skin, blood, or other sources, sequenced, digitized, stored, and used for numerous purposes. Whenever data is digitized and stored, there is the possibility of privacy breaches. While modern whole genome sequencing technology has allowed for unprecedented access and understanding of the human genome, and excitement for the potentialities of personalized medicine, it has also generated serious conversation about the ethics and privacy risks that accompany this process of uncovering an individual's essential instructions of being: their DNA sequence.
Research
Genetic sequencing is a pivotal component of producing scientific knowledge about disease origins, disease prevention, and developing meaningful therapeutic interventions. Much of research utilizes large-group DNA samples or aggregate genome-wide datasets to compare and identify genes associated with particular diseases or phenotypes; therefore, there is much opposition to restricting genome database accessibility and much support for fortifying such wide-scale research. For example, if an informed consent clause were to be enforced for all genetics research, existing genetic databases could not be reused for new studies - all datasets would either need to be destroyed at the end of every study or all participants would need to re-authorize permissions with each new study. As genetic datasets can be extrapolated to closely related family members, this adds another dimension of required consent in the research process. This fundamentally raises the question of whether or not these restrictions are necessary privacy protections or a hindrance to scientific progress.
Clinical Use
In medicine, genetic sequencing is not only important for traditional uses, such as paternity tests, but also for facilitating ease in diagnosis and treatment. Personalized medicine has been heralded as the future of healthcare, as whole genome sequencing have provided the possibility personalizing treatment to individual expression and experience of disease. As pharmacology and drug development are based on population studies, current treatments are normalized to whole populations statistics, which might reduce treatment efficacy for individuals, as everyone's response to a disease and to drug therapy is uniquely bound to their genetic predispositions. Already, genetic sequencing has expedited prognostic counseling in monogenic diseases that requires rapid, differential diagnosis in neonatal care. However, the often blurred distinction between medical usage and research usage can complicate how privacy between these two realms are handled, as they often require different levels of consent and leverage different policy.
Commercial Use
Even in the consumer market, people have flocked to Ancestry.com and 23andMe to discover their heritage and elucidate their genotypes. As the nature of consumer transactions allows for these electronic click wrap models to bypass traditional forms of consent in research and healthcare, consumers may not completely comprehend the implications of having their genetic sequence digitized and stored. Furthermore, corporate privacy policies often operate outside the realm of federal jurisdiction, exposing consumers to informational risks, both in terms of their genetic privacy and their self-disclosed consumer profile, including self-disclosed family history, health status, race, ethnicity, social networks, and much more. Simply having databases invites potential privacy risks, as data storage inherently entails the possibility of data breaches and governmental solicitation of datasets. 23andMe have already received four requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to access consumer datasets and although those requests were denied, this reveals a similar conundrum as the FBI–Apple encryption dispute.
Forensic Use
DNA-information can be used to solve criminal cases by establishing a match between a known suspect of a particular crime and an unknown suspect of an unsolved crime. However, DNA-information on its own can lead to expected errors of a certain probability and should not be used as entirely reliable evidence on its own.
Policy
As an individual's genomic sequence can reveal telling medical information about themselves, and their family members, privacy proponents believe that there should be certain protections in place to ultimately protect the privacy and identity of the user from possible discrimination by insurance companies or employers, the major concern voiced. There have been instances in which genetic discrimination has occurred, often revealing how science can be misinterpreted by non-experts. In 1970, African-Americans were denied insurance coverage or charged higher premiums because they were known carriers of sickle-cell anemia, but as carriers, they do not have any medical problems themselves, and this carrier advantage actually confers resistance against malaria. The legitimacy of these policies has been challenged by scientists who condemn this attitude of genetic determinism, that genotype wholly determines phenotype. Environmental factors, differential development patterns, and the field of epigenetics would argue gene expression is much more complex and genes are not a diagnosis, nor a reliable diagnosis, of an individual's medical future.
Incipient legislations have manifested in response to genetic exceptionalism, the heightened scrutiny expected of genomics research, such as the 2008 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in the United States; however, in many cases, the scope and accountability of formal legislation is rather uncertain, as the science seems to be proceeding at a much more rapid pace than the law, and specialized ethics committees have had to fill this necessary niche. Much of the criticism targets how policy fundamentally lacks an understanding of technical issues involved in genome sequencing and fails to address how in the event of a data breach, an individual's personal genome can not be replaced, complicating privacy protection even further. As computational genomics is such a technical field, the translation of expert language to policy is difficult - let alone translation to laymen language -, presenting a certain barrier to public perception about the capabilities of current genomic sequencing technologies which, ultimately, makes the discourse about protecting genetic privacy without impeding scientific advancement an even more difficult one to have.
