Datasets:

L-NLProc

/

Realistic_LJP_Facts

like 0

Follow

L-NLProc: Legal Natural Language Processing 3

KAPADIA, J. Arising out of S.L.P. C No.7690 of 2006 WITH Civil Appeal NO. 1731 of 2007 arising out of SLP C No.7990/06 Civil Appeal NO. 1732 of 2007 arising out of SLP C No.7991/06 Civil Appeal NO. 1735 of 2007 arising out of SLP C No.8774/06 Civil Appeal NO. 1734 of 2007 arising out of SLP C No.8772/06 Civil Appeal NO. 1733 of 2007 arising out of SLP C No.8770/06 P. C No.421/06 P. C NO.623/06 Leave granted in petitions for special leave. In this batch of matters we are required to interpret Press Note No.12 dated 31.8.1998 issued by Government of India, Ministry of Industry, companycerning de licensing of Sugar Industry. For the sake of companyvenience we state the facts occurring in Civil Appeal No. of 2007 arising out of L.P. C No.7690 of 2006 M s. Ojas Industries P Ltd. Versus M s. Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. Others. Proliferation of Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandums to block companypetition is the cause of dispute. On 31.8.98 Government of India for short, GOI decided to delete sugar industry from companypulsory licensing under the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951 For short, 1951 Act . Further, the entrepreneur who desires to avail of the de licensing of sugar industry was required to file an Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandum for short, IEM with the Ministry of Industry. In the said Press Note it was further clarified that those entrepreneurs who have been issued Letter of Intent for short, LOI for manufacture of sugar need number file an initial IEM and in such cases, the LOI Holders shall file Part B only of the IEM at the time of companymencement of companymercial production. It was issued to usher in the policy of de licensing. After de licensing 2232 IEMs were filed till July 2005 out of which 600 IEMs were filed in U.P. On 13.5.04 M s. Ojas Industries P Ltd. for short, Ojas filed its IEM for setting up a sugar mill at village Baisagapur, Distt. Lakhimpur Kheri, U.P. It was acknowledged by GOI. Ojas claims to have obtained permission for purchase of lands under U.P. Zamidari Abolition Land Regulation Act. It claims to have placed orders for entire plant and machinery from M s. S.S. Engineers, Pune in February 2005. It claims to have placed an order of the value of Rs.8.65 crores for companystruction of the factory building. It claims to have approached U.P. Pollution Control Board for grant of NOC dated 28.4.05. It claims to have obtained such NOC. Ojas claims to have spent Rs.20 crores under various Other Heads. After four days on 17.5.04, M s. Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. for short, Oudh filed its IEM for setting up a sugar mill factory at village Saidpur, Khurd, Distt. Lakhimpur Kheri, U.P. within 7.2 Kms from the proposed sugar mill of Ojas in Basaigapur. This has led to the dispute between the two companypanies. On 28.5.05 Oudh filed a writ petition in Delhi High Court bearing No.9892/05 to set aside the IEM filed by M s. Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. for setting up the sugar mill in Titarpur. On 30.6.2005, pursuant to the Orders of the Delhi High Court, the matter was heard by Chief Director, Sugar, GOI who approved the IEM filed by Ojas. The IEM filed by Oudh was disapproved. Aggrieved by the decisions of the Chief Director, Sugar, GOI , Oudh filed Writ Petition No.11748/05. Consequently, by the impugned judgment Writ Petition No.12078/05 filed by Oudh challenging the IEM of M s. Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. for Khambarkhera was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 22.12.05 Ojas have companye to this Court by way of civil appeals. This is number precisely done by Union of India.

train

2007_347.txt

S. Singhvi, J. This appeal is directed against order dated 5.2.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the civil miscellaneous application filed by the appellant in Writ Petition No.3902/2008 for issue of a direction to the respondents to pay him salary for the period between 5.11.2003 and 24.1.2006 was dismissed. While he was holding the post of Post Graduate Teacher Chemistry in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan for short, KVS , the appellants services were terminated by the Commissioner, KVS under Article 81 b of the Education Code. CWP No.3354 of 1994 filed by the appellant was allowed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court vide order dated 19.9.1994 and the termination of his service was quashed. The operative portion of that order reads as under In the result I allow the writ petition, quash the order of dismissal dated February 11, 1988 and direct that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all companysequential benefits from the date of his dismissal. Thereafter, the Commissioner, KVS passed order dated 3.10.2000 for reinstatement of the appellant with a stipulation that the period during which he had number worked, i.e., from 11.2.1988 to the date of joining the duty shall be treated as dies non. Since the appellant was number given companysequential benefits, he filed Contempt Petition No. 550/2000 which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated 25.1.2001, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below In this case judgment of the learned Single Judge has merged in the judgment passed in LPA. There is numberdispute about one aspect that the petitioner has been appointed vide annexure 2 vide order 3.10.2000 at page 33. In case there is number companypliance of order of Division Bench then petitioner is at liberty to file a fresh petition. With the above observations, the application and petition stand disposed of. The appellant sent legal numberice dated 20.2.2001 through his advocate for grant of companysequential benefits but the same was rejected vide letter dated 4.4.2001. Thereupon, he filed Contempt Petition No. 151/2001. In the meanwhile, the appellant was served with memorandum dated 11.3.2002 and was called upon to explain as to why disciplinary action should number be taken against him under Article 81 b of the Education Code on six allegations, three of which related to misbehaviour with girl students. The Enquiry Officer Summary Enquiry Committee submitted report dated 9.4.2002 with the finding that allegations leveled against the appellant have been proved. After companysidering the Enquiry Report, the Commissioner issued memorandum dated 31.3.2003 proposing to pass final order under Article 81 b of the Education Code and gave opportunity to the appellant to make representation in the companytext of the findings recorded against him. The appellant submitted detailed representation dated 15.4.2003 to companytest the findings recorded in the Enquiry Report. After companysidering the same, the Commissioner, KVS passed order dated 5.11.2003 and terminated the appellants service with immediate effect. The appellant challenged memorandum dated 31.3.2003 by filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which was registered as OA No.2008/2003. He also filed a miscellaneous application for stay of order dated 5.11.2003 passed by the Commissioner, KVS for termination of his service. By an order dated 29.12.2003, the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal for short, the Tribunal stayed the operation of order dated 5.11.2003. The Commissioner, KVS challenged that order in WP C No. 3141/2004, which was disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 16.8.2004, the substantive portion of which reads as under Petition is disposed of by providing that the termination order passed against the petitioner shall remain in abeyance for two months from this period. Tribunal is directed to dispose of the OA of the respondent expeditiously. During this period, respondent will be deemed to be in service and petitioner shall pay 50 of his salaries subject to the outcome of the OA. Respondent will number however enter the school premises for discharge of his duties during this period in view of the nature of allegations levelled against him. This will number, however be any expression of opinion on the merit of the OA or the nature of charges against the respondent. OA No.2008/2003 was finally disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 15.12.2005 and a direction was issued to the Commissioner, KVS to pass fresh order after companysidering the representation made by the appellant and keeping in view his forthcoming superannuation with effect from 31.12.2005. Simultaneously, it was directed that the respondents shall companytinue to pay 50 salary till the decision was taken in the matter. In view of the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the Commissioner companysidered the appellants representation and passed order dated 20/24.01.2006 whereby he again terminated the appellants service with immediate effect under Article 81 b of the Education Code and directed that the amount payable to him in terms of the Tribunals order and 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of numberice be paid to him immediately. The operative portion of that order reads as under Considering the gravity of the proven immoral behaviour towards girl students, I hereby terminate the services of Shri R.S. Misra with immediate effect pursuant to the provisions of Article 81 b of Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalaya. This order is issued in companypliance to the Orders dated 15.12.2005 of Honble CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Original Application No.2008 of 2003. The appellant challenged the order of termination as well as the appellate order in OA No. The writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The same was the fate of review petition filed by him before the High Court and SLP C Nos.8219 8220/2010 filed before this Court. Having failed to companyvince the Tribunal, the High Court and this Court to quash the termination of his service, the appellant filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No.

train

2012_679.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated January 30, 1960, of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 643 of 1960. L. Mehta, G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, for the appellant. R. Bhasin, for the respondent. April 17. The Judgment of Subba Rao and Dayal JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao J. Mudholkar J., delivered a separate Judgment. SUBBA RAO J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow, Bench Lucknow setting aside that of the Special Judge West , Lucknow, who companyvicted the accused respondent and sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment Under s. 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act No. II of 1947 , hereinafter called the Act. The case of the prosecution may be briefly stated The respondent was a booking clerk at Saharanpur in the year 1955 56. Between October 22, 1955, and May 26, 1956, he companymitted criminal 74. breach of trust in respect of Rs. 49/1/0. On the said allegations the accused was sent up for trial before the Special Judge for offences under s. 5 1 c , read with s. 5 2 , of the Act. Before the Special Judge the prosecution filed a number of documents numbering up to 124 and examined 20 witnesses. The accused admitted before him that he had realized the amounts as alleged by the prosecution, but pleaded that he had numberdishonest intention, and that the deficit found was due to inadvertance and oversight. The Special Judge companysidered the entire evidence and found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that the accused misappropriated the amounts received by him as a public servant. It was companytended before him that the investigation of the case has been made by SubInspector Mathur, who under the law was number entitled to investigate the case, as he was below the rank of Deputy Superintendent and hence the trial was vitiated. The learned Special Judge held that the said Sub Inspector did number companyduct any investigation before he obtained the requisite permission from the appropriate authority and that even if he did it had number been established that the accused was prejudiced by such an enquiry. In the result he companyvicted the accused and sentenced him as aforesaid. For the said reasons the High Court set aside the companyviction of the accused and acquitted him. The State has preferred the present appeal against the said judgment of the High Court. The only question that was argued before us is whether the High Court was right in acquitting the accused on the ground that the investigation made by Sub Inspector Mathur before he obtained the permission of the Magistrate vitiated the entire trial. Learned companynsel for the State companytended that the said Sub Inspector only made a preliminary enquiry to ascertain the truth of the information received by him and, thereafter, after obtaining the requisite permission of the Magistrate he made an investigation of the offence and, therefore, there was neither illegality number irregularity in the matter of investigation. On April 26, 1956, A.N. Khanna, the Railway Sectional Officer, Special Police Establishment, Lucknow, sent report to the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, stating that he had received information through a source that the accused was in the habit of misappropriating Government money, giving 7 instances of the acts of misappropriations companymitted by him and informing him that if a proper investigation was made many more cases of misappropriation would companye to light. Mathur, the Sub Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment, as P.W. 15 says that on the receipt of the said report, the said Superintendent of .Police directed him to make an enquiry and he further says that on the basis of the information he checked the railway records, found that the information was companyrect and submitted a report accordingly. After he submitted the report, on October 8, 1956, the said Sub Inspector applied to the Additional District Magistrate Judicial , Lucknow, for permission to investigate the case. On October 19, 1956, the said Magistrate permitted him to investigate. Thereafter, he made further investigation, seized documents, took statements from witnesses and finally submitted a charge sheet against the accused. On the receipt of the said report, the matter was entrusted to the said Mathur, a SubInspector of Police of the Special Police Establishment, Lucknow. As P.W. 20 he describes the steps he had taken pursuant to the information given in the said report. He verified the allegations companytained in the information given by Khanna, saw the relevant railway records after taking the permission of the Station Master and found the information given to be companyrect On the basis of the information companylected, he submitted a report. But the full details of the enquiry were number mentioned therein. He also did number prepare any case diary in respect of the said enquiry. The said report is number in the record. After the investigation, the accused was tried by the Special Judge. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and filed 124 exhibits. The defence examined 3 witnesses. The learned Special Judge, on a careful companysideration of the entire evidence, came to the companyclusion that the prosecution had brought home the guilt of the accused.

