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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-10T18:33:36.159000Z" | "2023-08-14T15:53:00.999000Z" | Service Execution | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1569.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Service Control Manager",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:36:57.378000Z" | "2024-03-29T15:42:13.499000Z" | Cloud Accounts | Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.
An adversary may create long lasting [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
Cloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005) or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009) or other methods.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1078.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Identity Federation",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Federating GC",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Deploying AD Federation",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.7 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-23T22:28:28.041000Z" | "2022-05-04T14:52:51.290000Z" | Environmental Keying | Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)
Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.
Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1480.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001"
},
{
"description": "Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint Router Malvertising",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper",
"url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ebowla: Genetic Malware",
"url": "https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EK Clueless Agents",
"url": "https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EK Impeding Malware Analysis",
"url": "https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo",
"url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js"
},
{
"description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Environmental Keyed HTA",
"url": "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:21.689000Z" | "2020-07-14T19:49:47.340000Z" | Fallback Channels | Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:33:00.009000Z" | "2024-02-14T21:56:34.831000Z" | NTFS File Attributes | Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004"
},
{
"description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/"
},
{
"description": "Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea"
},
{
"description": "Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA",
"url": "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html"
},
{
"description": "Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/"
},
{
"description": "Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ADS Mar 2014",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft File Streams",
"url": "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404"
},
{
"description": "Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018",
"url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/"
},
{
"description": "Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018",
"url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/"
},
{
"description": "Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec ADS May 2009",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the <code>ZwSetEaFile</code> and <code>ZwQueryEaFile</code> Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)
There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.
The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:43:38.588000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:46.538000Z" | Kerberoasting | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1558.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003"
},
{
"description": "EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016",
"url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
},
{
"description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018",
"url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SPN",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SetSPN",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014",
"url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016",
"url": "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:45:34.293000Z" | "2021-04-22T20:20:14.595000Z" | DCSync | Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.
Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)
DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
},
{
"description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
"url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
},
{
"description": "Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wine API samlib.dll",
"url": "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
},
{
"description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM"
},
{
"description": "Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:37.450000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:50:15.929000Z" | System Time Discovery | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or <code>systemsetup</code> on macOS.(Citation: MSDN System Time)(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)(Citation: systemsetup mac time) These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.(Citation: Mac Time Sync)(Citation: linux system time)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>.(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as <code>GetTickCount()</code> to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.(Citation: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion)
On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.(Citation: show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd)
In addition, system calls – such as <code>time()</code> – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.(Citation: MAGNET GOBLIN) On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as <code>systemsetup -gettimezone</code> or <code>timeIntervalSinceNow</code> to gather current time zone information or current date and time.(Citation: System Information Discovery Technique)(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)(Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1124",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124"
},
{
"description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). About systemsetup in Remote Desktop. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "systemsetup mac time",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/remote-desktop/apd95406b8d/mac"
},
{
"description": "ArchLinux. (2024, February 1). System Time. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "linux system time",
"url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_time"
},
{
"description": "Check Point Research. (2024, March 8). MAGNET GOBLIN TARGETS PUBLICLY FACING SERVERS USING 1-DAY VULNERABILITIES. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MAGNET GOBLIN",
"url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/magnet-goblin-targets-publicly-facing-servers-using-1-day-vulnerabilities/"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2023, March 6). show clock detail - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s2.html#wp1896741674"
},
{
"description": "Cone, Matt. (2021, January 14). Synchronize your Mac's Clock with a Time Server. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mac Time Sync",
"url": "https://www.macinstruct.com/tutorials/synchronize-your-macs-clock-with-a-time-server/"
},
{
"description": "M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia/"
},
{
"description": "Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AnyRun TimeBomb",
"url": "https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/"
},
{
"description": "Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Technet Windows Time Service",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSDN System Time",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RSA EU12 They're Inside",
"url": "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf"
},
{
"description": "YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). The System Information Discovery Technique Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1082. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "System Information Discovery Technique",
"url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-system-information-discovery-technique-explained-mitre-attack-t1082"
},
{
"description": "YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - How Attackers Avoid Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 26, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion",
"url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/virtualization/sandbox-evasion-how-attackers-avoid-malware-analysis"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Network",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-27T13:52:45.853000Z" | "2023-11-15T14:38:10.876000Z" | At | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002"
},
{
"description": "Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "rowland linux at 2019",
"url": "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/"
},
{
"description": "Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GTFObins at",
"url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/"
},
{
"description": "IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux at",
"url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html"
},
{
"description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task",
"url": "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
In Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code> and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:26:08.145000Z" | "2023-08-11T21:34:38.558000Z" | Dynamic-link Library Injection | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>LoadLibrary</code>).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Another variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's <code>AddressOfEntryPoint</code> before starting a new thread in the target process.(Citation: Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection) This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.(Citation: Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001"
},
{
"description": "Aliz Hammond. (2019, August 15). Hiding Malicious Code with \"Module Stomping\": Part 1. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping",
"url": "https://blog.f-secure.com/hiding-malicious-code-with-module-stomping/"
},
{
"description": "Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Red Teaming Experiments. (n.d.). Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection",
"url": "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T02:17:46.086000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:14:01.255000Z" | Exploits | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying)
In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)
An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.
Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005"
},
{
"description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Exploit Database",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/"
},
{
"description": "Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TempertonDarkHotel",
"url": "https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage"
},
{
"description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NationsBuying",
"url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html"
},
{
"description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab",
"url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
},
{
"description": "Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wired SandCat Oct 2019",
"url": "https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] |
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:01:56.887000Z" | "2024-04-11T21:51:44.851000Z" | Modify Authentication Process | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556"
},
{
"description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013",
"url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
},
{
"description": "Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Xorrior Authorization Plugins",
"url": "https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/"
},
{
"description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dell Skeleton",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). The <code>Store passwords using reversible encryption</code> configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>, <code>Set-ADUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network",
"Azure AD",
"Google Workspace",
"IaaS",
"Office 365",
"SaaS"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:01:15.930000Z" | "2020-11-10T18:29:31.138000Z" | Credential API Hooking | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1056.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Hook Overview",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014",
"url": "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/"
},
{
"description": "Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015",
"url": "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/"
},
{
"description": "Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012",
"url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html"
},
{
"description": "Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011",
"url": "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook"
},
{
"description": "Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Jay GetHooks Sept 2011",
"url": "https://github.com/jay/gethooks"
},
{
"description": "Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Zairon Hooking Dec 2006",
"url": "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/"
},
{
"description": "Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017",
"url": "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/"
},
{
"description": "GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GMER Rootkits",
"url": "http://www.gmer.net/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Process Snapshot",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012",
"url": "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)
Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.
Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-12T18:28:15.451000Z" | "2022-08-31T17:30:05.440000Z" | Firmware Corruption | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices may include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.
In general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. For example, corruption of firmware responsible for loading the operating system for network devices may render the network devices inoperable.(Citation: dhs_threat_to_net_devices)(Citation: cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine) Depending on the device, this attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1495",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2022, April 28). Alert (AA22-057A) Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"
},
{
"description": "U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, August 30). The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dhs_threat_to_net_devices",
"url": "https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/ar-16-20173.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement",
"url": "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research"
},
{
"description": "Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-02T13:54:43.136000Z" | "2024-04-12T02:30:08.379000Z" | Inhibit System Recovery | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>
* <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>
* <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>
* <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system
* <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)
On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.
Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1490",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490"
},
{
"description": " Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/code-hosting-service-shuts-down-after-cyber-attack"
},
{
"description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved November 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Diskshadow",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow"
},
{
"description": "Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crytox Ransomware",
"url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/"
},
{
"description": "Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020",
"url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/"
},
{
"description": "TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved October 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "disable_notif_synology_ransom",
"url": "https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.
Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage</code>).
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network",
"IaaS",
"Containers"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:26:51.207000Z" | "2022-04-20T17:09:17.363000Z" | Netsh Helper DLL | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007"
},
{
"description": "Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Demaske Netsh Persistence",
"url": "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Netsh",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon",
"url": "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code> registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T19:24:00.951000Z" | "2024-01-31T14:15:55.690000Z" | Spearphishing via Service | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.
A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1566.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003"
},
{
"description": "Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018",
"url": "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:08:20.244000Z" | "2024-03-07T14:29:02.408000Z" | Internal Proxy | Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1090.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro APT Attack Tools",
"url": "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2022-04-18T14:43:46.045000Z" | System Script Proxy Execution | Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1216",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216"
},
{
"description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List",
"url": "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
},
{
"description": "Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Project",
"url": "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T22:24:21.841000Z" | "2020-03-26T23:12:30.499000Z" | Dead Drop Resolver | Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1102.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T00:30:25.444000Z" | "2024-02-02T20:10:01.862000Z" | Junk Data | Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1001.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:08:07.742000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:43:12.843000Z" | Spearphishing Service | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1598.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001"
},
{
"description": "O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Social Media Phishing",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-31T14:01:52.321000Z" | "2023-04-15T16:11:25.409000Z" | Container API | Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API)
An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1552.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker API",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes API",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.
It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:51:28.513000Z" | "2023-03-07T13:05:42.901000Z" | Domains | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)
Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs DNS Hijack 2019",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking",
"url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en"
},
{
"description": "Janos Szurdi, Rebekah Houser and Daiping Liu. (2022, September 21). Domain Shadowing: A Stealthy Use of DNS Compromise for Cybercrime. Retrieved March 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/domain-shadowing/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-12-12T14:59:58.168000Z" | "2020-03-25T23:30:20.638000Z" | SQL Stored Procedures | Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).
Adversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017)
Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1505.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001"
},
{
"description": "Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures",
"url": "https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/"
},
{
"description": "Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019",
"url": "https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft CLR Integration 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017"
},
{
"description": "Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NetSPI SQL Server CLR",
"url": "https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T17:58:04.155000Z" | "2021-12-14T23:14:26.107000Z" | Network Device Authentication | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004"
},
{
"description": "Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant - Synful Knock",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T22:06:41.739000Z" | "2024-04-16T13:00:33.303000Z" | Disk Content Wipe | Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1561.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001"
},
{
"description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase` commands that delete critical configuration files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T15:37:47.583000Z" | "2023-04-12T23:39:25.476000Z" | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.(Citation: copy_cmd_cisco)
Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1048.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). copy - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "copy_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/C_commands.html#wp1068167689"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `copy` commands being run to exfiltrate configuration files to non-standard destinations over unencrypted protocols such as TFTP. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-16T15:23:30.896000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:39.601000Z" | Dylib Hijacking | Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004"
},
{
"description": "Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO",
"url": "https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5"
},
{
"description": "Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Writing Bad Malware for OSX",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "wardle artofmalware volume1",
"url": "https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html"
},
{
"description": "Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github EmpireProject HijackScanner",
"url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py"
},
{
"description": "Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib",
"url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Run path dependent libraries can include <code>LC_LOAD_DYLIB</code>, <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code>, and <code>LC_RPATH</code>. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are <code>@rpath</code>, <code>@loader_path</code>, and <code>@executable_path</code>.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the <code>otool -l</code> command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T19:53:10.576000Z" | "2020-10-22T17:49:02.660000Z" | Downgrade System Image | Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
On embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage. With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart. The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts.
Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600). Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1601.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002"
},
{
"description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
"url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:26:46.695000Z" | "2023-07-14T13:04:04.591000Z" | Local Accounts | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1078.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-10-15T11:41:47.274000Z" | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.
Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.
There have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries (Citation: Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack), evade security logs (Citation: Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog), or deploy hidden infrastructure.(Citation: GhostToken GCP flaw) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1211",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211"
},
{
"description": "Bill Toulas. (2023, August 2). Hackers exploited Salesforce zero-day in Facebook phishing attack. Retrieved September 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploited-salesforce-zero-day-in-facebook-phishing-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Nick Frichette. (2023, March 20). Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog, and Other Logging Research. Retrieved September 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog",
"url": "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/bypass-cloudtrail-aws-service-catalog-and-other/"
},
{
"description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2023, April 21). GhostToken GCP flaw let attackers backdoor Google accounts. Retrieved September 18, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GhostToken GCP flaw",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ghosttoken-gcp-flaw-let-attackers-backdoor-google-accounts/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"SaaS",
"IaaS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:39.262000Z" | "2022-05-05T05:00:37.443000Z" | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1127",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127"
},
{
"description": "Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Exploit Monday WinDbg",
"url": "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Tracker",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "engima0x3 RCSI Bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "engima0x3 DNX Bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-10-04T20:42:28.541000Z" | "2023-03-22T20:45:22.531000Z" | System Shutdown/Reboot | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A)
Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.
Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1529",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529"
},
{
"description": "Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant \"Nyetya\" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Nyetya June 2017",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "alert_TA18_106A",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the <code>reload</code> command. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-09-28T01:36:41.638000Z" | "2022-05-20T17:41:16.112000Z" | MMC | Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, <code>mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_com_reg) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014"
},
{
"description": "bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "abusing_com_reg",
"url": "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mmc_vulns",
"url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/"
},
{
"description": "Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "win_msc_files_overview",
"url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "win_mmc",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "win_wbadmin_delete_catalog",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "win_clsid_key",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "what_is_mmc",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console"
},
{
"description": "Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "phobos_virustotal",
"url": "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious.
Monitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as <code>services.msc</code> or <code>eventvwr.msc</code>. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-11-19T14:13:11.335000Z" | "2021-11-29T15:56:50.370000Z" | Process Argument Spoofing | Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)
Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)
Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/010"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 6). PEB structure (winternl.h). Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft PEB 2021",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/ns-winternl-peb"
},
{
"description": "Chester, A. (2019, January 28). How to Argue like Cobalt Strike. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019",
"url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/how-to-argue-like-cobalt-strike/"
},
{
"description": "Mudge, R. (2019, January 2). https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019",
"url": "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/"
},
{
"description": "Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020",
"url": "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/"
},
{
"description": "McLellan, T. and Moore, J. et al. (2021, April 29). UNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat. Retrieved June 2, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye FiveHands April 2021",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat.html"
},
{
"description": "Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of process argument spoofing may be difficult as adversaries may momentarily modify stored arguments used for malicious execution. These changes may bypass process creation detection and/or later process memory analysis. Consider monitoring for [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), which includes monitoring for process creation (especially those in a suspended state) as well as access and/or modifications of these processes (especially by the parent process) via Windows API calls.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not and/or do no align with its logged command-line arguments. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-24T22:30:55.843000Z" | "2021-08-30T21:35:12.049000Z" | COR_PROFILER | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)
Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)"
},
{
"description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/"
},
{
"description": "Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019",
"url": "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"
},
{
"description": "Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell",
"url": "https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell"
},
{
"description": "Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "subTee .NET Profilers May 2017",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |