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194-10004-10406.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
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[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[30]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[31]AGENCY INFORMATION
[33]INSCOM/CSF
[34]194-10004-10406
[36]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT
[38]PAGE 74
[40]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[41]USA
[42]CG, FT JACKSON sc
[43][ RESTRICTED ]
[44]06/05/68
[45]MARTI, MANUEL
[46]RESIDENCES
[47]EMPLOYMENT
[48]CIVILIAN SCHOOL
[49]FBI INVESTIGATIVE FILES CHECK
[50]RELATIVES
[51]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[52]UNCLASSIFIED
[53]3
[55]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[56]03/07/95
[58]O
[60]Date : 01/14/98
[61]Page : 1
[63]INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED. PAGE 74 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[64]WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.
[66]NW 88613 Docid:345292277 Page 1
[68]|
[70]: ron tA ll
[72]-
[74]: a DEPART MENS or SEF ENSe (art -
[75]c Ac>NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST 0-9 - >
[77]1. LAST NAME> FIRST NAME - MIDOLE NAg pie een
[79]BEQUEST DATE
[81]AYO
[82]“JUN 1968 ~
[84]Bs
[86]MARTI, -Manuel «a
[88]3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL,FORMER NAME(S)
[90]None
[91]6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[93]» San Juan, PLR.
[95]SECURITY NUMBER
[97]693-36-4601
[99]7. SERVICE NUMBER !
[100]{352773870 |
[102]SECURITY PROGRAM } \
[104]Ue
[106]Pi |
[107]in &
[109]Log] mititary
[111][J crvivian
[113]RESULTS ATIN«: AJIGE os (1) tnoustriat
[114]"TO: ft, GACKSON,, B.0. 29207 |
[116]} (Include ZIP
[118]Code) |
[120]| LOCAL FILES CHECKED
[121]WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS
[123]Cc. INITIATOR OF REQUEST
[125]O3/0 |
[126]a. FATHER 10Aug10 1201 University Ave. |
[127]MARTI, Manuel Utaado, P.R. Bronx, NY US |
[128]b. MOTHER (Full Maiden Name) 6Janl5 ~~
[129]BADILLO, REYES San Juan, P.R. Deceased US |
[130]@ SPOUSE (Full Maiden Name) .
[131]| None |
[132]13. RESIDENCES (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)
[133]c NUMBER AND STREET d. city @ STATE
[134]905 B. 167 St. Bronx NY ;
[135]1201 University Ave. !f response to penrorequast NY Os
[137]On post residence there are
[139]c. EMPLOYER
[140]Polly Perry Inc. |
[141]Mutual Ins. Advisery A
[143]US ARMY.
[145]Manhattan, NY
[146]Manhattan, NY
[148]CG NAME
[150]Bronx Comm.Clg.
[153]16. ("Yes” answers must be explained in Item 18, below.) . prints lage necessary ARE mBogiive cneck, .
[154]a, Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen? b. REASON
[156]6. Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service? x [army [| E: BASIC TRAINEE
[157]| | PRE-COMMISSION |
[159]NUCLEAR
[161]4
[163]18, REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)
[165]l6e-Ist term inductee
[167]4
[169]DD 2.1584
[171]‘REPLACES DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
[173]. 4
[174]A 2 - a ae eee a eee
[176]NW 88613 Docid:34529277 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10004-10408.pdf | [1]AGENCY
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[28]NWLG8613. Docid:34529274_ Paget
[30]Date : 01/14/98
[32]Page : 1
[34]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[35]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[37]AGENCY INFORMATION
[39]- INSCOM/CSF
[41]194-10004-10408
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]PAGE 79
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[47]USA
[48]WHITE, CHAD B
[50]CG, THIRD US ARMY
[52][ RESTRICTED ]
[53]07/11/68
[55]1 a
[56]MARTI, MANUEL
[58]NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
[60]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[61]UNCLASSIFIED
[63]3
[65]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[66]03/07/95
[68]ENCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[69]WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCOSURES.
[71]Len ate baie stareaasta |
[73]DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[75]: HEADQUARTERS
[76]U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
[77]FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219
[79]ICOP-I11 | 11 JUL 1968 ©
[81]SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel, US 52 773 870, SSN: 093-36-4601
[82]DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan, PRL
[84]To: Commanding General
[85]Third United States Army
[86]ATTN: DCSI, AJAGI-M
[87]Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330
[89]1. References:
[90]a. AR 604-10.
[92]be DD Form 1584. , 0G, ATTN: AJJIGI, Ft Jackson, S.C.
[93]»subject as above, dated 5 June ;
[95]2. Forwarded for your information are’ the results of the National Agency
[96]Check (NAC) requested by reference tb.
[98]3. Information contained in inclosure may be within the purview of
[99]- reference la. If additional investigation is desired, your request should be
[101]returned with inclosure and 3 copies of a current DD Form 398 of SUBJECT to
[102]this headquarters, ATTN: ICOP-IIT.
[104]FOR THE COMMANDER:
[106]1 Incl Bag 7
[108]USAIRR Dossier 093-36-4601 "MAS, MI
[109]Acting Assistant Adjutant General
[111]Ic FL 97-4 (
[113]Rev)
[114]11 Jan 68
[116]NW 88613 Docid:34529274 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10005-10030.pdf | [1]AGENCY
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[25]COMMENTS
[27]| NW'88613 Docid:34529810 Page 1
[32]Date : 08/19/98
[33]Page : 1
[35]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[36]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[38]AGENCY INFORMATION
[40]INSCOM/CSF
[42]194-10005-10030
[44]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[45]PAGE 2
[47]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[49]USA
[51][ RESTRICTED J
[52]00/00/00
[54]1
[56]SCHEER, ROBERT
[58]ALIASES ~
[60]COSUBJECTS
[62]INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS
[63]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[65]UNCLASSIFIED
[67]3
[69]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[70]03/07/95
[72]Th NOTE: ‘Allea and. cosubject 1 names es developed during
[73]INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS _| Subsequent or ‘bring-up"’ investigations, will be sepa-
[75]‘For use of this form,see AR 381-45; jhe Bropeneot ogency Is rated from those previously recorded by entry of the date
[76]Of fice of ¢ of the Assistont Chief of Staff fo t into! tigence. this supplemental action is taken.
[78]TO irst Name - Midgfe) eter, ” ~ Dossi hon R
[79]S7( /e ZY / /
[81]ae. SECURITY OF AS oF 3 ABET, BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH
[82]ae. lr 4 Wes 36
[84]THE FOLLOWING NAMES HAVE BEGN CARDED AS AL Ases OR COSUBJECTS APPEARING IN THIS OOSSIER. THIS. FORM WILL SE
[85]PLACED AT THE TOP OF THE DOSSIER.
[87]ALIASES - IDENTIFYING DATA as ABOVE
[89]_— . SOCIAL SECURITY sO , , uy DOCUMENT
[90]cosussects OR SERIAL NO. DATE OF BIRTH : . DATED*
[92]DA, FORM 2371 os : U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 © ~ 576545
[93]INOYV 60 _ . .
[95]nw 88613 Docld:34529870 Page Z | [2]
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194-10005-10042.pdf | [1]AGENCY
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[21]CLASSIFICATION
[22]RESTRICTIONS
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[25]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[26]OPENING CRITERIA
[27]COMMENTS
[29]NW 88613 Docid:34529841 Page 1
[31]Date
[32]Page 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[35]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[37]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[39]194-10005-10042
[40]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[41]PAGE 25 ‘
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[45]USA
[46]BALDWIN, WILLIAM R.
[48][. RESTRICTED ]
[50]12/05/58
[52]SCHEER, ROBERT
[53]INVESTIGATION (S) CONDUCTED
[54]LATEST CLEARANCE (S) ISSUED
[55]AGENCIES CHECKED
[57]SUMMARY OF CONTENT
[59]STANDARDIZED SYNOPSIS FOR REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIVE FILES
[61]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[62]CONFIDENTIAL
[64]3 .
[65]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[66]03/07/95
[68]: REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 APR 63.
[70]08/19/98
[72]"STANDARDIZED SYNOPSIS FOR REVIEW OF NOTE: Subsequent review ~ an !
[73]INVESTIGATIVE FILES make the entry under item 16 and HL 016 9h0
[75]H
[76]-. will sign (including grade and title) H
[78]{AR 381-48) immediately under such information, : ‘ H
[79]|
[83]re
[85]|
[87]i
[88]i
[89]f
[90]I SUBJECT’S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME 3. SERVICE NUMBER . 14. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
[92]SCHEER, Robert NMN _ _ N/A | 112-28-113h
[95]» DATE OF BIRTH 6& PLACE OF BIRTH 7
[96]ir h April 1936 — Bronx, New York
[97]a
[99]|
[101]4
[103]INVESTIGATION(S) CONDUCTED ~— * : . : LATEST CLEARANCE(S) ISSUED
[105]BY WHOM (command cr agency) r “TF DATE BY WHOM (command or agency)
[107]SECRET
[109]" AGENCIES
[110]CHECKED*
[112]'
[114]10. U.S. CITIZEN . o he NATURALIZED, GIVE DATE AND PLACE
[116]N07 7 N/A -
[118]14. HAS CLEARANCE EVER 15. EVER PROCESSED UNDER AR 380-131, AR 604 10
[119]ATIONS (If YES, ex- ZATIONS AFFILIATION (/f | BEEN DENIED OR REVOKED | SR 620-220-1 OR OTHER APPLICABLE REGULATION
[120]Plain in item '16)° YES, explain in item 16) (If YES, explain in item 16) (if YES, explain in item 16)
[122]yes | [X] No CX) Yes — {_] No [] ves Xj no [3 ves [7] No
[124]16. SUMMARY OF CONTENT (Use reverse side if additional space is néeded)
[126]See attached ROT (1).
[128]Case adjadioatea favorably by this headquarters and forwarded to D/A c on
[129]23 December 1958 with the recommendation that SUBJECT be declared acceptable
[130]for induction into the military service,
[132]FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G.2:
[134]TED E. ‘CORDINIER
[135]Major Gs
[136]Chief, Personnel’ Security Branch .
[138]. (EGRADED UNCLASSIFIBL,
[139]. ? 5 AND MARKED:
[140]‘ °FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY¥®
[141]JAUTE: T a ° AR 38A-229,
[143]17. DATE OF REVIEW
[145]B : + ager. cy) i
[146]5 December 5 First U.S, Army 4
[148]WILLIAM Re BALDWIN, 1st. Lt, Complaint . :
[149]| Section, S2, 108th. CIC. Group OF: ve 2 Ctl cere, ;
[151]\| * Indicate in the applicable block all agencies checked ‘using the following key: NR - no record; ND - non derogatoiy; NI- not identifiable;
[152]i tem 16 - which 1 means that related derogatory information is summarized in Item 16. i
[154]| D A {FORMS : 2073 7 —_ a - _— 7 a,
[156]NW 88613 Docid:34529871 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10005-10063.pdf | [1]Date
[2]Page
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]08/19/98
[8]1
[10]AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]INSCOM/CSF
[20]194-10005-10063
[22]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]PAGES 79-81
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[27]TO
[29]TITLE
[31]DATE
[32]PAGES
[33]SUBJECTS
[35]‘DOCUMENT TYPE
[36]CLASSIFICATION
[37]RESTRICTIONS
[38]CURRENT STATUS
[40]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[41]OPENING CRITERIA
[42]COMMENTS
[44]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA ;
[47][ RESTRICTED ]
[49]{ RESTRICTED ]
[50]08/28/58
[52]3
[54]SCHEER, ROBERT
[56]EMPLOYMENT ~s
[58]US POST OFFICE
[60]CITY COLLEGE LIBRARY
[62]DONNEL LIBRARY
[64]LAUFERS HOTEL
[65]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[66]AGENT'S NOTES
[68]AGENT REPORT
[70]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[71]UNCLASSIFIED
[73]3
[75]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS ~
[76]03/07/95
[78]NW 88613 Docid:34529849 Page 1
[80]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[81]f
[83]SCHEER, Robert
[84]Pre-Inductee
[86]DOB:
[87]POB:
[91]April 1936
[92]ron, Wee York
[94]AGENT REPORT
[96](SR 380-320-10)
[98]3, CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[100]H1-014631
[102]4
[104]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[106]13 (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 August 1958, the Personnel File of SUBJECT was examined
[108]at the Personnel Section, Room 3218, United States Post Office, 33d Street and .
[109]8th Avenue, New, York, New York, and the following information was revealed:
[111]Name Recorded:
[113]‘Date, of Birth:
[115]“= Place of Birth:
[117]Residence Address:
[119]Wife:
[120]Dates of Employment:
[122]Job Title:
[124]Department or Section:
[126]Salary:
[128]Employee Numbers
[130]Secial Security Number:
[132]Selective Service Numbers.
[134]Loyalty Information:
[136]at
[137]Robert SCHEER
[139]4 April 1936
[140]Bronx, New York
[142]653 Britton Street
[143]Bronx, New York
[145]Selena Scheer
[147]April 1957 to Present |
[149]April 1957 to 8 August 1958
[150]Temporary Substitute-Clerk
[151]Part Time
[153]9 August 1958 to Present
[154]Distribution Clerk (Substitute)
[155]PFS-l,, Step 2
[157]Outgoing Mails
[159]Grand Central Station
[160]New York, New York
[162]h April 1957 to 8 August 1958
[163]$2.00 per hour
[165]8 August 1958 to present
[166]$2.07 per hour
[168]789010
[169]112~36-2283 (Standard Form 85 carries
[170]"SS 331-88-2)0", in this same Personnel
[171]File)
[173]7 9 50-29~36-186
[175]Employment Application processed through
[177]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[179]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group . ;
[181]DA
[183]FORM
[184]t APR 52
[186]3 4 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341,
[188]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[190]U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1954—O- 284854
[192]NW 88613 Docid:34529849 Page 2
[195]|
[198]o
[199]Q
[201]AGENT REPORT
[203]a S
[205](SR 380-320-10)
[207]. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[208]SCHEER, Robert
[209]Pre-Inductee
[210]DOB: ls-April 1936
[211]POB: Bronx, New York
[213]2, DATE SUBMITTED
[215]28 August 1958
[217]i —}-
[219]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[221]H1-014631
[223]ca
[225]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[227]Education: |
[229]Employments:
[231]References:
[233]&0
[235]2d Civil Service Region, Investigations
[236]Division, 11 September 1957. File stamped
[238]. "Processed under Executive Order 10)50".
[240]Post Office Department Form 61 containing
[241]Oath of Office Statement, and Subversive
[243]Activity and Affiliation Statement signed
[244]9 August 1958. No qualifications listed
[246]thereon.
[248]Christopher Columbus High School
[249]Astor Avenue, Bronx, New York
[250]Graduated 1953
[252]City College
[253]New York, New York
[254]September 1953 to Present
[256]April 1957 to Present
[257]New York Post Office, New York, New York
[259]No Dates Recorded
[260]City College Library
[261]133d Street, New York, New York -
[263]June 1956 to September 1956
[264]Donnel Library, 1 West 53a Street
[266]New York, New York
[268]June 1955 to September 1955
[270]' Laufers Hotel
[272]Sylvan Lake, New York |
[274]Serena Turan ;
[275]1910 Union Street
[276]Bronx, New York
[278]Norman Bernstein
[279]2858 Bronx Park East
[280]Bronx, New York
[282]Fred Keen
[283]2858 Bronx Park East
[284]Bronx, New York.
[286]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[288]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group
[290]078
[292]DA 1 irrs2 G&A eeetaces wo aco ror 341: Cer Ure
[294]6, SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[296]Alita
[297]Se OEY
[299]L/P San Z
[301]U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854
[302]Heh
[304]NW 88613 Docid:34529849 Page 3
[307]a a
[308]Now
[310]AGENT REPORT NH
[311]. (SR 380-320-10) .
[312]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT . . 2. DATE SUBMITTED .
[313]SCHEER, Robert 28 August 1958
[314]Pre-Inductee ; 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[315]DOB: 4, April 1936 H1-014631
[316]POB: Bronx, New York .
[318]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[320]AGENT'S NOTES: Neither Social Security Number (SSN) 112-36-2283 >» nor the
[321]notation "SS 331-88-20", agree with the SSN: 112-28-113) contained on the records
[322]of S. Klein Department Stores, another listed employment. SUBJECT did not list
[323]employments at City College Library, and Donnel Library on his DD Form 398.
[325]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT --- - ~ _ 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[326]OTs 3
[327]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group 019 LA
[329]DA ; FORM 3 A 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM Ml, 1 JUN 47, ree “Eh
[331]USE ONLY U.S. omen PRINTING OFFICE : —
[333]NW 88613 Docid:34529849 Page 4 | [3]
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194-10005-10064.pdf | [1]Date : 08/19/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10064
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 82-83
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 08/20/58
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]BMPLOYMENT a
[25]S. KLEIN DEPARTMENT STORES
[26]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[28]AGENT REPORT
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[35]OPENING CRITERIA : .
[36]COMMENTS :
[38]NW 88613 Docld:34529850 Page 1
[40]“hw
[42]“AGENT REPORT No
[44]: ; (SR 380-320-10)
[45]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT . 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[47]SCHEER, Robert . , 20 August 1958
[48]Pre-Inductee 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[49]DOB: 4 April 1936 . HL O16 940
[51]POB:: Bronx, New York
[53]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[55]14 (EMPLOYMENT) On 20 August 1958, the employment records of S. Klein
[56]Department Stores, 3rd Floor, 6 Union Square, New York, New York, were examined
[57]with the assistance of Samuel B. Ward, Personnel Assistant, and the following
[59]{information was revealed:
[61]meg Name Recorded: . | SCHEER, Robert
[62]“Residence Address: 653 Britton Street
[63]. FO Bronx 67, New York
[64]- Date of Birth: , 4 April 1936
[65]Place of Birth: oo Bronx, New York
[67]Father: - Fred Scheer
[68]653 Britton Street
[69]Bronx, New York
[71]Social Security Number: 12-28-1134
[73]Dates of Employment: 8 June 1954 to 4 October 1954 x
[74]Position or Title: Stock Clerk and Cashier
[75]Départment or Section: Shoes, & June 1954
[77]Charge Department, 14 June 1954
[79]Salary: 8 June to 13 June 1954
[80]- $32.00 per 40 hour week
[82]d
[84]14 June 1954 advanced to $34.00
[85]per 40 hour week
[87]Reason for Leaving: Reduction in Force
[88]Eligible for Rehire: Not recorded
[90]Schools Attended: , PS 96
[91]' Bronx 8 years
[93]Christopher Columbus High School
[94]Bronx, New York
[95]4 years
[97]SS
[99]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT C a ) 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[100]( q =
[102]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group , 2p GEA
[103]DA t APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341. 1 JUN of Geen GEE =a a "y i ge wy.
[105]U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O- 284854
[107]we
[109]NW 88613 Docid:34529850 Page 2
[112]AGENT REPORT
[114](SR 380-320-10)
[115]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT _ . 2, DATE SUBMITTED
[117]SCHEER, Robert , ; 20 August 1958
[119]Pre-Inductee ,
[120]DOB: 4 April 1936 : , Hl 016 940
[121]POB: Bronx, New York
[123]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[124]. Queens College
[125]Flushing, New York
[126]1 year
[128]References: _ Martin Kroop.
[129]674, Moheegan Avenue
[130]Bronx, New York
[132]Miss Tillie Horowitz
[133]2750 Barker Avenue
[134]Bronx, New York
[136]Fred Keen |
[137]' 2858 Bronx Park East
[138]New York, New York
[140]Mr, Ward stated that due to the turnover ‘in employees at S. Klein,
[141]he could not locate the name of any former supervisor, or co-worker of SUBJECT,
[142]who. was in contact with SUBJECT in this 1954 employment.
[144]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT . 6, SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[146]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group
[148]FORM U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854
[149]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 meee ie MAY;BE,USED,. 7 _—
[150]i ret o
[151]a y
[154]wal UES:
[156]NW 88613 Docid:34529850 Page 3 | [3]
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[153]ify
[155]
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[159] |
194-10005-10066.pdf | [1]Date : 08/19/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSP
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10066
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT: INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 85-86
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 10/27/58
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[26]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[28]HILLTOP LODGE
[30]AGENT REPORT
[32][ RESTRICTED ]
[34]]
[36]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[37]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED . y
[38]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[39]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS -
[40]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[41]OPENING CRITERIA :
[42]COMMENTS : SEE AGENT'S NOTES.
[44]NW 88613 Docid:34529852 Page 1 ‘
[46]|
[48]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[49]‘SCHEER, Robert
[50]Pre-Inductee
[51]DOB: ) April 1936
[52]POB: Bronx, New York
[54]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[56]AGENT REPORT
[58](SR 380-320-10) .
[59]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[61]27 October 1958
[63]3, CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[65]H1-016940
[67]A ;
[68]1b (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 October 1958, Paul Wolfson, 2h Marlborough Road,
[70]Brooklyn, New York, former co-owner of Hilltop Lodge, a listed employment of
[71]SUBJECT, supplied the following information in substance:
[73]Name Recorded:
[75]_ Residence Address:
[77]Social Security Numbers
[79]Dates of Employment:
[80]Job Title: ;
[81]“Rate of Pay:
[83]Reason For Leaving:
[84]Eligible for Rehire:
[86]Other Pertinent Information:
[88]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[90]PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group
[92]NW 88613 Docid:34529852 Page 2
[94]DA 1 APR 52 3 4 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN FOR’ CFL If i
[96]. Robert SHEER
[98]653 Britton Street,
[99]Bronx, New York —
[101]112-28-113))
[103]July and August 1953
[105]Waiter, summer camp
[107]$60.00 monthly, Total pay $121.50
[108]End of summer season
[110]Yes
[112]SUBJECT listed occupation as student,
[114]enrolled to attend Queens College,
[115]beginning in September 1953.
[117]6, SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[119]itil.
[121]q
[123]~ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O- 284854
[126]—.
[128]AGENT REPORT
[130]_. . (SR 380-320-10) -
[131]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2, DATE SUBMITTED
[133]SCHEER, Robert ; 27 October 1958
[135]Pre-Inductee ..- — ; , 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[136]POB: Bronx, New York ; . a
[138]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS.
[140]1? (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 October 1958, Paul Wolfson, accountant, and former
[141]co-owner of Hilltop Lodge, Sylvan Lake, New York, with residence at 2); Marl-
[142]borough Road, Brooklyn, New York, declined to be interviewed at his residence,
[143]but furnished substantially the following information spontaneously in tele-
[146]Source knew SUBJECT as a summer camp waiter employed at Hilltop Lodge,
[147]during July and August 1953. Frequency of contact was several times weekly,
[148]and the last contact was in August 1953,
[150]SUBJECT performed HIS duties well, got along well with guests at Hill-
[151]top Lodge, and left in August 1953, at the end of the 1953, Summer season,
[152]Source found SUBJECT an honest, trustworthy and reliable employee. HE used
[153]good judgment in the performance of HIS duties, and departed this job eligible
[154]for rehire, Source knew nothing further concerning SUBJECT'S background,
[155]associates, or loyalty to the United States. oo
[157]AGENT'S NOTES: Numerous attempts were made to personally interview
[158]Source at 2h Marlborough Road, Brooklyn, New York with negative results,
[159]Source called the 108th CIC Group, and furnished the above information. The
[160]call was in response to a letter left at his residence requesting an appoint-
[161]ment for interview.
[163]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[165]‘PAUL F, ROHDE, 108th CIC Group
[167], FORM WRHAN ane 5. 1954—-0-
[168]DA 1 APR 52 3 4 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341.1 JUN 47, wen te ky Beees, (PA nies SAN Y U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854
[169]: Bi A belly ine i ar Y
[170]SHO Gell Bi |
[172]NW 88613 Docid:34529852 Page 3 | [3]
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[8]
[13]
[15]
[23]
[24]BMPLOYMENT =
[25]
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[139]
[144]honic contact:
[145]
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[156]
[162]
[164]
[166]
[171]
[173]
[174] |
194-10005-10105.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Caset:Niw
[2]e 5-15-21)
[4]AGENCY
[6]RECORD NUMBER
[7]RECORDS SERIES
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[10]ORIGINATOR
[11]FROM
[13]TO
[15]TITLE
[17]DATE
[19]PAGES
[20]SUBJECTS
[22]DOCUMENT TYPE
[23]CLASSIFICATION
[24]RESTRICTIONS
[25]CURRENT STATUS
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[31], NW 88613 Docid:34529910 Page 1
[33]Date : 08/19/98
[34]Page : 1
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]INSCOM/CSF
[43]194-10005-10105
[45]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[46]PAGE 155
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[51][ RESTRICTED ]
[53][. RESTRICTED ]
[55]08/26/58
[57]SCHEER, ROBERT
[59]EMPLOYMENT 7s
[60]LAUFER'S RIVER VIEW LODGE
[61]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[63]AGENT REPORT
[65][ RESTRICTED ]
[67]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[69]UNCLASSIFIED
[71]3
[73]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS -
[74]03/07/95
[77]AGENT REPORT |
[79](SR 380-320-10)
[81]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[82]SCHEER, Robert
[83]Pre-Inductee
[84]DOB: 4 April 1936
[85]POB: . Bronx, New York
[87]4, REPORT OF ont
[89]_ a (EMPLOYMENT) On 25 August 1958, Mr. Morris-Laufer, Co-owner, Laufer's
[90]‘River View Lodge, summer resort, Loch Sheldrake, New York, furnished. a payroll
[91]record pertaining to Robert SCEEER which contained the following information:
[93]2, DATE SUBMITTED
[95]26 August 1958
[97]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[99]H1 016940
[101]aN
[102]i
[104]Name Recorded: Robert SCHEER
[106]Date of Birth:. Not Recorded
[107]Place of Birth: Not Recorded
[108]Age: Le 193
[109]Address: © 653 Britton Street, New York, New York |
[110]Social Security Number :° 112-28-1134
[111]Student: Yes
[113]~ Marital Status: . Not recorded
[114]Number Tax Exemptions: One , ‘
[115]Dates of Employment: 4 July 1955 to:3 September 1955
[116]Position: — Bus Boy (Assistant Waiter)
[117]Salary: $50.00 per month plus Room, Board and Tips |
[118]Efficiency: Not Recorded
[119]Reason for Leaving: End of Season
[120]Eligibility for. Rehire: Not Recorded
[122]Previous Employment: 1. S. Klein, 1451 Union Square, New York, New
[123]; : ; York.
[125]23 Hilltop Lodge, Hopewell Junction, New York
[127]AGENT'S NOTES: No additional pertinent information concerning SUBJECT is avail-
[128]able at this source. Note that on his Statement of Personal History, SUBJECT.
[129]lists employment at this source for the summer of 1956 when it was in 1955.
[130]The.correct name is Laufer's River View Lodge and not Laufer's Country Club
[132]’ as shown on SUBJECT'S SPH.
[134]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[135]AND MARKED
[137]*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY™
[139]AUTH: > 4 > AR 381-130
[142]OA
[143]A
[145]3. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[147]CLEMENT J. PACYNA, 108th CIC Group 153
[149]FORM .
[150]DA 1 APR 52 3 A 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, ! JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.
[152]SEPRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854
[154]NW 68612 Docld:34529910 Page 2 | [3]
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[156] |
194-10005-10140.pdf | [2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10140 .
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]‘AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 1110-1117
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM :
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY
[21]PAGES : 8
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]Io,
[25]| DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[26]| CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[27]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[28]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[29]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[30]OPENING CRITERIA
[31]COMMENTS
[33]NW 60613 Docld:34530159 Page 1
[35]ARMED FORCES SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE
[37]1.— EXPLANATION
[39]1. The interests of National Security require that all persons
[40]being considered for membership or retention in the Armed
[41]Forces be reliable, trustworthy, of good character, and of com-
[42]plete and unswerving loyalty to the United States. Accordingly,
[43]it is necessary for you to furnish information concerning your
[44]security qualifications. The answers which you give will be used
[45]in determining whether you are eligible for membership in the
[46]Armed Forces, in selection of your duty assignment, and for such
[47]other action as may be appropriate.
[49]2. You are advised that in accordance with the Fifth Amend-
[50]ment of the Constitution of the United States you cannot be
[52]compelled to furnish any statements which you may reasonably
[53]believe may lead to your prosecution for a crime. This is the
[54]only reason for which you may avail yourself of the privilege af-
[55]forded by the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer questions
[56]under Parc IV below. Claiming the Fifth Amendment will not
[57]by itself constitute sufficient grounds to exempt you from mili-
[58]tary service for reasons of security. You are not required to
[59]answer any questions in this questionnaire, the answer to which
[60]might be incriminating. If you do claim the privilege granted by
[61]the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer any question, you
[62]should make a statement to chat effect after the question involved.
[64]H.—ORGANIZATIONS OF SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE
[66]1. There is set forth below a list of names of organizations,
[67]groups, and movements, reported by the Attorney General of che
[68]United States as having significance in connection with the
[69]National Security. Please examine the list carefully, and note those
[70]organizations, and organizations of similar names, with which you
[71]are familiar. Then answer the questions set forth in Part IV below.
[73]2. Your statement concerning membership or other association
[74]with one or more of the organizations named may not, of itself,
[75]cause you to be ineligible for acceptance or retention’ in the
[77]Armed Forces. Your age at the time of such association, cir-
[78]cumstances prompting it, and the extent and frequency of
[79]involvement, are all highly pertinent, and will be fully weighed.
[80]Set forth all such factors under ‘Remarks’ below, and continue
[81]on separate attached sheets of paper if necessary.
[83]3. If chere is any doubt in your mind as to whether your name
[84]has been linked with one of the organizations named, or as to
[85]whether a particular association is ‘worth mentioning,’ make a
[87]|
[89]sidiaries and affiliates.
[91]subsidiaries and affiliates, including—
[92]Alabama People’s Educational Assdciation.
[93]Florida Press and Educational League.
[94]Oklahoma League for Political Education.
[96]Virginia League for People’s Education.
[97]Young Communist League.
[98]Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
[99]Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois.
[100]Action Commitee to Free Spain Now.
[102]slavia, Inc.
[104]time Unions.
[105]American Christian Nationalist Party.
[107]Birobidjan, Inc.
[108]American Committee for Spanish Freedom.
[109]American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
[111]Europe.
[113]American Committee for National Unity.
[114]American Council on Soviet Relations.
[115]American Croatian Congress.
[117]American Jewish Labor Council.
[119]American League Against War and Fascism.
[120]American League for Peace and Democracy.
[121]American National Labor Party.
[122]American National Socialist League.
[123]American National Socialist Party.
[124]American Nationalist Party.
[125]American Patriots, Inc.
[127]American Peace Crusade.
[129]American Peace Mobilization.
[130]American Poles for Peace.
[131]American Polish Labor Council.
[132]American Polish League.
[134]United American Spanish Aid Committee).
[135]American-Russian Fraternal Society.
[137]lations with the Soviet Union).
[138]American Russian Institute, Philadelphia.
[139]American Russian Institute of San Francisco.
[141]Los Angeles.
[144]Nw 88614" Bocid:34530159 Page 2
[146]Communist Political Association, its subdivisions,
[148]People’s Educational and Press Association of Texas.
[150]American Association for Reconstruction in Yugo-
[152]American Branch of the Federation of Greek Mari-
[154]American Committee for European Workers’ Relief.
[155]American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born.
[156]American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in
[158]American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in
[160]American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly
[161]known as the Greek American Council; Greek
[163]American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the
[165]American-Russian Institute, New York (a/so snown
[166]as the American Russian- Institute for Cultural Re-
[168]American Russian Institute of Southern California,
[170]PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS
[172]American Slav Congress.
[174]American Women for Peace.
[176]American Youth Congress.
[178]American Youth for Democracy
[180]Armenian Progressive League of America.
[182]Associated Klans of America.
[184]Association of Georgia Klans.
[186]Association of' German Nationals /Retchsdeutsche
[187]Verernigung ).
[189]Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch
[190]of Nazi Party.
[192]Baltimore Forum.
[194]Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee.
[196]Black Dragon Society.
[198]Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massa-
[199]chusetts.
[201]Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee.
[203]Bulgarian American People’s League of the United
[204]States of America.
[206]California Emergency Defense Committee.
[208]California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street.
[209]San Francisco, California. *
[211]Carpatho-Russtan People’s Society.
[213]Central Council of American Women of Croatian
[214]Descent (also knoum as Central Council of Amer-
[215]itan Croatian Women, National Council of Croa-
[218]Central Japanese’ Association (Berkoku Chuo Nippon-
[219]jin Kai). .
[221]Central Japanese Association .of Southern California.
[223]Central Organization of the German-American Na-
[224]aonal Alliance ( Deutsche-Amerikanische Einbeits-
[225]front)
[227]Cervantes Fraternal Society.
[229]China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
[231]Chopin Culrural Cencer.
[233]Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder.
[235]Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges.
[237]Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New
[238]York City). :
[240]Citizens Emergency Defense Conference,
[242]Citizens Protective League. . : :
[244]Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh.
[246]Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organiza-
[247]tions, including Civil Rights Congress for Texas.
[248]Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights
[250]Congress of New York. .
[252]Columbians.
[254]Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola.
[256]Comite Pro Derechos Civiles.
[258]Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland.
[260]Committee to Aid the Fighting South.
[262]Commitee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of
[263]Pittsburgh's Political. Prisoners.
[265]RE OBSOLETE (for Army use).
[267]nm“: Bund (/ Amertkadeutscher Valbs-
[269]full explanation under “Remarks.”
[271]Organizations designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order 10450, are listed below:
[272]Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, sub-
[274]Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.
[276]Committee for. Constitutional and Political Freedom.
[278]Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six.
[280]Committee for Nationalist Action.
[282]Committee for the Negro in the Arts.
[284]Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in
[285]Phitadelphia.
[287]Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights.
[289]Commitee for World Youth Friendship and Cul-
[290]tural Exchange.
[292]Committee to Defend Marie Richardson.
[294]Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights.
[296]Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas.
[298]Congress Against Discrimination.
[300]Congress of the Unemployed.
[302]Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith
[303]Act.
[305]Connecticut State Youth Conference.
[307]Congress of American Revolutionary Writers.
[309]Congress of American Women.
[311]Council on African Affairs.
[313]Council of Greek Americans.
[315]Council for Jobs, Relief, and Housing.
[317]Council for Pan-American Democracy.
[319]Croatian Benevolent Fraternity.
[321]Dai Nippon Butoku Kai / Military Virtwe Society of
[322]Japan ar Military Art Society of Japan).
[324]Daily Worker Press Club.
[326]Daniels Defense Committee.
[328]Dante Alighieri Society -*Betueen 1935 and 1940).
[330]- Dennis Defense Committee.
[332]Detroit Youth Assembly.
[334]East Bay Peace Committee.
[336]Elsinore Progressive League.
[338]Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees
[339](founding body of the North American Spanish Aid
[340]Committee ). .
[342]Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War.
[344]Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims.
[346]Families of the Smith Act Victims.