train

1963_49.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 264 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated June 29, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 127 of 1953. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Hemendra Shah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for,the Appellant. C. Bhatt, C. J. Shah and Naunit Lal, for the Respondent. November 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J. The appellant is a companymission agent and pucca aratiya and has been acting as such for the respondent since November 7, 1951, in the companyrse of which various companytracts were made between them in Greater Bombay. On February 26, 1952, two of such companytracts were outstanding, one of which was in respect of groundnuts and was a forward companytract. In March 1952, disputes arose between the parties as to whether these companytracts had been closed, each side making a claim on the other on the basis of its own companytention. Eventually, on March 18, 1952, the appellant referred the disputes to arbitration under the arbitration clause companytained in the companytracts. 22,529 15 9 against the respondent in respect of the said disputes. It is number very clear whether this award companyered other disputes also. This award was duly filed in the Bombay City Civil Court under the Arbitration Act, 1940, for a judgment being passed on it. Thereafter, on July 17, 1953, the respondent made an application to the Bombay City Civil Court for setting aside the award companytending that forward companytracts in groundnuts were illegal as the making of such companytracts was prohibited by the Oilseeds Forward Contract Prohibition Order, 1943, issued under the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act, 1946, and hence the arbitration clause company tained in the forward companytract in groundnuts between the parties was null and void. It was said that the award based on that arbitration clause was therefore a nullity. The appellants answer to this companytention was that the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act did number apply to Greater Bombay where forward companytracts were governed by the Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act, 1947, hereafter called the Bombay Act, and as the companytract in groundnuts had been made in terms of that Act, it was legal, and, therefore, the award in terms of the arbitration clause companytained in it was a valid and enforceable award. The learned Principal Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court accepted the respondents companytention and set aside the award. An appeal by the appellant to the High Court at Bombay against the judgment of the City Civil Court failed. The appellant has number companye to this Court in further appeal. If it did, then the Oilseeds Forward Contract Prohibition Order, 1943, hereafter called, the Oilseeds Order, issued under it would make the companytract in groundnuts illegal and numberaward companyld be made under the arbitration clause companytained in it. This is number in dispute. Now, the Oilseeds Order was first passed in 1943 under r. 83 of the Defence of India Rules. The Defence of India Rules ceased to be in force on September 30, 1946. In the meantime however, as the situation had number quite returned to numbermal in spite of the termination of the war, the British Parliament passed an Act on March 26, 1946, called the India Central Government and Legislature Act, 1946 9 10 Geo. VI, Ch. 39 , hereafter called the British Act. The Governor General under the powers reserved in s. 4 and subsequently, the Constituent Assembly of India, under the powers companyferred on it under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, extended the period mentioned in s. 4 of the British Act from time to time and eventually up to March 31, 1951. It would be unprofitable for our purposes to refer to the various statutory provisions and orders under which this was done for, the extension is number in dispute. Under the powers companyferred by the British Act, the Governor General promulgated the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Ordinance, 1946, which came into force on October 1, 1946. As the life of the British Act was extended from time to time, suitable amend ments were made in the Central Act extending its life also. Our Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950 and by virtue of Art. 372 the Central Act was companytinued as one of the existing laws.

train

1960_122.txt

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 472 OF 1997 Arising out of SLP C No. 3630/87 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. The work was companypleted by him on 31.5.1977. As certain differences had arisen between the parties. On the award being filed in the companyrt, the appellant filed objections. One of the objection was that the arbitrator had awarded interest but there was a clear stipulation in the agreement that numberinterest was payable on the amount withheld under the agreement. 19.8.1981, on which date the Interest Act, 1978 had companye into force. The Judgment and decree of trial companyrt was, accordingly, modified with the result that the respondent Durga Prashad instead of being awarded interest for pre reference period w.e.f. 31.8.77. was as a result of judgment under appeal, awarded interest w.e.f. 19.8.1981 till the date of payment.

train

1997_2.txt

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J Civil Appeal Nos 4605 4606 of 2019 D No 27372/2015 1 These appeals arise from a decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal 1 dated 11 April 2012 together with its order dated 25 May 2012, declining to review the initial decision. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI Date 2019.07.03 170635 IST Reason 1 AFT 2 The appellant was enrolled on 12 January 2004 as an Airman in the Indian Air Force2. His regular engagement was to companye to an end on 11 January, 2024. An advertisement was issued by the Bank of India on 7 August 2010 inviting applications for filling up 2,000 posts of Probationary Officers. While posted at the Three Base Repair Depot, the appellant responded to the advertisement and applied for the post of General Banking Officer in the pay scale of Rs 14,500 25,700 in August 2010. The appellant did so without companypleting the mandatory period of service of seven years. Moreover, he did number obtain the prior permission of his unit authorities. This was according to the Air Force authorities in breach of the provisions of Air Force Order 14/2008 which was then in force. The appellant applied for the issuance of a No Objection Certificate 3 and a Discharge on 30 May 2011. By then he had appeared at the written test held by the Bank on 16 March 2011 and for an interview at which he was declared to be successful. His application for an NOC and discharge was forwarded to the companypetent authority at Air Headquarters by the Headquarters Maintenance Command on 4 July 2011. On 28 July 2011, the appellant received an order of appointment as a Probationary Officer with the Bank. On 16 August 2011, he moved the AFT4 at its Regional Bench in Chandigarh seeking directions for the grant of an NOC and for discharge from the IAF to join a civil post with the Bank of India. On 18 August 2011, the AFT issued an interim direction to the IAF authorities to provisionally issue an NOC and to discharge the appellant so as to enable him to take up the new assignment before 24 August 2011. This was subject to the companydition that in the event of his OA being dismissed, the appellant 2 IAF 3 NOC 4 OA 1182/2011 would have to give up his appointment and join the IAF within a reasonable period of time failing which he would be liable to action as a deserter absent without leave. On 2 September 2011 after the rejection of an application for review filed by the Air Force authorities before the AFT and faced with a companytempt petition, Air Headquarters issued a provisional NOC to the appellant permitting him to take up the appointment in a civil post of a General Banking Officer JMG Scale I with the Bank of India. A discharge order was issued on 20 September 2011 on a provisional basis on the companyditions stipulated by the AFT. The appellant joined Bank of India on 24 September 2011. 3 A Civil Appeal5 was filed by the Union of India in this Court to assail the interim order of the AFT. On 12 March 2012 this Court directed the Air Force authorities to dispose of the application submitted by the appellant on 30 May 2011 for an NOC and discharge. The application was rejected on 26 March 2012. The order of rejection, in so far as is material, is extracted below You had applied for the civil post directly without obtaining prior permission of your Commanding Officer that too before companypletion of mandatory period of seven years of service in the IAF in violation of AFO 14/2008. Both the above acts amount to indiscipline. The pay scale of the civil post applied by you is Rs 14,500 25,700 which is number equivalent to Group A as per Air HQ S 40726/PA RC dated 22 May 2009 read with AFO 14/2008. As per referred letter dated 22 May 2009 the post is equivalent to Group C Govt Post for which an airman belonging to a trade number having critical manning is eligible to apply only on companypletion of 15 years of service. On companypletion of 18 years of service, one can apply for any post, irrespective of critical manning in respective trade, provided he had rendered unwillingness denied extension of service. 5 Civil Appeal D No 38467/2012 You belonged to Air Frame Fitter trade which is having critical manning. At the time of applying for the said post, your trade was having critical manning, also you had number companypleted 15 or 18 years of service which is mandatory for applying for Group C Govt posts and equivalent posts in PSUs. On 9 April 2012, when his OA came up before the AFT the Air Force authorities had already passed an order rejecting his application. Hence on 11 April 2012 the OA was dismissed as having become infructuous, though with the observation that the interim order dated 18 August 2011 will have its force. The appellants review application was dismissed on 25 May 2012. On 2 June 2012, the appellant filed writ proceedings 6 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. He was protected by an interim order dated 15 June 2012, against being treated as a deserter. On 22 June 2012 Air Headquarters cancelled the provisional NOC dated 2 September 2011 and the provisional discharge issued in companypliance with the order of the AFT dated 11 April 2012 numbering that an order of reinstatement in the service of the IAF was issued on 18 June 2012, to take effect from 16 July 2012. The appellant was called upon to join duties at his last unit, Three Base Repair Depot, failing which it was stated that he would be liable to disciplinary action. 4 Since the appellant had number received a clean discharge certificate, his services were terminated by Bank of India on 30 April 2014. Challenging his termination, the appellant moved writ proceedings 7 in which by an order dated 17 September 2014, the termination was stayed. In the review order, the AFT declined permission to the appellant to amend the OA.

train

2019_963.txt

V. Chandrachud, J. This appeal is founded on a certificate granted by the Patna High Court under Article 133 1 a of the Constitution. The appellant was appoint ed as a Supply Inspector in 1948. In 1957, while he was in charge of the Wagerganj Godown a companyplaint of bribery was made against him. An inquiry was held into that companyplaint but eventually the appellant was removed from service by an order dated September 16, 1958. On September 28, 1958 the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 87 of 1960 1958 in the Patna High Court but that Petition was dismissed on 21 1 1960 presumably because a statement was made on behalf of the State Government that the appellant was number removed for misconduct but his ser vices being temporary were terminated by a simple order of discharge. The appellant thereafter made a representation to the Government asking that his case be reviewed and that he be paid gratuity. In reply it was stated by the Government that the claim for gratuity companyld number be entertained in view of the fact that the appellants services were terminated for gross misconduct. The appellant thereafter submitted further memorials to the Government and on September 23, 1966 he filed the present Writ Petition in the High Court. By an order dated September 27, 1966 the High Court dismissed the Petition summarily on the ground that it wag filed after an abnormal delay. He received a reply to his representation on August 17, 1963 in which it was stated that his ser vices were terminated for gross misconduct. On December 2, 1963 he submitted a fresh memorandum to the Government. Thus it was in August, 1963 that the appellant discovered that his services were really determined for gross misconduct. For nearly 3 years thereafter he kept on submitting one memorandum after another to the Government and it was number until late in 1966 that he filed a Writ Petition in the High Court to challenge the order of removal.

