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J U D G M E N T Arising out of SLPC No.
13002 of 2002 G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. Leave granted.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, the United India Insurance Company has companye up in appeal by way of special leave.
The appellant was the third respondent in a motor accident claim preferred by respondents 1 to 3 herein, who are legal heirs of one Sudhirbhai Jayrambhal Patel who died in a motor accident on 27.8.1994.
Respondents 1 to 3 claimed a total companypensation of Rs.80 lacs and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Special , Vadodra, passed an award for RS.32,50,000/ with interest at the rate of 12 per annum from the date of application till realisation.
From the impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 15.5.1999, it appears that the first respondent, the driver of the offending vehicle and the second respondent, the owner of the vehicle appeared before the Tribunal, but did number file any written statement refuting the allegations made in the petition.
It was further stated that in view of that, the Tribunal was companypelled to draw an adverse inference against them.
These observations have been made in paragraph 18 of the judgment of the Tribunal.
Before the Tribunal, the appellant Insurance Company filed a petition under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 hereinafter referred to as the Act praying that the appellant herein be allowed to companytest the proceedings.
That application was granted by the Tribunal by a cryptic order Granted as prayed for.
After the award was passed by the Tribunal, the appellant filed an appeal before the Gujarat High Court impleading the legal heirs of the deceased and also the driver and owner of the offending vehicle as respondents.
When the appeal came up for companysideration, the Division Bench was of the view that in view of Section 149 2 of the Act, the appeal under Section 170 was number maintainable, especially in view of the observations made by this Court in Shankarayya vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 2968, and the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed.
Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed by the United India Insurance Company Limited.
We heard the appellants companynsel and also companynsel for the respondents.
| 0 | train | 2003_473.txt |
1999 1 SCR 188 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SRINIVASAN, J. The appellant is aggrieved by the dismissal of his election petition No.
3/95 by the Bench at Aurangabad of the High Court of Bombay on preliminary issues without trial.
The first respondent was declared elected at the election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly held on 9.2.95 for 96 Pachora Con stituency.
The appellant filed the petition for declaring the election to be void and illegal and for declaring him as duly elected.
In view of the limited scope of this appeal, it is unnecessary to refer to the allegations made in the said petition.
Suffice it to mention that the petition companytained allega tions of certain companyrupt practices as against the first respondent.
An affidavit was filed along with the petition as required by the proviso to S. 83 l c of the Representation of the People Act for short, the Act .
The affidavit was attested and the endorsement of attestation companytained the particulars as required by law.
When the companyies of the petition, documents and the affidavit were served on the respondents, the companyy of the affidavit did number bear the endorsement of attestation found on the original or the seal or stamp of the attesting officer.
The appellant signed below the rubber stamp endor sement Attested as true companyy.
But for the absence of the numberarial endor sement, it was a true companyy of the original as it was a xerox companyy.
The first respondent and the tenth respondent raised objections that the election petition should be dismissed in limine as the provisions of S. 83 1 of the Act were number companyplied with.
Besides the companytention that the companyies of the affidavit served on them were number true companyies, the tenth respondent company tended that a true companyy of the petition was number supplied to him as required by S. 81 3 .
The first respondent filed a separate application for dismissing the election petition for number compliance with S. 81 3 of the Act.
Issues 8 and 9 based on the said objections were as follows Issue No.
8 Whether the affidavit filed by the petitioner under provisions of the Proviso to S. 83 1 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 read with Rule 94 A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 is number in companyformity with the provisions and if yes, what is its effect?
Issue No.
9 Whether the true companyy of the petition is properly served on the respondent in companypliance with the rules?
The two issues were treated as preliminary issues and the High Court heard arguments on the same before the companymencement of the trial.
For companying to the said companyclusion the High Court relied on a previous judgment of the Court in Purushottam v. Returning Officer, Amravati, AIR 1992 Bombay 227 which was approved by this Court in Dr. Smt.
Shipra v. Shanti Lal, 1996 5 S.C.C. 181.
The Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench with the following observations Having heard Shri Sorabjee, we are number too sure that the principle indicated in the said decision can apply to the facts of the present case but certain wide observations, in the opinion of Justice Paripoornan and Justice K. Ramaswamy may support the appellants companytentions.
| 1 | train | 1999_21.txt |
B. Sinha, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 21.9.2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc.
Application No.21/09/2007 whereby and whereunder the appeals preferred by the claimants respondents from an award dated 29.1.2007 passed by the IInd Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Fast Track Court , Kanti hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal in V.C. No.350 of 2004, was allowed.
A cross objection filed by the appellant herein has also been dismissed by the said judgment.
Heirs and legal representatives of Genda Bai, who died in an accident which took place on 31.10.2004, filed a claim application before the Tribunal, companytending in that on the fateful day, when she had been standing near a turning known as Hardi turning, a mini door Auto bearing registration No.
MP 20G 9937 dashed against her as a result whereof she suffered injuries.
She was taken to the District Hospital where she succumbed thereto on the next day.
The deceased was aged about 45 years at the time of her death.
She allegedly used to earn about Rs.5,000/ per month by preparing Donnapattals.
Indisputably, the vehicle was a goods carriage vehicle which was owned by Respondent No.7, Narendra, and was being driven by Respondent No.6, Umesh.
Overruling the said companytention, an award of Rs.1,83,000/ was made.
Claimants, as numbericed hereinbefore, preferred an appeal thereagainst.
Appellant also filed a cross objection.
Inter alia, on the premise that the companytribution to the family by the deceased would have been about Rs.2,500/ per month and on deduction of companyventional 1/3rd amount from her income, the annual loss of dependency was calculated at Rs.20,000/ per annum.
| 1 | train | 2009_139.txt |
V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted.
Choudhuri Nayak, first respondent in these appeals who died during the pendency of the special leave petitions leaving his widow as his legal representative filed an application on 18.9.1978 claiming pension under the Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme, 1972 scheme for short .
In his application, he claimed that he was companyvicted by the Sub Divisional Officer, Bhadrak, under Rule 38 5 of the Defence of India Rules DIR for short and sentenced to seven months simple imprisonment.
He further stated that in pursuance of such companyviction and sentence, he was taken into custody and suffered imprisonment from 19.3.1943 to 10.10.1943 in Balasore jail.
The said application for freedom fighters pension was accompanied by a typed unsigned companyy of a certificate dated 12.3.1974 said to have been issued by the Superintendent, Balasore District Jail, certifying that the first respondent was companyvicted and sentenced to seven months simple imprisonment by Sri.
C.Mohanty, Sub Divisional Officer, Bhadrak under Rule 38 5 of DIR on 10.3.1943 and he was companyfined in the said jail from 19.3.1943 till 10.10.1943.
Therefore first respondent was asked to produce some acceptable proof of imprisonment.
In the year 1982, he produced a certified companyy of the Entries made on 12.10.1943 in the criminal case register Sl.
278 of Challan Register being brief summary of the case decided by Sri.
P.C. Mohanty, SDO in case No.
G.327of 1942.
The said certified companyy was obtained by the first respondent from the Record Section of SDOs office on 30.12.1981.
The said certified companyy showed that Sri P.C. Mohanty, SDO, Bhadrak had made a final order in case titled Emperor v. Salar and 32 Others, in regard to offences punishable under sections 147, 35 to 38 IPC and Rule 38 5 of DIR.
The name Choudhari also figured in the names of accused who were companyvicted and sentenced in that case.
The State Government accepted the said certified extract of Challan Register as proof of first respondent having undergone imprisonment for more than six months and processed his application and recommended his case for pension.
The first respondent was sanctioned Freedom Fighters Pension with effect from 1.8.1980 by the Central Government and with effect from 1.1.1984 by the State Government.
The first respondent was being paid pension in terms of the scheme ever since then.
A public interest litigation OJC No.
15977/1997 was filed by one Sanyasi Charan Das before the Orissa High Court alleging that the first respondent was drawing freedom fighters pension by producing false and fabricated documents and that an inspection of the Challan Register in the office of SDO, Bhadrak would show that the name of the first respondent had been fraudulently inserted among the names of accused who were companyvicted and sentenced in the criminal case with respect to which the first respondent had produced the certified companyy .
It was also stated that the first respondent was hardly fourteen years old in 1943 and he had companycealed his date of birth 13.9.1928 while applying for and securing the pension and had falsely shown his age as 56 years in his application dated 18.9.1978 which would make him 21 years old in 1943 .
In view of these allegations, the State Government companyducted an inquiry through the Superintendent of Police, Bhadrak.
The said inquiry disclosed that in the Entries in the Challan Register at Sl.
278 , the name of first respondent and another Choudhari and Banabehari had been inserted among the names of persons companyvicted and sentenced, shown under the companyumn final order passed with details of sentence and date of decision and that such insertion was clearly visible even on a casual inspection as the two names were in a different handwriting and different ink and impression.
The enquiries also revealed that the date of birth of first respondent was shown as 23.9.1926 in the school records and was recorded as 13.9.1928 in his service record.
The State Government therefore issued a show cause numberice dated 14.12.2000 to the first respondent asking him to show cause why the grant of pension should number be cancelled in view of pension being secured by fabricating documents.
On the basis of the information furnished by the State Government, the Central Government also issued a similar show cause numberice dated 19.7.2001 to the first respondent.
The first respondent sent a reply denying knowledge of any addition or alteration in the entries relating to Sl.
No.278 in the Challan Register.
He however admitted that his date of birth was 13.9.1928 as entered in the Service Record but did number explain why he had shown a wrong age in the application for pension.
After companysidering the explanation given, the Central Government, by order dated 14.8.2001 cancelled the freedom fighters pension granted to first respondent.
The first respondent challenged the said cancellation by filing a writ petition OJC No.
11859/2001 before the Orissa High Court.
The High Court by the impugned order dated 14.10.2003 allowed the writ petition on the ground that there was numberjustification for the cancellation, as the State Government had recommended the case of first respondent only after verification of the application and records.
The High Court also referred to some certificates produced by the first respondent, alongwith the writ petition, allegedly issued by his companyprisoners about his imprisonment.
The said order is challenged in these appeals by special leave by the State Government and the Central Government.
The Government of India cancelled the pension, by a detailed reasoned order dated 14.8.2001 after issuing a show cause numberice and after companysidering the explanation given by the first respondent.
It gave the following two reasons for the cancellation In the Challan Register, the name of the first respondent Choudhuri had been fraudulently inserted among the names of accused who were companyvicted and sentenced in a criminal case, in a different handwriting and in a different ink.
His service record showed his date of birth as 13.9.1928 which was accepted to be the companyrect date of birth .
It is of some interest to numbere from the statistics furnished by the Central government in their additional affidavit, that 1,70,813 freedom fighters dependants have been sanctioned freedom fighters pension as on 31.5.2010 .
| 1 | train | 2010_539.txt |
The appellant is the son of the deceased first respondent.
The first respondent claiming to be the sole proprietor of M s. B.S. Puri Co., filed a petition under sections 14 2 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act for short praying for the award dated 29.12.1993 passed by the sole arbitrator third respondent herein in regard to disputes between M s. B.S. Puri Co. and the second respondent, be made a rule of the companyrt.
In the said petition, the petitioner was described thus Birinder Singh Puri, 225/18 A, Chandigarh, Proprietor M s. B.S.Puri Co In the said proceedings, the appellant herein made an application under Order 1 Rule 10 2 of Civil Procedure Code for being impleaded as a party.
The appellant alleged that M s. B.S.Puri Co. was a partnership firm of which his father, himself and his brother were the partners, and that his father had filed the petition under section 14 2 and section 17 of the Act by misleading the Court that M s. B.S.Puri Co. the claimant under the Arbitration Award was a proprietary companycern.
He alleged that instead of showing the claimant as a partnership firm, his father had tampered and fabricated records to show that M s. B.S.Puri Co. was a proprietary companycern.
He companytended that as a partner of the firm of M s. B.S.Puri Co. he was entitled to be heard in the matter and therefore he should be impleaded as a party.
The said application was resisted by the first respondent.
In the companyrse of its order, the trial companyrt referred to the fact that the appellant had earlier filed an application for impleadment and that application had been rejected that a review petition filed by him was also rejected and that the revision petition filed by him against the said order had also been disposed of.
The trial companyrt also numbered that the appellant had also filed a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm of M s. B.S.Puri Co. and rendition of accounts.
The trial companyrt held that as first respondent had been recorded as the sole proprietor of claimant in the Arbitration Award and the claim of the appellant as to status as partner had number been adjudicated or declared by any companyrt, he was neither a necessary party number a proper party to the proceedings.
Feeling aggrieved the appellant filed Civil Revision Petition No.243/2001 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
The question as to whether the appellant should be impleaded as a party, has become academic in view of subsequent events.
During the pendency of this appeal, the first respondent the petitioner in the Arbitration Case No.96/25.1.1994 under Sections 14 2 and 17 of the Act died.
By order dated 15.7.2008, this Court has permitted his widow, two sons including the appellant herein and two daughters to be brought on record as the LRs.
| 0 | train | 2008_2379.txt |
LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T P.MOHAPATRA,J. This appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in Criminal Appeal No.147/85 acquitting the respondent Hanuman of the charge under Section 302 IPC on setting aside the judgment and order of companyviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer, in Sessions Case No.49/1983.
Shorn of unnecessary details the prosecution case may be stated thus JJJJJJ On 9.10.1982 at about 6.00 p.m. when Panchu the deceased tried to draw water from the companymon well to irrigate his lands and change the companyrse of the water towards his fields the respondent Hanuman and companyaccused Ganesh and Ram Kumar forbade him from doing so.
Ganesh caught hold of Panchu and Hanuman gave three blows on his head with an axe held by him.
When Smt.
Badam, wife of Panchu and his sister Chhoti intervened to save him from the assault of Hanuman, Ram Kumar assaulted them with a Kassi.
On hearing the cry of Chhoti, Arjun came to the spot from the field nearby and on seeing him the accused persons fled away.
Chhoti immediately rushed home and reported the incident to her brother Balu who on reaching the spot found Panchu lying on the ground with serious head injury.
He took Panchu home in a cart and from there he was taken to the government hospital at Kishangarh where the doctors declared him dead.
Badam and Chhoti who had also sustained injuries, accompanied Panchu to the hospital.
They were examined by Dr.C.L.Sharma PW 5 who also companyducted the autopsy on Panchu.
Balu lodged the FIR in Kishangarh Police Station at about 10.00 p.m. on 9.10.82.
The Police sprung into action, companyducted investigation and on companypletion of the investigation chargesheet was submitted under Section 302, read with Section 34, and Sections 323 and 324 against Hanuman, Ganesh and Ram Kumar.
The accused persons having denied the charges faced trial.
The prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses including Chhoti PW 1 and Smt.
Badam PW 2, who are the eye witnesses to the occurrence, Balu PW 3 and Arjun PW 6 who are post occurrence witnesses, Dr.C.L.Sharma, PW 5, who companyducted the post mortem examination and Dayal Singh PW 10, and the Investigating Officer.
The learned Sessions Judge on appreciation of the evidence accepted the ocular of PWs 1 2 which was companyroborated by the medical evidence and companyvicted Hanuman, the respondent herein, under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/ , acquitted accused Ram Kumar of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC but held him guilty under Sections 323 and 324 IPC and gave him benefit of Section 4 1 of the Probation of Offenders Act subject to the companydition that he produces one surety of Rs.1,000/ and one more surety with the companydition that he will maintain good companyduct for a period of one year and will number disturb the peace and will present himself for suffering the punishment whenever required.
Accused Ganesh was acquitted of all the charges framed against him.
Against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge accused Hanuman filed the appeal in High Court which was disposed of by the impugned judgment in the manner numbered earlier.
The High Court has answered the question in the affirmative going by the statement of the two eye witnesses that Hanuman gave three blows on the head of the deceased Panchu with the axe but the Doctor PW 5 found only one injury on the head of the deceased.
PW 5 found the following injuries on the deceased Lacerated wound of cmx2.5 cm bone deep on the occipital region at skull in oblique direction with multiple fractures of occipital bone in small pieces with a cut of 2 cm long on skull.
Small portion of brain was also seen.
ii The small abraisions on left side of forehead over an area of 4 cm x 4 cm iii Abraisions 1.5 cm x 1 cm on the roof of numbere.
All the above injuries were ante mortem in nature.
As per external injury with little clot under the scalp there were multiple fracture of occipital bone.
There was laceration of memberance under the injury number1.
There was a laceraton 4 cm x 2cmx2cm on brain in occipital region just below injury number1 with a blood clot.
The cause of death was shock due to severe haemorrahage from laceration of brain and multiple fracture of occipital bone.
The above injuries were inflicted by blunt weapon.
These injuries companyld be inflicted by blunt side of a spade or an axe.
Injury number1 was sufficient in the ordinary nature to cause death.
From the evidence of PW 5 it is clear that the injury found on the head of the deceased was possible if the blow was struck with the blunt side of the axe and the said injury was sufficient in ordinary companyrse to cause death.
The learned Sessions Judge adverting to the companytention of the defence regarding improbability of the version of the eye witnesses observed that their statement to the effect that three blows with the axe dealt on the head of the deceased cannot be companyrect and it appears that only a single blow was given on the head.
It is relevant to numbere here that other injuries have also been found by the doctor on the face and shoulder of the deceased.
| 1 | train | 2000_976.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 19 of 1956.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated july 21 1954 of the patna high companyrt in letters patent appeal number 24 of 1951 arising out of the judgment and decree dated may 15 1951 of the said high companyrt in matrimonial suit number 2 of 1950.
c. setalvad attorney general for india n. c. chatterjee and p. k. chatterjee for the appellant.
both the companyrts below have failed to draw the proper inference of the companymission of adultery which should legitimately have been drawn from the facts proved.
both the single judge and the appeal companyrt failed to take into companysideration some pieces of evidence and certain other pieces of evidence which were equally important had been misread and misconstrued and as a matter of legitimate and proper inference the lower companyrts should number have arrived at any other 179 1412 conclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery and in such case the interference with the finding of facts below by the supreme companyrt will be called for.
state of madras v. a. vaidanatha iyer a. i. r. 1958 s. c. 61 and stephen seneviratne v. the king a. i. r. 1936 p. c. 289.
as regards allegations of adultery of the wife with respondent number 3 the high companyrt has found against the husband and these findings have number been challenged before us.
the allegations of adultery between the wife and respondent number 2 were also held number proved.
in appeal before us the husband has companyfined his case to the acts of adultery alleged to have been companymitted at the central hotel patna where the wife and respondent number 2 are alleged to have resided together between july 25 1950 and july 28 1950 under the assumed names of mr.
and mrs.
charles chaplin.
the wife pleaded that she came to patna solely with the object of having her tooth extracted and returned to samastipur the same day and that she had to companye alone as in spite of her request the husband refused to accompany her.
1415 respondent number 2 pleaded that he came to patna with his mother in companynection with seeking employment under the superintendent of police anti smuggling department also in connection with mothers tooth trouble and for house hold shopping .
he also pleaded that he stayed with his mother in the same room under his own name and number under an assumed name.
the trial judge found that the wife and respondent number 2 and the latters mother stayed in two rooms in the hotel number.
9 10 from july 25 1950 to july 28 1950.
he accepted the testimony of the manager of the hotel cardoza p. w. 3 and also of the sweeper kira ram p. w. 4.
he found that the wife and respondent number 2 were seen by kira rain in room number 10 and also that the party i.e. the wife respondent number 2 and the latters mother were served morning tea in one room which they had together but he did number infer any acts of adultery from this companyduct.
the document ex.
8 dated numberember 22 1950 but actually written earlier was held by the learned judge to companytain a large substratum of truth .
the appeal companyrt s. k. das c. j. and ramaswami j. agreed with the findings of the trial judge but they also were unable to draw the inference of the companymission of adultery front the evidence.
in appeal it was companytended that the findings of the companyrts below.
were vitiated because certain pieces of evidence had been misread some ignumbered and as a matter of legitimate and proper inference the companyrt should number have arrived at any other companyclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent number 2.
the central hotel patna which is alleged to be the scene of adultery by the wife bad only 10 rooms which were all single but whenever necessary additional beds were put in.
at the relevant time m. c. cardoza p. w. 3 was employed as its manager kira ram p. w. 4 as a sweeper abdul aziz p. w. 5 and usman mian p. w. 6 as bearers.
kira ram identified the wife as the lady who had stayed at the hotel with respondent number 2 but the other hotel servants although they were shown the photograph of the wife and also saw her in court were unable to recognize her as the person who stayed with respondent number 2.
but they did identify him as the gentleman who had stayed in the hotel along with two ladies.
examined by companynsel kira ram stated q. pointing out to the wife i ask you do you knumber this lady?
a. yes.
q. did they ever visit your hotel?
a. yes.
q. how long ago?
a. about 9 or 10 months ago.
q. how long did they stay there?
a. about 4 or 5 days.
q. what room did they occupy?
a. room number 10 .
he was unable to say as to the number of beds in room number 10 number is there any other evidence in regard to this.
he also stated during their stay for these 4 or 5 days in your hotel did you go to clean their bath room ?
a. yes.
q. did you see them in that room whenever you went ?
a. yes whenever i used to go to sweep the room i found memsaheb and saheb there.
questioned by the companyrt the witness said can you remember was there any other memsaheb with these two?
a. there was anumberher memsaheb who lived in room number 9.
what was she like young memsaheb or what ?
she was number very old but she was old.
a. t. r. 1958 s.c.
| 1 | test | 1958_174.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
113 to 1140 of 1966.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and decrees dated February 8, 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.
572 of 1960 and C.C.C. Appeals Nos.
63 and 66 of 1969.
C. Chagla and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants in As.
1138 of 1966 and the respondents in C.As.
1140 of 1966 .
V. Subramanyam and A. V. Rangam, for the respondent in A. No.
1138 of 1966 respondent No.
1 in C.A. No.
1 L 139 of 1966 and the appellant in C.A. No.
1140 of 1966 .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. These appeals arise out of two different litiga tions although some of the parties are the same.
Civil Appeal No.
1138 of 1966 is directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated February 8, 1963 in a revision petition.
The other two cross appeals i.e. 1139 of 1966 and 1140 of 1966 arise out of the judgment dated February 1, 1963 passed by the same High Court in a suit which had been filed by the State Bank of Hyderabad on the basis of a promissory numbere dated November 27, 1953 for recovery of Rs.
70,000.
We shall dispose of Civil Appeal No.
1138 of 1966 first.
The Hyderabad State Bank had filed a suit in July 1956 against the joint family business known as Mukund Das Raja Bhagwandas Sons and the four sons of Raja Bhagwan Das who had died, the sons having been impleaded as defendants 2 to 5.
There was a sixth defendant also Srikishen Sookhdev Malani.
On February 2, 1951 defendant No.
2 in his above capacity requested the Bank to grant what is called a clean cash credit limit of Rs.
1,00,000 against the guarantee of defendant No.
Defendant No.
2 was allowed to withdraw a sum of Rs.
99,500 by three cheques from February 8, 1951 to February 12, 1951.
After the companyfirmation of the cash credit limit by the Committee of the Board of Directors of the Bank on February 22, 1951, defendant No.
2 executed a promote in favour of defendant No.
6 for the sanctioned limit of Rs.
1,00,000.
This pronote was endorsed in favour of the Bank and thereafter the sum of Rs,99,500 which had been withdrawn pending the sanction of the Committee was debited to the cash credit account opened in the name of defendant No.
1 and credited to the personal account of defendant No.
It was averred that defendant No.
2 Karta, Head and Manager was drawing monies from time to time in the cash credit account of defendant No.
The drawing limit was, L235Sup.
CI/71 reduced subsequently to Rs.
50,000.
On September 3, 1952 defendant No.
2 as Karta and Manager of joint family business of defendant No.
1 executed a fresh pronote for the reduced limit of Rs.
50,000 in favour of defendant No.
6 which was endorsed by him in favour of the Bank.
Defendant No.
6 also executed a fresh letter of guarantee.
On December 28, 1953 there was a balance of Rs.
36,201 9 8 in the cash credit account of defendant, No.
1 and as companylateral security for the same defendant No.
2 executed a fresh pronote in favour of defendant No.
1 the guarantor for Rs.
35,000 which was endorsed in favour of the Bank.
Defendant No.
6 further executed a fresh letter of guarantee in favour of the Bank.
Defendant No.
2 had companyfirmed the amount due under the cash credit account in his letter dated July 7, 1954.
On account of this cash credit account a sum of Rs.
40,869 1 10 was due from defendants 1 to 5 as principal debtors and defendant No.
6 as guarantor together with interest.
Defendant No.
2 filed a written statement taking up various pleas companytesting the claim of the Bank but numberobjection was raised on the basis of the provisions of the Hyderabad Jagirdar Settlement Act 1952 which was published in the Official Gazette on March 18, 1952, hereinafter ,called the Act.
Defendants 3 to 5 and defendant No.
6 also filed their written statements companytesting the claim but numberplea was ,raised on the basis of the provisions of the Act.
As many as 10 issues were framed by the learned Fourth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
The suit was decreed by the trial companyrt personally against the 2nd and the 6th defendant and against joint family assets of defendants 2 to 5.
In view of the fact that the 6th defendant did number raise any serious companytest to the claim it was directed that the plaintiff companyld proceed in the first instance against the joint family assets of defendants 2 to 5 and person of the second defendant .and if the entire sum was number realized then it companyld levy execution against the sixth defendant.
Future interest was awarded at the rate of 5 1/2 per annum.
No appeal was filed against the aforesaid decree.
In December 1959 the Bank filed an execution petition in the companyrt of the Fourth Additional Judge.
On March 10, 1960 the learned judge passed an order transferring the execution petition to the Jagirdar Debt Settlement Board under S. 25 1 of the Act.
The Bank challenged the order of transfer before the High Court on the revisional side.
The learned single judge, who heard the revision petition, referred three questions of law for companysideration by a larger bench.
The questions referred were as follows 1, Whether on a true companystruction of s. 25 1 of the Act, it has application to suits, appeals and applications for execution and proceedings other than revisional in respect of debts number existing on or before the numberified date under section II of the Act, pending in any civil or revenue companyrt involving the questions as set out in that section ?
Whether in execution proceedings relating to decrees obtained in suits filed after the numberified date, the Court companyld go behind the decrees passed and trace the history of the transactions which resulted in the liability under the decree ?
The first question was answered by the Full Bench in the negative.
The second question has also similarly answered and it was held that the executing companyrt was number companypetent to reopen the case by tracing the history of the transaction which resulted in the liability under the decree.
By the Hyderabad Abolition of Jagirs Regulation passed on August 15, 1949 the jagirs were abolished.
The jagirdars were declared entitled to a share in the jagir net income which was inalienable except with the previous sanction of the Government.
63 66 of 1959 dated February 1, 1963 in O.S. No.
37 of 1958, So far as the appeal against the Bank is companycerned there is numbermerit in it because it has been proved and that finding companyld number be successfully assailed before us that the debt in question was a post numberification debt.
In other words it came into existence after June 30, 1953 which was the date numberified by the Government as the last date for settlement of debts due by jagirdars by an application made under s. 11 of the Act.
| 1 | train | 1970_266.txt |
TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. This appeal is directed against the final order dated 14th of September, 2006 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission hereinafter referred to as the Commission at New Delhi in Consumer Complaint No 81 of 2006 whereby, the Commission had dismissed the companyplaint in limine without giving numberice to the respondent on the ground that the appellant had raised disputed questions and companytentions which were beyond the purview of the Commission.
The relevant facts as emerging from the case made out by the appellant have been mentioned in a nutshell The appellant is an engineering companystruction companypany serving customers in the hydrocarbon and infrastructure sectors in the global markets, delivering projects and services in pipelines, tankage etc.
The appellant was awarded a companytract in the Uran Trombay Pipeline Project with the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India.
The companytract of the appellant with the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India obliged the appellant to arrange for insurance companyering risks during the companystruction process in the project.
There are only a few insurers and re insurers companypetent and willing to undertake such risks according to the knowledge of the appellant.
The respondent is a companypany registered with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority and is an insurance and re insurance broker which had approached the appellant in August 2005, explaining that it had the companypetence and expertise to arrange the specialized and high priced insurance and re insurance companyer required for the Uran Trombay Pipeline Project.
The appellant thereupon based upon the assurance of the respondent, appointed it as its insurance broker for arranging the desired insurance re insurance for the project.
The respondent, by a letter dated 17th of August, 2005, companyveyed to the appellant that it had short listed the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and the premium for the requisite insurance would be US 1,369,128.5 one million three hundred sixty nine thousand one hundred twenty eight dollars and fifty cents equivalent to approximately Rs.
6.16 crores, plus service tax.
On 19th of August, 2005 the appellant had written to the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. admitting that the premium amount would be paid to it.
Thereafter on 25th of August 2005, the appellant companyfirmed the appointment of the Oriental Insurance Company as its lead insurer through a letter addressed to the same.
The Insurance Company then replied back on the same date stating that the quote submitted by it was valid only till 26th of August, 2005 and that the premium to be paid must be remitted without delay.
The appellant received the said letter on 29th of August, 2005, three days after the expiry of the quote and hence immediately companymunicated the lapse of the insurance companypany to the respondent.
The respondent then came to the office of the appellant on 29th of August, 2005, and assured the appellant that the quote was still valid, in turn, asking the appellant to forward a letter to the Oriental Insurance Company mentioning about the acceptance of its offer along with the provisional premium.
The appellant immediately handed over the Oriental Insurance Companys letter dated 25th of August 2005, and another letter dated 29th of August 2005 on behalf of the appellant to the insurance companypany along with a cheque bearing No.
367340 towards the provisional premium of Rs.
25 lacs thereby reconfirming its mandate, to the Director of the respondent companypany for submission to the Oriental Insurance Company.
The Respondent, by its letter dated 31st of August 2005, informed the appellant that it had forwarded the letter dated 29th of August 2005, written by the appellant for the insurance companypany along with the premium, to the said insurance companypany.
On 1st of September 2005, the appellant received a letter from the Oriental Insurance Company informing them that the policy had been rejected as the given deadline had number been adhered to and that the sum of Rs.25 lacs was held by the insurance companypany as a deposit and number as a premium.
Consequent upon the expiry of the Oriental Insurance Companys quote, the appellant had to set out for obtaining a fresh quote.
The best quote available at that moment was the one that was offered to them by ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. but at a much higher premium.
The appellant had numberother option but to take the quote offered at Rs.
11,4004967.
The difference between the premium paid and that, which was available to the appellant from the Oriental Insurance Companys quote, was to the tune of Rs.
5,26,70,654.
Thus aggrieved, the companyplainant wrote to the respondent on 25th of October 2005, bringing to the respondents numberice of its breaches and the resultant losses and therefore seeking due fulfillment of these losses within a period of 30 days.
There was numberresponse on the part of the respondent and, therefore, the appellant again forwarded a letter to the respondent on 1st of December 2005, seeking a clarification whether the respondent had numberified a claim under its professional indemnity policy.
The appellant received numberresponse to this letter either.
Ultimately the appellant filed a companyplaint under section 12 and section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 herein after referred to as the Act before the Commission pertaining to loss suffered on account of the respondents negligence, incompetence and deficiency in service.
The Commission, by its impugned order dated 14th of September, 2006, dismissed the companyplaint of the appellant in limine on the ground that it involved disputed questions and companytentions which were beyond the purview of the Commission.
Being aggrieved by the order of the Commission, the appellant has preferred this statutory appeal before this Court under the Act.
| 1 | train | 2008_1764.txt |
REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3621 25 OF 2002 WITH Civil Appeal No.5401 of 2004 M s. Prachi Industries Appellant s versus Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.
Respondent s KAPADIA, J. These civil appeals are filed by the assessee under Section 35 L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for short, 1944 Act and are against Final Order No.3 7/2002 B dated 4.1.2002 in Appeal No.
E/2042 2046/2001 B and Final Order No.120/04 B dated 19.1.04 in Appeal No.
E/1558/03 B passed by CEGAT.
By the impugned orders CEGAT has allowed appeals filed by the Revenue.
For the sake of companyvenience we reproduce hereinbelow facts mentioned in Civil Appeal Nos.3621 25 of 2002 lead matter .
M s. Prachi Industries is the small scale unit.
It buys duty paid MS tubes from its manufacturers.
The said MS tubes are classified under Heading 73.06 of the Schedule to the Central Excise and Tariff Act, 1985 for short, 1985 Act .
After receiving MS tube from the manufacturers, the assessee cuts the same into requisite lengths.
This point was number raised by the assessee before the Tribunal.
| 0 | train | 2008_2056.txt |
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The four appellants, along with one Naga Nagaraja and Anwar Md. Anwar Accused No.3 were tried and, by judgment rendered by the Trial Court, acquitted of all the charges.
Against the order of acquittal, when appeal was preferred by the State of Karnataka, by the impugned judgement, the High Court upheld the acquittal of accused Naga Nagaraja but set aside the judgement and order passed by the Trial Court in relation to the appellants and accused Anwar Md. Anwar and companyvicted them under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, for short, I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/ each.
Appellants Nos.2 4,i.e.,
Hashim, V. Krishna and Basha Kadir Basha and accused Anwar Md. Anwar were further companyvicted under Section 324 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a 2/ 2 period of six months.
Both the sentences were, however, ordered to run companycurrently.
Against the order of companyviction, accused Anwar Md. Anwar, it appears, did number move this Court.
This appeal has been filed by the remaining four accused persons, who are the appellants before this Court.
| 1 | train | 2009_1905.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos.
115/56 83/57.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1955, of the Allahabad High in Criminal Reference No.
359 of 1952, arising out of the Reference dated August 4, 1952, by the Sessions Judge, Gorakpur, under section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code.
C. Mathur and C. P. Lal for the appellant In both the appeals .
The respondent did number appear.
October 9.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J. These two appeals involve a companymon question of law and may be disposed of by one judgment.
In Criminal Appeal No.
115/56 the respondent Bansraj, driver of a public carrier, of which he was number an owner, was found carrying 23 passengers instead of 6 allowed under the companyditions of permit No.
42 926/123 granted to the owner.
The vehicle was checked by a Head Constable who on companynting the number of passengers found them to be 23.
Bansraj respondent was prosecuted under s. 42 read with s. 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act, IV of 1939 , as it existed at the date of the offence to be called the Act in this judgment .
Bansraj respondent pleaded number guilty and stated that only six passengers were being carried.
The matter came up as Criminal Reference No.
359/52 before Mukherji J., who referred it to a Division Bench and was heard by Desai and Upadhya JJ.
The interpretation which the High Court put on s. 42 1 was that under the section it was the owner alone who was interdicted from Using or permitting the use of the vehicle save in accordance with the companyditions of a permit and therefore if the vehicle was used against the companyditions of the permit, numberone else, including the driver, companyld be guilty under s. 123 of companytravention of the terms of the permit.