[348]Federation of Italian, War Veterans in the U. S. A.,
[349]Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Ltaltani,
[350]Federazione degli Stati Uniti a! America).
[352]Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society.
[354]Florida Press and Educational League.
[356]Frederick Douglass Educational Center.
[358]Freedom Stage, Inc.
[360]Friends of the New Germany / Freunde des Neuen
[361]Deutschlands).
[363]Friends of the Soviet Union.
[365]Garibaldi American Fraternal Society.
[367]George Washington Carver School, New York City.
[369]Page !
[374]Germag American Republican League
[376]German American Vocational League ¢ Deurshe
[377]Amerskanishe Berufige-metnsehaft)
[379]Guardian Club,
[381]Harlem Trade Union Council.
[383]Hawau Civil Liberties Commuttec.
[385]Heimuska Kai. also known as Nokube: Hereki,
[386]Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin, Heivaku Gimu-
[387]sha Kai and Zaiber Heimusha Kai / Japanese Re-
[388]siding in America Miltary Conseripts Assocration)
[390]Hellenic: American Brotherhood,
[392]Hinode Kai ¢ fenperiatl Japanese Reservists)
[394]Hinomaru Kai (Resing Sun Flag Socuty—a aroup
[395]af Japanese War Veterans)
[397]Hokuber Zaigo Shoke Dan ¢Nerth American Reserve
[398]Officers Asta nation)
[400]Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense.
[402]Hungarian-Amernan Council for Democracy.
[404]Hungarian Brotherhood.
[406]idaho Pension Union.
[408]Independent Party / Seutsle. Washington).
[410]Independent People’s Pany
[412]Industrial Workers of the World.
[414]International Labor Defense.
[416]International Workers Order, its subdivisions, sub-
[417]sidiaries and affiliates
[419]Japanese Association of America.
[421]Japanese Overseas Central Society ¢Kuigai Dohn
[422]Chuo Kar}
[424]Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo. Japan. 1940.
[426]Japanese Protectave Association / Recruiting Organ-
[427]sation)
[429]Jefferson School of Social Science. New York City.
[431]Jewish Culcure Sociery.
[433]Jewish Penple’s Committee.
[435]Jewish People's Fraternal Order.
[437]Jikyoku Lin Kai ( The Committee for the Criss).
[439]Johnson-Forest Group.
[441]Johnsonutes.
[443]Jome Ant-Fascist Refugee Committee.
[445]Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
[447]Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St.
[448]Louis. Missouri.
[450]Kiber Seinen Kai ¢ Assocration of U.S. estrzens of
[451]Japanese ancestry who have returned to America after
[452]Mudying m Japan}
[454]Knights of the White Camelia.
[456]Ku Klux Klan,
[458]Kyffhaeuser. also known as Kyffhacuser League
[459](Kyffhseuser Bund), Ky ffhacuser Fellowship (Kyf-
[460]hacuser Kameradschaft)
[462]Kyffhaeusee War Relief ( Kiffhacuser Kreegshilfiuerk).
[464]Labor Council for Negro Rights.
[465]Labor Research Association, Inc.
[466]Labor Youth League.
[468]League for Common Sense.
[470]League of American Writers.
[472]Lictor Society (ltahen Black Shirts),
[474]Macedonian-American People’s League.
[476]Mario Morganuni Circle.
[478]Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon.
[480]Maryland Congress Against Discrimination.
[482]Massachusetrs Committee for the Bill of Rights.
[484]Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not con-
[485]nected with the Minute Women of the U.S. A.
[486]Inc.).
[488]Maurwe Braverman Defense Committee.
[490]Michigan Civil Raghts Federation.
[492]1. Ser forth an explanation for each answer checked “Yes”
[493]under question 2 below under “Remarks.”
[494]extra sheets as necessary for a full explanation, signing or initial-
[496]ing each extra sheet.
[498]2. Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1001, provides, in pertinent
[499]part: “Whoever . . . falsifies, conceals or covers up . . . a ma-
[500]statements . . . or makes
[501]shall be fined not more than
[502]$10,000 or imprisoned not more than $ years, or both.” Any
[503]false, fraudulent or fictitious response to the questions under Part
[504]IV below may give rise to criminal fiabilicy under Title 18,
[506]terial fact, or makes any false
[507]or uses any false writing .
[509]NW sabia’ poeid-sashorse Page 3
[511]Michigan Council for Peace.
[512]Michigan School of Social Science.
[514]Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan f Impertal Military briends
[515]Group or Southern California War Veterans).
[517]National Association of Mexican Americans (also
[518]bnown as Asocracion Nacional Mexico- Americana }.
[520]National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be
[521]confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America
[522]organized in February 1942).
[524]National Committee for the Defense of Political
[525]Prisoners.
[527]National Committee for Freedom of the Press.
[529]National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith
[530]Act Vicums,
[532]National Commuttee to Win the Peace.
[534]National Conference on American Policy in China
[535]and the Far East (2 Conference called by the Com-
[536]mittee for a Demncratre Far Eastern Policy).
[538]National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent.
[540]National Council of American-Sovier Friendship.
[542]National Federation for Constitutional Liberties.
[544]National Labor Conference for Peace.
[546]National Negro Congress.
[548]National Negro Labor Council.
[550]Nationalist Action League.
[552]Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.
[554]Nature Friends cf America ¢ Since 1935)
[556]Negro Labor Victory Committee.
[558]New Committee for Publications,
[560]Nichibes Kogyo Kaisha / The Great Fuyjit Theatre).
[562]North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
[564]North Amertcan Spanish Aid Committee.
[566]North Philadelphia Forum.
[568]Northwest Japanese Association.
[570]Ohio School of Social Sciences.
[572]Oklahoma Comminee to Defend Political Prisoners.
[573]Oklahoma League for Political Education.
[575]Original Southern Klans, Incorporated.
[577]Pacific Northwest Labor School. Seattle, Washing-
[578]ton. 7
[580]Palo Alto Peace Club,
[582]Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the
[583]Canal Zone).
[585]Peace Information Center.
[587]Peace Movement of Ethiopia.
[589]People’s Drama, Inc.
[591]People’s Educational and Press Association of Texas.
[593]People’s Educational Association / Incorporated under
[594]name Los Angeles Educational Association. imc ).
[595]also known as People's Educational Center. Peo-
[596]ple’s University, People’s School.
[598]People's Institute of Applied Religion.
[600]Peoples Programs / Seatrie, Washington ).
[602]People’s Radio Foundation, Inc.
[604]People's Rights Party.
[606]Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights.
[608]Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art.
[610]Photo League (New York Crty J.
[612]Pittsburgh Arts Club.
[614]Political Prisoners’ Welfare Committee.
[616]Polonia Society of the WO.
[618]Progressive Getman-Americans, also known as Pro-
[619]gressive German-Americans of Chicago.
[621]Proletaritan Party of America.
[623]Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
[625]Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, South.
[626]west Area.
[628]Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs.
[630]Provisional Committce ‘to Abolish Discrimination
[631]in the State of Maryland.
[633]Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC).
[635]ll. — INSTRUCTIONS
[637]Attach as many
[639]U.S. C., Section 1001.
[640]will not incur such liability unless you supply inaccurate state-
[641]ments with knowledge of their untruthfulness. You are there-
[643]~sttornquenos Unidos ¢ Puerto Ricans United ).
[645]Quad City Commirtee for Peace.
[646]Queensbridge Tenants League.
[648]Revolutionary Workers League
[649]Romanian-American Fraternal Society.
[650]Russian American Society, Inc.
[652]Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association,
[653]composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War).
[655]Samuel Adams School, Boston, Mass.
[657]Santa Barbara Peace Forum.
[659]Schappes Defense Committee.
[661]Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee.
[663]School of Jewish Studies, New York City.
[665]Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington.
[667]Serbian American Fraternal Society.
[669]Serbian Vidovdan Council.
[671]Shinto Temples (Limited to State Shinto abolished
[672]in 1945).
[674]Silver Shirt Legion of America.
[676]Slavic Council of Southern California.
[678]Slovak Workers Society. .
[680]Slovenian-American National Council
[682]Socialist Workers Party, including American Com.
[683]mittee for European Workers Relief.
[685]Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
[687]Southern Negro Youth Congress.
[689]Suiko Sha ¢ Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
[691]Syracuse Women for Peace.
[693]Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia,
[694]Pennsylvania.
[696]Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York,
[698]Trade Union Committee for Peace.
[700]Trade Unionists for Peace.
[702]Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council.
[704]Ukramtan-American Fraternal Union,
[706]Union of American Croatians.
[708]Umon of New York Veterans.
[710]United American Spanish Aid Committee.
[712]Unired Committee of Jewish Societies and Lands.
[713]manschaft Federations, also known as Coordina-
[714]tion Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and
[715]Fraternal Organizations.
[717]United Committee of South Slavic Americans.
[719]United Defense Council of Southern Califorma.
[721]United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organiza-
[722]non.
[724]United May Dav Committee
[726]United Negro and Allied Veterans of America.
[728]Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights
[729]Congress of New York.
[731]Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
[733]Virginia League for People's Education,
[735]Voice of Freedom Commutee
[737]Walt Whiuman School of Social Science. Newark
[738]New Jersey
[740]Washington Bookshop Association
[742]Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
[744]Washington Commitee for Democratic Action.
[746]Washington Commonwealth Federation.
[748]Washington Pension Union
[750]Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation.
[752]Workers Alliance (srme April 1936)
[754]Yiddisher Kultur Farband.
[755]Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home. Inc.
[756]Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc. .
[758]You are advised, however, that you
[760]fore advised that before you sign this form and turn it in to
[762]US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1961 O—607912
[764]For Official Use Only
[766]Selective Service or military authorities, you should be sure chat
[767]it is truthful; chat detailed explanations are given for each "Yes"
[768]answer under question 2 of Part IV below, and that details given
[769]are as full and complete as you can make them.
[771]3. In stating details, it is permissible, if your memory is hazy
[772]on particular points, to use such expressions as, ‘I think,” “in
[773]my opinion,"’ “I believe.”’ or “to the best of my recollection.”
[775]Page 2
[777]Page 4
[780]1.
[782]1V.— QUESTIONS
[784]{For each answer checked “Yes” under question 2, se! forth o full explanation under ‘Remarks’ below)
[786]l have tread the list of names of organizations, groups, and move-
[787]menis set forth under Part Il of this form and the explanation which
[788]precedes it.
[790]1. Have you ever cantributed money to any of the organizations,
[791]groups, or movements listed?
[793]. Concerning the list of organizations, groups and movements set forth
[794]under Part H above:
[796]k Have you ever contributed services to any of the organizations,
[797]groups, or movements listed?
[799]Are you now a member of any of the organizations, groups, or
[800]movements listed?
[802]| Have you ever subscribed to any publication of any of the organ-
[803]izations, groups, or movements listed?
[805]. Have you ever been a member of any of the organizations, groups,
[806]or movements listed?
[808]. Are you now employed by any of the organizations, groups, or
[809]movements listed?
[811]Hove you ever been emploved by a foreign government or any
[812]agency thereof?
[814]Are you now a member of the Communist Party of any foreign
[815]country?
[817]Have you ever been employed by any of the organizations,
[818]groups, or movaments listed?
[820]. Hove you ever attended any meeting of any of the organizations, T
[822]groups, or movements listed?
[824]Have you ever been o member of the Communist Party of any
[825]foreign country?
[827]. Have you ever attended any social yathering of any of the argan-
[828]izations, groups, or movements fisted?
[830]. Have you ever attended any gathering of any kind sponsored by
[831]any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?
[833]. Have you prepared material for publication by any of the organ-
[834]izations, groups, or movements listed?
[836]i. Have you ever corresponded with ony of the organizations, groups,
[837]or movements fisted or with any publication thereof?
[839]Have you ever been the subject of o loyalty of security hearing?
[841]q. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any organiza-
[842]tion, association, movement, group or combination of persons
[843]not on the Attorney General's list which odvocates the overthrow
[844]of our constitutional form of government, or which has adopted
[845]the policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of
[846]force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the
[847]Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form
[848]of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?
[850]r. Hove you ever been known by any other jast name than thot used
[851]in signing this questionnaire?
[853]ZL serve CE APS a Sees DP AOOST Pees,
[854]Diu Se Tbe/ tvefese Ie FF 5A Grens: ode
[856]HW ZIP wiper Soe SEES: LESLIE wn
[858]vnfients Armerloorant 26 Ae LIL
[862]REMARKS (Continued)
[864]NW/G0613 Docid:34530159 Page 4
[866]Page 3
[868]REMARKS (Continued) ~
[870]Robert Scheer, born 4 April 1936 in Bronx, New York,
[871]@ registrant under the Universal Military Training
[872]Act, was this date given an opportunity to execute
[873]DD Form 98 and in my presence he refused to do eo.
[875]1/LT, AGC
[877]CERTIFICATION
[879]In regard to any part of this questionnaire concerning which I have had any question as to the meaning, | have requested
[880]and have obtained a complete explanation. I certify that the statements made by me under Part IV above and on any supple-
[881]mental pages hereto attached, are full, true, and correct.
[883]TYPED FULL NAME OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION SERVICE NUMBER (if any) SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION
[885]TYPED NAME OF WITNESS ‘DATE SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
[887]“4 3
[888]US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1961 O—607912
[890]nw addr Bet aadsorse Page 5 For Official Use Only:
[892]Page 4
[894]At.
[897]~~ fe
[899]. STATEMENT @#-;, 38PAL HISTORY <omeommmases
[903]INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all
[904]answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is ‘“‘None,”’ so state. Do not misstate or omit material
[905]fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and
[906]attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.
[908]1, (Print) FIRST NAME—MIDOLE NAME--MAIDEN NAME (Uf any)—LAST NAME d e b
[909]. nf MR. - - ~ sot 2. STATUS
[910]Clues. ROBERT (NNN) SCHEER ; so.
[911]Oo MISS. 7 ; | 4 l CIVILIAN ‘| ~ | turraay on ACTIVE DUTY
[912]3. ALIAS(ES). NICKNAME(S). OR CHANGES IN NAME (Other than by marriage) 4, PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS °
[913]~~ “'Neone - : wv. .. | 2828 Milvie St., Berkeley, California
[915]{ S. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, month, year)
[917]4 April 1936
[919]PLACE OF BIRTH (City, County, State, and Country) PLACE CERTIFICATE RECCRDED
[920]Bronx,New York,New York,USA Bronx, New York
[921]RACE HEIGHT WEIGHT COLOR OF EYES COLOR OF HAIR SCARS. PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS.
[923]Cauc 70" 180 . Brown Brown None
[925]6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS? [_] ves HXKNO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS
[926]NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES? (] YES [Jf NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? [_] YES fefhO IF THE
[927]: ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES." EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20, :
[929]i 7,U,S. NATIVE JF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO. IF DERIVED, PARENTS’ CERTIFICATE NO(S). |. | DATE, PLACE. AND COURT
[931]a kpe 7:
[932]YES . a . ot
[934]gg. 1; ee
[935]NO
[937]eyo wyas. Toa eee _onurs . :
[939]: ALIEN ReGisTRATION NOS 1) 7 FST NATIVE CouNTRY + N14) paTE-AND PORT OF ENTRY a, DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME :
[940]top tase : . - = . AU. S. CITIZEN?
[941]HEF Tce Jo. . - > :
[943][ves To
[945]MILITARY SERVICE
[947]| SERVICE AND COMPONENT — «+ -.- | ORGANIZATION AND STATION. i DATE CURRENT ACTIVE -
[948]rau ra - aos ean : _-.. | / SERVICE STARTED
[954]GRADE AND SERVICE NO SERVICE AND COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION
[956]H HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY. ORAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? o YES i) NO
[957]SE 'YES."’ COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:
[959]wee ee
[960]COUNTRY SERVICE COMPONENT I ‘[T FROM (Date) | TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.
[961]\ m7 alueistn we ; .
[963]. : aH
[966]9. EDUCATION (Account for all civilian’schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)
[967],
[968]MONTH AND YEARLY HOLA GRADUATE
[969], UEFEOEA DEGREE
[970]\ FROM— ; uot ESE mes NO
[971]| Sep 49
[973]| Sep 53
[974]Sep 55
[975]ep coer ore rst aAguse Unive
[976]i Bp Os pre-e un Gs fUnS Vera £1 Py
[978]10. 7 FAMILY (Lis¢,/nionder ginenn par eras: gpouse guar diansy atépparanits,{fostéy patents, parénts!inz law} formez spouse(s) il divorced give date
[980]. Tey Sedo. puonden sient ea: and sisters, cee hough seosecsat nelude arly’ others you resided with of vith whom a close relationship
[981]existed or exists. If the person is not a U.S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate
[982]number and place of issuance.) . .
[984]U.S. CITIZEN
[986]RELATION AND NAME DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING YES
[987]FATHER 25 flay 1898
[988]Fred Scheat, co iiss -teleuGermanyerueu* cou iccrs Penesebee Sug Isbeu - ceTpé
[989]MOTHER (Maiden name) 24 Apr 1900 —C«j 2660 Bronx Park East
[990]Ide KOten Cae iin PR oe Bronx, New York
[991]: SPOUSE (Maiden name Fab. 1942 ‘ 2628 ftilvie Street ‘
[992]Anne Weills Eureka, Calif. Berkeley, Calif. x
[994]OTHER (Specify)
[996]None
[998]Li CUE Sep a
[1000]Exception to Standard Form 86 _
[1001]~ Aaya f the Budget June 1960
[1003]nw sedi) Erteraktth a0 Bake 6 Gener arene ne peony,
[1005]Qe.
[1008]pane
[1009]nn e ne ae i -_
[1010]ea, Lincles, cm |
[1014]: — ENDS Livine IN FORFIGN COUNTRIES (13: srandparents, first cousins, aur
[1016]” 'brothsrs- ena cisters WW, ond cthes porsoms vith wham 92 cless relationship existed or ex::
[1019]RELATIONSHIP AND NAME AGE OCCUPATION ADDRESS / ~ CITIZENSHIP
[1020]‘Wone
[1021]t
[1023]|
[1024]r
[1027]NAME OF IMMEDIATE
[1028]SUPERVISOR
[1030]4 ‘S Ji
[1031]Ue Se Post Office
[1032]New York City, New York
[1033]Syracuse University
[1034]Syracuse
[1036]SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
[1038]DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? $[] YES MR NO DO YOU HAVE
[1039]ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN
[1040]GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ([] YES (No HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? [7] Yes
[1041]XX] NOs IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS “YES,"" EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.
[1043]112-268-1134
[1045]CREOIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES (Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the
[1047]United States or its Territories.
[1048]; 1 “state or
[1049]* ': TERRITORY
[1051]ire
[1053]Tel ER
[1055]“ STREET AND NUMBER ht
[1056]Jr oeLise 3 cregiis rand § character ye
[1058]| (Basinesscuddress preferred z]
[1061]fips]
[1063]|
[1065]NW 60613 Docid:34530159 Page f
[1068]19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFUECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES O1
[1070]R UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM
[1071]THE OUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON To TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE/FURTHER EXPLANATION? oO YES O NO
[1073](F *YES,"" GIVE DETAILS
[1075]See Remarks
[1077]Fic
[1078]20. REMARKS
[1080]MIG Kory ye CAbsec® sores seh) sayy x
[1082]go ooply
[1084]Bae Path moe v
[1085]ITEM gf12) FOREIGN TRAVEL Continued ) hen
[1087]FOE ya, Leh SB GGK BER goes
[1088]. rod @b..1966 to Mar 196605: "Vietnam, Combodia,Thailend and Japan - Write «
[1090]x
[1091]i Sar ad
[1092]a >
[1095]errs Sa
[1097]AOLE
[1099]“yy
[1103]I refuse to answer questions 16, 17, and 19 on the grounds that they violate my
[1104]‘constitutional: rights under: :the:-let, Sth 2 14th: Amendnents ‘to the United Statee
[1105]Gonstitutionsiv 5. HABMOMNCS he Vue te agengs tice Age a
[1107]eeh op GH Be Loe CYeaA 57, wh JOM AGES ca pose eee nee
[1109]iehose ow aD AseBe Papy mesure ® os hose v
[1111]Bou ta aRobert Scheer}: a: registiant under the Military Thaining © INR Gaye
[1112]and Service Act, refused to complete DD Form 398 in its
[1114]entirety.
[1116]MYRON K. HAYASHIDA
[1117]1/LT, AGC
[1119]1 CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE. COMPLETE. AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN
[1120]GOOD FAITH. | UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH
[1121](See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001)
[1123]ye
[1124]a
[1126]‘DATE
[1128]5 Oct 1966
[1130]SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FOR
[1132]ANDSADDAE SE FS SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
[1133]~ HAVASHYBA, 1/LT, acc () * :
[1134]g 7% Jac ian > Pornia ZelVL7 HAY aye
[1135]THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION
[1136]SIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (top secret, secret, etc.) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS
[1138]“
[1140]ne.
[1144]Peae rs)
[1146]et
[1147]DATE OF CLEARANCE
[1149]REMARKS.
[1151]U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 0—573450_
[1153]NW 88613 Docid:34530159 Page 8
[1157]tT: STREET. AND, NUMBER, Boeds
[1159]a _ _ " "sTaTE on cour?
[1160]1949":") ‘1958 |
[1162]. 1968 |" ¥559 7 Spracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing i fae for
[1164]California
[1166]| 2961 | 1963 [ 2157 Mason Street | | ~—s (|| San Francisco | California |
[1168][1964 | 1965 | 332 Castro St. & 2870 Geery || San Francisco | California |
[1170]| 2965 |
[1172]2628 Milvia Street California
[1174]TYPE
[1176](Social, fraternal, profeasional, etc.)
[1178]NAME AND ADDRESS
[1180]See Remarks
[1182]ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EV! EN'A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A.. OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?
[1184]ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF/A FASCIST ORGANIZATION? tht
[1186]2 a OR
[1187]ARE YOY NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY PRGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT. GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE
[1188]OvERT Hon OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE
[1189]OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF
[1191]eee Tea TUT aah MEANS? <3 Luby (que tcwy ayeey
[1192]ce om ee ¥ 18
[1194]ARE YOU:NQW.OR HAVE you EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY, ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPELDESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT. OFFICIAL, OR, EMPLOYEE? ;
[1195]set Pee mk : oo , . ‘ we Do, we
[1198]ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR’ HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE. ARE OR
[1199]HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
[1201]HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR
[1202]PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATI NAL. hen OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM: THE SALE. GIFT. OR DIS-
[1203])
[1206]{TRIBUTION:OF ANY-WRITTEN, P(RIN: ED. Ra BER MAT EES PREPARED: REPROQUCED, OR PUBLISHED. BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR iINSTRUMENTALITIES?
[1208]IF “YES,” DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES... ATTACH ADDITIONAL-SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS. SPECIFY NATURE
[1210]AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INGUUDING PRFICE;OR;POS|TION HELO; ALSO INCLUDE DATES. PLACES. AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE
[1211]i acpetetcan :
[1213]BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF, THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS. THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATEO.
[1215]yeu Gr: eh Mg Se : wf oke “EYE:
[1217]Me Pe ty Ede] opaere
[1221]Joos &
[1223]See Remarks
[1225]16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING. OR CONVICTED. FINED. OR IMPRISONED OR
[1226]PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (excluding
[1227]minor trafic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of $25, or less was imposed)! INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. oO YES iF | NO
[1228]IF “‘YES,"’ LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAMZ AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER
[1229]DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.
[1231]wits RELATE. et rn
[1232]4 - b : . tr
[1234]“1
[1236]19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN
[1237]YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR
[1238]RE URTHER EXPLANATION? [) Yes oO NO IF “YES.” GIVE DETAILS ne enone
[1240]THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON To TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUI
[1242]613 Docld:34530159 Page 9 Sea Remarks | [1]! Date : 08/18/98
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[1244] |
194-10006-10141.pdf | [1]Date : 08/20/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10141
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 476
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[18]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[19]TO :
[20]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[21]DATE : 07/14/61
[22]PAGES : 1
[24]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[25]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[26]EMPLOYMENT
[27]CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
[28]AGENT REPORT
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[35]OPENING CRITERIA
[36]COMMENTS
[38]NW 88613 Doctd:34530084 Page 1
[40]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[42]SCHEER, Robert
[44]SSve, 50-29-186
[45]DOB: 4 ‘April 1936
[46]POB: Bronx, New York
[48]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS.
[50]AGENT REPORT
[52](SR 380-320-10)
[54]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[56]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[58]Hi 016 94,0
[60]76 (EMPLOYMENT) On 13 July 1961, Mildred Schoenberg, secretary, Payroll
[61]Office, City Universtiy of New York, formerly City College of New York, consulted
[62]the records concerning Robert SCHEER, and the following information was found to
[63]be recorded:
[65]Name:
[67]Date of Birth:
[69]Place of Birth:
[70]Address:
[72]Dates of Empdhoyment:
[73]Position:
[75]Salary:
[77]Reason for Leaving:
[78]Hligibility for rehire:
[79]Social Security Number:
[80]Additional Pertinent In-
[81]formation:
[83]Robert SCHEER
[85]Not listed
[87]Not listed .
[89]653 Britton Street, Bronx, New York
[90]20 June 1960 to 2 August 1960
[91]Lecturer, Summer Session
[93]$286 for summer term.
[95]End of term
[97]Not listed
[99]112-28-1134
[101]None listed.
[103]Schoenberg does not know SUBJECT, and knows of no one who would have
[105]knowledge of SUBJSCT.
[107]FORM 16—7411G-1 Us S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
[108]1 Ar 52 REPLACES WO AGO FORM Mi. 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USF }
[110]| RAM Sea
[112]’ NW 88613 Docid:34530084 Page 2 | [3]
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[114] |
194-10006-10178.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 21 Date : 08/24/98
[2]aK Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10178
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 635-636
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : DIETRICH, DAN H JR
[18]TO : CG, USA INTEL CMD
[19]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 10/05/66
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]REQUESTED ACTION
[25]CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS
[26]LATEST INVESTIGATION/ CLEARANCE
[27]TYPE OF INVESTIGATION
[28]RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
[29]REQUEST FOR AND RESULT OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]. RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[36]OPENING CRITERIA
[37]COMMENTS
[39]NW-88613 Docid:34530123 Page 1
[41]- ° a a a ae . a" . a oenneiaent
[42]ves. Hi Poe ye oer ‘
[43]— ci * . ad " sia KE |
[44]pei, Pt
[45]REQUEST FOR AND RESUL. io PER ONNE! SECURITY ACT! At an x d
[46]AR 381-130 al) aes 366
[48]TQ: (Controt Oftice)
[50]FROM: (Requesting Agency)
[52]CG, USA Intelligence Cmd CO, AFEES
[53]ATTN: ACofS, CONOPS ar} 415 Clay Street
[54]PO Box 398 Fort. Mionrbe, Va iy ones OG land, Celifornia
[56]Fort Holabird, Md 21219
[58](Enter name and address of the ACTION AGENCY to which results are td be sent, if known by
[59]requester)
[61]| CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY | CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY USE ONLY
[62]REQUIREMENT REQUEST NO.
[64]-
[66]OPENING DATE
[68]CHIEF, USAPSG
[69]ATTN: Adjudication Branch
[70]Fort Holabird, Md 21219
[72]YY OCIAL SECURITY NO,
[74]112-208-1134
[76]6. GRADE AND POSITION
[78]N/A
[80]1, SUBJECT (Last name in capitals, first and
[81]middie names)
[83]SCHEER, Robert (NMN)
[85]44. DATE OF BIRTH
[86](Day, Month, Year)
[88]4 April 1936
[90]5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State and country)
[92]Bronx, New York, New York, USA
[94]7.-REQUESTED ACTION CX} INVESTIGATION [_]VALIDATION [_] RECORDS CHECK
[95]8. TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: 9. a. FOR CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS TO: ;
[96](Nac) [[Jnact (jet [JotHeR(exptain in item 15) [trop secret [Jsecret [J] CONFIDENTIAL
[97]10. TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR:
[99]Induction
[101]5. [_] FOR LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
[103]c. (_] INTERIM CLEARANCE DESIRED
[104]a. [K] OTHER (Explain in Item 15)
[106]11. JUSTIFICATION
[108]PAR 18, AR 604-10
[110]12, REVIEW OF FILES REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH AR 604-5, COMPLETED ON
[112]REVEALED:
[114]‘{] No UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION Tounravorasce INFORMATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE A BAR TO ACTION
[115]CONTEMPLATED
[116](J INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN [TEM 15
[117]13. LATEST INVESTIGATION/ CLEARANCE (Type, when, by whom) 14. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE
[118]N/A EXCEEDING NTS SINCE
[120]1S. REMARKS (If unfavorable information entered, transmit in sealed envelope thru intelligence channels.).
[122]Request investigation of registrant in view ef remarks meade by registrent in remarks
[123]section of DD Form 98 and OD Form 398,
[125]Headquarters
[126]us Army Recrui tin
[128]TYPED NAME AND TITLE
[130]MYRON K. HAYASHIDA
[131]1,LT, AGC
[132]SECTION I! - CONTROL OFFICE TO. REQUESTER
[133]16. im] NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED
[135](J 'tems ON SPH (PSQI REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.
[136]——_—___—_——
[138]([] (INTERIM REPORT FORWARDED. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN OF INCLOSURES UPON COMPLETION.
[140]nN 233 a
[141]FORM ~
[142]DA .<°%.2784 For Off cial U se Oni ;
[144]NW 88613 Docid:34530123 Page 2
[146]a
[149]FOR OFFIR
[151]SECTION II! — REQUE. ...R TO CONTROL OFFICE
[152]17, REPORT OF ACTION 7
[153](CJ INFORMATION NOTED (C] suBseEcT REASSIGNED TO NON- ([] INFORMATION CONSIDERED NO BAR TO
[154]SENSITIVE DUTIES, INVESTIGATION CLEARANCE. REQUEST COMPLETION
[155]MAY BE CANCELED. OF INVESTIGATION,
[157]18. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED
[159]HEADQUARTERS
[161]19. REMARKS (If retuming corrected forms, st&te her’)
[163]TYPED NAME AND TITLE SIGNATURE
[165]20. RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
[166](No RECORD (CJ FAVORABLE [CT MINOR UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION RECORDED IN ITEM 21
[168]oO PRIOR INVESTIGATION INSUFFICIENT FOR ACTION CONTEMPLATED D3 rorwarven FOR SECURITY DETER—
[170]1F NEEDED, INITIATE REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION. MINATION BY CLEARING AUTHORITY
[172]TYPE OF INVESTIGATION COMPLETED BY DOSSIER NUMBER
[173][oxac) (nacre HC) Bi PX oTHER Us hi a teh / o/ 697 40
[174]21. REMARKS
[175]a. THIS FORM, TOGETHER WITH ANY JN€LOSURES, REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND USACRF COPY OF DA FORM 873
[176](if appropriate) WILL BE RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OFFICE WITHIN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT.
[177]b. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM YOUR COMMAND, THIS FORM AND INCLOSURES WILL BE
[178]RETURNED IMMEDIATELY WITH ITEM 23 COMPLETED.
[179]c. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO: PARAGRAPHS AR 604—5; PARAGRAPH__AR 604-11; PARAGRAPH
[180]AR 640-98; AND PARAGRAPH AR, 381—130,.AS ARPLICABLE. 3 ok a
[182]INCLS
[184]NESS 1 ER Hror 497 40
[186]SECTION V — ACTION AGENCY TO CONTROL OFFICE
[187]22. REPORT OF ACTION ' - ary - — -8 (
[188][J FAVORABLE DETERMINATION, USACRF _CUNravonasce DETERMINATION, | ([] REQMEST ADDITIONAL INVESTI-~
[189]COPY DA FORM 873 ATTACHER : RECO IMENDED ACTION IN ITEM 24 GATION AS INDICATED IN ITEM 24
[191]23. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED
[192]TO HEADQUARTERS %
[194]Noa a
[195]a y
[197]24. REMARKS
[199]o
[201]i o why
[202]INCLS TYBED NAME ANOLMeLe& . SIGNATURE _
[203]~ WE Ii-10,O - > ae og rr
[204]SVM KEGAT ‘R bDEK2OMMEF, OX rt ah ut
[205]f tee:it .
[207]NW 60613 Docid:34530123 Page 3 | [3]
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[169]
[171]
[181]
[183]
[185]
[190]
[193]
[196]
[198]
[200]
[206]
[208]
[209] |
194-10006-10180.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 21
[2]e (13
[4]AGENCY
[6]RECORD NUMBER
[7]RECORDS SERIES
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[10]ORIGINATOR
[11]FROM
[13]TO
[15]TITLE
[17]DATE
[19]PAGES
[20]SUBJECTS
[22]DOCUMENT TYPE
[23]CLASSIFICATION
[24]RESTRICTIONS
[25]CURRENT STATUS
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[31]NW.60613 Docld:34530125 Page 1
[33]Date
[34]Page
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]CSF /INSCOM
[42]194-10006-10180
[44]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS.
[46]PAGE 639
[47]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[49]USA
[50]NICHOLS, W H
[52][ RESTRICTED ]
[53]01/09/67
[55]2 .
[57]SCHEER, ROBERT
[59]RESIDENCES
[61]EMPLOYMENT
[63]CIVILIAN SCHOOL
[65]US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[68]QU OMASSTETED
[70]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/07/95
[73]08/24/98
[75]1
[77]US ARMY REQUEST Fx NANO * oF ao
[78](Agee) Pony EE
[81][3. LAST NAME) FIRST NAME ena) NAME - ALI 7 tiah ams i Aci f nf
[83]SCHEER, Robert
[84]5. DAY, MONTH. VEAR OF BINTH 6. PLAGE OF BIRTH 1) SERVICE NUMBER
[85]. =
[86]OBGAK, Mew York, Saw York
[88]8. RELATIVE'S NAMES . to. PRESENT ADDRESS
[89]Jo. FATHER
[91]Ceccaced
[93]b. MOTHER {maiden name) 2640 frons Pork East
[94]2628 ic Street
[95]_Cerkel felifernta
[97]¢.NUMBER AND STREET d. city e@. STATE
[98]G53 Grftton Streat, Gronx flew York | tas York
[99]Syrocusa &.Y.Earried Student Sys. cuss tga Yore
[100]Cerielsy Celife
[101]San Froneisco
[102]San francianc
[104]13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter}
[105]b.to | c. EMPLOYER d. PLACE
[106]University cf California
[107]Ses 63 City Lights cocketore -.
[110]REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY
[112]INVESTIGASTONVCGNBUCGHD TO Date
[113]- FROM b. to Cc. NAME
[114]Sop 69 | Jun 63 Univeralty of Californie ain, urn a
[115]a. A
[117]yes NO 15. ITEM ("'Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
[118]. ’
[119]j : x 1S THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
[121]: 1 x . ANY FOREIGN CONNEGTIONS, INTERESTS. EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[122]: 4 . ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL © THER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
[123]| - ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?
[125]since SUBJECT refused to execute fingerprint
[127]card. ee
[129].
[131]NACC: Request check of FBI(C)-Nane check only
[133]Yhalisnd = te
[134]Feb 2985 | fa'tar' 1506 ~ ~ Vietnam, Combedie, TeSland & Japan = To write
[136]_— M CONTROL EG aed “Pron BCSPESTopera tioned 39S.
[137]1 16 067 gg
[138]DATA FURNISHED UNABLE 10 LOCATE Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
[139]ON BASIS scoRD IN. FRE IDENTIFICATION DVISION Foe Zia Leth fAY
[140]ARREST R 6305 6016 alot JAN 9 1 1967
[141]-
[143],\ IA Tr SODT REPLACES DA FORM 380, | DEC 98. WHICH Sone are, eon RS
[145]NW 60613 Docid:34530125 Page 2
[147]"2 US ARMY REQUEST F-. 2 NATIO a
[148]faprey | FD
[150]Vis, LAST NAME) FIRST NAME - (eid) NAME - ALIABYSS uns AMES] ci} NB Bri Ay a SOCIAL SELUMITY tO. ‘
[152]SCHEER, fRahert as d a 2
[153]| WS. DAY. MONTH. YEAR OF BIRTH ~_ [6 PLACE ho ) 7 SERVICE NUMBER
[154]. —
[155]2 s OPS, Hee York, tae York
[157]8. RELATIVE'S NAMES 9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 10, PRESENT ADDRESS 11. CITIZENSHI
[159]a. FATHER
[161]) Fred Scheor Ceceased US
[162]b. “Tae {maiden name) . 2659 frome Pork Esot
[164]: u aa Giro
[166]¢.NUMBER AND STREET . e.sTaTe ff
[167]G53 Eeition Street, Bros Soy aT Cana Yorks |
[168]Syscouce Wo¥ Carried Student Housing Uyc. us tas Yor
[169]Fronoieces Straut beried: Celife |
[170]2157 Geson Streot
[171]444 Colushus Strest
[172]£32 _testro St. & 2670 G
[174]13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during Tost 15 years, whichever is shorter)
[175]b.TO | C.EMPLOYER | d. PLACE
[177]Univeraity ef Califernte Berkeloy, Califarnia
[178]City Lights Soskatore «.. Son Foeanntena, Collfe
[180]INVESTIGASHON
[181]Univeralty of Californis
[183]15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
[185]. 1S THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
[187]. ANY FOREIGN CONNEETIONS. INTERESTS. EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[190]. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
[192]| ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR OD FORM 98?
[194]. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?
[196]be mpyanas “Ui aoob aie e yee es Geecamt 2028 Etivie Strecty C3201 yp Delete rh 4
[197]» STE 2D ce Fe iso te Sop 1968 = tbe © Ta scra to crite 7 Is
[198]Jan £553 to far 1585 < England, France, Palend,tungazy ySovient Union ":
[199]Crechcalevie = Ta write
[200]Fen IS35 te Bar 1965 = Vietnam, Cambodia, Indensaia, Iapun, Lovs &
[202]; fad 1680 tq fax 4905 ~ Vietnam, Combadie, Theiisnd & Jeoun ~ @ To exits
[203]ay NCE USE me SCSTHSTOLAN ton IIS.
[204]Headquarters, USAINTC
[205]ATTN: ICOP-III-24
[206]Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
[208]19 THRU: Keeteede { .7
[209]Rg 6305 bons aSpleetl IAN. 2 1 1967
[211]Hed, chosing
[213]TIA RE 3027 eee eee EE for sen Cresing Oran Rue 4
[215]1 AUG 65
[217]17. CONTROL OFFICE USE
[219]N16 19676 wut
[220]BLE 10 U
[221]ATA FURNISHED UNA
[222]on cond IN. EBL IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
[224]NW 60613 Docid:34530125 Page 3 | [3]
[5]
[9]
[12]
[14]
[16]
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[21]
[26]
[30]
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[35]
[38]
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[54]
[56]
[58]
[60]
[62]
[64]
[67]
[69]
[72]
[74]
[76]
[79]
[80]= ——————
[82]
[87]
[90]
[92]
[96]
[103]
[108]Ranpert's Segazines$.fe
[109]
[111]
[116]
[120]: a ?
[124]
[126]
[128]
[130]
[132]
[135]
[142]aed ‘pal
[144]
[146]
[149]=
[151]
[156]
[158]
[160]
[163]; Kuren fusasios sae rt ‘ei fuzaien
[165]
[173]
[176]
[179]
[182]
[184]
[186]
[188]
[189]—.——
[191]
[193]
[195]
[201]; Thalicrd @ To arite
[207]
[210]
[212]
[214]
[216]
[218]
[223]
[225]
[226] |
194-10006-10181.pdf | [1]Date : 08/24/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case Nw JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]a SD te IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10181
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 640-640A
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : NICHOLS, W H
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE 7 RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 11/04/66
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]RESIDENCES
[26]EMPLOYMENT
[28]CIVILIAN SCHOOL
[30]US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
[32]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[33]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[34]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[35]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[36]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[37]OPENING CRITERIA : ;
[38]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED AND ANNOTATED "FOR OFFICIAL USE
[39]ONLY" WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.
[40]INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED.
[42]NW.60613 Docid:34530126 Page 1
[44]a
[46]US ARMY Rc ~s ie TIGA i i Y ‘ TOA TE OF REQUEST
[47]Z rth PETS ET # Nov "ee x>!
[49]v CONTROL OFFICE:
[51]3 LAST NAME - FIRST NAME (ma) ) NAME © ALIASES) = NICKS
[55]BS. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH “Té6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[56]4 &pesi 1625 Orena, Men York,
[58]8. RELATIVE’S NAMES 9. DATE AND PLACE OF
[60]23 fay 2693
[62]2!
[63]wes Yack
[65]Peed Sedtcor
[66]b. MOTHER (maiden name}
[67]Ide Kuren
[68]¢. SPOUSE (MEEEEBLSne}
[69]anne Gellis
[70]4 12, RESIDENCES (List all from | 6th birthday or during last yO years, whichever is shorter}
[72]0. FROM | b.to C.NUMBER AND STREET me city e. STATE
[73]1sa9 S55 653 Er&£tisn Streat, arary Uso York |
[74]2953 &o59 syrectcos WeVoCoreied Stade: iow York
[75]1959 4263 Francisca Strest Celive
[76]3982 1553 2157 Geeon Gtrast Calif.
[77]41963 3853 444 Columns Strest Celife
[78]anne ante W979 Centon Sb. & SED Cee Eon Frenciccs Calife
[80]AGENCY To BRE CHECKED: st 15 years, whichever is shorter)
[81]fice contain FBI oni ~ Records of this d. PLACE
[83]JECT ated through 196 Califaral
[84]_rvice Registrant we qProcessed asa Selective seaeeley mahal cece felife
[85]ree lett
[86]Seep aacohen dated 28 May 65(San Premera Sen Francisco, Calife
[87]ashington D c) and 14 Feb 66(san Francis
[88]al information re
[90]Request
[91]LURJECT. q any addition
[93]fo. FROM b.TO Cc. NAME d. PLACE
[94]‘ Sep S93 | Jon G3 Univaraity of Celffarria Cerkalay, Califgenta
[96]15. ITEM {"'Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks}
[98]G. 1S THE SUBECR ROAD COPE LOR: RESUETS dS HaNMiteo states?
[100]. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS. EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[102]b
[103]c. ANY FOREIGN TREVFEST GT APR ONC OMDUO DED TOs AD En ment?
[104]d
[106]. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
[108]16. TES corre ones ccm S eon plain paper) B8ivie 8 ’ carl Lay, fornie 4
[109]Ale gis oe fy5 3... to Sep 1969 = Gare @ Ts leorn te erite 4
[110]Jen 1°53 to Gor 1953 — Englend,frence,Palend,Mungary,sSoviant Unian 8 |
[112]feb 1965 to Cor 2965 = Vietnas, Coziodia, Indonosia, Japon, toon &
[114]4
[116]1
[117]N
[118]h
[121]Feo 1935 bs 1955 = : ratisnd & Jcosn « To urite
[122]Ae 20) Piast and nornions of. DD 395, . _ —
[123]17. CONTROL OFFICE Use ed annotated 18 FROM Hood 3 pe g ons
[124]een: bee chee ee ee we eadquarters, INTC
[125]To be rec uN wien separated frqn. ATTN: ICOP-III 2
[127]FOR OFFIC. L USE Coe Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
[129]ee AE) pat DFFIGIAL USE off’
[131]a WH. 8 SOD s Stony
[132]i Mie een ee oe? r
[134]A S85 PR NDC Torte REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58. WHICH S > Cf 1
[135]1 AUG .
[137]NW 60613 Docid:34530126 Page 2
[141]US. ARMY ke —p.
[143]« CONTROL OFFICE:
[145]| $3 LAST NAME - FIRST NAME 5) NAME - ALIAS: EG NIE Wit KEL
[146]; e
[148]SOHEER, Rozers
[150]BS DAY, MONTH, VEAR OF BIRTH ‘Te, PLACE OF BIRTH
[151]4 hpwil 1035 Owenttg Men York, eo Yark
[152]@. RELATIVE'S NAMES 9. DATE AND PLACE OF Sap { i ate ae
[153]— 5
[155]‘% Cay 1895
[157]c.NUMBER AND STREET . e@. STATE
[158]653 Eritten Stzeet, aren ou fon York
[159]Gyrecuse eYellozeied Stitent Housing Sy... - New Vork
[160]Francisca Stract ; Colive
[161]2157 feeen Street Calif.
[162]444 Coluctus Strect
[164]13. EMPLOYMENT (List afl from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)
[165]0.FROM b.To c. EMPLOYER d. PLACE
[167]14, LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL
[168]HO. FROM b. To c. NAME tort d. PLACE
[169]Univaralty of farnis
[171]15. ITEM (''Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
[172]1S THE SUBSECRROUEM > COPE OR RESTEEO AEWEWN te states?
[173]. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[174]. ANY FOREIGN TEN FEST GWE EONCC ONDUC TER TO SDADE ment?
[176]. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
[178]. FORMER US GOVERNMEN
[181]ORPT OO bi
[183]Te a RSyE Hiden S"yegs njinue.on ‘tobe poper) Blivie $ > Cort: ley, fornte 4
[184]: ATES 225 os ad cap lh ae = Ge = To leara te erito 3
[185]Jon i053 to Gar 8963 - Cnplerdi,frence,Palend,Nungary,sovient Union a |
[186]Czechaeleukia < To write
[188]Feb 1965 te Gar 2965 = Vietnea, Comtodie, Indenegia, Japan, toon &
[190]; Fhalisnd - » To atite
[192]t ANY ARREST OR COURT AMG
[194]‘ a oe Tee ican =» Te te |
[195]Fea eg 4 Rites 2 O° Aiws2 oO vi On and nh ns. of... DD 4 5. 1 _- urd csatecen
[196]j 17. CONTROL OFFICE. USE, ~ 4 annotated] 1% FROM DCofS, Operations
[197]To be reprnc” j ible f Headquarters, USAINTC
[199]} ° ALY when separated rqm ATIN: ICOP-ITI 2
[201]FOR OFFIC USE ¢ Fort Holdeird, Maryland 21219
[203]Ca ale aan OFFICIAL USE ody
[205]a Ww. H. Nice t il
[207]r Div! See aati tee aha one er ;
[209]FARM REPLACES DA FORM 340. 1 DEC 58, WHICH 5 4
[210]KEEL | Co 1
[212]NW 60613 Docid:34530126 Page 3
[214]i
[215]|
[218]4,
[220]wo
[222]eM immenstivtiinn. Cina
[224]WHICH W735 SEN YOR OE OSL — 2
[226]AGENCY ONZ2-
[228]an VS bh tl dows Trew oF
[233]Pare pee gt pane
[234]PORSES (0 te tyes
[235]WD oa er at ene Teme
[237]to wid Sa0j03¢ wi peal bull.
[239]In recrarey fa rary rocnest
[241]NW 60613 Docid:34530126 Page 4
[243]v7] eww 4
[244]- 3 . “ -
[246]Pb pSb, + 7
[248]This reply js result of check of FBI
[249]investicative Men too
[251]‘eu LZ arrest
[252]records, reays-
[254]cobiaitied to
[255]Pasi Identivicghes ~uclon.. Finger.
[256]Prints ave necessary for positive check,
[258]Say US PIE, “
[260]“) | [3]
[6]
[8]
[13]
[15]
[23]
[25]
[27]
[29]
[31]
[41]
[43]
[45]
[48]
[50]
[52]
[53]SEHEEDs Rovert$
[54]
[57]
[59]
[61]
[64]
[71]
[79]
[82]
[89]
[92]
[95]
[97]
[99]
[101]
[105]
[107]
[111]Czcshenieuxis = To urite
[113]
[115]
[119]
[120]Thai2end « Ta tite
[126]
[128]
[130]
[133]
[136]
[138]
[139]————— — se
[140]
[142]
[144]
[147]
[149]
[154]
[156]
[163]
[166]
[170]
[175]
[177]
[179]
[180]+
[182]
[187]
[189]
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[198]
[200]
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[208]
[211]
[213]
[216]
[217]
[219]
[221]
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[225]
[227]
[229]
[230]}
[231]thie gn ce
[232]
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[245]
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[250]
[253]
[257]
[259]
[261]
[262] |
194-10006-10183.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 21
[4]Date
[5]Page
[7]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[8]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[10]08/24/98
[11]1
[13]AGENCY
[15]RECORD NUMBER
[16]RECORDS SERIES
[17]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[19]AGENCY INFORMATION
[21]CSF/INSCOM
[23]194-10006-10183
[25]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[26]PAGE 642°
[28]ORIGINATOR
[29]FROM
[31]TO
[33]TITLE
[35]DATE
[37]PAGES
[38]SUBJECTS
[40]DOCUMENT TYPE
[41]CLASSIFICATION
[42]RESTRICTIONS
[43]CURRENT STATUS
[45]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[46]OPENING CRITERIA
[47]COMMENTS
[49]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[51]USA
[52]{ RESTRICTED ]
[54]{ RESTRICTED ]
[55]10/13/66
[57]1
[59]SCHEER, ROBERT
[61]LOCAL AGENCIES CHECK
[63]POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAN FRANCISCSO, CALIFORNIA
[64]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[66]AGENT REPORT
[68]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[70]QUCMASSTETED
[72]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[73]03/07/95
[75]| NW-60613 Docld:34530128 Page 1
[77]ar ee
[79]AT REFORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[81]1, NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT a+] 2. DATE SUBMITTED ' ~ co,
[82]SCHEER, Robert 13 October 1966 .
[84]AGENT REPORT
[86]SSve Registrant, SSN: 112-28-1134 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[87]DOB: 4 Apr 1936
[89]POB: Bronx, N.Y. =
[91]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[93](LOCAL AGEWCIES) Gn the dates indicated, the agencies indicated
[94]below were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of S!BJECT's
[95]name, and disclosed no records:
[97]— Sheriff's Of fice, Marin County, San Rafael, Calif
[99]eg HOPPE 'S CHFice, Sonoma County, Santa Rosa, Calif
[101]Police Departnent, South San Francisco, California
[103]—— Police Department, Pacifica, California
[105]——_—__.______., Police Department, Daly City, California
[107]13 October 1966 Police Department, San Francisco, California
[109]——— Police Department, Brisbane, California
[111]— Police Department, San Bruno, California
[113]—— ee Police Department, Burlir.game, California
[114]. . ‘,Folice Department, Millbrae, California
[116]ie F ficee of the Provost Marshal, Presidio of San
[117]Francisco, California
[119]C42
[121]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURY OF SPECIAL AGENT P
[123]115th INTC Grown (1) » LARRY C. VOT CJP2 “il
[125]DA o# 34 Trorsorricm use "ONT? Snow auTOMn” TERMINATION
[127]FROM AUTOMATIC FERMINATION
[129]| NW 60613 Docid:345301208 Page 2 | [2]3-
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[131] |
194-10006-10184.pdf | [1]44 USC 2107
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]08/24/98
[8]1
[10]AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]CSF/INSCOM
[19]194-10006-10184
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]PAGE 643
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]NW.60613 Docid:34530129 Page 1
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[51][ RESTRICTED ]
[53][ RESTRICTED ]
[55]10/07/66
[57]SCHEER, ROBERT
[59]LOCAL AGENCIES CHECK
[61]POLICE DEPARTMENT, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
[62]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[64]POLICE DEPARTMENT, BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
[66]SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ALAMEDA COUNTY, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
[68]AGENT REPORT
[70]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[71]UNCLASSIFIED
[73]3
[75]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[76]03/07/95
[78]AGENT REPORT
[80](FM 30-17)
[81]SCHEER, Robert 7 October 1966
[83]SSve Regi strant SSN: 112-28-11 3 A, 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[84]DOB: 4 April 1936 .
[85]POB: Bronx, New York
[87]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[89](LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, files of the following
[90]agencies were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT" 5
[91]name, and disclosed no. record:
[92]Sheriff's Office,
[93]Sheriff's Office,
[94]Sheriff's Office,
[95]Sheriff's Office, |
[97]Sheriff's Office,
[99]7 October 1966 Sheriff's Office, Alameda County, Oakland, California
[101]6 October 1966 Police Department, Oakland, California
[102]| 6 October 1966 Police Department, Berkeley, California
[103]Police Department,
[105]“Police Department,
[107]Police Department,
[109]‘Bureau of Police;
[111]643
[112]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[114]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT . j ATURE OF SPECI§L AGENT
[115].
[117]115th INTC Gp (
[118]ROBERT A MALONEY,
[120]FORM
[121]1 APR 52 » 34 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 34}, 1 JUN 47, Yimice MAY BE USED.
[123]* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF —656148
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194-10006-10185.pdf | [1]Date : 08/24/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10185
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 644
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 10/13/66
[21]PAGES : 1
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]CASUAL SOURCE
[25]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[26]RECORD CHECK
[27]AGENT REPORT
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]. CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA
[35]COMMENTS
[37]NW 80613 Docid:34530130 Page 1
[39](AR 381-130; FM 30-17) |
[41]ca [eaee:
[42]1. NAME OF SUBJECT O8 TITLE OF INCIDENT Lo. 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[44]SCHEER, Robert 13 October 1966
[45]‘lsSvce Registrant SSN: 112+28=1134
[47]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER, “
[48]IDOB: 4 April 1936
[49]FOB: . Bronx, New York | ;
[51]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[53]AGENT REPORT _-, 1E NEEICIAL USE
[55](CASUAL SOURCE) On 11 October 1966, a records check in regard to
[56]| SUBJECT was conducted at Casual Source Bel4, Berkeley, California, and revealed
[57][the following information:
[59]Name: Robert SCHEER
[60]' Circumstances: Issued a permit for campaign speaking as a
[62]candidate for US Congress in the Spring of
[63]1966.
[65]FOR OFFICIAL USE OWLY
[67]3. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ; “| 6 SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[69]L IEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I)
[71]FORM .
[72]DA 1 APR 52 34 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. .
[74]NW 88613 Docid:34530130 Page 2 | [3]
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[76] |
194-10006-10186.pdf | [1]Date : 08/24/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10186
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT ‘INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 645
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]DATE : 10/11/66
[21]PAGES : 1
[22]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]CASUAL SOURCE
[25]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[26]RECORD CHECK
[27]AGENT REPORT
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA
[35]COMMENTS
[37]NW.60613 Docid:34530131 Page 1
[39]AGENTREPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[40]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT’ . 2. DATE SUBMITTED .
[42]SCHEER, Robert , 11 October 1966 The
[44]SSve Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134 3, CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER "
[45]DOB: 4 April 1936
[46]POB: Bronx New York ; .
[48]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[50](CASUAL SOURCE) On 6 October 1966, a records check conducted at
[51]Casual Source A-16, Oakland, California, in regard to SUBJECT revealed the fol-
[52]lowing information: ; -
[54]Name: Robert SCHEER
[55]Age: 29 Years old in 1965
[56]Occupation: . Student, Teacher; and writer
[58]Residence: 332 B Castro Street, San Francisco, California
[60]1
[62]Wife: Anne
[64]Since 1960, HE has been active in demonstrations in the Bay Area of
[65]California. Participated in the San Francisco City Hall riots, against the
[66]execution of Caryl Chessman, sit-ins, and teach-ins.
[68]1960 Visited Cuba and wrote favorably of Castro
[69]1965 Member of Vietnam Day Committee
[70]1966 Foreign news editor of Rampart Magazine
[72]1966 Visited Cambodia
[74](CASUAL SOURCE) On 6 October 1966, Casual Source A~14, Oakland,
[75]California, informed that Robert SCHEER is.a well-known individual in the
[76]Bay Area of California who usually supports all liberal political policies.
[77]HE has been active in free speech movements in Berkeley, California, has been
[78]a candidate for election to the US Congress, and is active in attempting to
[79]alter US policy toward Vietnam. There is no evidence that HE has ever attended \
[80]a meeting of any organization that is considered subversive toward the US
[81]Government. nor has HE been identified as a member of any such organization. .
[82]HIS wife, Anne, is active in similar endeavors as SUBJECT. \
[84]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[86]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT “~""T @. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT.
[88]L LEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I)
[90]FORM
[91]D A 1 APR 52 3 4 1 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.
[93]nn Soe
[95]NW 88613 Docld:34530131 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10006-10187.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 88613 Docld:34530132 Page 1
[30]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[32]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[34]AGENCY INFORMATION
[36]CSF/INSCOM
[37]194-10006-10187
[39]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[41]PAGE 646
[43]USA
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[47][ RESTRICTED ]
[49][ RESTRICTED ]
[50]10/11/66
[52]1
[54]SCHEER, ROBERT
[56]SUBJECT INTERVIEW
[58]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[60]ARMED FORCES EXAMINING AND ENTRANCE STATION
[62]AGENT REPORT
[64]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[65]UNCLASSIFIED
[67]3
[69]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[70]03/07/95
[72]EXHIBIT (S)
[74]I,II,III,IV, AND V INDEXED SEPARATELY. '
[76]AOETTROREOR OFricin USE ONLY _
[77]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[79]SCHEER, Robert 11 October 1966
[81]SSve Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER °
[82]DOB: 4 April 1936
[83]FOB: Bronx, New York ; .
[85]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[87](SUBJECT INTERVIEW) On 5 October 1966, Robert SCHEER, 2828 Milvia
[88]Street, Berkeley, California, was interviewed at the Armed Forces Examining and
[89]Entrance Station, 1509 Clay Street, Oakland, California, and HE stated that HE
[90]desired counsel present before HE answered any questions in regard to quali-
[91]fication of DD Forms 98 and 398. HE submitted documents in substantiati mn
[92]of _s views_on US policies which are attached as EXHIBITS ao aa
[93]ry and )
[95]FOR OFICIAL USE ONLY
[97]C46
[99]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT .
[100]L LEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I) , . wo
[101]; ue Jap 7 xl
[103]FORM
[104]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. ¢
[106]NW 60613 Docid:34530132 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10006-10188.pdf | [1]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[2]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[6]1
[8]i : AGENCY
[9]RECORD NUMBER
[11]-RECORDS SERIES
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[15]AGENCY INFORMATION
[17]CSF/INSCOM
[18]194-10006-10188
[20]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[22]PAGE 647
[24]ORIGINATOR
[25]FROM
[27]TO
[29]TITLE
[31]DATE
[33]PAGES
[34]SUBJECTS
[36]x
[38]DOCUMENT TYPE
[39]CLASSIFICATION
[40]RESTRICTIONS
[42]_ CURRENT. STATUS
[44]_ DATE OF LAST: REVIEW
[45]OPENING CRITERIA
[46]COMMENTS
[48]NW 80613 Docld:34530133 Page 1
[50]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[52]USA
[53]115TH INTC GROUP (I)
[55][ RESTRICTED ]
[56]10/11/66
[58]1
[60]SCHEER, ROBERT
[62]ARTICLE(S) OBTAINED FROM. SUBJECT
[63]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[65]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[66]UNCLASSIFIED
[68]3 .
[70]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/07/95
[73]EXHIBIT(S) I,11I,III,IV, AND V INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[75]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET ° 4 “Ot A
[78]Se alan feel
[80]Bxhibit Number : Y, x, aw at He
[82]SUBJECT: SCHEER, Pert
[83]SSve Registrant SSN: oooh
[84]DOB: 4 April 1936
[85]POB: Bronx, New York
[87]File Number:
[89]‘Preparing Unit: 115th INTC Group ( I )
[91]Agent Report Dated: 11 October 1966
[93]Description: Documents obtained from SUBJECT during SUBJECT Interview,.
[95]tt /. Hau THE Muiter STATES Got pwehVED iN
[96]yietwam ay RoBeeT SCHEER
[98]7 RnmPaets vieTN&M PRIMER
[100]$ oe C nParew MATERIAL (scleer FoR Crneness)
[102]4 ef CAMPAIGN MATERIAL (scHleer for Cy mone).
[103]te S- CAmPas GM maTER Ab EcHEer Kar -ConGREs®
[105](para 134 d(10)(e), FM 30-17) S47 Hs
[106]AMINT Form 2-25 . wy BACLUDED Fi
[108]. (Rev 11 Feb 63)
[110]( i
[111]34530133\Page 2 Po eee \
[112]f sore | [3]
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194-10006-10195.pdf | [1]—, ‘ . —,
[4]Date : 08/24/98
[5]Page : 1 .
[7]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[8]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[10]AGENCY INFORMATION
[12]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[13]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10195
[14]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[15]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 751
[17]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[19]ORIGINATOR : USA
[20]FROM : FINNEGAN, J B
[21]TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
[22]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[23]DATE : 03/08/67
[24]PAGES : 1
[25]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[27]MEMORANDUM
[29]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[30]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[31]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[32]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[33]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[35]COMMENTS
[37]NW 60613 Docid:34530141 Page 1
[39]FOR OFFICIAL Use ONLY
[40]oo g- MAR 1967
[42]USAPSG
[44]MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[45]ATTENTION: Mr. Patrick D. Putnan
[47]SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert (NMN) - SSN: 112-284-1134
[48]DPOB: 4 Aprii 1936 - Bronx, New York
[50]1, Request any reports concerning Robert SCHEER subsequent to the
[51]report of Special Agent William E, Hughes, Field Office File Number
[52]100-46832, Bureau File Number 105-106720 dated 3-14-66. This office has’
[53]on file two additional memorandums concerning SUBJECT dated April 21, 1966
[54]and June 28, 1966, same file number as above,
[56]2. Please indicate whether the FBI has any objection to further
[57]processing of this case as the eventual result may be a field board
[58]action involving SUBJECT,
[60]3. Further request that correspondence be forwarded through the
[61]Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison Representative to the Personnel
[62]Security Division, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligance, Department
[63]of the Army, Washington, D. C.
[65]FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAF? FOR INTELLIGENCE:
[67]Signed
[68]J B PINHEGAN
[69]COL AIS
[70]£or pyrrri J. TADICH
[71]Colonel, GS ;
[72]Chief, Personnel Security;
[73]Division
[78]na
[79]e
[81]FOR OFFICIAL USE OfLY
[83]NW 88613 Docld:34530141 Page 2 | [2]aa
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[74]
[75]%
[76]
[77]oJ
[80]
[82]
[84]
[85] |
194-10006-10196.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 2107 Note) Caset Nw
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]Date
[8]Page
[10]08/24/98
[11]1
[13]AGENCY
[15]RECORD NUMBER
[16]RECORDS SERIES
[17]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[19]AGENCY INFORMATION
[21]CSF/INSCOM
[22]194-10006-10196
[24]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[26]PAGES 752-753
[28]ORIGINATOR
[29]FROM
[31]TO
[33]TITLE
[35]DATE
[37]PAGES
[38]SUBJECTS
[40]DOCUMENT TYPE
[41]CLASSIFICATION
[43]| RESTRICTIONS
[44]CURRENT STATUS
[46]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[47]OPENING CRITERIA
[48]COMMENTS
[50]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[52]USA
[54]TADICH, DMITRI J
[55]TJAG
[57][ RESTRICTED ]
[58]05/23/67
[60]2
[62]SCHEER, ROBERT
[64]RECOMMENDATION
[66]VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE
[67]COMMUNIST PARTY
[68]SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
[70]PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY
[72]BERKELEY CHAPTER OF THE W.E.B. DUBOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA
[74]DISPOSITION FORM
[76]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[77]UNCLASSIFIED
[79]3
[81]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[82]03/07/95
[84]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 19 SEP 94
[86]NW 88613 Docid:34530142 Page 1
[88]yo
[90]Ro
[94](AR 340-18)
[96]REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL
[98]f USAPSG SCHEER, Robert - SSN: 112-28-1134 (U)
[100]DPOB: 4 April 1936; Bronx, New York
[102]DATE 2 3 MAY 1967 CMT 1
[103]M.C. Sneeringer/trt/6139
[105]TO TJAG
[107]FROM = ACST (C)
[109]1. (U) Forwarded under the provisions of paragraph 29a(1), AR 604-10.
[111]2. (U)‘ Inclosed case file has been reviewed, and it is recommended that SUBJECT
[112]be rejected for service in any capacity. .
[114]3 ef Following credible derogatory information is furnished as a basis for
[115]this recommendation:
[117]a. During 1965 and 1966 SUBJECT was an active member and leader of the
[118]Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). The VDC was a radical leftist group which was heavily
[119]infiltrated by confirmed Communists and Marxists. The VDC solicited and received
[120]financial support and/or assistance from the Communist Party (CP), Socialist Workers
[121]Party (SWP), Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and the Berkeley Chapter of the W.E.B.
[122]DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). The CP and the SWP have been cited by the Attorney
[123]General of the United States; the PLP is organized, controlled, and dominated by a
[124]| factionalist group of dissident Communists who broke away from the CP because they
[125]did not believe it was moving fast enough in accomplishing its revolutionary goals;
[126]and the DCA is supported, controlled and dominated by the CP. (Tabs B, pp3, 4 and 5;
[127]C; D3; E; F; G; H3 I, ppIV, 32, 41; J and K)
[129]b. In 1966 HE was associated with the United Committee Against the War
[130]which is dominated by the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance, the youth group of
[131]the SWP. (Tabs Q; R and S) a
[133]c. In 1964 HE was an associate and instructor of the San Francisco New
[134]School (SFNS). The SFNS was formulated by a radical group to criticize existing
[135]structures and policies and was the forerunner in the west coast area of the
[136]Students for a Democratic Society, a militant youth group that has received support
[137]from the CP. (Tabs A; C, pp 21 and 223; L;.M; NY ~~
[139]d. On 5 October 1966 SUBJECT refused:to complete DD Form 98 (Armed
[140]Forces Security Questionnaire). (Tab 0)
[142]e. On 5 October 1966 SUBJECT refused to complete DD Form 398 (Statement oe
[144]of Personal History) in its entirety. (Tab P) os
[147]4, (U) FBI check for any reports subsequent to those contained in thellfiles 5
[149]and for any objections to further processing of this case is being made thistdateli a
[150]Results thereof will be forwarded for inclusion in case file. WY => 8
[151]Qa
[152]752 28
[154]4
[155]4
[157]A
[159]USAPSG S 151-7
[161]NIN Tr eae
[163]! (AL EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
[164]5 DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
[166]COR U
[168]| O
[169]| BY
[171]when separated from olassified Inclesuras
[173]jNCLAS
[174]| REGRAQED US Gos
[175]TH PARA
[177]” REPLACES DD FORM SS, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE
[179]FORM DAOG
[180]j tres ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 3 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED. «9 * GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1908 Om
[181]DA , bette 2496 ce Wmnommean
[183]NW 88613 Docid:34530142 Page 2
[185]USAPSG 23 MAY 1967
[186]SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert
[188]5. (U) Request that file be returned through the Director of Security, OACSI,
[189]to the Chief, USAPSG, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219, upon completion of your action,
[191]‘FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
[195]Dossier 112 28 11 34 (SFeKey
[197]re SUBJ-Vols 1,2,3% 4 4 4 Vers DMITRI J. TADICH “A
[198].Colonel, GS ,
[199]Chief, Personnel Security
[200]Division
[201]x
[202]as
[203]a £3
[204]Wo Sy
[205]mh on
[206]rT) ite 2
[207]Oo a3
[208]FON
[209]7 ee
[210]ST
[211]ry Ore s
[212]omy d
[213]Ma.
[214]a oO
[215]Vos
[216]OCF
[218]cone
[219]753 :
[220]ated au
[222]wen sonercted from classified
[223]inclosuics,
[224]~XCLY.
[226]YeDV COU AUTOMATI
[227]ae MATIC RECRADING
[228]bop Dt 6200.10 Dogg NOT aPpPLy :
[230]NW 60613 Docid:34530142 Page 3 | [2]s-] oa
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[232] |
194-10006-10197.pdf | [1]Date : 08/24/98
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]eae te IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10197
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 755
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : TADICH, DMITRI J
[18]TO : CHIEF, OPO
[20]TITLE : [ RESTRICTED ]
[21]DATE : 07/28/67
[22]PAGES : 1
[23]SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT
[24]INDUCTION
[25]| SECURITY
[26]|
[27]COMMENT
[29]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[30]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[31]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[32]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[33]. DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[35]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
[36]CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL. INCLOSURE NO INCLUDED.
[38]NW 88613 Docid:34530144 Page 1
[42]no ee
[45]Ww
[49]FON OFFICIAL USE ony
[51]SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert, SSN: 112-28-1134
[52]; DPOB: 4 April 1936, Bronx, New York
[54]TO: Chief, OPO . FROM: ACSI
[56]TIN: @-E vs .
[57]AT) EPD-EPPA M. C. Sneeringer/jmm/6139
[59]1, Case concerning SUBJECT is forwarded for appropriate action.
[61]2, The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence adheres to his determination,
[62]as stated in Comment Number 1, that induction of SUBJECT into military service is
[63]inconsistent with the interests of national security. However, the determination
[64]of. The Judge Advocate General that the proposed allegations should not be drawn
[65]for the reason stated in Comment Number 2, precludes rejection of SUBJECT for
[66]security reasons under present policy.
[68]3.. In the event it is determined that SUBJECT is declared acceptable for
[69]induction, recommend that appropriate personnel records be annotated to preclude
[70]HIS receiving access to classified information. ;
[72]4, Request that the file be returned through the Director of Security,
[73]Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to the Chief, United States Army
[74]Personnel Security Group, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219, upon completion of
[75]your action,
[77]FOR THE ASSISTANT. CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
[79]1 Incl “ATR
[80]Dossier 112 28 11 34 (S) Colonel, GS
[81]re SUBJECT (4 volumes) Chief, Personnel Security
[83]Division
[85]he
[87]T55
[89]FAR BEFISIAL USE ONLY
[91]mo BE REGRADED UNCLASSTPTED SRY BSPARAPED
[92]PRON CLASSIFIED CORREGMOGLSHCe Sr MATBRIAL, oe
[93]his docunsnt will thon be uarked: /- q
[95]POR OBFIGIAL USE OWLY jg ee
[96]. eee ysa BSG»
[98]DATE: 28 JUL 1967? CMT 3 ~
[100]-
[104]NW 88613 Docld:34530144 Page 2 | [3]
[6]
[8]
[13]
[15]
[19]
[28]
[37]
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[40]:
[41]
[43]
[44]rr eee na
[46]
[47]vy
[48]
[50]
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[55]
[58]
[60]
[67]
[71]
[76]
[78]
[82]
[84]
[86]
[88]
[90]
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[97]
[99]
[101]
[102]———— —
[103]
[105]
[106]
[107] |
194-10006-10198.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[2]RECORD NUMBER
[3]RECORDS SERIES :
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[7]i ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[13]DATE
[14]PAGES
[15]SUBJECTS
[17]DOCUMENT TYPE
[18]CLASSIFICATION
[19]RESTRICTIONS
[20]CURRENT STATUS
[22]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[23]OPENING CRITERIA
[24]COMMENTS
[26]NW 60613 Docid:34530145 Page 1
[28]Date : 08/24/98
[29]Page : 1
[31]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[32]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[34]AGENCY INFORMATION
[36]CSF/INSCOM
[38]194-10006-10198
[40]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[41]PAGE 756
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[45]USA
[47]FITZSIMONS, JOHN F
[48]CHIEF, USAPSG
[50]{ RESTRICTED ]
[51]09/07/67
[53]1
[55]SCHEER, ROBERT
[57]SECURITY CLEARANCE
[58]INDUCTION
[60]COMMENT
[62]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[63]UNCLASSIFIED
[65]3
[67]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[68]03/07/95
[70]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
[71]CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL. INCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED.
[73]APPAR aE
[75], ot ran oe
[76]- i *
[78]EPPAW »
[79]SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert,-.SSN: 112 28 1134 (vu)
[80], 41936 -—. Bronx,- New York
[81]uo S
[82]THRU: EP 167 :
[83]TO: Chief, USAPSG FROM: OPO DATE: % SEP 0! gun 4
[84]Ft Holabird, Md 21219 . Major Devany/50371
[86]1. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Recruiting Command has been informed that
[87]subject ‘registrant is acceptable for induction with the proviso that he is not eligible
[89]‘for a security clearance. A copy of the implementing instructions has been added to
[91]subject's dossier.
[93]2. The Adjutant General's Office, ATIN: AGPO-SEF has been. furnished a copy of
[94]the instructions mentioned above for necessary action regarding the flagging control.
[96]-FOR THE CHIEF: OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS:
[98]‘F. FITZSIMONS
[99]Colonel, USA
[100]ief, Waiver Branch, PAD, EPD
[102]1 Incl
[105]FOR OFFIGIAL USE ONLY.
[107]FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL . . Sp-]
[108]This document will then be marked USK''Psae Sf;
[110]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
[112]a
[114]756
[115]PROTECTIVE MARKING IS XXCLUDED FROM
[116]AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (PAR 19, AR 345-15)
[118]4
[120]NW 88613 Docld:34530145 Page 2
[122]os | [4]
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194-10006-10235.pdf | [1]h
[3]‘ AGENCY
[4]RECORD NUMBER
[5]RECORDS SERIES
[6]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[8]OO O
[10]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[11]‘IDENTIFICATION FORM
[13]AGENCY INFORMATION
[15]CSF/INSCOM _
[16]194-10006-10235
[18]Date : 11/02/98
[19]Page : 1
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]AC678001R-PAGE 437
[26]ORIGINATOR
[27]FROM
[28]TO
[29]TITLE
[30]DATE
[31]PAGES
[32]SUBJECTS
[34]DOCUMENT TYPE
[35]CLASSIFICATION
[36]RESTRICTIONS
[37]CURRENT STATUS
[39]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[40]OPENING CRITERIA
[41]COMMENTS
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION .
[44]USA
[45]REPORT
[46]07/15/69
[47]WERBELL, MITCHELL L
[48]REEVES, S F a
[50]INTERVIEW
[52]REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT (DD FORM
[54]1149)
[56]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[57]UNCLASSIFIED
[59]3
[61]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[62]03/07/95
[64]DD FORM 1149 INDEXED SEPARATELY
[66]NW 60613 Docid:34530346 Page 1
[68]a 928231, 8414320, 12047120, 411564, 700867 and 930843.
[70]-ll. 0 On 15 July 1969, 'S. F. REEVES, GS-8,SSAN: 261-50-7220,
[71]Shipment Planner,~2201st Transportation Squa““on, Eglin AFB,
[72]Plorida, advised . Eglin AFS that a review his files revealed
[73]a copy of a GBL, hws F-0,648,922, dated 28 March 1969, with an
[74]‘attached DD Form 1149 (REQUISZTICN AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT),
[75]dated 13 March 1969, Requisition Nr FPB2823 9073XLO0OXXX, both of
[76]‘which he furnished to the writer. A review of these documents
[77]revealed that an. outgoing shipment consisting of one box of small
[78],arms ammunition weighing 55 pounds and a box of captured enemy
[79]weapons, weighing 140 pounds, was shipped from (23 _-TL (ATEL), Eglin
[80]AFB, Florida 32542 (Mr. COOLEY/882~2328) to Sicvics, 1655
[81]Peachtree Street N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309, ...cn: Mr. FRED
[82]“BROWN. The DD Form 1149 reflects serial numbc. - for the ll
[83]‘weapons as follows: - 4514, 1300273, .35285, 681-9, 12099391,
[85]NW 60613 Docid:34530346 Page 2 | [2]
[7]
[9]
[12]
[14]
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[33]
[38]
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[49]
[51]
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[60]
[63]
[65]
[67]
[69]
[84]
[86]
[87] |
194-10006-10298.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 210 Note). Caset: Nw
[2]: Date: [1 -] 5-20)
[4]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[6]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[8]Date
[9]Page
[11]12/10/97
[12]1
[14]AGENCY
[16]RECORD NUMBER
[17]RECORDS SERIES
[18]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[20]. AGENCY INFORMATION
[22]CSF /INSCOM
[23]194-10006-10298
[25]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[29]ORIGINATOR
[30]FROM
[31]TO
[33]TITLE :
[35]DATE
[36]PAGES
[37]SUBJECTS
[39]DOCUMENT TYPE
[40]CLASSIFICATION
[41]RESTRICTIONS
[42]CURRENT STATUS
[44]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[45]OPENING CRITERIA
[46]COMMENTS
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[52]CO, 66TH MI GP
[53]DCSI, USAREUR
[54]MESSAGE
[55]03/20/72
[56]3
[57]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[58]CI INTEREST
[60]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[61]UNCLASSIFIED
[63]3
[65]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[69]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94. DUPLICATE OF PAGES
[71]12-14.
[73]NW 60613 Docid:34530590 Page 1
[75]iY GUEPDSAe. Cow ta d,eOoreoesorts.
[77]ABY OOeeg ih GIRLY
[79]To oR tebe 4
[80]3 Pip et eS Ve Be
[82]NAA Ty fp
[83]HAR Tea
[85]M00 GGT ND &P MUNECH &
[87]{O DCSE USAREMG HELDELSERG FRO?s AE AG:
[89]| THE SGLLOSING
[90]Gh CSc PRE Fe
[91]Fe OO POSTE MI
[93]SOT il GP MONDOH
[95]TG OG.
[97]ARUTNE -f +CE
[99]SUBJECT LNCIDENT OF PGS
[101]ye AT iin HOURS, 3 FES 72,
[103]DETACHMENT »
[104]CGWS A CT
[105]AN UNLDENTIFLED PERSON ATT
[107]Shp bot races gD
[108]Pee 4 Me Wek. tos
[111]AULG S49404 PRCe
[113]MESSAGE 1S SE?
[115]CO FRANKS URT
[117]SGEST (NE B2iSd,
[119]G TEAM, ost
[121]f/AEUTIN wOPORs
[123]HACL t eo def
[125]ANSMUTTED FOR YOUN LMTORMATION:
[127]ERG #/ARUTMY Rr AOn sé
[131][REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[132]on 2Se99¢Y¢
[134]BBY CDR USAINSOOM FOL/PO
[135]AUTH Para1-603 DOD 5200.18
[137]SIELE Ci ENTESEST
[139]LY HAY6O0D, Hy O&TH USA ARTILLERY -
[141]FEDER AL REPL it Gs GERMANY CrEG) »
[143]Q THE DUESSELDORE F4EL0 GrFICE To REPORT AN INCLORET Of
[145]EPPTING TO ELLICIT OFFIGLA LRSORMATI GE
[147]KOUSA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, DA ELS
[151]NW 60613 Docid:34530590 Page 2
[153]Fee ee
[154]ty LY KULESRA, COMMABTENG CEFICER, € THAMp COTM USA ARTILLERY
[156]| DETACHMENT, STATED That HE WAS LSPORMED BY A Nitec GF HES UNIT
[158]THAT AN ATTEMPT TGQ OMTALN GPFLCLAL INFORMATION 84D TAKEN SLACE
[159]IN DA ELN ON 31 JAN Tas RULESZA WAS ABLE TO OETERMLME THAT
[160]TUREY OTHER MEMBERS OF NIG URLT BAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SAME
[161]PERSON IN THE AREA IM AN ATTEMPT TO OBTALN LMFORMATION.«
[163]3. THE FOLLOWING LISTED LMDLVIDUALS OF GC TEAM, oTH USA ARTLLLEGY
[165]REGRADED UNCIASSIFIED *
[166]‘ON aY |
[167]SBY CDR USAECOM FOUPOS |
[168]AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.18
[170]PAGE 2 WUPTR ibs 4 .
[171]DETACHMENT WERA APPROACHED BY THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL 5
[172]As PETER Ds NERPS, PFC, 475°34 “4972
[173]He PHILLIP Bs MAYs PRC, $44-48-$481, CUSTODIAL AGENT.
[174]Ce STEPHEN B. WILSON, SPA, L6T*45"235329— CLERK»
[175]Be ROBERT Ma CHERDy SPS, 31495427459, GUARD.
[176]‘Sa ALL LISTED MEMBERS OF © TEAM HAVE BEEN LNTERVIEWED BY SA‘S
[177]GF DURSSELDORY FIELD OFFICE.
[178]S. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLICITING THE INFORMATION 1S
[179]AS FOLLOWRE
[180]Ae NAMES "JOHN THE DER GAT" AKA? JOHN DEE JAY ASA: HOKN
[181]®o OCCUPATIONS DISC BOs AY AT THE LORD NELSON BAR on #iN
[182]Ce MEXSUYT SEN FEET on
[183]De WEIGHTS 190 PUNDE SC / Ce
[184]¢ BUELOS SLIGHT .
[185]« MAUR 2 BLACK WITH LONG Si BEBURNE
[186]G» DISTINGULSHING CHARACTERISTICS? NONE
[187]as ATTEMPTS ARE CURRENTLY BELNG MADE THROUGH GERMAN CUAMNELE To
[188]SOTAIN POSLTIVE LDENTEFICATION OF JOHN DER JAYs
[189]7. JOMM DEE JAY SPEACKS RUSSIAN GENMAN SPANIEM AND ENGLISH» ME HAS
[190]EXPRESSED PROTEST SENTIMENTS AND HAS SAID HE HAD BEEN TO
[191]oa 8
[193]; NW 88613 Docld:34530590 Page 3
[195]<7 7m “™
[196]C) a
[197]PAGE 3 UWUETEASS+ : = _ 7
[198]FOSG0S, USSR, BHERE KE LEARNED 7 SPEAK ENGLISH. HE tLALNES *
[200]HAVE A GGUSLN Ub NEPHEN 8HO 18 A MAJOR IN THE GERNAN DEMOCRATIC
[202]REPUBLIC (GBH) ARMY. HE ALLYGEDLY TRAVELS TLYTO THE Gine
[204]AND HAS EAPRESSED & DESIRE TO RETURN TREXE PO LOVE BECAUSE
[206]HE HAPTER ThE FEDERAL FRPUSLIC OF GERHANYs HE 2S ZATBEMELY ticoe
[208]CESTINATION Ge A RECERT GORVOY WMOSE MESSION Wis TO CACHANGE
[209]WARHEADS AT GSASLOM UNITS. HORN BEE JAY ASKED GOQBERT ts. CRELDs
[210]TBENTEP IED LN PARA 4 JO BRING HIM SOME SAS AND ARSY BOOKS. ALL
[211]Hie J0RD, YANPED IE SOME WAR STORIE Ss Ma OTHERS ABOUT NORAD Of
[213]SANRAS 1 SF RCLAL AUMURLITIONS REGUGNITELON AND AUTHENTICATION
[215]3+ JOHN DER JAY MENTIONED AN ASSOCLATION (NOT FURTHER IDENTLOEED)
[216]WITH SSG (USAR) FRU ALEXANDER, SECTION NCGLC, HOMSTEN URCA), fats
[220]WhG WORKS AS A BEGUNITY SERGEANT AT THE USAF ESR SITE THERE «
[221]ye TRE Se@, SASGON HEADQUARTERS, FRANKFURT GEL Anu Tt
[223]WERE UBLTEVEG GN © FRE 72.
[225]LNVESTIGATIVE ACTION SLEL CONTINUE AT THIS COMPANY AND
[227]we
[228]aS
[229]»REGRARED UNCI ASSIFIED
[230]"ON 2Sepoy
[231]“BY CBS USS, G NE ore Mi FO1/PO
[232]AUTH Para4-603D0D 5200.1R
[234]| SRAM ‘* 9
[238]VEAA INTERVALS:
[240]DAT
[241]| DOWNGRADE tye
[242]| Mor AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED |
[245]. pon BIR Sav
[246]Ve RR
[248]ra
[250]pai wine
[252]q
[254]NW 88613 Docid:34530590 Page 4 | [3]
[5]
[7]
[10]
[13]
[15]
[19]
[21]
[24]
[26]
[27]AC640653W-PAGES 7-9
[28]
[32]
[34]
[38]
[43]
[47]
[49]
[51]
[59]
[62]
[64]
[66]
[67]: 03/07/95
[68]
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[72]
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[86]
[88]
[92]
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[109]eas
[110]
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[129]ERG //AGUTIC eC /
[130]
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[244]0.10
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[256] |
194-10006-10300.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Caset:Niw
[2]= (14-19-20
[4]AGENCY
[6]RECORD NUMBER
[7]RECORDS SERIES
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[10]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[12]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[13]AGENCY INFORMATION
[15]CSF /INSCOM
[16]194-10006-10300
[18]Date : 12/10/97
[19]Page : 1
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA
[50]CO, 66TH MI GP
[51]DCSI, USAREUR
[52]MESSAGE
[54]03/20/72
[56]3
[58]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[60]CI INTEREST
[62]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[63]UNCLASSIFIED
[65]3
[67]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[68]03/07/95
[70]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94.
[72]7-9.
[74]DUPLICATE OF PAGES
[76]NW 88613 Doctd:34530593 Page 1
[78]NDA @il ad
[79]PTICZYUW UUFTD@298 0841431-CCCC--UUFTB. a
[81]ZNY CSIC «ONLY
[83]FP 2614002 MAR Te
[85]FM CO 66TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUTMI-OP~CE//
[86]TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG FRG//AEAGB-C1 (s00//
[88]BT.
[90]THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATIONS
[91]O 911002 FEB 72
[93]FM CO 165TH MI CO FRANKFURT FRG //AEUTMI-F-CI//
[95]TO CO G6TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUT ME -CE//
[97]BT vs
[98]REGRADED UNCI aAgSie
[100], sBY CDA USainscoy ¢
[101]— Tce va _ (AUTH Pare 1-603 DOD S200 om
[103]SUBJECT: INCIDENT OF POSSIBLE Cl INTEREST
[105]ie AT 110 HOURS, 1 FEB 72, LT HAYGOOD, HQ, 66TH USA ARTILLERY
[106]DETACHMENT, SOEST (MC 3815), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG);
[107]CONTACTED THE DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE TO REPORT AN INCIDENT OF
[108]AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON ATTEMPTING TO ELLICIT OFFICLA INFORMATION
[109]FROM A MEMBER OF C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, DATELN
[110](CLO 8424), FRG.
[112]2e LT KULESZA; COMMANDING OFFICERs C TEAM, o©STH USA ARTILLERY
[113]DETACHMENT, STATED THAT HE WAS INFORMED BY A MEMBER OF HIS UNIT
[114]THAT AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAD TAKEN PLACE
[115]IN DAJELN ON 31 JAN 72¢ KULESZA WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT
[116]THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SAME
[117]PERSON IN THE AREA IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN LNFORMATION.
[119]3+ THE FOLOWING LISTED TNDIVIDUALS OF C TEAM,G6TH USA ARTILLERY
[121]NW 88613 Docid:34530593 Page #4
[123]PAGE 2 UUFTF i334 qu.
[124]DETACHMENT WERE APPROACHED BY THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL
[126]Ae
[128]LBS PHILLIP Ws MAY, PFC, 544-468-5481, CUSTODIAL AGENT.
[129]L€. STEPHEN R. WILSON, SP4, 167-40-2332,, CLERK.
[130]< ROBERT Me CREED, SPA, 514-54-474,5, GUARD.
[132]be
[133]OF
[134]5.
[135]AS
[136]Ae
[137]Be
[138]Ce
[139]De
[140]Ee
[141]Fe
[142]Ge
[143]6
[145]BOTAIN POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF JOHN DEE JAY.
[147]PETER De HERPSs, PFCy 475-54 -6972
[149]ALL LISTED MEMBERS OF C TEAM HAVE BEEN LNTERVIEWED BY SA'S
[151]DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE.
[153]A DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLICITING THE INFORMATION IS
[155]FOLLOWDS
[157]NAME3 "JOHN THE DEE JAY" AKA’ JOHN DEE JAY AKA: HOHN
[159]OCCUPATIONS DISC JOCKEY AT THE LORD NELSON | BAR, DATEIN
[161]HEIGHT: SLX FEET
[163]WEIGHT! 19@ PUNDS
[165]BUILD? SLIGHT
[167]HAIR? BLACK WITH LONG SIDEBURNS
[168]DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS! NONE
[170]ATTEMPTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE THROUGH GERMAN CHANNELS TO
[172]7. JOHN DEE JAY SPEACKS RUSSIAN GERMAN SPANISH AND ENGLISH. HE HAS
[174]EXPRESSED PROTEST SENTIMENTS AND HAS SAID HE HAD BEEN TO
[176]NW 88613 Docid:34530593 Page 3
[178]ON
[179]BY CDR USAINECOM FOUPO
[180]AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.18 -
[182]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[183]2 Sepe4¢
[185]PAGE 3 UUFTE1334 qe.
[187]MOSCOW, USSR, WHERE HE LEARNED TO SPEAK ENGLISH. HE CLAIMED TO
[188]HAVE A COUSIN OR NEPHEW WHO 1S A MAJOR IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
[189]REPUBLIC (GDR) ARMY.e HE ALLEGEDLY TRAVELS REQUENTL O THE GBR
[190]AND HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN THERE TO LIVE BECAUSE
[192]HE HATED THE FEDFRAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HE IS EXTREMELY KNOW-
[193]LEDGABLE ABOUT THINGS PERTALNING TO THE MILITARY. HE KNEW THE
[194]EXACT DEPARTURE TIME, LOCATION, INTERMEDIATE STOPS, AND FINAL
[195]DESTINATION OF A RECENT CONVOY WHOSE MISSION WAS TO EXCHANGE
[196]WARHEADS AT SASCOM UNITS» JOHN DEE JAY ASKED ROBERT Me CREED,
[197]IDENTIFIED IN PARA 4 TO BRING HIM SOME WAR AND ARMY BOOKS. ALL
[198]HE, JOHN, WANTED WERE SOME WAR STORIES, NOTHING ABOUT NORAD OR
[199]SANRAS (SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS RECOONEPEON AND AUTHENTICATION
[200]SYSTEM) «
[202]&. JOHN DEE JAY MENTIONED AN ASSOCIATION (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED)
[203]WITH SSG (USAF) FNU ALEXANDER, SECTION NCOLC, HOPSTEN (NCA), FRG,
[204]WHO WORKS AS A SECURITY SERGEANT AT THE USAF ESR SITE THERE.
[206]9. THE S-2, SASCOM HEADQUARTERS, FRANKFURT GER AND THE OSI
[208]WERE BRIEFED ON 8 FEB 726
[210]ide INVESTIGATIVE ACTION WILL CONTINUE AT THIS COMPANY AND
[211]RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT» GP-S
[213]BT
[215]ON -Z. spay SSIFIED
[216]= BY CDR USainecoy & ovPO
[217]DOWNGRADED, AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; ‘AUTH Para 1-603 Dop Ouro.
[218]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED 5200.
[219]“POD DIR 6200.10
[220]NNNN
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194-10006-10311.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 88613 Docid:345306005 Page 1
[30]Date 12/10/97
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]CSF/INSCOM
[40]194-10006-10311
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATIO.
[47]USA
[48][ RESTRICTED ]
[50]AGENT REPORT
[51]02/05/72
[53]3
[54]KAMINSKI,
[56]HANS D
[57][ RESTRICTED ]
[58]JOHN THE DEE JAY
[59]LORD NELSON, WESTERN, KESSIN (BARS IN DATTELN)
[60]MILITARY SUBJECTS
[62]XR-71
[64]STADTSCHAENKE BAR
[66]C-RATIONS
[68]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[69]UNCLASSIFIED
[71]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[73]03/07/95
[75]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94.
[76]INCLUDED.
[78]EXHIBITS NOT
[80]AGENT REPORT
[82]For use of this form, see FM 30- 17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[84]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[85]February 1972
[87]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[89]On 1 February 1972, Robert M. Creed, SP4, 51-54-4745, Security
[90]Guard, Ys Team, 66th USK Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal
[91]Republic of Germany (FRG), was interviewed at his place of duty regarding
[92]an incident of possible Counter-intelligence interest, and stated substantially
[93]as follows:
[95]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[97]UW ;
[98]aN ource was approached by a man who identified himself as John the
[100]Dee Jay on 31 January 1972, in the Lord Nelson, a bar in Datteln. John
[102]ithe Dee Jay was the Disc Jockey at the Lord Nelson. John sat down with
[104]Source and began a normal conversation. The conversation soon turned to
[106]military subjects. John asked about CPT FNU Myers and CPT FNU Jackson,
[108]who supposedly had been assigned to the unit at one time. John mentioned
[110]that he had taken pictures of Myers and his family. John asked Source about
[112]radar and other military subjects, John constantly mentioned Security
[114]Sergeants, phone numbers and personnel that were formerly at the unit.
[116]John stated that he knew the last Security Sergeant of © Team, and was
[118]interested in knowing who was now the Security Sergeant. At 2330 hours,
[120]Source left the Lord Nelson and proceeded to the Western Bar, Datteln.
[122]At the Western, Source met a man, name unknown, who owned the photography
[124]shop across the street from the Western, whom Source described as a "drinking
[126]buddy". Source and the unidentified man (UIM) left the Western about 0100
[128]hours and proceeded to the Lord Nelson. At the Lord Nelson, Source and UI
[130]were joined at their table by John the Dee Jay. Upon learning that Ui
[132]was a Photographer, John asked him if he had ever taken pictures of a military
[134]installation. The UID did not answer the question, but stated that he had
[136]j taken pictures of a man named Julius (PHONETIC-NFI), Julius supposedly had
[138]been an American stationed in Datteln with the US Army. The UIM became
[140]nervous because of John's questioning, excused himself, and left the bar.
[142]Source did not see UM anymore that evening. ‘Source and John remained
[144]at the Lord Nelson. The conversation between Source and John returned to
[146]military subjects. John spoke about military subjects with authority ana
[148]apparent proficiency. John said many things about military subjects that
[150]Source had no knowledge of. Source was unable to recall any of the specifics
[152]of the conversation. Source felt dwarfed by John's military knowledge
[154]and at one time asked John if he knew about the XR-71. John became very
[156]interested and asked Source what was the XR-71. Source replied that he was
[158]not allowed to talk about it, and the subject was dropped. John mentioned
[160]twice during the evening, that he had been kicked off Haard Kaserne, where
[162]C Team was located in Datteln, for being caught wearing a complete set of US
[164]fatigues in downtown Datteln. The first time John mentioned the in¢ident
[166]he said it occurred two_years_a ate he said it
[168]TIED
[169]“1 POUPO
[171]AUTH Pe:a 1-603 Bb 5200.18
[175]dy
[177]On 2?
[178]BY CLA L
[180]REGIE
[182]3G
[184]Page 1 of 3 Pagew
[186]BO segyfe TES Ro
[187]S. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT = : é. SiGuarone OF SPECIAL AGENT
[188]HBINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group Hho’ wa Fe by SF
[190]DA rom 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORME
[191]1 APR 52 PLACES ne
[193]NW 88613 Docid:34530005 Page 2
[196]AGENT REPORT
[198]Far use of thie form, coe PM 30°17(C): AR 361°130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chiof of Seas far Intolligones.
[200]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[201]5 February 1972
[203]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[205][4 REPORT OF FINDINGS
[207]4
[209]| happened in 1956. Source did not mention the diserepancy to John. John
[210]fstabed that ne had also veen kicked off two or three kasernes in the Southy
[212]on @ site in Southern FRG. Source was unable to recall the exact identi-
[213]fication of the agency John claimed to have been interrogated by, but
[214]ymentioned that it was something like MA, MD, MI, MAD, MAI, John said he
[215]had been released after the interrogation and followed, but that he had
[216]managed to lose the people who were following him. John mentioned that
[218]he had paced off Haard Kaserne and knew exactly where and how to get on to
[219]the Kaserne without being detected. Source and John left the Lord Nelson
[220]yat 0300 hours and went to another bar in Datteln. Source thought the name of
[221]the bar was the Kessin (PHONETIC), out was not sure. Upon arriving at the
[222]Kessin, John said that he had to pick up his pay check from the owner of the
[223]bar and left Source. John and the owner of the bar went into a private office
[224]ffor about five minutes before John returned. .The owner of the Kessin also
[225]owned the Lord Nelson and Western. Source and John left the Kessin at 430
[226]yhours and proceeded by taxi to John's apartment, which was located above the
[227]Western. John stated that if Source did not believe everything that he had
[228]said, that Source could contact an Air Force Security Sergeant and confirm
[229]everything. John gave Source a slip of paper (EXHIBIT ___), on which was the
[230]neme of the Security Sergeant, his job title, station, and telephone numbers.
[231]JJohn stated that if Source mentioned or showed the paper to anyone that it
[232]would get the Security Sergeant into trouble. John also hinted that bodily
[233]lharm might resuit to Source if the paper got into the wrong hands. John
[235]gave Source an old US Air Force parka to wear back to the kaserne because it
[236]Jwas cold and Source's own jacket was Light weight. In the pockets of the
[237]parka were four beer coasters, (EXHIBITS > 5 > and ), anda
[238]used streetcar ticket (EXHIBIT }. dohn arranged another meeting with
[239]}Source for 1700 hours, 5 February 1972, at the Stadtschaenke Bar,. Datteln.
[240]John gave a slip of paper (2XHIBIT ‘) to Source with the information for the
[241]next meeting. John asked Source to obtain any information on Julius mentioned
[242]iby UIM, that he could. John mentioned that he had known Cristobal Pimentel-
[243]{Davilla and asked Source to obtain some C-Rations for him. Source then left
[244]{John and returned to his unit. Source did not believe that he had supplied
[245]any official information to John, but felt that it wes possible that he might
[246]‘Thave as he was quite drunk before the evening ended. Source described
[247]John as follows: Six to six feet one inch tall, weighing 180-190 pounds,
[248]jslight build, black hair with long sideburns, and wore a red shirt with a
[249]Inavy blue coat and tie, black shoes, long black overcoat and black fur hat.
[253]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[255]HEINZ B. ICKERT, 66th MI Group _
[257]rom FG "
[258]DA 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 3.
[260]NW 60613 Docid:34530605 Page 3
[262]and that his name was on record. John mentioned being caught and interrogated
[264]Page 2 of 3 Pages
[267]£200.1R
[269]‘ay 4
[272]AUTH Para 1-urs Do
[274]it aamiten YR —— -_
[276]; AGENT REPORT “
[278]Far use af thie farm, coo FM 30-17(C): AR 381+130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Ascicoant Chiof af Stall far Intalliganes.
[279]. NAME OF SUBJECT OF TITLE OF INCIDENT , 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[281]5 February 1972
[283]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER
[285]3 REMARKS: Source explained that the. XR-71 that he had mentioned
[286]to John did not, to the best of his knowledge, exist.
[287]Oo
[289]H 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[291]AGENT'S NOTES: The UIM mentioned was the owner of the Althoff
[292]Photo Shop, Hohe Strasse, Datteln.
[294]Page 3 of 3 Pages
[296]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 4 7 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT : '
[297]| HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group Soo E’ RAY
[298]a a os "
[300]FORM.
[301]1 APR 52 REPLACES WO
[303]NW 60613 Docid:34530005 Page 4 | [2]
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194-10006-10312.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 88613 Docid:345306000 Page 1
[30]Date 12/10/97
[31]Page : 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]CSF/INSCOM
[40]194-10006-10312
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]AC640653W-PAGE 48
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[47]USA
[48][ RESTRICTED ]
[50]AGENT REPORT
[51]02/04/72
[52]1
[54]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[56]POSSIBLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST AT C TEAM
[57]STELPFLUG, JOHN Cc
[59]ARMY DISCHARGE
[61]LUKASIK, JOHN P
[63]USA AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL, FORT BLISS, TEXAS
[65]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]UNCLASSIFIED
[69]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/07/95
[73]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[75]AGENT REPORT
[77]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[79]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[81]ebruary 9
[83]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[85]On 1 February 1972, an attempt to interview the following persons
[86]regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest at C Team,
[88]66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (1068424), Federal Republic of Germany,
[89]APO New York 09078, met with negative results.
[91]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[93]John GC. Stelpflug, SP5, 392-48-2033, formerly of C Team, 66th USA
[94]Artillery Detachment, had departed the unit on 7 January 1972. Stelpflug
[95]had returned to the United States to be discharged from the US Army.
[97]Stelpflug left a forwarding address of W164 N9423 Water Street, Menominee
[98]Falls, Wisconsin.
[100]John P, Lukasik, SP5, 161-38-4615, formerly of G Team, 66th USA
[101]Artillery Detachment, had departed the unit on 23 January 1972 for assign~
[102]ment at the USA Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas,
[104]RECHAL
[106]AUTH P Pea “anerg MgiouP 1a
[108]5. TPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[109]HEINZ EB. ICKERT, 66th MI Group
[111]FORM , ae ¢
[112]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FORM ;
[114]NW 88613 Docid:34530006 Page 2 | [2]
[6]
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194-10006-10313.pdf | [1]Date : 12/10/97
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[11]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10313
[13]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 49
[16]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[18]ORIGINATOR : USA
[19]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[20]TO :
[21]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[22]DATE : 02/04/72
[23]PAGES : 1
[24]SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D
[26][ RESTRICTED ]
[27]JOHN THE DEE JAY
[28]GENERAL NUISANCE
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[38]NW 88613 Docid:34530007 Page 1
[40]REPORT
[42]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[43]February 1972
[44]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[46]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[48]@ On 1 February 1972, Phillip Wo May, PFC, 44-48-5481, Custodial
[49]Agent, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal
[50]Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place
[51]of duty concerning an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest,
[52]and stated substantially as follows:
[54](%) About two or three weeks ago, Source was approached by a man that
[55]identified himself as John the Dee Jay in the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln.
[56]John said that he was the Disc Jockey at the Lord Nelson, another bar in
[57]Datteln. With Source at the Stadtschaenke were John Stelpflug, John Lukasik,
[58]and Terry Drivis (PHONETIC), John the Dee Jay made a general nuisance of
[59]himself. He talked about security at the site and gave verbally a list of
[60]telephone numbers he claimed were security information telephone numbers in
[61]Heidleberg (MV7773), FRG, and other cities in FRG. Source was unable to
[62]recall any of the telephone numbers John the Dee Jay mentioned. John asked
[63]Source who the Security Sergeant of the unit was, He also asked about persons
[64]who had been formerly assigned to the unit, Source was not familiar with
[66]any of the names mentioned as Source has been at the unit only a short time.
[67]John talked about how, if he was a spy, he would get information fram people.
[68]Source felt that John the Dee Jay was trying to make him and the others
[69]nervous, John spoke fluent English and German and claimed that he could
[70]speak Russian. Source described John as follows:
[72]Height: Six feet to six feet one inch
[73]Weight: 200-210 pounds
[75]Age: 27-28 years old
[77]Build: Solid
[79]Dress: Wore furry coat and shoes, possibly camel hair
[81]Source had not met John the Dee Jay before and had not seen or had contact
[82]with him since and gave negative responses to all questions posed by hin.
[84]REGaE TO TIED ©
[85]On € = . ay 1 FOUPO
[87]AUTH Para Voi BUD 5200.17
[89]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[91]HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MZ Group 49 SL, 2 Behr 2
[92]. DA ven 52 341 REPLACES WD AG: Srhie SRA
[94]NW 88613 Docid:34530007 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10006-10314.pdf | [1]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[2]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[4]Date
[5]Page
[7]12/10/97
[8]1
[10]AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]CSF/INSCOM
[19]194-10006-10314
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]AC640653W-PAGE 50
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA
[49][ RESTRICTED ]
[51]AGENT REPORT
[52]02/05/72
[54]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[55]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[56]PERSONNEL RECORDS
[57]MYERS, CLYDE E
[58]DRUG USAGE
[60]DORKA, EVA-MARIA
[61]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[62]UNCLASSIFIED
[64]3
[66]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[67]03/07/95
[69]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[71]NW 88613 Docid:345306008 Page 1
[73]AGENT REPORT
[74]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[75]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT . 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[77]5 February 1972
[79]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[81]4, REPORT OF cre
[83]) On 1 February 1972, the personnel records of C Team, 66th. USA
[84]Artillery Detachment, Datteln, (108424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),
[85]APO New York 09078, were checked with the aid of FNU Kulesza, 1LT, 286-
[86]48-0611, Team Commander, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, regarding
[87]the aan persons and revealed the following information:
[89]) Clyde BE. Myers, PFC, 266-96-0932, arrived C Team 11 December 1968,
[90]departed unit on 8 November 1971 for assignment with 51st Infantry, Cralsheim
[91](NV7843), FRG. Disqualified from nuclear weapons as part of 611-5 program
[92]because of use of drugs. Myers was engaged to Eva~Marie Dorka, Gelsinkirchen
[93](166909), FRG, Bronner Strasse 22, Reference Agent Report dated 5 February
[94]1972, Subject as above, interview of Robert Creed,
[96]Kulesza was unable to discover anyone by the name of Jackson or
[97]Julius,/’first or last name, that had ever been stationed at C Team. Reference
[98]Agent Report dated 5 February 1972, Subject as above, interview of Robert
[99]Greed.
[101]REGS eo ne IIED
[102]ON _
[103]BY CL7: ay
[106]AUTH Pa:a tui Bho 520078
[108]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[110]HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group Sw, & LheoY
[112]FORM p>
[113]t APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO
[115]NW 88613 Docid:34530008 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10006-10315.pdf | [1]Date : 12/10/97
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10315
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 51
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 02/04/72
[21]PAGES : 1
[22]SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D
[24]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[25][ RESTRICTED ]
[26]COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
[27]EXCHANGE OF WARHEADS AT C TEAM
[28]REMARKS
[29]AGENT'S NOTES
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[33]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[35]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[36]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[37]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[39]OPENING CRITERIA :
[40]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[42]NW 88613 Docid:345306009 Page 1
[44]AGENT REPORT
[45]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[46]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. OATE SUBMITTED
[48]Februa 1972
[49]4. REPORT Of FINDINGS
[51]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[53]) Onl February 1972, Peter D. Herpst, PFC, 475-54-6972, Clerk,
[54]G Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (108424), Federal Republic of
[55]Germany, APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty concerning
[56]an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially
[57]as follows:
[59]U ;
[61]Wy About two or three weeks ago, just before a scheduled exchange of
[62]warheads at G Team, Source was approached in a Datteln bar, the Stadtschaenke,
[63]by a man who identified himself as John Dee Jay. John was the Disc Jockey at
[64]another bar in Datteln, the Lord Nelson. Source thought that Dee Jay was
[65]only a nickname and not John's real name. John asked Source and other Americans
[66]in the bar if they knew where some of the former members of the unit are pre~
[67]sently stationed. Source could recall only one name John had asked about,
[68]Cristobal Pimentel-Davilla. John told Source "If you see Pimentel, tell him
[69]I have the package for him." Source knew that John had called the unit that
[70]night asking for Pimentel-Davilla. John at one time asked Source to tell him
[71]who the Security Sergeant of the unit was, but Source refused to answer the
[72]question. Source descriped John as follows: Height: Six feet to six feet
[73]one inch tall; Weight: 200-210 pounds; Age: 22-24 years old; Build: Stocky;
[74]Hair: Dark; Dress: Wore furry coat and shoes, possibly camel hair. Source
[75]had not met John before and has not seen him since and gave negative responses
[76]to all ay posed by him.
[78]WU
[80]) REMARKS: Source felt that the package John mentioned that he
[81]had for Pimentel-Davilla was probably drugs, either hashish or marijuana.
[82]Source knew that Pimentel-Davilla used both drugs and may have been selling
[83]them Sy members of the unit.
[85]AGENT'S NOTES: Full identification of Pimentel-Davilla was as
[86]follows: Pimentel-Davilla, Cristobal, SP6, 582-58~-9662, departed C Team on
[87]20 January 1972 on a permanent change of station to Fort Eustis, Virginia.
[89]REGRET OO NSIED
[91]on 2? Sepaqy
[93]BYCLA LL. 0? “a + FOUPO
[94]“AUTH Paia 1-005 BUD 5200.1A
[96]5. TYPED NAME ANO ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT r 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[97]aE Hs on fo
[98]HEINZ E. IGKERT, 66th MI Group - EC Ghut
[100]FORM nha
[101]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FOR
[103]EN
[105]NW 88613 Docid:34530008 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10006-10316.pdf | [1]Date : 12/10/97
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]| RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10316
[11]| RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 52
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 02/04/72
[21]PAGES : 1
[22]SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D
[24]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[25][ RESTRICTED ]
[26]COUNTER- INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
[27]THE DORTMUND POLICE
[28]REMARKS
[29]AGENT'S NOTES
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[36]OPENING CRITERIA :
[37]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[39]NW 88613 Docid:345306010 Page 1
[41]7
[43]AGENT REPORT
[45]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[47]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. OATE SUBMITTED
[48]4, February 1972
[50]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[52]) On 1 February 1972, Stephen R. Wilson, SP4, 167-40-2332, Clerk,
[53]G Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (10842,), Federal Republic of
[54]Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty
[55]concerning an incident of possible Counter—Intelligence interest, and stated
[56]substan aw the following: ;
[58]U
[60]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[62]&bout two or three weeks ago, Source was approached by a man
[63]who identified hinself only as John in the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln.
[64]John refused to mention his last name, but Source knew that he had been
[65]the Disc Jockey at the Western, a bar in Datteln, and waa now the Disc
[66]Jockey at the Lord Nelson, another bar in Datteln. Source had only a
[68]brief conversation with John, but was asked for the name of the Security a
[69]Sergeant at the unit. John then told Source to tell Pimentel that he wes Qa o ue
[70]back in town. Source described John as follows: i= =3
[71]3 in)
[73]Height: Six feet to Six feet one inch tall oa
[74]Weight: 180-190 pounds » AS
[76]Hair: Brown an \ eee
[78]Dress: Wore furry coat and boots 2
[79]Distinguishing marks: None mY) are)
[81]a sO
[83]Source had not met John before although he had seen him at the Lord Nelson, ‘f wet
[84]and has not had contact with John since. Source did not answer questions tu z +5
[85]»O
[87]posed by John that pertained to military affairs,
[89]REMARKS: Source felt the reason John was interested in Pimentel
[90]probably had something to do with drugs. Pimentel was known to smoke hashish
[91]and marijuana, ‘The Dortmund Police, Dortmund (109308), FRG, were interested
[92]in Pimentel as a drug pusher. Dortmund Police had been to the unit two or
[93]three times to talk to Pimentel about drugs and had searched his house and
[94]car. Pimentel had his car impounded shortly before he left the unit in
[95]regards to refusing to pay the one thousand German Marks deductible on an
[96]automobile accident he had. The case was still pending. Pimentel was
[97]married and had four children, all residing with him in Datteln, but had
[98]German girlfriends in the area. Source could provide no further information
[99]about ON
[103]is AGENT'S NOTES: Pimentel referred to by Source above was Cristobal
[104]Pimentel4Davilla, SP6, 582~58-9662, formerly assigned to C Team, Pimentel-
[105]Davilla left the unit on 20 January 1972 for assignment at Fort Bustis,
[106]Virginia. — >
[110]ASR F hte aaron
[112]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[114]HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group
[116]FORM
[117]DA 1 APR 52 34 1 REPLACES WD AGO |
[119]NW 88613 Docid:345306010 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10006-10317.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 88613 Docid:345306011 Page 1
[30]Date
[31]Page : 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]CSF /INSCOM
[40]194-10006-10317
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA
[47][ RESTRICTED ]
[49]AGENT REPORT
[50]02/06/72
[51]3
[53]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[55]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[57]{ RESTRICTED ]
[59][ RESTRICTED ]
[61]POSSIBLE COUNTER~INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
[63]AGENT'S NOTES
[65]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[66]UNCLASSIFIED
[68]3
[70]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/07/95
[73]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[75]12/10/97
[77]AGENT REPORT
[79]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[80]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[82]6 February 1972 ‘
[84]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[86]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[88]\W)
[90]On 4 February 1972, Raymond R. Leal, 1LT, 459~78-6563, Platoon
[91]Leader, 164th Military Police Company (MPG), Milsau (NCA), Federal Republic
[92]of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09059, and Ronald A. Margulies, SP4, 220-48-
[93]5408, Senior MP, 164th MPC, were interviewed separately regarding an incident
[94]of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and both stated substantially
[95]as follows:
[97]) On 3 February 1972, Sources were in the Lord Nelson Bar, Datteln
[98](LC8424,), FRG, with other members of their unit, 1LT Wood and an unidentified
[99]Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), when they were approached by the Dise Jockey
[100]of the bar, who introduced himself only as John, and asked them if there was
[101]a particular song they would like to hear, After playing the record requested,
[102]John walked back over to Sources and sat down with them. John began asking
[103]them military related questions almost as soon as he sat down. John asked
[104]them what unit they were from. He wanted to know where they came from
[105]and where they were going. He asked them why they were in Datteln, John
[106]stated that he knew who the Security Sergeant at C Team, 66th USA Artillery
[107]Detachment, Dattelin, APO New York 09078, was. When John did not receive the
[108]answers to his Questions he stated that he knew what they were doing in
[109]Dattein. John stated that Datteln was a dead town, but that things were
[110]hoping in Westkirchen (C3549), FRG. The site that the convoy had just come
[111]from. John then listed every site the convoy had just come from. John .
[112]identified the sites by unit designation, location, APO number, and telephone
[113]number of the orderly room. John was completely accurate in every detail.
[115][John stated that he knew what they had brought to Datteln and knew how long
[116]they were going to stay. John talked about how easy it was to get information
[117]out of people by using indirect questions. John said that about four years
[118]ago he had a Lieutenant that was supplying him information about the site
[119]at Datteln. John then boasted that he could find out anything he wanted to
[120]by giving ten beers to almost any German soldier at the site. John stated
[121]that he did not have any bugs so Sources and their friends did not have to
[122]worry about what they said. John was very interested in the jeeps in the
[123]parking lot near the Lord Nelson, John said that the jeeps had poor radios
[124]and that he had a transmitter/receiver about one foot long, three to four
[125]inches wide, and about six inches high, with a three foot antenna that could
[126]reach Brazil. When asked where such a radio could be purchased, John said
[128]|}that it was a special model and could not be bought anywhere. John mentioned
[129]how easy it would be to puta fake bomb into the jeeps and asked Sources if
[130]they checked the jeeps before starting them or just got in and started them.
[132]D 5200.1R
[134]. mo
[138]HP
[140]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[142]HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group
[144]FORM -
[145]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGOiG
[147]NW 88613 Docid:34530611 Page 2
[149]AGENT REPORT."
[151]For use af thic form, see EM 30°17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for {ntalligance.
[153]1, NAME GF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT : 2. GATE SuemITTED
[155]6 February 1972
[157]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[159]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[161]John wanted to know on what frequency the radios operated, John stated that
[162]he hated to be a Dise Jockey, that he had more important things to do.
[164]John also stated that they had some mighty fine missiles in Soest (MC3813),
[165]FRG. John stated that the Russian Army was far superior to anything in
[166]Europe. He talked at length about the Russian Army. Sources felt that
[168]John was serious about what he was saying and not trying just to make them
[169]uneasy. John asxed Margulies if he was a CID agent. Margulies replied that
[170]he wes not. John talked about and named every intelligence agency of the
[171]United States. He mentioned MI, OSS, ONI, CLA, CID and the FBI. John said
[172]that Israel's intelligence network was far superior to that of any countries!
[173]in Europe or that of the United States, John spoke fluent German and English
[174]and spéke Spanish and Russian to Sources to prove that he knew how. John
[175]said he learned to speak English in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
[176](USSR), and said "we have to learn many languages." John kept asking about
[177]Ramstein Air Force Base and stated that he had been to the NCO Club at
[178]Ramstein. John said he hated the FRG and that he wanted to go back to
[180]the German Democratic Republic (GDR). John stated that he goes to the GDR
[181]often and that he’has been’ to Moscow (NCA), USSR. John expounded on how
[182]much better it was to live in the GDR. John claimed to have a cousin or
[183]nephew, Sources could not recall which, who was a Major in the army in the
[184]GDR. John talked about brainwashing at length and how information could
[186]be gotten from people without the threat of physical-violence. John said that
[187]the American Prisoners of War in North Viet Nam would never be the same
[189]even after they were released. John stated that his hobby was just listening
[191]and looking around. Sources said that they had to go because tommorrow of
[192]was a busy day and they had field exercises at 0900 hours. John quipped in | a a9
[193]"Don't you mean that you and the convoy are leaving at 0600 hours?!, and < Oe om
[194]added that tommorrow whould be a busy day from him also. John mentioned that ‘TA.
[195]he had stolen something and had sold it. John described the object in great Rare
[196]i detail, as to size, dimensions, and color, but never said what it was. : “3
[197]Sources could only recall that it was about one and a half feet long with _ v 3
[198]fins on the end. Sources thought from the description that John gave, that : a
[199]he was talking about a mortar projectile or some kind of small rocket, ny ) ‘o
[200]When Sources left the bar at 0430 hours, they waited for John outside the a fo
[201]bar, but he did not come out. They then proceeded through the parking lot oNoe
[202]where their jeeps were parked to their hotel across from the Lord Nelson. xe ae
[203]At 0515 hougs, Margulies looked out of his hotel window and saw John leave tr
[204]the Lord Nelson. John proceeded directly to the. jeeps in the parking lot
[205]Page 2 of 3 Pages
[207]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[211]al Cnamata’ EE, en sles s: ji ~ A ees
[212]FORM wee
[213]DA 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 3ee enue
[215]| NW 88673 Docid:34530011 Page 3
[217]nt a
[219]dali ete 2
[220]AGENT REPORT ss
[221]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the Proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chiaf of Staff for Intelligenee.
[222]1... N&ME OF SUBJECT OR TIE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[224]6 February 1972
[226]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[228]f 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[230]and spent five minutes going over them inside and out. Margulies was positive
[231]John had checked the radios closely and noted what frequency they were set
[233]on. Margulies checked the jeeps in the morning before starting them to
[235]see if anything had been done to them, but could find nothing.
[237]W
[238]scar tS NOTES: Soest mentioned above is the location of the
[239]Headquarters and A Team of the 66th USA Artillery Detachment. Westkirchen
[240]mentioned above is the location of D Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment.
[241]The convoy mentioned above assewbled to prepare to depart Datteln at 0600
[242]hours, 4 February 1972. ‘
[244]FREER 0 TITIED
[246]One: Senay . “SUPO
[248]AUTH Pasa eo 5200.18
[250]Page__3 of 3 Pages
[252]f 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[254][HEINZ B. ICKERT, 66th MI Group | = I haves a a
[255]DA rire 341 REPLACES WD AGO FOR
[257]NW 60613 Docid:34530011 Page 4 | [2]
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194-10006-10318.pdf | [1]Date : 12/10/97
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10318
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 56-57
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 02/06/72
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : KAMINSKTI, HANS D
[24]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[25]{ RESTRICTED ]
[26]POSSIBLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
[33]OPENING CRITERIA :
[34]COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94
[36]NW 88613 Docid:34530012 Page 1
[38]AGENT REPORT
[40]onent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[42]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[43]6 February 1972
[44]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[46]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[47](\
[49]On 4 February 1972, Robert M. Creed, Spi, 514-514-4745, Security
[50]Guard, GC Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC842i,), Federal
[51]Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place
[52]fof duty regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest,
[53]and stares substantially as follows:
[55]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-330; the prop
[56]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[58]4) At 1200 hours on 3 February 1972, Creed received a telephone call
[59]at the unit from John the Dee Jay. John began the conversation by asking
[60]Source his last name, saying that he had a difficult time getting a hold of ©
[61]Source knowing omdy his first name Bob. Source told John his last name and
[62]then was asked to spelliit. Source spelled his last name while John repeated
[63]it slowly as if he were writing it down. John asked Source if he could meet
[64]him at the Lord Nelson Bar, Datteln, that evening. ‘Source replied that he
[65]could and asked John if he wanted him to return the Air Force parka he had
[66]borrowed from him the previous evening. John said that it was not necessary
[67]to return the jacket and that Source could hold on to it for a while if he
[68]wished. John said "You didn't have a chance to get to the man at the photo
[69]shop yet, have you?" Source said that he had not. John said thet it did not
[70]matter, it could be done later, John asked Source if he could meet him at
[71]the Lord Nelson at 2000 hours, to which Source replied that he could. The
[72]conversation ended.
[74]Source met John the Dee Jay at 2000 hours, 3 February 1972,
[76]in the Lord Nelson, Datteln, John was very interested in the Military
[77]Police that were in Datteln, wanting to know why they were in town. John
[78]stated that he knew they had come from Westkirchen (MC3549), FRG, and wanted
[79]{to know where they were going next, John was extremely interested in the
[80]Military Policemen, John was interested in the jeeps that the Military Police
[81]had with them, two of which were parked in the parking lot near the lord
[82]Nelson, John wanted to know what the numbers written in chalk on the jeeps
[83]|meant. Were they call numbers or code numbers as to the point of origin of
[85]the jeeps. John mentioned that the radios in the jeeps were nothing, that Q
[86]he knew where he could get a radio that could reach Brazil. John mentioned is
[87]Julius and said something about Julius having some military photographs. a
[88]John was not clear on this point and Source was unable to determine exactly v
[89]what John had meant. John said that he was going to have his photograph
[90]taken at the Althoff Photo Shop, Datteln, which was acress the street from
[91]the Western Bar, where John resided. John asked Source to bring him some . ;
[92]war and Army books. John said all he wanted were some war stories, nothing 7
[93]about NORAD or SANRAS (Special Ammunitions Recognition and Authentication ty
[94]System). Source was not positive that John had said SANRAS because John aM
[95]had said it quickly, but Source was fairly sure. John offered to pay for Lu Zz
[96]all Source's drinks if Source did not have any money. Source returned a
[97]the borrowed Air Force parka to John who was very suspicious about it and
[99]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[100]* RL he . F
[101]HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group 56 SLocove E. Fafoore— .
[102]D A 1 eel 34 ] REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. o
[104]7+ FOUPO
[106]P50 5200.18
[108]ay
[110]AUTH Para 1-82:3
[112]NW 88613 Docid:345306012 Page 2
[114]oo TS
[116]a ie ~ae—a— 0 s— ee 7 7 — nl
[118]_ AGENT REPORT a
[120]For use of thie form, coe FM 30-17(C); AR 381*130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Aeeietant Chick of Staff for Intelligence.
[121]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[122]6 February 1972
[124]3. CONTROL SYMBOL O8 FILE NUMBER
[126]| 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[128]wanted to know where it had been the dast couple of days. Source told John
[130]that it had been in his room at the unit, but John was still quite nervous
[132]about the parka, John stated that he did not tell anyone about what Source
[134]had said to him the night before. John did not talk to Source about what
[136]his was refering to with the statement, John then left Source to talk to |
[137]some members of the Military Police that had just entered the Lord Nelson, |
[138]John talked only to members of the convoy from that time on. Although Source
[140]remained in the Lord Nelson for two more hours, John did not approach him
[142]again. Source was suppose to meet John again at 1700 hours on 5 February
[144]1972, at the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln, but told John that he had duty
[145]saturday and would be unable to meet him, John said he would call the
[146]unit Saturday to talk to Source and find out if he still had duty that
[147]evening and would be unable to meet hin.
[149]we TIED
[150]RE a
[152]BY CLA Be 5200. 48:
[156]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[158]HEINZ ‘sé, ICKERT, 66th MI Group ~ aA 2 heck
[159]DAS 1 joy 52 34 | REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.
[161]NW 60613 Docid:34530012 Page 3 | [3]
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194-10006-10329.pdf | [1]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[3]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[5]Date
[6]Page
[8]12/10/97
[9]1
[11]AGENCY
[13]RECORD NUMBER
[14]RECORDS SERIES
[15]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[17]ORIGINATOR
[18]FROM
[20]TO
[22]TITLE
[24]DATE
[26]PAGES
[27]SUBJECTS
[29]DOCUMENT TYPE
[30]CLASSIFICATION
[31]RESTRICTIONS
[32]CURRENT STATUS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[35]OPENING CRITERIA
[36]COMMENTS
[38]AGENCY INFORMATION
[40]CSF/INSCOM
[42]194-10006-10329
[43]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[44]AC640653W-PAGE 71
[46]USA
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]CO 165TH MI CO FKFT GER
[51]CO 66TH MI GROUP MUNICH GER
[53]MEMO
[55]02/10/72
[57]1
[59]KAMINSKI, HANS D
[61]INCIDENT OF POSSIBLE CI INTEREST
[63]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[64]UNCLASSIFIED
[66]3
[68]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[69]03/07/95
[71]REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
[73]ON 2 SEP 94
[75]NW 88613 Docid:34530625 Page 1
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194-10007-10031.pdf | [1]Date : 02/08/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK: ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10031 . :
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X4013287WE2 - PAGE 42
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO : |
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 03/04/71
[21]PAGES : 1
[22]SUBJECTS : BEER, HENRY
[24]BEER, HENRY S. os
[25]BEER, JOACHIM F.
[26]PEHL, JOACHIM F.
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
[33]OPENING CRITERIA :
[34]“COMMENTS : PAGE 42 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON OCTOBER 17, 1994.
[36]NW 88613 Docid:34529279 Page 1
[38]AGENT REPORT
[40](SR 380-320-10)
[41]1. NAME OF SUBUECT OR TITLE OF INCTOENT Po , + OATE SUBMITTED
[43]BEER, Henry 5S. a . "4 "March 1971
[45]34 CONTROL. SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[47]Ye REPORT OF FINDINGS
[49](LOCAL AGENCY) On 4 March is, ‘the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO),
[50]{US Army Berlin Brigade, West Berlin, APO New York 09742, were checked |
[52]regarding SUBJECT'S step-son, Joachim §. Beer aka Joachim PF. Pehl, DPOB:
[54]4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, and revealed the following derogatory
[56]informations . .
[58]Under ‘Beer, Joachim F., Sot, 412-86-6383, Service Company, US Army
[59]Berlin Brigade, APO New York 09742, the PMO had the following remarks: On
[60]|.19 December 1970 ~ Report of a fire, and on 22 January 1971 - complainant,
[61]} disturbing’ the peace. No additional information given.
[63]GROUP 3
[64]DOWNGRADED oe “2 INTERVALS;
[66]SLASSIFIED,
[68]Bos TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPFCIAL AGENT
[70]ERANDY Le THOMPSON, 66th MI I Group
[72]DA Om 341
[74]NW 88613 Docid:34529279 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10007-10262.pdf | [1]- AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 60613 Docid:34529524 Page 1
[30]Date 03/04/96
[31]Page : 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[40]194-10007-10262
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]X4013287WE2 - PAGES 462-463
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[47]USA
[48][ RESTRICTED ]
[50]AGENT REPORT
[51]03/10/71
[53]2
[55]BEER, HENRY
[57]BEER, HENRY S. _
[59]BEER, JOACHIM F.
[61]BEER, JOACHIM FRIEDRICH EBERHARD
[63]PEHL, JOACHIM FRIEDRICH EBERHARD
[64]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[65]CONFIDENTIAL
[67]3
[69]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/09/95
[73]PAGES 462-463 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER
[74]1994.
[76]AGENT REPORT
[78]CSR_ 380-320-110)
[79]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT + OATE SUBMITTED
[81]BOER, Henry 8.
[82]NY. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[84](201 PIL’ CHECK) On 10 March 1971, Military Persomel Records, Military
[85]Personnel Branch, AG Division, US Army Berlin Bigade, APO New York 09742, concerning
[86]SUBJECT’S step-son, Joachim P. Beer, aka: Pehl, DPOB: 4 December 1942, Berlin-
[87]Schoeneberg, West Berlin (WB), were checked and disclosed the following
[88]infornations
[90]Joachim Friedrich Eberhard Beer
[91]Joachim Priedrich Eberhard Pehl
[92]DPOB: é December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, WB
[94]SSAN s 412-86-6361
[96]Parents: Father — Major Erieh Prits Pehl
[97]Hother ~- Barta Charlotte Beer nee Thiel
[98]div Pehl
[99]ns RADED UNCLASSI leu DPOB: 26 May 1912, Berlin, Germany
[100]; N14 an Residence: Dickensstrasse 11, Hannover 3, FRG
[101]; ete) Step Father: Henry S. BEER
[102]aN COR USAINGC ON ‘ee ee 2 DPOB: 20 January 1920, Vienna, Austria
[103]AUTH PARA 1-653 500 5209.1-" oy oment: US Army Element, Hannover, APO
[104], New York 09174
[105]Joachim F. Pehl adopted by step-father
[106]BEER on 6 May 1965
[108]Married to Rogwitha Beer, nee Ulerth, on
[109]12 Dec 69; present address is Hanaganstr
[110]43, Apartment 3, Berlin 37, WB. Wife's
[111]date of birth is 19 February 1950, Berline
[112]Heukoelln, WB.
[114]Place of duty: Maintenance Division, US Army Berlin -
[115]Brigade (USABB), WB, APO 09742.
[117]Units Service Company, Special Troops Battalion,
[118]USBB, APO 09742.
[120]DD Forn 98: Coupleted without qualification on,
[121]29 November 1963.
[123]GROUP 3
[125]GN AT E OF SPECIAL AGENT
[127]DA. 3 a
[129]NW 60613 Docid:34529524 Page 2
[131]AGENT REPORT
[133](SR _380-320-10)
[134]i. NAME OF SUBVECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT . » DATE SUBMITTED
[136]BEER, Henry S.
[138]O-Rarcnh j
[139]« CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[141]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[143]Security Clearance: Confidential, granted by Commanding
[144]Officer, Special Troops Battalion, USABB,
[145]on 1 Kay 1970, on the basis of a Background
[146]Investigation completed by USAIRTC on
[147]24 Jan 67, dossier number AC635107 of
[148]para 3-6, AR 600-200 (ALIEN BI).
[150]BASD: 15 December 1965
[151]ETS: 28 November 1972
[152]Date signed to USAREUR: 1 May 1969
[153]DEROS: 11 April 1972
[155]Primary MOS: 4554L29-Small Arms Repairman and German
[156]Linguist
[158]Record of Disciplinary
[159]Aotions None
[161]5+ TYPEO NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPFCIAL AGENT
[163]DA. 0.341
[165]NW 60613 Docid:34529524 Page 3 | [2]
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194-10007-10266.pdf | [1]- AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR :
[9]FROM
[11]TO
[13]TITLE
[14]DATE
[15]PAGES
[16]SUBJECTS
[18]DOCUMENT TYPE
[19]CLASSIFICATION
[20]RESTRICTIONS
[21]CURRENT STATUS
[23]DATE OF LAST’ REVIEW
[24]OPENING CRITERIA
[25]COMMENTS
[27]NW 60613 Docld:34529527 Page 1
[29]03/04/96
[30]Page : 1
[32]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[33]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[35]AGENCY INFORMATION
[37]INSCOM/CSF
[39]194-10007-10266
[41]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[42]X4013287WE2 - PAGE 466
[44]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA
[47][ RESTRICTED ]
[49]AGENT REPORT
[51]03/04/71
[53]BEER, HENRY
[55]BEER, HENRY Ss. ™
[56]BEER, JOACHIM F.
[57]PEHL, JOACHIM F.
[59]LOCAL AGENCY CHECK
[61]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[62]CONFIDENTIAL ;
[64]3
[66]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[67]03/09/95
[69]PAGE 466 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER 1994.
[71]AGENT REPORT
[72](SR_380-320-10)
[73]Ll. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[75]| BERR, Henry 5.
[77]2- DATE SUBMITTED
[79]4 PBLCH iat
[80]3. ONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[82]4%. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[84](LOCAL AGENCY) On 4 March 1971, the Provost Marshal's Office (FNO),
[85]US Army Berlin Brigade, West Berlin, APO New York 09742, were checked .
[86]| regarding SUBJECT'S step-son, Joachim S. Beer aka Joachin P. Pehl, DPOB;
[88]4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoenebergy and revealed the following derogatory
[89]j information:
[91]Under Beer, Joachim P., SOT, 412-86-6383, Service Company, US Army
[92]| Berlin Brigade, APO Yew York 09742, the PMO had the following remarkes On
[93]19 December 1970 - Report of a fire, and on 22 January 1971 - complainant,
[95]| disturbing the peace. Wo additional information given.
[97]ON 14. bau.
[98]BY CDA USA
[99]AUTH PABA TS
[101]a
[103]GROUP 3
[104]DOWNGRADED AT 7% YEAR INTERVALS;
[105]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DE. LASSIFIED,
[107]5+ TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPFCIAL AGENT “16. oad OF SPECIAL AGENT yy
[108]. + Z
[110]RANDY. Jue THOMPSON, Obth MT The LE a
[112]NW 60613 Docid:34529527 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10007-10267.pdf | [1]Date 03/04/9
[2]Page : 1
[4]992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Caset:Niw
[5]s-L5-21)
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[9]RECORD NUMBER
[10]RECORDS SERIES
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[13]ORIGINATOR
[14]FROM
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[25]DOCUMENT TYPR
[26]CLASSIFICATION
[27]RESTRICTIONS
[28]CURRENT STATUS
[30]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[31]OPENING CRITERIA
[32]COMMENTS
[34]NW 60613 Docid:34529531 Page 1
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]_ +DENTIFICATION -FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]INSCOM/CSF
[42]194-10007-10267
[44]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[45]X4013287WE2 ~ PAGE 470
[47]USA
[48]BLN STA 66TH MI Gp
[49]66TH MI GP CI DIV
[50]CABLE
[52]03/10/71
[54]1
[56]BEER, HENRY
[57]BEER, HENRY s.
[58]BEER, JOACHIM F.
[59]PEHL, JOACHIM F,
[60]INVESTIGATION
[62]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[63]CONFIDENTIAL
[65]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[66]03/09/95
[68]PAGE 470 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER 1994.
[70]VZCZCNDAD21
[71]RTTCZYUW RUFTTNMO980 0691315-CCCC--RUFTTNE,
[72]zuy ccOcc ICN ONLY,
[73]RIGM245Z MAR 71 2
[74]FM OO BLN STA 66TH MI GP BLN GER
[75]TO CO 66TH MI GP CI DIV MUNICH GER
[77]BT REGRADED UNG
[78]| CONFIDENTIAL ace
[79]AEUTM |-0-@(CE) AUTH PARA t 4
[81]FOR: AEUTM|—OP-CE
[82]“SUBJ: BEER, HENRY S, (U)
[83]A, LEAD SHEET, DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1971, YOUR OFFICE, CON-
[84]CERNING SUBJECT,
[86]1, (C) LAC?S AND MAC’S ON SUBJECT’ S“STEP-SON, JOACHIM S. BEER
[88]AKA JOACHIM F, PEHL, DPOB: 4 DECEMBER i942, BERL IN-SCHOENEBERG,
[89]WERE NEGATIVE OR NON DEROGATORY, w/EXCEPTION OF DISTURBING PEACE
[91]IN JAN 71.
[92]2. (C) CKS REVEAL ONE SGT (E-5) JOACHIM saF, ae BEER, DPOB: 4 DEC
[93]ho, BERLIN, SSAN: 412-86-6361, MOS: 45B40, WAS FORMERLY A LABOR
[95]! SERVICE EMPLOYEE, FROM AUG 63 TO MAY 65, AS AN ELECTRONIC
[96]APPRENTICE, IN JUN 65, BEER WENT TO HANNOVER,7 !RG TO PROCESS
[98]FOR IMMIGRATION TO THE US IN NOV 65, ALLIEN REGISTRATION
[100]NO, 14391499, LAST TwO NUMBERS NOT POSITIVE, PRESE
[102]PAGE 2 RUFTTNMO98G CONF }! DENT IAL
[104]IN THE US ARMY W/SERVICE CO,, US ARMY BERLIN,
[105]AR’S TO FOLLOW, GP-3
[107]BT
[108]VO980
[110]RGCALO Al iD (EAR RE
[111]NOT i M acai DECLASSIFED
[113]DOD DIR 520010 96,
[115]| Nw 8613 podld!hs29531 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10007-10417.pdf | [1]Date : 03/07/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9], AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10417
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 487-488
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 04/22/70
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[24]TRINKALA, VICTOR Lies
[25]MILITARY SERVICE
[26]UNDERAGE
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[30]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
[36]OPENING CRITERIA :
[37]COMMENTS : EXHIBITS INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[39]NW 60613 Docid:34529648 Page 1
[41]7)
[45]R381
[47]DATE SUBMI
[49]NAME OF SUBJECT OF TITLE OF INCIDENT
[51]gD
[53]vt
[55]2.
[57]gk ~~
[59]L SYMBOL OF FILE NUKE
[61]a
[63]CONTE
[65]d.
[67]a0 frag
[68]O92) 1010.6)
[70]States
[74]poser a cacy teint eaten dine A Tb tn RRA SRG ORETARUONAIE ARLAS SH SEPM SR DTS ASN EO MEE EB ANCA: 3 SRM AER
[76]BEST COPY AVAILABLE
[78]MS ONE
[80]RRRI ETE TGs eS ON
[82]CHA
[84]* SPECIAL
[86]SENT
[88]4
[90]AG
[93]q
[94]3
[95]4
[97]34579648 Page 2
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[101]Qo
[103]BB
[106]GENG
[107](AR
[109]i
[111]1970
[113]LOR FILE NUMBER
[115]Toe P38 CONTROL SH
[117]a > at
[118]9321 6005.
[120]i
[121]i
[123]aannetee
[125]Counter
[127]urce received
[129]TIAVIIVAY AdOd 1839
[131]SCH SPAN Ren ENE ITN £1 EP TES RAED NE SS TOSI AT
[133]tm A Se aS Re YA Rd ASOLO CREME RSA EN
[134]je Boon .
[135]‘f . ~-! .
[137]PRATER SENET SERENE HAO RRR RR ST SOE REN
[139]ECIAL AGERT
[140]“3
[143]NW 88613 Docid:34529648 Page 3
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[151] |
194-10007-10418.pdf | [1]OQ)
[3]992 [44 USC 2107 Note]. Cased: Nw Date : 03/07/96
[4]MISES Page : 1
[6]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY INFORMATION
[11]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[13]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10418 .
[15]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[16]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 489-490
[18]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[20]ORIGINATOR : USA
[21]FROM : 115TH MI GROUP
[23]TITLE : EXHIBIT
[24]DATE : 04/22/70
[25]PAGES : 2
[26]SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[28]TRINKALA, VICTOR L-”
[29]RECORD OF INTERVIEW
[30]' UNDERAGE
[32]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[33]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[34]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[35]‘CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[36]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[38]COMMENTS
[40]NW 88613 Docld:34529649 Page 1
[44]A
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[169]NW 88613 Docld:34529649 Page 2
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[200]NW 88613 Docid:34529649 Page 3 | [2]
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194-10007-10422.pdf | [1]Date : 03/07/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[8]. AGENCY
[9]RECORD NUMBER
[10]RECORDS SERIES
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[13]AGENCY INFORMATION
[15]INSCOM/CSF
[16]194-10007-10422
[18]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[20]X1332650W - PAGES 497-500
[22]ORIGINATOR
[23]FROM
[25]TO
[27]TITLE
[29]DATE
[31]PAGES
[32]SUBJECTS
[34]DOCUMENT TYPE
[35]CLASSIFICATION
[36]RESTRICTIONS
[37]CURRENT STATUS
[39]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[40]OPENING CRITERIA
[41]COMMENTS
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[45]USA
[46]{ RESTRICTED ]
[48]AGENT REPORT
[49]04/16/70
[50]4
[52]NAGELL, RICHARD C,
[53]TRINKALA, VICTOR L-
[54]FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
[55]CONSCIENTIOUS. OBJECTOR
[56]DISCHARGE FROM ARMY
[57]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[58]UNCLASSIFIED
[60]3
[62]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[63]03/09/95
[65]NW 88613 Docld:34529653 Page 1
[67]SEY A TTS er ESA EET
[69]a
[70]V. NAME OF SUBJECT Of TITLE OF INCIDENT
[72]4. REPORT OF F FINDINGS
[74]aD on patent.
[76]AGENT REPORT
[77]{AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
[79]2. DATE SuaMITTeD
[80]16 April 1970
[81]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[83]9321 ~' 6006
[85]CRINKALA, Victor i, ;
[86]DPOB: 28 Hoverther 1950; Rochester, Pa,
[87]PVT = 185 hoe LESS
[89](nEsca CR: LANE ous ) On 1 April 1970,
[91]2, Hunee: *, also knovn as
[92]Ly H foted L Strand, 206 West hsd Street, New York, New
[95]residing at Roo 301, Hotel Woodstock, Le] West 43d Street,
[97]New Yerk, New Yor}! 10035, wes inter red at his residence in an attempt
[99]to identity Richaré Nag a. t 1ysi
[101]service and now
[102]Slows :
[104]Muneer knew Richard Nage tL as a former United Stetes Army Officer
[106]pacherg. Ce Negeil and first met hin in 1956, white both, Source ;
[108]; erving schtenses at the Federal Prison (FP) at Fort
[109]Leevent worth, Ranses . Brom 1965 to 27 Nevenber - A988, when Source WOs rellese.
[110]8eG Prom the FP, Souree saw ty basis es a fellow
[111]inmate. While at the EP, wes a Lorier United
[112]States Army Captain, and tne CIA (Centxal
[113]Intelligence Agency) or
[114]Lt
[116]02
[118]ils unknown. Accoréin
[119]mentioned agency, Nage‘ll
[121]rectly iave re red
[122]the assassination of former Pres: ident Jenn fr,
[123]i / an EL Paso, Texas, Nagel, was
[125]land charged with some Kind of ¢
[127]details unknown, As & tesvlt of
[128]fined to the _ at Fort Le aver wort
[129]was released from the BP ond since
[130]four occasions on a
[131]‘the Hotel, Strend sor
[132]ay information concerning Nagel:
[133]i in 1969. exe
[135]won, Hew York,
[137]h>
[138]ga
[139]ra
[141]Race ;
[145]Weight: _
[148]DOF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE G? SPEclaL AGENT j
[149]. aaa . : 7
[151]sPISTRANO PA BON TRLIZA
[153]NW 60613 Docid:34529653 Page 2
[155]“(Con tinued }
[157]te stew cen! mee ert errs
[159]|
[160]|
[162]aR RaR ESP FIONN AED EAT OTT EU a tS OER iceaiaieaeeideeince taiineer onc NS A Se a
[164]EPORT
[168]3 Roch ester, Pa.
[169]- we 952L = 6006
[171]4. REPORT ¢ OF FR HNDINGS
[173](MIscE SLLANECUS-Continus
[175]Color of Hair
[176]Color of Eves:
[177]Physica Detects:
[179]2
[181]ga
[183]go
[184]we
[186]COve
[187]ah vis unknoy
[188]fegelL does x fear ELAsses or a”
[189]musteche and “he is always clean
[190]shaven.
[193]BEE
[195]Py
[197]. Remar
[199]z
[201]fa
[202]73
[203]+.
[205]Sometime cin : mnile Source was or
[206]from L600. to Dh 10 hours, SUBIEOT
[207]Source allow HIM te sleep at the not el
[209]or town and Glad nob he any ta
[211]ah for
[212]have te een close
[213]BCQLY three
[215].
[217]ana Source had not
[219]L @G the
[220]ask and res
[222]5
[224]GLd Source that HE we
[225]ived with Hl 3
[227]ARPT SSE We DSIRE CRT SC ER AT SS RETR DATTFPEVRST IME ML
[229]rates. Atom y
[231]to For te t conden, Georgia, for basic ollie
[232]urce the fact thas is a
[233]LE a Conselenti ous
[235]Pe
[236]SUL. Sad S 2
[240]nae hyde
[241]nuece bi
[243]con ver Batt ons
[247]ae i
[249]Pout of & he H :
[251]6nd. SUBIEGT i :
[255]LIES, a couple of. dave after p
[260]SORE. Negeil a8
[262]: Aray Cheplain School, Coe
[263]|
[264]t
[267]5. TYPED HARE AND ORGANIZATION OF GRECIAL AOERTT
[269]¥,LOSth ME Gp. (7
[271]CAPTSTR
[275]preven See mmeememre =
[277]LE ALE
[279]i ameasiies comes
[282]a
[285]Se oath mtn np i ir DS AACE MOR AA TL SL se a
[287]ah ey fl
[291]‘f
[292]i
[294]NW 88613 Docid:34529653 Page 3
[297]|
[299]"NAME OF SUSIECT Of TITLE OF INCIDENT
[300]TRINKALA, Victor. Le ae
[301]DPOBr 28 November 1950: Rocheste
[302]PVE = 1.86 he pene
[304]3. “CoetROL § 1 OR Hie = Uae ER
[306]S321 » 6006
[308]oantaise
[309]Deh ahah
[311]telephone end at tr
[312]Source believed thet
[314]mentioned to Sources
[315]Senater in PL
[316]itis Source *g
[319]or 2 we
[321]var cm
[323]‘that oe vher Mrs »
[325]UBTECr ant
[326]tat
[328]1 ifort
[330]ehy ‘chat Be sell wroue
[332]fieth a
[334]@, Souree
[335]td had not sean
[337]In December
[339]unknown to Sovrce , SUE Tach
[340]share Source'’s apartment at th
[342]recalted
[343]use, possessic
[344]£ and there is @
[346]2 Jeb for SUBJECT at the |
[352]use of r
[354]Hotes Ls )
[355]om York, where pare srt.
[357]A ab works ne > aurin 4 be 200 Sha at
[359]Saws WEL)
[361]aearomal
[362]CI AT BD
[364]To Sovres ts
[366]FF
[368]y three
[372]ed
[374]ay
[376]been rear
[378]Re
[384]OBE res STRANG ) BARON
[386]ir pon ay eee
[388]NW 88613 Docid:34529653 Page 4
[391]OF SUQJECT O8 THLE OF INCIDENT . : : Lene a ~ GATE SUBMITTED
[392]TRINKALA, Victor he re 7 mes "Y6 | 26 Apri L370
[394]2 OR FIRE MUMBER
[398]DPOB: 2g" MW ovenber 19503 Roche st er, Pe. | ote
[399]5 4 2 . ,
[400]YP» 186 4e 1155 : a
[402]ra
[403]cl
[405]ca
[406]cs
[409]ay
[411]Se
[413]fo)
[414]ion
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[417]ea
[418]cr
[419]ay)
[420]ch
[422]ct
[423]oO
[424]pr
[425]hate
[427]ea
[429]_Bince HE is a Conseientdcus
[430]ex than in self-dete
[432]3 Nowe 8s During the course of this interview, it was noted
[434]a stirs al
[435]‘the hotel
[437]ALG
[438]p
[442]Were
[444]the room a
[445]resented
[447]When Source
[449]iS ANT OEE
[451]J
[452]f
[453]|
[455]|
[456]i
[458]t
[459]|
[461]7
[462]i
[464]Oo AME J AND ORGANZA OF SRL AGERE TTT
[465]eee Le } A 7) ne eb
[467]NW 88613 Docid:34529653 Page 5
[469]SOLE SE SEA ERAT UMAR a CES Nd PR STOTT NN a
[471]sp ergy enpenerags ae oe nh emepeenp nereennes
[473]we el | [3]
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[475] |
194-10007-10423.pdf | [1], AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[27], COMMENTS
[29]| NW 88613 Docid:34529654 Page 1
[31]03/07/96
[32]1
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]INSCOM/CSF
[43]194-10007-10423
[45]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[46]X1332650W - PAGE 501
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[51][ RESTRICTED ]
[53]AGENT REPORT
[54]04/16/70
[56]1
[58]NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[60]TRINKALA, VICTOR L.*
[61]AGENCY CHECKS
[63]POST OFFICE BOX
[65]PAPER, TEATUAL DOCUMENT
[66]UNCLASSIFIED
[68]3
[70]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/09/95
[73]BERR ere neers
[74]ORT
[76]PREP GH
[80]BBG ET)
[82]. | 1. NAME OF SUBJECT G8 THLE OF INCIDENT — Sea Wee . .
[83]iA. Vietor Le. 7 _ 16 Aprid 170 ; im
[85]28 Hon vember 1950; Rock: Lest er, Pee [= CONTROLS |
[87]Pyro 366 h HO 455 a CG | 932 |
[89]1 6. REPORT GF “FINDING
[91]* iA T ras S. 4 ¥ ‘
[92](LOCAL H, Smith, Cor.
[93]respondence Cleri s
[95]1 Station, 120
[97]Rast 45th Street wow Yo eke “10017, ;
[99]Pah ettenot to obi: name ess of . bse
[100]Erenti Box 2 ed Post offi that
[101]; Post office sent]. ¥ Letered wader the + name of *
[103]Cherd G, ir PDundeo
[104]' Source furthe it 5 a me 2 ase
[105]tO Negeli din the box
[106]as to who is pres rent
[107]forward the mail to
[109]SRS
[113]vences is mage to Agent Report, dated 16 — ‘
[114]ovestigation, where
[116]a RSPR
[118]sin the mailing address o
[120]STREET AMET AERO ORS REIN ORR RR ERE ETE EERO ARERR PE SE A I TE A I TORIES RNA RR BA TRE STI EET
[124]Kernen eeatrse agree naan re
[126]NW 88613 Docid:34529654 Page 2 | [2]
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[112]
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[123]
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[127]
[128] |
194-10007-10424.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 21
[2][|:4-
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]03/07/96
[8]1
[10]. AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]INSCOM/CSF
[19]194-10007-10424
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]X1332650W - PAGE 502
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA
[49][ RESTRICTED ]
[51]AGENT REPORT
[52]02/25/70
[54]1
[56]NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[58]TRINKALA, VICTOR Le«
[59]CHARACTER REFERENCE
[61]SWORN STATEMENT
[63]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[64]UNCLASSIFIED
[66]3
[68]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[69]03/09/95
[71]SWORN STATEMENT INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[73]NW 688613 Docld:34529655 Page 1
[76]’ .
[78]Tucan’ riaecieiosaisinetieatnarianierbeaehonshantietamaaecanenscet-outpentht deeds tie inehatiaeedeheaimadiaenmid stale Mate ard
[80](AR 384-1
[82]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR THLE OF INCIDENT
[83]TRIHKALA, Victor Lee .
[84]DPOB: an November 1950; Rochester,
[85]pvr - 185 42 1155
[87]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS —
[89]502
[91]NW 60613 Docid:34529655 Page 2
[93]a 4
[95]SONS TBE G
[97]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[99]25 February 1970
[101]9321 - G00S
[105]a. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMSER
[107]|
[108]J
[110]pt eal ER ROME ATES I TEM BOR A le
[112]GENT KEPOR
[113]o; FRI 30h17)
[116]ne,
[118]es
[120]TER rer SER AI RE 8 AF ET em WN EEE PRP ACOA SESE
[122]Sere ores | [3]
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[124]
[125] |
194-10007-10425.pdf | [1], AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[23]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[24]OPENING CRITERIA
[25]COMMENTS
[27]CURRENT STATUS” :
[29]NW 88613 Docld:34529656 Page 1
[31]Date : 03/07/96
[33]Page : 1
[35]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[36]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[38]AGENCY INFORMATION
[40]INSCOM/CSF
[42]194-10007-10425
[44]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[45]X1332650W - PAGES 503-507
[47]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[49]USA
[50]108TH MI GROUP
[52]:. EXHIBIT
[54]02/25/70
[56]NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[58]TRINKALA, VICTOR L.~
[60]SWORN STATEMENT
[62]TAPE RECORDING OF INTERVIEW
[63]CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
[64]DISCHARGE FROM ARMY
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]UNCLASSIFIED
[69]3
[71]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[72]03/09/95
[74]AVY
[75]WAP
[77]At
[79]MI
[83]‘SUBIECT'S Sworn S!
[85]Soe i
[89]sy Bf
[91]NW 88613 Docid:34529656 Page 2
[93]paanbaseen ee Sab RA ERR TP RONLHEO NE sea ES TI LTTE aa SOG ELA SRR RTA SAS STR RT WET TAE
[94]; WITNESS STATEMENT
[95]"(AR 195-10 -.TB PMG 3)
[97]I, Room 1332,
[98]New York, NY_ 10007
[100]MIDDLE NAME
[102]ecace 108th Mi Group, Regi
[103]25 > Federal Pleza
[105]SOCIAL SEC oURUT Y ACCOUNT NO,
[107]Ve. ‘Trinkela, before we progeed, .
[108]-of this interview. ..The United States Department of Army must be assured of,
[109]character, suitability, . and unswerving loyalty to, the United States of per
[110]ace Jn the United States Army and its Reserve component. In this regard,
[111]have been asked to voluntarily undergo en inter
[112]“background since you were discharged
[113]reserves. This interview will provi
[114]ntlof Ar ‘tly LO determine yp 8
[115]“heave” just-said. tovyou?:
[116]AS “Yess. .
[117]Q...—Do you. have-eny-objection
[118]ad | ee \\ ge .
[119]Q. Please stand and raise your | pight hand, Do you eftirn to tell 4
[120]whole truth and nothing but the truth? —
[121]i Ae Yes, I so affirn.
[122]| Q. Do you have any object tion to havin ww this interview tape recorded for
[123]i tive purposes?. ee \y / “oO
[124]Ae No, none whatsoevers' Voix ;
[125]@ Please state your name, address of residence, occupation, name end address of
[127]poneerning | Your
[128]from active duty and a place ih the inactive
[129]é a Qualoo i
[131]under
[133]sos pees woes
[135], - employer, and Social Security Account Number,
[136]‘Ae My name is Victor Lee Trinkals end I reside at the Hotel Weods stock, Room 301,
[137]} 0 127 West 43d. Street, Manhattan, New Yor ‘Ian currently unemployed. My Social
[139]Security Account Number is 186 42 1155. .
[141]| Q. What addresses have you resided et since your discharge? :
[143]i Ae I dived at the Hotel Strand, 206 West (430 Street, Manhattan, New York for approx
[145]mately two or three weeks after my discharge from the Army. . I then ‘moved to my
[146]..., Suprent address and have resided there ever since.
[148]Q. What-employment have you hed since your discharge?
[150]| A. None. I collect a weekly unemployment check from New York State which pays fox
[152]i
[154]|
[156]bills.
[157]Q. Did you come directly to New York City after your dischar
[158]A. Yes.
[159]Q. Mr Trinkala, have you ever had contact
[160]or representatives of any foreien count
[161]A. No, none that T know of. 5O4
[162]Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been contacted by a representative of
[163]a foreign intelligence service either here e-or abroe 2
[164]A. No, none’ that T know cf.) | oo, ;
[165]Q. Have you or any member of your. family ever been contacted by anyone w
[166]_" than casual interest in your military assignnents,” career, or duties?
[169]v $
[171]with any embassies, legations, consulates,
[174]7
[176]ad
[178]Exuiasys |
[180]cand ONAL PAGES MUS Tr CONT. IN THE BEADING SSSTA +e,
[182]OF, : PAGES 4
[183]a STA TEMES vr WILLD Rm CONCLUDED ES
[185]Me
[187]pb.
[188]gS
[189]mere
[191]S
[192]655
[194]9
[197]a
[199]i
[203]f ao 2 ne
[204]ON :
[206]ga :
[207][sus
[212]se]
[214]ry
[216]Me
[218]a
[222]fr
[224]by
[228]“i
[230]m
[232]teen omjcomwrnre|
[236]613 Dochd:345279656 Page 3
[238]Les” ee ee - | 186 Ae! 1155 |
[240]ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS ~ 7 a 7 — s =
[241]“427 West’ 43d Streety- Room 391 5° Manhattan, New York t.
[243]so deapastoncemeventinnniannectne ener eons a te tains raceme
[245]; SWORN STATE HE i
[247]7
[251]Statement of TRINKALA, Vi
[253]Vy ae ‘No, no one that I can recall. ;
[254]If you were contacted by someone with a.more than casual interest in your
[256]Qe
[258]Q.
[259]A.
[261]Q.
[262]Ae
[264]nilitary a Signnents , career, or duties, what would you do?
[266]I would report them'to the FBI, CIA, or the OID, ;
[267]11 consider yourself to be a Consei
[269]Do yous’ Mr. Trinkala,
[270]8 Yeo YY | -
[271]You do
[273]Explain, if you will, Me. Trinkala.
[274]T I do, not believe in killing someons for no
[275]la Man because someone tells me to.
[277]Whe
[279]reason.
[281]Is)
[282]LO @ certain point.
[284]are your Conscientious Objector grounds based upon?
[286]I have religious and moral objections to killing people.
[288]When were you discharged?
[289]I was discharged on 3 December 1969,
[291]What were the reasons given for your discharge?
[293]‘Were you told. why you were discharged?
[295]_Heve you ever assoc! tated owith th MY iss
[296][email protected] Samer os ee, .
[297]: Have: you ever
[299]There were. several reesons involved. A fricnd of mine helped me
[300]- charged.
[302]LAN Lae
[303]WON
[305]De aa \ . .
[306]How did he help you obtain a discharge?
[308]I do not know how he helped, or if, in fact, he did
[310]What is your friend's name?
[312]His name is Richard Nagel.
[314]Where does Richard Nagel reside!
[316]Ido not know where he lives. I have never
[317]him personally. He is 4 friend ofa friend.
[318]How did you become acqua
[320]met him in person
[322]ited Sth, Mp, Nagel.
[324]I really cannot recall the reasons for ny discherg
[326]Be.
[328]“zi consider yoursel? to be a Conscientious Objector?
[329]-I consider myself to be a Conscientious Objector t
[331]etor Lee, taken et 108th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federel
[333]Plaza, Room 7332, New York, .New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued:
[335]3
[337]entious Objector?
[339]T just con not bring myself
[340]e
[342]and do not know
[344]Me, Nagel is actually the friend of Tony Muneer of whom I have known for three
[345]or four years
[349]Where does Mr. Muneer reside and what is his
[351]Tony Moneer resides at the Hote ot Hoodstock,
[352]Have you ever resided in the same vesidence
[353]discharge?
[355]Yes, we both lived in the Hotel Strand, 206 }
[356]York.
[357]What was his occupation at that time?
[359]He was working as a Desk Cle and going to
[360]What was your occupation at that time
[362]I.was working at the Clinton: Hotel, 19 West
[364]occung abhor
[366]T27 Wes § 43d
[368]t 3
[369]So, Mr. Muneer told you he would’ help you get
[371]Yes, he said hé would sneak to a friend, Richer
[372]“Did he ever te elt: you what he did to help you get
[374]No.
[376]been contacted by any indy
[378]os dissident, . antissrmy, or ancl —war groups’
[380]Ido et Tenowe
[382]Bas. any person ever.asked you. to attend meetin
[384]~ New York, He is employed there as a Desk Clerk.
[385]with Mr.
[387]oD
[389]West 43d Street
[391]school at 1
[395]who 168
[397]NW 88613 Docid:34529656 Page 4
[399][BMe
[403]Street, Menhettan,
[405]Muneer previous to your
[407]t, Manhattan, New
[409]see
[415]the Arm a
[417]oO:
[419]ae)
[421]enti-wer groups? 2. < |,
[423]1 York
[425]at he could do.
[427]@ representative of any
[429]Statement of TRINKALA, Victor Lee, taken at {O8th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federal
[430]~ Plaza, Room 1332, New York, New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued:
[432]Ae
[434]Ae
[436]OPrPoro
[438]“Have you ever attended any meetings of any 4 dissident, anti-Army, anti-war
[442]i
[444]- “Have you“ever been arrested.
[445]“how
[446]sthe Army and at Basic training.
[448]‘About three-or four. times.
[450]No, never. PL
[451]Where were you stationed whil® in the Army? .
[452]Iwas stationed at Fort Gordon, Georgia for approximately nine weeks during
[453]which time I recetved Basic Training. I then went to Fort Polk, Louistanna,
[454]for AIT training in the MOS 11570, I stayed at Fort Polk for approximately
[455]10 weeks. I was then sent to Oakland Army Terminal with orders for Viet Nam
[456]I wes discharged at Oskland Army Terminal on 3 December 1969.
[457]Po you not remember the reasons for your discharge?
[459]Yo, I do not remember the spescifie reasons.
[461]How much time. had you spent in the Army?
[463]I had spent five months and 22 days.
[465]Did you not think it rather odd. thet you shovld be granted a discharge after
[466]only five months and 22 days?
[468]Yes, | thought it was odd but I did not know.what was happening.
[470]Did you receive any cour eling whili he army from Army personnel?
[472]Neo, but the Personnel Officer at Oakland Amy Termine asked me who Richard
[473]Nagel was. .
[475]Way did he ask you the identity of Richard Negel and what was-his name and
[478]I do not know why he asked me about Richard Nagel. He wes a Warrant Officer. mae
[480]I do not remember his name or rank.
[482]Wheat did you tell him about Mr, Nagel?
[484]I told him only that he was e personal friend of mine.
[486]Had you requested a discharge at any time prior to arriving at Oakland Army
[489]Ido not recall.
[491]You had never requested a discharge?
[492]Iwas trying to get my combat status changed to non-combat status. I never
[493]initiated any formal procedures to obtein a discharge.
[495]Bid you ever tell any one that you were a Conscientious Objector?
[497]Yes; I told the adjutant at Oakland Army. Terminal but he tore up my request
[498]told’me to get the hell out.
[500]Have you his name end rank? \
[501]No, I do not cécall his name
[502]Did Richard Nagel ever inention to you how he got you out of the Aimy?
[503]No, as I mentioned before I have never seen him before or since. He ec
[505]long distance from New York City while I was at Oaklend Army Terminal
[506]was the first and last [heard from hin.
[508]Noa
[510]-Has Tony Muneer heard from him or does he know of his whereabouts?
[511]No, Tony has not heard from him since December 1969 and does not know of Rich
[513]Nagel's whereabouts. |
[515]Have you ever been arres ed?
[516]Yes. ° :
[518]How many times?
[520]4 a
[522]No, and I ‘Listed. alll my arrests
[524]a. had tO eu out before: ‘going i
[528]and
[532]NW 88613 Docid:34529656 Page 5
[535]SRST SSR WIRE Ta I a PRN IN AOS LAG A NET sary |
[536]4
[538]vin drny, rents
[540]NO but most. of my friends. dé not. ike. the Army. 1 do not. know their reasons;
[541]To what country do you owe your alle em lance? ; a ;
[542]“The. United. States. .... re
[543]Do you support the Constitution. of the United States end are you willing to
[544]_ ,perdefent the United States against any and all of her enemies w Shout: exception? |
[545]BU f support the Constitution and am willing to fight any enemies who invede the
[546]United States bub I am not willing to fight. in Viet Nam because I believe the
[547]wer is immoral, - : _
[548]Q. If called upon to fight in Viet Nam would you go? ;
[549]A.’ I would try to obtain Conselentions Objector status. If that did not work I do
[550]not know what I would do, :
[551]Q. Would you be willing to go on Active Duty if called upon?
[552]A. I would not be willing to be called to Active Dut uy and. Ido not knew if I would
[553]‘go if called.
[554]Q. Why are you opposed to killing?
[555]A. Iwas brought up to be opposed to: kil vane They wanted to teach me in
[556]' “months to kill somebody and you cannot teach in four months sonething
[557]cpposed to what you have been taught for many years.
[558]@. Are these attitudes » to religious beliefs?
[559]fa Yes, I am Catholic and do not believe in kitting.
[560]if you had. to-kill someone im self-defense what would you do?
[561]fe I would fight back but this is different then being placed in Viet Nam where
[562]' I:would probably have to k#Ll.
[563]Q. If you were in Viet Nam and vere under fire would you: ie
[564]A. Yes, I would. ‘Any. human Deing would fight back.g 7
[565]Q. If a foreign power attacked the United States would!
[566].f - the aggressor? -"\j /| *
[567]102 not wee ae
[569]a the
[571]a the enemy
[573]to killing
[575]LY BEE TOSI RIT A ETE EP INT ERA TRA ee
[578]e rr
[580]ye
[582]a 7
[584]MOM SEAN INE PE OW SERA AY: AAR SSRN CNIS RN A OR REI RCE PENRSTTN Sa SRSNP ~ erent pnastanrte nanan seme
[586]z =z HAD READ To ME THIS STATE
[587]ERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMER
[589]i Vi etor Lee Trinkale _
[590]pMERT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ERDS ON PAGE
[591]PMADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. 1 HAVE IM 2D ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE IMITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EAC E
[592]p CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. | HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT KOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, ¥ Wi THOU? THRE
[594]OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, GR UNLAWFUL IRGUCEMENT. = 4
[596]Signature of Person Admisleteriag Case
[598]Tomy re Me _PHERSON, Sneci
[600]C4 al_Agent
[601]ra) Administer é Oaray .
[603]oD yned Be Kame of Pe:
[605]earrepctniene eu grmrnasme i teacseirtnent sumer wugeaentanregecotmemnen eervenetpened ose orat
[607]NW 88613 Docid:34529656 Page 6 | [2]
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194-10007-10426.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 210% Note). Caset:Niw
[2]4 Cate: (13-1 o
[4], AGENCY
[6]RECORD NUMBER
[7]RECORDS SERIES
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[10]ORIGINATOR
[11]FROM
[13]TO
[15]TITLE
[17]DATE
[19]PAGES
[20]SUBJECTS
[22]DOCUMENT TYPE
[23]CLASSIFICATION
[24]RESTRICTIONS
[25]CURRENT STATUS
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[30]; COMMENTS
[32]NW 88613 Docid:34529657 Page 1
[34]Date
[35]Page : 1
[37]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[38]. IDENTIFICATION FORM
[40]AGENCY INFORMATION
[42]INSCOM/CSF
[44]194-10007-10426
[46]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[47]X1332650W.- PAGE 508
[49]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[51]USA
[52][ RESTRICTED ]
[54]AGENT REPORT
[55]11/14/69
[57]1
[59]NAGELL, RICHARD C.
[60]TRINKALA, VICTOR L.7
[61]MILITARY SERVICE
[62]HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
[63]CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
[64]CANCELLATION OF ORDERS
[65]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[66]CONFIDENTIAL
[68]3
[70]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[71]03/09/95
[73]PAGE 508 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 1 JUNE 1994.
[75]03/07/96
[77]— A NEI IN a ie YD EH RS
[79]PRINKALA, Victor Le. ANED UNC IFIED | mber 1969
[80]_ DPOB: nk bes : ‘AEGR ADED UNCLASS q. LOR FILE NUMBER
[82]On WN OT 994
[83]| ~ BY CDR USAINSCOM FOV/PO
[84]é. (REPORS OF FINDINGS ~ a AUTH | PARA 1-603 DoD 5200:+
[86]eres sleweanrrsed Nec sem
[88]Pvt US 527 87 228
[90]i
[91]i
[92]i
[93]i
[94]i
[95]i
[97](MI SCELLANECUS )
[99]1B No:
[100]ion I, 26 Fede
[102]Lon was received
[104]ostanciel
[106]Op ct
[107]Sy
[108]Sy
[111]NPR EET OSE MERE RIE ENE AT RRL NR ECPI EE CT TE
[113]UE
[114]in @ combat sone,
[115]“Army Captian, 5
[118]LYE is
[120]o
[124]g and ex
[125]suated
[127]if
[129]on the
[130]informatics
[132]eG
[134]Decause he was
[137]f : we
[139]berms . ;
[140]Gd to:come
[142]RMT RENO TST RP TEEN SEG ROE TRIMER TEES OS SP ESTAS TED RES ETT SRE SR ENOTES ETI SER AOR
[144]ME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT —
[148]. Eitan dover ta
[150]NW 88613 Docid:34529657 Page 2 | [3]
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194-10012-10030.pdf | [1]' WW
[3]194-10012-10030 [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992]
[5]AGENCY
[7]RECORD NUMBER
[8]RECORDS SERIES
[9]AGENCY FILE NOMBER
[11]N
[12]“
[14]Date .:~02/09/98
[15]Page ~: 1
[17]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[18]IDENTIFICATION FORM .
[20]AGENCY INFORMATION
[22]INSCOM/CSF
[23]194-10012-10030
[25]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[27]AC643360W -
[29]PAGES 15-16
[31]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[33]ORIGINATOR
[34]FROM
[36]TO
[38]TITLE
[40]DATE
[42]PAGES
[43]SUBJECTS
[45]DOCUMENT TYPE
[46]CLASST FICATION
[47]RESTRICTIONS
[48]CURRENT STATUS
[50]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[51]“ OPENING CRITERIA
[52]COMMENTS
[54]USA
[55]CIA
[57]CTIA INFORMATION REPORT
[59]01/04/63
[60]2
[61]PFUNTNER, JORDAN J.
[63]UNDIMINISHED PRESTIG
[66]ay
[68]OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA
[70]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[72]UNCLASSIFIED
[75]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[77]09/22/97
[79]COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA.
[80]COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND
[81]DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97.
[83]68037 Docld:3451746 Page 7
[85]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[87]th is material contains information affecting the Natio onal Defense. of the United States within the meaning of the Ess wonage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
[89]793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prahibited by law.
[91]CLASSIFICATION —- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[93](When Filled inj
[95]COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA -REFORTNO. DCS ~3/532 , 860
[96], SUBJECT YNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO OCATEDISTR 4 JANUARY 1963
[97]IN LATIN AMERICA
[99]. PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[101]DATE OF- - DECEMBER 1962 _ REFERENCES
[103]IN
[104]INFO. are RBD-W-+2107.- - AKI9S
[105]| lacea ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963) |
[106]| DATE ACQ.
[107]APPRAISAL 3. FIELD REPORTNO, OEL—-34 ,413
[109]| THIS Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT I$ TENTATIVE.
[111]| SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A.
[112]YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA,”
[114]emanated
[115]1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS
[116]IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES,
[117]THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM,
[118]AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER, oe
[119]2, LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY *
[120]DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS, THIS CONTROVERSY
[121]1S LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE
[122]INDEPENDENT AND FELXIBLE POLICIES. THERE 1S A GENERAL TREND AGAINST
[123]POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE .” | fe ’
[125]FIGATION ANDJOR
[127]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT.
[128]; AS. SANITIZED
[130])
[131]DA 1 4722 a ' oe . Le
[133]NW 68037 Docld:34517486 Page 2
[136]is
[137]a oe
[138]a
[141]BRITISH COMMENTS.
[142]A, ‘THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT
[144]i AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SGURCES T IT IS
[145]AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. To wit aM 4 J
[147]B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA
[149]ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT
[151]THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE,
[153]REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND
[154]~ TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA.
[155]4, FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.
[157]END OF MESSAGE
[159]_- ACTHON: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[163]| DA IN 4722 |
[164]denen | tiie mA |
[166]Batt oh
[168]Rpt ee : eee ae - we ee - . rcs
[170]"NW 68037 Docld:34517486 Page 3 | [2]
[4]
[6]
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[65]—
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[69]
[71]
[73]1c
[74]
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[86]
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[113]
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[126]
[129]
[132]
[134]
[135]®
[139]ee
[140]
[143]
[146]
[148]
[150]
[152]
[156]
[158]
[160]
[161]* "INFO: DCSOP ae
[162]
[165]
[167]
[169]
[171]
[172]
[173] |
194-10012-10400.pdf | [1]Date : 07/19/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]992 (44 USC 2107 Note) Caset: Nw
[7]- Date [4-] 5-20)
[9]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[11]AGENCY
[13]RECORD NUMBER
[14]RECORDS SERIES
[15]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[17]AGENCY INFORMATION
[19]INSCOM/CSF
[20]194-10012-10400
[22]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[24]ZFOOO0003W - PAGES 785-787
[26]ORIGINATOR
[27]FROM
[29]TO
[31]TITLE
[33]DATE
[35]PAGES
[36]SUBJECTS
[38]DOCUMENT TYPE
[39]CLASSIFICATION
[40]RESTRICTIONS
[41]CURRENT STATUS
[43]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[44]OPENING CRITERIA
[45]COMMENTS
[47]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[49]USA
[51]DCST USCOB BERLIN
[53]OPSTI USAREUR HEIDELBERG
[54]MESSAGE
[56]12/02/67
[58]3
[60]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[62]POSSIBLE US ARMY DESERTERS
[64]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[65]CONFIDENTIAL
[67]3
[69]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[70]03/20/95
[72]PAGES 785-787 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.
[74]NW 60613 Docld:34531087 Page 1
[76]“"GONFIDENTIAL | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE — ee
[78]NATIONAL MIUTARY COMMAND CENTER
[80]MESSAGE CENTER’ 7 a :
[82]BON JCS738/5 & Loe CALL 53337
[83]' VZCZCTEAS58 (67355 -- 6 FOR NMCC/MG
[84]_ PP RUEPJS . gq pu8 232 SERVICE
[85]CE RUFPA 034 3390945 ;
[86]ZNY CCCCC Los -|8 162
[87]Pp 0094572 DEC 67 . i of
[88]FM USCINCEUR as
[89]INFO DIA JACI WASH DC |
[90]p 021238 DEC 67 GP 4
[92]4 DCS! USCOB BERLIN GER .. YEAR INTERVALS
[93]TO DPSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER
[94]i | DECLASSIF |
[96]smn 0 - 303-67 FROM: DCI, USCOB
[97]SD CARPENTER an
[98]Ss (Ww
[100]SB JECT : POSSIBLE US oo
[101]1 (C) On OVEMBER 1967, WEST BERLIN POLICE ADVISED
[103]THAT THESFOECOWING PERSONS, DESERTERS FROM THE AMERICAN
[104]ARMY, WERE POSSIBLY IN WEST BERLIN? — “ REG
[106]FETER SIMONS . ON DGF
[107]BORN & MAY.1943-1N GERMANY BY CDR Lon € SCs FOt/PO
[108]ROMAN ARNOLD ; AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1A
[110]BORN 6 JANUARY 1945, PRESUMABLY IN GERMANY
[111]2, (©) THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM THE DUS-
[113]| SELOORF POLICE, WHO REQUESTED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS BE
[114]TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AND TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY
[115]POLICE « DURING A VISIT IN OUESSELOORF IN LATE OCTOBER, THE
[116]TWO MENTIONED THAT THEY WANTED TO GO TO BERLIN TO AN
[117]WWIDENTIFIED STUDENT ORGANIZATION. THEY FURTHER STATED
[118]THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO GO TO VIETNAM
[119]3. (C) THIS SAME MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE FRANKFURT /
[120]MAIN POLICE, INASMUCH AS SIMONS HAS A GIRL FRIENO THERE,
[121]AND HIS FATHER ALSO RESIDES IN THAT CITY. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
[122]FRANKFURT POLICE WERE THE SAME5 =”
[123]4 (C) ON 1DECEMBER 1967, THE WEST BERLIN POLICE REPORTED
[124]THAT THE TWO MEN HAD BEEN REGISTERED IN THE FRENCH SECTOR SINCE
[125]27 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT.FALKENTHALER STEIG 148, C/O DECHy BERLIN-
[126]HERMSFDORF. POLICE ARE DEFERRING ANY ACTION IN THAT MATTER.
[127]5. (C) CONFIDENT IAL SOURCES HAVE VERIFED THAT THE TWO MEN
[128]HAVE BEEN IN WEST BERLIN ON SEVERAL OCCOASIONS IN OCTOBER AND
[130]ACTION: DIA-15
[131]« CJCS-1 DJS-3 Ji-2 SDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/MPR=1 ST-1 CIA-4
[132]“CSA-1 [NO=2.CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE~1(55) ETO/RA
[134]= Sa
[135]PAGE 1 OF 3 “
[137]DA IN 465341 785
[139]NW 60613 Docid:34531087 Page 2
[142]congas. " DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSL
[143]NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
[145]MESSAGE CENTER
[147]NOVEMBER , WITH THEIR EXACT WHERE ABOUTS UNKNOWN. THEY HAVE RETAINED —
[148]ATTORNEY HORST MAHLER TO REPRESNT THEIR INTERESTS. IT APPEARS
[149]THAT ARNOLD 1S TRYING TO OBTAIN YUGOSLAVIAN CIT IZENSHIP. THE
[150]Si DENT ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN {OENTIFIED AS THE FREE UNIVERSITY
[151]ASTA, OR GENERAL STUDENTS COMMITTEE, THE STUDENT BODY ORGANIZATION.
[152]Fi) STUDENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS ACTIVE IN THE AREA OF OFFERING
[153]TO ASSIST LOCAL MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WISH TO AVOID SERVICE IN
[154]VIETNAM BY GOING TO A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. ,
[155]6 (CU) INFORMATION ON DD FORM 553 RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE FROM
[156]_ POLICE DUSSELDORF INDICATES FOLLOWING DATA:
[157]ARNOLD, ROMAN, SP4& £4
[158]RA 16 858 1835
[159]SSN 3 395-36 1583
[160]SPECTAL PROCESSING DET, HQ USAG TROOPS
[161]fT HOOD, TEXAS , .
[162]DATE AND LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY s, yp OCT 67,
[163]AF EES, CHICAGO, ILL. yo ; ,
[164]_ ABSENT AS OF 3.21 SEP 67, 8515 HRS =
[165]CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF s 10 0CT 67
[166]MS: 36C 28
[167]MB: 6 JAN 45, POB: GERMANY
[168]SIMONS, PETERKe, SP4 E4
[169]RA 19 841 799
[170]SSN 2 59 0-66-6254
[171]SAME UNIT
[172]DATE ANDO LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY 28 APR. 65,
[173]pS US ARMY RMS, LOS ANGELES, CA :
[174]|. ABSENT AS OF 8 21 SEP 67, 0515 HRS
[175]CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF 3 18 0CT 67
[176]#OS2 31M 20 (RADIO RELAY OPERATOR)
[177]DOB: 5 MAY 43N PCBs COTTBUS, GERMANY ;
[178]7 (C) ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO ASCERTAIN IF SIMONS AND ARNOLD
[179]ARE IN BERLIN AND TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON THE PERSONS AND
[180](RGANIZATIONS RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO THESE US ARMY DESERTERS. IT
[181]IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHETHER SUBJECTS ARE US CITIZENS OR
[183]“PAGE 2 OF3 | ; , 54525
[185]. | BY CDA Us-43CChi F04/PO
[186]AUTH Para 1-663 DOD 5200.1R
[187]DA IN 465341 . PAGE 2
[189]NW 60613 Docid:34531087 Page 3
[192]— DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[193]. | . NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
[195]MESSAGE CENTER
[197](ERMAN NATIONALS.» WEST BERLIN POLICE RECORDS INDICATE SIMONS IN
[198]POSSESSION OF FRG PASSPORT NR 2616712 AND THAT ARNOLD WAS UNABLE TO
[199]PRODUCE ANY IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. GPa
[201]& ¢f) ADVERSE PLBLICITY ANO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY RESULT
[202]WHEN SIBJECTS ARE APPREHENDED. THERE ARE NO LEGAL PROBLEMS SEEN
[203]EITHER BY THE SJA, USCOB OR BY USBER. MINISTER HAS BEEN BRIEFED
[204]AND USBER 1S PROVIDING DETAILS TO U. S. EMBASSY, BONN.
[205]Q (C) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY USAREUR OR US EMBASSY BONN
[206]THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IF SUBJECTS ARE DETERMINED TO
[207]fF IN BERLIN. | .
[208]A. WEST BERLIN POLICE WILL BE ASKED 70 APPREHEND
[210]SUBJECTS. US MILITARY POLICE WILL ACCOMPANY THE WEST BERLIN
[212]Be SUBJECTS WILL BE APPREHENDED AS QUIETLY AS POS-
[214]SIBLE AND TAKEN TO BERLIN BRIGADE STOCKADE AND PLACED IN
[215]SEPARATE ROOMS. l
[217]Ce SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN COORDINATED
[219]FOR C47 AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT EMPLEHOF TO FLY SUBJECTS
[221]TO RHEIN MAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER APPREHENSION OUE TO
[223]POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND STWENT REACTIONS.
[224]40. (C) DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MILITARY POLICE AT RHEIN
[226]MAIN WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PM BERLIN BRIGADE. HOWEVER, RecoM-
[227]VEND USAREUR COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT FROM
[229]. RHEIN MAIN. GP=4 ; .
[231]“oT
[233]NVNN
[235]PAGE 3 OF 3
[237]ACTION: DIA(ARMY ACSI) ;
[238]DA. IN 465341 PAGE 3
[240]BY CDR U3 ie)
[241]AUTH Para 1-663 DOD §200.1R
[243]NW 60613 Docid:34531087 Page 4
[245]54525 | [3]
[5]
[8]
[10]
[12]
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[18]
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[28]
[30]
[32]
[34]
[37]
[42]
[46]
[48]
[50]
[52]
[55]
[57]
[59]
[61]
[63]
[66]
[68]
[71]
[73]
[75]
[77]
[79]
[81]: 6THSu .- ft DA IN ;
[91]
[95]
[99]
[102]
[105]
[109]
[112]
[129]
[133]
[136]
[138]
[140]
[141]
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[182]
[184]
[188]
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[232]
[234]
[236]
[239]
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[244]
[246]
[247]
[248] |
194-10012-10408.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 2107
[4]AGENCY
[6]RECORD NUMBER
[7]RECORDS SERIES
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[10]ORIGINATOR
[11]FROM
[13]TO
[15]TITLE
[17]DATE
[19]PAGES
[20]SUBJECTS
[22]DOCUMENT TYPE
[23]CLASSIFICATION
[24]RESTRICTIONS
[25]CURRENT STATUS
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[31]NW 60613 Docid:34531095 Page 1
[33]Date 07/19/96
[34]Page : 1
[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]INSCOM/CSF
[43]194-10012-10408
[45]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[46]ZFOO00003W - PAGES 795-796
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[51]{ RESTRICTED ]
[53]AGENT REPORT
[54]10/05/67
[56]2
[58]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[60]REPORT OF FINDINGS ~
[61]POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION
[62]ARNOLD, ROMAN D. S.
[64]FIELD 201 FILE
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]UNCLASSIFIED
[69]3
[71]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[72]03/20/95
[74]Cin TE Y
[76]TT aid
[78]Tad
[79]U
[81]~~ AGENT REPORT
[83](AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
[85]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[87]October 196
[89]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[91]r NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[93]{Possible Sensitive Desertion
[95]] 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[97](FIEID 201 FILS) On 3 October 1967, the 201 file of Roman D. S. Arnold,
[98][Specialist Four (f-4), RA 16 838 103, Wireman's Helper, 49th Signal Platoon,
[100]198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from the Special Processing
[101]Detachment, United States Army Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the
[103]following information was extracted:
[105]Protective Marking is Excluded From
[107]ASHTON K. DURVaT?
[109]DA
[111]erie
[113]FORM
[115]lA
[116]in
[118]PR
[120]Neme: Roman Davor Srecko Arnold |
[121]Rank: Specialist Four (#-4
[123]ASH: RA 16 838 103
[125]SSAN: 355 36 1583
[127]DOB: 6 January 1945 _,
[129]POB: Lindau Bodensee, Germany,
[130]Citizenship: German: _
[131]BRED: 14 Uctober 1965
[133]BIS: 13 October 1969
[135]Marital Status:
[136]Religious Preference:
[138]Tt 44
[140]fauners
[142]Mother:
[144]Physical Profile:
[146]Paysical Description: .
[148]Civilian Suployments
[149]Civilian Education:
[151]Aptitude Test Scores:
[154]. mn . 79
[155]Automatic Tennination (Par 19, AR 345-15) : (continued)
[156]} 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL ACENT 6: SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[157]. iY
[159]20list. MI Dat
[161]52
[162]te
[164]NW 60613 Docid:34531095 Page 2
[166]34 i REPLACES Woe ”
[168]a Wis
[170]' Single -
[172]Roman Catholic
[173]Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth not
[174]indicated; presently resides in German
[175]Federal Republic, address unknown,
[177]Zdenka Miketta; born in Yugoslavia, date
[179]and exact location winown; presently
[181]resides at Post Office Box 1644, Wille
[182]mington, North Carolina, Arnold's DA Porn
[183]20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indicates
[184]‘that his mother is an Alien; Alien Registra-
[185]tion Number, date end place of entry within
[186]United States unlmowm. ; ,
[187]1111218, 15 October 1965
[189]Age, 223 Sex, Mele; Height, 72"; Weight,
[191]135 vounds; Hair, Brown; yes, Brown; Scars
[192]or identifying marks, None indicated. -
[194]None indicated
[196]Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record)
[197]indicates 12 years education terminated with
[198]High School graduation. His DA Form 20
[199]lists Naine-Township High School, Des. .
[200]Plaines, Illinois, as institutéion attended
[201]with schooling being completed in 1965,
[202]exact date unknown. ;
[204]IN, 86; As, 100; aL, 111; GH, 107; li, 1073
[205]CL, 107; Gl, 87
[207]j
[208]fee
[209]Ue ef
[211]Se hence
[217]—— a ; [IG TECHS A hn
[218]oo POV UEUIAL USE -
[219]A AGENT REPORT _
[221](AR 381-130; Fm 30-17)
[222]ae 1
[223]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[225]C) obe 96
[226]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER .
[228]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[230]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[232](201 File continued)
[234]Militery Education: ; Rad Rel & Carr Attnd, 31N20, Sig C, 12
[236]weeks during 1966, exact dates not given,
[238]Record of Non-Judicial
[239]Punishment:
[240]Record of Courts Martial;
[242]None indicated
[243]None indicated
[245]DD Form 98: Executed 15 October 1965, without
[246]qualification, ;
[247]DD Form 398: Arnold's 201 file aid not contain g
[248]. DD Form’ 398 (Statement of Personal History),
[249]DA Form 873: None :
[250]DA Form 25453 . _ None
[251]Security Clearance: None
[253]Civilian Foreign Travel:
[255]Oo ve
[256]Foreign Service: 19. March 1966 = 27 January 1967, USAREZUR
[257]Germany ) -
[258]Promotionsf/Reductiona: Py, mates! 12 October 1965, AR 60i<210
[259]PVT, H-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-1Sa,
[260]AR 600-200
[262]PFC, E-3(P), 23 June 1966, U0#59, Co B,
[263]Tth USA Sig Spt Bn 1966 . .
[264]SP4, B-a(2), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SO#42,
[265]Has, 198th Int Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67
[267]Chronology of Military
[270]15 October 1965, USA Beg Sta, Ft Knox, Ky
[271]22 October 1965 ~ 1 January 1966, 2 Co,
[272]3d Bn, Ist Bde, USATCI, Ft Benning, Ga
[273]-1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, stu Co, |
[274]. XUSASESCS, Ft Gordon, Gao ,
[275]23 March 1966 - 23 Hay 1966, Btry.C, 5th
[276]sl Bn, 6th Arty, USARZUR
[277]25 May 1966 - 6 arch 1967, Go B, 7th 03a
[278]Sig Spt Bn, USARSUR
[279]6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 142st Sig
[280]Bn, Ist Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex :
[281]19 May 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon,
[282]198th Ingf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex
[283]The absence of a DD Form 398 from Arnoldts
[284]201 file limited the quanity of infornation
[285]which could. be obtained for each item
[286]‘listed above, His 201 file did not reflec:
[287]any action taken to conduct a background:
[288]investigation on this individual, ;
[289]196 .
[290]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT 5
[292]if
[293]‘ . SE .
[294]Lier) Keo Cos
[296]Ca
[298]Remarks:
[300]3. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[302]rere |
[305]DA 1 APR 52 3 él i REPLACES WO AGO Pol 1
[307]| . . . :
[309]: Lo . -.
[311]ASETON K. DURRETT, 501s¢ pT Det
[312]5 CRETE, SOL st
[314]NW 60613 Docid:34531095 Page 3 | [2]03-1 8-
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[44]
[47]
[49]
[52]
[55]
[57]
[59]
[63]
[65]
[68]
[70]
[73]
[75]
[77]
[80]
[82]
[84]
[86]
[88]
[90]
[92]
[94]
[96]
[99]
[102]
[104]
[106]
[108]
[110]
[112]
[114]
[117]
[119]
[122]
[124]
[126]
[128]
[132]
[134]
[137]
[139]
[141]
[143]
[145]
[147]
[150]
[152]
[153]v4 ae
[158]
[160]
[163]
[165]
[167]
[169]
[171]
[176]
[178]
[180]
[188]
[190]
[193]
[195]
[203]
[206]
[210]
[212]
[213]
[214]ras
[215]¥
[216]
[220]
[224]
[227]
[229]
[231]
[233]
[235]
[237]
[241]
[244]
[252]
[254]
[261]
[266]
[268]: Service:
[269]
[291]
[295]
[297]
[299]
[301]
[303]
[304]FORM ‘ ij
[306]
[308]
[310]
[313]
[315]
[316] |
194-10012-10409.pdf | [1]Date : 07/19/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]392 [44 USC 2107 Nate). Caset:Nw JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]wie ee IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10409
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZFO00003W - PAGES 797-799
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 10/05/67
[21]PAGES : 3
[22]SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[24]REPORT OF FINDINGS-»
[25]POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION
[26]SIMONS, PETER K.
[27]FIELD 201 FILE
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA
[35]COMMENTS
[37]NW 60613 Docid:34531096 Page 1
[39]1, NAME OF SUSJECT O8 TITLE OF INCIDENT
[41]a
[43]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[45]Pea EN
[46]AGENT REPORT
[48](AR 381-130; FM 30-17) |
[50]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[52]following information:
[54]Name: -
[56]Rank:
[58]Service Number:
[61]DOB;
[63]POB;
[65]Citizenship:
[67]BPED:
[69]BETS:
[71]Marital Status:
[73]Religious Preference:
[74]' Father:
[76]Mother:
[80]' Physical Profile:
[81]Physical Description:
[83]Civilian Education:
[85]Civilian Employment:
[87]Apti tude Test. Scores:
[89]Ti entde
[91]Protective 2
[93]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT |
[95]FORM
[96]1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FO!
[98](FIELD 201 FILE) On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simona,
[99]Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the \
[101]Specialist 4 (E4)
[103]> May 1945
[105]German, Alien Registration Tunber, A 13 022 5273
[107]ing is Exeluded Prof? . . .
[108]Automatic Termination (Par YO. AK Sd5.Jag : 7 9 / , (CONTINUED) :
[110]WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Arnd Div)
[112]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER . ,
[114]Peter Karl Simons
[116]RA 19 841 799
[117]550~66=6254
[119]Cottbus, Germany _
[121]Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New
[123]York, New York.
[125]28 April 1965
[127]27 April 1963
[129]Single
[131]Roman Catholic ;
[133]Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB:
[135]Unknown; Fresent Address: Unknown.
[137]Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB:
[139]17 September 1920; Present Address:
[141]Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W, Germany,
[143]Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown;
[145]Present Address: Veston-Super-Nare, Somerset,
[147]England.
[149]PULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965
[151]Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; ‘ieight, 1787;
[153]Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None.
[155]55-59, Martin-Buteer; Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated;
[157]59-62, Dierdorf Handesischule, Duesseldorf, Germany,
[159]Graduated.
[161]‘Apr 59eApr 62, Deurogmbh, Berliner Alee 29, buesseldort,
[163]Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL),
[165]immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, AimSea Forwarders Inc,
[167]406 S. Main St., Los Angeles, Califomia, Supervisor, 1
[169]Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty
[171]Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Hr.
[173]Kilmer, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York;
[175]Oct 64—-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St.,|
[177]Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined Arny; :
[179]Apr 65 to present, US Army.
[181]IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; Gil, 102; MM, 115, CL, 123;
[184]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT ~
[186]Wibteim. f Mivelitte
[188]NW 60613 Docid:34531096 Page 2
[190]2. DATE SUBMITTED ; |
[191]5 October 1967
[193]pe nested eet nner enn ence ne fe enema ee mE TREE OTTER OT pees see
[196]CIAL
[197]AGENT REPORT
[199](AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
[201]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[203]5 October 1967 | 7
[205]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[207]Military Education: Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31M20, Signal
[208]Corps, 12 weeks, 1965
[210]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[212]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[214]© .
[215]4 REPORTOFFINOINGS (PIETD 201 FILE) (Continued
[217]Record of Non-Judicial
[219]Punishment: None
[220]Record of Courts Martial: None
[221]DD Form 39S: ; Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1965
[222]DD Form 9&:_ Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965
[223]Security Clearance: None; Background investigation requested
[225]by. the ACofS, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia,
[226]on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for
[227]retention of Simons in Militery Service
[228]Civilian Foreign Travel: 53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56
[229]a to Aug 56, Great Britain, Schooling; fug 57
[230]to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61,
[231]France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the
[232]following countries for sight seeing purposes
[233]from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgiun,
[234]Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, Iuxemburg, France,
[235]a and Spain ~ ; - ,
[236]Foreign Service: — 14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Germmny
[237]Promotions/Reductions ! PVT El (P) 8 Apr 65 AR 601+210
[238]- PVT B2 (P) 28 Aug 65 Far 7-19 AR 600-200
[239]PFC E3 (P) 4 dan 66 Par 1 UOs4, Co B, 32d Sig Bn
[240]APO 757
[241]SPA BA (fT) U0#32, Co B, 32dSig Bn, AFO 09757
[243]Chronology of Military Loot .
[244]Services 28 Apr 65 USARECSTA (4075) FT POLK LA
[245]10 May 65 CoElBn2TngBDE Ft Polk Ia
[246]17 Jul 65 StuCoS USASESCS I Gordon, GA
[247]16 Nov 65 CoB 32dSigBn APO 09757
[248]25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus _
[249]9 Jan 67 CoC l4lstSigBn lst AD Ft Hood,Tex
[250]_ : “8 Jun 67) A9thSigPlatoon, 19SthIn*Bde, FtHd, Tex
[251]Remarks Remarks: . _
[252]1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal,
[253]17. August 1967, issued new identification card,
[254]2. Special Order Number 31, Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade,
[255]Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons
[256]effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Cberlindau 89.
[257]Frankfurt-iain, Germany. Special Instruction: EM will report to the
[258]Army atiache at the American Embassy, or to the Commander of the USA
[259]Element, as appropriate. . oo
[260]3. Simons enlisted under the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one
[261]Michael C. Morgan, RA 19 &41 794, for further assignment to USSREUR.
[262]Protective Morking is Exeluded From TGR : (CONTINUED)
[263]S. THREE OME IANO’ PEGANZATION AF SEG ADEN, 345-15)
[265]6, SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[266]7 / “ f,
[268]- | WILLTAM F, MOCKLER, 5OlstMI Det (Armd Div) . Miia 2
[270]DA Vis BAD srces wo nco 16H. NTE MAH Mh HAE CNTY
[272]NW 60613 Docid:34531096 Page 3
[274](AR 381-130; FM 30-17)
[276]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR THLE OF INCIDENT
[278]| Possible Sensitive Desertion
[280]4 Reront or Foss (TTELD 201 FILE) (Continued
[282]4. Simons drew advance pay'o
[283]$60 a month for six months.
[285]Proteetive Marking is Exeluded Prom
[286]Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)
[288]3. TYPED NAME ANO ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[290]WILLIAM F, MOCKLER, 501st MT ost (frm Div) |
[292]FORM
[293]1 APR $2 REPLACES WD
[295]“AGENT.
[297]REPORT
[299]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[300]5 October 1967
[302]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[304]f $360, 16 Aug 67, to be remid
[306]199
[308]6. SIGNATURE oF SPECIAL AGENT ue
[310]TE £40. a Kiseklet!
[312]NW 60613 Docid:34531096 Page 4
[314]Tene hernia event genta ena | [3]
[6]
[8]
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194-10012-10452.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[5]. RECORDS SERIES
[6]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[8]ORIGINATOR
[9]FROM
[11]TO
[13]TITLE
[15]DATE
[17]PAGES
[18]SUBJECTS
[20]DOCUMENT TYPE
[21]CLASSIFICATION
[22]RESTRICTIONS
[23]CURRENT STATUS
[25]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[26]OPENING CRITERIA
[27]COMMENTS
[29]NW 60613 Docid:34531161 Page 1
[31]Date
[32]Page : I
[34]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[35]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[37]AGENCY INFORMATION
[39]INSCOM/CSF
[41]194-10012-10452
[43]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[44]ZFOOQQ003W - PAGE 894 . .
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA .
[49][ RESTRICTED ]
[51]AGENT REPORT
[53]11/28/66
[55]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[57]POTENTIAL US ARMY DEFECTOR TO THE USSR
[58]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[60]LOCAL AGENCY CHECK
[62]’ PAPER, .TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[64]CONFIDENTIAL
[66]3
[68]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[69]03/20/95
[71]05/06/98
[73]: . 0; FM 30-17)
[74]1, NAME OF SUBJECT O8 TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[76]POTENTIAL US ARMY DEFECTOR TO THE USSR 28 November 1966
[77]|
[79]| (LOCAL AGENCY) On 28 November 1966, George Bombel, Captain, 0-5707877;,
[81]f social security number 527-48-5002, Commanding Officer, Company T, US Army
[83]| Signal Center and School (USASCS), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, checked the unit's
[85]| Morning Report and the Personnel Register (DA Form 647) to determine if Virgilio
[87]| Capino, Private E-1, RA 10124363, Company T, was on leave, pass, or absent. from
[88]Company T for the period 19 through and including 23 October 1966. The records
[89]revealed that Capino was present for duty during this period.
[91]f 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[93]Bombel explained that Company T is a student company and its personnel
[94]} are considered the transient type; consequently, Bombel had no personal knowledge
[95]| regarding Capino. f i
[97]Pe
[99]ECIAL AGENT ;
[101]FAacGos ; i
[103]| ANDREW V. JACOBS
[105]FORM : er,
[106]DA 1 po 52 34 ] REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.
[108]NW 60613 Docid:34531161 Page 2 | [2]
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194-10012-10471.pdf | [1]992 (44 USC 2107
[2]03-18.
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]Date : 07/22/96
[8]Page : 1
[10]AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]INSCOM/CSF
[19]194-10012-10471
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]ZFOOQO0003W ~ PAGES 913-914
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA
[49]DURRETT, MILTON K. [ R ]
[51]AGENT REPORT
[52]10/05/67
[54]2
[56]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[58]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[59]FIELD 201 FILE CHECK
[61]ARNOLD, ROMAN DAVOR SRECKO
[62]POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION
[63]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[64]UNCLASSIFIED
[66]3
[68]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[69]03/20/95
[71]PAGES 913-914 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES
[73]795-796.
[75]NW 88613 Doctd:34531180 Page 1
[77]a ; oo eT Te
[80]TT on RGENT REPORT LL
[83](AR 391-130; FM 30-17) .
[85]CNAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[87]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[89]October 1967
[91]3, CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE HUMBER
[93]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[95]@. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[97]mes
[98]Specialist
[100]oO
[102]PT2LD 201 FILE) On 3 Cctober 1967, th 201 file of Romen D. S. Arnol<
[103]Four (H-4), RA 16 836 103, Wireman's Helver, 49th Signal Platoon,
[104]198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from tne Special Processing
[106]Detachaent, United States arny Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the
[107]following information was extracted:
[113]Neme: Roman Davor Srecko Arnold
[114]renk:s Specialist Four (2-4
[116]ASH: RA 16 838 103
[118]SSANs 359.3 36 1583 1583
[120]DOB: 6 January 1945
[122]POB: “—Lindan Bodsnseé, Gernany
[124]Citizenship: German
[126]BPSD: 14 Sctober 1965
[128]ats:
[130]13 Octaker 1969
[131]Single
[132]Roman Catholic
[134]Maritel Statusi
[135]Religious Preference?
[137]Fathers . Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth rot
[138]indicated; presently resides in German
[139]Federel Revublic, address umcnow.
[140]Mother!’ adenke Tal
[142]rettay porn in Yugoslavia, dave
[143]and exact location wnknown; presently
[144]resides at Post Office Box ‘1644, Will-
[146]| mington, North Carolina. Arnold's DA
[147]|
[150]Form
[151]20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indic
[152]thet his mother is an Alien; Alien Registra-
[153]tion Nunber, date and
[154]United States unimoiwm.
[155]1111218, 15 Cctober 1965
[157]Age, 22} Sex, Vales Height, 72"5 Weight,
[158]155 vounds; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars
[159]or identifying merks, None indicated.
[160]None indicated
[162]Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record)
[163]indicates 12 years education terminated with
[164]: Hich School graduation. His DA Form 20
[165]| lists Maine-Towship High School, Des
[167]. . Pees? Illinois, as institution attended
[168]| ; , ith schooling being completed in 1965,
[169]|
[170]y
[171]i}
[173]4
[175]oO
[176]15)
[178]place of entry witnin
[179]Profile:
[180]Description:
[182]Civilian Smyloyment:
[183]| Civilian Education
[185]exact date unknown. >
[186]IN, 96; AS, 100; BL, 111; G2, 1075 191, 207
[187]-_ CL, 107; GI, 87 .
[189]| Protective Marking ig Excluded From - 915
[190]| Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 3452159 .
[192]| TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[194]Aptitude Test Scores:
[196](contimed)
[198]f 2528, 5OLst 1 Det,
[199]FORA ae) 4 t bead
[201]4) “&. REPLACES WD 450
[203]an ap? 2 Sd) a i
[205]'
[207]NW west
[209]Docid:34531180 Page 2... 5 3
[212]IEEE ERE EEE EEE IEEE OO Ee
[214]wm et te
[216]Late cee nents ee er ven ern ne nenmemeremmninen lf
[218]co AGENT REPORT
[220]. (AR 381-130; FM 3017)
[221]¥. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[223]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[225]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[227]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (201 File continued)
[229]Military Education: Rad Rel & Carr Attnd, 31H20, Sig C, 12
[230]weeks during 1966, exact dates not given.
[231]Record of Won-Judicial
[232]Punishment: None indicated
[233]Record of Courts Martial: None indicated
[234]DD Form 98: Executed 15 October 1965, without
[235]qualification.
[236]DD Form 398: Arnold's 201 file did not contain a
[237]. DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History).
[238]DA Form 873: None
[239]DA Form 2545: None
[240]Security Clearance: None
[241]Civilian Foreign Travel: None indicated other than residence of 48
[242]months in Germany, ending in 1949.
[243]' Foreign Service? 19 larch 1966 - 27 January 1967, USARSUR
[244](Germariy ) ‘
[245]Promotionsf/2eductions: Pvi, S148) 15 October 1965, AR 601-210
[246]; . PVT, H-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-19a,
[248]AR 600-200
[249]PFC, B-3(P), 23 June 1966, U0j59, Co B,
[250]7th USA Sig Spt Bn 1966
[251]SP4, E-A(T), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SOjM2,
[252]Hqs, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67
[254]Chronology of Military
[256]Service: 15 October 1965, USA Bec Sta, Ft Knox, Ky
[258]22 October 1965 ~ 1 January 1966, EB Co,
[259]3d Bn, Ist Bde, USATCI, Ft Benning, Ga
[260]1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, Stu Co,
[261]XUSASESCS, Ft Gordon, Ga
[262]23 Merch 1966 - 23 Hay 1966, Btry C, 5th
[263]Msl Bn, 6th Arty, USAREUR
[264]23 May 1966 - 6 March 1967, Co B, 7th USa
[265]Sig Spt Bn, USARSUR
[266]6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 141st Sig
[267]Bn, Ist Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex
[268]19 Hay 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon,
[269]198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex
[271]Remarks: The absence of a DD Form 598 from Arnold's
[272]201 file limited the quanity of infornation
[273]which could be obtained for each iten
[274]listed above. His 201 file did not reflect
[275]any action taken to conduct a background
[276]investisation on this individual.
[278]914
[280]6, SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[281]a 4
[283]PED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[285]vA
[286]“ON K. DURIBET, SOlst Ml Det ane wiv,
[288]i dea ts
[289]FORM 34 | REPLACES WD AGO oA) 34, ! jens ay | incl May BE. ihe. fi
[290]yarns? gy 4 Pare ae
[291]us \ dey g gy Biv Coa oe ae
[293]NW 88613 Docid:34531180 Page 3 | [3]
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194-10012-10472.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 2107 Note) Caset:Niw
[2]03-18.
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]Date : 07/22/96
[8]Page : 1
[10]AGENCY
[12]RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]AGENCY INFORMATION
[18]INSCOM/CSF
[19]194-10012-10472
[21]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[23]ZFOOOQ003W - PAGES 915-917
[25]ORIGINATOR
[26]FROM
[28]TO
[30]TITLE
[32]DATE
[34]PAGES
[35]SUBJECTS
[37]DOCUMENT TYPE
[38]CLASSIFICATION
[39]RESTRICTIONS
[40]CURRENT STATUS
[42]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[43]OPENING CRITERIA
[44]COMMENTS
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]USA
[49][ RESTRICTED ]
[51]AGENT REPORT
[52]10/05/67
[54]3
[56]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[58]REPORT OF FINDINGS
[60]FIELD 201 FILE CHECK
[61]POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION
[62]SIMONS, PETER KARL
[64]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[65]SNCDASSTETED
[67]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[68]03/20/95
[70]PAGES 915-917 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES 797-799.
[72]NW 88613 Doctd:34531181 Page 1
[74]rs,
[76]“"AR QEFICIAL LISE ORLY
[77]aad AGENT REPORT
[79](AR 381-130; FM 30-17)!
[83]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[85]5 October 1967
[87]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[89]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[91]Possible Sensitive Desertion
[93]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[95](FIELD 201 FILE) On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simons,
[96]Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the ,
[97]following information:
[99]Name:
[101]Rank:
[103]Service Nunber:
[104]SSAN:
[106]DOB:
[109]Citizenship:
[111]BPED:
[113]ETS:
[115]Marital Status:
[116]Religious Preference:
[117]Father:
[119]Mother:
[123]Physical Profile;
[124]Physical Description:
[126]Civilian Education:
[128]Civilian Employment:
[130]Aptitude Test Scores:
[132]Peter Karl Simons
[134]Specialist 4 (E4)
[136]RA 19 841 799
[138]550~-66-6254
[140]5 May 1943
[142]Cottbus, Germany
[144]German, Alien Registration Number, A 13 022 527;
[146]Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New
[148]York, New York,
[150]28 April 1965
[152]27 April 1968
[154]Single
[156]Roman Catholic
[158]Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB: j
[160]Unknown; Present Address: Unknow. ;
[162]Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB: i
[164]17 September 1920; Present Address: r
[166]Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W. Germany. .
[168]Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown; i
[170]Present Address: Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset, i
[172]‘England. a i
[174]PULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965
[176]Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; Weight, 1784;
[178]Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None.
[180]55-59, Martin-Buteer; Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated;
[182]59-62, Dierdorf Handesischule, Duesseldorf, Germany, |
[183]i
[185]Gradua ted.
[187]Apr 59=Apr 62, Deurognbh, Berliner Alee 29, Duesseldorf,
[188]Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL),
[189]immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, AimSesa Forwarders Inc,
[190]406 S, Nain St., Los Angeles, Califomia, Supervisor, _
[191]Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty
[192]Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Mr.
[193]Kilmer, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York;
[194]Oct 64-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St.,
[196]Apr 65 to present, US Army.
[197]IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; GM, 102; MM, 115, CL, 123; |
[199]GT, 106
[200]Protective MGorténe is Miscluded From’? °
[202]i
[203]|
[204]Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined: Amy} |
[206]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[209]a a
[210]LL ECCED RE Fo LAME LE EL
[212]SOAS
[214]Automatic Tormingtion (Per TO. AR OA
[216]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[218](CONTINUED)
[220]|
[222]WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)
[223]FORPA
[226]DA 1 are 52 3 4) i REPLACES WD AGO rords fo) Pavel La sii Nagle useb | e C a \ | Y
[228][vn Seerrener Tru 11 - wae SON eee ee =
[230]NW 88613 Docid:34531181 Page 2
[232]oe FOR QEEICIAE HSE Ake
[233]7 AGENT REPORT ~~
[235](AR 381-130; FA 30-17)
[237]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[238]| ; 5 October 1967
[239]| Possible Sensitive Desertion 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[241]« MroROFrmONGS (PIEID 201 FILE) (Continued)
[243]Military Education: Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31120, Signal
[244]Corps, 12 weeks, 1965
[245]Record of Non-Judicial
[247]Punishnent: None
[248]Record of Courts Martial: None
[249]DD Form 395: Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1945
[250]DD Form 98: Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965
[251]Security Clearance: None; Background investigation requested
[253]by the ACofS, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia,
[254]on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for
[255]retention of Simons in Militery Service
[256]Civilian Foreign Travel: 53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56
[257]to Aug 55, Great Britain, Schooling; fug 57
[258]to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61,
[259]France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the
[260]following countries for sight seeing purposes
[261]from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgium,
[262]Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, laxemburg, France,
[263]and Spin
[264]Foreign Service: 14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Gerzany
[265]Fromotions/Reductions! PVT El (P) & Apr 65 AR 601-210
[266]PUT E2 (P) 28 Aug 65 Far 7~19 AR 600-200
[267]PrCE3 (P) 4 Jan 66 Per 1 UO4, Co B, 32d Sig Bn
[268]APO 757
[269]SPA EL (T) U0#32, Co B, 32dSig Bn, APO 09757
[270]Chronology of Military
[271]Service: 28 Ape 65 USARECSTA (4075) FT POLK LA
[272]. 10 May 65 ComlBn2ngBDE FL Polk Ia
[273]17 Jul 65 StwCoS USASESCS Ft Gordon, GA
[274]16 Nov 65 CoB 32dSigBn APO 09757
[275]25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus
[276]9 Jan 67 CoC lAlstSigdn lst AD Ft Hood, Tex
[277]8 Jun 67 A9thSigFlatoon, 198thInfBde,FtHd, Tex
[278]} Remarks Remarks: ,
[279]1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal,
[280]17 August 1967, issued new identification card,
[281]2. Special Order Number 31, Headquserters, 198th Infantry Brigade,
[282]Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons
[283]effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Oberlindau 89.