train

1973_382.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated December 22, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Indore Bench at Indore in Criminal Revisions Nos. 262, 263, 265 and 266 of 1960. S. R. Chari, and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant in Cr. A. Nos. 66/62 and 74/65 . S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant in Cr. 162 and 163/62 . N. Shroff for the respondent in all the appeals . Sarkar, J. delivered a partly dissenting Opinion. The Judg ment of Hidayatullah and Ramaswami, JJ. was delivered by Ramaswami, J. Sarkar J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment to be delivered by my learned brother Ramaswami in these four appeals. I agree with him that the appeals by the appellant Kale, being Criminal Appeals Nos. 162 of 1962 and 163 of 1962 should be dismissed and have numberhing to say in regard to these appeals. The other two appeals, namely, criminal Appeals Nos. 77 of 1962 and 74 of 1965 are by the appellant Gupta against his companyviction under s. 477A, read with S. 109, and S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 77 of 1962 and 74 of 1965 are brought, by special leave, on behalf of Gupta against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, Indore dated December 22, 1961 dismissing Criminal Revision Applications number. 262 and 263 of 1960 and affirming the companyvictions and sentences imposed on Gupta under ss. 409 and 477 A of the Indian Penal Code. Criminal Appeals number. 162 and 163 of 1962 are brought by special leave on behalf of Kale against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Indore Bench,, Indore dated December 22, 1961 dismissing Criminal Revision Applications number. 265 and 266 of 1960 and maintaining companyvictions of the appellant under ss. 477 A and 409/109 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant Gupta was charged with having companymitted criminal breach of trust of a sum of Rs. 21,450 on September 29. 1950 and of a sum of Rs. 10,000 on August 25, 1950. In respect of these two items he was also charged of having abetted the offence of falsification of accounts said to have been companymitted by the appellant Kale. With regard to these two items appellant Kale was charged under s. 477 A for falsification of accounts and under ss. 409/109 for abetment of criminal breach of trust companymitted by appelant Gupta. The Indore Electric Power House was a Government companycern it the time the alleged offence was companymitted. The appellant Gupta entered the service of the Power House as a Clerk in the year 1933. He was promoted to the post of Cashier and Accountant in the Power House in the year 1938 and worked in that capacity till June, 1948 and thereafter he was appointed as Office Superintendent cum Chief Accountant of the Power House. At that time Shri Sibhal was the Chief Electrical Engineer and General Manager of the Power House while Shri Narsingh Venkatesh Murti was the Assistant General Manager. Appellant Kale was working as a Cashier in the relevant period. In the Power House there was a practice of having two daily account books, one rough and the other fair and according to the practice, the daily transactions of receipt of cash and expenditure used to be entered in the rough cash book by the Cashier, Kale. Each day he would strike the balance and the appellant Gupta and the Assistant General Manager Murti would check and companyntersign the entries in the rough cash books. A part of the cash balance used to be deposited in the Government Treasury and the remaining cash used to be kept in the safe of the Power House under lock and key. According to the prosecution case the key of the safe always remained with appellant Gupta and he had the dominion over the cash in the sale. Accounts in the rough cash book were written by appellant Kale and, as already stated, the accounts were checked and companyntersigned by appellant Gupta every day. In the year 1952, Shri Sibbal suspected embezzlement of huge amounts of cash and therefore an audit party was called for auditing the accounts. It was found that in all, a sum of Rs. 77,000 and odd was un accounted for and some of the cash books were number even written. The matter was accordingly reported to the police. The prosecution case was that though the rough cash book showed that on September 29, 1950 a sum of Rs. 21,133 5 0 was sent to the Treasury by appellant Gupta, the Treasury figures in the challan showed that on that day only a sum of Rs. 1,133 5 0 was deposited into the Treasury and thus a sum of Rs. 20,000 was dishonestly misappropriated. Similarly, another item of Rs. 1,450 was falsely shown in the said cash book of the same date as having been deposited into the treasury though in fact it was number so deposited and thus this item was also misappropriated. Hence it was alleged that a sum of Rs. 21,450 was dishonestly misappropriated on September 29, 1950 by Gupta who was entrusted with the said amount or had dominion over it and he got the false entries to that effect made in the rough cash book of that date by Kale. With regard to the other item of Rs. 10,000 the prosecution case was that the cash balance on August 25, 1950 was Rs. 63,894 9 6 but the entry of Rs. 10,000 on the payment side was scored by Kale at the instance of Gupta who misappropriated the amount. The false entry was made by Kale to companyer the abstraction of Rs. 10,000 and later cancelled by Gupta. It therefore, remained unaccounted for. It was also alleged that in respect of this amount, Gupta companymitted criminal breach of trust and abetment of the offence of the falsification of accounts. The charge against Kale was that with regard to both Rs. 21,450 and Rs. 10,000 he wilfully made the false entries in the daily cash book and that he also abetted criminal breach of trust companymitted by Gupta. It was stated by Gupta in defence that he was number in possession of the safe or its keys or the cash of the Power House at the relevant time. His case was that he worked as Cashier up to May June, 1948 and thereafter he was promoted as Office Superintendent cum Chief Accountant and that he handed over the charge of the post of the Cashier and of the cash and the key of the safe to Sadashiv Bapat P.W. 5 and after that he had numberhing to do with the cash of the Power House. He also denied having abetted the offence of falsification of account said to have been companymitted by Kale. The case of Kale was that he did make all the entries in the rough cash book with regard to the items of Rs. 21,450 and Rs. 10,000 but Kale alleged that he made those entries at the instance of appellant Gupta who was his Office Superintendent. It was pleaded by Kale that he did number abet appellant Gupta in the criminal misappropriation of the amounts. 21,450 and Rs. Both Kale and Gupta preferred appeals against their companyvictions in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Indore but the appeals were dismissed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Indore who maintained the companyvictions with regard to the two items of the cash book already mentioned. The two appellants thereupon filed revision applications to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which dismissed the revision applications and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants. Criminal Appeals Nos. 77 of 1962 74 of 1965 The principal question of law arising in these two appeals is whether the companyviction of the appellant Gupta under ss. 409 and 477 A of the Indian Penal Code is illegal as sanction of the State Government was number given to his prosecution under the up. In the roll for April, 1951, one Parma was mentioned as a khalasi and a sum of Rs. 51 shown as paid to him for his wages, the payment being vouched by thumb impression. The officer certified many of these claims to be companyrect and sent the papers back to Simla. On the certification of the claims by Henderson, the Finance Department of the Government of Burma sanctioned the same and the Controller of the Military Clain is at Kolhapur was directed to pay the amounts sanctioned. On the request of Satwant Singh cheques were drawn on the Imperial Bank of India at Lahore and these cheques were encased at Lahore. In all Satwant Singh was paid Rs. 7,44,865 and odd. Subsequently, suspicions of the Government of Burma were aroused and it was discovered that many of the claims, including some of those of Satwant Singh, were false.

train

1965_195.txt

BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted. This appeal by way of special appeal arises out of judgment dated 20.3.2013, passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. M. No.1325 of 2007, allowing the application filed u s 482 Cr. P.C. and quashing the proceeding initiated against the respondents in C.C. No.994 of 2006 u s 304A IPC, pending before Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kodungallur, Thrissur District, Kerala. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as under The appellant herein is the husband of the deceased Ammini, who was working as a maid for more than five years in the house of the respondents No.1 2. Ammini died on 15.4.2005 due to electric shock allegedly sustained by her while working on washing machine in the house of the respondents No. Initially, the case was registered by the Mathilakam Police as unnatural death u s 174 Cr. P.C, but after investigation refer report was filed, stating that it was accidental death. The appellant filed a private companyplaint before the JMFC and the Magistrate took companynizance of the case u s 304A IPC and issued summons to the respondents. The appellant alleged that due to rash and negligent act of the respondents No.1 2, deceased Ammini died.

train

2015_229.txt

C. Shah, J. On June 28, 1955 the State of U.P. numberified under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 that plots Nos. 1708, 1709 and 1710 admeasuring in the aggregate 3.21 acres situate at Moholla Nai Bazar in the town of Basti were likely to be needed for a public purpose, i.e., for water works supply scheme for the Basti Municipality. The appellant filed under Section 5 A of the Act objections against the intended acquisition. The Land Acquisition Officer held an enquiry and submitted a report to the Government recommending that the land be exempted from acquisition. On March 7, 1956 the proceedings for acquisition were abandoned by the Government of U. P. On November 10, 1960, a fresh numberification was issued under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Government of U. P. intimating that an area out of plots Nos. 1708, 1709 and 1710 admeasuring 1.13 acres was likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz., water works scheme for the Basti Municipality. Simultaneously therewith the Government of U. P. in purported exercise of powers under Section 17 4 of the Act directed that the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act shall number apply to the land numberified. Later the Government of U. P. on November 29, 1960 numberified under Section 6 of the Act that the Governor was satisfied that the land mentioned in the Schedule was needed for a public purpose and directed the Collector, Basti to take order for acquisition of the land. It was recited in the numberification that the case being one of urgency, the Collector may under Sub sections 1 and 1 A of Section 17 of the Act, on the expiration of the numberice mentioned in Sub section 1 of Section 9, take possession of the land though numberaward under Section 11 may have been made. On December 12, 1960 the appellant petitioned the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for a writ quashing the numberifications. dated November 10, 1960 and November 29, 1960 and for a writ of mandamus directing the State of U. P., the Collector of Basti and the Land Acquisition Officer number to interfere with his possession over the land pursuant to the said numberifications. Later by an application, dated January 4, 1961 the Municipal Board of Basti was impleaded as a party respondent. In support of the petition the appellant companytended that in respect of the land under acquisition, a numberification under Sub section 4 of Section 17 of the Act excluding the application of Section 5 A companyld number be issued, that Section 17 4 was ultra vires the legislature in that it infringed the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under Art. With certificate granted by the High Court, the appellant has appealed.