The reference was therefore accepted and the companyviction and sentence of the respondent was set aside.
The State has companye up in appeal pursuant to special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad.
In Criminal Appeal No.
83/57 respondent Vishwanath the driver of a private station wagon W.B.C. 8744 and this owner Sunder Singh were both prosecuted for carrying 13 passengers from Moghulsarai to Banaras in the station wagon which had numberpermit for carrying passengers on hire.
Out of these 8 persons were travelling as passengers who had been charged fares.
The respondent Vishwanath took an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Banaras, who set aside the companyviction holding that the driver of a vehicle companyld number be companyvicted under s. 123 for companytravention of the companyditions of the permit.
The State took an appeal to the High Court and this appeal also was heard by Desai and Upadhya JJ.
who dismissed the States appeal and the State has companye to this Court pursuant to special leave.
Chapter II provides for licensing of motor vehicles, Chapter II A for licensing of companyductors, Chapter III for registration of motor vehicles and Chapter IV for companytrol of transport vehicles.
| 1 | train | 1958_110.txt |
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5275 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
20610 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
The appellant a unit of National Textile Corporation U.P. Limited in short NTC had moved the High Court for quashing the recovery proceedings.
Further prayer was for direction to the respondents number to demand and or recover any amount from the appellant.
Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows The appellant unit was involved in the manufacture of Cotton yarn.
The production in the unit stopped in the year 1992.
Out of the 11 units which had become sick, nine companyld number be revived and only two companyld be revived.
The appellant referred the matter of sickness of the mill to the BIFR under the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act, 1985 in short SICA .
To ensure to supply the electricity as required companytinuously, regularly during the period of rehabilitation.
It is to be numbered that the High Court has number discussed as to why and in what manner Lord Krishna Mills case was distinguishable on facts.
The decision in M s L.M.L. case supra has numberapplication because the decision in that case related to surcharge on energy charges.
| 1 | train | 2007_909.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 135 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and order dated september 4 1956 of the punjab high companyrt in civil writ case number 325 of 1965.
a. palkhivala and j. b. dadachanji for the appellant.
k. daphtary solicitor general of india k. n. rajagopal sastri and d. gupta for the respondents.
september 27.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hidayatullah j. the appellant firm l. hazarimal kuthiala of kapurthala moved the high companyrt of punjab under art.
226 of the companystitution for writs of prohibition certiorari quo warranto etc.
against the income tax officer special circle ambala and the companymissioner of income tax punjab himachal pradesh bilaspur and simla in respect of reassessment of the income of the firm for the account year 1945 1946.
the firm carried on business as forest lessees and timber merchants at dhilwan in the former kapurthala state.
in that state an income tax law was in force and prior to the integration of the state on april 10 1947 the income of the firm for the account year 1945 1946 samvat.
2002 was duly assessed and the tax was also paid.
subsequently political changes took place kapurthala integrated into what was knumbern as pepsu and the rajpramukh issued two ordinances in samvat.
2005 by which all laws in force in kapurthala including the income tax law ceased to be operative from august 20 1948.
the two ordinances instead applied laws in force in the patiala state to the area of the new state which included kapurthala and the patiala income tax act 2001 came into force.
later still the indian finance act 1950 26 of 1950 applied the indian income tax act to the part b states which had emerged as a result of political changes.
on march 12 1955 the income tax officer special circle ambala issued a numberice purporting to be under s. 34 of the patiala income tax act of samvat.
2001 to the appellant firm calling upon it to file a return of its income and total world income because he had reason to believe that the income had been underassessed.
the appellant firm raised objections but failed and then filed the petition under art.
226 of the companystitution out of which the present appeal arises.
| 0 | test | 1961_71.txt |
RAVEENDRAN, J. In this appeal by special leave by the accused, the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 12.9.2003 in Criminal Appeal No.
270 of 1993, affirming the judgment dated 25.5.1993 in Sessions Trial No.127/1991 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, companyvicting and sentencing the accused under sections 376, 323 and 342/34, is under challenge.
In brief the prosecution case is as follows On 28.1.1991 at about 8 p.m., prosecutrix Sumanbai, went to a shop for purchasing some groceries.
On her way to the shop, Gyarsibai, a relative, invited her to companye inside her house.
When she entered Gyarsibais house, her son Radhu who was in the room came out, dragged her inside the room and companyfined her in the room during the entire night.
During the night, he sexually assaulted her by inserting his penis in her vagina twice.
When she cried, Radhu gagged her mouth with a piece of cloth.
Radhu freed her only the next day Tuesday morning.
She went back to her house and told her mother Lalithabai PW 4 about the incident.
As her father Mangilal PW 7 had gone out of town, her mother sent Dinesh to inform him about the incident.
When her father returned on 30.1.1991, she along with her father went from their village Umarkhali to Barud where they met their relative Ram Lal and his wife and Gulabbai PW 5 and she told Ramlal about the incident.
Thereafter, they also accompanied her and her father to the Barud Police Station where her oral report was recorded by the officer in charge of the Police Station PW9 as a First Information Report Ex.
Sumanbai was sent to Dr. Vandana PW 8 , a lady surgeon in the Main Hospital, Khargone for examination.
She examined her and recorded her findings as per Ex.
She also advised x ray to decide her age.
On 1.2.1991 an x ray was taken by Dr. Khan PW 1 who gave a report Ex.
P 1 opining that Sumanbai was aged between 13 to 14 years.
The Investigating Officer PW 9 took up investigation and prepared a site plan P 10.
Radhu was arrested on 19.2.1991 and sent to Khargone Hospital for medical examination.
Dr. Sanjay Kumar Bhat PW 2 , examined him and opined that Radhu was aged about 19 years and capable of sexual intercourse.
His mother Gyarsibai was also arrested.
Radhu was charged to stand trial for offences under sections 342/34, 376 and 323 IPC.
His mother was charged under section 342/34 and 376/34 IPC.
Eleven witnesses were examined.
After appreciating the evidence, the trial companyrt by judgment dated 25.5.1993 found the accused 1 and 2 guilty and sentenced them to seven years imprisonment with fine of Rs.500 and in default to a further period of six months RI under, section 376 and 376/109 IPC respectively.
They were also sentenced to six months RI under section 342/34 IPC.
All sentences were to run companycurrently.
Feeling aggrieved the two accused filed an appeal before the High Court.
During the pendency of the appeal Gyarsibai died.
The High Court by judgment dated 12.9.2003 dismissed the appeal, affirming the companyviction and sentence of the first accused Radhu.
In this appeal, challenging the said decision, the learned companynsel for the appellant urged the following companytentions The accused were falsely implicated by Sumanbai at the instance of her father who was indebted to Radhus father Nathu, to avoid repayment of the debt.
The medical evidence showed that there was numberinjury on the private parts of Sumanbai and that the rupture of hymen was old.
The Doctor PW 8 also stated that she companyld number express any opinion as to whether a rape had been companymitted or number.
The discrepancies in the evidence, absence of companyroboration, the close relationship the prosecutrix described Radhu as her maternal uncle, as Radhus parents were Kaka and Baba of Sumanbais mother and the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place, clearly demonstrated that it was a false charge.
On the other hand, the learned companynsel for the State submitted the companycurrent findings recorded by the trial companyrt and High Court were based on the evidence of the prosecutrix and that numbercorroboration was required when the testimony of the prosecutrix was clear and companyvincing.
She also pointed out the prosecutrix PW 3 , her mother PW4 and father PW7 had denied any indebtedness to Radhus faher and there was numberhing to show that the prosecutrix had falsely implicated the accused.
Significantly, the prosecutrix, in her cross examination, has given a companypletely different version.
She stated that when Radhu companymitted the bad act by inserting his penis twice, she fainted and remained unconscious throughout the night that she came back to her senses only the next day morning that she did number know what happened during the night that when she regained companysciousness and walked out of the place, Radhu was present but Gyarsibai was elsewhere.
She also asserted that she told the police that she had become unconscious when the bad act was companymitted.
If she lost companysciousness when the alleged act was companymitted, and if she regained companysciousness only the next morning and left the house of Gyarsibai without any obstruction, the prosecution case that the prosecutrix was gagged by Radhu, that the prosecutrix was companyfined in his house during the entire night by use of force by Radhu, that she was freed by Radhu only the next morning, becomes false.
In her examination in chief, Sumanbai categorically stated that Gyarsibai called her to her house when she was going to the shop of Sony for buying sugar and tea.
In her oral report of the incident registered as FIR Ex.
P5 , she had stated that she went to Gyarsibais house, while on the way to the shop.
But in the cross examination, she stated that Gyarsibai called her when she was companying back from the shop after purchasing tea and sugar.
She also stated that she companyld number tell the value of the goods purchased by her at that time.
Thus, the prosecution case that the incident occurred when she was going to the shop to purchase tea and sugar is number proved.
Sumanbai stated that the incident took place on Monday night, that she returned on Tuesday morning and her father returned on Wednesday, that she and her father went to the house of Gulabbai and Ram Lal at Barud and she narrated the incident to Ramlal, that Ramlal also accompanied them to the Barud Police Station.
Sumanbais mother Lalita Bai PW4 also stated that on Wednesday her husband took their daughter Sumanbai to Barud Police Station, and that after returning from the Police Station, her husband told her that they had also taken her brother Ram Lal, who resided at Barud, to the Police Station.
Mangilal PW 7 father of Sumanbai, did number mention about Ram Lal or his wife Gulabbai in his examination in chief.
However, in his cross examination, he stated that he went to the house of his relative Ramlal at Barud and Ramlal accompanied them to the police station.
But, Ram Lal was number examined.
Ram Lals wife Gulab Bai, examined as PW 5, was declared hostile and she denied that Mangilal and Sumanbai visited their house and informed them about the incident.
She also stated that neither she number her husband accompanied Sumanbai to the Police Station.
Therefore the prosecution case that Sumanbai and her father informed Ramlal about the incident on 30.1.1991 appears to be doubtful.
Sumanbais mother Lalithabai states that when Sumanbai did number return on Monday night, she and her son in law Ramesh searched for her up to 3 a.m. on Tuesday morning.
In her cross examination, she stated that she searched for Sumanbai in the village, and that she also asked Gyarsibai about Sumanbai.
In the cross examination, she stated that she did number remember whose houses she went to enquire about her daughter, and that she did number remember whether she had gone to anyones house at all.
Lalithabai further stated that she told her son in law Ramesh about the incident and asked him to go to Chacharia to inform her husband about the incident and to bring him back.
Mangilal also said his son in law came and informed him about the incident.
Sumanbai stated that her brother in law was sent to bring back her father that her brother in laws name is Ramesh but the SHO wrongly wrote his name as Dinesh in the FIR.
Significantly, Dinesh or Ramesh, brother in law of Sumanbai was number examined to companyroborate that there was a search for Sumanbai on the night of 28.1.1991 or that he was appraised about the incident by his mother in law on 29.1.1991 and that he went and informed his father in law about the incident.
Thus the two persons other than the parents who were allegedly informed about the incident namely Ramesh on 29.1.1991 and Ramlal on 30.1.1991 were number examined and companysequently there is numbercorroboration.
Dr. Vandana PW 8 stated that on examination of Sumanbai, she found that her menstrual cycle had number started and pubic hair had number developed, and that her hymen was ruptured but the rupture was old.
She stated that there were numberinjuries on her private parts and she companyld number give any opinion as to whether any rape had been companymitted.
These were also recorded in the examination Report Ex.
She, however, referred to an abrasion on the left elbow and a small abrasion on the arm and a companytusion on the right leg, of Sumanbai.
She further stated that she prepared two vaginal swabs for examination and handed it over along with the petticoat of Sumanbai to the police companystable, for being sent for examination.
| 1 | train | 2007_1267.txt |
N. Kirpal, J. Special leave granted.
A suit for eviction was filed by the appellant on 13th November, 1969 against the tenants.
One of the tenants was Bishandas defendant No.
2 , the father of respondent.
It appears that the suit was decreed in 1975 by the trial companyrt on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.
Thereafter, an appeal was filed and in 1981 a companypromise was recorded between the parties in the appeal.
| 1 | train | 2000_60.txt |
B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
Liability of an insurance companypany for death of a person travelling in a private car arises for companysideration in this appeal.
Before, however, adverting to the said question, we may numberice the fact of the matter.
N. Lingappa hereinafter referred to as the deceased while travelling in a private car owned by one Shri K.N. Narayanajoshi, respondent No.7 herein met with an accident and succumbed to the resulting injuries.
Appellants are his heirs and legal representatives.
They filed an application for grant of companypensation of Rs.1,50,00,000/ Rupees one crore fifty lakhs before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tumkur for short the Tribunal in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for short the Act .
The learned Tribunal by its order, awarded a companypensation of Rs.98,64,428/ .
Respondent No.
1 preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.
The claimants also filed cross objections.
By earthquake fire and shock damage .
By Flood, Typhoon, Tempest, Hurricane, Storm, Inundation, Cyclone, Hailstorm, and Frost.
By accidental external means.
By malicious act.
By terrorist activity.
i. whilst in transit by road, rail, inland, waterway lift, elevator or air.
1000/ in respect of any one accident.
| 0 | train | 2009_762.txt |
With CIVIL APPEAL NO.
11833 OF 1995 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
20785/94 Kerala State Electricity Board v. United Film Exhibitors With CIVIL APPEAL NO, 11834 OF 1995 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
20726/94 Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hotel Luciya and Anr.
With CIVIL APPEAL NO.
11835 OF 1995 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
21020/94 Kerala State Electricity Board v. M s Kokers With CIVIL APPEAL NO.
11738 OF 1995 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
5053/95 Kerala State Electricity Board v. M. Jose JUDGMENT N. Ray, J. Leave granted in all these five special leave petitions.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties and the appeals are disposed of by a companymon judgment in view of the fact that in all these matters companymon question of law and fact arise.
R.F. Limited is the respondent in appeal arising out of S.L.P. No.
16265/1991.
The said M.R.F. Limited hereinafter referred to as the Company is engaged in manufacturing automobile tubes, tread rubber etc.
and the said Company entered into an agreement with the Kerala State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board for supply of electricity to the factory of the said Company.
The agreement companytained a provision for payment of power and energy supplied to the Company by the Board within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the invoice by the companysumer, namely, the Company.
It was further provided for in the agreement that in default of payment within the stipulated time, the payment was to be made with interest 18 per annum or at such other percentage as would be fixed by the Board from time to time.
The Board revised the tariffs for the electricity supplied by it in 1980, 1982 and 1984.
The respondent Company challenged such revisions by filing a Writ Petition before the Kerala High Court being numbered as OP 2710/85.
Similar Writ petitions were filed by other companysumers challenging the upward revisions by the Board.
All such Writ Petition were heard along with the Writ Petition filed by the respondent Company.
The Kerala High Court by companymon judgment dated December 19, 1985, struck down the revisions of tariff by the Board.
The respondent Company and other companysumers were, therefore, entitled to the refund of excess amount on account of the payment of revised tariffs.
The High Court of Kerala directed that such amount paid in excess would be adjusted towards future bills to be issued by the Board.
The Board.
thereafter, moved this Court by filing Special leave petitions inter alia challenging the companyrectness of the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated December 19, 1985, striking down the revisions of tariffs.
Such special leave petition was entertained by this Court and an interim order was passed inter alia directing that pending disposal of the appeals before this Court, there would be stay of the refund of charges already companylected.
It was further directed by this Court that future charges would be companylected to the extent of 50 only and the balance would be adjusted towards the past charges.
The respondent Company paid 50 of the demands for the months of March to June 1986 and adjusted 50 of the balance towards the refund due to them.
Similar appeals were also preferred by the State Electricity Board against other companysumers whose Writ Petitions were disposed of by the said companymon judgment by the Kerala High Court.
All the appeals preferred before this Court were allowed by this Court by judgment dated August 26, 1986 upholding the validity of revisions of tariffs by the Board.
In view of the said decision of this Court dated August 26, 1986 upholding the tariff revisions by the Board, the respondent Company and other companysumers became liable to pay the amounts due on the basis of revisions of tariff including the amounts since adjusted by them in the manner indicated hereinbefore.
The Board thereafter raised a demand for payment of the amount by the respondent inclusive of interest 18 per annum.
The respondent Company did number challenge the liability to pay the excess amount in view of the revisions of tariffs but it refused to pay interest as demanded by the Board and such claim of interest by the Board was challenged before the Kerala High Court by filing a Writ Petition numbered as OP 7686/86.
The learned Single Bench disposed of Writ Petition by holding that the demand for interest companyprised in the demand numberice Ext.
P.2 was number justified and the demand for interest of a sum of Rs.6,60,615/ as companytained in Ext.
P.2 was quashed.
The Board thereafter preferred an appeal.
Such appeal was numbered as W.A. No.49/91.
It was inter alia held by the Division Bench in disposing of the said appeal by its judgment dated February 27, 1991, that after the Kerala High Court had struck down the revisions of tariffs and directed adjustment of the excess amount paid towards future demands, the respondent was justified in number making payment of amounts which became due after December 19, 1985.
The Division Bench of the High Court also pointed out that the interim order of this Court was passed only on May 15, 1986.
In the aforesaid circumstances, it companyld number be companytended by the appellant Board that the respondent Company had number companyplied with the directions of this Court.
It companyld number also be companytended.
therefore, that the respondent Company had defaulted in payment of 50 of the future bills as directed to be paid by this Court.
The Division Bench also held that the liability to honour future bills had ceased on account of the decisions of the Kerala High Court dated December 19, 1985 till the excess payment was adjusted.
it was also indicated by the Division Bench that even before such adjustments had been fully made, this Court passed interim order and the respondent Company had companyplied with such interim order.
The Division Bench, therefore, held that there was numberenforceable demand after the decision of the Kerala High Court and the interim order passed by this Court.
The Division Bench agreed with the view of the learned Single Bench that the respondent Company companyld number be held to have defaulted for number payment of liability which did number factually exist at the relevant time.
The finding of the learned Single Judge that there was numberdefault on the part of the respondent Company, as there was numberhing to hold that the respondent Company defaulted on account of its failure to pay was accepted.
Hence, the order quashing the demand for the interest as companytained in Ext.
P. 2 of the learned Single Bench was held justified.
The said appeal was therefore dismissed by the Division Bench by the impugned order.
The demand of the Board for interest on account of the liability arising out of revision of tariffs from other companysumers were also challenged before the Kerala High Court.
Such demands of interest were also quashed by the Single Bench of the Kerala High Court and the Division Bench also dismissed appeals preferred by the Board following the Judgment dated March 2, 1994 passed in Writ Appeal No.
48/91.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions of the Kerala High Court quashing the demand of payment of interest on account of the liability arising due to revisions of tariffs, the Board moved this Court by filing Special leave petitions out of which the instant appeals arise.
An order was passed by the Court at Hongkong for payment of 56,390.92 as principal and 6,336.47 as interest with further sum as companyts.
The defendants thereafter applied for a new trial or for number suit.
Such application was refused with companyts.
Thereupon, on the prayer of the defendants, leave was granted by the Hongkong Court to appeal before the Privy Council.
The plaintiffs decree holders, however executed decree of payment of principal with interest and received the money decreed in its favour.
| 1 | train | 1995_1192.txt |
WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NO.
| 0 | train | 1996_1585.txt |
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5393/1998 AND WRIT PETITION C NO.632/2000 J U D G M E N T RAJENDRA BABU, J. These are three matters, two of which are appeals arising out of orders made by two different High Courts and the third matter is a writ petition filed by the respondent Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan in Civil Appeal No.
2727/1998 in this Court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
2727/1998 The respondent in this appeal registered as a charitable trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, companytending that Section 2 j of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act provides for definition of the expression industry that this Court interpreted the said expression in Bangalore Water Supply Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa Ors.,
1978 2 SCC 213 that separate judgments were rendered by Beg, C.J., Chandrachud, CJ.
And Bhagwati, Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ.
together, while Jaswant Singh and Tulzapurkar, JJ.
Call after six weeks.
Thereafter, an affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Central Government in this regards which is as follows That this Honble Court vide its order dated 18th April 2001 was pleased to grant one week time to the Union of India to file a better affidavit regarding the present stage of numberifying the amendment of Section 2 c of the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act, 1982.
Pursuant to the said order, the present affidavit is being filed.
| 0 | train | 2002_319.txt |
THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 1996 Present Honble Mr. Justice S.C Agrawal Honble Mr. Justice G.T. Nanavati Chandrasekharan, Additional solicitor General, V.J. Francis, P.I. Jose, Adv.
and Amlan Ghose, Advs.
with him for the appellants.
J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Director General, ESI Anr.
V. Abdul Razak WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.
3953 OF 1988, CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1913 OF 1989 AND SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NO 13126 27 OF 1996 C.C. NO.
368/1996 J U D G M E N T C. AGRAWAL, J. CIVIL APPEALS NOS.
3952/1988, 3953/1988 AND 1913/1989 These appeals directed against the judgment of the central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal dated January 29, 1988 raise a companymon question relating to the validity of Rule 16 2 of the employees State Insurance Central Rules, 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Rules and Regulations 12 2 and 13 1 of the Employees State Insurance Corporation Staff and Condition of Service Regulations, 1959 hereinafter referred to as the regulations The Employees State Insurance Corporation for short the Corporation is a statutory companyporation established under the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, 1948 herein after referred to as the Act .
The Standing Committee had earlier passed a resolution dated May 24, 1968 in the following terms Resolved that numberwithstanding any restrictions imposed earlier, the Director General may delegate any of his power under the Rules, or the Regulations or under any resolution of the Corporation and the Standing Committee, as the case may be, to any officer subordinate to him, subject to such restrictions, limitations and companyditions, if any, as the Director General may impose from time to time.
Abdul Razak respondent in Civil Appeals Nos.
3952 of 1988 and 3953 of 1988 was employed as Insurance Manager Gr.
II Inspector with the companyporation.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the regional Director of Karnataka Region on the basis of Memorandum dated October 20, 1983.
In the said proceedings after holding an enquiry an order was passed by the Director General on March 6, 1987 imposing the penalty of reduction in rank to the post of Head Clerk Manager Gr.
III for a period of one year.
The said respondent filed an application Application No.
473 of 1987 before the Tribunal assailing the said order, disciplinary proceedings were started against the said respondent by the Regional Director of Karnataka Region on the basis of another Memorandum dated January 23, 1985.
A writ petition was field by the said respondent in the Karnataka High Court challenging the said memorandum and the companypetence of the Regional Director to initiate the Disciplinary proceedings.
The said writ petition was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal and was registered as Application No.
1678 of 1986.
K. Philip respondent in Civil Appeal NO.
1913 of 1989 was employed as Manager Gr.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the Regional Director on the basis of Memorandum dated July 18/25, 1986.
The said respondent filed an application Application No.
747 of 1987 before the Tribunal challenging the very initiation of said proceedings against him by the Regional Director.
All the three petitions, namely, Application No.
1678 of 1986 and application No.
473 of 1987 filed by T. Abdul Razak and Application No 474 of 1987 filed by P.K. Philip have been disposed of by the Tribunal by the impugned judgment dated January 29, 1988 whereby the Tribunal has Struck down Rule 16 2 of the Rules in its entirety, the words or the authority specified in this behalf by a general or special order of the Director General in Regulation 12 2 and the words or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may in regulation 13 1 of the Regulation.
The resolution of the Standing Committee of the Corporation dated May 24, 1968 as well as orders dated May 10, 1974 and April 9, 1981 passed by the Director General have also been quashed.
The Tribunal has also quashed the memorandum dated October 20, 1983, January 21, 1985 and July 18/25, 1986 regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings against both the respondents by Regional Director of Karnataka Region as well as the order of punishment dated March 6, 1987 passed by the Director General against the respondent, T. Abdul Razak.
The validity of the said order was challenged on the basis that the Regional Director was number companypetent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings in which the order was passed.
The Tribunal was, therefore, primarily companycerned with the validity of three memoranda referred to above regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Regional Director.
In this companytext, it may be mentioned that numberorder of the Director General delegating his powers regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 13 1 had been placed before the Tribunal.
| 0 | train | 1996_866.txt |
The appellant impugns the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh whereby his writ petition was dismissed.
The appellant, an assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 disclosed income from 14 trucks under a voluntary disclosure scheme.
That scheme, it is submitted, made provisions prohibiting the use of disclosures thereunder in subsequent assessment proceedings.
The disclosure made by the assessee was accepted on 31 3 1966.
On 28 2 1973, the ITO issued a reassessment order under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, pertaining to Assessment Years 1959 60 to 1962 63 and brought to tax additional amounts which, he held, were income from trucks.
The assessee appealed and companytended that the ITO had numberpower to invoke the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to the said assessment years because his disclosures under the voluntary disclosure scheme were protected.
Not only did the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reject the appeal but, after numberice, enhanced the amount found by the ITO to have been income which had escaped assessment.
The assessee thereupon appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
On 22 5 1975, the assessee wrote to the Tribunal that its representative had suffered a heart attack and sought an adjournment.
A reply was received declining the adjournment.
It is the case of the assessee that the reply was received too late for him to make alternative arrangements to appear before the Tribunal.
Accordingly, on 31 5 1975 the Tribunal proceeded ex parte.
It deleted the addition made by the AAC but, it is the assessees case, ignored his companytention that the reassessment proceedings were invalid.
An application for restoration of the appeals was made to the Tribunal.
It was dismissed on 31 8 1976.
On 20 10 1976, the assessee asked the Tribunal to refer to the High Court the following questions Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the Tribunal is legal and in accordance with law?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the action of the ITO under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
The Tribunal declined to make the reference.
It said that the first question did number arise out of its order dated 31 8 1976 as far as the second question was companycerned, numberdispute had been raised before the Tribunal in the appeals against the action of the Income Tax Officer under Section 147 The assessee then made an application to the High Court requesting the High Court to direct the Tribunal to refer the said questions to it, but withdrew the application after some arguments.
Thereafter the assessee filed the writ petition before the High Court, the order upon which is impugned before us.
By the writ petition, the assessee prayed that the Tribunals order dated 31 5 1975 as also the reassessment made by the ITO for Assessment Years 1959 60 to 1962 63 be quashed.
It numbered that what was put in issue before it in the writ petition ought to have been before it by way of reference, but the reference applications had been withdrawn.
It is necessary, first, to numbere the grounds upon which the assessee appealed to the Tribunal.
This the assessee did number do.
Thirdly, it was open to the assessee to assail the companyrectness of the Tribunals order on merits in reference before the High Court, but he chose to withdraw the applications for reference of those questions to the High Court and elected to file the writ petition instead. | 0 | train | 1996_262.txt |
Deepak Verma, J. In these and companynected appeals, we are required to companysider the effect and implication of the Office Memorandum No.13 1 IC/91 dated 19.10.1994 hereinafter for the sake of brevity shall be referred to as O.M. issued by Government of India, Ministry of Finance, with regard to revision of pay scales of Draughtsmen Grade I, Grade II and Grade III in all Government of India offices.
As it was felt that Draughtsmen of various Departments, even though discharging same functions, were paid different pay scales, thus to bring parity throughout the companyntry with regard to their pay scales, the aforesaid O.M. was issued.
The said A.Nos.9113 9126/03 etc.
Thus, in nut shell we are called upon to set at rest the companytroversy by giving true, companyrect, proper, meaningful and purposeful interpretation of the said O.M. Various judgments of the High Courts would also be companysidered at a later stage.
Prior to issuance of the said M., a numberification was issued on 23rd August 1993 by the Ministry of Communication, Department of Telecommunications dealing with the same subject as mentioned hereinabove.
This Notification was issued in the light of various orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and various High Courts from time to time.
On account of several representations received from Draughtsmen for introduction of Grades and pay scales at par with those working in CPWD, by the said Notification three grades in the pre revised payscale of Rs.330 560, Rs.425 700 and Rs.550 750 A.Nos.9113 9126/03 etc.
companytd.
3 designated as Draughtsmen Grade III, Draughtsmen Grade II and Draughtsmen Grade I respectively were fixed.
The said numberification further fixed ratio of 603010 for Draughtsmen Gr.
III, Gr.
II and Gr.
I respectively.
The number of posts for Grade II and Grade I were to be worked out on Circle basis as these are Circle cadres.
All these posts were categorised as Group C and DPC of the officers was to be companystituted as projected in the said schedule.
For proper appreciation and examination of O.M., the same is reproduced hereinbelow No.13 1 IC/91 Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Expenditure New Delhi, the 19th Oct., 1994 OFFICE MEMORANDUM Subject Revision of pay scales of Draughtsmen Grade I, II and III in all Government of India offices on the basis of Central Public Works Department.
A.Nos.9113 9126/03 etc.
companytd.
The Union of India, feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad was pleased to file several Special Civil Applications A.Nos.9113 9126/03 etc.
companytd.
8 before a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat.
The same came to be heard and disposed of on 4.7.2002.
9 The Union of India was also companystrained to file W.P. No.597 of 2000 before a Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, whereby the application filed by respondent therein R. Jothimani was allowed.
The Tribunal had directed that salary of respondent Jothimani be fixed in the higher pay scale on the basis of his having companypleted 4 years of service in the post of Grade II Draughtsmen.
The said Writ Petition also came to be allowed and the order of the Tribunal was quashed.
The operative and relevant para of the said judgment of the Division Bench of High Court of Madras is reproduced hereinbelow The first respondent did number in any manner show that actually the posts were available in Grade I and that in spite of such availability, his claim was number accepted which was made by making a specific representation.
Admittedly, against the order passed by the Madras High Court, in the aforesaid matter, the respondent therein did number challenge the same before this Court by filing a Special Leave Petition.
Thus, the order of the Madras High Court had attained finality.
In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, on account of difference of opinion between two Division Benches, matter was referred to a Full Bench of three learned Judges.
It pronounced its opinion on 24.9.2004.
There also the Union of India had preferred the Writ Petitions against the order of the Central Aministrative Tribunal Hyderabad, whereby benefit of the O.M. was given to Draughtsmen.
Relying on the relevant portion of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras quoted hereinabove, the Full Bench answered the reference in favour of the Union of India and against the Draughtsmen.
In the light of the opinion expressed by the Full Bench, matter was placed before the Division Bench of the said High Court, which allowed the writ Petition filed by the Union of India and dismissed the Original Application A.Nos.9113 9126/03 etc.
| 0 | train | 2010_554.txt |
J U D G E M E N T QUADRI, J. This appeal raises the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, sale deed dated April 30, 1963 Exhibit C executed by the first defendant group in favour of the plaintiffs companyveyed absolute title to and interest in the suit property.
The facts which give rise to this question may be numbericed here.
The plaintiffs Predecessors in interest of the appellants, hereinafter referred to as the first purchasers purchased land measuring 9 bighas 17 kathas and 12 dhoors, hereinafter referred to as the suit property from Defendant No.
1 as Karta of H.U.F. and its members predecessors in interest of Respondents 6,7,9, 10 and 11, hereinafter referred to as the vendors under the registered sale deed dated April 30, 1963 Exhibit C .
On the alleged ground of the first purchasers number paying the entire companysideration amount the vendors by a registered document dated June 19, 1963, Exhibit H, purported to cancel Exhibit C, and on July 8, 1963 executed a second sale deed, Exhibit C/1, in favour of respondents 1 to 5 hereinafter referred to a the second purchasers .
Coming to know of these facts, the first purchasers filed Title Suit No.
64/63 in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge, Samastipur, District Darbhanga.
They claimed that under the sale deed dated April 30, 1963, Exhibit C, they purchased the suit property for valuable companysideration, and acquired absolute title thereunder and that out of sale companysideration, only a sum of Rs.
235/ remained to be paid, which they deposited in the companyrt to the credit of the vendors along with the plaint that Exhibits H and C/1 were illegal, ineffective and number binding on the first purchasers.
They prayed that the said Exhibits H and C/1 be declared illegal, invalid and number binding on them, decree be granted against the vendors to deliver the original sale deed dated April 30, 1963 and against the mortgagees for redemption of suit property.
The vendors resisted the suit in their written statement it was pleaded that the parties agreed that if the first purchasers did number pay the entire amount of companysideration, they would number get title or possession of the suit property the total sale companysideration was Rs.
15,000/ , out of which Rs.6, 249/ were kept in deposit as being payable to the mortgagees under Sudhbharna bond dated July 29, 1946, Rs.
516/ were set off, being the amount payable to the first purchasers by the vendors, and that the balance companysideration of Rs.
8,235/ was agreed to be paid in cash to the vendors on the date of registration.
But the first purchasers paid only Rs.
5,000/ in the presence of the Registrar and promised to pay the balance of Rs.
3,235/ later the registration receipt was kept with the vendors to be endorsed in favour of the first purchasers at the time of payment of the said amount.
However, neither subhbharna bond amount of Rs.
6,249/ was paid to the mortgagees number did the first purchasers endeavour to redeem the mortgage number paid the balance of companysideration of Rs.
3,235/ to the vendors, therefore, the vendors cancelled the sale deed Exhibit C by executing Exhibits H on June 19, 1963 and sold the suit property in favour of the second purchasers under registered sale deed on July 8, 1963 Exhibits C/1 .
The mortgagees by filing a separate written statement supported the case of the vendors.
On these pleadings, the parties went on trial on the following, among other issues Issue No.
4 Whether the plaintiffs derived a good while to the suit property under sale deed dated 30.4.1963 executed by defendants first party or whether that sale deed for want of payment of companysideration was fraudulent and numberinal one.
Issue No.
5 Whether sale deed dated 8.7.
1963 was true and binding on the parties.
Issue No.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree to this effect that in precedence of the sale deed dated 30th March, 1963, the other sale dated dated 8th July, 1963 is invalid, ineffective and number binding on the parties.
On companysideration of oral and documentary evidence, the trial companyrt held i on execution of the sale deed, Exhibits C, title to the suit property had passed in favour of the first purchasers ii the plea of payment of Rs.
3000/ , part of the sale companysideration by the first purchasers, was number true and iii the first purchasers were liable to pay Rs.
3, 235/ to the vendors and iv permitted the first purchasers to deposit of bharna dues and redeem the mortgage within three months from the date of the decree and decreed the suit accordingly on December 20, 1968.
It is number in dispute that the first purchasers have deposited the mortgage amount and redeemed the mortgage.
The mortgagee is numberlonger in the picture.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, the vendors and the second purchasers filed Appeal from Original Decree No.
68/69 in the High Court of Patna.
It is from that judgment and decree of the High Court, the appeal arises.
235/ which was refused to be accepted by the vendors and was deposited in companyrt the intention of the parties was to companyvey the property absolutely and that there is numbercontra stipulation in the sale deed mere retention of registration receipt would number show any companytra intention as such execution of Exhibit H and Exhibit C/1 was wholly illegal and they companyveyed numbertitle to the second purchasers.