Across the world, each country has unique healthcare and research frameworks that produce different policy needs – genetic privacy policy is further complicated when considering international collaborations on genetic research or international biobanks, databases that store biological samples and DNA information. Furthermore, research and healthcare are not the only fields that require formal jurisdiction; other areas of concern include the genetic privacy of those in the criminal justice system and those who engage with private consumer-based genomic sequencing.
Forensic Science
England and Wales
91% of the largest forensic DNA database in the world, the National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database (NDNAD), contains DNA information from residents of England and Wales. The NDNAD stores genetic information of criminally convicted individuals, those who were charged but acquitted of a recordable offence, those who were arrested but never charged with a recordable offense, and those who are under counterterrorism control. Of the 5.5 million people in the database, which represents 10% of the total population, 1.2 million have never been convicted of a crime. The European Court of Human Rights decided, in the case of S and Marper v United Kingdom (2008), that the government must present sufficient justification for differential treatment of DNA profiles of those in the criminal justice system compared to that of non-convicted individuals; essentially, there must be no abuse of retained biological materials and DNA-information. The decision highlighted several existing issues with the current system that poses privacy risks for the individuals involved: the storage of personal information with genetic information, the storage of DNA profiles with the inherent capacity to determine genetic relationships, and fundamentally, the act of storing of cellular samples and DNA profiles produces opportunities for privacy risks. As a result, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 was created to ensure proper use of collected DNA materials and regulate their storage and destruction. However, many problems still persist, as samples can still be retained indefinitely in databases, regardless of whether or not the affected individual was convicted – and even the samples of juvenile delinquents. Critics have argued that this long-term retention could lead to stigmatization of affected individuals and inhibit their re-integration into society and also, are subject to misuse by discriminatory behavior innate to the criminal justice system.
Germany
In 1990, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany decided that sections of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provided justifiable legal basis for the use of genetic fingerprinting in identifying criminals and absolving innocents. The decisions, however, lacked specific details on how biological materials can be obtained and how genetic fingerprinting can be utilized; only regulations of blood tests and physical examinations were explicitly outlined. In 1998, the German Parliament authorized the establishment of a national DNA database, due to mounting pressure to prevent cases of sexual abuse and homicides involving children. This decision rendered as constitutional and supported by a compelling public interest by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2001, despite some criticism that the right of informational self-determination was violated. The court did mandate that DNA information and samples must be supported by evidence that the individual can commit a similar crime in the future. To address the legal uncertainty, the Act on Forensic DNA Analysis of 2005 introduced provisions that included exact and limited legal grounds for the use of DNA based information in criminal proceedings. Some sections order that DNA samples may only be used if they are necessary to accelerate the investigation, eliminate suspects, and a court must order genetic fingerprinting. Since its implementation, there has been a monthly addition of 8000 new sets to the database, bringing into question the necessity of such wide scale data collection and whether or not the wording of the provisions provided effective privacy protection. A recent controversial decision by the German government expanded the range of familial searching by DNA dragnet to identify genetic relatives of sexual and violent perpetrators – an action that was previously deemed as having no legal basis by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany in 2012.
South Korea
The National Forensic Service of South Korea and the Public Prosecution Authority of South Korea established separate DNA analysis departments in 1991, despite initial public criticism that the data collection was enacted without considering the informational privacy of subjects involved, a criticism that turned to support with a series of high-profile cases. In 2006, a proposed bill by the General Assembly on the collection and operationalization of DNA information outlined crime categories for the storage, the control, and the destruction of DNA samples and DNA information. However, the bill failed to pass as it could not translate into any significant change in actual practice. The incomprehensive crime categories included were only applicable in obtaining biological information without an individual's consent, and the protocol to destroy collected samples were unclear, exposing them to misuse.