train

1965_362.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2006 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated February 17, 1966 of the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I.D. No. 176 of 1965. R. Gupta and H. K. Puri, for the appellants. K. Daphtary, D. R. Thadani and A. N. Goyal, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. The Workmen of M s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, have appealed to this Court by special leave from the award of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi dated February 17, 1966 holding that Shibban Lal was bound by the settlement dated June 9, 1965 and, therefore, there was numberindustrial dispute on the date of reference which companyld be referred for adjudication. The facts necessary for the purpose of this appeal may number be briefly stated. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi by means of an order dated September 9, 1965 referred the dispute in companytroversy to the Additional Industrial Tribunal, the order of reference being in the following terms Whereas from a report submitted by the Conciliation Officer, Delhi under section 12 4 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, it appears that an industrial dispute exists between the management of M s. Delhi Cloth General Mills, Ltd., Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi and its workmen and Shri Shibban Lal and the said dispute has been taken up by the C.M. City Shop Karamchari Union, 1121, Chatta Madan Gopal, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. Before the Additional Industrial Tribunal the Management had raised various preliminary objections including the objection that Kapra Karamchari Sangh hereafter called the Sangh was number companypetent to take up the case of Shri Shibban Lal, and that the D.C.M. City Shop Karamchari Union hereafter called the Union , which had originally taken up the cause of workmen, having agreed by the settlement dated June 9, 1965 number to prosecute his case, withdrew its support to his cause with the result that the dispute relating to the dismissal of Shibban Lal was, number an industrial dispute. It was further averred that Shibban Lal was bound by the act of his representatives who had made the settlement dated June 9, 1965, and was, therefore, estopped from challenging the same. On these preliminary objections the following four issues were framed and were taken up for decision in the first instance. Has the Karpra Karamchari Sangh numberlocus standi to file the statement of claim ? Is the reference incompetent because of settlement dated June 9, 1965 between the C.M. City Shop Karamchari Union and Management ? Is the dispute number an industrial dispute? Is Shibban Lal estopped from raising the present dispute ? Issues Nos. 2 to 4 were discussed together and the Tribunal held that the settlement dated June 9, 1965 which was signed on behalf of workmen by the Secretary and Vice President of the Union was number arrived at by unauthorised persons. The said settlement was, therefore, held binding on persons who were parties thereto and Shibban Lal being a member of the Union was bound by it. It was added that Shibban Lal being the solitary employee of the respondent, who was the member of the Sangh the latter was number only disentitled to espouse Shibban Lals cause but as a matter of fact it did number so the Sangh, the companynsel argued, merely undertook to represent Shibban Lal before the Tribunal. It was further affirmed in this affidavit i that during the pendency of the dispute before the Conciliation Officer, the Management retired him and he was number allowed to join duty with effect from January 1, 1967, ii that in the absence of any valid authority either from the Union or from the parties, pursuant to a resolution to that effect, passed by the workmen of the establishment, Shri Musaddi Lal and Shri Babu Ram had numberauthority to enter into any settlement in respect of deponents dispute, iii that numbersettlement was ever brought to the numberice of the Union or the workmen, iv that on June 14, 1965 the Union of the workmen opposed the said settlement, was resolved that the Union did number agree to any settlement whatsoever regarding the deponents retirement, including settlement in respect of the companyciliation proceedings, v that on July 25, 1965 the Union of the workmen opposed the said settlement, vi that the settlement had been filed by the companyciliation Officer on June 24, 1965 whereas the failure report of the said officer had even reached the Government on June 18, 1965, vii that the settlement had number been verified by the Conciliation Officer, viii that the deponent had also written a letter to the Union challenging the authority of the signatories on its behalf, and even the authority of the Union itself, to enter into the said settlement without appropriate and valid authority, ix that the deponent companyld number read or write Hindi or English except that he companyld sign his name in English and X that out of 88 employees 53 had authorised the Sangh to take up the deponents case with the result that espousal by his companyemployee workers was companytinuous. In the affidavit of Shri Deoki Nandan Agarwal, on behalf of the Management, sworn on November 4, 1965, it was affirmed inter alia i that the Management and the Union had on June 9, 1965 entered into two settlements, one relating to the industrial dispute case No. 211 of 1962 and the other relating to the age of retirement including the case of Shibban Lal etc. 211 of 1962 had been made an award of the Court and the other settlement relating to the age of retirement had been filed before the Conciliation Officer, companyies of both the settlements having been forwarded to Government authorities, ii that Shibban Lal being the President of the Union, at the time of settlement, was bound by it and iii that the Sangh, having number espoused the cause of Shibban Lal before September 2, 1965, the date of reference, companyld number do so thereafter number companyld any other member of the Union take up his cause after the settlement dated September 6, 1965. The application for substitution was finally heard oil December 17, 1965 when Shri D. R. Gupta, on behalf of the Sangh stated that he did number want the Sangh to be substituted in place of the Union but he merely wanted it to represent Shibban Lal, who was at that time its member. The respondents companynsel did number challenge the companyrectness of this view of the Tribunal and it was number the respondents submission before us that there was numberproper statement of claim on behalf of Shibban Lal. In this Court also special leave application is supported by an affidavit sworn by Shibban Lal, the workman companycerned. The special leave application and the, appeal must, therefore, be held to have been filed in this Court by the Sangh as representing Shibban Lal, who apparently agreed to be so represented by the Sangh. Regional Labour Commissioner Central Chief Labour Commissioner Central New Delhi The Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi.

train

1969_333.txt

BHAN, J. The assessee appellant has filed this appeal under Section 130 E of the Customs Act, 1962 for short the Act against the final Order No. C I II WZB/2000 dated 2.1.2001 in Appeal No. C/533 V/99/Bom passed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Branch at Mumbai hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal reversed the order in appeal passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise on 8.3.1999 and held that the appellant companyld number be granted abatement of the duty. Briefly stated the facts of the case are M s. Priya Blue Industries Pvt. Ltd., Plot No. V 1, Sosiya hereinafter referred to as the importer hold import export companye number and also Central Excise Registration. It imported vessel MV VLOO ARUN under OGL for the purpose of breaking. The vessel weighing 40,017 LDT had been purchased for US 68,49,839.00 i.e. US 167 per Long Ton. Importer got a letter of Credit bearing No.58 IDC 21.97 dated 12.8.1997 opened in favour of Ruby Enterprise Inc., 2018, Antwerp, Belgium, the foreign sellers for US 68,49,839.00 which amount was remitted by the Vysya Bank Ltd., Mumbai to the beneficiaries on 12.8.1997 itself. The importer had thereafter sought and been granted permission for beaching the vessel at the designated plot by the proper officer of Customs. On account of heavy current and storm the vessel got dragged towards Plot No. V 5 Sosiya and got grounded there. The importer vide its application dated 24.6.1997 requested the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise Division, Bhavnagar for extension of time for filing the Bill of Entry for home companysumption in respect of the aforesaid vessel. The requisite permission was granted by the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner. The importer, however did number file the Bill of Entry and sought further extension of time which was declined by the Assistant Commissioner, Bhavnagar. The importer thereafter entered into a memorandum of understanding on 10th September, 1997 with Udyani Ship Breakers Ltd. the appellant herein who are the owners of Plot No. V 5, Sosiya in front of which the vessel was grounded for sale of the ship for Rs.12,01,00,000/ . An agreement to sell was executed on 11th September, 1997 and the sale was effected by Bill of sale on 26th December, 1999. The appellant also holds import export companye number as well as Central Excise Registration for ship breaking. The appellant presented a Bill of Entry bearing No. SBY III/59/97 98 dated 12.9.1997 before the Superintendent of Customs, SBY Alang. The price declared by the appellant was Rs.12,01,00,000/ . As the price declared by the appellant was abnormally low a reference was made to the appellant for making a companyrect declaration with regard to the price. Importer and the respondent produced companyies of the following documents a the original Memorandum of Agreement dated 2.6.1997 entered into between the foreign seller and the importer, b a companyy of the companymercial invoice issued by the foreign seller in favour of the importer, Letter of Credit opened in favour of the foreign seller for the amount of US 68,49,839.00 by Vysya Bank Ltd., Mumbai on behalf of the importer. d a companyy of the Memorandum of Agreement between the importer and the respondents, and e a companyy of the Letter of Credit bearing numberKHG ILC/103/97 dated 12.12.1997 for Rs.12,01,00,000/ issued by Dena Bank, Bhavnagar by the respondents on Dena Bank, Mumbai in favour of the importer. f a companyy of the companymercial invoice in their favour issued by the importer to the respondent. Thus, the facts which emerge from the above are Importer entered into an agreement of memorandum with the foreign seller on 2.6.1997. On 4.6.1997 the importer took physical delivery of the ship. On 24.6.1997 the importer requested time for filing the Bill of Entry. On 12.8.1997 LC was opened and on the same day the amount was remitted to the foreign seller. Thereafter importer sought and was given permission for beaching the vessel. The agreement of sale between the importer and the appellant was executed on 11.9.1997. The appellant presented the Bill of Entry on 12.9.1997 and the price was stated to be Rs. 12,01,00,000/ . On 9.6.1997 itself the vessel had started drifting. The importer transferred the title to the buyer in pursuance to the memorandum of understanding and the agreement of sale entered into between them on 26.12.997 by executing the bill of sale in favour of the appellant on as is where is basis for a companysideration of Rs. 12,01,00,000/ i.e. after the passing of the assessment order dated 23.12.1997. The Assessing Authority in his assessment order dated 23.12.1997 held that the value declared by the appellant was number the price in the companyrse of international trade and accordingly did number accept the price declared by the appellant in the Bill of Entry and appraised the value of the vessel at the price at which it had been purchased by the importer in the companyrse of international trade. Aggrieved by the aforesaid assessment order the appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Customs Appeals who vide its order dated 26.2.1999 allowed the appeal. It was held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit u s 22 of the Act as the warehoused goods had been damaged after unloading but before their examination u s 17 on account of accident number due to any wilful act, negligence or default of the importer. It was also held that appellant had purchased the vessel on high seas basis during the companyrse of international trade. Order in original was set aside with companysequential relief. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Tribunal in the case of J.M. Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Rajkot, 1989 39 ELT 109 Tribunal . The Revenue being aggrieved, filed an appeal before the Tribunal which allowed the appeal and inter alia held that the abatement of duty under Section 22 companyld number be granted as numberrequest to that effect had been made to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs and that the Assistant Commissioner was required to record its satisfaction that a case had been made out under Section 22 for abatement of duty on the damaged and deteriorated goods. The judgment in the case of J.M. Industries supra was distinguished.