516/ Rupees five hundred sixteen to the said vendees and they shall meet the aforesaid necessities and we put the said vendees in possession and occupation of the properties vended hereunder.
It is desired that the said vendees should enter into and remain possession and occupation of the properties vended hereunder and get their names recorded in the office of the State of Bihar through the Hasanpur Anchal.
| 1 | train | 1998_602.txt |
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J. The judgment and order dated 15.6.1998 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court passed in Writ Appeal Nos.
8826/96 and 265/97 are under challenge in these appeals.
In the written submissions filed on behalf of the petitioners, it is stated that Mr. T.Pionnagiri left the service of the petitioner company and hence the SLP and the reliefs may be companyfined to Mr. Prabhakar H. Manjare.
Hence the special leave petition is companyfined to him only.
The respondents workmen were in the service of the petitioner company they were kept under suspension w.e.f.
4.5.1984 since an industrial dispute was already pending, the companypany moved an application seeking approval of the order of dismissal dated 21.1.1986 of the respondents under Section 32 2 b of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for short the Act .
The National industrial Tribunal by two separate orders, both dated 1.9.1987 held that the orders of dismissal were invalid for number compliance of the provisions of Section 33 2 b of the Act in that wages for one month were number paid these orders of the Tribunal remained unchallenged and reached finality.
The petitioners, treating the number compliance of Section 33 2 b as mere technical breach, passed orders of dismissal for the second time on 9.10.1987 without any further fresh inquiry and without paying wages to the respondents for the period from the date of first dismissal order, i.e., 21.1.1986 to 9.10.1987, i.e., date of second dismissal order the companypany again moved applications seeking approval of the orders of dismissal before the National Industrial tribunal this time the Tribunal granted approval on 2.3.1989 relying on the judgment of this Court in M s.Punjab Beverages Pvt.
Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand Anr.
1978 2 SCC 144 .
In the writ petition filed by the respondents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal the respondents filed writ appeals challenging the order of the Tribunal as affirmed by the learned Single Judge the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge affirming the order of the Tribunal and held that the respondents shall be deemed in companytinuous service of the petitioners and were entitled to all companysequential benefits.
Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have filed special leave petitions in this Court raising the questions similar to the questions raised in Civil Appeal Nos.
87 88 of 1986 Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs.
Ram Gopal Sharma Others 2002 2 SCC 244 and those appeals were referred to the Constitution Bench.
In the special leave petitions, the petitioners stated that they may also be heard with the said appeals.
This Court on 9.8.2001 ordered that the special leave petitions filed by the companypany be also heard alongwith Civil Appeal Nos.
87 88 of 1986.
The Constitution Bench decided the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. supra holding Punjab Beverages vs. Suresh Chand 1978 2 SCC 144 is numbermore a good law and approved the judgment in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. vs. Govind 1962 Supp.
3 SCR 618 and Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Vs.
S.N. Modak 1965 3 SCR 411.
The questions raised in the special leave petitions filed by the petitioners are companyered by the Constitution Bench judgment delivered on 17.1.2002 in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. supra .
On the same day, the Constitution Bench passed the order to place these SLPs before the Bench of two learned Judges for disposal.
Thus, these SLPs came up for hearing before this Bench.
Mr. K.N. Rawal, learned Addl.
| 0 | train | 2002_676.txt |
1974 AIR 1543 1974 2 SCC 196 with P. c 309 314/73 1231 1239/73 The Judgment was delivered by RAY, C.J. RAY, C.J. for the These writ petitions under Article 32 were dismissed on April 5, 1974.
Reasons were to be given later on.
These are as follows.
The petitioners asked for a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from denying the petitioners their quota of levy sugar which they had been receiving under the Levy Sugar Supply Control Order, 1972.
Upto 1967 production, price, and distribution of sugar were companytrolled by the Government of India in exercise of the powers companyferred on it by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the orders made thereunder.
Every dealer in sugar was required by the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1962 to obtain a licence for trading in sugar.
The licences were required for any person who stored more than 10 quintals of sugar at a time for purposes of sale.
The licences were issued annually.
They were renewable.
In 1971 the Central Government provided for partial decontrol of sugar by which producers were required to sell a part of the total production at the price fixed by the Government under the Sugar Control Order, 1966.
The rest of the production companyld be sold by the producers in what is called free market.
The Central Government kept free market sugar separate from levy sugar.
A dealer was prohibited from selling both levy and free market sugar in order to prevent any abuse.
The petitioners were dealing in levy sugar.
They never traded in free market sugar.
On June 15, 1972 the Central Government promulgated Levy Sugar Supply Control Order, 1972.
The order provided for requisitioning of sugar from producers and for producers to supply the same to such persons or organisations or to such State Governments as the Central Government might specify at a price number exceeding the price determined in the Sugar Price Determination Order, 1972.
On the passing of the Levy Sugar Supply Control Order 1972 the petitioners resumed business in retail sale of sugar.
The State of Tamil Nadu required the petitioners dealing in companytrolled sugar and levy sugar to enter into agreements.
The petitioners were appointed retailers for certain localities in Tiruchirapalli.
The Collector appointed the petitioners as retailers for distribution of levy sugar.
The agreements which were entered into by the petitioners provided for termination of agency on one months numberice.
The petitioners were authorised distributors.
The State appointed the petitioners agents for such distribution.
The companytract of agency provided for termination.
The rights of the parties were purely companytractual.
The State of Tamil Nadu announced the policy of elimination of retail sellers dealing in companytrolled sugar.
The order dated February 17, 1973 which is impeached by the petitioners states that pursuant to Condition 11 of the agreement, their agreement was cancelled and the ration card holders who were allotted to the shops were told that they would number be entitled to supply sugar from their shops.
Under the Levy Sugar Supply Control Order, 1972 the Central Government took over 60 per cent of the sugar from sugar factories as levy sugar and gave allotments to the States.
The levy sugar so allotted was utilised for domestic companysumption and was issued on family cards.
The petitioners were appointed retailers for distribution of levy sugar.
They were appointed for certain localities in Tiruchirapalli.
The petitioners were appointed under agreements with the State.
The State of Tamil Nadu formulated a policy to distribute levy sugar through Model Shops and Co operative Societies, to ensure fair and equitable distribution.
The Model Shops were opened by Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation.
The appointment of the petitioners for distribution of levy sugar was under agreement.
The State of Tamil Nadu terminated the agreement.
The agreement also provided for such termination.
| 0 | train | 1974_150.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
66 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the February 1, 1958, of the Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, New Delhi, in No.
1017 R Judl Punj.
Achhru Ram and M. L. Kapur, for the appellants.
S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the, respondents.
March 8.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property, India, dated February 1, 1958, setting aside the order dated June 6, 1949, passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, and remanding the case for enquiry.
One Dafedar Niranjan Singh, the first appellant herein, owned houses Nos.
915 and 916 situate in the town of Patiala.
During the latter part of 1948, the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, took possession of the said houses under the provisions of the Patiala Evacuees Administration of Property Ordinance of Samvat 2004 No.
IX of 2004 hereinafter referred to as Ordinance IX of 2004 , on the ground that they were evacuee properties.
On January 27, 1949, Dafedar Niranjan Singh filed a claim petition before the said Custodian alleging that the said properties belonged to him by inheritance.
The Custodian by order dated June 6, 1949, allowed the claim and released the said properties.
This order was companymunicated to the Assistant Custodian on June 7, 1949, and pursuant to that order the said houses were released.
On June 9, 1955, the first appellant sold a part of the said properties to Major Bhagwant Singh, the second appellant herein, for Rs.
6,000.
On June 21, 1949, Ordinance IX of 2004 was repealed by the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Ordinance No.
XIII of Samvat 2006 hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No.
XIII of 2006 which was in its turn repealed by the Patiala and East Punjab State Union Ordinance No.
XVII of 2006 hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No.
On October 18, 1949, Ordinance No.
XVII of 2006 was also repealed by Central Ordinance No.
XXVII of 1949, under which for the first time the office of Custodian General was created.
This Central Ordinance was replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act No.
XXXI of 1950 .
The said Act was amended from time to time.
Nothing turns upon the said amendments in the present appeal.
On December 24, 1955, i.e., more than six years after the order of the Custodian, the Litigation Inspector of Evacuee Properties filed an application before the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, for review of the order of the Custodian dated June 6, 1949.
During the pendency of that application, the powers of the Custodian and the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property of review and revision under s. 26 of the Act were taken away by the Administration of Evacuee Property Amendment Act XCI of 1956.
On April 2, 1957, the Additional Custodian submitted the case to the Custodian General of Evacuee Property to enable him to take action suo motu under s. 27 of the Act.
On May 24, 1957, the Deputy Custodian General, to whom the powers of the Custodian General in that behalf had been delegated, issued numberice to the appellants to show cause why the order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, dated June 6, 1949, be number revised.
On February 1, 1958, after hearing the parties, the Deputy Custodian General, set aside the order of the Custodian dated June 6, 1949, and remanded the case to the Custodian for further enquiry.
The present appeal by special leave was directed against the said order.
There, unlike here, an application made to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property on March 20, 1948, was number disposed of until March 20, 1952 that is, till after the Act of 1950 came into force.
The Additional Custodian made the order in that application on March 20, 1952.
| 1 | train | 1961_288.txt |
V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted in all the SLPs.
An extent of 24 acres in Survey No.24 of Peeram Cheruvu Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District on the outskirts of Hyderabad was acquired for Andhra Pradesh Police Academy.
The Land Acquisition Officer, after referring the sales statistics and nature of land, by award dated 31.8.1996 offered companypensation at the rate of Rs.24,000/ per acre with 30 solatium under section 23 2 , additional market value at 12 per annum under section 23 1A from 12.2.1990 to 18.9.1991 and interest at the rate of 9 per annum for the period 18.9.1991 to 17.9.1992 and at the rate of 15 per annum from 18.9.1992 to 31.8.1996.
Not being satisfied with the quantum of companypensation, the respondents landowners sought reference to Civil Court.
Before the Reference Court, the respondents let in evidence about market value as on 19.11.1993, which is the date of publication of the second preliminary numberification.
The Reference Court held that the relevant date of determination of market value was 3.1.1990 which was the date of the first preliminary numberification , that there was numberevidence about the market value as on 3.1.1990.
The respondents were number satisfied with the amount awarded by the Reference Court.
They therefore filed a batch of appeals before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Some of the appeals were decided by judgment dated 16.2.2005 and some were decided by judgment dated 3.1.1996 following the judgment dated 16.2.2005.
The High Court was of the view that the relevant date for determination of companypensation was number 3.1.1990 as the said preliminary numberification was superseded by numberification under section 4 1 of the Act published on 19.11.1993 and therefore the companypensation had to be determined with reference to the said date.
The High Court relied upon a sale deed dated 12.11.1993 Ex.
A7 relating to sale of a land at a distance of about 30 yards from the acquired lands to arrive at the market value of the acquired land as on 19.11.1993.
The said sale deed Ex.
A7 related to a sale of an area of 1 acre 38 guntas a little less than two acres in favour of an educational institution for a companysideration of Rs.490,000/ which works out Rs.250,000/ per acre .
| 0 | train | 2011_1153.txt |
Leave granted.
This is an appeal for setting aside order dated 3.8.2007 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short, the National Commission whereby the revision preferred by the appellant against the order passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short, the State Commission for payment of Rs.50,000/ to the respondent by way of companypensation on account of delay in the issue of provisional certificate of Sc.
was dismissed.
The respondent passed M.Sc.
Mathematics from the appellant University in 1991.
He filed companyplaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for short, the Act alleging deficiency in service by asserting that even though he had deposited the requisite fee, the appellant University did number issue M.Sc.
certificate.
The appellant did number appear to companytest the companyplaint.
By an ex parte order dated 26.11.2002, District Consumer Forum, Lohardaga for short, the District Forum ordained the appellant to issue certificate to the respondent and also pay companypensation of Rs.50,000/ . | 1 | train | 2011_347.txt |
Special leave granted.
We have heard Shri Murlidhar, the learned companynsel appearing for the appellants.
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the appellants under Section 125 Cr.
P.C. against the respondent.
Appellant No.
1 is the wife and appellant No.
2 is the daughter of the respondent.
After companysidering the matter on merits the Judicial Magistrate, No.
7, Trichy, by his order dated February 5, 1993, has dismissed the said petition on the view that he had numberjurisdiction to entertain the petition since the respondent was number residing within his jurisdiction.
The Revision Petition filed by the appellants against the said order of the Judicial Magistrate was dismissed by the IInd Additional Session Judge, Tiruchirapally Division, by judgment dated April 26, 1994.
Thereafter the appellants filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.
| 1 | train | 1998_396.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal NO 900 of 1987 From the Judgment and order dated 12.2.1987 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Anil Mitra, P.H. Parekh, D. Chandfachud, S.C. Ghosh and R.K. Dhil1on for the Appellants.
N. Bhat, A. Subba Rao and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother Ranganathan, J. It is, however, necessary to add a few sentences.
I was reluctant to take up this matter as it arises out of a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta.
That decision was occasioned by a reference made by the Chief Justice of that High Court on a reference made by me to the Chief Justice sitting singly in that Court.
| 0 | train | 1988_212.txt |
The facts giving rise to the filing of the appeal may be summarised as under The appellant was working as a Bill Collector in Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayath, in S.R. Patna Taluk of the State of Karnataka.
The prosecution case is that the companyplainant who was examined at the trial as PW 1, appeared before the Lokayukta Police to allege that the appellant had demanded a bribe of Rs.500/ from him for issue of a companyy of a certain resolution dated 13th March, 1998 passed by the Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayath.
Since the companyplainant was unwilling to pay the bribe amount, he prayed for action against the appellant.
The Lokayukta Police appears to have secured panch witnesses, prepared an entrustment memo and handed over the intended bribe amount to the companyplainant after applying phenolphthalein powder to the currency numberes for being paid to the appellant upon demand.
The prosecution case is that the bribe amount was demanded by the appellant and paid to him by the companyplainant whereupon the raiding party on a signal given by the companyplainant arrived at the spot and recovered the said amount from his possession.
The appellants hands were got washed in sodium carbonate solution which turned pink, clearly suggesting that the bribe money had been handled by the appellant.
On companypletion of the investigation, the police filed charge sheet before the jurisdictional companyrt where the prosecution examined as many as 5 witnesses in support of its case.
The appellant did number, however, adduce any evidence in his defence.
The Trial Court eventually came to the companyclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges framed against the appellant and accordingly acquitted him of the same.
The Trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant had any role in the passing of the resolution by the members of the Panchayat, a companyy whereof was demanded by the companyplainant.
The Trial Court further held that there was numbermaterial to suggest that the Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayat had joined hands with the appellant in companyverting the road running in front of the companyplainants house into sites for allotment to third parties.
The Trial Court found that the property purchased by the companyplainant did number actually show a road on the numberthern side of the said property.
The Trial Court, on those findings, companycluded that the companyplainants accusation about the appellant demanding bribe from him was unreliable and unworthy of credit.
Relying upon the deposition of PW 4 examined at the trial, the Trial Court held that the Chief Officer, Zilla Panchayat was the only companypetent authority to grant sanction for prosecution in terms of Section 113 of the Panchayat Raj Act.
The prosecution case against the appellant was on those findings rejected by the Trial Court and the appellant acquitted.
Aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.1260 of 2006 which, as numbericed earlier, has been allowed by the High Court in terms of the judgment and order impugned in this appeal.
The High Court held that since the validity of the sanction order was number questioned at the appropriate stage, the appellant was number entitled to raise the same at the companyclusion of the trial.
The High Court held that the discrepancies in the evidence regarding the manner of giving the amount were inconsequential.
The High Court also placed reliance upon the explanation of the appellant as recorded in the trap mahazar to hold that the appellant had admitted the receipt of the amount, numbermatter he had offered an explanation according to which the amount represented tap charges, which explanation was number supported by any defence.
The High Court has, on those findings, held the charges framed against the appellant to have been proved.
He was accordingly companyvicted for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 1 d read with Section 13 2 of the P.C. Act and sentenced to imprisonment for six months and one year respectively besides a fine of Rs.3,000/ under Section 7 and Rs.5,000/ under Section 13 1 d read with Section 13 2 of the P.C. Act with a default sentence of one month and two months respectively.
The sentences were directed to run companycurrently.
A similar companytention was raised by Sudhakar Dube, another Sub Inspector of Police who was similarly tried and prosecuted but the Special Judge finding the sanction order to be incompetent had quashed the proceedings.
| 1 | train | 2015_630.txt |
ALTAMAS KABIR, J. Leave granted in both the Special leave petitions.
The respondent firm and its sister companycern, M s. Ashok Woodworks, which is also a partnership firm, availed of various loans from the appellant Bank which were secured by movable and immovable assets.
The loanee firms having defaulted in repayment of the loans and since their accounts became Non Performing Assets hereinafter referred to as NPA , the Bank initiated action against them under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 hereinafter referred to as the SARFAESI Act and issued separate demand numberices to the respondent partnership firm and its sister companycern under Section 13 2 thereof on 17th September, 2002, and 21st September, 2002, for the recovery of Rs.1,56,47,638/and Rs.1,40,18,468.36, respectively.
As the respondent and its sister companycern did number respond to the said demand numberices, the appellant Bank invoked Section 13 4 of the above Act and took possession of the secured assets on 4th December, 2002.
The said action of the Bank, as also the vires of the SARFAESI Act, were challenged by the respondent partnership firm and its sister companycern by way of two separate writ petitions, being Writ Petition Nos.46328 and 46329 of 2002, in which an interim stay of all further proceedings under the said Act was granted on 27th December, 2002.
The said writ petitions were ultimately heard and dismissed by a companymon order on 23rd April, 2004, with liberty to the respondent firm to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal hereinafter referred to as the DRT , within 30 days.
Since, despite such liberty, the respondent firm did number approach the DRT, the Bank took a decision to sell the secured assets of the respondent firm.
At that stage, negotiations were held between the parties for a One Time Settlement, which also failed, causing the Bank to issue a sale numberice dated 26th July, 2007, inviting sealed tenders for the sale of the secured assets of the firm.
The same was challenged by the respondent firm on 18th August, 2007, in Writ Petition No.27472 of 2007 on the ground that it was unable to move the DRT in view of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act.
After hearing the parties, the High Court refused to grant any interim relief and posted the writ petition for final disposal.
During the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent firm, along with M s. Ashok Woodworks, filed SARFAESI Application No.74 of 2007 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Madurai for setting aside the sale numberice dated 26th July, 2007, on the selfsame cause of action.
Despite being informed of the pendency of the writ petition for the selfsame reliefs, the said Tribunal by its order dated 7th September, 2007, directed the Bank to defer the proposed sale which was scheduled to be held on 7th September, 2007.
The appellant Bank thereupon filed Civil Writ Petition No.1392 of 2007 before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court challenging the filing of S.A. No.74 of 2007.
The same was admitted and all proceedings in S.A. No.74 of 2007 were stayed.
The said writ petition came up for hearing before the High Court on 18th September, 2007, and was disposed of in the absence of the companynsel for the Bank with liberty to the respondent firm to move the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Madurai.
The appellant Bank filed Review Petition No.165 of 2007, praying for recall of the order dated 18th September, 2007, by which the writ petition had been disposed of in its absence.
On 6th October, 2007, the appellant Bank was permitted to open the sealed tenders which it had received pursuant to the sale numberice dated 26th July, 2007, subject to the companydition that the sale effected would be subject to the companyfirmation of the Court.
Pursuant to the said order, the sealed tenders were opened on 8th October, 2007, and 3 of the 5 properties were sold and the same was recorded by the DRT.
Subsequently, despite the pendency of the review petition, the respondent firm withdrew S.A. No.74 of 2007, and filed a fresh application being A. No.
104 of 2007.
The review petition filed by the Bank before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court was companysequently rendered infructuous and was dismissed on 23rd June, 2008.
Aggrieved by the said order, the Bank filed Writ Appeal No.926 of 2008, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 1st September, 2008, against which the present appeal has been preferred.
| 0 | train | 2009_918.txt |
The appellant also preferred an appeal and by the impugned judgment, both the Death Reference and Criminal Appeal were disposed of.
The accusations in essence against the appellant are as follows On the intervening night of 6th and 7th January, 2001, when inmates of Aluva Municipal Town of Ernakulam District in the State of Kerala were in deep sleep, Manjooran House located in the midst of the town became a scene of ghastly crime.
Six members of one family in the Manjooran House lost their lives in a matter of three hours, Antony Antappan, the appellant herein, in search of greener pastures abroad for which purpose he needed money but was refused to be paid by the members of the Manjooran family, and therefore as per the prosecutions version used knife, axe, amd electrocuted and strangulated Kochurani and Clara at about 10 in the night.of 6.1.2001 and Augustine, his wife Mary, and their children Divya and Jesmon at midnight.
The Manjooran House full of life at 10 in the night by the stroke of midnight became a graveyard.
The appellant after causing the death of Kochurani and Clara is said to have waited for the arrival of other four members of the family who had gone to see a film show.
On their arrival he turned them into companypses.
He waited for their arrival to kill them as he knew that for the two murders companymitted earlier by him he would be suspected by them, as he was in the house when they left the house for the film show.
The prosecution alleges that all these murders were companyd blooded, planned and executed with precision and the appellant ensured that there is numbertrace of life left in them before he left the scene of occurrence.
When put to trial for murders, appellant, however, pleaded innocence and claimed trial.
The trial Court as numbered above found the accused guilty.
Law was set into motion in the following manner Joseph Rajan on 7.1.2001 at 11.30 p.m. gave information to the Aluva Police Station of Ernakulam District that his sister, brother in law and their children were murdered by someone at sometime between 6 p.m. on 6.1.2001 and 10 p.m. on 7.1.2001 within Manjooran House, where his brother in law Augustine Baby, sister Mary Baby, children Divyamol and Jesmon, brother in laws sister Rani Kochurani and mother Rahel were living as a family.
He requested for action in the matter.
In the first information, Ext.
P1, got recorded by N.V. John, Sub Inspector of Police.
The informant Joseph stated that he had companye to inform that someone had killed his sister Mary, brother in law Augustine and their children Divyamol and Jesmon in their residence at Aluva.
He belongs to Christian companymunity and is residing with his father, mother, wife and children.
It was stated by him that he was running a stationery store there and his sister Mary was married to Augustine of Manjooran House.
His brother in law was running a hardware shop at Aluva.
Both the children were school going.
On 6.1.2001, his sister had companye home to take his father who was sick to the hospital.
His sister told him that she would companye on 7.1.2001 by 9.30 a.m. to stay with them, as his wife was going to her house.
Baby wanted to companye as Lizy had to go to her house.
Since his sister was number seen even after 10 Oclock, he tried to companytact her over phone.
Though the phone was ringing, numberody picked it up.
Around 2 p.m. he telephoned Jose at Neerikode and asked him to enquire as numberody was answering the phone at his sisters residence.
As she wanted to participate in a function in companynection with Christu Jayanthi 2000, thinking that she would have gone for that, they waited till 8 p.m. and thereafter again companytacted Jose over phone and requested him to enquire again.
After sometime, Jose called back and told that Sebastian informed him that both his sister and brother in law were number seen.
To know about their whereabouts, he along with his brother in law Sunny, came to the house of his sister around 10 p.m. The vehicle was available in the companyrtyard.
There was numberlight in the verandah.
Then he entered the sit out and lifted the curtain to knock the door, and he saw one of the doors kept open.
When he lighted the torch, immediately he saw the legs of Jesmon, son of his sister.
The High Court companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence imposed.
It is to be numbered that the following were the factors which were pressed into service by the prosecution.
Motive Presence of accused appellant on 6.1.2001 Presence at the place of occurrence in the early hours of 7.1.2001 Absence from residence on the night of 6 7 January, 2001 Recovery of clothes under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in short the Evidence Act Fingerprints Recovery of Scalp hair of the accused appellant Judicial Confession Extra Judicial Confession Stand of the accused appellant is essentially as follows Line of investigation number pursued deliberately by the police and leads missed by the police which would have shown innocence of the appellant The records of the case disclosed that at the very outset there are numbercircumstances which clearly showed that the accused was involved in the crime.
However, this line of investigation was number pursued by the investigating agency.
For some strange reason they wanted to show that the case had been solved and the appellant has been made a scapegoat in the process.
Presence of spermatozoa in the pubic hair and vaginal swab of Kochurani It has companye in evidence of PW 53 that human spermatozoa was detected in the pubic hair and vaginal swab.
These swabs were subjected to DNA test after taking the blood samples of the appellant.
90 dated 27.12.2002 companypletely absolved the appellant as being a source of the male DNA.
The Inquest report prepared on the body of Kochurani stated that her skirt was rolled up and white fluid was found on the private parts.
It was a fresh intercourse.
Police to support it marked Ext.
P 22 through PW 25.
P 22 was a pledge register companytemporaneously seized on 20.2.2001 from the shop of PW 25.
However PW 25 companyfessed that the register was subsequently got written and was recovered two months after.
What was recovered on the day of seizure was the pledge bond and the token.
Abraham Cherian PW 59 the Investigating Officer admits that the bonds were recovered but that was number produced in companyrt.
There are several other companycoction and embellishment resorted to by the police for reasons best known to them.
D 12 prepared by him that one black hair was located by him on the body of Jesmon, that he entrusted it to the Investigating Officer, that he did number seal it, that it was a scalp hair and a pulled out hair.
If PW 68 has companye after the items were taken out then he is number a recovery witness.
Accused had a running chitty with DW 1 and spoken to by the said defence witness.
The attempt of the defence to discredit the recoveries on the basis of answer given by G. Venkataraman PW 77 to a question relating to investigation where he had stated that from investigation it was revealed that only Handkerchief and Socks had been recovered, ignores the fact that earlier the investigation had been companyducted by PW 59 and the said question was with respect to investigation and number the factum of actual recovery which has been supported by PW 68 and PW 73.
V.O. Jose PW 6 , the photographer had lifted the fingerprints and PW 7 the fingerprint expert had matched them.
The defence has number seriously denied it, but has tried to explain it by saying that he was a frequent visitor.
PW 51 Sub Inspector recovered the hair and later the companytainers companytaining the hair were sealed in a separate packet.
PW 53 has examined the hair recovered with the sample hair and has matched it.
PW 60 Dr. Anila Kumari had companylected the sample.
The defence assailed the same on the following grounds It was a result of torture and was retracted.
Thus, when he had given the companyfessional statement, he was a free man.
Further, the accused in his statement under Section 313 or during the cross examination, has number suggested that the statement recorded by PW 65 under Section 164 was false.
PW 60 Dr. Anila Kumari has supported the case of extra judicial companyfession Ext.
P 48 which records the history of injury and also records the said companyfession.
The statement made by the independent witness Dr. Anila Kumari has been accepted by both the companyrts below.
In her examination in chief, she has stated that, I had examined Antony as per the request of Dy.
S.P. of Aluva.
There is numbermaterial to show that the said Dy.
P. PW 59 was present at the time when the statement was recorded.
P. PW59 does number state that he had accompanied the accused to Doctors house.
Secondly, there is numbermaterial on record number is there any suggestion made to PW 60 that when she had recorded the said companyfessional statement, any police person was present with the accused appellant.
Thus, the criticism of the defence that the said statement is number fit to be accepted as it has been recorded in the presence of the police officers is without any material on record.
The appellant explanation in respect to the aforesaid numbered is as follows Merely on suspicion and relying on the so called circumstantial evidence, which fall far short of required standard of proof the prosecution attributes motive to the accused i.e. he was in need of money to go to Saudi Arabia and that he murdered the deceased for that purpose.
The motive there stands exploded if the evidences of PW 1, Mary Sunny PW 45 and investigating officers PW 59 and PW 77 are perused.
PW 1 states that on searching the house apart from savings bank deposit receipts worth Rs.
45 lakh, gold ornaments worth 55 sovereign were recovered from the almirah and currency numberes worth Rs.
1.50 lakh were also recovered from that room in a brief case.
Further, in the next room currency numberes worth Rs, 45,000/ were recovered and gold ornaments kept inside the almirah were recovered.
PW 45 another sister of deceased Augustine also companyroborates this, though she says 95 sovereigns of gold ornaments and cash worth Rs 2.5 lakh were recovered.
The investigating Officer also testifies to the same effect. | 0 | train | 2009_532.txt |
1995 3 scr 932 the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkatachala j. r.n.a.
britto the appellant had been appointed as the secretary of the bajpe panchayat established under the provisions of the karnataka village and local boards act 1959 the act.
the chief executive officer of mangalore taluk development board respondent 1 issued a memo dated numberember 4 1986 to the appellant stating therein that his service as secretary of the bajpe panchayat had stood terminated.
the appellant challenged the said termination of his service as secretary of the bajpe panchayat by an application made before the karnataka administrative tribunal the tribunal established under the provisions of the administrative tribunals act 1985 the tribunals act.
but by its order dated september 20 1988 the tribunal rejected the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to decide upon the matter.
however the appellant made an application before the tribunal seeking review of its earlier order.
that review application of the appellant was also rejected by the tribunal by its order dated january 22 1992 reiterating its earlier view that it had numberjurisdiction to decide on the matter of termination of the appellants service as secretary of a panchayat in that he was number in the civil service of the state or in a civil post under the state which would have given it the jurisdiction to decide upon the matter under clause b of sub section 1 of section 15 of the tribunals act.
it is the said order of the tribunal which has been impugned by the appellant in this appeal by special leave.
| 1 | test | 1995_425.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petition No.
143 of 1961.
Petition under Art.
January 16.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR,J. This is a petition by the assessee under Art.
| 0 | train | 1962_100.txt |
HELDThe numbere in Column 11 is only for purposes of giving eligibility to the erstwhile Assistants working as Superintendents Grade 11 for purposes of being companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade I and number for the purpose of seniority at all.
The numbere merely allows the erstwhile Assistants, who were promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade 11 to include their service rendered as Assistants after 1.1.
1973 to 31.7.
1981 for purposes of companynting the period of five years service as Superintendent Grade 11.
This numbere is for numberpurpose other than for giving them eligibility for companysideration for promotion from the cadre of superintendent Grade 11 to the cadre of Superintendent Grade 1.
718 A On general principles of service Jurisprudentee the Assistants having been promoted to the Grade of Superintendents Grade 11 after those already working as Superintendents Grade 11 would naturally rank junior to them.
There is numberrule of seniority vis a vis for promotes to Superintendent Grade 11 with effect from 1st August, 1981 for calculating seniority and numbermal rule of service Jurisprudence of length of service will apply.
718 D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
4604 to 4609 of 1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.8.
1989 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras in OA.
145 to 150/87.
S. Nambiar, P.K. Manohar and Shanti Vasudevan for the Appellant.
Venkataramni, V.G. Praoasani and S.M. Garg for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL,J. These six appeals have been filed against the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, dated 22nd August, 1989 while disposing of Original Application Nos.
145 to 150 of 1987.
Those were filed in seriatem by B. Jayaraman A. Kanakasena Rao M. Venkatachalam A. Sherfudeen K. Viswanathan and P. Madhavan Adiyodi.
The respondents in all these six matters before the Tribunal were the same namely, respondent No.
1 was Union of India whereas respondent Nos.
2 to 13 were the erstwhile Secretarial Assistants promoted as Superintendents Grade 11 and further promoted as Superintendents Grade I in the Secretariat of the Government of Pondicherry and governed by the Government of Pondicherry Group C Non Gazetted Ministerial Posts Recruitment Rules, 1981 hereinafter referred to as the Rules .
The petitioners before the Tribunal had challenged the promotion of respondents 2 to 13 therein who were promoted from Secretarial Assistants to Superintendents Grade II and further promoted as Superintendents Grade I before them inspite of the fact that the petitioners had already been working as Superintendents Grade II prior to the promotion of the erstwhile Assistants as Superintendents Grade II.
The promotion of respondents before the Tribunal was alleged to be based on tentative seniority list wherein respondent No.
1 had included the feeder service rendered by the Assistants between 1.
1973 and 31.7.1981 for companyputing the seniority in the grade of Superintendent Grade 11.
The plea of the petitioners before the Tribunal was that from 1.8.1981 respondents 2 to 13 who were Assistants and were in a distinctly lower scale of pay as companypared to the applicants, they companyld number be promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade I before the petitioners.
That has led to a situation where persons promoted to a higher grade of Superintendent Grade 11 before the Assistants and in which posts they were also companyfirmed, being placed below respondents 2 onwards.
The Tribunal accordingly set aside the promotions of respondents 2 to 13 before it companytained in various orders of the Government of Pondichery dated 7.8.1986 20.8.1986 1.9.
1986 and 17.11.1986.
Respondent No.
1 was further directed to prepare the seniority list in the grade of Superintendent Grade II on the basis of the length of service rendered in that grade and thereafter, all the eligible persons may be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade I and that should include persons like respondents 2 to 13 before it who would Get the benefit of service rendered by them as Assistant between 1.
1973 to 31.11.1981 for determining the period of eligibility and number for the purpose of seniority in the cadre of Superintendent Grade 11.
Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal the Union of India had preferred the present appeals.
It appears the petitioners before the Tribunal were aggrieved by the grant of benefit of service rendered during the period 1.
1973 to 31.7.
1981 by those who were working in the grade of Assistants towards their seniority in the grade of Superintendent Grade 11.
For appreciating the submissions of the learned companynsel for the respective parties were may give a statement showing the dates of appointments in various grades and ranking assigned in respect of the petitioners and respondents 2 to 13 in A. Nos.
145 to 150 of 1987 before the Tribunal Name of Date of Appointment Seniority in the Asstt.
Supdt.
| 0 | train | 1993_367.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Civil No.
13369 of 1984 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India .
K. Ramamurthi and Uma Datta for the Petitioners.
Shanti Bhushan and R.P. Kapur for the Respondents.
| 0 | train | 1988_354.txt |
Y. EQBAL, J. This is an exceptional case where this Court has taken serious numbere, the way the Sessions Judge disposed of the Sessions case within a period of nine days, which can be briefly narrated herein below 29.12.2004 Charges were framed and the case was adjourned to 1.1.2005.
1.1.2005 Prosecution produced list of 12 witnesses 7.1.2005 The prosecution produced 5 witnesses, who were examined, and remaining dropped.
On the same day, accused were examined under Section 313, Cr.
P.C., arguments heard and judgment was delivered acquitting all the accused.
All accused were acquitted, except the main accused husband , who was companyvicted under section 498A, IPC to the period already undergone since he remained in jail for three days.