The DNA Information Act of 2009 attempted to resolve these weaknesses, including provisions that stated biologically sensitive information may only be collected from convicted individuals, confined suspects, and crime scenes. Genetic fingerprinting was made permissible for specific crimes, including arson, murder, kidnapping, rape or sexual molestation, trespass upon residence at night for stealing, larceny, and burglary, and numerous other violent crimes. The act also required a written warrant for acquiring samples from convicted criminals or suspects if the concerned individuals do not give written consent. All samples must be destroyed in a timely manner if the concerned individual is proclaimed innocent, acquitted, their prosecution is dismissed, and upon their death. Importantly, if collected samples are used to ascertain individuals at the crime scene, the DNA information must be destroyed upon successful identification. However, there are still several flaws and criticisms to this legislation, in terms of clarifying the presumption of innocence, the rather trivial enforcement of sample destruction (only 2.03% of samples are deleted annually) and requisite of a written warrant (99.6% of samples are obtained without a warrant), and there is still much debate about whether or not this legislations violates the right of informational self-determination.
Biobanks
United States
In the United States, biobanks are primarily under the jurisdiction of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects (Common Rule). As neither of these rules was conceived with the intention of regulating biobanks and the decentralized levels of regulation, there have been many challenges in their application and enforcement, and federal law fails to directly tackle international policy and how data can be shared outside of the EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement. An area that needs clarification is how federal and state laws are differentially and specifically applied to different biobanks, researchers, or projects, a situation further complicated by the fact that most biobanks are part of larger entities, or in collaboration with other institutions, confusing the line public and private interests. About 80% of all biobanks have internal oversight boards that regulate data collection, usage, and distribution. There are three basic access models applied to the accessibility of biobank samples and data: open access (unrestricted to anyone), tiered access (some restrictions to access dependent on the nature of the project), or controlled access (tightly controlled access).
GINA provisions prohibit health insurers from requiring genetic testing or requesting genetic information for enrollment purposes and prohibit employers from requesting genetic testing or genetic information for any type of employment assessment,(hiring, promotion, termination). However, insurers can request genetic information to determine coverage of a specific procedure. Some groups are also excluded from following GINA's provisions, including insurers and employers of federal government employees, military, and employers with fewer than 15 employees.
China
China has a widespread network of hospitals and research institutes. It is currently undergoing a plan to create a more cohesive framework for data sharing among existing biobanks, which was previously under the jurisdiction of overlapping and confusing regulatory laws. Many biobanks operate under independently, or within a network of other networks, with the most prominent being the Shanghai Biobank network. Under this main network, guidelines detail specific de-identification policies and explicitly endorse broad consent. Recently, the Chinese Constitution has formally recognized individual privacy as a distinct and independent constitutional right, and therefore, legislators have begun developing a Draft Ordinance on Human Genetics Resources to organize national laws on biobanking management measures, legal liability, and punishment for violations. International data sharing will be even more strictly regulated under these federal laws.
Australia
Biobanks in Australia are mainly under the regulation of healthcare privacy guidelines and human research ethics committees – no formal biobank legislation exists but international data sharing is widely permitted. The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) develops guidelines for and funds many of these institutions. There is discussion towards broad consent for biobanking.
Consumer Genetic Testing
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privacy advocate, found that existing legislation does not have formal jurisdiction in ensuring consumer privacy where DNA information is concerned. Genetic information stored by consumer businesses are not protected by the HIPAA; therefore, these companies can share genetic information with third parties, conditions contingent upon their own privacy statements. Most genetic testing companies only share anonymized, aggregated data with users’ consent. Ancestry.com and 23andMe do sell such data to research institutions and other organizations, and can ask for a case-by-case consent to release non-anonymized data to other parties, including employers or insurers. 23andMe even issues a warning that re-identification may take place and is possible. If a consumer explicitly refuses research use or requests for their data to be destroyed, 23andMe is still allowed to use their consumer identifying and behavioral information, such as browsing patterns and geographical location, for other marketing services.
Areas of Concern
Many computational experts have developed, and are developing, more secure systems of genomics sequencing to protect the future of this field from misguided jurisdiction, wrongful application of genetics data, and above all, the genetic privacy of individuals. There are currently four major areas of genetics research in which privacy-preserving technologies are being developed for:
String searching and comparison
Paternity tests, genetic compatibility tests, and ancestry testing are all types of medical tools that rely on string searching and comparison algorithms. Simply, this is a needle-in-a-haystack approach, in which a dataset is searched for a matching “string”, the sequence or pattern of interest. As these types of testing have become more common, and adapted to consumer genomic models, such as smartphone apps or trendy DNA tests, current privacy securing methods are focused on fortifying this process and protecting both healthcare and private usage.