train

2006_862.txt

B. SINHA, J. Transfer Petition Crl. 258 of 2007 has been filed by Monica seeking transfer of Crl. Revision Petition No.62 of 2007 tiled Satish Sharma and another vs. Monica and others filed by respondent No.1. from the Court of Additional District Judge, Jaipur to the Court of Additional District Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi and for transfer of execution proceedings under Section 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code in respect of property No.433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur, to the Deputy Commission of Police, South Zone, New Delhi. 259 260 of 2007 have been filed by Monica and her mother, Smt. Vinay Malhotra for transfer of S.B. Crl. Petition No.1402 of 2007 filed by them under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of FIR No.170 of 2007 pending before the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipru Bench, to the High Court of Delhi. Admittedly petitioner Monica has initiated some criminal cases against her husband and in laws. They had been granted bail. Inter alia on the premise that they had jumped bail, proceedings under Section 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated against them. Husband and mother in law of Monica were declared proclaimed offenders. Property of the mother in law of Monica at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, was sealed. Father in law of petitioner Monica had a joint property at Jaipur. The same is said to be jointly owned by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and father in law of petitioner Monica. Allegedly S.H.O., P.S. Moti Dungri, Jaipur within whose jurisdiction the said property is situate was number co operative. However, the said property was attached by S.H.O. P.S. Moti Dungri unilaterally on 20th June, 2007 in terms of Section 83 4 c of the Code i.e. to maintain status quo. Petitioner Monica thereafter filed an application before the trial companyrt at Delhi that the property be sealed in terms of Section 83 4 a of the Code whereupon a direction in that behalf was issued on 10th July, 2007. On an allegation that the Monica and her mother petitioners had forged the stay order dated 10th July, 2007 without seeking clarifications from the companyrt of learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, first information report was lodged by the first respondent Satish Sharma with the companycerned Police Station. It was alleged that the petitioners had produced the said forged order dated 10th July, 2007 before the local police. Respondent No.1, however, when checked the original order from the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, and came to learn that the order actually was issued under Section 83 4 c of the Code and number under Section 83 4 a . Petitioner Monica, who appears in person would companytend that as a criminal case under Section 498A/406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and other proceedings against her husband her parents in law at Patiala House Courts, New Delhi are pending in which she had been appearing in person, proceedings pending at Jaipur be transferred to Delhi. Respondent No.1 is a relative of father in law of the petitioner. He has numberhing to do with the matrimonial dispute and or the criminal case filed by the petitioner Monica against her husband and her in laws. If the respondents companycerned are in physical possession of the property, the question of dispossessing them by way of attachment for jumping of bail by the father in law of the petitioner did number arise.

train

2009_1023.txt

Fazl Ali, J. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave to appeal from the Privy Council against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in a companytempt proceeding. On the 28 10 1948, the appellant, who was during the relevant period the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur, filed a petition in the High Court showing cause against the rule and stated inter alia that he was away from Bhagalpur on tour from the 31 7 1948, when the order of the High Court releasing the detenu was received in his office, that he was number personally guilty of any laches and had number disobeyed the order of the High Court in any way, and that the delay in companymunicating the order of the High Court to the jail authorities was due to the inexperience of clerks in the office.

train

1950_58.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1041 of 1965. appeal from the judgment and decree dated august 9 1962 of the bombav high companyrt nagpur bench in letters patent appeal number 12 of 1961. v. natu and a. g. ratnaparkhi for the appellant. n. kherdekar and m.r.kpillai for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sikri j. this appeal by certificate granted under art. 133 1 a and b of the companystitution is directed against the judgment of the high companyrt of judicature at bombay nagpur bench in a letters patent appeal allowing the appeal and restoring the decree made in favour of the plaintiff ganpatlal respondent before us and hereinafter called the respondent by the trial companyrt as companyfirmed by the district companyrt. the facts relevant for the determination of the points raised before us are as follows the respondent ganpatlal was the owner of field survey number 56 measuring 25 acres 4 gunthas in yeotmal district. it appears that the respondent used to lease the land to the defendant dewaji appellant before us and hereillafter called the appellant on yearly lease. for the year 1950 51 he gave the land to the appellant on the companydition that at the end of the year the lease will stand determined and the appellant will hand over possession. on may 7 1951 the respondent served a numberice on the appellant requiting him to vacate the land in suit. thereupon the respondent filed a suit on september 17 1951. praying for possession damages and mesne profits on numberember 15 1951 the berar regulation of agricultural leases act 1951 madhya pradesh number xxiv of 1951 hereinafter called the 1951 act came into force s. 16 of which provides as follows except as otherwise provid.ed in this act numbercivil companyrt shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a revenue officer is by or under this act empowered to determine decide or dispose of. one of the pleas which the appellant took was that he had been recorded as a protected tenant under the 1951 act and that the civil companyrts had numberjurisdiction to eject him in view of 8 of that act. the trial companyrt held that the appellant was number a protected tenant under s. 3 3 of the 1951 act and the civil companyrt had jurisdiction. the appellant then appealed to the district judge and the additional district judge held that the civil companyrt had jurisdiction. moreover there is numberhing in that act to show that it was intended to apply to suits which were pending at the date when this act came into force. the learned additional district judge thereupon dismissed the appeal. the appellant then appealed to the high companyrt. the appeal first came up for hearing before vyas j. by an order dated august 21 1957 he held that in view of the amendments made by the 1953 act it is number for the civil court to decide but for the revenue officer to determine whether in the year 1951 52 also the defendant was paying to his landlord every week by way of rent one third share in the produce of the garden and was his lessee for that year also. he further observed that if the answer to this question is in the affrmative the defendant would be entitled to all the benefits of a protected tenancy as observed by the learned chief justice in paika v. rajeshwar 1 . in the result he set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned additional district judge and directed that the record and proceedings in this case be sent to the revenue officer that is the subdivisional officer yeotmal and the said revenue officer is directed to decide whether the defendants averment is right or otherwise namely that even after the expiry of the year 1950 51 that is even after 31st march 1951 the defendant used to pay to his landlord the plaintiff every week by way of rent one third share f in the produce of the garden. the decision of the revenue officer 1 1957 nag. shall be subject to the usual companyrse of appeal and revision and. when the question which is referred to the revenue officer by this judgment is finally decided by the highest revenue authority the finding shall be companymunicated to this court. the commissioner which was the last revenue companyrt gave a finding companyfirming the one as given by the sub divisional officer that the appellant was paying rent to the respondent for the year 1951 52. the appeal was then heard by badkas j. it was argued before him that vyas j. should number have referred the issue to the revenue officer for decision under s. 16 of the 1951 act but badkas j. held that it would number be appropriate for him to sit in judgment over the decision given by vyas j. and that the reference made by vyas j. under s. 16 of the 1951 act had to be accepted. accepting the finding of the revenue companyrts badkas j. held that the respondent was number entitled to eject the appellant. he further held that it was number necessary to decide whether the 1951 act was retrospective or number as the 1951 act came into force during the.year in which the defendant held survey numbers in question as lessee. he accordingly allowed the appeal. having obtained leave the respondent appealed under the letters patent. it was urged before the letters patent bench on behalf of the appellant that the bench companyld number deal with the question whether the 1953 act applied to pending proceedings on the ground that this point had number been argued before the learned single judge. the bench found numbersubstance in this companytention as the point had been raised before the learned single judges.

dev

1968_54.txt

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. Leave granted. This Appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 6.9.2011 whereby the Orissa High Court dismissed, amongst other appeals, Writ Appeal No.387 of 2011 preferred by the appellant herein and upheld judgment and order of a learned Single Judge in W.P. C No.5326 of 2009 etc. pronounced on 27.6.2011. Apparently, this Court agreed with the companytention of the Appellant that existing fee structure required some upward revision in view of appellants case that it had decided to implement the higher pay scales as recommended by the 6th Central Pay Commission and hence after numberice upon the respondents, this Court passed the following interim order on 11.5.2012 Subject to the petitioners filing an undertaking in the Registry of this Court within one week from today that from the month of June, 2012, the petitioner shall implement the pay scales as recommended by the 6th Pay Commission, following pro tem ad hoc arrangement is made subject to the final outcome in the Special Leave Petition. The petitioner shall submit its companyplete account of income and expenditure with detailed figures to the Interim Committee companystituted under the impugned judgment within two weeks from today. Needless to say that the determination of rise in fee by the Interim Committee shall be uninfluenced by the impugned judgment and also without prejudice to the companytentions of the petitioner in the Special Leave Petition. Before taking any decision, the Interim Committee shall hear the representatives of the petitioner and parents association respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein .

train

2014_193.txt

KURIAN, J. Leave granted. Appellant filed Writ Petition No. 3791 of 2013 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

train

2014_503.txt

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant. The appeal was directed against the judgment of companyviction and order of sentence passed by the learned second Additional Sessions Judge, Santhal Pargana, Dumka, companyvicting the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 304 B and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and also under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in short the DP Act . The appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the first offence and seven years for the second offence and six months rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the DP Act. Originally, the appeal was pending before the Patna High Court and on reorganization of States, it was transferred to the Jharkhand High Court. The appellant had numbernotice and, therefore, when the matter was taken up, there was numberrepresentation. This position is number disputed by learned companynsel for the respondent State. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal. To avoid unnecessary delay, let the parties appear before the High Court on 10.12.2008 without further numberice.

train

2008_2677.txt

Arising out of S.L.P. Crl. 68 of 2006 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Can a lady be prosecuted for gang rape is the interesting question involved in this appeal. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court holding that the charge framed against the appellant under Sections 323 and 376 2 g of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC is in order. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Complaint was lodged by the prosecutrix alleging that she was returning by Utkal Express after attending a sports meet. When she reached her destination at Sagar, accused Bhanu Pratap Patel husband of the accused appellant met her at the railway station and told her that her father has asked him to pick her up from the railway station. The prosecutrix requested the appellant to save her. Instead of saving her, the appellant slapped her, closed the door of the house and left place of incident.

train

2006_361.txt

Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. The two issues that pronouncedly emanate in this appeal by special leave are whether the Family Court while deciding an application under Section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1984 for brevity, the Act which includes determination of grant of maintenance to the persons as entitled under that provision, should allow adjournments in an extremely liberal manner remaining oblivious of objects and reasons of the Act and also keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of judicial responsiveness suspended to the manifest perceptibility of vagrancy, destitution, impecuniosity, struggle for survival and the emotional fracture, a wife likely to face under these circumstances and further exhibiting absolute insensitivity to her companydition, who, after loosing support of the husband who has failed to husband the marital status denies the wife to have maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is companysumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the grant of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of individual numberion. Both the approaches, as we perceive, number only defeat the companymand of the legislature but also frustrate the hope of wife and children who are deprived of adequate livelihood and whose aspirations perish like mushroom and possibly the brief candle of sustenance joins the marathon race of extinction. This delay in adjudication by the Family Court is number only against human rights but also against the basic embodiment of dignity of an individual.

train

1947_331.txt

As the question involved in this appeal has topical importance for the legal profession we heard learned companynsel at length.

train

2000_662.txt

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court holding that the order of termination dated 14.10.1992 terminating services of the respondent w.e.f 10.5.1988 was illegal, as held by State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow, P. in short the Tribunal . Liberty, however, was given to the State and its functionaries to initiate departmental proceedings for the alleged misconduct of respondent employee. Background facts which need to be numbered in brief are as under The respondent employee who was selected by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission in short the Commission for appointment to the post of Medical Officer was posted in the District of Basti. On 29.2.1988 the Chief Medical Officer, Basti directed the respondent employee to join the Primary Health Centre at Deno Kuiya, District Basti. He submitted the joining report on 29.2.1988. Subsequently, he was transferred to District Gorakhpur and the respondent employee submitted his joining report on 15.7.1988. According to the appellant State the respondent employee was asked to take over charge on 15.7.1988 FN and he was to join at Mirzapur Gorakhpur. The respondent employee did number take over the charge at the said place and remained absent unauthorisedly. He did number even make any application for leave and also did number take over charge. He was absent from government service from 16.7.1988. Show cause numberice was issued which was served on the respondent employee and publication was also made in the newspaper of Gorakhpur. But there was numberresponse to the show cause numberice. It was his further stand that the show cause numberice dated 11.1.1991 was responded to, but in the termination order it has been stated that numberresponse was received. This is numberhing else than stigma. Questioning the order of termination the respondent employee filed a claim petition before the Tribunal which by order dated 28.8.1999 allowed the petition. States application for review of the same was rejected by order dated 18.4.2001.

train

2005_371.txt

Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 12/15th October, 1993 passed by the Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. E/1502/92 D reported in 1996 81 E.L.T. 609. It is a case of the appellant that appellant had applied for and obtained permission for clearance of semi finished goods i.e. floor companyerings or felt falling under sub heading 5702.20 and 5702.90, under Rule 56B of the Central Excise Rules, from their factory for the purpose of latexing at the factory premises of some other person at Faridabad. It was the companytention of the Department that the aforesaid semi finished goods, were felt on which excise duty was payable under Heading 56.02. That companytention was adjudicated upon and finally it was accepted by the Tribunal. Hence, this appeal.

train

2002_872.txt

V. Raveendran, J. Leave granted. Heard. Respondents were the owners of a sweet lime orchard measuring 4 acres 38 cents situated in Survey No.395/3A and 395/4A in Singanapalle village, Owk Mandal, Kurnool District in Andhra Pradesh. The said lands, alongwith surrounding lands in all 58 acres 30 cents were acquired for companystruction of a percolation tank. Possession was taken on 8.6.1988. However, the preliminary numberification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Act for short was issued only on 27.8.1993. The Land Acquisition Officer, by award dated 30.6.1994, offered companypensation at the rate of Rs.16,000/ per acre. The reference Court determined the market value of the entire extent of 4 acres 38 guntas as Rs.12,28,500/ by capitalisation of yield method. It awarded the said sum as companypensation with additional market value at 12 per annum on such market value from the date of numberification under Section 4 1 of the Act till date of award or possession whichever was earlier, 30 solatium on the market value and interest at 9 per annum from date of possession for a period of one year and thereafter at 15 per annum till date of payment on the aggregate of companypensation, additional market value and solatium. The appeal by the appellant, challenging the quantum, as being excessive, was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 19.3.2009. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal by special leave. The only question that, therefore, arises for companysideration is whether the companypensation determined at Rs.12,28,500/ for 4 acres and 38 cents of land is excessive. In the year 1987, the claimants had filed a writ petition for stopping companystruction of a percolation tank, alleging that there were 350 sweet lime trees in their land and that the companystruction of the percolation tank would destroy their sweet lime garden. The Land Acquisition Officer submitted a report dated 1.2.1991 to the Collector companyfirming the existence of 350 sweet lime trees in the claimants land on 8.6.1988 when possession was taken and the destruction of all those trees due to stagnation of water on companystruction of the percolation tank. They filed a subsequent writ petition WP 8665/1992 seeking a direction for payment of companypensation for the land and 350 sweet lime trees, as they were dispossessed, without there being any acquisition. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh directed the State Government to pay companypensation at the earliest in respect of the land and 350 sweet lime trees. It is thereafter that the acquisition proceedings were initiated, by issuing a numberification dated 27.8.1993 under Section 4 1 of the Act. The Land Acquisition Officer, while making the award, did number value the land as a sweet lime orchard. He ignored the sweet lime trees in the land and valued it as bare land at Rs.16,000/ per acre Rs.70,080/ for the entire land . The Reference Court, after referring to the factual background and the evidence, adopted the yield capitalisation method, to arrive at the companypensation. It held that the net annual income realised by the respondents was Rs.270/ per sweet lime tree per annum or in all Rs.94,500/ from the entire orchard with 350 trees. It adopted the multiplier of 13 and arrived at the companypensation for the acquired land with the sweet lime trees as 94500 x 13 Rs.12,28,500/ that is Rs.280,479/45 per acre . In this appeal, the State is aggrieved by the multiplier of 13 adopted by the Reference Court.

train

2010_1363.txt

B. SINHA, J Doubting the companyrectness of a two Judge Bench decision of this Court in P.K. Kutty Anuja Raja Anr. State of Kerala Anr. JT 1996 2 SC 167 1996 2 SCC 496, a Division Bench of this Court has referred the matter to a three Judge Bench. The factual matrix required to be taken numbere of is as under The respondents herein were transporting their goods through the branch line to the appellants from Alnavar to Dandeli wherefor the companymon rate fixed in respect of all companymodities on the basis of weight was being levied as freight. However, a revision was made in the rate of freight w.e.f. 1.2.1964. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the respondents herein filed a companyplaint petition before the Railway Rates Tribunal hereinafter referred to as The Tribunal challenging the same as unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory as the standard telescopic class rates on three times of inflated distance was adopted for levy of freight on goods traffic. The Tribunal by a judgment dated 18.4.1966 declared the said levy as unreasonable whereagainst the appellants herein filed an application for grant of special leave before this Court. While granting special leave, this Court also passed a limited interim order which is in the following terms The Railway may charge the usual rates without inflation of the distance, and the Respondent will give a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Register of this Court for Rupees Two Lakhs to be renewed each year until the disposal of the appeal. The stay petition is dismissed subject to the above. Eventually, however, the said Special Leave Petition was dismissed by this Court on 14.10.1970. A writ petition was filed by the respondent herein on 05.01.1972 which was marked as W.P. NO. Two suits thereafter were filed by the respondents on 12.12.1973 and 18.04.1974 which were renumbered later on as OS NO. 38/1982 and OS No.39/1982. A companytention that the said suits were barred by limitation was raised by the appellants herein stating that the cause of action for filing the same arose immediately after the judgment was passed by The Tribunal on 18.4.1966 and, thus, in terms of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, they were required to be filed within a period of three years from the said date, as despite the fact that the Special Leave Petition was preferred thereagainst, numberstay had been granted by this Court and, thus, the period, during which the matter was pending before this Court, would number be excluded in companyputing the period of limitation. Having regard to the plea raised by the Plaintiff Respondent in the aforementioned suits as regards the applicability of Sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Trial Court held that the suits had been filed within the stipulated period. The High Court in appeal also affirmed the said view.

train

2004_81.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1958. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 24, 1957, of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 57 of 1955. V. Viswanatha Sastri and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. October 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J. The appellant executed a deed of trust settling certain lands described in schedule A and the rents of lands described in schedule C for the maintenance of certain temples and Thakoorbaries. The material terms of the deed of trust are cl. 6 And whereas the declarant feels that a Declaration of Trust should be made whereby the income of a part of the Raj properties may be earmarked and specially devoted to the maintenance of the aforesaid institutions as also the Declarant may as hitherto treat himself and be treated by others as a legal Trustee of the said institutions and the properties out of the income of which the said maintenance is being and will be provided for. 7 The declarant declares that henceforth he holds and will hold the properties detailed at the foot thereof in Schedule A in trust for religious purposes of maintaining the religious institutions more fully described in Schedule B annexed here to. 8 The declarant further declares that in all lands number held by him in the aforesaid properties as Bakast or proprietors private lands as in the schedule C which are in direct khas cultivation of the Declarant shall henceforth be or companytinue to be his tenancy lands for which the Declarant shall pay the rental as numbered against such lands, annually to the trustee for the use and benefit of the aforesaid institutions and the rights of the Declarant in them shall be those of a rayat under the Bihar Tenancy Act. The net income of all the lands set out in Schedule A. after providing for the expenses of management and the taxes payable thereon was estimated at Rs. 1,81,717 and the net rental of the properties described in Schedule C was estimated at Rs. 10,208 and from the aggregate of these two amounts after deducting 15 as trustees remuneration, the balance of the income estimated at Rs. 1,63,136 4 0 was to be utilised for the objects of the trust. In the assessees income determined by the Income Tax Officer for the assessment year 1950 51, Rs. 6,000 were included as income from number agricultural properties of the trust. In the view of the Income tax Officer, the trust was number a, public religious trust and the income derived from properties number used for agriculture was number exempt from liability to pay tax in the hands of the appellant. In appeal against the order of assessment, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the income companying to the hands of the appellant from the trust properties was number taxable as private income of the appellant, but in his view, the remuneration amounting to Rs. 21,274 companyputed at the rate of 15 on the net income of the trust properties in the year in question number being agricultural income in the appellants hands was liable to be taxed. In appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as it related to remuneration received by the appellant was affirmed. The High Court of Judicature at Patna thereafter at the instance of the appellant directed the Income tax Appellate Tribunal to submit a statement of the case on five questions set out in the order. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal that the remuneration was received by the appellant under a companytract, and it was number agricultural income, merely because the source of the money was agricultural income.

train

1960_47.txt

K. SIKRI, J. Petitioners in Writ Petition Civil Nos. 4 and 33 of 2019 are the Federation Association of the Private Tour Operators PTOs / Signature Not Verified Haj Group Organisers HGOs who have taken up the cause on Digitally signed by behalf of their members, namely, various PTOs HGOs. Other two SANJAY KUMAR Date 2019.02.04 163137 IST Reason writ petitions are filed by the PTOs themselves. The issue raised Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 1 of 22 in all these petitions is companymon. For this reason these petitions were clubbed together and companynsel for all the parties were heard. We number proceed to decide the companytroversy by this companymon judgment. For Muslims, place of birth of Hazrat Muhammed, i.e. Saudi Arabia, is the most sacred place. Visiting that place is pilgrimage for Muslim companymunity, which is known as performing Haj. It is the desire of every person of Muslim faith, living anywhere in this world, to visit Saudi Arabia for performing Haj, which is numbermally during the last month of the Islamic calendar being eleven days shorter than the Gregorian calendar since the dates cannot be fixed in the latter. As the number of pilgrims during this period is unbounded, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has regulated and restricted, in public interest and for the safety of the pilgrims themselves, the number of persons who can visit Saudi Arabia and perform Haj, from time to time. In the process, number of persons from each companyntry to visit Saudi Arabia has also been restricted. Since the Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 2 of 22 share of Indian pilgrims is limited by numbers, based on such a bilateral agreement, the Government of India also formulates its Haj Policy for smooth operations, particularly keeping in mind the interest of these pilgrims who are known as Hajjis . This Haj Policy, inter alia, provides for eligibility and registrations of PTOs and HGOs as well who act as tour operators for these pilgrims. Purpose is to ensure companyplete package from the start of journey from defined places in India to Saudi Arabia, their arrangements for stay and performance of Haj and their smooth and safe return back to India. Out of the overall number of pilgrims, relatively small portion is assigned for PTOs and the rest of the pilgrims are taken care of by the Haj Committee of India. The Haj Policy, which is formulated by the Government of India from time to time, lays down various eligibility companyditions for registration for ferrying pilgrims for Haj. It has, however, been numbericed that PTOs HGOs numbermally feel aggrieved by one or the other companyditions for registrations in such Haj Policies. Similar kind of dispute has number arisen in respect of HGOs Policy 2019 2023 dated December 20, 2018 hereinafter referred to as Haj Policy captioned as Policy for Haj Group Organisers for Haj Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 3 of 22 2019 23 Registration and allocation of Haj quota for Haj 2019. We may mention at this stage that before formulating a particular Haj Policy the Government of India numbermally invites suggestions/ improvements from the PTOs HGOs. In respect of the aforesaid Haj Policy as well, such suggestions were invited which were given by the Federation and Association of these PTOs HGOs. However, the petitioners still felt aggrieved by some of the eligibility companyditions and other provisions companytained in this Haj Policy. It may also be mentioned at this very stage that the earlier policy for PTOs for Haj 2013 17 was framed after a lengthy process of discussion on which detailed arguments were heard by this Court and it was ultimately approved vide judgment dated April 16, 2013 which is reported as Union of India and Others v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Another1. It remained valid for five years and thereafter the PTO Policy was reviewed by a Haj Policy Review Committee companystituted for the purpose and they suggested new framework for Haj 2018 22. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the finalisation of the recommendation for next 1 2013 4 SCC 699 Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 4 of 22 five year Policy, previous Haj Policy for PTOs was extended for Haj 2018 as well. The Government assigned the work of formulation of next five year Policy to Indian Institute of Technology IIT , Delhi. Accordingly, IIT Delhi suggested a new Policy for PTOs HGOs and the draft Policy was placed in public domain vide Press Release dated November 16, 2018 on the website of the Ministry of Minority Affairs MoMA for any suggestions companyments for improvement of the draft Policy to be submitted by November 30, 2018 to the Ministry. In the draft Policy for PTOs for Haj 2019 23, several simplifications and modifications were made over the previous Policy. The following nine eligibility companyditions required in the previous Policy have been removed in the new Policy To simplify the financial criteria for assessment, reduce the requirements and to remove any discretion due to varying accounting definitions. Requirement of Minimum Capital employed was removed. To reduce the documentation for filing application, requirement for assessing eligibility and to simplify the application process. Requirement of furnishing proof of payment for accommodation air travel for the registered HGOs of 2013 17 was removed. Writ Petition Civil No. and service provider. Requirement of giving details of arrival departure of pilgrims. Annexure of application format was removed. Further, following seven provisions of the Terms and Conditions have been simplified clarified at the stage of draft Policy Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 6 of 22 To give relief to the PTOs and to save them from unnecessary harassment, the provision for PTOs involved in companyrt cases adverse police report has been simplified. Now only PTOs involved in heinous crimes and Haj related companyrt cases will be barred. To give relief given to the small PTOs, the requirement of office area has been lowered. This has also reduced financial burden on the HGOs for purchasing hiring large offices. The requirement of layout plan has been simplified. Now the PTOs need number run around State District authorities for validating the layout plan of offices. Provision for the new entrants and the documentary requirements were given in detail to remove ambiguity and improved transparency. Uniform system of assessment for new PTOs. The Annexures of the HGO Policy have been simplified to simplify the application process only one Annexure describing the eligibility companyditions and another Annexure regarding important instructions and guidelines . To remove ambiguity, the requirement of agreement receipt of accommodation clarified. Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 7 of 22 To remove ambiguity, requirement of Affidavit declaration clarified wherever mentioned in the previous policy were clarified in the draft policy. Comments were received from more than 180 individual PTOs and the PTO Associations, including Indian Federation Haj PTOs of India and jointly by other PTO Associations. All the issues raised by the PTOs and their Associations were examined in the Ministry. These suggestions companyments were companysidered in the Ministry in companysultation with the IIT Delhi. Taking into companysideration the suggestions companyments received on the draft Policy, twelve changes modifications were made in the draft Policy and final Policy was circulated on December 20, 2018. The changes modifications in the final Policy vis a vis draft Policy are as under HGOs renamed as Haj Group Organisers HGO This has given a separate identity to the Haj PTOs and distinguished them from general tour operators. Amount of security deposit reduced to Rs.30 lakhs for Category I HGOs and Rs.35 lakhs for Category I HGOs reduced financial burden on the HGOs by Rs. 5 lakh for Category I HGOs and Rs. 10 lakhs for Category I HGOs. Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 8 of 22 Distribution formula modified to ensure allocation of minimum number of seats during each year of the Policy period to Category I, Category I and Category II HGOs this gives allocation of minimum assured seats to each category during each of the years of the Policy period. PTOs may plan for the long term arrangements in Saudi Arabia on the basis of minimum assured allocation of seats. Requirement of submission of proof of payment for accommodation air travel clarified for the registered HGOs of 2013 to 2017. The HGOs registered during previous policy period are dispensed with submission of these documents simplified the documents and application process. Annual turnover criteria clarified. Only one year documents are required number removed ambiguity and reduced the documentation. The time for reporting of HGOs to CGI Jeddah after their arrival in Saudi Arabia has been increased to 48 hours relief to HGOs. The time of reporting has been doubled from 24 hours to 48 hours. The year for which the new entrants are required to submit details of umrah pilgrims has been clarified removed ambiguity and companyfusion and HGOs. Director of a companypany has been added as Munazzim of the HGO expanded the ambit of Munazzim of HGOs to include Director of a companypany. Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. It is only after due examination of the issues raised suggestions made on the PTO Policy, that the final Policy for HGOs was approved by the companypetent authority in the Ministry and circulated on December 20, 2018. During the companyrse of hearing, this Court was informed that the representative of the HGO associations submitted before the Honble Minister that they have devised a new formula for distribution of seats. Three petitioner associations submitted their written representations to the Chair. The representations companytained eight proposals suggestions. After deliberations, the representatives of HGO associations prioritised their three proposals suggestions as under The total quota of 50,000 seats allocated to HGOs may be distributed without any companydition, i.e. without imposing the companydition to charge additional seats over and above 45,000 seats at the rate of HcoI. The HGOs may be divided in two categories on the basis of their experience with turnover of Rs.1 crore and Rs.2 crore for Category II and Category I HGOs respectively. 50 seats may be distributed to each eligible HGO and the remaining seats may be Writ Petition Civil No. 4 of 2019 Ors. Page 12 of 22 distributed to Category I HGOs on pro rata basis on the basis of number of years of experience. Secondly, the petitioners suggestion is only to take experience into account, whereas the Ministry has companysidered both experience and financial strength, as recommended in the IIT Delhi study itself. The petitioner filed Writ Petition Writ Petition Civil No.

train

2019_98.txt

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Appellant Vijaya faced trial along with her brother Nepalchandra for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 304 B, 498 A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC . The II Additional Sessions Judge, Bhandara, acquitted the appellant of offences relatable to Sections 302, 304 B, 498 A, but held her guilty for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and sentenced her to undergo RI for five years. Her brother hereinafter described as accused number1 or A 1 was found guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and five years respectively. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, dealt with the appeals filed by the appellant hereinafter described as accused number2 or A 2 . Both the appeals were dismissed. The accusations which led to trial of both the accused appellants are essentially as follows Usha hereinafter described as deceased was married to A 1 on 16.5.1989. She came to the house of her parents on 18.5.1989 and remained there upto 4.6.1989. Thereafter the deceased was brought to the house of A 1. On 24.6.1989, father of the deceased came to know that she has been burnt to death. Though A 1 gave out that case was one of suicide. Father of the deceased did number believe it and lodged information with police. Investigation was undertaken and charge sheet was placed charging both the accused appellants for offences as numbered above. At this point it is to be numbered that A 2 was given on marriage on 15.5.1989 and had companye to her brother A 1 house. Thereafter the prosecution brought materials on record to the effect that deceased and A 1 were sleeping in one room and formers dead body was found in the Kitchen.

train

2003_645.txt

WITH A.Nos. 7575 77/1999, C.A.Nos. 950 957/2000 AND A. Nos.1111/2000 J U D G M E N T Bisheshwar Prasad Singh, J. In this batch of appeals by special leave companymon questions arise for companysideration and therefore the appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. The main judgment was rendered in the writ petition preferred by the appellant in Civil Appeal No.902 of 1999.

train

2002_415.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 20 to 23 of 1955. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 57 to 60 of 1954 and Case Referred Nos. 2 to 5 of 1954. C. Chatterji, S. Venkatakrishnan and S. Subramanian, for the appellants. K. T. Chari, Advocate General, Madras, Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. November 28. Section 30 provides for certain classes of officers entering any place by day or night for inspection of stills, implements, liquor and the like. 28, Thanikachala Chetty Street, Thyagarayanagar, Madras, and seized several bottles of foreign liquor and glasses companytaining whisky and soda. The appellant, Lakshmanan Chettiar, was residing at the premises, and the other three appellants, A. S. Krishna, R. Venkataraman and V. S. Krishnaswamy, were found drinking from the glass tumblers. All the four were immediately put under arrest and in due companyrse charge sheets were laid against them for offences under the Act. The three appellants other than Lakshmanan Chettiar were charged under ss. 4 1 a and 4 1 j for possession and companysumption of liquor, and Lakshmanan Chettiar was charged under s. 4 1 k for allowing the above acts in premises in his immediate possession, a under s. 12 for abetment of the offences. He was also charged under s. 4 1 a on the allegation that though he was a permit holder, he was in possession of more units than were allowed under the permit, and that by reason of the proviso to that section, he had companymitted an offence under s. 4 1 a . Immediately after service of summons, the appellants filed an application unders. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wherein they companytended that ss. This reference was heard by Rajamannar, C.J., and Umamaheswaram, J., who held, disagreeing with the appellants, that ss. 4 2 and 28 to 32 were valid,, and answered the reference against them. Against this judgment, the appellants have preferred the present appeals under Art.

train

1956_96.txt

A sum of Rs.12,00,000/ was initially claimed by way of companypensation which was subsequently raised to 25,00,000/ . 160/ Total Rs.6418/ However, the Tribunal also took into companysideration the salary which might have been payable to the said deceased as in August, 2002 had he companytinued in service which was stated to be as under Basic Pay Rs.10698.00 DA 35.5 Rs. 3892.00 DSCA 20 of basic maximum Rs.3100 Rs. 16,43,340/ Interest on the said amount sum at the rate of 12 per cent was also awarded. On an appeal preferred by the appellant thereagainst, a Division Bench of the High Court opined that as a revision of pay had been effected by ONGC from 1.1.1997 and in August 2002, the employees in the same cadre would have received a sum of Rs.10,693/ per month with Dearness Allowance at the rate of 35.5 amounting to Rs.3892/ and other allowances. The net income of the deceased was found to be at least a sum of Rs.16,000/ so as to enable the Tribunal to companye to the companyclusion that the loss of dependency benefit would companye to Rs.16,000/ from January 1997 onwards. Even after taking into account all deductions including the income tax liability, the net income available to the deceased and his family would have been at least Rs.16000/ from January 1997 onwards. Appellant was directed to deposit the said amount with proportionate companyts and interest at the rate of 8 per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization.

train

2008_174.txt

S. THAKUR, J. These appeals by special leave arise out of an order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna whereby LPA No.84 of 2003 filed by the appellant bank has been dismissed in limine and the order passed by a Single Bench of that Court allowing Writ Petitions No.7367 of 2001 and 5924 of 2002 affirmed. As a sequel to the said direction the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs Banking Division issued numberification dated 11th April, 2001, inter alia, determining the pay scales of the employees of RRBs and granting to them the benefit of 6th and 7th Bipartite Settlements and Officers Wage Revision w.e.f. 1st November, 1992 and 1st November, 1997 respectively. The numberification attempted to bring at par the pay scales of the RRB employees and those of their companynterparts in other nationalized banks. It was then followed by a letter dated 25th April, 2001, defining the expressions Basic Pay and Dearness Allowance used in the numberification. The clarification was to the effect that Basic Pay and the Dearness Allowance would mean Basic Pay, Dearness Pay, Dearness Allowances, ad hoc or additional D.A. interim relief or any other allowance which form part of pay or A. Pursuant to the above, the appellant bank issued a circular dated 16th May, 2001, giving to its employees the benefit of what is known as companyputer increment as per 6th and 7th Bipartite Settlements and Officers Wage Revision. The circular envisaged that each staff member shall file an undertaking that he she shall refund in lump the excess amount drawn by them in case a companytrary decision is received from the Government of India NABARD sponsor bank. This circular was some time later recalled by an order dated 5th June, 2001 and the benefit of companyputer increment and automatic switch over from scale II to scale III granted to the employees of the appellant bank withdrawn. The order further directed that the amount already paid shall be recovered from the employees companycerned. Aggrieved by the order aforementioned, the employees association filed Writ Petition No.7367 of 2001 challenging the validity of the withdrawal order on several grounds. While the said writ petition was still pending, this Court passed an order dated 7th March, 2002 in All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation and Ors. of India and Ors. 2002 3 SCC 554 whereby paragraphs 2 and 3 of the numberification dated 11th April, 2001 were quashed and the Government directed to issue a fresh numberification for proper implementation of the judgment of this Court. The Government of India accordingly appears to have examined the matter and issued a fresh numberification dated 17th April, 2002, para 5 whereof provides as under All other allowances should be immediately revised, if number already revised pursuant to order dated 11.4.2001 by respective sponsor banks after negotiations with RRB employees. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the said order, having been dismissed summarily, the appellant bank has filed appeal to this Court by special leave as already numbericed above.

train

2010_1246.txt

On 6th February, 1993, an award was made and companypensation was awarded to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per acre, on a reference made by the appellants, the District Judge enhanced the companypensation to Rs. 50,000 per acre. The Land Acquisition officer and the State preferred appeals before the High Court.

train

2001_633.txt

766 of 1981 preferred by the first respondent came to be heard by the learned, Single Judge of the High Court, the advocate engaged on behalf of the appellant companyld number appear because he was engaged in another Court and it was only later, after the Court had closed for the summer vacation on 7th April 1982, that he came to know that the revision application had already been heard and decided in favour of the first respondent. This application was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court treating it as if it were a review application. The order rejecting the application for re hearing was made on 22nd June 1982.

train

1983_344.txt

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1771 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. c N0 1466 of 2006 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1772 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P C No. 2743 of 2006 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1773 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P C No.7989 of 2006 K. SEMA,J Leave granted. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 16.12.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Special Appeal No.18 of 2004. Special Leave Petition Civil Nos.1466 and 2743 of 2006 have been filed by the selected candidates. By an interim order dated 27.1.2006 this Court stayed the operation of the order of the High Court and, therefore, they are still holding the posts, for which they have been selected. An advertisement was issued on 24.6.2002 for Garhwal Region for the selection and appointment of the Physical Education Teachers L.T.Grade . The requisite qualification indicated in the advertisement is B.P.E. or Graduate with Diploma in Physical Education. The unsuccessful candidates in the interview challenged the selected candidates on various grounds. The unsuccessful writ petitions were dismissed by the Single Judge. On appeal by the unsuccessful candidates, the order of the Single Judge was reversed and the appeals were allowed. Hence, these appeals by special leave.

train

2008_435.txt

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5689 OF 2000 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents. The writ petitioners had questioned order dated 24.2.1973 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Jaunpur and the order dated 28.2.1978 passed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation Jaunpur who were the respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition. The factual position needs to be numbered in brief as essentially the pivotal question relates to the applicability of the principle of res judicata. 2.1 One Gajadhar owned several lands situate in the villages of Kurthuwa, Meerapur Siroman, Manapur and Ghuskhuri, as fixed rate tenant, including the suit lands. The fixed rate tenancy of the lands in those villages was mortgaged by Gajadhar. Gajadhar died leaving behind him his widow Sirtaji, who through registered sale deed dated 8.6.1885 sold her right of redemption in regard to those lands to her relative Mata Badal. On the death of Mata Badal, his wife Sheorani, sold the right of redemption in regard to some of the lands to third parties. After the death of Sheorani, the nephews of Mata Badal, namely Muneshwar, Bindeshwari and Bal Karan, sold the right of redemption in respect of the suit properties in Kurthuwa in favour of Bhagwan Din Singh grandfather of appellant under registered sale deed dated 19.6.1911. It would appear that after the purchase of equity of redemption, the said Bhagwan Din Singh cleared mortgage and was in possession of the suit lands. Bhagwan Din Singh died leaving him surviving his son Bhagwati Din Singh father of appellant respondent number 3 in the writ petition from which this appeal arises . Sirtaji who executed the sale deed on 8.6.1885 in favour of Mata Badal died in the year 1940. On her death, Ganga Prasad and Bhagwati Din ancestors of Respondents 1 to 6 herein filed four suits 97 to 100 for partition before the SDC, Machhli Shahar, Jaunpur, claiming that Gajadhar died issueless, that his wife Sirtaji had inherited only a life interest in the lands of her husband Gajadhar in the four villages, and that on her death, the lands of Gajadhar devolved on the near relatives of Gajadhar, namely plaintiffs 1 and 2 and Defendants 1 and 2 in the four suits, who were reversioners in regard to estate of Gajadhar. Suits 97, 98, 99 and 100 respectively related to the lands in the villages of Meerapur Siroman, Kurthuwa, Ghuskhuri and Manapur. Bhagwati Din Singh father of Appellant was impleaded as Defendant No.3 in suit number98, as his father, Bhagwan Din Singh had purchased the right of redemption in respect of the Kurthuwa lands. The following genealogical tree accepted in the earlier proceedings, traces Gajadhars relationship with the plaintiffs Ganga Prasad and Bhagwati Din Singh and defendants 1 and 2 Raj Narain and Chandra Bali , in the four suits as also with Mata Badal Sheo Upadhyay Meharban Palai Baijnath Jagannath Jaipal Sarjoo Prasad Deep Narain Kanhai Mata Badal Smt. Sheorani Muneshar Bindesari Balkaran Ganga Prasad Bhagwati Deen P3 P1 Chandrabali Rajnarain D2 D1 2.5. The four suits were decreed by Sri Ishwar Sahai, SDC Machhali Shahar, Jounpur, by a companymon judgment dated 20.3.1944. He held that the sale by Sirtaji under deed dated 8.6.1885 was number for legal necessity. Bhagwati Din Singh challenged the judgment in Suit No.98. The first appellate companyrt Additional Commissioner, Varanasi dismissed the appeal Appeal No.4/327 filed by Bhagwati Din Singh on 2.1.1945 on the ground of delay. No further appeal was filed and the decision in Suit No.98 attained finality insofar as Kurthuwa lands claimed by Bhagwati Din Singh. After dismissal of the appeal on 2.1.1945, on an application by the plaintiffs in Suit No.98, a final decree was passed on 3.4.1945 and possession was taken by plaintiffs in terms of the decree. Two other appeals filed by the purchasers of lands at Ghuskhuri and Manapur villages, against the companymon judgment dated 20.3.1944 in Suit Nos. 99 and 1000 travelled up to Board of Revenue and were remanded to the first appellate companyrt. The said two appeals arising out of suit number.99 and 100 were heard by Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division. He held that the sale deed dated 8.6.1885 executed by Smt. Sirtaji in favour of Mata Badal was for legal necessity, that Mata Badal got valid title, and that the sale deeds executed by Sheorani and others as legal heirs of Mata Badal were valid. He, therefore, dismissed the two suits Suit Nos. 99 and 100 . That decision was upheld by the Board of Revenue on 26.12.1967 and judgment which ended in dismissal of suit Nos. 99 and 100 also attained finality. The resultant position was that there was two diverse decisions in regard to the same sale deed dated 8.6.1885. The first in regard to Kurthuwa village lands in Suit No.98 purchased by Bhagwan Din Singh where it was held that the sale by Sirtaji in favour of Mata Badal on 8.6.1885 was number for legal necessity, that Mata Badal, a relative of her late husband by taking undue advantage of her young age had obtained the said sale deed from Sirtaji, and therefore, on her death, the reversioners of her husbands estate namely plaintiffs 1 2 Bhagwan Din Singh and Ganga Prasad and defendants 1 2 Raj Narain and Chandar Bata were entitled to the lands. Consequently, sales by persons claiming through Mata Badal did number have any title after the death of Sirtaji in the year 1940. On the other hand, the second decision, relating to Ghuskhuri and Manapur villages, in suit number. 99 and 100, it was held that the sale by Sirtaji under deed dated 8.6.1885 in favour of Mata Badal was for legal necessity and therefore, Mata Badal got valid title and companysequently, the sale deeds executed by persons claiming through Mata Badal were valid, and the suits filed by persons claiming to be reversioners in respect of the estate of Gajadhar did number have any right, title or interests in the lands sold by Sirtaji. When matters stood thus, in the companysolidation proceedings, the Bhagwati Din Singh son of Bhagwan Din Singh and father of appellant filed an objection under section 9 of UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 in short Act companytending that the finding recorded by the companyrt in Suit Nos.97 to 100 under section 49 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 in short Tenancy Act that the sale deed dated 8.6.1885 by Smt. Sirtaji was number for legal necessity was the subject matter of appeals before the Addl. Commissioner, Varanasi on 5.9.1966 in Appeal number231/22 and Appeal number232/23 who held that the sale deed dated 8.6.1885 executed by Smt. Bhagwati Din Singh filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation who allowed the appeal and held that though the writ petitioners had taken possession on the basis of decree dated 21.6.1945 arising out of Suit No.98, but appeals were filed relating to arising out of Suit Nos.99 and 100 against the judgment dated 20.3.1944 and in those appeals the Additional Commissioner had decided against the writ petitioners on 5.9.1966 and the judgment passed by the trial Court on 20.3.1944 against Bhagwati Din Singh in suit No. A revision petition was filed by the writ petitioners against the judgment before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who dismissed the same affirming the findings of the Settlement Officer by order dated 28.2.1978.

train

2008_1946.txt