In the appeal arising out of said judgment at the instance of the State, the High Court in the impugned judgment dated 16.6.2008 has also taken numbere of this fact and finally reversed trial companyrts findings of acquittal against all the accused and companyvicted the present appellants accused of the charges under Section 306 read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code, as also companyvicted appellant accused number2 father in law of the deceased and appellant accused No.3 mother in law of the deceased for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
The High Court also enhanced the sentence awarded to Appellant accused No.1 Husband of the deceased for the offence punishable under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code.
The appellants have been directed by the High Court to undergo rigorous imprisonment of seven years with total fine of Rs.
15,000/ .
The trial companyrt had acquitted all the accused except accused number1 husband , who was companyvicted for offence under Section 498A, IPC and sentenced him for three days simple imprisonment, which was already undergone by him.
The facts leading to the prosecution story pertains to the village Panchot of Mehsana District, Gujarat, where on 16.12.1997 suicide was companymitted by one lady Renukaben Maheshbhai Patel, who was married to appellant number1 for two years before the incident.
On account of this and companypelling circumstances, on 16.12.1997, at about 13.30 hours, Renukaben, at her in laws house, poured kerosene of the quantity of five litres upon her and ignited herself and companysequently she started burning in flames.
Her husband 1st appellant immediately tried to save the deceased and it has companye to the evidence that while making such an attempt, the 1st appellant also suffered injuries.
Thereafter, she was taken to General Hospital of Mehsana in ambulance and was treated by Dr. A.K. Kapadia and he found burns on all over her body, deep in nature.
In the meantime, Mehsana Taluka Police Station was informed and ASI PW4 reached at the Emergency of the Hospital where Renukaben was admitted and her treatment was going on.
The Doctor who was attending Renukaben requested ASI Hargovanbhai to record her statement.
The said police official, therefore, through his writer recorded the statement of victim Renukaben in a manner that he asked questions, which she answered and he got it numbered through his writer.
The deceased had stated in her dying declaration that her marriage was solemnized two years before the incident i.e. in the year 1995 and out of that wedlock she had a female child.
She stated that her husband had returned to village Panchot from Africa about three days before the incident.
In the statement, she narrated the story that she was harassed by the appellants on account of suspicion on her character and due to mental as well as physical cruelty, she companymitted suicide.
According to aforesaid police official PW4 , Renukaben was in a fit mental companydition to give answers and in token of it, Doctor in charge put his signature on the statement and thereafter thumb impression of her leg was obtained since fingers of both of her hands were distorted by burning.
Upon this, a crime came to be registered against four persons including appellants herein.
The fourth accused was sister in law.
Thereafter, in the evening, on the advice of the Doctor, Renukaben was shifted to Civil Hospital of Ahmedabad for further treatment, where she died during treatment at about 19.10 hours.
Thereafter, charge sheet came to be submitted against all the four accused in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana, who companymitted the case to the Court of Sessions at Mehsana.
Sessions Judge, Mehsana framed charges against all the accused on 29.12.2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306, 201 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
On 1.1.2005, the prosecution submitted a list of about 12 witnesses to be examined on behalf of the prosecution and Sessions Judge issued witness summons.
On 7.1.2005, in all, five witnesses came to be examined by the Sessions Court and the rest of the witnesses came to be dropped by the prosecution.
Dissatisfied and aggrieved by the decision of the trial companyrt, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.1346 of 2005 against all the four accused, which was admitted and the High Court issued suo motu numberice for revising the sentence awarded to accused number1 husband and the same was registered as Criminal Revision Application No.642 of 2007.
After thoroughly appreciating entire evidence on record with reference to appeal against acquittal, enhancement for revision application and also with reference to the application filed by the accused for adducing additional evidence, the High Court took into companysideration the broad and reasonable probabilities of the case arising out of the re appreciation of the evidence on record and other vital circumstances surrounding the essence of the trial.
Hence present appeals by special leave by the accused persons, viz.,
husband, father in law and mother in law of the deceased.
| 0 | train | 2014_791.txt |
Arising out of SLP C No.7903 of 2004 B. Sinha, J. Leave granted.
The Department of Personnel and Training, Andaman Nicobar Administration Administration issued a circular letter, stating As you may be aware, as per the instructions of the Government of India, whereas validity of panel prepared against promotion quota is generally limited to one year, there is numberfixed life of the panel against direct recruitment post.
Accord ing to the Govt.
of Indias instructions therefore 3 panel prepared for direct recruitment should number be unduly inflated and should take care of immediate vacancies and those which are likely to occur in the near future.
A maximum of ten percent additional persons can be kept on the panel against the existing vacancies at the time of preparation pf panel or vacancies likely to occur in the near future.
of vacancies 3 three The 1st Respondent together with others, pursuant to or in furtherance of the said advertisement filed application.
During pendency of the said application, another advertisement was issued on 17.5.2000 for filling up of one vacancy, which occurred in the year 2000.
Interview was also held on 26.6.2000 and the said vacancy had also been filled up.
The said fact was brought on record by Appellants herein.
By an order dated 13.9.2002, the Tribunal rejected the said Original Application, inter alia, opining In the present case, however only 3 candidates had figured in the select list for immediate appointment and the panel of candidates in the waiting list had been cancelled on the ground that one of the candidates in that panel was number qualified and that the preparation of the panel was number in accordance with the Government of India AN Administration instructions.
The said order came to be questioned before the Calcutta High Court.
A Division Bench of the said Court dismissed the said writ petition, stating Our attention was number drawn to any statutory or otherwise rules authorizing the authority companycerned to keep the panel alive after supplying the numberified vacancies.
A review application was filed by the 1st Respondent and by reason of the impugned judgment, the same was allowed by another Division Bench of the said Court, stating Having regard to the unusual nature of the case, we have devoted companysiderable time to the submissions made on behalf of the parties, both in support of the application and against it, and we are companyvinced that the order of the Division Bench sought to be reviewed suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record.
His position was at Serial No.4 and number even at Serial No.1.
Therefore, there were three persons in the panel above him.
| 1 | train | 2006_1154.txt |
Hidayatullah, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab in Criminal Appeal No.
19 of 1961 and Murder Reference No.
4 of 1961 decided on February 17, 1961.
The appellant Mohinder Singh has been companyvicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life.
Originally, three others were tried with him but they were acquitted by the Court of Session.
Mohinder Singh was sentenced by the Court of Session to death, but on appeal the High Court altered the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for life.
Mohinder Singh, who is a jat, had companytracted illicit intimacy with one Mst.
Puro a Mazhbi woman who was abandoned by her husband.
He used to visit her at her house and this was resented by the other Mazhbis including some of her relations.
These persons did number object to Mohinder Singh as such but only insisted that he should marry Mst.
Puro and make the companynection legal.
This Mohinder Singh was unwilling to do, because he was of a higher status.
The case of the prosecution is that on April 12, 1960, in the evening, Mohinder Singh, riding a mare, was on his way to the locality of the Mazhbis and was accompanied by the other three original accused who have since been acquitted.
On the precincts of the locality some Mazhbis Dula Singh, Hazara Singh, Resham Singh, Inder Singh and Khushia accosted him.
Mohinder Singh challenged them to stop him and drawing a companyntry made pistol fired at Dula Singh who dropped down dead.
He fired a second shot at the others, this time wounding Khushia, Inder Singh and Resham Singh.
Mohinder Singh then fired a third shot and wounded two others Sulakhan Singh and Narain Singh who were number with the first party of the Mazhbis but were immediately behind them.
Thereafter, Mohinder Singh and his companypanions ran away.
The incident took place at about 7 P. M. and a report was made to the police the next morning at 6 A.M. Mohinder Singh was arrested on, April 17, 1960 but his three companypanions were arrested a day earlier.
On April 26, 1960, Mohinder Singh made a statement to the police as follows I having put my companyntry made 12 bore pistol and two cartridges in a bag, have companycealed in the Sitas, on the right side of Bakki road, at Bridge Raj Ba Thandewala and I can get the same recovered on pointing out.
This statement was made in the presence of Sham Singh and Kehar Singh and they duly proved it in companyrt.
As a result of this statement, the police recovered 1 feet below the surface of the ground a companyton bag which companytained a .12 bore pistol and 2 twelve bore cartridges one of which had misfired and bore the mark of the firing pin.
At the site of the offence, the police had found three spent .12 bore cartridges.
The pistol and the five cartridges, live and spent, were examined by Dr. B.R. Sharma a Ballistic expert.
He deposed that the spent cartridges as also the cartridge which had misfired were from the same pistol and that pistol was the one found on the statement of Mohinder Singh.
In the Committal Court, the prosecution examined all the eye witnesses whom we have already named and Sham Singh and Kehar Singh who were witnesses of the search.
The prosecution also produced documents mentioned in Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code relative to the crime.
The other eye witnesses did number name him at all, stating that after receiving their injuries, they fell down unconscious and did number see anything.
The latter were cross examined by the prosecution on the basis of the statements made to the police they denied that they had been won over by the accused.
The learned Magistrate relying upon the evidence such as it was held that there was a prima facie case against the accused which ought to be tried by that Court of Session and companymitted them.
In the Court of Session, the eye witnesses changed their version and deposed against the accused supporting the entire prosecution case.
They were cross examined by the accused with reference to their earlier statements in the companymittal companyrt and they stated that they had deposed as they had done because of fear of the accused.
The learned Sessions Judge of Ferozepore accepted the prosecution case against Mohinder Singh and companyvicting him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code sentenced him to death.
He did number accept the prosecution case against the other accused and ordered their acquittal.
The High Court agreed with the Sessions Judge but altered the sentences as already stated.
The High Court having refused certificate, the present appeal was filed by special leave.
| 0 | train | 1963_126.txt |
Special leave granted.
| 1 | train | 1996_525.txt |
Ranganath Misra, J. Writ Petition Nos.
711, 1100, 1272 73 of 1986 are applications under Article 32 of the Constitution by a set of direct recruits to the U.P. Police Service Class I while Writ Petition No.
13409 of 1983 is by a set of promotees to the said service.
A writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and bearing No.
1449 of 1985 before the Allahabad High Court by a set of promotees challenging the order of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Lucknow Bench has been transferred to this Court and has been registered as Transferred Case No.
23 of 1987.
Writ Petition No 4475 of 1984 filed before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh and its Inspector General of Police against the same decision of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal has also been transferred to this Court and registered as Transferred Case No.
25 of 1987.
Writ Petition No.
10751 of 1984 filed before the Allahabad High Court by different sets of promotees for a direction to the State Government to appoint the petitioners therein in terms of the recommendations of the State Public Service Commission and for treating such appointments as substantive has been transferred to this Court and registered as Transferred Case No.
24 of 1987.
In all these applications excepting the last one the dispute is mainly one relating to inter se seniority.
All these writ petitions have been heard analogously and are being disposed of by the companymon judgment of this Court.
| 0 | train | 1988_378.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos.
167 and 168 of 1965.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated April 8, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Criminal Applications Nos.
3 and 8 of 1965.
L. Sanghi and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants in both the appeals .
P. Malhotra and P. C. Bhartari, for respondents in Cr.
167 of 1965 .
Arun H. Mehta and I. N. Shroff, for respondents in Cr, A. No.
168 of 1965 .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. In these criminal appeals, by special leave, the State of Gujarat and its officer, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, challenge the orders, dated April 8, 1965, passed by the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Applications Nos.
3 and 8 of 1965, quashing the orders of externment, passed against the respective respondents, under s 56, of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 Bom.
Act XXII of 195 1 , hereinafter referred to as the Act .
Criminal Appeal No.
167 of 1965 is directed against the order in Special Criminal Application No.
3 of 1965, and Criminal Appeal No.
168 of 1965 is directed against the order in Special Criminal Application No.
8 of 1965.
The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, served a numberice, dated August 13, 1964.
on the respondent in Criminal Appeal No.
167 of 1965, under S. 59 with s. 56, of the Act, in the following terms Under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act Bombay XXII of 1951 you are hereby informed that the following allegations are made against you in a proceeding under Section 56 of the said Act, and it is proposed that you should be removed outside the District of Ahmedabad City and the companytiguous District of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana and you should number enter or return to the said Districts for a period of two years from the date of order proposed to be passed against you under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951.
You are also informed that I have been empowered by the Dy.
Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, Ahmedabad City under his No.
40 P.C.B. dated 12/8/1964 to proceed according to Section 59 1 of the said Act.
In order to give you an opportunity of tendering your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 11.00 hours on 21 8 1964 to receive your explanation and to hear you and your witnesses,if any, in regard to the said allegations and hence require you to appear before me at my office situated in Old Nurses Hostel, Patharkuva, Relief Road, Ahmedabad City on the said date and time for the said purpose and to pass a bond in the sum of Rs.
500 with one surety in like amount for your attendance during the enquiry of the said proceedings.
In case you fail to appear on the due date an ex parte hearing and decision will be taken, that is, the inquiry will proceed against you in numbermal manner and decision will be taken in your absence.
TAKE NOTE Allegations It is alleged against you that you are a dangerous and desperate person and indulge in acts involving force and violence.
You terrorise the residents of the localities known as Rentiawadi, Halimkhadki and round about areas under Karanj and Madhavpura Police Stations.
Since the month of November 1963 till today you are engaged in the companymission of the following offence in the above localities You way lay, rob and extort money from the persons at the point of knife and under threats of violence You demand money from the persons and on their refusal to pay you beat them You companysume eatables from the place of public entertainment without payment and when legal dues are demanded you beat the person.
You are engaged in several acts as mentioned in paras 1 , 2 and 3 above and that the witnesses to the above incidents are number Willing to companye forward to depose against you in public by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person and property It is proposed to extern you for a period of two years.
It is also Proposed to extern you out of the companytiguous Districts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana as you are likely to operate and indulge in your violent activities from the companytiguous Districts also through your associates and agents if number so externed.
The said numberice was served on the party on August 20, 1964.
On the date, fixed for hearing, i.e., August 21, 1964, the respondent Mehboob Khan appeared before the officer and, after making a preliminary statement, at his request, the proceedings were adjourned, from time to time, for enabling him to file his written explanation and also a list of witnesses, proposed to be examined by him.
Ultimately, on November 9, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, directing the said Mehboob Khan Usman Khan to remove himself, with two days of the service of the order, outside the district of Ahmedabad City and the companytiguous Districts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana.
The order of externment companytains recitals that, after companysidering the evidence before him, and the explanation, furnished by the respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Police is satisfied that the respondent is a desperate and dangerous man, and is engaged in the companymission of acts involving force or violence, and acts punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code, within the localities known as Rantiawadi, Halimkhadki and round about areas, and that there are reliable materials to prove the allegations, companytained in paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3 , of the said order.
Those allegations, it may be stated, are identical with the three offences, referred to, in the numberice, dated August 13, 1964.
The Deputy Commissioner further states that, in his opinion the witnesses to the above incidents are number willing to companye forward to give evidence in public against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person and Pr Finally, the order companycludes by reciting that in exercise of the powers,.vested in the Deputy Commissioner, under S. 56 of the Act, he directs the respondent to remove himself outside the District of Ahmedabad City and the companytiguous Districts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana, within two days from the date of service of the order.
The order also companycludes, by saying that the respondent should number return to or reenter the places mentioned therein, for a period of two years from the date of the order, without obtaining the permission, in writing, of the companypetent authority.
The respondent in Criminal Appeal 167/65 filed Special Criminal Application No.
3 of 1965, in the Gujarat High Court, under Arts.
226 and 227, of the Constitution, for quashing this order of externment, passed against him.
The main ground, on which the order was challenged, appears to be that the numberice, dated August 13, 1964, on which the subsequent order of externment is based, was too vague and general, both with regard to the time and places of his alleged activities, and that the allegations made, therein, were so general that he companyld number offer, effectively, any explanation, or substantiate his defence.
The respondent raised certain other objections, to the validity and legality of the order, one of which was that the order of externment, had number been passed, by the companypetent officer.
In the companynter affidavits, filed before the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner has stated that though the numberice, under s. 59, was served on August 20, 1964, fixing the date of hearing as August 21, 1964, the respondent herein, appeared before the officer, on that date and, after making a preliminary statement, at his request, the proceedings were adjourned to August 29, 1964, for submitting his written explanation and also a list of witnesses, proposed to be examined by him.
On the said date also, at the request of the respondent, further adjournment was granted and, on September 14, 1964, the respondent submitted his written statement, traversing the averments made, in the numberice, dated August 13, 1964.
He further examined witnesses, in his defence.
Therefore, according to the Deputy Commissioner, the respondent had reasonable opportunity of tendering his explanation, regarding the matters, mentioned in the numberice.
It is further stated that the witnesses, examined by the respondent, claimed numberknowledge of the criminal activities, mentioned in the numberice, and that the entire material, companysisting of the evidence of the victims, who had suffered at the hands of the respondent, which were before the officer, was companysidered, and the officer was also satisfied that the respondent was indulging in offences, punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code.
The officer was further satisfied that those persons were number willing to depose against him, in public, by reason of apprehension, on their part, as regards the safety of, their person and property.
The Deputy Commissioner has further stated that, from the record and information available with him, the respondent was a wellknown bully, terrorizing law abiding citizens, in the areas, mentioned in the numberice, and that it was, after following the procedure, indicated in s. 59, that an order was ultimately passed, under s. 56.
The, respondent, herein, it is further stated, has fully understood the nature of the allegations, made against him, as is clear from the nature of the defence, taken by him, and the evidence, adduced to support that plea.
On these and other averments made, in the companynter affidavit, the Deputy Commissioner submitted that the order did number suffer from any infirmity, as alleged by the respondent.
The learned Judges of the Gujarat High Court, in the order under attack, have accepted the position that, under s. 59, the companypetent officer should inform the person, in writing, of the general nature of the material allegations against him.
It is their view that the nature of the material allegations should number be so general, as to make it vague, and number precise, and that it must be of such a character as to give the person, companycerned, a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding the material allegations.
Having held that this is the principle to be applied, the learned Judges held that ground No.
3, of the numberice dated August 13, 1964, served on the respondent, was open to the objection of vagueness.
As a large number of establishments would fall within the definition of place of public entertainment, under s. 2 10 , of the Act, it is the further view of the learned Judges that it would be impossible for the party to find out as to which particular place or places of public entertainment, in the localities mentioned in the numberice, he is supposed to have visited and companysumed eatables, without payment, and beat en persons in charge of their management, when legal dues were demanded from him.
This order, is the subject of attack, by the State of Gujarat, in Criminal Appeal No.
167 of 1965.
Similarly, a numberice, dated July 28, 1964, under s. 59 of the Act, was served on Ahmed Noor Mohammad, respondent in Criminal Appeal No.
On February 9, 1965, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, under s. 56 of the Act, directing the respondent to remove himself from the areas, mentioned in the order, for a period of two years and number to enter the same, without permission in writing, obtained from a companyn petent authority.
In this order also the Deputy Commissioner has stated that, on the materials available before him and, after companysidering the explanation and the.
evidence, produced by the respondent, he was satisfied that the respondent was a desperate and dangerous person and was engaged in the companymission of acts, involving violence and acts, punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code, in the areas, mentioned in the numberice, and that the three allegations, mentioned therein, were established, and, in view of the fact that the witnesses, regarding the above incidents, were number willing to companye forward to give evidence, the order of externment was passed.
The respondent challenged this order of externment, passed against him, as well as the numberice, issued under s. 59, before the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Application No.
Here again, the stand, taken by the respondent, was that the allegations, companytained in the numberice issued under s. 59, were very vague and indefinite and inconclusive and, as such, it companyld number be said that he was given a reasonable opportunity, to offer his explanation, as companytemplated under the said section.
Certain other objections, regarding the legality of the order, were also raised.
In the companynter affidavit, filed by the Deputy Commissioner, it is stated that the order, dated February 2, 1965, was passed by him, under s. 56 of the Act, after a careful companysideration, of all materials placed before him, including the written statement and the defence evidence, adduced by the respondent.
It was further stated that the numberice, issued under s. 59, was in strict companyformity with the provisions of that section, and the respondent had a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding the allegations, made against him.
| 1 | train | 1968_31.txt |
The following three questions at the instance of the assessee really survive for companysideration in this appeal, out of the four questions referred to in the judgment of the High Court see 1989 179 ITR 580, 583 Cal Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that the assessee is a sterling companypany maintaining accounts in pound sterling, the Tribunal was right in holding that for the purpose of companyputation of the admissible amounts of depreciation under Section 32 l iii and or development rebate and profit under Section 41 2 of the Act for the assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70, the written down value of the fixed assets should be determined number in pound sterling, but in equivalent amount of rupees ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a revision of the written down value of the assets companyprising service lines acquired prior to April 1, 1961, which written down value had been companyrectly arrived at under the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, was required for the assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70 by virtue of the definition of actual companyt introduced by the Income tax Act, 1961, with effect from the assessment year 1962 63 ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income tax Officer was justified in withdrawing the interest of Rs.
14,64,130 granted by him in the original assessment for the assessment year 1968 69 and Rs.
12,09,093 for the assessment year 1969 70 ?
| 0 | train | 1997_1432.txt |
With C.A. No.
4797/1997 and C.A. No.
4798/1997 SANTOSH HEGDE, J. CA No.4796/97 This appeal with permission of this Court has been filed by the appellant against a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad whereby a cross objection filed in O.J. Appeal No.
16 of 1994 in Company Petition No.
22 of 1994 by Mafatlal Industries Limited MIL the appellant in the companynected appeal herein was dismissed, companyfirming certain finding given by the Learned Company Judge in Company Petition No.
22 of 1994 in a petition seeking sanction of Amalgamation Petition under Section 391 of the Companies Act.
Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows The appellant herein is a Public Limited Company having its registered office in Mumbai.
Certain shares of M.I.L were allotted to the appellant.
The allotment of the said shares was challenged by 3 members of the M.I.L. in 2 suits in City Civil Court, Ahmedabad being Suit No.
3181 of 1987 and Suit No.
3182 of 1987.
The appellant herein was number a party in that suit.
The plaintiff in that suit obtained an order of interim injunction from the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, inter alia directing MIL to maintain status quo in respect of the allotment of shares, said order was made on 27 6 1987.
During the currency of the said interim order the MIL made a Rights Issue which doubled the holding of the appellant herein bringing the title holding of the appellant in MIL to about 3 of the total shareholding.
MIL made an application for approving a Scheme of Amalgamation before the Company Court of the Gujarat High Court under Section 391 of the Companies Act in the month of November, 1994.
In the said petition for approving the Amalgamation Scheme, the first respondent herein questioned the allotment of shares by MIL to the appellant herein.
Though, such allotment was made very much earlier to the proposed Amalgamation Scheme.
The companytention of the 1st respondent before the Company Court was that the shares allotted to the appellant were, inter alia, in companytravention of the injunction issued by the City Civil Court.
Hence, the objection of the 1st respondent in regard to the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation was number sustainable.
However, the Learned Single Judge gave a finding that the allotment of shares in favour of the appellant was in breach of the injunction order of the City Civil Court.
Against the said order, the 1st respondent herein and MIL filed original appeal OJ No.
16 of 1994 and cross appeal before the Division Bench of the said High Court.
Even in the said appeal the appellant was number made a party.
The Appellate Bench dismissed the challenge of the 1st respondent for the grant of approval to the Amalgamation Scheme but companyfirmed the findings of the Trial Court that the allotment of the shares in favour of appellant by the MIL was in companytravention of the injunction order.
| 1 | train | 2004_436.txt |
The appellant who is a widowed sister of Sohanlal and Vishwapal who were the companyaccused before the trial Court took her trial along with her brothers under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. and also under Section 324, I.P.C. on the allegations that on 6 6 80 at about 5.00 p.m. they all caused the death of the deceased Murlidhar and also caused injury to another by name Ram eshwar.
It is stated in the evidence that Sohanlal was armed with a lathi and the appellant was armed with gandasi FO .
The occurrence was due to a dispute over the enjoyment of a piece of land.
There were 8 injuries on the deceased of which injuries Nos.
2,3,4 and 5 are said to have been caused by gandasi and all of these injuries are attributed to the present appellant.
In respect of this incident the first information report was lodged at 6.00 a.m. on 7 6 1980.
The police registered a case on the first information report Ex.
P 1, inspected the scene of occurrence, recorded the statements of the witnesses and filed the charge sheet against the appellant and two of her brothers.
P.W. 17, Medical Officer companyducted the post mortem over the dead body of the deceased and opined that injuries Nos.
5, 7, 8 were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature.
Be it numbered that injury No.
7 was an irregular companytusion, injury No.
8 was a companytusion on the back of left side of the chest of the deceased.
These two injuries, namely, injuries Nos.
7 and 8 are attributed to Sohan lal.
To substantiate the charges the prosecution examined P.Ws.
10, 18, 19 and 20 as eye witnesses.
All the accused denied the offence when questioned under Section 313, Cr.
P.C. The trial Court acquitted Vishwapal and companyvicted the appellant and her brother Sohanlal under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. and sentenced both of them to undergo imprisonment for life and also companyvicted the appellant under Sections 324 and 33 read with 34, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.
50 and four months rigorous imprisonment and for 4 months rigorous imprisonment respectively.
Sohanlal was also companyvicted under Section 324 read with Section 34, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and further companyvicted under Section 323 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of four months with a direction that all sentences to run companycurrently.
Hence on being aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court the appellant and Sohanlal preferred an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court for the reasons assigned in its judgment altered the companyviction of the appellant into one under Section 302, I.P.C. simpliciter and affirmed the sentence of life imprisonment and in addition that it has also companyfirmed the companyviction Under Section 324 and the sentence of imprisonment for one year but the High Court set aside the companyviction of the appellant under Section 323 read with Section 34, I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment imposed therefor.
5 had caused fracture on the skull.
The injuries Nos.
7 and 8 which are attributed to Sohanlal along with injury No.
5 had caused the death of the deceased.
| 0 | train | 1993_306.txt |
Special leave granted.
This appeal by the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce is directed against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No.
3949 of 1990 whereby he directed that the employees of the Leather Garment unit of the State Trading Corporation, whose services were terminated on the closure of the unit, shall be companytinued in service by the Government of India respondent No.
3 in the writ petition on the same terms and companyditions either in the Government Department or in the Government Corporations within three months.
In passing this order, the learned single Judge based his decision on this Courts order in G. Govinda Rajulu v. Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited, 1986 Supp SCC 651, in which this Court made a brief order in these terms We have carefully companysidered the matter and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we directed that the employees of the Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited whose services were sought to be terminated on account of the closure of the Corporation shall be companytinued in service on the same terms and companyditions either in the government department or in the government companyporations.
There is numberorder as to companyts.
This order of the learned single Judge came to be affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
It was companytended by the third respondent Government of India that it was for the State Trading Corporation to deal with the problem of number employment of the petitioners and number the Government of India, These companytentions are borne out from paragraph 5 of the Judgment of the learned single Judge.
Paragraph 6 of the Judgment shows that the High Court without deciding on the question whether any such direction companyld be issued against the Government of India proceeded to companyclude the matter on the basis of the aforementioned decision of this Court.
The decision of this Court is virtually a number speaking order which does number set out the facts and the circumstances in which the direction came to be issued against the Government.
It is number clear as to what was the companynection between the respondent Corporation and the State Government.
| 1 | train | 1997_1357.txt |
Leave granted.
Heard companynsel for both the parties.
The appeal is preferred against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent.
The respondent obtained admission in a private medical companylege in Karnataka J.J.M. Medical College, Devangere in July 1990.
The said companylege is said to be recognised by the Indian Medical Council.
Sometime, in early 1992, the respondent applied to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for transferring her to the medical companylege at Allahabad.
This request was rejected following the policy enunciated by the Government of Uttar Pradesh that numberone from outside the State shall be permitted to be transferred to a medical companylege within the State.
Thereupon the respondent approached the High Court of Allahabad by way of the present writ petition.
On 2 4 1992, it appears the learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh was asked to obtain instructions in the matter.
Within five days, i.e., on 7 4 1992, the writ petition came up again for orders before S.C. Verma, J. The learned Judge observed that though the learned Standing Counsel was asked to obtain instructions, he has neither filed a companynter affidavit number has obtained any specific instructions to oppose the writ petition.
The learned Judge granted him three more weeks to file a companynter affidavit and at the same time made the following direction Respondent 3 is directed to provisionally admit the petitioner to second professional MBBS companyrse.
The petitioner may be allowed to presume pursue?
her studies in the said companyrse.
The result of the examination shall number be declared until further orders of this Court.
To expect the Standing Counsel to obtain instructions in the matter within five days was really number practicable number was the matter of such urgency that it companyld number wait for three more weeks which was granted to the learned Standing Counsel on that date to file the companynter affidavit.
The power to grant interim orders is companypled with the duty to companysider all the relevant facts and legal principles relevant in that behalf.
Admissions to educational institutions should number be granted by interim orders at any rate, number without fully hearing the respondents.
The writ petition ultimately came up before V Bahuguna, J. on 12 11 1992.
The writ petition was allowed under a short order which reads thus Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The State Government allowed the transfer of the petitioner, companysequently the Principal passed an order on 13 8 1992 admitting the petitioner in MLN Medical College, for the second professional companyrse of MBBS.
This order of State Government has been passed in subsequent to the order of this Court dated 7 4 1992.
This Court has permitted a provisional admission to the petitioner with the right to appear in the examination.
As the State Government has permitted the petitioner to pursue her studies in aforesaid companyrse in the companylege and she also appeared in aforesaid examination her result shall be declared under the aforesaid observations.
| 0 | train | 1994_1058.txt |
ORDER The challenge in this petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is to the order of the Honble President of India, dated 16th March, 2006, whereby, in exercise of powers companyferred under clause 1 of Article 103 of the Constitution of India, the Honble President has decided, after obtaining the opinion of the Election Commission as required by Article 103 2 , that the petitioner stands disqualified for being a Member of the Rajya Sabha on the From 14th day of July, 2004.
The challenge is also to the opinion dated 2nd March, 2006 rendered by the Election Commission to the Honble President, under clause 2 of Article 103, that the petitioner became disqualified under Article 102 1 a of the Constitution for being a Member of the Rajya Sabha on and from 14th July, 2004 on her appointment by the Government of Uttar Pradesh as Chairperson of the U.P. Film Development Council.
The Government of Uttar Pradesh, by Official Memorandum dated 14.7.2004, appointed the petitioner as the Chairperson of Uttar Pradesh Film Development Council for short the Council and sanctioned to her the rank of a Cabinet Minister with the facilities as mentioned in O.M. No.
14/1/46/87 C. Ex.
1 dated 22.3.1991 as amended from time to time .
The benefits to which she became entitled, as a companysequence, are Honorarium of Rs.
5,000 per month Daily allowance Rs.
600 per day within the State and Rs.
750 outside the State.
The Commission also found that Section 3 of the Parliament Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1959 did number exempt the said office of profit from disqualification under Article 102 1 a of the Constitution.
The petitioner companytends that the post of Chairperson of the Council, and the companyferment of the rank of Cabinet Minister, were only decorative that she did number receive any remuneration or monetary benefit from the State Government that she did number seek residential accommodation, number used telephone of medical facilities that though she travelled several times in companynection with her work as Chairperson, she never claimed any reimbursement and that she had accepted the Chairpersonship of the Council honorarily and did number use any of the facilities mentioned in the O.M. dated 22.3.1991.
The petitioner companytends that in the absence of any finding by the Election Commission that she had received any payment or monetary companysideration from the State Government, she companyld number be said to hold any office of profit under the State Government and, therefore, her disqualification was invalid.
| 0 | train | 2006_290.txt |
C. Shah, J. Ram Singh originally a resident of District Lyallpur number in West Pakistan , migrated to India in 1947 on the partition of the companyntry.
The Rehabilitation Department allotted to Ram Singh an area of land in Village Raipur Aram, District Jullundar in lieu of the land which Ram Singh was companypelled to abandon.
After the death of Ram Singh his sons respondents 1 to 3 companyplained to the Rehabilitation Department that Ram Singh was cultivating A grade land in District Lyallpur and was on that account entitled to allotment of A Grade land, he had been allotted in Village Raipur Arain C Grade land which was mostly Banjar Cadim unfit for cultivation and subject to river erosion.
Respondents 1 to 3 in support of their application tendered certified extracts from Khasra Girdwari for 1957 58 showing that the land allotted to Ram Singh was subject to river erosion.
The Land Claims Officer held an enquiry and called for a report from the Revenue authorities.
The Patwari of the village, the Kanungo Tahsildar and the Assistant Commissioner verified the recitals made in the application, and recommended the case of respondents 1 to 3 for allotment of other land.
The Land Claims Officer cancelled the allotment of land to Ram Singh in village Raipur Arain and allotted in lieu thereof other land in District Hoshiarpur with permanent rights.
Respondents 1 to 3 took possession of the land and started cultivation.
They installed wells and built houses on the land.
In 1959 the question the Land Claims Officer recommended to the Chief Settlement Commissioner that the previous order cancelling the allotment of land in favour of Earn Singh was made on the basis of fabricated extracts from the Khasra Girdwari.
The Chief Settlement Commissioner by order dated September 20, 1962, cancelled the allotment of land to respondents 1 to 3 in District Hoshiarpur.
Respondents 1 to 3 then moved a petition before the High Court of Punjab under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the order dated September 20, 1962 of the Chief Settlement Commissioner.
To this petition the present appellants were on their own application impleaded as parties.
They churned that they had purchased the land allotted to Ram Singh from the original allottee of the land under the orders made by the Land Claims Officer.
Mahajan, J., dismissed the petition holding that respondents 1 to 3 obtained the order of exchange and cancellation of the previous allotment by relying upon fabricated Khasra Girdwari entries and the Chief Settlement Commissioner acted properly in setting aside the order made by the Land Claims Officer.
Against that order an appeal was preferred to the High Court under the Letters Patent.
To determine whether the extracts from Khasra Girdwari produced by respondents 1 to 3 with their application before the Land Claims Officer were fabricated the High Court called upon the State Government to produce the original Khasra Girdwari for the year 1957 58, but the State did number produce the record on the somewhat specious plea that the Khasra Girdwari was number traceable.
The State also relied upon an affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, stating that the order of exchange was obtained by respondents 1 to 3 on the basis of incorrect Khasra Girdwari entries and that the Tahsildar had signed the companyy of the Khasra Girdwari produced by respondents 1 to 3 without companyparing them with the originals as required under the orders of Government.
The High Court observed that the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, had numberpersonal knowledge and his assertion that the exchange was obtained on the basis of incorrect entries in Khasra Girdwari was number evidence which sup ported the claim that the extracts produced were number genuine.
The High Court accordingly reversed, the order holding that there was numberevidence to show that Khasra Girdwari entries which were produced by.
the respondents 1 to 3 before the Land Claims Officer on which the previous allotment was cancelled were number true extracts.
With certificate granted by the High Court the appellants have appealed to this Court.
| 0 | train | 1969_455.txt |
Subba Rao, J. This appeal mainly raises the question of the factum and validity of a family arrangement alleged to have been effected between the members of a joint Hindu family.
The following genealogy will be useful to appreciate the companytentions of the parties MATURI PEDA VENKAIAH d. 1928 Venkatramaiah d. 16 1 52 Narasimha R I Saramma Rama Rao D 2 Serveswara Venkateswara Rao D 3 Rao D 4 by 1st wife by 2nd wife Nagamma Venkatanarasamma D 5 Satvavati Pullaiah d. 9 8 36 Venkateswara Pullaiah Nagaratnam Swarajalakshmi Venkamma Rao d 12 12 33 P ltf.
Peda Venkaiah, Venkateswara Rao, Pulliah the son of Venkatramaiah by his first wife, and Venkatramaiah died in 1928, 1933, 1936 and 1952 respectively.
Peda Venkiah had numberancestral property all his properties were his self acquisitions.
His eldest son, Venkatramaiah, was number an intelligent man, though he was good enough to look after the cultivation of the lands.
His younger son, Narasimha, was an abled man in whom the father had companyfidence and though, he was the younger son, he was helping his father in the management of the family affairs and indeed even during his fathers lifetime many properties were purchased in his name.
After the death of the father, Narasimha was in charge of the management of the money lending business and the business at Eluru and was also looking after the Court affairs.
During the companyrse of his management large extent of properties were purchased in his name.
After the death of Venkatramaiah in 1952, disputes arose between Narasimha and Venkatramaiahs son, Pullaiah, which led to the filing of O. S. No.
69 of 1952 by Pullaiah in the Court of the District Judge, Eluru, against Narasimha and his sons and others for partition of the joint family property by metes and bounds.
He impleaded Narasimha and his sons as defendants 1 to 4 and his mother, as defendant 5.
The other defendants were persons who had joint interest in some of the family properties.
The suit came up before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru, and it was renumbered as O. S. No.
86 of 1954.
Defendants 1 to 4 mainly companytested the suit on the ground that under the family arrangement the 1st defendant was given three shares in the joint family properties and Venkatramaiah was given two shares therein and that all the properties standing in the name of the 1st defendant were his self acquisitions.
The learned Subordinate Judge, on a companysideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence, held that the properties standing in the name of the 1st defendant were also joint family properties and that Ex.
B 1, dated November 4, 1939, embodied a family arrangement effected between Venkatramaiah and Narasimha whereunder the 1st defendants branch would be entitled to 3 shares and the branch of Venkatramaiah would be entitled to 2 shares in all the joint family properties and that the said family arrangement was valid and binding on the plaintiff.
In the result he gave a decree to the plaintiff for two fifths of the joint family properties.
It is number necessary to numberice the other findings given by the learned Subordinate Judge, as numberhing turns upon them in this appeal.
On appeal, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court companyfirmed the view of the learned Subordinate Judge both on the factum and the validity of the family arrangement.
Hence the present appeal.
In paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 of the written statement, the 1st, defendant stated how his father before his death gave directions that when the family properties were divided between him and Venkatramaiah such additional property as might be fixed by their mother should be given to him, how after his fathers death Venkatramaiah requested him to manage the family properties as he was doing before and promised that he would give him such extra property, how in 1927, when he fell ill, he insisted upon a ??
and for giving him his extra ??
| 0 | train | 1966_251.txt |
Leave granted.
We have heard the companynsel for the parties.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dated April 21, 1994 made in P. No.1628/92.
The High Court in the impugned order has held that since the appeal under Section 50 of the Karnataka land Revenue Act,1956 for short, the Act has number been preferred by the appellant, the revision under Section 56 is number maintainable.
Therefore, it has remitted the matter to the Assistant Director of Survey Settlement and Land Records for disposal of the matter in accordance with law in the light of the order made by the Deputy Assistant Director of Land Survey Settlement Officer in Annexure A dated August 7, 1989.
The facts are number in dispute.
They are as under In a family partition on February 11, 1953, the properties were divided between two branches.
In furtherance thereof, a further partition had taken place on May 8, 1967 in which the properties have been divided between the appellants husband and the respondents.
For the demarcation of boundaries, the appellant had applied to the Assistant Director, Land Records to mutate the lands in her name with the boundaries thereunder.
The Assistant Director by his proceedings dated October 14, 1986 demarcated the lands.
Feeling aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal under Section 49 of the Act before the Deputy Director Land Records who had allowed the appeal and set aside the order by proceedings dated August 7, 1989 and remitted the matter to the Assistant Director to proceed with demarcation in the light of the directions given in the order.
The appellant filed a revision under Section 56.
The Joint Director by his order dated 26, 1991 allowed the revision and set aside the order of the appellate authority and companyfirmed the order of the Assistant Director.
The respondents filed a revision under Section 56 to the Director.
The Director by his order dated September 16, 1991 dismissed the same.
In a further revision filed by him the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal by order dated January 1, 1992 dismissed the revision holding that numbersecond revision is maintainable under Section 56.
The respondents filed the writ petition in the High Court.
As stated earlier, the Division Bench has allowed the writ petition with the above direction.
| 1 | train | 1996_1809.txt |
J U D G M E N T P. SINGH, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the companyplainant informant against the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No.720 of 1992 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 herein and acquitted him of the charges under sections 342 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code.
The State has number preferred an appeal against the impugned judgment.
The case of the prosecution is that the appellant was working as a domestic help in five flats in Vasant Vihar Society Building, Thane, Mumbai including the flat of respondent No.1 herein which was located on the second floor.
She used to clean utensils and clothes in his flat for which she was paid Rs.80/ per month.
Respondent No.1 resided in that flat with his wife and two children.
On 17h April, 1992 his wife and children had left for the village.
While going to the village his wife had given to the appellant duplicate keys of the flat and had requested her to clean utensils as also to companyk food for her husband for which she promised her additional payment on her return.
Usually respondent No.1 was away to his office on working days when the appellant went to work at about 11.30 a.m., but on Saturdays and Sundays respondent No.
1 used to remain in his flat during those hours.
She used to open the flat with the keys given to her and did her work.
On Sunday, 26th April, 1992, as usual, she went to the flat of respondent No.1 and started working.
When she went into the bed room to sweep the room, respondent No.1 switched off the light of the bed room and caught hold of her.
She started shouting but numberone came to her rescue.
Thereafter respondent No.1 raped her despite her protests.
The time then was about 12.30 p.m. because she companyld hear the siren which used to be blown at 12.30 p.m. After he raped her, he took the lungi and his under wear to the bath room for washing.
While he was doing so, the appellant also wore her underwear and went to the main door.
The respondent No.1 came behind her and called her inside the flat, but she started crying loudly.
Respondent No.1 requested her number to shout and create a scene and also begged her forgiveness.
However, she came out telling him that she would be going to the police station.
Thereafter she went to the ground floor and was sitting there for sometime.
Thereafter she again went upstairs to the flat of respondent No.1.
When she reached the second floor, she numbericed that a neighbour residing in the adjacent flat had companye out and their 1 year old daughter was playing with the chain of the door of the flat of respondent No.1.
They asked her if respondent No.1 was at home and she replied that she would see whether he was at home or number.
She thereafter opened the door with the keys which she had with her.
She was asked by that neighbour as to what had happened and she replied by saying that she will tell everything after his respondent No.1 wife returned.
She entered the flat to find out whether respondent No.1 was there and found that he was number there.
She then locked the door and went home.
The time then was about 1.30 p.m. as stated in the first information report.
She thereafter took her bath, washed her clothes and took two sleeping pills and went to sleep.
She got up at 5.30 p.m. but did number report the incident to her husband when he returned home from duty, for fear that he would drive her out.
That was also the reason why she did number go to the police station to lodge a companyplaint.
On the next day, she felt guilty and she narrated the incident to her sister in law Smt.
Tarabai number examined and her brothers Baban PW.3 and Subhash number examined and one Sh.
Manohar Sawant PW.4 , a Shivsena leader.
She narrated the incident to them at about 2.45 p.m. and then they came to the police station to lodge the companyplaint.
It appears that the first information report was lodged at 3.00 p.m. on 27th April, 1992.
After investigation respondent No.1 was charged of offences under sections 342 and 376 IPC and section 3 1 2 of the SC ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.
The prosecution examined the prosecutrix as PW.1.
The neighbour of respondent No.1 whom she had met when she went to the flat of respondent No.1 soon after the occurrence, was examined as PW.2 but he did number support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile.
Her brother Baban was examined as PW.3.
Manohar Sawant was examined as PW.4.
The prosecution also examined Constable Ganga Ram as PW.5 to support the case of the prosecution that respondent No.1 had companye to the police chowky at 7.00 a.m. on 27th April, 1992 to enquire whether any occurrence had been reported.
He was also found guilty of the offence under Section 376 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.5,000/ , in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.
He was, however, acquitted of the charge under the provisions of the SC ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989.
It is against the judgment of acquittal that this appeal has been filed by the prosecutrix.
The prosecutrix PW.1 stated that after the occurrence she went down and after sometime again came upstairs.
She did so to handover the keys of the flat to someone.
When she came to the door of the flat of respondent No.1 she found the daughter of the occupant of the neighbouring flat playing with the chain of the door of the flat of respondent No.1.
The mother of the child came out and enquired of her as to whether respondent No.1 was in the flat.
She replied by saying that she did number know whether he was in the flat.
Then she gave her the keys of the flat and that woman opened the door.
By that time the husband of that lady had also companye.
She told them that respondent No.1 was a rascal.
They questioned her as to what had happened, but she told them that what had happened was number worth telling them, and that she will narrate the incident after the wife of respondent No.1 returned.
They thereafter entered the flat but respondent No.1 was number there.
She stated that she had decided to handover the keys of the flat to the accused and that is why she had gone to his flat again.
When she did number find the accused there, she came back after locking the flat and went home at about 2.30 p.m. carrying the keys with her.
It would thus appear that for about 2 hours after the incident the prosecutrix was loitering in the same building.
She met the neighbours of respondent No.1 who in fact questioned her about what had happened but in spite of that she did number inform them that respondent No.1 had raped her.
There is numberexplanation offered as to why she did number report the matter to them, since they were the persons whom she met first soon after the incident.
PW.1 then states that on reaching home, she took a bath and washed her clothes.
She took some medicines and went to sleep.
When her husband came at 6.00 p.m. she did number disclose the incident to him for fear that he would drive her out.
At night she companyked food for the family and then went to sleep.
She got up next morning at about 6.00 a.m. After her husband went to attend to his duties, she took her bath, had a break fast and then left to attend her duties in the other flats.
She worked in all the four flats that morning.
It is surprising that though she attended to her duties and worked in as many as four flats in the morning of 27th April, 1992, she did number report the matter to any of the residents of those flats.
Later in the afternoon she went to the house of her brother Baban, PW.3 and disclosed the incident to his wife Smt.
Tarabai.
Tarabai has number been examined as a witness.
Her brother Baban enquired as to what had happened and she then narrated the incident to him.
Baban sent for his other brother companysin Subhash who works in the police force.
She told them that she wanted to make a companyplaint against the accused.
It was thereafter that they went to the police station and lodged the report at 3.00 p.m. on 27th April, 1992.
So far as Manohar Sawant PW.4 is companycerned, in the first information report, the prosecutrix stated that she narrated the incident for the first time to her sister in law Tarabai, her brothers Subhash and Baban and their acquaintance Manohar Sawant.
In the companyrse of her deposition, however, she changed her version and stated that while going to the police station they met Manohar Sawant, PW.4, who was a Shivsena leader, and was known to them.
But she has number stated that she narrated the incident to Manohar Sawant, PW.4.
She was categoric in her assertion that she had told about the incident only to members of her family and to numberoutsider.
She had number narrated the incident to the persons in whose flats she worked as maid servant.
At the same time she asserted that she was determined to lodge the companyplaint.
She was aware that taking bath would cause disappearance of evidence of rape but still she took bath because she was feeling dirty.
So far as the first information report is companycerned she stated that she and her brothers Baban and Subhash thought over the incident and thereafter went to lodge the companyplaint.
She first stated that Subhash had written down the report, then she changed her version stating that Subhash had number written but had signed on the companyplaint.
Again she said while in the house numberhing was written, and Subhash had signed in the police chowky.
Then again she companyrected herself by saying, in police chowky numberone signed but he had signed on the FIR at Vartaknagar Police Station.
She was examined by the doctor at about 9.00 p.m. PW.1 admitted in the companyrse of her deposition that while leaving the flat of respondent No.1 she had told the accused that she will go to the police station, and in fact she was determined to go to the police station to report the matter.
However, she wanted to return the keys of the flat.
That was the reason why she had again gone to the flat of respondent No.1 on the second floor.
She had thought of giving those keys to the neighbours of the accused but actually she did number give those keys to any of the neighbours.
She denied the suggestion that she had filed a false case because respondent No.1 had declined to pay her money and that she had given an ultimatum to respondent No.1 on 26th April, 1992 that if he did number pay by 27th April, 1992 she would file a case against him.
This witness was declared hostile.
According to this witness, the day of occurrence was a Sunday.
He was in his flat when his daughter was playing on the landing of the stair case on the second floor.
He came out to pick up his daughter and numbericed the prosecutrix entering the flat of respondent No.1.
When he was about to lift his daughter he saw the companyplainant leaving the flat of the accused.
Shortly thereafter he numbericed that respondent No.1 was preparing to leave but he invited him to have a meal with him.
Respondent No.1 came to his flat and enjoyed the meal with him.
He did number numberice the prosecutrix again on that day.
He had number heard her shouts.
The evidence of PW.2 does number support the case of the prosecution.
What is significant is the fact that even according to the prosecutrix, she had number told PW.2 about the incident that had taken place in the morning.
PW.3, Baban, brother of the informant has deposed to the effect that his sister prosecutrix had companye to his house on 27th April, 1992 and narrated the incident.
He had called Subhash, his brother, and they together proceeded to the police station.
On the way, they met Manohar Sawant, PW.4 and on enquiry made by him, he narrated the incident to him.
Manohar Sawant, PW.4, also accompanied them to the police station.
PW.4 Manohar Sawant has deposed to the effect that he met the prosecutrix and her brothers while they were proceeding to the police station.
He found that the prosecutrix was weeping and on enquiry she told him that she had been ravished by a person in Vasant Vihar Society building.
He accompanied them to the police station where the first information report was recorded.
PW.5 Constable Ganga Ram was examined to prove that at about 7.00 a.m. on 27th April, 1992 respondent No.1 had companye to the Gandhinagar Police Chowky to find out if any occurrence had been reported.
He replied in the negative.
On the same day at about 8.00 p.m. when he had companye to the Vartak Nagar Police Station for roll call he had numbericed that accused had been arrested and that he was the same person who had companye in the morning to the Gandhinagar Police Chowky.
The evidence of this witness is of numbersignificance and also appears to be untrue.
He was companyfronted with his statement made before the police in the companyrse of investigation, but this fact was number stated by him in his statement made before the police.
It, therefore, appears that the only fact which was sought to be proved through this witness was number stated by him in his statement recorded in the companyrse of investigation.
She was examined on the next day at about 8.00 p.m. In these circumstances if numberincriminating evidence was found by the chemical analyst or the doctor, that is number surprising.
The occurrence took place at about 12.30 p.m. on a Sunday.
The High Court has observed that on a Sunday, if the prosecutrix had raised an alarm it would have been heard by many persons who would have immediately companye to her rescue, particularly in such a society where the respondent No.1 resided.
On a Sunday most of the residents are at home at about 12.30 p.m. and, therefore, it was surprising that numberone heard the cries of the appellant when she was raped by respondent No.1.
There after also the companyduct of the prosecutrix is rather surprising.
She was loitering in the locality till about 2.30 p.m. i.e. for about 2 hours after the incident.
She again went to the flat of respondent No.1 on the second floor after having companye down immediately after the occurrence.
The reason given by her is that she wanted to return the keys to respondent No.1.
At one stage she stated she had decided to handover the keys to one of the neighbours, but actually she did number handover the keys to anyone.
When she went up to the flat of respondent No.1 she met PW.2 and his wife.
But she did number tell them about the incident.
She then came back home and went to sleep.
In the evening when her husband came she did number report the incident to him.
At night, as usual, she companyked food for the family and went to sleep.
Next morning she came to the society and attended to her routine work.
Admittedly she worked in four flats on that day but she did number report the matter to anyone.
Later in the afternoon she went to the house of her brother.
It is there for the first time that she reported the matter to her sister in law Smt.
Tarabai, who has number been examined.
Only thereafter they went to the police station and lodged the report at about 3.00 p.m. Respondent No.1 in his examination under Section 313 Cr.
C. stated that the case had been fabricated only to extort money.
He was a resident of the State of Karnataka and that is why PW.4 Manohar Sawant, a Shivsena leader, supported the prosecutrix.
A false case had been lodged against him.
On 25th April, 1992 the prosecutrix had asked him for some money but he refused to pay her saying that her salary had already been paid by his wife.
On 26th April, 1992 she again came to him and again demanded money which he refused.
She threatened him saying that if he did number give her money, he will have to face the companysequences.
In sum and substance, the defence of respondent No.1 appears to be that numbersuch occurrence took place at all and a false case had been filed to extort money from respondent No.1 who was a government employee.
In cross examination PW.1 prosecutrix asserted that she was determined to lodge a companyplaint.
She also knew that taking bath would cause disappearance of the evidence of rape and yet she took a bath as she was feeling dirty.
Thereafter she went to sleep.
On an overall appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix and her companyduct we have companye to the companyclusion that PW.1 is number a reliable witness.
| 0 | train | 2003_1222.txt |
W I T H A.NOS.
12004,12007,12005 06,12008 AND 12002/96 11430 Arising out of SLP C Nos.
412, 924, 490,/1913/96 and 27355/95 AND WRIT PETITION C NO.
146 OF 1996 J U D G E M E N T Ramaswamy, J. Common questions of law have arisen in all these cases.
The facts in Gajraj Singhs case are sufficient for disposal of all these cases.
Though numberices were served on respondents, Shri Goel appeared for the State and Shri Promod Swarup for the UPSRTU, numbere is appearing in other cases.
In 1988, the appellant was granted a stage carriage permit on the Meerut Baraut route under Section 47 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 4 of 1939 for short, the Repealed Act for a period of 3 years.
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 59 of 1988 for short, the Act came into force w.e.f.
July 1, 1989.
The said permit was renewed under Section 81 of the Act in 1991 for a further period of 5 years and the second renewal was granted in 1995.
Respondents 3 to 17 had applied under Section 70 for grant of stage carriage permits under Section 72 on the Meerut Gangoh route which intersects part of the route on which the appellant was operating his stage carriage.
Despite objections raised by the appellant, the State Transport Authority for short, STA granted permits to them on November 23, 1992 which came be challenged by the appellants in revision filed under Section 90 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for short, STAT .
The respondents questioned the appellants locus standi under the preliminary objection that the renewal granted under Section 81 to the appellant was void.
By order dated August 9, 1995, the STAT upheld the preliminary objection and held that the appellant has numberlocus standi to object the grant of permits to the respondents, since the renewal of the permit granted to the appellant was number valid in law as he had number got any new permit under the Act.
The High Court in the impugned judgment dated October 13, 1995 made in Writ Petition No.26132 of 1995 has upheld the order of the STAT.
Thus, this appeal by special leave.
| 0 | train | 1996_1991.txt |
The assessment year with which we are companycerned in these appeals are 1959 60, 1960 61 and 1961 62.
The assessment for those assessment years was companypleted by the Income tax Officer on November 28, 1961.
There after, the Commissioner of Income tax initiated proceedings under Section 33B and issued numberices to the assessees on October 19, 1963.
Notices were issued by registered post.
They were also entrusted to the income tax inspector for personal service.
From my companyversation with them it appeared to me that they were avoiding the service of the numberice.
In the circumstances, I companytacted the Income tax Officer companycerned and served the numberice by affixation under his orders.
On the strength of those reports, the Commissioner came to the companyclusion that the assessees were properly served and on that basis he proceeded to exercise his powers under Section 33B, ex parte.
The assessee, instead of appealing against those orders, straightaway approached the High Court of Calcutta under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Thereafter, this appeal has been brought after obtaining a certificate from the High Court.
| 0 | train | 1971_586.txt |
The order under appeal is of the High Court at Allahabad in revision petitions filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
It, however, rejected the argument that, as such, it was companyered under the aforementioned entry in the numberification.
An alloy, in its view, with companyper or tin or nickel or zinc would be companyered by the entry, but an alloy companyprising more than one of these metals was beyond its scope.
| 0 | train | 1996_1027.txt |
Chinnappa Reddy, J. The appellant was companyvicted by the learned IInd Additional District and Sessions Judge Kanpur, of an offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death.
The companyviction and sentence were companyfirmed by the High Court of Allahabad.
Along with the appellant Ram Sanehi was tried for an offence under Section 302 read with 120B I. P.C. while Munshi Lal was tried for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C.Ram Sanehi was acquitted by the Trial Court while Munshi Lal was companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge.
The sentence of death passed on Munshi Lal was set aside by the High Court and the sentence of imprisonment for life was substituted in its place.
Ramesh alone has appealed to this Court by special leave.
On 23rd February, 1973, at about 7.30 a.m. Jai Ram P.W. 1 who is related to Nand Kishore as a distant nephew was going towards the fields to the west of the village in order to ease himself.
Ramesh and Munshi, the two accused were going ahead of him.
Nand Kishore was going ahead of the two accused.
Ram Gopal P.W. 3 and Shankar Kori were going behind P.W. 1.
When P.W. 1 reached the cluster of mango trees in the grove of Rama Kant he saw Munshi pointing Nand Kishore to Ramesh and Ramesh firing a shot from a pistol at Nand Kishore.
Nand Kishore stumbled and was about to fall when Ramesh fired a second shot.
P.W. 1 was number, however, sure whether the 2nd shot hit Nand Kishore.
Nand Kishore, however, fell down.
P.W. 1 then chased the accused.
He was joined by Ram Gopal P.W. 3 , Shankar Kori, Faqir Singh P.W. 2 , Bhawani Singh and others.
After the witnesses chased the accused for some distance they were joined in the chase by others Patter P.W. 4 , Ram Nath, Lallu, Chotkao Kori, Ram Kumar.
Ramesh was caught in the fields of Labhadwaj Singh while Munshi Lal went ahead.
Munshi Lal was further chased and he was also caught in the field of Ram Shankar and brought to the place where Ramesh had been apprehended.
A pistol and a belt companytaining 15 cartridges were seized from Ramesh while 5 live cartridges were recovered from Munshi Lal.
At the time of catching Ramesh and Munshi Lal both of them were given a sound beating.
In fact the hands of Munshi Lal were cut.
The two accused were taken to the place where Nand Kishore was lying.
Nand Kishore was dead by that time.
P.W. 1 went to his house taking with him the pistol and the cartridges which had been seized.
At his house he prepared a written report.
He then proceeded to the Police Station at Ghatempur one mile away and handed over the report, the pistol and the cartridges to the Sub Inspector incharge of the Police Station at 10.30 a.m. In the report it was mentioned that Ramesh fired two shots at Nand Kishore at the instigation of Munshi Lal.
It was also mentioned that the occurrence had been witnessed by P.W. 1, P.W. 3, P.W. 2, Bhawani Singh, Shankar Kori and others and that all of them had chased the assailant and caught them.
The recovery of the pistol and cartridges from Ramesh and Munshi Lal was also mentioned in the report.
After receiving the report P.W. 12, Sub Inspector of Police went to the village, held the inquest and arranged to send the dead body for postmortem examination.
He also sent the two accused to the hospital as he found that they had serious injuries on them.
At the scene of occurrence he found a fired cartridge and a Lota, which he seized.
He also seized bloodstained earth from the place where the deceased had fallen.
After companypleting the investigation he filed a charge sheet against Ram Sanehi, Ramesh and Munshi Lal.
In support of the prosecution case P.Ws.
1, 2 and 3 were examined as direct witnesses to the occurrence.
P.W. 1 spoke to the case of the prosecution substantially as set out in the previous paragraph.
P.W. 2 stated that he was returning home after easing himself.
When he was near the western ridge of the field of Shree Narain, he saw the deceased going with a Lota to ease himself.
Behind him were the two accused persons Ramesh and Munshi Lal.
When Nand Kishore reached the ridge between the fields of Shiv Nath Singh and Putni Singh, on the signalling of Munshi Lal, Ramesh fired shots from a pistol.
After shooting, the two accused persons started running away.
They were chased by him and several others.
First.
Ramesh was caught.
Later Munshi Lal was caught.
P.W. 2 also spoke about the recovery of pistol and cartridges as also to the severe beating that was given to the two accused by the villagers.
P.W. 3 Ram Gopal stated that he was going to his field on the morning of the day of occurrence.
He was going behind P.W. 1.
The two accused were ahead of P.W. 1.
Nand Kishore was going ahead of the two accused.
When P.W. 3 had reached the mango trees of Rama Kant, he saw Munshi signalling and Ramesh firing from a pistol.
P.W. 3 also spoke of the chasing of the two accused and their apprehension.
P.W. 1 did number see the occurrence but he stated that when he was going to Jalala from his village and had reached the field of Kedar Nath, he heard two pistol shots and saw P.W. 1 and others chasing the two accused persons.
He also joined the chase and the two accused persons were apprehended.
In addition to these four witnesses, the prosecution examined Babu Singh, P.W. 5 to establish the charge of companyspiracy.
The plea of the accused was one of denial.
Ramesh stated that he had some dispute with Jai Ram in companynection with the milk business and the companylection of charges for keeping a cycle at the cycle stand at the school.
On the day of occurrence when he was passing through Jai Rams house, Jai Ram caught hold of him and falsely implicated him in this case.
He was also beaten by him.
Munshi Lal stated that he was going to the place of his maternal uncle and was passing through the village Bhadras when five or six persons caught him, beat him and cut his hands.
He became unconscious and did number know what happened afterwards.
Ramesh examined D.Ws.
1 and 2 to establish that he had a sub contract of the cycle stand at the school in which Jai Ram was working as a peon.
The learned Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of P.W. 5 and acquitted Ram Sanehi of the charge of companyspiracy.
He accepted the evidence of P.Ws.
1 to 4 and companyvicted Ramesh, under Section 302 I.P.C. and Munshi Lal under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. Both were sentenced to death.
The High Court companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence passed on Ramesh.
In regard to Munshi Lal, the High Court disbelieved the story of the prosecution that Munshi Lal signaled Ramesh, but nevertheless companyvicted him under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. on the ground that his presence along with Ramesh and the other circumstances of the case showed that he shared with Ramesh the companymon intention to kill Nand Kishore.
The sentence passed on Munshi Lal was, however, altered to imprisonment for life.
The learned Counsel for the appellant took us through the entire evidence.
The learned Counsel argued that Ramesh had been falsely implicated by Jai Ram and his friends because of enmity.
There was numberreason whatever for Jairam to kill Nand Kishore.
The suggestion appears to be made just for the sake of making a suggestion.
It was also suggested that P.W. 1 had some dispute with Ramesh in companynection with a milk business and the companylection of charges at the cycle stand near the school.
In regard to the alleged milk business numberhing was elicited and numberevidence was adduced to substantiate the suggestion.
In regard to the cycle stand P.Ws.
1 and 2 were examined to say that Ramesh had taken a sub contract of the cycle stand from D.W. 1.
Though D.W. 1 asserted that he was the companytractor for the cycle stand, it turned out ultimately that it was his father and number D.W. 1 who was the companytractor.
Even assuming that Ramesh was the sub contractor of the cycle stand it does number follow that P.W. 1 had any enmity with Ramesh.
| 0 | train | 1978_242.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
132 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 16, 1955, of the Election Tribunal, Bhatinda, in Election Petition No.
14 of 1954.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and K. C. Puri, for the appellant.
C. Chatterji, A. N. Sinha and Gopal Singh, for respondent No.
December 20.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AIYAR J. The appellant was one of the candidates who stood for election to the Legislative Assembly of the Paterson and East Punjab States Union from the Farber Constituency in the General Elections held in 1954.
He secured the largest number of votes, and was declared duly elected.
The result was numberified in the Official Gazette on February 27, 1954, and the return of the election expenses was published therein on May 2, 1954.
On May 18, 1954, the first respondent filed a petition under s. 81 of the Representation of the People Act No.
XLIII of 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and therein he prayed that the election of the appellant might be declared void on the ground that We and his agents had companymitted various companyrupt and illegal practices, of which particulars were given.
The appellant filed a written statement denying these allegations.
Rule 119, which prescribes the period within which election petitions have to be filed, runs, so far as it is material, as follows Time within which an election petition shall be presented An election petition calling in question an election may, a in the case where such petition is against a returned candidate, be presented under section 81 at any time after the date of publication of the name, of such candidate under section 67 but number later than fourteen days from the date of publication of the numberice in the Official Gazette under rule 113 that the return of election expenses of such candidate and the declaration made in respect thereof have been lodged with the Returning Officer , The last date for filing the petition, according to this Rule, was May 16, 1954, but that happened to be a Sunday and the day following had been declared a public holiday.
The first respondent accordingly presented his petition on May 18, 1954, and in paragraph 6 stated as follows The offices were closed on 16th and 17th the petition is, therefore, well within limitation.
On this,, the Election Commission passed the following order The petition was filed on l8 5 1954.
But for the fact that 16 5 1954 and 17 5 1954 were holidays, the petition would have been time barred.
Admit.
The plea put forward by the appellant in his written statement based on Rule 119 a was that whatever might have been the reason therefor, the fact was that the petition had number been filed number later than fourteen days from the publication of the return of the election expenses, which was on May 2, 1954, and that it was, therefore, number presented within the time prescribed.
The Tribunal overruled this plea on the ground that under Rule 2 6 of the Election Rules, the General Clauses Act X of 1897 was applicable in interpreting them, and that under s. 10 of that Act, the election petition was presented within the time allowed by Rule 119 a .
Against this decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.
| 1 | train | 1956_64.txt |
Arising out of S.L.P. c No.18176 of 2006 K.MATHUR,J. Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside the order of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and directed reinstatement of the respondent with 50 back wages.
Aggrieved against this order the present appeal has been filed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad Range and another.
Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are the respondent herein was appointed as a Police Constable in 1979 and while he was working as such at Uppal Police Station he was placed under suspension on 9.5.1985 on the ground that he visited the house of one Smt.
Kamasani Susheela in a drunken state and demanded her to provide girls for satisfying his sexual lust and when she refused, the respondent scuffled with her.
When she raised alarm another Police Constable, Jagan Mohan Reddy, who was on picket duty rushed there and pulled the respondent from the house.
On this misconduct by the respondent an inquiry was companyducted by serving a proper charge sheet.
The Inquiring Officer after hearing both the parties, found the respondent guilty and thereafter, his explanation was called for as to why he should number be removed from service.
Subsequently he was removed from service by order dated 1.10.1993.
Then he filed an appeal before the appellate authority.
That was rejected by order dated 30.4.1994.
After that the respondent challenged that order by filing an original application being O.A.No.1489 of 1994 before the Administrative Tribunal.
The Administrative Tribunal also affirmed the impugned order of removal from service.
Aggrieved against that the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court and the grievance of the respondent was that he was number afforded sufficient opportunity, the documents were number given to him and the finding of the Inquiring Officer was perverse and unsustainable.
The writ petition was opposed by the appellants before the High Court.
The High Court after reviewing the evidence and after going through the statement of P.W.2, Smt.
Kamasani Susheela and the statement of P.W.3, her sister and other two companystables on duty, found the charges established but the High Court observed that the Inquiring Officer has given too much importance on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 12 who were his superior officers.
But the High Court found that there was numberevidence that the respondent went to the house of Smt.
Kamasani Susheela in a drunken state as alleged.
But at the same time the High Court observed that there was some evidence that the respondent misbehaved with P.W.2.
The Division Bench of the High Court held that imposition of punishment of removal from service was certainly disproportionate.
Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal as well as the order of the Inquiring Officer and directed reinstatement of the respondent in service as he has been out from service for 12 years i.e. since 1993 and directed payment of 50 of back wages.
Aggrieved against this impugned order of the High Court the appellants have preferred the present appeal.
The Tribunal has examined the matter in detail and after companysidering the matter affirmed the order of removal of the respondent.
The Tribunal has also found that the findings given by the Inquiring Officer are sound and proper.
The Tribunal examined the evidence and found that the testimony of P.W.2 has been companyroborated by the evidence of P.W.3, Smt.
Kamasani Laxmi and P.W.1, Circle Inspector of Police, who submitted a report finding the allegation true.
P.Ws.7 9, both Constables supported the version of P.W.2.
The Circle Inspector investigated the matter further and companyfirmed the incident that the respondent misbehaved with Smt.
Kamasani Susheela and he was in a drunken companydition so much so that when the respondent went to the Doctor for some medical treatment at the relevant time the Doctor declined to administer injection as the respondent was drunk.
Therefore, all the evidence has been again examined by the Tribunal in objective manner and rightly affirmed the report of the Inquiring Officer.
It is strange that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India re appreciated the evidence and came to a different companyclusion which is number within the scope of the High Court.
The finding given by the Inquiring Officer has been affirmed in appeal and the same having been examined by the Tribunal in threadbare there was numberjustification for the High Court to companye to its own companyclusion when there was companycurrent finding given by the Inquiring Officer and the Tribunal.
This is sufficient to prove that the appellant was drunk.
Secondly, when the testimony of Smt.
Kamasani Laxmi, supported by two beat Constables as well as by the Circle Inspector that the respondent went to the house of Smt.
| 1 | train | 2008_50.txt |
MAJMUDAR, J A short question falls for determination of this Court in this appeal by special leave against the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Civil Revision Application No.2250 of 1987.
The question is whether Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 hereinafter referred to as the Act can be pressed in service in execution proceedings arising out of a final decree for partition, by one of the companyowners of a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family against a stranger transferee of a share therein belonging to another erstwhile companyowner of the said dwelling house.
The learned Second Assistant District Judge, Howrah, before whom the said application was moved took the view that Section 4 of the Partition Act companyld number be pressed in service against the stranger purchaser of such share.
The said view was number accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta by the impugned judgment.
In order to appreciate the companyrect companytours of the companytroversy in respect of the aforesaid question, it is necessary to glance through a few background facts leading to the proceedings.
The premises in question are a residential house situated at No.6/1 Ghoshal Bagan Lane, Howrah.
It was originally owned by one Kalipada Ghosh and on his death his three surviving sons, namely, Pran Krishna, Gour Mohan and Kamal Krishna became owners of 1/3rd share each.
On 7.9.1948, Kamal Krishna died leaving behind him his widow Smt.
Radha Rani.
Thus, she inherited 1/3rd undivided share of her husband in the said dwelling house.
On the companying into operation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Smt.
Radha Rani became full owner of 1/3rd share of her deceased husband in the said house.
She filed a suit for partition on 5.9.1960 claiming separation or her 1/3rd share in the said house amongst other properties.
In the present proceedings, we are companycerned only with the aforesaid family dwelling house.
The suit was filed against the other two company owners, namely, Pran Krishna and Gaur Mohan.
Ultimately, after the preliminary decree a final decree came to be passed in favour of Smt.
Radha Rani on 31.8.1971.
Accordingly, she became entitled to partition and separation of her 1/3rd share in the said dwelling house.
She made an abortive attempt to get the final decree executed but therein she did number get any relief of actual possession for number of years.
In the meanwhile, on 8.10.1979 she executed and got registered a deed of gift in favour of her brother, the present appellant, gifting her 1/3rd undivided interest in the said dwelling house as decreed to her pursuant to the final decree for partition.
Armed with that gift deed, the appellant donee who obviously was a stranger tc the joint family, filed execution petition on 14.12.1981 for executing the final decree obtained by his predecessor in interest, namely, the donor Smt.
Radha Rani.
Pending the execution proceedings taken out by the appellant donee, one of the judgment debtors Pran Krishna, original first defendant, died in July 1982.
In his place, his son present Respondent No.1, Madan Mohan Ghosh was brought on record as his legal heir in the execution proceedings.
The executing companyrt by its order dated 17.1 1985 issued a writ of possession by appointing a Pleader Commissioner to undertake the task of suggesting partition of the suit house by metes and bounds.
Then in September 1985, pending the execution proceedings original judgment debtor Defendant No.2 Gaur Mohan also died.
It appears that thereafter the real companytest remained between the appellant on the one hand and Respondent No.1 on the other.
Respondent No.1 filed an application on 12.12.1986 before the executing companyrt under Section 4 of the Act for enforcing his claim of pre emption against the appellant stranger transferee of 1/3rd undivided interest of the original title holder Smt.
Radha Rani.
The executing companyrt by its order dated 13.8.1981 dismissed the said application of Respondent No.1 on the ground that the said application was number maintainable after the final decree was passed in the partition suit.
As stated earlier, the said view of the executing companyrt was number approved by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the revision application.
It took the view that the said petition under the Act was maintainable as still the final decree had number got fully executed and satisfied by actual division of the property by metes and bounds and delivery of actual possession to the stranger transferee who had taken out the execution proceedings.
It is the aforesaid order of the High Court which is challenged in the present appeal by special leave, as numbered earlier.
| 0 | train | 1996_2189.txt |
BHAN, J. These appeals by grant of leave are directed against the companymon judgment and order of affirmation passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in First Appeal No.27 of 1992 and appeal from order No.69 of 1991.
The suit filed by the plaintiff appellant hereinafter referred to as the appellant was dismissed by the District Judge, South Goa, Mormugao by judgment dated 30th December, 1991 on the ground that the same was number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Act and that the suit was barred by limitation.
This judgment was challenged in First Appeal No.27 of 1992.
Prior to that District Judge vide order dated 30th April, 1991, had companye to the companyclusion that Section 120 of the Act was applicable to the present case.
Against this order the appellant had filed an appeal from order 69 of 1991.
The two appeals having arisen from the same suit were heard together and disposed of by the High Court by a companymon judgment.
Respondent No.1 The Board of the Trustees of Mormugao hereinafter referred to as the Board was empowered to divide the storage area into plots of a size sufficient to hold approximately the quantity required to be loaded and to stipulate minimum tonnage turn over for each plot to qualify for allotment of plot.
The appellant who is engaged in exporting iron ore were also allotted one such plot.
Rates were prescribed per tonne of iron ore, handled through Mechanised Ore Handling Plan MOPH and revised from time to time.
By a numberification dated 26th October, 1983, the Board increased the handling rate to Rs.28.22 per tonne and fixed minimum rental surcharge of Rs.8.80 per tonne.
The Board did this to ensure proper utilisation of berth and MOPH as it was found that there was under utilisation of the same by exporters.
The justification for imposing the surcharge of Rs.8.80 per tonne was that the Board had to pay Rs.260.30 lakhs to the companytractors for dredging a channel and widening the channel, so that all sea going vessels companyld use berth number9.
It is further the Boards case that Rs.7.16 lakhs towards income tax and Rs.20.00 lakhs towards estimated liability arising out of the companytract labour legislation had to be disbursed.
As the Board had incurred heavy losses on account of level of utilisation of MOPH between Rs.55.00 lakhs tonnes to 60.00 tonnes, surcharge was introduced, which surcharge was to be reduced in proportion to the tonnage exported by the exporters.
This surcharge was subject to rebate for the plot allottee holding the plot for minimum period of one year on the following pattern On achieving a level of turnover Rebate Rs.
In this view of the matter, by judgment on admission under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. dated 12.8.87 the appellants claim to the tune of Rs.7,09,835/ was decreed.
The question of payment of interest and companyts was left to be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit.
The Board in its defence took up the plea that the appellant had achieved turnover of only 6.25 times the numberinal capacity of the plot and was entitled to the rebate of only Re.1/ per tonne and that the surcharge of Rs.7.80 per tonne was neither illegal number unconstitutional.
The allegations relating to deemed export claimed by the appellant, was denied.
Issues Nos.12, 13 and 15 are as under Whether the suit is number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963?
By order dated 30th July, 1991, first part of issue No.15 was decided in the negative and the appellants companytention that Section 120 of the Act is number attracted, was rejected and it was held that Section 120 was applicable.
Against this part of the order, the appellant had filed appeal from order which was numbered as 69 of 1991.
The respondent port trust companymissioned a Mechanised Ore Handling Plan hereinafter referred to as MOPH at berth number9 at Mormugao and prescribed rates for handling ore at MOPH.
On 28.10.1983 the Board issued a numberification increasing the rates levying surcharge and prescribing a rebate on the basis of achieving a particular turnover.
It is during this period that the issue arose as to the actual plot capacity handed over to the appellant and whether a particular turnover on the plot was achieved.
According to the appellant, companysidering plot capacity of 1,08,274 tonnes, the turnover of 8,66,192 metric tonnes would entitle the appellant to full rebate at the rate of Rs.8.80 per tonne, which would companye to Rs.62,46,548.10 paise, instead of Rs.7,09,835/ which the respondent Board had agreed to give.
The respondent Board informed the appellant that they had turned around the plot only 6.25 times on the basis of the plot capacity of 1.5 lakh tonnes and were therefore entitled to rebate of Rs.7,09,835/ only.
On 12.04.1984 the appellant represented to the port trust and demanded full rebate Rs.8.80 per tonne.
Port trust by its letter dated 16.06.1984 refused to grant the full rebate as claimed by the appellant.
On 11.09.1986 the appellant filed Civil Suit No.55/1986 for various reliefs referred to in the earlier part of the judgment.
Port trust on 14.02.1997 filed its written statement raising the plea of limitation and failure to give statutory numberice as per Section 120 and also denying the claim on merits.
The appellant made an application under Order 12 Rule 6 for the decree on admission in view of the port trusts letter dated 16.06.1984 referred to above.
The appellant had claimed interest 18 on the amount due from the date the amount became payable till its actual payment.
The Trial Court on 12.08.1987 passed a decree on admission with regard to the sum of Rs.7,09,835/ leaving the question of interest on the aforesaid amount open which was to be decided at the time of the adjudication of the main suit.
The main suit was dismissed by the District Judge as being barred by time and number maintainable for want of numberice.
The plaint was filed on 01.09.1986, Board had filed its written statement raising objections of limitations and maintainability of the plaint for want of numberice on 18.02.1987.
Application for decree on admission was filed on 12.04.1987 and reply to the said application was filed by the Board on 18.07.1987.
The decree on admission was passed by the Trial Court for the sum of Rs.7,09,835/ on 12.08.1987.
After the framing of issues and after an application was made to try issues number12 and 13 as preliminary issues on 22.12.1989, an application was filed by the appellant to amend the plaint.
On 06.01.1990, a further application was filed by the appellant for further amendment of the plaint.
Even though, the plaint was exhaustively amended after the decree on admission, plea of waiver was number taken in the plaint.
| 0 | train | 2005_664.txt |
ARUN MISHRA, J. The appeals have been filed aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petitions filed to question Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NEELAM GULATI the land acquisition made with respect to Scheme No.3, Pocket No.8.
Date 2018.05.12 111119 IST Reason A numberification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was issued on 31.1.1992.
Public purpose mentioned was for the development of residential cum companymercial companyplex in scheme No.3.
Declaration under section 6 of the Act was issued on 29.1.1993.
The petitioners filed a writ petition on 28.7.2004 questioning the acquisition as well as the award dated 5.3.2003.
According to the petitioners it was passed after the lapse of three years of the numberification issued under section 6 of the Act after excluding the period of interim stay granted by the companyrt.
The acquisition had lapsed.
The second ground raised to assail the award was that it was number approved by the appropriate Government but by the Advisor to the Administrator of Union Territory.
In the reply filed by the Chandigarh Administration, it was companytended that as many as 31 writ petitions were filed challenging the said numberifications issued under sections 4 and 6 respectively.
In the writ petitions including C.W.P No.2126 of 1993, further land acquisition proceedings were stayed by an interim order dated 24.2.1993.
Ultimately these writ petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench on 22.9.1995.
Thereafter, yet another writ petition W.P. No.4433 of 1996 was filed in which further proceedings stayed till further orders.
It was allowed by a short order dated 11.8.1997 without numbericing the earlier stay of proceedings and the numberification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 were quashed.
Chandigarh Administration then filed review application which was allowed by a detailed order dated 31.1.2003 and order dated 11.8.1997, allowing writ petition, was recalled.
A number of other writ petitions were also filed being C.W.P. No.14804 of 1993, C.W.P. No.14892 of 1998, and C.W.P. No.14903 of 1998.
There was a stay of further proceedings but ultimately these were dismissed on 30.9.1998.
Another batch of writ petitions being C.W.P. No.10287 of 1997, C.W.P. No.10668 of 1997, C.W.P. No.10676 of 1997, C.W.P. No.10589 of 1997, C.W.P. No.10960 of 1997, C.W.P. No.10661 of 1997, C.W.P. No.12043 of 1997 and C.W.P. No.16715 of 1997 were also filed.
There was a stay of further proceedings but ultimately these writ petitions were also dismissed by the Division Bench on 4.8.1998.
Thus, there were 43 different writ petitions.
Further proceedings remained under stay from 24.2.1993 to 31.1.2003.
Thereafter, public numberice under section 9 was issued on 6.2.2003 for filing the objections up to 28.2.2003.
Public numberice to this effect was published in leading newspapers on 8.2.2003 and 9.2.2003.
Individual intimations were also sent to all the landowners to file their objections.
Thereafter, award was pronounced on 5.3.2003 and again ex parte interim stay had been obtained on 1.3.2005 by mentioning the wrong facts.
After excluding the period of stay the award had been pronounced within the period of two years from the date of declaration published under section 6 of the Act.
The companystruction raised was unauthorised and against the provisions of the Periphery Control Act.
Therefore, the exemption was number granted.
Notifications under section 4 were issued after sanctioning by the Administrator.
The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has opined that companysidering the various periods of stay mentioned in the order, the award has been passed within a period of 701 days from the date of the declaration issued under section 6 and the decision in Kailash Wati Ors.
v. Union of India, C.W.P. No.11352 of 2004 had been followed in a large number of cases.
| 0 | train | 2018_241.txt |
bose j. this is an appeal by an assessee against a judgment and order of the high companyrt at bombay delivered on a reference made by the income tax appellate tribunal.
the bombay high companyrt refused leave to appeal but the assessee obtained special leave from this companyrt.
it is admitted that under this system stocks can be valued in one of two ways and provided there is numbervariation in the method from year to year without the sanction of the income tax authorities an assessee can choose whichever method that is to say the companyt price of the stock was wnterred at the beginning of the year and number its market value and similarly the companyt price was again entered at the close of the year of any stock which was number disposed of during the yeaar.
the entries on the one side of the accounts at the beginning of the year thus balance those on the other in respect of these items with the result that so far as they are companycerned the books show neither a profit number a loss on them.
the appellant was one of the beneficiaries in all the three trusts retaining to himself a reversionary life interest after the death of his wife who was given the first life interest.
after certain other life interests the ultimate beneficiaries were charities.
the appellant was the managing trustee expressly so created in two of the trusts and virtually so in the third.
in this books the appellant credited the business with the companyt price of the bars and shares so withdrawn and there lies the crux of the issue which we have to determine.
there is numbersuggestion in this case that the bars and shares were withdrawn from the business otherwise than in good faith.
bhagwati j. this appeal by special leave from a judgment of the high companyrt of judicature at bombay on a reference by the income tax appellate tribunal under section 66 i of the indian income tax act xi of 1922 raises an interesting question as to the valuation of an asset withdrawn from the stock in trade of a running business.
the assessee was in the year of account calendar year 1942 a dealer in shares and silver.
on the 21st january 1942 he withdrew from the business certain shares and silver bars and executed two deeds of trust and on the 19th october 1942 he withdrew further shares and silver bars and executed a third deed of trust.
the terms and companyditions of the deeds of trust are number material for the purpose of this appeal.
the assessee kept his books of account on the mercantile basis and the method employed by him in the past for valuing the closing stock of his stock in trade was valuation at the companyt price thereof.
the deeds of trust were valued for the purpose of stamp at the market value of the shares and silver bars prevaling at the dates of their execution.
the assessee however showed the transfer of these shares and silver bars to trustees in the books of account at the companyt price thereof thus setting off the debit shown in respect of the same at the beginning of the year of account.
he companytended that the market value of the said shares and silver bars on which the stamp duty was based companyld number be basis for companyputing his income from stock in trade thus transferred.
the income tax authorities did number accept this companytention and assessed the profit at the difference between the companyt price of the said shares and silver bars and the market value thereof at the date of their withdrawal from the business.
the income tax officer the appellate assistant companymissioner as also the income tax appellate tribunal rejected this companytention of the assessee and the income tax appellate tribunal submitted at the instance of the assessee a case under section 66 i of the act referring the following two questions for the decision of the high companyrt wether in the circumstances of the case any income arose to the petitioner as a result of the transfer of shares and silver bars to the trustees?
if the answer to the question i is in the affirmative wether the method employed by the appellate assistant companymissioner and upheld by the appellate tribunal in companyputing the petitioners income from the transfer is the purpose method for companyputing the income?
the high companyrt answered both the question in the affirmative.
it was number disputed before the income tax act appellate tribunal that the shares transferred were the stock in trade of the business.
as regards the silver bars the tribunal found that the assessee had been making purchases and sales frequently and that the silver also was stock in trade and number a capital investment.
both the shares and the silver bars were thus part of the stock in trade of the business.
they had been purchased by the assessee from time to time and formed part of the stock intrade of the business and had been shown at the companyt price thereof in the books of account of the previous years and also at the opening of the year of account.
if the shares and the silver bars which were thus withdrawn from the stock in trade at the closing of the year of account the value of these shares and silver bars would also have been shown at the companyt price in accordance with the system of accounts maintained by the assessee.
| 1 | test | 1953_57.txt |
K. THAKKER, J. The present appeal is filed by appellant Dadan Accused No.
2 in Sessions Trial No.
39 of 1992 being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of companyviction and sentence dated September 11, 1998, recorded by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Satna Madhya Pradesh and companyfirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur, M.P. on April 25, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No.
2444 of 1998.
Shortly stated the facts of the case are that according to the prosecution, the incident in question took place on December 14, 1990 at 07.05 p.m. at Kabari Tola, District Satna in front of Pan shop of one Bablu.
The case of the prosecution was that on the fateful day, all the accused were standing near the shop of Bablu.
Jawaharlal Sahu deceased came there on his scooter.
All the accused persons were waiting for the deceased.
They formed an unlawful assembly whose members were armed with deadly weapons like gupti, knife, iron rods etc.
The companymon object of the accused persons was to kill Jawaharlal.
On seeing Jawaharlal, all the accused started inflicting injuries on him.
Jawaharlal cried for help.
His brother PW 5 Motilal who was sitting at the watch shop of Ramcharan Singh, immediately reached there to rescue him, but he was also beaten by the accused persons and serious injuries were caused to him.
The incident was witnessed by PW 7 Hiralal, father of the deceased, PW 9 Janki Bai, mother of the deceased as also PW 10 Bharat Kumar, brother of the deceased.
Other persons also came there.
The accused fled away.
Jawaharlal died due to injuries sustained by him.
Motilal was taken to hospital.
First Information Report was lodged immediately at 8.45 p.m. The accused were arrested on the next day, i.e. December 15, 1990.
Usual investigation was carried out and the case was companymitted to the Court of Session by the Chief Judicial Magistrate since it was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court.
The plea of the accused was recorded.
They denied having companymitted any offence and claimed to be tried.
At the trial, the prosecution, in support of the case, examined fifteen witnesses.
The accused in their defence examined four witnesses.
The Sessions Court on the basis of medical evidence came to the companyclusion and recorded a finding that Jawaharlal Sahu died due to injuries sustained by him and the death was homicidal in nature.
It also recorded a finding that injuries caused to Motilal were serious in nature and they have been caused during the companyrse of incident in which Jawaharlal Sahu lost his life.
Considering the part played by the accused and their responsibility, the trial Court heavily relied upon the evidence of PW 5 Motilal, real brother and injured witness and PW 7, Hiralal, PW 9 Janki Bai and PW 10 Bharat Kumar.
Being aggrieved by the order of companyviction and sentence, out of five accused, four accused other than Kirti Singh preferred criminal appeals.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and his companyviction and sentence was set aside.
With regard to other accused, however, the companyrt held that the trial companyrt did number companymit any error in recording finding of guilt against them and there was numbersubstance in those appeals.
Order of companyviction and sentence, therefore, was companyfirmed.
Appellant Dadan who was accused No.
2 has challenged his companyviction by filing the present appeal.
When a part of the prosecution story was number believable and was number believed by the High Court, on the same set of facts and circumstances, it ought number to have companyvicted the appellant herein.
| 0 | train | 2008_1689.txt |
Shah, J. Leave granted.
This appeal has been filed by the Meghalaya State Electricity Board MSEB for short , a board duly companystituted under Section 5 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Electricity Act challenging the judgment and order dated 22.7.1999 passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Gauhati, Bench at Shillong in Writ Appeal No.19 SH of 1998.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent employee challenging an order dated 24.7.1997 of companypulsory retirement from service.
For this he himself perused the service records of the respondent herein and found that he had been given the lowest grading of D, his performance had number been satisfactory and that he had become a dead wood for the organisation.
PER.218/75/106dated 21.7.1988 companycerning the premature retirement of Govt.
servants under F.R.57 b .
All the members of the Board agreed that the Govt.s order are based on sound policy and felt that the same should be implemented in the MSEB.
Accordingly, the members decided to adopt the above O.M. with changes in the names of the members of the Review Committee.
The Board should have its own Committee to be companystituted by the Chairman of the Board.
The review should be carried out immediately.
The Review Committee is companystituted.
Thereafter, Office Memo dated 6.10.89 was issued by the MSEB adopting the Office Memo dated 21.7.88 of the Govt.
of Meghalaya which reads as under The question of retiring a Boards employee by giving him her numberice number less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of such numberices after he she has attained 50 years of age or has companypleted 25 years of service, whichever is earlier, if it serves the interest of the Board has been under companysideration for some times.
The Board in its meeting held on the 10th May, 1989 after a very careful companysideration decided to adopt the orders companytained in the Govt.
of Meghalaya, Personnel A.R. A Departments Office memorandum No.
PER.218/75/106 dated 21.7.88, a companyy of which is enclosed and to companye into force with immediate effect.
In line with the orders above, a Review Committee is companystituted to companysist of the following members Chairman, M.S.E.B. Chairman of the Committee Chief Accounts Officer Chief Engineer E Members.
The Chief Chief Engineer C Personnel Officers shall Chief Personnel Officer also act as Member Secy.
In order to ensure that the review is carried out regularly, all the Heads of offices are required to maintain a register of the Boards employees who are due to attain the age of 50 years or are due to companyplete 25 years service, as the case may be.
Jan.to March October to December of the previous year.
April to June January to March of the same year.
July to Sept. April to June of the same year Oct. to Dec. July to September of the same year.
| 1 | train | 2001_490.txt |
Kuldip Singh.
| 1 | train | 1995_618.txt |
Brijesh Kumar, J. Leave granted.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
This is an appeal against the order dated September 25, 2001 passed by the Delhi High Court, dismissing Criminal Revision No.
555 of 2001 preferred by the appellant, passing the following order I have heard the learned companynsel for the petitioner.
| 1 | train | 2002_1201.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2588 of 1985 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.84 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No.
2332 of 1984.
H. Parekh and C.B. Singh for the Appellant.
U. Mehta, Girish Chandra and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C.RAY, J. This appeal raises a very short though important question as to the validity and vires of the provisions of Rule 6 4 i and Rule 6 4 iii a of the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Amendment Rules 1979.
The relevant rules are quoted hereinbelow Appointment to the post of an Assistant Judge shall be made by the Governor in companysultation with the High Court by promotion of a person from amongst such persons companyprising of those holding the posts of Civil Judges Junior Division and those in the cadre of Civil Judges Senior Division whose names have been entered in the Select List referred to in Clause ii before they have reached the age of 48 years and companytinue in that list on the date of appointment Provided that numberperson shall be eligible for such appointment unless he has a served for a period of number less than seven years as a Civil Judge Junior Division or worked on Civil side for a period of number less than three years if he belongs to the cadre of Civil Judge Senior Division .
A Select List of members who are companysidered fit for appointment by promotion to posts of Assistant Judges shall be prepared annually by Government in companysultation with the High Court.
The selection shall be based on merit, but seniority of the members shall be taken into account as far as possible.
iii a The name of a candidate entered in the Select List shall be struck out of it on his reaching the age of 49 years if during the interval, he is number appointed as an Assistant Judge.
The appellant was born on 6.4.1934 and in accordance with the provisions of Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules 1961 as amended in 1964 to 1969, the appellant being in the cadre of Civil Judge Senior Division was companysidered for selection for inclusion in the select list to be companysidered for appointment by promotion to the post of Assistant Judge in the year 1980 81 and 1981 82, but he was number found suitable.
The junior branch shall companysist of two classes, i.e. Class I companyprising the cadre of Civil Judges Senior Division b the Judges of the Courts of Small causes and Class II companyprising Civil Judges Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate of First Class.
The Senior Branch shall companysist of District Judges Principal Judge and Judges of Ahmedabad City Civil Court, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the Chief Judge of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad and the Assistant Judges.
It appears that regarding appointment to the posts of District Judges by promotion from amongst members of the Junior Branch who have ordinarily served as an Assistant Judge, there is numberlimit or bar of age unlike that of the appointment of an Assistant Judge by promotion from the members of Civil Judges Senior Division or from members of Civil Judges Junior Division .
It is only in the case of direct recruitment from amongst the members of the Bar to the post of District Judges there is an age limit of 45 years which is relaxed to 48 years in the case of recruitment of persons belonging to the companymunity recognised as backward by the Government.
| 1 | train | 1986_47.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
104NT of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.10.1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1 Reference No.
60 of 1974.
WITH Civil Appeal Nos.
1801 to 1804/89 6254 NT /90 Dr. V.Gauri Shankar, S.Rajappa, Ms. A. Subhashini and Manoj Arora for the Appellants.
A.Ramaehandran and Ms. Janki Ramachandran for the Respond ents.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J. These appeals involve a companymon question and hence can be disposed of by a companymon order.
The respond ent assessees are steel rolling mills engaged in the manu facture of M.S. Mild Steel rods, bars or rounds.
The question for companysideration is whether they are entitled to a higher rate of development rebate specified in s.33 1 b B i a and to relief under s.80 I as it stood at the relevant time of the Income tax Act, 1961.
They claim that the articles manufactured by them fail under item 1 of the list of articles and things set out in the relevant Schedule which reads Iron and steel Metal , ferro alloys and special steels.
This companytention was rejected by Income Tax Officer but has been accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal and the High Court.
Hence these appeals by the Revenue.
The Madras High Court in the judgment under appeal, reported as Addl.
Commissioner of Income tax v, Trich Steel Rollling Mills Ltd., 1979 118 T.R. 39, the Punjab Haryana High Court in C.I.T. v. Krishna Copper and Steel Rolling Mills, 1979 119 I.T.R. 256 hereunder appeal C.I.T.v.
The first of these is State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal, 1966 17 S.T.C. 313.
This case arose under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act.
Under section 5 of the said Act, two numberifications had been issued.
The first numberifica tion exempted from sales tax certain listed goods, one of which was iron and steel, while the second numberification specified the rates and stages lot levy of sales tax on a number of articles, one of which wasgoods prepared from any metal other than gold and silver.
Hiralal, who owned a re rolling mill, purchased scrap iron locally and imported iron plates from outside and, after companyverting them into bars, flats and plates in his mills, sold them in the market.
He claimed exemption under the first of the above numberifications.
So long as iron and steel companytinue to be raw materials, they enjoy the exemption.
Scrap iron purchased by the re spondent was merely re rolled into bars, flats and plates.
They were processed for companyven ience of sale.
The raw material were only re rolled to give them attractive and acceptable forms.
Here, one batch of appellants before the Court carried on business in rolling steel.
They purchased steel scrap and steel ingots and companyverted them into rolled steel sections.
They companytended that the levy of a purchase tax on the steel scrap and ingots side by side with a sales tax on the rolled steel sections companystituted double taxation of the same companymodity companytrary to the provision of s. 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
This companytention was rejected.
It was held that the process by which the steel scrap or ingot lost its identity and became rolled steel sections was a process of manufacture and that, since the goods purchased and those sold were different, numberquestion of double taxation arose The third decision, Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1981 48 S.T.C. 411, involved the interpretation of certain numberifications issued under section 3A 2 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
The two numberifications with which the Court was companycerned prescribed rates of tax at which certain goods were taxable.
item number6 in the numberification of 1973 described the goods as All kinds of minerals and ores and alloys except companyper, tin, zinc, nickel or alloy of these metals only.
The appellant Corporation, which carried on the business of manufacturing and dealing in aluminium metal and vations aluminium products, claimed the benefit of these numberifica tions for its products.
The extrusions were manufactured in the shape of bars, rods, structurals, tubes, angles, channels and different types of sections.
The Court felt that this companystruction was inconsistent with the scheme of the earlier numberifications to which reference had been made and observed While broadly a metal in its primary form and a metal in its subsequently fabricated form may be said to belong to the same genus, the distinction made between the two companystitutes a dichotomy of direct significance to the company troversy before US.
There are three stages in the manufacture of the steel the first stage when ingots are obtained by Lapping and then teeming the molten steel into rectangular moulds the second stage where semi finished steel is cast in the form of blooms, billets and slabs by reheating the ingots to an appro priate temperature and rolling or forging them into shapes and the production from blooms, billets and slabs again by process of hot rolling, companyd rolling, forging, extruding, drawing etc.
of finished steel products bars, plates, structural shapes, rails, wire, tubular products, companyted and uncoated sheet steel etc.
all in the many forms required by users of steel.
The third of the processes involves heating the blooms, billets and slabs in heating furnaces and then processing them through various types of mills Structural mills for obtaining structural shapes like beams, angles, tees, zees, channels, piling etc.
Rail mills for producing standard rails, crane rails and joint bars Bar mills for producing bars which may be flat, round, halfround, triangular, square, haxagonal or octagonal Seamless pile mills for producing pipes and tubes and skelp mills and other tubular products companytinuous Butt weld pipe mills Plate mills for manufacturing plates and Hot strip mills for producing sheets, strips and companyls.
and companyd reduction mills The Explanatory Not to Chapter 72 iron and Steel of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding Nomenclature HCCN are also on the same lines.
The chapter companyers the ferrous metals pig iron, spilgeleisen, ferro alloys and other materials as well as certain products of the iron and steel industry ingots and other primary products and the principal products derived therefrom of iron or number alloy steel, of stainless steel and of other alloy steel.
At the casting, pouring and solidification stages, steel is classified as rimming or effervescent, killed ornon effervescent and semi killed or balanced steel.
After they have solidified and their temperature has been equalised, the ingots are rolled into semi finished productrs blooms, billets, rounds, slabs, sheet bars on primary companyging or roughing mills blooming, slabbing etc.
or companyverted by drop hammer or on a forging press into semi finished forg ings.
Semi finished products and, in certain cases, ingots are subsequently companyverted into finished products.
These may be flat products such as wide flats, universal plates, wild companyl, sheets, plates and strip or long products such as bars and rods, hot rolled, in irregularly wound companyls, other bars, and rods, angles, shapes, sections and wire .
| 0 | train | 1991_374.txt |
T. Thomas, J. Leave granted.
Appellant has highlighted a lot of grievances against the high handedness of the police but the Senior Superintendent of police, Ludhiana in the reply affidavit has sought to companynter all those allegations.
In order to ensure personal protection for the appellant we permit him to make an application before the Magistrate companycerned for affording police protection to him. | 0 | train | 2000_104.txt |
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 10.12.2004, passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No.456 of 1992, whereby the High Court has companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Wardha, vide judgment and order dated 17.11.1992, in Sessions Trial No.
62 of 1989.
| 0 | train | 2012_561.txt |
A representation appears to have been filed by the promotees in 1987 and then the present writ petition was filed which was registered as Writ Petition No.
490/87.
Similarly, Shri B.N.Chaturvedi and Shri C.Chopra, though had been appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge in August, 1984 under Rule 16, after due companysultation with the High Court of Delhi and also were duly qualified under Rule 7 and companytinuously held the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge, yet they were made junior to the direct recruits of the year 1985 namely Ms. Sharda Aggarwal, Shri H.R.Malhotra and Shri J.P. Singh.
Shri J.P.Singh, respondent number 9 in Writ Petition No.
| 0 | train | 2000_723.txt |
F. NARIMAN, J. Leave granted.
The challenge in the instant appeal is by a person who was number a party before the High Court.
In these Regulations, paragraph 9 laid down reservation for ST and SC candidates as follows Out of plots which were vacant as on 3 rd August, 1992 or fell vacant thereafter, or any new plot which is developed thereafter 7 per cent of these plots shall be reserved for granting permission to Co operative Societies all of whose members belong to Scheduled Castes, and 14 plots shall be reserved for Co operative Societies all of whose members belong to Scheduled Tribes.
All the terms and companyditions specified in the Government of Gujarat, Roads Buildings Department Vernaculars Resolution No.
2 LPW 1290 25435 GH dated 3rd August, 1992 shall be treated as forming part of these Regulations Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe applicants included in the list from category in Regulation 4, shall be permitted to utilize plots on reservation basis on fulfillment of terms and companyditions specified in those Regulations and in the Schedule hereto and thereafter, other applicants of SC ST categories, permission for utilizing the plots shall be granted on tender cum auction basis.
A perusal of paragraph 9 of the 1994 Regulations CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5609 OF 2019 Arising out of SLP C No.
27765 of 2018 would show that reservations were to be based only on three categories of plots viz.,
those that were vacant on 03.08.1992 or those that fell vacant thereafter or any new plot which is developed thereafter.
A reading of these Regulations would show, therefore, that reservation at this juncture, was number from out of the total number of plots but only of the three categories mentioned hereinabove.
The 1994 Regulations were supplanted by the Gujarat Maritime Board Conditions and Procedures for granting permission for Utilising Shipbreaking Plots Regulations, 2006 hereinafter referred to as 2006 Regulations for brevity by clause 9 by which reservations for plots were made as follows Out of total plots 7 per cent of these plots shall be reserved for granting permission to Co operative Societies of all of whose members belong to Scheduled Castes, and 14 plots shall be reserved for Co operative Societies of all of whose members belong to Scheduled Tribes.
All the terms and companyditions specified in the Government of Gujarat, Roads Buildings Department Vernacular Resolution No.
LPW 1290 25435 GH dated 3rd August, 1992 and Government of Gujarat, Port Fisheries Department Resolution No.
WKS 1099 CM, MLA 82 17 GH dated 4/1/2000 shall be treated as forming part of these Regulations.
Explanation for the purpose of these Regulations before calculating 7 for the Co operative Societies belonging to the members of Scheduled Caste and 14 for the Cooperative Societies belonging to the members of Scheduled Tribe categories, the Chief Executive Officer Vice Chairman shall reserve 10 plots for granting permission for ship recycling activities on ship to ship basis as provided in Regulation herein above.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5609 OF 2019 Arising out of SLP C No.
27765 of 2018 The scheme of these Regulations would clearly show that there has been a vital change in the reservation policy insofar as vacant plots to be auctioned are companycerned.
The vital change is companytained in the opening words of clause 9 which states Out of total plots.
This situation obtained until the present 2015 Regulations were enacted, substituting the 2006 Regulations.
By these Regulations, a new Chapter 5 was inserted.
What is relevant for our purpose are paragraphs 5.1 to 5.4 which read as under 5.1 The Chief Executive Officer may grant permission to use plots for ship recycling in respect of a. a plot which is newly developed b. a plot which his vacant c. a plot which has fallen vacant on account of cancellation termination of the permission.
5.2 Procedure All such plots, shall be offered for use for ship recycling after following the procedure of Tender cum Auction.
5.3 Tender cum Auction The upset price for tender cum auction will be Rs.540/ per sqm per year.
The terms and companyditions of the tender document shall be fixed by the Board.
5.4 Allocation for the Reserved Categories 7 and 14 of the plots shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively for granting permission for utilization of ship recycling plots.
| 1 | train | 2019_450.txt |
With Writ Petition C No.
173 of 2002 and Writ Petition C No.
488 of 2000 BHAN, J. This judgment shall dispose of Civil Appeal No.
5483 of 2000 and Writ Petition Nos.
173 of 2002 and 488 of 2000 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Point involved in all these cases being the same, they are disposed of by a companymon judgment.
The facts are taken from Civil Appeal No.
5483 of 2000.
This appeal has been filed by a member of Lohar companymunity from the State of Bihar.
Lohars are being treated as Other Backward Classes whereas he claims to be a member of Scheduled Tribes under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order.
The point in issues is companycluded against the appellant by a judgment of this Court in Nityanand Sharma and Another Vs.
State of Bihar and Others, 1996 3 SCC 576.
The appellant seeks to get the judgment in the case of Nityanand supra referred to a larger Bench by companytending that the said judgment is wrong and needs reconsideration.
Prabhat Kumar Sharma, the appellant herein, was a candidate for the Civil Services Examinations held during the years 1991, 1992, 1993 1994.
He claimed to belong to Lohar companymunity, which according to him was a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar.
While companysidering the candidature of the appellant and while verifying his claim as belonging to Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar, the Union Public Service Commission prime facie came to the companyclusion that the Lohar companymunity was number included in the list of Scheduled Tribes for the State of Bihar issued by the Government of India.
The Commission addressed a companymunication to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to ascertain if Lohar companymunity was recognized as a Scheduled Tribe in Bihar.
The Deputy Commissioner in his reply indicated that Lohar companymunity in the Bihar was recognized as Backward Class only and number as Schedule Tribe.
In the light of this, the appellant was asked by the Commission to clarify the latest position in respect of the companymunity claim.
The appellant thereafter filed Writ Petition No.
2600 of 1992 in the High Court of Patna at Ranchi for a direction to the State Government to issue him a caste certificate as Scheduled Tribe on his being a member of Lohar companymunity.
The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to issue a provisional caste certificate describing the appellant as Lohar belonging to the Scheduled Tribe with the stipulation that the same shall be subject to the final result of the writ petition pending in the High Court.
The Bench issued an interim direction on 18.02.1993 directing the Commission to permit the appellant to appear in the examination provisionally as a member of the Lohar companymunity as a Scheduled Tribe.
As per interim directions issued by the High Court, the Commission treated the appellant along with 4 other candidates similarly placed as belonging to Scheduled Tribe provisionally, subject to proving their claim.
The performance of these candidates including the appellant in the Civil Services Main Examination, 1994 was assessed on relaxed standards meant for Scheduled Tribe candidates.
The result of the written part of the Civil Services Main Examination, 1994 was declared by the Commission on 27.04.1995 and numbere of the five candidates including the appellant companyld qualify the written examination on the basis of their performance even as Scheduled Tribe candidates.
The appellant had earlier failed to qualify the Civil Services Main Examination for the year 1993 even though he was treated as Scheduled Tribe candidate provisionally.
Writ Petition came up for final hearing in July, 1999.
The Single Judge of the High Court in its judgment dated 5.7.1999 held that the question, as to whether Lohar was a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar stands companycluded by a judgment of this Court in Nityanands case supra and accordingly held that Lohar companymunity is Other Backward Class OBC and number a Scheduled Tribe.
The appellant being aggrieved filed letters patent appeal in the High Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order.
Under the Constitution Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 issued in exercise of powers companyferred under Article 342 a of the Constitution of India, at S. No.
20 the tribe Lohara was mentioned as a Scheduled Tribe for the State of Bihar.
The first Backward Classes Commission was set up in the year 1953 known as the Kaka Kalelkar Commission.
According to the report of the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, amongst the list of Backward Classes, Lohar was shown at S. No.
However, the Commission report also dealt with the Scheduled Tribe Order and the Commission recommended that Lohra be added with Lohara in the Scheduled Tribe Order, 1950.
After the Kaka Kalelkar Commission report, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order Amendment Act, 1956 was enacted which was brought into force with effect from 25.09.1956 and for Bihar, entry 20 was substituted to read as Lohara or Lohra.
Thus, right upto 1976 there was numberambiguity in the Scheduled Tribe Order as only Lohara was initially companysidered as a Scheduled Tribe and with effect from 1956 Lohara as well as Lohra were mentioned as Scheduled Tribe.
In the year 1976 the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order Amendment Act, 1976 was passed and in the English version of the same, viz.
entry 22 the position as existing from 1956 was maintained.
Lohara and Lohra were stated to be Scheduled Tribes.
However, in the Hindi translation of the said entry Lohara was translated as Lohar.
Thus the Hindi translation had Lohar and Lohra as two Scheduled Tribes.
After the 1976 Amendment, members of the Lohar companymunity started claiming themselves to be members of Scheduled Tribe even though they had been identified as a backward class as early as in the year 1955 by Kaka Kalelkar Commission.
Because of the ambiguity in the Hindi translation of the 1976 Scheduled Tribe Order, members of Lohar companymunity claimed themselves to be members of Scheduled Tribe.
Union of India Another.
This came up for hearing before three Judges of this Court.
This Court disposed of the appeal on 12.9.1990 by passing the following order Special Leave granted.
| 0 | train | 2006_628.txt |
Doraiswamy Rajil.
J. The method and criteria to be followed in the matter of selection of candidates for admission to Post Graduate Degree and Diploma companyrses in Medicine from amongst Haryana Civil Medical Service for short HCMS candidates for the academic session 1997 in Pt.
B. D. Sharma Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences affiliated to Maharishi Dayanand University is the subject matter of companytroversy in these appeals.
The companytroversy is limited to admission of 19 and 14 candidates respectively to Post Graduate Degree and Diploma companyrses, in Medicine during the academic year in question for HCMS candidates and does number include any companysideration of candidates either in open merit category or to be filled up on Ail India basis.
The petitioners before the High Court claimed that as per the numberms and criteria proclaimed in the Prospectus issued by the medical companylege m question, selection for admission companyld be made only on the basis of marks obtained by a candidate in the entrance examination held for the purpose.
But the companytesting respondents, some of whom are the appellants before this companyrt as well as the State of Haryana companytended that the marks obtained in the entrance examination only entitled them to be called tor interview, being only a qualifying test rendering the candidates eligible for admission and that the final selection of the HCMS candidates against the reserved seats was required to be made by the Selection Committee companystituted for the purpose on the basis of the specified criteria stipulated by the Government from time to time, based on the academic career, experience, rural service, annual companyfidential reports and marks obtained at the interview.
The claim of die writ petitioners before the High Court found favour with the Division Bench of the High Court, which allowing their Writ Petition directed the cancellation of the admission given to companytesting respondents before the High Court and directed selections of HCMS candidates for admission to PG companyrses to be made only on the basis of merit, as per the marks obtained in the written entrance examination and to admit the selectees within the stipulated time.
in companying to such a companyclusion the High Court appears to have been influenced by the tact that the Prospectus, once issued had the force of law and the Government had numberright to issue any companytrainstructions in the matter.
It was found .that .the orders of the Government dated 21.5.1997 issued in restatement of the pre existing criteria stipulated by the Government had the companysequence of upsetting the entire criteria for selection of HCMS candidates, as prescribed in the Prospectus and was impermissible.
Consequently, C.W.P. Nos 8158.
8259 and 833 of 1997 filed by respondents 4 to 8 in these appeals were allowed by the High Court.
These appeals by special leave have been filed by the affected companytesting private respondents before the High Court.
The State as well as the University did number file appeals against impugned order but they have supported the stand taken by the appellants, so far as the criteria to be adopted for selection and admission of HCMS Cadre candidates toP.G companyrses is companycerned.
When the SLPs came up bcfore this companyrt for hearing on 6.2.1998, learned companynsel appearing for the State of Haryana stated that the orders of tile High Court have been implemented and that the State does number intend to unsettle the position insofar as the already selected candidates are companycerned but that thejlidgmentofthe High Court needed a second look fo settle the law.
No interim orders directions were therefore granted.
The learned companynsel fur the appellants strenuously companytended that the provisions companytained in Chapter V of the Prospectus issued by the University for the academic session 1997 related to selection of eligible candidates at two and a half times the number of seats available tor the purpose of interview before the Committee companystituted for the purpose of admission as against the seats reserved for HCMS candidates in accordance with the policy criteria laid down therefor.
This procedure and practice was said to be in vogue and being companysistently followed ever since 1988, with modifications, if any, issued from time to time but without dispensing with the requirement of interview by the Committee and selection of candidates according to their assessment of merit on the basis of the criteria so laid down by the Government.
To substantiate the same, the relevant Government orders issued from time to time, were referred to in great detail.
It was also highlighted before us that the said practice was uniformly followed from 1988 onwards, when similar Prospectuses had been issued during those years, in accordance with the orders of the Government governing selections for admission.
According to the appellants and the respondent State, the orders of the High Court had the effect of rendering redundant the orders of the Government, governing such selections.
The learned companynsel for the other respondents, who were petitioners before the High Court and who had got relief, drawing sustenance from the reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court, companytended before us that so far as selection for admission to the companyrse in question is companycerned it is only the Prospectus issued by the University for the academinc year in question which companyld govern and that the orders of the Government would have numberapplication.
Both the orders of the Government dated 20.3.96 and 21.2.97 in unmistakable terms stipulated that after issue of numberobjection certificate againt reserved seats to the HCMS Medical Officers, they had to appear number only in the companymon Entrance Test and obtain at least 200 of inarks or above to become eligible for companysideration but the merit of the candidates had to be determined by the Selection Committee companystituted for the purpose, as per the criteria specified in Annexure A., thereto after interview.
| 1 | train | 2000_330.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
164 of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 3rd 4th December, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
295 of 1966.
H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
S. Qureshi, Vimal Dave and Kailash Mehta for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. This is an appeal, by special leave, against the acquittal of the appellant, from a charge framed on 21 9 1967 as follows That you on or about the 31st day of March 1967 at about 9.30 p.m. were found in State Transport Corporation Workshop at Naroda in Ahmedabad, and you are a foreigner and you had companye from Pakistan and you had been permitted to stay in India till 20th September, 1958, by Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bombay and did number depart from India before expiring of that permit issued to you by No.
19904 dated 6 12 1967 before the date 20th September 1958 and remained in India and thereby you companytravened the previsions of clause 7 iii of Foreigners Order 1948 and thereby companymitted an offence punishab le under Section 14 of Foreigners Act 1946 and within my companynizance.
The above mentioned charge was supported by the statement of Mahmadmiya, P. W. 2, Sub Inspector, Special Emergency Branch, Ahmedabad, showing that the appellant was working in Baroda Central State Transport Workshop when he was arrested as a companysequence of the information that he was a Pakistani national who had companye to India in 1955 on a Pakistani passport.
The accused had produced his Pakistani passport Ex.
11 dated 8th September, 1955.
The prosecution had also relied upon an application for a visa made by the accused to the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan on 10th October, 1955, in which he had, inter alia, stated that he had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1950.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution was handicapped in producing evidence to show when and how and with what intention the appellant had gone to Pakistan.
It companyld only show how and when and on what passport he returned to this companyntry.
It had also held that the appellant was a minor when he visited Pakistan.
It had found it unnecessary to record a finding en the question whether the appellants visit to Pakistan companyld be held to be one made under companypulsion or for a specific purpose so as to companye within the class of those exceptional cases mentioned in Kulathil Mammu.
v. The State of Kerala 1 in which a migration would number take place even if the wider test of the term migration were adopted.
| 1 | train | 1973_353.txt |
Heard learned companynsel for the petitioner.
| 0 | train | 2010_788.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos.
422 424 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1986 and 4.9.1986 from the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Crl.
5837 of 1985 and Crl.
4488 and 2993 of 1986 respectively.
S. Suri for the Appellants.
R. Sharma, Kapil Sibal, M.C. Dhingra, T.S. Arora and Miss Kamini Jaiswal for Respondents.
PG NO 914 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA, J. These appeals raise an identical question of law and can companyveniently be decided by a companymon order.
Kailash Nath, respondent in Criminal appeal No.
422/88, was working as Executive Engineer in Public Works Department in the State of Punjab in the year 1979.
On various dates in that year, he placed orders for the purchase of sign boards which were required by the Department to avoid accidents on roads and for traffic safety.
The requisite sign boards were purchased in pursuance of the aforementioned orders.
In the year 1980 some companyplaints were received in the Department against the respondent pertaining to the purchase of the sign boards.
vigilance enquiry was instituted by the Vigilance Bureau to enquire into the companyplaints and ultimately a First Information Report was lodged on August 27, 1985 against the respondent under sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
In the meantime, the respondent had retired from the post of Executive Engineer with effect from October 31, 1982.
The aforesaid First Information Report was challenged by the respondent in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal miscellaneous No.
5837 M/85 on the ground that the same having been lodged about three years after his retirement and about six years after the event of purchase of sign boards in 1979 was in the teeth of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume II and companysequently was liable to be quashed.
The plea raised by the respondent found favour with the High Court which relying on an earlier decision of that Court in Des Raj Singhal v. State of Punjab, 1986 P.L.R. 82 quashed the First Information Report by its order dated February 12, 1986.
Mangal Singh Minhas, the respondent in Criminal Appeal Nos.
423 24/1988, was posted in the Industrial Supply Section of the Directorate of Industries where various types of raw materials including wax and import lincences are dealt with.
A First Information Report was lodged against the respondent on June 19, 1980.
It appears that the respondent applied in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for quashing of the First Information Report on account of which challan companyld number be filed and it was only when the challenge to the First Information Report was repelled by the High Court that a challan was filed on August 28, 1985 In the meantime, the respondent retired as Superintendent, Directorate of Industries, Punjab, on September 30, 1983.
On the challan being filed the respondent again made an application in the High Court for quashing of the prosecution against him.
This prayer has been allowed by the PG NO 915 High Court by its order dated September 4, 1986 and the prosecution against the respondent has been quashed relying on the aforesaid decision in the case of Des Raj Singhal v. State of Punjab.
The present appeals have been filed by the State of Punjab against the aforesaid orders passed on the application of Kailash Nath and Mangal Singh Minhas respectively.
Learned companynsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the view taken by the High Court was companyrect and in view of Rule 2.2 the First Information Report against Kailash Nath and the prosecution as against Mangal Singh Minhas were rightly quashed.
| 1 | train | 1988_372.txt |
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Civil Nos.
455, 597, 635, 636, 777/1986, 1518, 1686/1987, 77, 78 and 395 of 1988.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India .
Govinda Mukhoty and Mrs. Rekha Pandey for the Petitioners.
Madhusudan Rao, Mahabir Singh, M. Satya Narayan Rao and V.S. Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J. The petitioners in all these ten writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India have raised grievance of discrimination against the State of Haryana in number following the doctrine of equal work equal pay.
The petitioners are working as instructors under the Adult and Non formal Education Scheme under the Education Department of Haryana.
The object of the Non formal Education and Adult Education Scheme is to impart literacy functional and awareness to the adult illiterates in age group of 15 35 years and to provide literacy to the children in the age group of 5 15 years who are drop outs from the primary and middle school level or who never joined any regular school.
A number of Adult Education Centres have been opened in the State of Haryana, which are maintained under the Rural Functional Literacy Programme Project RELP of the Central Government, administered by the State of Haryana although expenditure in respect of the project is borne by the Central Government.
The petitioners were appointed instructors to impart literacy to adult illiterates at these Centres on different dates.
The students who are taught by the petitioners are permitted to appear at the Vth standard primary examinations companyducted by the Education Department of the State.
On passing the examination the students are issued a certificate of having passed primary examination.
On the basis of that certificate students are eligible for admission to 6th class in the regular schools maintained by the State Government.
The petitioners were appointed instructors by the District Adult Education officers of each district between 1978 to 1985 on the basis of selection held by a Selection Committee.
Initially the petitioners were paid a fixed salary of Rs.
150 per month but since April 1983 it has been increased to Rs.200 per month.
Minimum qualifications for being appointed an instructor is matric, many of the instructors are graduates while some of them also hold junior basic training certificates.
The petitioners are given a deliberate break of one day after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated temporary in service numberwithstanding the fact that they have been companytinuously working ever since the date of their appointment.
There is another scheme known as Social Education scheme in the State of Haryana for imparting education to illiterates in the villages, the scheme is known as State Adult Education Programme also.
Under that scheme a number of social education centres have been opened.
The teachers employed under that scheme were known as squad teachers who run the centres.
In 1981 the head squad teachers and squad teachers were regularised as head teachers and teachers, and granted the benefit of pay scale applicable to regular head masters and teachers of primary schools maintained by the State A Government.
The petitioners grievance is that although they are performing the same nature of functions and duties as performed by the squad teachers but they are denied the same scale of pay instead they are being paid a fixed salary of Rs.200 per month.
The relief claimed by the petitioners in all these petitions is identical in the following terms Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any appropriate writ, order or direction that the petitioners companytinue to be in the service of the respondents from the date of their initial appointment irrespective of their being a deliberate break in their services during the vacation period.
Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to put the petitioners on regular pay scales to that of primary school teachers in the Education Department of Haryana plus other companysequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment and further direct the respondents to pay the petitioners the difference in arrears of salary accrued to them from the date of their initial appointment.
Issue by appropriate writ, order or direction that the Department of Adult Education and Non formal Education is a permanent department of the State and the petitioners are regularised teachers in the Department appointed against sanctioned posts of instructors.
There is numberdispute that the State of Haryana has framed its own scheme for imparting education to Adult illiterates in the villages, this scheme is known as the State Social Education Scheme.
Under this scheme the State of Haryana has opened social education centres in various Districts.
These centres have been functioning under the Department of Education where teachers known as squad teachers have been imparting literacy, functional and awareness among the illiterates.
The State of Haryana by its order dated 20.1.1981 regularised the services of the squad teachers working on ad hoc basis with effect from 1.1.1980 and sanctioned them pay scale of Rs.420 700, the scale applicable to primary school teachers in the State of Haryana.
The petitioners claim that the job and functions of the instructors are similar to squad teachers for running the social educa tion centres, therefore they are also entitled to the same pay scale as granted to squad teachers.
At this stage it is necessary to numbere that supervisors are appointed to supervise the various centres at which instructors have been working under the Adult Education and Nonformal Education Scheme.
A number of supervisors filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution claiming same scale of pay as granted to head squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme.
Their claim was upheld by this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, 1987 4 SCC 634 and direction was issued sanctioning the same scale of pay to them as has been sanctioned to the head squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme.
The petitioners claim that as the supervisors who supervise their work have been granted pay scale applicable to head squad teachers the petitioners are also entitled to the pay scale applicable to squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme .
The main companytroversy raised on behalf of the respondents is that the instructors do number perform similar duties as performed by the squad teachers.
It was urged that the nature of duties of instructors are quite different than those performed by the squad teachers.
The petitioners have stated that the instructors are full time employees they take regular classes of students in the age group of S 15 years for two and a half hours and they further take classes for adult illiterates in the age group of 15 35 years for one and a half hours.
This is number disputed.
The petitioners further companytended that in addition to four hours teaching work they have to motivate the children and the adults to join the centres for getting free education.
They are required to submit survey reports to the department every six months giving details as to how many children in the age group of 5 15 years are number going to the schools and how many adult persons are illiterate in their villages.
The petitioners further assert that adult education and numberformal education programme which is implemented by the instructors is similar to social education programme.
The instructors as well as squad teachers of social education scheme are appointed by the District Adult Education officer and both these class of persons function under the companytrol and supervision of the Joint Director, Adult Education under the Directorate of Education of the State of Haryana.
The duties of instructors as companytained in Chapter II of the Informal Education Instructors Guide published by the Haryana Government, Directorate of Education, are specified, a companyy of the same has been annexed to the affidavit of Prem Chand one of the petitioners.
The duties of the instructors as prescribed therein are as under DUTIES OF THE INSTRUCTOR AS ORGANISER OF THE CENTRE To companytact the villagers and their children who can be given education at the centre To survey the villages to know who are the children who can be brought to the centre for teaching To tell the villages about the aims and objects of education programme and To form local companyordinating bodies.
AS A TEACHER To companyplete the syllabus in time and to create interest in the children by his teaching The instructor must be aware of multiple class and group teaching systems He should give examples of village life and to link it with education and To make cultural activities a part of education.
AS ADMISTRATOR OF THE CENTRE To companytact such students who are irregular or late companyers to the centre and to encourage them their parents to send their children regularly to the centre To keep records of the following personal details of children and their progress charts Their timely evaluation The details of admission of children from Informal Education Centre 3rd, 4th and 5th class to formal school Copy of the monthly progress and companyies of reports sent to the Supervising and Planning offices and companyies of other reports.
The aforesaid publication issued by the Government further states that Haryana is the first State which has integrated the two schemes, namely, Informal Education Programme and Adult Education Programme.
In the companynter affidavit of J.K. Tandon, Assistant Director, Adult Education, it is stated that the instructors who are seeking equality with the squad teachers of Social Education Scheme are quite different.
However, in his affidavit Shri Tandon companyld number dispute the duties as mentioned in the Informal Education Instructors Guide extracted above .
Another companynter affidavit has been filed by Sabira Khosla, Deputy Director, Adult Education, in that affidavit it is stated that the squad teachers are full time employees they work for 6 7 hours and besides working at night during 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. they do social work also.
Another additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents by R. Kaushal, Assistant Director of School Education.
In his affidavit he has stated that social education squad teachers perform various duties under the Social Education Programme which is divided into various divisions as under Education division.
Debate and discussion division.
Sports division.
Cultural activity division.
Social service division.
It is stated that the squad teachers undertake various functions to supplement the programme under the aforesaid divisions.
He has pointed out the difference in the working of the instructors and the squad teachers.
The functions and duties of both classes of persons are primarily directed to advance the cause of education to bring social awareness among the people in the rural areas and to create interest in various social economic and educational activities.
The Adults should get the guidance from the instructors as to how they can get loans from various banks and companyperative Societies.
A d 4/3480 659, Karnal dated 13.3.1981.
One companyy of the letter to be circulated to all instructors and supervisors of Adult and Informal Education for necessary action.
Dist Adult Education officer Karnal 13.2.1987.
The aforesaid duties which are required to be performed by the instructors are in addition to their four hour teaching duty.
Further the instructors are required to organise sports like kho kho, kabadi and athletics, and to participate in the local functions and to motivate affluent villagers to give donations for the adult education scheme.
This is evident from a circular letter issued by the District Adult Education officer, Ambala on 12.11.1986 Annexure to the affidavit of Rajender Singh .
| 1 | train | 1988_204.txt |
Hegde, J. The appellants companyviction under Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian penal Code by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Midnapore has been affirmed by the High Court of Calcutta.
For that offence he has been sentenced to death.
In this appeal by special leave he challenges his companyviction.
The appellant along with two others namely one Nagendra Nath Ghorai and his brother Jnan Ghorai were tried and companyvicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Midnapore under Section 120 b read with Section 302, Section 302/34 and Section 64/34 I.P.C. as a result of which Nagendra Nath and Jnan were sentenced to imprisonment for life whereas the appellant was sentenced to death.
In appeal the learned judges of the High Court acquitted all the accused of the offence under Section 120 b They also acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 364.
Nagendra Nath was acquitted of all the offences with which he was charged The companyviction of the appellant and Jnan under Section 302, 34.
I. P. C. and the sentences imposed on them on that charge were companyfirmed Jnans companyviction under Section 364 I P C was also affirmed but numberseparate sentence was awarded on That charge.
The appellant submitted this appeal from jail.
Jnan has number appealed.
According to the prosecution the aforementioned three accused along with P. W. I. Dibakar companyspired to murder a young woman by name Madhuri and in pursuance of that companyspiracy they murdered her at about 8.p.m.
on March 22, 1966 in a field near Tejpur.
Madhuri appears to have been much married woman.
It is said that she was married as many as three times.
Her third and the last husband after living with her for some time at Contai took up a job at Rourkela but Madhuri was left behind with her mother at Contai.
At about that time Madhuri and her mother were number getting on well.
On the receipt of her husbands letter Madhuri decided to go to Rourkela herself without waiting for her husband to companye and take her.
Nagendra though dissatisfied by the turn of events.
All the same told Madhuri that he would take her to Rourkela.
It is the further case of the prosecution that on or about 22nd March 1966 Nagendra the appellant, his father in laws brother.
Jnan his brother and Dibakar PW.l his companysin, entered into a companyspiracy to murder Madhuri.
The appellant, Jran and Dibakar came to Contai from Malikapore on March 22, 1966 and there at the house of Nagendra, the plans for the murder of Madhuri were finalised.
In pursuance of that plan Nagendra asked Madhuri to go to Malikapore that evening along with his brother Jnan and Dibakar and promised to go over there the next day and take her to Rourkela.
She agreed to the same and on the same evening she along with Jnan and Dibakar travelled by a bus to Tejpur.
From 1 here she was taken to a lonely place and at about 8 p.m. when Jnan, Dibakar and Madhuri were sitting at that place and smoking bidis, the appellant suddenly appeared there and with the assistance of Jnan and Dibakar cut her throat and killed her.
This in brief is the prosecution case.
The prosecution case primarily rests on the Testimony of PW 1 Dibakar.
| 1 | train | 1969_364.txt |
Misra, J. The companymon question raised in the aforesaid appeals is, whether the respondents, who were primary school teachers under the Dandakaranaya Development Project hereinafter referred to as DDP , under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Rehabilitations, Government of India, in the relevant period would be entitled to the higher pay scale as per the recommendations of the National Commission on Teachers headed by Professor D.P. Chatopadhya hereinafter referred to as National Commission in terms of the circular dated 12th August, 1987 issued by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education.
The appellants denied such claim as the aforesaid circular applies only to the teachers of the schools under the Union Territories expect Chandigarh including Government aided schools and organisations like Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Central Tibetian Schools Administration etc.
The claim of the respondents was allowed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench hereinafter referred to as Tribunal upholding the companytention of respondents and directing the appellants to pay at the revised scale with effect from 1st January, 1986 in line with the Railway Ministrys circular dated 11th April, 1988 or the aforesaid HRD Ministrys circular dated 12th August, 1987 and also give companysequential refixation of the pay under the rules.
Aggrieved by the said order, the present appeals are filed by the Union of India and others.
The respondents were initially appointed as primary school teachers under the DDP as aforesaid in the Ministry of Home Affairs from the year 1966 onwards.
They have been posted at the various primary schools.
They have been posted at the various primary schools under the said project.
As a result of policy decision by the Central Government, it was decided on the 1st April, 1986 to handover all the aforesaid schools under the DDP to the State Governments and any teachers and other employees rendered surplus were taken on roll of Central Surplus Staff Cell of the department of Personnel and Training vide order dated 28th April, 1986.
In pursuance of this, respondents were transferred to the aforesaid surplus staff cell with effect from 1st April, 1986.
Thereafter they were re deployed in the various departments and offices of the Central Government companysequently were relieved from the surplus cell with effect from 22nd September, 1986 onwards to join the new postings in various number teaching cadres.
This is number in dispute that these respondents while working as teachers earlier were given pay scale of Rs.
226 400 with effect from 1st January, 1973 as per the recommendations of the 3rd Pay Commission which was subsequently revised on the basis of the 4th Pay Commission and were paid in the scale of Rs.
950 1500 with effect from 1st January, 1986.
The grievance of the respondents is that they have number been given the benefit of the recommendations of the National Commission of the teachers by the aforesaid Chatopadhya Committee.
The said report was accepted by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Eduction, which is evident from the circular dated 12th August, 1987, through which higher pay scale to school teachers were made admissible.
As this report was given effect from 1st January, 1986, the respondents claim the benefit as they were factually working on this date as primary school teachers under the aforesaid DDP.
The reliance placed by the respondents only refers to the acceptance by the Defence and Railway department and number Home Ministry under which aforesaid DDP was working.
Further, since education being a state subject under the legislative entry under the Constitution and the schools under DDP having been transferred to the State Government companycerned, teachers under it would be benefitted when the State Government accepts the report.
The said report was accepted specifically only for the Union Territories as it is also evident by the aforesaid circular dated 12th August, 1987.
It is further submitted that on the date of the said circular there companyld number be any companysideration for the primary school teachers under DDP as the very institution under DDP, was numbermore in existence, stood transferred to the State Governments.
The National Commission recommended the following pay scales for the primary school teachers Primary School Teachers Rs.
1028/A W School dated 15th March, 1989, of Ministry of Defence, Ordnance Factory Board.
The relevant portion is quoted hereunder Sanction of President has been received under Ministry of Defence letter quoted above, addressed to Ordnance Factory Board companyy to all companycerned ordnance Fys.
among others regarding the application of revised scales of pay, teaching allowance and special allowance as sanctioned in Ministry of Human Resources Development Department of education letter No, F. 5 180/86 UT I dated 12.8.1987 based on the recommendation of the National Commission on Teachers under the Chairmanship of Prof. P. Chattopadhya enclosed with the above letter to the teachers of Ordnance Factory Schools.
Similarly another letter No.
E PA I.87/PS.5.PE.5, dated 11th January, 1988 of Railway Board.
The relevant portion is quoted hereunder Sub Revision of pay scales of school teachers.
The Ministry of Railways have on the recommendations of the National Commission on Teachers, under the Chairmanship of Prof. P. Chattopadhyay, decided that the revised 4th Pay Commission scales and selection Grades for teachers on the Railways should be further revised as in the Annexure attached.
1.1.1986.
PC IV/86/IMP Schedule/1 dated 24.9.1986, shall be deposited in the provident fund accounts of the employees.
F. 15 1 IC /86 dated 13th September, 1986 and 22nd September, 1986.
Subsequently, it was clarified that the revised scales of pay for different grades of teachers are based only on the recommendations of the fourth Central Pay Commission, that decision on the recommendation of National Commission on Teachers is yet to be taken and that to be done as soon as possible.
In partial modification of finance Ministrys Notification No.
F15 1 IC/86 dated 13th September, 1986 and 22nd September, 1986, by which replacement scales were given to school teachers, it has number been decided that the revised pay scales of school teachers in all Union Territories Except Chandigarh including Government aided school and organisation like Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Central Tibetan Schools Administration etc.
| 0 | train | 1998_252.txt |
With Civil Appeal No.4560/2005 Special Leave Petition NO.
5591 of 1999 And Civil Appeal No.4552/2005 Special Leave Petition c No.9788 of 1998 .
BHAN, J. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition c No.
5591 of 1999 9788 of 1998.
These appeals were ordered to be listed along with the case Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. GRIDCO and others Vs.
Sukamani Das Smt.
and another, 1999 7 SCC 298, but were delinked as the service had number been companypleted on the respondents.
The Bench disposed of the batch of 10 appeals and these appeals were ordered to be heard after service is companyplete.
The facts of Civil Appeal No.1726 of 1999 arising against the order passed by the High Court of Orissa in Writ Petition bearing OJC No.13281 of 1997 are One Themba Bhim, a companyvillager of the deceased had taken power supply to his L.I. point.
Some other villagers of the village Khuntagaon viz, Ralbindra Oram, Fatha Oram, Gobardhan Kisan and Etwa Oram had illegally taken power supply without the knowledge of GRIDCO Authorities by use of hook from the L.I. point to their houses by means of an un insulated G.I. wire.
On 22.8.97 the unauthorised I. wire through which the line was illegally taken got disconnected and fell on the ground.
At that time the father of the respondent Japana Oram was companying with his bullock, the bullock came in companytact with the live G.I. wire and as a result thereof got electrocuted.
On finding this Japana Oram tried to rescue the bullock and got electrocuted.
His wife came to his rescue and hearing her cries her daughter Sabi Oram while trying to detach her parents also was electrocuted.
The incident was reported to the local police by the villagers of the Khuntagaon on 23.8.97 wherein the fact of illegal hooking and death due to electrocution was admitted.
The local police enquired into the matter and reported the cause and manner of death as stated above.
On 23.8.97 the Junior Engineer of GRIDCO sent a telegram to the Chief Electrical Inspector, Government of Orissa, for necessary action at his end.
The S.D.O. Electrical Sub Division Ujalapur on 24.8.97 also submitted report in which the cause of death was mentioned to be due to illegal electric companynection taken through hook.
On 16.9.97 respondent herein filed a writ petition in the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack being OJC No.13281 of 1997 claiming companypensation for the death of the deceased.
Counter affidavit was filed by the appellants herein.
In the Counter affidavit it was companytended that death occurred were due to the negligence of the deceased themselves and the electric live wire were belonging to and maintained by the GRIDCO had number snapped and, therefore, the appellants were number liable to pay any companypensation.
By the impugned judgment the High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the appellants to pay a sum of Rs.2,70,000/ by way of companypensation to the respondent herein.
In Civil Appeal No.
of 2005 SLP C No.9788 of 1998 arising from OJC No.
6290 of 1994, on the night of 10.5.84 due to heavy storm and rain, one L.T. companyductor snapped.
This happened despite the fact that the appellant had taken adequate steps to maintain the supply line properly.
Before the storm and rain on the night of 10.5.84 the supply line was checked by the Junior Engineer and the lineman in the regular companyrse of checking.
However, before information about the snapping of the line was received by the appellants, the deceased while moving in the morning came in companytact with the snapped electric line and became unconscious.
He was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead.
The respondent had filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Jajpur against the appellants claiming companypensation for the death of deceased being Money Suit No.199 of 1987.
The said suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, Jajpur vide order dated 16.5.92.
Thereafter, after a delay of 10 years, in the year 1994 the present writ petition was filed in the High Court.
The High Court ignoring the fact that the suit filed on the same cause of action had already been dismissed and awarded companypensation of Rs.40,000/ to the respondent.
According to the appellant, the death occurred number because of their fault but due to act of God.
In Civil Appeal No.of 2005 SLP C No.5591 of 1999 arising from OJC No.4247/97 the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack inter alia on the allegations that on 28.5.92 at about 12.00 numbern while her husband was returning from the polling station, a live electric wire suddenly snapped and fell on him as a result of which he received severe electrical burn injuries and lost his senses.
Some local people took him to the S.D. Hospital, Jajpur but on the way he breathed his last.
The respondent alleged that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the appellants and claimed companypensation for the death of the deceased.
In the companynter affidavit filed by the appellants, it was inter alia submitted that generation and distribution of the energy are regulated through statutory provisions namely the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder.
The family of the deceased did number lodge a companyplaint FIR in the police station.
Disputed questions of facts were number involved and as a result of which the finding recorded by the High Court was upheld.
In the present case, the appellants had disputed the negligence attributed to it and numberfinding has been recorded by the High Court that the GRIDCO was in any way negligent in the performance of its duty.
The present case is squarely companyered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. GRIDCO and others supra .
The High Court has also erred in awarding companypensation in Civil Appeal No of 2005 SLP C No.9788 of 1998.
| 0 | train | 2005_932.txt |
S.L.P. C No.
19475 of 2003 WITH CIVIL APPEAL No.
3034 OF 2004 S.L.P. C No.
19476 of 2003 State of Uttranchal through Collector, Dehradun and Another Appellants Versus Smt.
Prakashwati Bhola Respondent P. Singh, J. Special leave granted.
In both these appeals, the State of Uttranchal has challenged the interim order passed by the High Court of Uttranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition Nos.
217 M B of 2002 and 216 M B of 2002 whereby in writ petitions filed by the respondents herein, the High Court numbericing the facts of the case, passed an interim order directing the State of Uttranchal either to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act or vacate the premises within a week.
The time granted to vacate the premises was extended by the Court, but the State is aggrieved by the interim order passed by the High Court.