Aggregate data release
The modern age of big data and large scale genomic testing necessitates processing systems that minimize privacy risks when releasing aggregate genomic data, which essentially means ensuring that individual data cannot be discerned within a genomic database. This differential privacy approach is a simple evaluation of the security of a genomic database and many researchers provide "checks" on the stringency of existing infrastructures.
Alignment of raw genomic data
One of the most important developments in the field of genomics is the capacity for read mapping, in which millions of short sequences can be aligned to a reference DNA sequence in order to process large datasets efficiently. As this high-capacity process is often divided up between public and private computing environments, there is a lot of associated risk and stages where genetic privacy is particularly vulnerable; therefore, current studies focus on how to provide secure operations within two different data domains without sacrificing efficiency and accuracy.
Clinical use
With the advent of high throughput genomic technology allowing unprecedented access to genetic information, personalized medicine is gaining momentum as the promised future of healthcare, rendering secure genomic testing models as imperative for the progress of medicine. Particularly, concerns voice how this process will involve multiparty engagement and access to data. The distinction between genetic sequencing for medicine and research purposes is a contentious one, and furthermore, anytime healthcare is involved in a discussion, the dimension of patient privacy must be considered, as it may conflict or complement genetic privacy.
Encryption Methods
Secure read mapping
Sensitive read mapping is essential to genomics research, as read mapping is not only important for DNA sequencing, but also for identifying target regulatory molecules in RNA-Seq. A solution proposes splitting read mapping into two tasks on a hybridized computing operation: the exact matching of reads using keyed hash values can be conducted on a public cloud and the alignment of reads can be conducted on a private cloud. As only keyed hash values are exposed to public scrutiny, the privacy of the original sequence is preserved. However, as alignment processes tends to be high volume and work intensive, most sequencing schemes still functionally require third party computing operations, which reintroduce privacy risks in the public cloud domain.
Secure string searching
Numerous genetic screening tests rely on string searching and have become commonplace in healthcare; therefore, the privacy of such methodologies have been an important area of development. One protocol hides the position and size of partial substrings, allowing one party (the researcher or physician) with the digitized genome and a second party (research subject or patient) with sole propriety of his or her DNA marker to conduct secure genetic tests. Only the researcher or the physician knows the conclusion of the string searching and comparison scheme and neither party can access other information, ensuring privacy preservation.
Secure genome query
The basis of personalized medicine and preventative healthcare is establishing genetic compatibility by comparing an individual's genome against known variations to estimate susceptibility to diseases, such as breast cancer or diabetes, to evaluate pharmacogenomics, and to query biological relationships among individuals. For disease risk tests, studies have proposed a privacy preserving technique that utilizes homomorphic encryption and secure integer comparison, and suggests storing and processing sensitive data in an encrypted form. To ensure privacy, the storage and processing unit (SPU) stores all the single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs) as real SNPs - the observed SNPs in the patient - with redundant content from set of potential SNPs. Another solution developed three protocols to secure calculating edit distance using intersections of Yao's Garbled Circuit and a banded alignment algorithm. The major drawback of this solution is its inability of performing large scale computations while retaining accuracy.
Secure genome-wide association studies
Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are important in locating specific variations in genome sequences that lead to disease. Privacy preserving algorithms that identify SNPs significantly associated with diseases are based on introducing random noise to aggregate statistics to protect individual privacy. In another study, the nature of linkage disequilibrium is utilized in selecting the most useful datasets while maximizing protection of patient privacy with injected noise; however, it may lack effective disease association capabilities. Critics of these methods note that a substantial amount of noise is required to satisfy differential privacy for a small ratio of SNPs, an impracticality in conducting efficient research.
Authenticated encryption storage
The nature of genomic sequences requires a specific encryption tool to protect against low complexity (repetitive content) attacks and KPA (Known-plaintext attack), given several expected symbols. Cryfa
uses packing (reducing the storage size), a shuffling mechanism (randomizing the symbol positions), and the AES cipher (Advanced Encryption Standard) to securely store FASTA, FASTQ, VCF, SAM and BAM files with authenticated encryption.
References
Applied genetics |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.