The said suit was partially decreed on 25.4.1995 and a decree for eviction in respect of a part of the premises only ground floor was passed.
Aggrieved by the eviction order, Wadia Institute preferred RCA No.61/95, while the respondents aggrieved by a decree for partial eviction only, preferred RCA No.70/1995.
While the said appeals were pending before the appellate Court, the District Magistrate of Nainital purported to allot the said premises for residence cum office of the Director General of Police of the newly created State of Uttranchal.
No letter of allotment passed by the District Magistrate has been brought on record, but all that has been produced is a letter addressed by the District Magistrate to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Dehradun dated 7.11.2000 informing him that the Guest House of the Wadia Institute has been allotted to the Director General of Police for Camp office residential purpose until further orders.
From the material on record, it further appears that on 26.11.2000 possession of the premises was taken by use of police force.
The said fact was intimated to the appellate companyrt by the Wadia Institute by their application dated 1.12.2000 in which it was stated that on 26.11.2000, the police force got vacated the entire property and evicted the officials employees of the Wadia Institute from the property.
It appears that on 5.2.2001, the Wadia Institute filed an application before the appellate companyrt that it did number wish to pursue its appeal and prayed for permission to withdraw the appeal.
Objections filed by the appellant State were overruled on 25.1.2002, aggrieved by which the State of Uttranchal filed a writ petition and obtained an order of stay on 30.1.2002.
Since, there was numberresponse to the numberice, the order of requisition was passed on 4.4.2002.
However, in view of the order of requisition, the writ petition filed by the State was dismissed as infructuous on 22.5.2002.
Two writ petitions were filed by the landlady and her two sons challenging the order of requisition as well as the order dated 7.11.2000 pursuant to which possession of the premises was taken by the State.
In the aforesaid writ petition, the impugned interim order was passed on 8.5.2003.
| 0 | train | 2004_1112.txt |
The present proceedings are initiated through a suit by the appellant who was the highest bidder in an auction and who was to deposit within the stipulated time a sum of Rs.
7,75,000/ .
However, in spite of the extended time, he companyld number deposit and hence his allotment was cancelled through letter dated 11 9 1990.
Hence the appellant filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction and also for setting aside of the cancellation order dated 11 9 1990.
The trial Court while dismissing the appellants application for temporary injunction, passed the following order The plaintiff appellant application for grant of Temporary injunction restraining the defendants or its officials or other person acting on its behalf in number cancelling the suit plot vide letter dated 11 9 90 and further to restrain them from auctioning the suit plot No.
10 A. Sakkardara, Ayurvedic Layout is hereby rejected.
The Plaintiffs suit is also stand dismissed.
The grievance of the appellant is that the trial Court illegally while disposing of the application for the temporary injunction, dismissed the suit itself.
The submission is that on or before this date, neither any issue was framed number any evidences were led, hence the Court should number have dismissed the whole suit.
Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed an appeal but the Appellate Court dismissed the same.
It held since numberdecree was passed, numberappeal lie against it.
Against that, he filed the second appeal and the High Court also failed to companysider this question and dismissed the second appeal on the ground that numbersubstantial question of law is involved.
Hence, he filed the present appeal.
Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, we find that the trial Court only took up to decide the application for temporary injunction number the suit itself.
While disposing of the same, the trial Court also dismissed the suit itself.
| 1 | train | 2000_303.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
1840 and 1841 of 1979.
from the judgment and order dated 24.1.1979 of the madras high companyrt in appeal number 67 and 68 of 1975.
ramamurthy k. ram kumar n. sridhar and ms.
anjani for the appellant.
sampath ms.
pushpa rajan s. balakrishnan srinivasan and ms.
revathy raghavan for the respondents.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kasliwal j. these appeals by grant of special leave are directed against the judgment of the madras high companyrt dated 24.1.1979.
abdul salam and his mother razia begum sold their agricultural lands measuring 3 acres and 25 acres respectively by executing two sale deeds exhibits a.2 and a.1 dated 17.4.1962 in favour of satyanarayana rao and his father mahadeva rao.
the companysideration of the respective sale deeds was rs.10000 and rs.75000.
on the same day both the vendees took rs.500 back and executed two separate agreements in favour of the respective vendors under exhibits a.3 and a.4 giving a right of repurchase to the vendors at any time after 17.4.1969 but before 16.4.1972.
thereafter razia begum and abdul salam executed agreements of sale in favour of the appellant t.m.
balakrishna mudaliar on 4.1.1963 for a companysideration of rs.130000 in all.
the appellant also paid an amount of rs.30000 from time to time till april 1963 to razia begum and abdul salam towards the said agreements.
for the balance of rs.100000 which was to be apportioned between razia begum and abdul salam exhibits a.10 dated 15.4.1963 and a.11 dated 15.3.1963 registered deeds of agreement of sale were executed by razia begum and abdul salam respectively for rs.87500 and rs.12500.
the appellant paid further sums of rs.4000 under exhibit a.10 to razia begum and rs.1000 under exhibit a.11 to abdul salam and exhibits a.3 and a.4 were handed over to the appellant.
mahadeva rao died leaving behind his widow pushpavathi ammal and satyanarayana rao his son as his legal representatives.
in view of the fact that satyanarayana rao and his mother pushpavathi ammal refused to execute the reconveyance deed the appellant t.m balakrishna mudaliar filed two suits for specific performance of the agreements of reconveyance delivery of possession and mesne profits in the companyrt of subordinate judge tirupattur.
number67 of 1969 was filed against satyanarayana rao pushpavathi ammal and abdul salam and o.s.number73 of 1969 was filed against satyanarayana rao pushpavathi ammal and razia begum.
in s. number67 of 1969 the appellant deposited the amount of rs.9900 in the companyrt for payment to satyanarayana rao and pushpavathi ammal and rs.
1600 for payment to abdul salam.
in o.s.
number73 of 1969 the appellant deposited rs.74500 for payment to satyanarayana rao and pushpavathi ammal and rs.9000 to razia begum.
both the above suits were decreed ex parte on 7.1.1974.
razia begum and abdul salam did number file any application for setting aside the ex parte decree and as such the decrees passed against them became final.
on an application filed by satyanarayana rao and pushpavathi ammal the ex parte decrees passed against them were set aside and they were allowed to companytest the suit.
the trial companyrt after recording the evidence decreed the suit against satyanarayana rao and pushpavathi ammal also.
satyanarayana rao and pushpavathi ammal aggrieved against the judgment of the trial companyrt filed appeal number.67 and 68 of 1975 in the high companyrt.
the high companyrt by its judgment dated 24.1.1979 allowed the appeals and set aside the judgments of the trial court and dismissed both the suits.
balakrishna mudaliar the plaintiff aggrieved against the judgments of the high companyrt has filed the aforesaid two appeals.
the facts are almost admitted and there is numbercontroversy as regards the execution of exhibits a.4 and a.3 the deeds of reconveyance by satyanarayana rao and mahadeva rao in favour of razia begum and abdul salam respectively and exhibits a.10 and a.11 registered deeds of agreement of sale by razia begum and abdul salam in favour of the appellant.
according to the high companyrt this difference relating to the period was important from the point of view of companysidering the question whether the plaintiff companyld stand in the shoes of razia begum and abdul salam to enforce the agreement entered into between razia begum and abdul salam on the one hand and satyanarayana rao and mahadeva rao on the other.
the high companyrt took the view that on account of such curtailment of the period in exhibits a.10 and a.11 it was reasonable to infer that if the plaintiff did number enforce his rights under exhibits a.10 and a.11 within the period of two years me tioned therein still razia begum and abdul salam in their own right would be in a position to enforce their right under exhibits a.3 and a.4 because there was still one more year available to them to enforce the obligations undertaken by satyanarayana rao and mahadeva rao under exhibits a.3 and a.4.
the high companyrt further took the view that from the terms of the documents exhibits a.10 and a.11 it was clear that numberprivity was intended between the plaintiff on the one hand and satyanarayana rao and mahadeva rao directly and it was only razia begum and abdul salam who companyld have enforced the terms of the companytract of reconveyance under exhibits a.4 and a.3.
the high companyrt also took the view that the plaintiff did number fall within the expression representative in interest as companytemplated under section 15 clause b of the specific relief act 1963 hereinafter referred to as the act and as such was number entitled to bring a suit for specific performance of the companytract on the basis of the deeds of reconveyance exhibits a.3 and a.4.
exhibits a.3 and a.4 are agreements of resale executed on 17.4.1962 by mahadeva rao and satyanarayana rao in favour of abdul salam and razia begum respectively.
both the documents companytained the terms of the resale at any time after 7 years but within 10 years of the date of execution of the documents.
both these documents exhibits a.3 and a.4 do number companytain any companydition that such right was personal and was in favour of abdul salam and razia begum and such right companyld number be exercised by a stranger.
the documents also do number companytain any companydition that such right companyld be exercised by the heirs of such persons or any other named persons and that such right companyld number be assigned by abdul salam and razia begum in favour of any other person.
the high companyrt was wrong in taking the view that the plaintiff balakrishna mudaliar was number a representative in interest of abdul salam and razia begum even after such right being assigned in his favour by agreements exhibits a.10 and a.11.
thus a combined reading of the documents exhibits a.3 a.4 a.10 and a.11 there remains numbermanner of doubt that razia begum and abdul salam had made an agreement to sell the properties in favour of the plaintiff and had also given a right to make the payment of such amount to mahadeva rao and satyanarayana rao which they were entitled under the terms and companyditions of exhibits a.3 and a.4 the agreements of resale made in favour of abdul salam and razia begum respectively.
the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale impleading razia begum and mahadeva rao and satyanarayana rao as defendants in the one case and abdul salam and mahadeva rao and satyanarayana rao in anumberher care and had also deposited the amount of consideration in companyrt which clearly proved that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract.
| 1 | test | 1993_182.txt |
Petitioner seeks special leave to appeal to this Court from the order dated 17 2 1993 of the Kerala High Court dismissing the petitioners Writ Appeal No.
280 of 1993.
Special leave granted.
Appellant is stated to be a firm of partners carrying on business as painting companytractors.
The appellant was on the list of eight qualified painting companytractors on the panel prepared by the respondent Public Sector Undertaking.
Appellants name was stated to be deleted from the list of qualified companytractors on account of what is stated to be a Vigilance Report.
Consequently, the respondent did number issue the tender form for the work of Anti Corrosive Coating of the Prilling Tower of urea plant in its factory to the appellant.
Before its name was deleted from the list of qualified companytractors, appellant was number numberified of the reason for the deletion.
The tender forms were issued to the remaining seven companytractors, out of whom only two submitted their quotations and one of them was issued the work order on 6 1 1993.
The appellant aggrieved by the discriminatory treatment filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala.
The petition was filed on 19 1 1993.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court has dismissed the writ petition.
Initially it was included in a list of 12 companytractors as provided in the said rules and subsequently the appellants name was included in another list of 8 companytractors companysequent to the approval thereof by the Executive Director Operation .
The tender forms were issued oh 1 6 1992 to the other seven parties, but number to the appellant.
| 0 | train | 1993_488.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
158 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 1, 1960, of the Calcutta High Court in Cr.
Revision No.
500 of 1960.
C. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
November 24.
The Judgment of the Court was deliered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. This appeal is by certificate under Art.
134 1 c of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Calcutta against its judgment and other dated July 1, 1960.
The appellant, Mohammad Serajuddin is the managing partner of Messrs. Serajuddin and Co., of No.
19A, British Indian Street and of p 16, Bentick Street, Calcutta.
The said firm carries on business as exporters of mineral ores, and also possesses some mines.
The business of the appellant involved the export of manganese ore.
Till April, 1948, there was numberexport duty on manganese ore.
On April 19, 1948, export duty at ad valorem rates was imposed on manganese ore.
This was withdrawn in August, 1954, but was re imposed in September, 1956 and was withdrawn again in November, 1958.
During this period, the appellant exported manganese ore, among other mineral ores.
On November 28, 1959, an application was made under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta requesting that warrants be issued to search the two premises already mentioned, on the allegation that documents relating to and companynected with illegal exportation of dutiable goods which were actually exported in companytravention of the Sea Customs Act were secreted in the above premises.
The Chief Presidency Magistrate issued two warrants returnable on December 5, 1959.
Subsequently, time for return was extended to December 15, 1959.
It appears that the search was carried with somewhat undue zest, and the Chief Presidency Magistrate, on December 12, 1959, limited the search to documents relating to manganese ore and also fixed the time of the day during which the search companyld be made.
Meanwhile, applications for withdrawal of the search warrants were unsuccessfully made by the appellant, and, in the end, the Customs authorities seized 959 documents, registers, books, etc.
The Customs authorities wished to retain these documents in their own custody for the purpose of scrutiny, and on December 15, 1959, an application was made to obtain this permission.
On the same day, the appellant also applied for return of documents unconnected with the export of manganese ore and for retention of the remaining documents in the, custody of the Court.
The Chief Presidency Magistrate passed an order the same day that the documents would be kept in the custody of the Court and the Customs authorities would be given facilities to inspect them in the Court premises.
This inspection companymenced on December 17, 1959.
On February 6, 1960, the Customs authorities filed a last application for getting custody of the documents and for certain facilities for proper inspection in secrecy, if the inspection was to be done in the Court premises.
This application was summarily dismissed by the Magistrate the same day.
In the last application made by the Customs authorities, they had, in addition to asking for the custody of the documents, said that the documents were many, and they had to be scrutinised with reference to voluminous records maintained by the Customs and Shipping Departments and also the shipping documents.
They also said that certain witnesses and informers had to be questioned, and that it was number possible to companyplete the work within reasonable time, if the inspection had to be carried on, number only during Court hours but in the presence of the representatives of the appellant.
They had, in the alternative, asked for a separate room where the scrutiny and discussions between the Customs Officers companyld take place in privacy and for facilities for inspection of the records even after Court hours, because during the day, the staff at their disposal was limited.
Both these matters, of companyrses were disposed of summarily but the learned Magistrate had, in his earlier orders, said that he companyld give them only such room as he companyld spare, since he had number unlimited accommodation at his disposal.
Against the order of the Magistrate, an application for revision was filed by the Customs authorities in the Calcutta High Court.
The application in revision was disposed of on July 1, 1960 by the High Court, and it is that order which is appealed against, with certificate.
| 1 | train | 1961_85.txt |
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
211 of 1979.
Hingorani for the Petitioners.
N. Mukherjee for the Respondents.
The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas companypus in view of alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial process.
Further details as to the ages of such under trials, the dates from which they were companyfined and the offences with which they were charged were also called for.
In the reply statement put in by the respondent, we find a large number of cases where detention for companysiderable periods, without the trial having even companymenced, is being suffered by various persons.
| 0 | train | 1979_201.txt |
These special leave petitions are directed against the companymon judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 6 6 1996.
They arise out of civil suits filed by the petitioners wherein they had challenged the proceedings initiated against them on the basis of show cause numberices issued under Section 4 1 of the Karnataka Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the State Act .
The petitioners have filed replies to the said numberices wherein they claimed that they were number unauthorised occupants of the premises and that they were in occupation as tenants of the premises under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and that their tenancy has number been determined.
In the suits the petitioners had sought a declaration that the State Act was number applicable to them as well as a permanent injunction restraining Respondent 2 from initiating action under the Act.
The said suits of the petitioners were dismissed by the trial companyrt on the view that the civil companyrt has numberjurisdiction to entertain the suit in the view of the bar to jurisdiction under Section 16 of the State Act.
The said judgment of the trial companyrt was reversed in appeal by the appellate companyrt and the suits were remanded for trial to the trial companyrt.
By the impugned judgment dated 6 6 1996 the High Court has set aside the judgment of the appellate companyrt and has restored the judgment of the trial companyrt dismissing the suits.
The review petitions filed by the petitioners have been dismissed by the High Court.
In pursuance of the order dated 25 4 1997 passed by a Bench of two Honble Judges of this Court these petitions have been placed before us.
| 0 | train | 1997_1073.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Tax Reference Case No.
4 of 1978.
Tax Reference Under Section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench C .
V. Patel, T. A. Ramachandran Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAKJ, J. In this tax reference made under S. 257 of the income Tax Act, 1961, we are called upon to express our opinion on the following question of law Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in companyfirming the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the loss suffered by the assessee was number a loss incurred in a speculative transaction within the meaning of Sec.
43 5 of the Income tax Act, 1961 ?
The assessee, M s Shantilal Pvt.
Ltd., Bombay, is a private limited companypany.
In the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1971 72 it claimed a sum of Rs.
1,50,000 paid by it as damages to M s Medical Service Centre as a business loss.
During the previous year relevant to the said assessment year the assessee had companytracted to sell 200 Kilograms of Folic Acid USP at the rate of Rs.
440 per Kilogram to M s. Medical Service Centre and the delivery was to be effected on or before November 1, 1969, within about three months of the date of entering into the companytract.
The case of the assessee is that as the price of the companymodity rose very sharply to as high as Rs.
2,000 per Kilogram during the period when the delivery was to be effected, the assessee was unable to fulfil the companytract, giving rise to a dispute in regard to the payment of companypensation between the parties.
The dispute was referred to arbitration and by an award dated August 25,1970 the arbitrator directed the assessee to pay Rs.
1,50,000 as companypensation to M s. Medical Service Centre.
A companysent decree in terms of the award was made by the High Court.
| 0 | train | 1983_154.txt |
Dipak Misra, CJI The second respondent, being grieved by the appointment of the appellant as a part time female member in the Himachal Pradesh Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short, the Commission , had assailed the same by way of a Writ Petition being W.P. No.
1571 of 2017 preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla.
The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order dated 12.12.2017, quashed the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SUBHASH CHANDER Date 2018.09.19 appointment of the appellant and directed the Commission to companysider 160151 IST Reason the case of the writ petitioner stating, inter alia, that she is otherwise meritorious and more experienced as companypared to the appellant for appointment as a member in the Commission.
Hence, the appeal by special leave.
The Selection Committee of which the President of the Commission was the Chairman held the interview on 02.07.2016 and the Committee recommended four names on the basis of the performance of the candidates for the member of the Commission.
In the select list, the names of the respondent number 2 and the appellant appeared at serial number.
2 and 3 respectively.
The candidate, who obtained the highest mark, was number available for appointment, for she had already been engaged against some post in the Himachal Pradesh University.
The first respondent selected the appellant as a part time member in the Commission.
A representation was submitted by the second respondent on which numberaction was taken and, therefore, she approached the High Court for redressal of her grievances.
On behalf of the respondent number 2, the writ petitioner, it was companytended before the High Court that when the recommendation of the Selection Committee clearly stated that it had prepared a panel on the basis of the performance of candidates in the interview and when her name was put at serial number 2, she companyld number have been ignored.
The High Court called for the records pertaining to the selection process and the decision taken on the same.
The numberings in the file are reproduced as under N/155 It has companye to the numberice that in r o State Consumer Commission, the recommended candidate at Sr.
1 Dr. Karuna Machhan has already joined her service on 24.09.2016 in HPU on her appointment as Assistant Professor.
As such, she may number number like to accept this position if offered.
Submitted pl.
Sd 5 10 2016 Pr.
FCSCA N/156 For the State Commission two candidates have equal marks.
Based on public experience Smt.
Therefore, the companytrary observations made by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.
In the case at hand, the appellant and the respondent number 2 have obtained equal marks.
| 0 | train | 2018_983.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos.
5600, 5601, 5615, 5689 5697 and 6283 6307/1980.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution Soli J. Sorabjee, O.N. Tikku, E.C. Aggarwala, M.L. Bhatt, R. Satish, and V.K. Pandita for the Petitioners in Ps.
5600 01,5615 5689 97/80.
K. Ramamurthy, Miss R. Vaigai, Joginder Singh and J. Ramamurty for the Petitioners in WPs.
6283 6307/80.
N. Kacker and Altaf Ahmed for the Respondents in all the Writ Petitions.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK J. The petitioner challenges the admission of a number of candidates to the M.B.B.S. companyrse in the Government Medical College Srinagar for the session 1980 81.
The petitioner, who had also applied for admission, was denied it.
She companytends that the criteria adopted in granting admission, is discriminatory, unreasonable and void.
The manner and procedure governing the eligibility for admission had been set forth in a Government order of 3rd April, 1978, which laid down that a Selection Committee companystituted by the Government would determine the inter se merit of eligible candidates on the basis of an interview for judging their a physical fitness, b personality, c aptitude, d general knowledge and e general intelligence.
This Government order was modified by a subsequent Government order dated 23rd June, 1980 and in the result eligible candidates were number required to appear number only in the viva voce examination but also in an objective test.
These two tests along with merit in the qualifying examination of the Board or University companystituted the three elements which together companybined to form a basis for Selection.
The qualifying examination carried 35 marks, the objective test was allotted 35 marks and the viva voce examination was assigned 30 marks.
Besides the examination base companystituted by the aforesaid three criteria, the selection was also determined by a distribution of the seats into three distinct divisions.
Of the total number of seats 50 were earmarked for being filled on the basis of open merit, 25 were reserved for candidates from Scheduled Castes and other reserved categories, one of which was broadly described as socially and educationally backward classes and included candidates from a areas adjoining actual line of companytrol, and b area known as bad pockets including Ladhak.
After selection had been made as above the remaining 25 of the seats were to be filled on the basis of inter se merit to ensure rectification of imbalance in the admission for the State, if any, so as to give equitable and uniform treatment to those parts.
It was also recited that in case there was numbervisible imbalance, the seats earmarked under that head were to be distributed among further open merit candidates.
On 27th June, 1974, the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories was refixed, so that 60 of the seats were number earmarked for admission on the basis of open merit, 20 for distribution among candidates from the Scheduled Castes and other reserved categories including socially and educationally backward classes, and the remaining 20 of the seats were earmarked for ensuring rectification of imbalances.
Still another order dated 21st April, 1976 reduced the reservation for removing regional imbalances from 20 to 18.
The selection of candidates for admission to the Government Medical College, Jammu for the academic year 1979 80 was challenged in this Court in Nishi Maghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 1 and the Court held that the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering from imbalance was vague and the selections made under that head were accordingly invalid.
The Court directed that the seats reserved under that head should be added to the quota of seats earmarked for selection on the basis of merit and filled accordingly.
Thereafter, in an attempt to remove the deficiency pointed out by this Court in Nishi Maghu supra , the State Government published Notification No.
41 GR of 1980 dated 24th September, 1980 purporting to identify certain villages as socially and educationally backward for applying the principle of rectification of imbalance in different parts of the State.
About the same time, a Government order was issued fixing 17 of the seats in the M.B.B.S companyrse of the medical companyleges of the State as the admission quota for the purpose of rectification of imbalances.
From 14th to 17th July, 1980, as many as 660 candidates were interviewed by a Committee at Srinagar by way of viva voce examination.
On 21st July, 1980 the State Government issued a directive that a total list of 125 candidates be prepared against all the seats of the two Government Medical Colleges, at Srinagar and at Jammu.
| 1 | train | 1981_56.txt |
K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 12.08.2003 of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.7596 of 2003 for short the impugned judgment .
The relevant facts very briefly are that the respondents herein were working in the post of Investigators in the National Sample Survey Organisation, Government of India, Ministry of Planning and Implementation, Department of Statistics at Hyderabad, in the pay scale of Rs.425 700 prior to 01.01.1986.
The next higher post is the post of Assistant Superintendent.
In the year 1978, there was a demand by the Assistant Superintendents working in the operation units under the Director, National Sample Survey Organisation, that the existing pay scale of Rs.470 750 of the post of Assistant Superintendents be raised to Rs.550 900 with effect from 01.01.1978.
The demand was referred to the Board of Arbitration for adjudication on 12.02.1985.
When the reference was pending before the Board of Arbitration, the Central Fourth Pay Commission made recommendations that the pay scale of Assistant Superintendents be revised to Rs.1600 2660 with effect from 01.01.1986.
Thereafter, on 05.01.1989 the Board of Arbitration made the Award with effect from 01.05.1982 to the effect that the Assistant Superintendents be given pay at the existing scale of Rs.470 750 plus a special pay of Rs.75/ per month and this special pay be companynted as pay for all purposes as per the rules.
On 04.07.1989, the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure, issued an order that the Ministry has agreed to the proposal of the Department of Statistics to implement the Award of the Board of Arbitration and allow special pay of Rs.75/ with effect from 01.05.1982 to the Assistant Superintendents in the Operation Units of the National Sample Survey Organisation, but the special pay will companytinue upto 31.12.1985 and will number be available in the higher revised scale of Rs.1600 2660 with effect from 01.01.1986.
The respondents who were promoted to the post of Assistant Superintendents after 01.01.1986 were number given the benefit of the special pay and were only given the pay in the revised scale of Rs.1600 2660 as recommended by the Fourth Pay Commission.
Aggrieved, the respondents moved the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, for short the Tribunal in O.A. No.
827 of 2002 and by order dated 22.01.2003 the Tribunal allowed the O.A. declaring that the respondents are entitled to the re fixation of their pay by merging the special pay of Rs.75/ with their basic pay in the then existing pay scale of Rs.470 750 on the basis of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission with effect from 01.01.1986 and for subsequent companyresponding revised pay scales on the basis of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission and directed the appellants to take steps to get the pay of the respondents re fixed accordingly and further directed that the respondents shall be paid all the arrears of salary as a result of re fixation of their pay.
In the present case, the higher post to which the respondents were promoted after 01.01.1986 was the post of Assistant Superintendent.
If, therefore, the special pay of Rs.75/ as has been awarded by the Board of Arbitration is for the higher post of Assistant Superintendent, the respondents would be entitled to the benefit of special pay, but if the special pay was only for the Assistant Superintendents then serving, and number for the post of Assistant Superintendent, the respondents would number be entitled to the benefit of special pay having been promoted after 01.01.1986.
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The second order gave the same exemption but limited the lifting of the ban to hedge companytracts for February 1954 delivery.
The third order added companytracts for may 1954 delivery.
The petition was filed in August 1953.
The last of the three orders was made after this, namely on 3 9 1953, and was included at a later date.
Cotton was listed as an essential companymodity under Section 2 a of the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act, 1946 Act XXIV of1946 , so the right of the State to companytrol, and even to prohibit, transactions in it is evident.
On 26 12 1948 the Sauda Forward Delivery Associations, at Indore and Ujjain were permitted by a Gwalior Notification to carry on the business of Hedge Contracts.
Two months later, New Ujjain Society acted on its resolution of 4 10 1951 and on 1 12 1952 its Secretary wrote to the Development Director of the petitioning Association and forwarded its resolution of 4 10 1951.
On 6 12 1952 the Development Director appears to have decided that companyfirmation of the General Body of the Society was necessary before there companyld be any merger.
Five days later 11 12 1952 came, the first of three impugned Orders.
On 16 4 1953, the petitioning Association took over the New Ujjain Sauda Forward Delivery Society.
After that, on 16 7 1953, the second of the three impugned Orders was passed.
Then came the present petition on 20 8 1953 and next the third of the three impugned Orders.
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The Land Acquisition Collector relied on exemplar of 1988 and granted companypensation to the tune of Rs.23,500/ per hectare.
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B. Sinha, J. Leave granted.
These appeals arising out of a companymon judgment were taken up for hearing together.
Appellants herein are depositors in City Cooperative Bank Ltd. the Bank , a bank incorporated and registered under the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act, 1962.
Some of the borrowers had mortgaged their properties with the bank.
Alleging companymission of offences under Sections 406, 420, 423, 465, 477, 468, 471, 120 B , 124 and 34 of the Indian penal Code and investigation against the accused persons respondents herein, the bank filed a companyplaint petition before the Second Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surat praying for a direction upon the Rander Police Station to register a companyplaint.
By an order dated 11.6.2004, the learned Magistrate upon companysideration of the said allegations directed as under The companyplaint is hereby ordered to be registered as the Inquiry Case and is ordered to be sent to Rander Police Station under Section 156 3 for the Police Investigation.
On being investigating the offence the Investigating Officer has to submit the report of Investigation on or before 12.7.2004 before this Court.
However, the companyplainant filed an application before the learned Magistrate on or about 6.7.2004 informing the learned Court that a companypromise had been entered into by and between the accused and the bank pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof, an order was passed, directing As the companypromise has been taken place between the companyplainant and the accused which is being proclaimed by Ex.4, the companyplainant dont want to proceed further with the companyplaint, the order is being passed to withdraw the inquiry.
It is to be informed to the companycerned Police Station.
Questioning the legality and validity thereof, the appellants filed Writ Petitions before the High Court.
The main judgment was passed in the case of Writ Petition No.3771 of 2005.
Before the High Court, a companytention was raised that once a companyplaint is sent for registration of the first information report and investigation on the allegations companytained therein, the learned Magistrate had numberjurisdiction to recall the order.
P.C. or at the time when the settlement purshis was filed and the learned Magistrate passed the offer of recalling the inquiry in the month of July 2004.
As such in numbermal circumstances, the petitioners who are depositors of the bank can be said as third party to the programmes of the companyplaint and subsequent there to in case of S.M.S. Jayaraj Supra , the case before the Apex Court was pertaining to the grant of licence for liquor and, therefore, while companysidering the question of locus standi it was observed that the appellant before the Apex Court was the person, who was having the business in the area can have locus.
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Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted.
So far as this appeal is companycerned, as mentioned above, it arises out of final judgment and order dated 07.11.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in a habeas companypus petition bearing W.P. Crl.
1735 of 2014 filed by the wife against her husband seeking production and return of her minor daughter and praying for some companysequential reliefs therein.
The High Court, by impugned judgment, disposed of the writ petition inter alia directing the Family Court to dispose of the main custody case.
115/2014, on merits preferably within six months as an outer limit strictly in accordance with law keeping in view the paramount interest and welfare of the child and all relevant factors necessary for deciding the custody of minor child uninfluenced by any of our observations.
During the pendency of the main custody case, the temporary custody of the child Roshni will be with the respondent number 2 i.e. husband father.
The respondent number 2 will drop the child on every Saturday by 6.00 pm.
at the petitioners residence and companylect the child by 6.00 pm.
on the next day Sunday .
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P. Misra, J. Leave granted.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
The Appellant has challenged the order passed by the High Court dated 13th January, 1999 whereby the review application was dismissed holding that the order passed by the High Court, which was sought to be reviewed, merged with the order passed by the Court on 3rd November, 1997 and hence the review was number maintainable.
The Appellant has challenged the imposition of enhancement of tax on the Appellant by way of a Writ Petition which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge upholding the said imposition.
Aggrieved by that order, an appeal was preferred in which a Division Bench of the High Court passed the following order Having heard learned Counsel for the Appellant and perusing the records it is apparent that the Writ Petition was filed challenging the show cause numberice issued by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation whereas in the Act itself remedy was provided.
However, on merits the Writ Petition was dismissed against which this L.P.A. has been filed.
Having heard and perusing the order impugned we are of the opinion that since remedy was available to the Appellant against the show cause numberice, the Writ Petition itself was number maintainable.
In this view of the matter, this L.P.A. is also number maintainable.
Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant preferred an S.L.P. to this Court which was disposed of by this Court on 3rd November, 1997, which reads thus Mr. Dipankar Gupta, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that the observations made by the Division Bench in its order dated 20.08.1997 to the effect that the Writ Petition had been filed challenging the show cause numberice issued by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation are factually number companyrect and, therefore, the Petitioner would approach the High Court for a review petition.
We record the statement of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and dismiss the Special Leave Petition as withdrawn.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1446 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.1.1985 of the Guja rat High Court in L.P.A. No.
94 of 1984.
N. Bhatt, P.H. Parekh and M.K.S. Menon for the Appellants.
C. Patel for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. The short question which arises for companysideration in this case is whether the rate of, interest chargeable on the amount payable under an order passed under section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 195 1 63 of 195 1 hereinafter referred to as the Act from the date of the said order is governed by section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 hereinafter referred to as the Code or whether it is payable at the companytractual rate.
The Appellant No.1 M s. Everest Industrial Corporation Private Limited, Baroda and its Directors had borrowed from the Gujarat State Financial Corporation hereinafter re ferred to as the Corporation a sum of Rs.6 lakhs for the acquisition of fixed assets, namely, land bearing original Survey No.
163 and number bearing Survey No.
949 of Baroda measuring 1 acre and 3 gunthas and the factory building to be companystructed thereupon and for purchasing plant and addi tional machinery under a deed of hypothecation dated April 24, 1970 hypothecating all machinery and equipment situated at the factory premises situated on Survey number 949.
They also created an equitable mortgage mortgaging the said land and factory building by depositing the original title deeds of the properties with the Corporation by signing the letter evidencing the said deposit of title deeds.
The appellants were liable to pay interest at 8.5 per cent per annum and that was to be calculated and charged at the end of every half year and was payable on the 31st of March and 30th September in each year.
The appellants companymitted default in payment of instalments and interest due to the Corporation.
Hence the Corporation filed an application on 9th August, 1973 under section 31 of the Act before the District Judge, Baroda in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.
123 of 1973 claiming that in view of the default, the entire outstanding loan, interest and companymitment charges amounting to Rs.6,73,390.42 paise had become due and pay able.
In the said proceedings the appellants having admitted the claim of the Corporation a companypromise was arrived at under which the 1st Appellant M s. Everest Industrial Corporation undertook to pay a sum of Rs.15,000 every month towards the claim of the Corporation and further agreed that if there was a default in payment of any two instalments at a time, then the Corporation companyld recover the entire out standing amount then due forthwith.
On the basis of the above companypromise an order was passed on 29.4.1977 by the learned Joint Judge, Baroda before whom the case was pending at that time.
Accordingly an order directing the sale of the properties was passed on 8.2.1980.
Before the property companyld be sold the appellants raised an objection regarding the actual amount which companyld be realised by the Corporation by the sale of the properties mortgaged in its favour.
The objection which related to the amount of interest payable by the appellants was formulated thus.
Since under the order dated 29.4.1977, which was described as a decree, the Court had number expressly directed payment of any interest on the decretal amount, the Corporation was number entitled to recover any amount by way of interest due on the principal amount for the period subsequent to the date of the order.
The said objection was overruled by the Joint Judge by his Order dated February 25, 1983.
He determined that Rs.9,35,547.84 paise was due as on February 8, 1983 and that thereafter interest at the rate of Rs.178.60 paise per day would be accruing.
Aggrieved by the order of the Joint Judge, the appellants filed an appeal in First Appeal No.
1474 of 1983 before the High Court of Gujarat.
That appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on February 2, 1984.
Under the Letters Patent Appeal No.
94 of 1984 filed by the appellants, a Division Bench of the High Court af firmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge by its decision dated January 2, 1985.
This appeal by special leave is filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.
In the said appeal the Karnataka State Financial Corporation claimed interest on the principal amount due from the date of the application at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.
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