[284]Frankfurt-iain, Germany, Special Instruction: EM will report to the
[285]frmy attache et the fmerican Embassy, or to the Co:mander of the US
[286]Elenent, as apvropriate,
[287]3e Simons enlisted urder the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one
[288]Michael C, Morgan, RA 19 €41 794, for further assignment to USARSUR.
[289]cavr da Machited From | © (CONTINUED)
[290]5. WPL OMY IANO BEGANATION, OF PEUM AGENT, 345-15) 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[292]Protcciivas Thork
[294]tho 9
[296]| WILLIAM FP. MOCKLER, SOLeSMI Det (Armd Div) Yo tebe
[300]DAL BAT ce wo nco Gay METER MRE CNTY
[302]delle ibe asian cilia - sw eecibevaa indepen eee ~ at ee teen instal
[304]NW 88613 Docid:34531181 Page 3
[307]AGENT REPORT”
[309](AR 381-130; FM 30-17) . ‘
[310]V. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT ~ ~
[312]‘2. DATE SUBMITTED
[314]5 October 1967
[316]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER, _
[317]J 4 erorrorrinoincs (VISLD 201 FILE) (Gontinusd)~ a -
[318]4. Simons drew advance yay of $360, 6 Aug 67, to be reraid
[319]at $60 a month for six months.
[323]1
[324]i
[325]Protuctive Marking is [xcluded Prom
[326]Automatic Termination (Pur 19 AR 345-35) g 1 7
[328]5. TYPED NAME AHD ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE QF SPECIAL AGENT 2!
[330]‘ oe Z - ve H
[331]STLLIAN Fy MOCK, 50lst MI Det (Armd Div) a A :
[333]Se ane DSi poner ene a
[335]& “ dee aay
[336]DA. “aim 3 A REPLACES WD folded sal Vouk Ly jE vnfl marle : beep. i |
[337]| meat Jv Ie Gree Ua |
[339]a a © Anat ah acted al wn nn -— ee ee a en
[341]NW 88613 Docid:34531181 Page 4 | [3]
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[121]Step-Father:
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[343] |
194-10012-10477.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITLE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[20]CLASSIFICATION
[21]RESTRICTIONS
[22]CURRENT STATUS
[24]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[25]OPENING CRITERIA
[26]COMMENTS
[28]NW 88613 Docid:34531187 Page 1
[30]Date : 07/22/96
[31]Page : 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[40]194-10012-10477
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]ZFOOOO0O3W - PAGE 935
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA
[47]REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
[48]07/00/66
[49]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[50]FAMILY HISTORY
[51]RESIDENCES
[52]EMPLOYMENT
[53]CIVILIAN SCHOOL
[54]DOWLING, JOHN JOSEPH
[55]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[56]SU CMASSTETED
[58]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[59]03/20/95
[61]Vv
[63]_CONTROL OFFICE:
[65]Bolu
[67]Payaart
[69]OWE ING
[71]JONM
[73]Y REQUEST-£OR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK ao
[75]ST NAME. a FIRST NAME ¢ MIDDLE "NAME - “ALIAS (ES) - NICKNAMES - CHANGED NAME
[76]J
[78]ae an
[80]DATE be REQUEST
[82]os
[84]r © {AR 381-130)
[86]4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
[88]26 Md 68 !
[90]if
[92]PODOWLING JOUN J.
[94]Waterbury, Conn San Diego, Calif
[96]A a aerer) A 560 68 6542
[97]H 5. DAY. MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH 6. PLACE OF BIRTH Pa 7. SERVICE NUMBER
[98]oo :
[99]Le) Yet 46 ee wakland, Calif pesssacenme.. a
[100]8. RELATIVE Ss NAME 9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 10. PRE ENT ADDRESS CITIZENSHI
[101]Jo FATHER 3016 Murre: 23 idge Rd
[103]fb. MOTHER {maiden name)
[105]actin
[106]Chia
[108]TNS. WR
[110]3016 Murray Riage Ra
[114]San Diero, Calif {
[116]ERA
[118]1 AUG
[120]DAS
[122]3027
[124]os
[128]an er ee
[130]NW 88613 Docid:34531187 Page 2
[132]Wire. FROM:
[134]Ac of S, G2
[135]Ft Ord, Calif
[136]Rio THRU:
[138]FINGERPRI NT CARD FD 258, MUST BE ATTACHED
[139]REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 30. gy x > OBSOLE TE
[141]Lyte i
[142]i
[143]whe. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday ‘or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter) : |
[144]i a. FROM b. TO c. NUMBER AND STREET en d. city @. STATE
[145]Tt
[146]~ F Li. 4
[147]f 1952 1966 4016 Murray Ridge Ra Sen Diego Calif tet
[148]! .
[150]t . 1
[151]} — 13, EMPLOYMENT /List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter) a
[152]t a. FROM b. To c. EMPLOYER T d. PLACE
[153]| | !
[154]p66 3-66 _ Bill Burgers Drive-in inda Vista
[155]p06 7x66 Car wash
[156]ig : — a = — et. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL " a _— — ~~ - i
[157]le FROM b. To c. NAME d. PLACE
[158]i Yes | ONO : " 1s. aT T Yes" “answers ore expanded in Remarks) i
[159]; gz @. 1S THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES? ql
[160]x b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[161]; x ¢. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
[162]H a d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
[163]x e. FORMER US GOVER GRE ENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
[164]vy fs ANY QUALIFUBS N°@F DOD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98? | [2]
[6]
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[126]athe ee antlbatal dab
[127]
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[149]:
[165]& ae RECORD?
[166]
[167] |
194-10013-10005.pdf | [1]Date : 07/22/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]892 (44 USC 2107 Note). Casett NW JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]eas IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10005
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZFOQOQOO3W - PAGES 959-960
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]}
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 01/24/68
[21]PAGES : 2
[22]SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[24]DEFECTOR
[26]GRIGGS, KENNETH C.
[27][ RESTRICTED ]
[28]INTERVIEW
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]COMMENTS : PAGES 959-960 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.
[37]EXHIBITS I THRU IV INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[39]NW 88613 Docid:34531203 Page 1
[41]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[43]| PIG, RA 19 772 37 (C)
[45]DPOB: 25 December 196, Korea
[47](AR 381-130; FM 30-17) |
[49]2. DATE SUBMITTED
[50]2h January 1968
[51]3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[53]8008-9182 SSANs 519-h6- 94
[55]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[57]On 23 January 1968, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, retired dairyman, residing
[59]Les nov
[60]ab 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, was interviewed at his home concerning oo78
[61]letters received in reference to his adopted son, Kenneth C. GRIUGS, and S
[62]stated substantially as follows: so
[63]J ao.
[64]. Source stated that he had received two letters concerning SUEJECT 7)
[65]| from a Philip LaChapelle Jr, 172h North Linder, Chicago, Tllinois, who claimed Qu) 3
[66]| to have been the Security and Intelligence clerk with the 191st Crdinance Deny
[67]| Battalion, Vietnam, but was presently out of the US Army. LaChapelle, in his Gs: v
[68]| first letter dated 8 November 1967, indicated to Source that being SULJE T's aan
[69]| closest friend in Vietnam, he felt that he should write to Source giving some of Tm
[70]| history and facts concerning the period prior to SUBJECT's defection. LaChapeli 2 3 o
[72]indicated sympathy and concern over SUBJuCTIs defection. LaChapelle stated that D
[74]he believed the Army had. suppressed infomation to cover up mistakes, LaChapellc
[76]told Source about SUEJEGY being beaten and shunn.d by HIS companions curing HIS |
[78]assignment with the 191st Ordinance Battalion an. that he was SUBJECI's only |
[80]friend, LaChapelle stated that he had also writven to SUBJECT, but had received
[82]no answer, Copy of letter written by LaChapelle dated 8 November 1967 is
[84]| attached as EXHIBIT T . On 16 November 1967, Source answered the letter of
[86]| 8 November 1967 thanking LeChapelle for the communication. Source indicated
[88]| that he had very little knowledge of SUBJECT s philosophy or plans and reouested
[90]| further information from LaChapelle since he was apparently more knowledgeable - :
[92]concerning these aspects, Source asked four specific ouestions of LaChapelle.s
[94]First asking about SUBJECT's view of the world, as known by LaChapelle. Secondly
[96]asking LaChapelle's view on why SUBJECT felt that HES conscience dictated decision
[98]was a solution to any problems that HE envisioned. Thirdly was SUBJiCT encouraged
[100]by a third party to defect and the last question was whether SUBJECT's defection was
[102]| motivated by resentment about HIS treatment by other Army personnel, Source
[104]| indicated that LaChapelle's tone in his letter indiceted a certain feeling of
[106]| bittemess about the way the incident was handled by the US Army. Source requested
[108]| a reply because the information would be of interest to Source. Copy of letter
[110]| by Source dated 16 November 1967 is attached as EXHIRIT “i, LaChapelle
[111]again wrote to Source on 20 November 1967, indicating interest in the letter : f
[113]| written by Source on 16 November 1967. lLaChapelle stated that he was bitter
[115]| because the Army took no remedial action concerning the mental state of SULJECT,
[117]| and indicated to Source that SUBJECT had a medical history of emotional
[119]| Gisturbance. LaChapelle stated that he had been the Security and Intelligence _
[121]| Clerk, 191st Ordinance Battalion, Vietnam, and SULJECT's personnel records | !
[123]| nad passed over his desk after the defection, LaChapelle indicated that the |
[125]records had been classified to conceal any embarrassing incidents. LaChapelte q
[127]commented on the National Security in reference to the classification of SUBJECT's |
[129]records, LaChapelle indicated that SUBJuCI's view of the world was that HE : :
[131]yas simply bitter and thought it was going in the wrong direction, LaChapelle t
[135]Pana
[137](continue da)
[138]| j 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ‘
[139]SEAT RAAT IAAT MA
[141]| FLOYD KR, EEERY, 115th ML EDOOWHOREDSD AT
[143]iN
[145]“6. SIGNATURE OF SCRCIAL AGENT
[146]al DTA!
[148]mart eZ pO Ce : _ A 4
[151]DA 1 APR 52 34 | REPLACES WD Loo Form 341, DION ab: Wich MAY BE USED. d a ue
[152]og on Te er Co a. ct A a ae a aaa
[154]cesta ee tuntes ee . ; OPE SR
[156]ete sates Henan veal
[157]NW 88613 Docld:34531203 Page 2
[164]toe
[166]TIT CAGENT REPORT
[168](AR 381-130; FM 30-17) 1”
[170]Fe
[172]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT . 2, DATE SUBMITTED
[174]GRIGGS, Kenneth C. 2 January 1968
[176]PFC, RA 19 772 378 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[178]IPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea 8008-9182 SSAN: 519-h%~799)
[180]H 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[182]stated that SUBJECT favored an absolute state of control as long as HE was one
[183]of the ruling class, LaChapelle stated that SURJECT's defection was the truest
[184]decision Hi could make thus making the only solution HIS conscience dictated.
[185]LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT was not encouraged by a third party to defect except
[186]maybe the world around HIM. LaChapelle stated that only three people other than
[187]himself who were in any way friendly were Chaplain Camp, presently in Germany,
[189]Hal Nelson, and John Klink. ‘hey would not encourage a defection. SUBJECT wuld
[190]not let HIMSELF be influenced by others. LaChapelle went on saying that SUBJECT's
[191]defection was motivated by HIS resentment of HIS treatment by other personnel,
[192]indicating that HE had been beaten and reauired stitches in HIS head on one
[194]i
[195]i
[197]fl
[199]occasion and that HE was considered different by HIS section leaders. SUBJECT 2297
[200]had mentioned defection to LaChapelle, but LaChapelle had talked HIM out of do 6)
[201]it. At that point in their relationship, the friendship between LaChapelle and -y
[202]SUBJECT seemed to decline, LaChapelle blames the Army and society for forcing 8 me
[203]| SUBJECT to defect. LaGhapelle recuested any information or photographs of S32
[204]SUBJECT because LaChapelle intends to be a writer and wants to write about os a
[205]SUBJECT and HIS problems. A copy of letter dated 20 Jovember 1967, written by res Qo
[206]| LaChapelle is attached as EXHTSIT ZI . On 2h November 1967, Source answered isa
[207]the letter of 20 November 1967, stating that at first he was apprehensive and 9 Re
[208]| wondered how much LaChapelle was involved with SUBJECT, Source commented thet heBPP- in
[209]| could offer very little concerning SUBJECT for LaChapelle to use in his writing. 33 oO
[210]Source stated that SUBJECT's mental problems started before HIS entry into the 3°
[212]US Army and that LaChapelle should take a more kindly view of the people who
[213]compiise society. Source gave LaChapelle a short history of SUBJECT from the
[214]time HE came to the United States in 1956 to the time HE was placed in the .
[215]Childrens Home, Boise. During this period, SUEJECT would not stay with any one
[216]thing for very "long, such as scouts, sports, end phys..cal activities. HE
[217]became angry very easily. SUBJECT was intelligent in school, From the time
[218]HE was placed in the Childrens Home until HE entered the US Army, SUBJECT
[220]had a history of running away end was never satisfied being in the same place for
[221]very long. SUBJECT finished hich school and entered the military service.
[222]Source steted his desire to agen hear from LaChapelle. A copy of letter dated
[223]2h November 1967, written by Source is attached as EXHIBIT iW.
[225]Source stated that he had not received any other correspondence
[227]| concerning SUBJECT, Neither Source nor his family have heard from SUBJECT or
[228]| any official of the Cuban Embassy in Japan. Source further stated that he hav~
[229]| no information concerning SUBJECT's present whereabouts or HIS future plans.
[230]Source stated that he would advise this office in the event he received other
[232]| letiers or information pertaining to SUBJECT.
[234]AGENT'S NOTES: Source was very cooperative. He had original letters
[235]| written by LaChapelle and carbon copies of his replies, which Source allowed this
[236]office to copy 960
[238]} 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
[240]rt Ye Mal r
[242]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[243]) FLOYD w. ERERY, 115th PEpGHeGS: (ayy ; Piped CO Eee
[244]D) A apn s2 34 | rence} WD AGO FORM 1.) JUN, 47, WHICH MAY BE use. ; _
[245]. Sine es wm tients san woe . .
[247]7 OS ARSE SSIES
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194-10013-10006.pdf | [1]992 [44 USC 2107 Note) Casett Mi
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[33]Date 07/22/96
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[36]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[37]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[39]AGENCY INFORMATION
[41]INSCOM/CSF
[43]194-10013-10006
[45]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[46]ZFOO00003W - PAGE 961
[48]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[50]USA
[52]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[53]01/24/68
[55]1
[57]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[59]COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR.
[61]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[62]UNCLASSIFIED
[64]3
[66]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[67]03/20/95
[69]LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[71]a
[73]EXHIDI' COVER SHEET
[75]Subject: GRIGS, Kennet’. C,
[76]PFC, RA 19 772 378
[77]DPOH: 25 December 1946, Korea
[79]File Number: 8008-9182
[81]519=-6-799
[83]Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)
[84], Agent Report Dated: 2, January 1968
[85]Description: Copy of letter dated 6 November 1967 written by Philip
[86]. LaChapelle Jre, 172 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois,
[87]to SUEJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs,
[88]2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaio.
[89]EXHIBIT
[90]ad
[91]thes a
[92]| ree . . ca oe cen cae vane ston seme, ie tabi eP
[94]ee oe kere ti Bets Sobek cree ene = . — ee ee ares _ aes
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[30]Date 07/22/96
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[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[40]194-10013-10009
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]ZFO00003W - PAGE 965
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[47]USA
[49]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[50]01/24/68
[52]1
[54]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[56]COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS
[58]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[59]UNCLASSIFIED
[61]3 .
[62]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[63]03/20/95
[65]LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[67]- oe pes
[68]: is
[70]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[72]. Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C.
[73]PFC, RA 19 772 378
[75]DPOB:
[77]25 December 1946, Korea
[79]File Number: 8005-9162
[80]5191 6—799L,
[82]Preparing Units
[84]115th MI Group (IV)
[86]Agent Report Dated: 2) January 1968
[90]wae eee - Aa tcnea saetle
[92]NW 88613 Docid:34531207 Page 2
[94]Description: Copy of letter dated 16 November 1967 written ty
[96]SURJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Grig:;,
[97]2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, to Ppity
[98]LaChapelle, 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illi icis.
[100]EXHIBIT 7
[102]965 | [2]
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[32]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[33]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[35]AGENCY INFORMATION
[37]INSCOM/CSF
[39]194-10013-10011
[41]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[42]ZFOO0003W PAGE 968
[44]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA
[48]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[49]01/24/68
[51]1
[53]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[55]COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR.
[57]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[58]UNCLASSIFIED
[60]3
[62]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[63]03/20/95
[65]LETTER .INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[67]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[69]Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth Co
[70]PFC, RA 19 772 378
[71]DPCE: 25 Lecember 1946, Korea
[73]File Number: 8008-9182
[74]519-6799,
[76]Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)
[78]Agent Report Dated: 2) January 1968
[80]Description: Copy of letter dated 20 November 1967 written by Philip
[81]‘ LaChapelle Jr, 1724 Linder, Chicago, Illinois, to
[83]. SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil Le Griggs, 2615
[84]- Noh 30th Street, Boise, Idaho.
[86]EXHIBIT 71!"
[88]968
[90]os ec bi tee
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[28]NW 88613 Docid:34531211 Page 1
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[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[40]194-10013-10013
[42]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]ZFO00003W PAGE 973
[45]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[46]USA
[47]EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
[48]01/24/68
[49]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[50]COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS
[51]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[52]UNCLASSIFIED
[53]3
[54]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[55]03/20/95
[57]LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[59]LXHLEIT COVER Slot
[61]Subjects GiIGGS, Kenneth C.
[62]PFC, BA 19 772 378
[63]DPOB: 25 December 1944, Korea
[65]File Number: 8008-9182
[66]519-6-799),
[68]Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)
[70]“Agent Report Dated: 2 January 1968
[72]Description: Copy of letter dated 2h November 1967 written by SURJECT's
[73]. adopted father, Mr. Cecil i. Griggs, 2615 North 30th
[75]Street, Boise, Idaho, to Philip LaChapelle Jr, 172k
[76]North Linder, Chicago, Illinois.
[78]EXHIBIT SZ
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194-10013-10139.pdf | [1]Date : 07/25/96
[2]Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10139 ; .
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : .ZFO00003W - PAGE 1179
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : [ RESTRICTED ]
[18]TO :
[19]TITLE : AGENT REPORT
[20]DATE : 10/04/82
[21]PAGES : 1 .
[22]SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[24]WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY
[26]GLAISTER, HENRY D.
[28]SWORN STATEMENT
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[32]RESTRICTIONS : 3 :
[33]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[34]: DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
[35]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]COMMENTS : SWORN STATEMENT INDEXED SEPARATELY.
[38]NW 88613 Docid:34531350 Page 1
[40]AGENT REPORT
[42]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency Is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[44]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
[46]4 October 1982 foe
[47]WHITE, Joseph Timothy 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER ; |
[48]PFC, 492-60-2196 pe
[49]DPOB:. 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO ;
[51]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[53]SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING
[54]RELEASED TO SUBJECT . .
[56]On 3 October 1982, Henry dD. Glaister, CPT, Field Artillery, 547-76-1040,
[57]United States Army, was re-contacted at his home at 812 Maplewood Drive,
[58]Columbia, Missouri 65201, for the purpose of obtaining his written permission
[59]for release of Agent Report (AR), DA Form 341, dated 22 September 1982,
[60]concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196, CPT Glaister reviewed AR
[61]prepared from his personal interview on 16 September 1982, (EXHIBIT )
[62]and executed a Sworn Statement, DA Form 2823, dated 3 October 1982,
[64](EXHIBIT } giving his written permission to release the AR, in full, to
[65]Norval (NNN) White Jr., father of Joseph Timothy WHITE,
[67]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT f
[68]rss. rome, seameme | fant Aryan
[69]DAR 347 coo GR-OFFCIREUSE. ONLY wero sovomv- sore
[73]r NW 88613 Docid:34531350 Page 2
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194-10013-10140.pdf | [3]Date : 07/25/96
[5]Page : 1
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[8]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[10]AGENCY
[12]. RECORD NUMBER
[13]RECORDS SERIES
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[16]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[18]. ORIGINATOR
[19]~ FROM
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[23]DATE
[24]PAGES
[25]‘SUBJECTS
[27]DOCUMENT TYPE
[28]CLASSIFICATION
[29]RESTRICTIONS
[30]CURRENT STATUS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[33]OPENING CRITERIA
[34]COMMENTS
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]INSCOM/CSF
[39]194-10013-10140
[41]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[43]: -ZFO000003W - PAGES 1180-1182 AND 1185-1187
[45]USA .
[46][ RESTRICTED ]
[48]AGENT REPORT
[49]09/22/82
[51]6
[53]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[55]WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY
[57][ RESTRICTED ]
[58]INTERVIEW
[60]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[61]UNCLASSIFIED
[63]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[64]03/20/95
[66]NW 88613 Docid:34531351 Page 1
[68]a Lar
[69]AGENT REPORT \
[71]. . (
[72]thie form, see FM 30-17(C) AR 381-130; the proponent agency Is the Olfice of the Assistont Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 1s
[74]. ? .
[75]For vac ol
[76]1. NAME OF SUBJECT O8 TITLE OF WHCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED -
[78]22 September 1982 _
[80]WHITE, Joseph Timothy 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[81]PFC, 492-60-2196
[82]DPOB: 5 Nov 62, St Louis, MO -
[84].
[86]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[88]SOURCE HAD NO. OBJEGTION TO.HIS IDENTITY. BEING
[89]RELEASED TO SUBJECT
[91]On 16 September 1982, Henry D. Glaister, Captain, 57-76-1040, United
[92]States Army, was interviewed in his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia,
[93]Missouri 65201, concerning Joseph T, WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. Source,
[94]SUBJECT'S former Military Science instructor from August 1980 to May 1981, at
[95]Kemper Military School and College (KMSC), Boonville, Missouri 65233, stated in
[96]substance as follows:
[98]Source first met SUBJECT in August 1980, when SUBJECT enrolled at KMSC.
[99]From August 1980 to May 1981, Source had contact with SUBJECT three times
[100]weekly for a one hour class,and twice monthly for weekend léadership classes.
[101]Also during this period, Source counseled SUBJECT on three occasions concern-
[102]ing SUBJECT'S academic performance. From June 1981 to July 1981, Source, act-
[103]ing as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advance Summer Camp (ASC)
[104]Liaison Officer for KMSC at Fort Riley, Kansas, had contact with SUBJECT on
[105]three separate occasions about SUBJECT'S performance in ASC. Source last met
[106]SUBJECT in September 1981, when SUBJECT enrolled for 1981/82 school year at -
[107]KMSC, Source has had no contact with SUBJECT since September 1981 when HE. |
[109]departed KMSC.
[111]SUBJECT was born in St Louis, Missouri, where HIS family still maintains
[112]their xesidence. SUBJECT'S father worked for an automobile company in Saint
[113]Louis, Missouri, (NFI). Source could provide no further information regarding
[114]SUBJECT'S family background, past employments, prior residences or education.
[115]SUBJECT had no close associates,
[117]SUBJECT was a member of Source's Military Science class from August 1980
[118]to May 1981. SUBJECT was a good student and did well on the course tests.
[119]Source had no disciplinary problems with SUBJECT but Source counseled SUBJECT
[120]on three occasions to improve HIS leadership skills. During a counseling
[121]session in approximately November 1980, SUBJECT told Source that HE was having
[122]financial difficulty in meeting HIS school expenses. SUBJECT further stated
[123]that HE was concerned with the financial assistance being provided by HIS
[124]parents as being a financial burden to the family, In approximately January |
[125]1981, Source assisted SUBJECT in entering the Simultaneous Membership Program
[126](Sup) to assist HIM financially. In the SMP, SUBJECT was required to train
[127]with the Missouri National Guard (MNG), Marshall, Missouri, once a month and
[128]received $88 for HIS duty time. From June 1981 to July 1981, SUBJECT attended
[130]PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
[131]FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (continued)
[132](Para 13, AR 340-16)
[134], 6. SIGNATURE Of SPECIAL AGENT
[136]RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group De Fark 9. poyan
[138]DAs 34) mF OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[139]NW 88673 Docid:34531351 Page 2 INCL (1)
[141]NAME AND ORGANIZATION Of SPECIAL AGENT
[143]3S. TYPED
[145]TY Gro. 1970 320-907/248
[147]AGENT REPORT
[149]. For vee of this fom, see FM W-17(C;- AR 381-130; the proponent agency in the Office of me Ansiatent Chief of Steff for tntalligance.
[150]7. DATE SUBMITIED
[152]22 September 1982
[154]3, CONTROL SYMBOL O8 FILE NU MOER
[156]RoTc ASC at Fort Riley, Kansas. In July 1981,..while.Source was assigned as an
[157]Individual Tactical Training (ITT) instructor at Fort Riley, Kansas, he re-
[158]ceived performance evaluations from SUBJECT'S peers and cadre personnel de-
[159]scribing SUBJECT as immature and unable to interact with HIS peers. As a result
[160]of these reports, SUBJECT was required to appear before an administrative review
[161]poard. .The review board was to decide if SUBJECT was to be given credit for
[162]completing ASC. Source, acting as defense representative for SUBJECT, sub-
[163]mitted testimony to the board that SUBJECT should be granted credit for ASC.
[164]Source could not recall any specific statements other than saying SUBJECT was
[165]immature but should be given the benefit of the doubt and be granted credit
[167]for completing ASC. The board ruled that SUBJECT would be given credit for ASC,
[168]Upon completion of ASC, SUBJECT was to report~for’ Annual Training (AT) with
[170]C Battery, 128th Field Artillery Battalion, MNG, Marshall, Missouri. When
[171]SUBJECT returned to KMSC approximately 15 September 1981, HE told Source that
[172]HE had failed to attend HIS AT, (NFI). SUBJECT further stated HE had attended
[173]airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, -from August 1981 to September 1981,
[174](NFI). In September 1981, SUBJECT'S financial trouble led to HIS disenro]lment
[175]from KMSC, which subsequently led to SUBJECT being disenrolled from the ROTC
[176]program, (NFI).. v :
[179]1. NAME OF SURJECT O8 THLE OF eCiOEnT
[181]WHITE, Joseph Timothy
[182]PEC, 492-60-2196
[183]DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO
[185]4, REPORT OF PINOINGS
[187]In approximately February 1981, Source was informed by Thomas McCarthy,
[188]Professor, KMSC, that SUBJECT and McCarthy debated the benefits of National
[189]Socialism (Nazism) during McCarthy's American Government class. SUBJECT'S
[190]support for Nazism enraged the other students and further widened the gap with
[191]SUBJECT'S peers, (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United
[192]States, but, because of HIS beliefs on Nazism and Communism,’HE was branded
[193]"Anti-US" by HIS peers. Source, personally could not recall any occasions in:
[194]which SUBJECT specifically denounced the United States Government. In approx-
[195]imately May 1981, Booker T. Washington, SUBJECT'S former. Cadet Commanding,
[196]Officer, A Company, KMSC, told Source that he was having trouble with SUBJLCT.
[197]Washington related that because of SUBJECT'S beliefs in Nazism, and HIS
[198]"superior" attitude over HIS peers, HE was alienating HIS peers against HIM,
[199]Washington related further that SUBJECT had gone AWOL overnight in approx-
[200]jmately April 1981 to attend a debate between the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux
[201]Kian (KKK) and a representative of the National ‘Association for the Advancement
[202]of Colored People (NAACP), The debate was held in Columbia, Missouri.
[203]Washington also advised Source that SUBJECT had National Socialist reading mate-
[204]rial in HIS barracks room, (NFI). Source did not know Washington's presont
[205]address, only that Washington may be in the Berkley or Oakland, California
[206]area, (NFI). °
[208]Source believed SUBJECT was mentally stable, but emotionally immature,
[210](continued)
[212]6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[214]|RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group aue 2. Bey
[216]Ra”
[217]D A van 32 3 4 ] REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. Yr aro: 1970 200-007/248
[219]FOR OFFICIAL USE ONEY
[221]§. TYPED NAME ANO ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT -
[223]| NW 68613 Docld:34531351 Page 3
[225]_ af . .
[226]ot CY
[228]| ce
[229]“= AGENT REPORT:
[230]For veo of this form, eee FM 30-17(C): AR 361-130; the proponent opency {5 the Office of the Asslatant Chief of Stolf for ntelll gence.
[231]1. NAME OF SUBIECT OF TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. GATE SUBMITTED
[233]22 September 1982
[235]3. CONTROL SYMBOL Of FILE NUMBER
[237]WHITE, Joseph Timothy
[238]PFC, 492-60-2196
[239]i uis. MO
[241]4. REPORT OF PNOINGS
[243]Source believed SUBJECT felt HIS peers were against HIM because of HIS “rightist”
[244]views and therefore, HE would not interact with them. SUBJECT also believed in
[245]the ‘Nietzsche Philosophy” of superior beings and that HE was one of the
[247]"Chosen Few", (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States
[248]because SUBJECT never made any disloyal statements in his presence. Source
[249]provided no {nformation regarding SUBJECT'S use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or
[250]adverse involvenents with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT was of high moral
[252]character and integrity.
[254]Source was willing to provide a sworn statement and appear before any
[255]court or administrative hearing which may arise concerning SUBJECT.
[257]_ AGENT'S NOTES: Source was shown a copy of message, DTG 0822002, SEP 82,
[258]SUBJECT: WHITE, Joseph Timothy, PFC, 492-60-2196, DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis,
[259]MO (U), and was asked to review the message..and to comment about what areas could
[260]be attributed to SUBJECT. Source replied that the message did contain areas
[261]attributable to SUBJECT. The following statements were identified by Source:
[263]a
[265]A. “..seMy deep conviction.” .
[267]B. “...UeS. troops were being sent to South Korea to ‘protect’ South Korea
[268]from ‘aggression’ from the North."
[270]C. ‘.s.-People like me have no hope in the United States after being dis-
[271]charged from the Army." ;
[273]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT © ©. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[275]RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group
[277]D A ists 34 | neriaces wo aco “EGR “OPETCT ys F 0 N FY Yi aro: 1990 990-907 /a40
[279]NW 88613 Docld:34531351 Page 4
[282]AGENT REPORT
[284]For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 361-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. -
[286]1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[287]. 22 September 1982
[288]| WHITE, Joseph Timothy 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[290]| PFrc, 492-60-2196
[291]DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO
[293]4, REPORT OF FINDINGS
[295]SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING
[296]RELEASED TO SUBJECT
[298]On 16 September 1982, Henry D, Glaister, Captain, 47-76-1040, United
[299]States Army, was interviewed in his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia,
[300]| Missouri 65201, concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. Source,
[301]SUBJECT'S former Military Science instructor from August 1980 to May 1961, at
[302]Kemper Military School and College (KMSC), Boonville, Missouri 65233, stated in
[303]substance as follows: ;
[305]Source first met SUBJECT in August 1980, when SUBJECT enrolled at KMSC.
[306]From August 1980 to May 1981, Source had contact with SUBJECT three times
[308]| weekly for a one hour class,and twice monthly for weekend leadership classes.
[309]Also during this period, Source counseled SUBJECT on’ three occasions concern-
[310]ing SUBJECT'S academic performance. From June 1981 to July 1981, Source, act-
[311]ing as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advance Summer Camp (ASC)
[312]Liaison Officer for KMSC at Fort Riley, Kansas, had contact with SUBJECT on
[313]three separate occasions about SUBJECT'S performance in ASC, Source last met
[314]SUBJECT in September 1981, when SUBJECT enrolled for 1981/82 school year at
[315]KMSC. S@urce has had no contact with SUBJECT since September 1981 when HE
[316]departed KMSC..
[318]SUBJECT was born in St Louis, Missouri, where HIS family still maintains
[319]their residence. SUBJECTS father worked for an automobile company if Saint
[320]Louis, Missouri, (NFI). Source could provide no further information regarding
[321]SUBJECT'S family background, past employments, prior residences or education.
[322]SUBJECT had no close associates.
[324]SUBJECT was a member of Source's Military Science class from August 1980
[325]to May 1981, SUBJECT was a good student and did well on the course tests.
[326]Source had no-disciplinary problems with SUBJECT but Source counseled SUBJECT
[327]on three occasions to improve HIS leadership skills. During a counseling |
[328]session in approximately November 1980, SUBJECT told Source that HE was having
[329]financial difficulty in meeting HIS school expenses, SUBJECT further stated
[330]that HE was concerned with the financial assistance being provided by HIS
[331]parents as being a financial burden to the family. In approximately January
[332]1981, Source assisted SUBJECT in entering the Simultaneous Membership Program
[333](smp) to assist HIM financially. In the SMP, SUBJECT was required to train
[334]with the Missouri National Guard (MNG), Marshall, Missouri, once a month and
[335]receivel$88 for HIS duty time. From June 1981 to July 1981, SUBJECT attended
[337]= MARKING IS EXCLUDED
[338]SeMINATION
[340]FROM A .
[341](Para 13, AR
[342]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[344]185
[345]RAUL J. LOZANO, 9024 MI Group 1185 Cry 0, Dw, RAO
[347](continued)
[349]DA Vs BQ] ecsv0 “FOR OFPICIAE™ USE ONEY sweeney"
[351]NW 88613 Docid:34531351 Page 5
[353]AGENT REPORT
[355]_ For use of this form, see FM 30°17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent ageney is the Office af the Agsistant Chief af Staff for Intelligence.
[357]+. NAME OF SUBJECT OR FALE OF INCIDENT 2. DATE SUBMITTED 3
[358]22 September 1982
[360]WHITE, Joseph Timothy . 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
[361]PFC, 492-60-2196
[362]DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO
[364]4. REPORT OF FINDINGS
[366]ROTC ASC at Fort Riley, Kansas. In July 1981, while Source was assigned as an
[367]Individual Tactical Training (ITT) instructor at Fort Riley, Kansas, he re-
[368]ceived performance evaluations from SUBJECT'S peers and cadre personnel de-~
[369]scribing SUBJECT as immature and unable to interact with HIS peers. As a result
[370]jot these reports, SUBJECT was required to appear before an administrative review
[371]board. The review board was to decide if SUBJECT was to be given credit for
[372]completing ASC. Source, acting as defense representative for SUBJECT, sub-
[373]mitted testimony to the board that SUBJECT should be granted credit for ASC.
[374]Source could not recall any specific statements other than saying SUBJECT was
[375]immaturé but should be given the benefit of the doubt and be granted credit
[377]for completing ASC. The board ruled that SUBJECT would be given credit for ASC,
[378]| Upon completion of ASC, SUBJECT was to report: for Annual Training (AT) with
[380]C Battery, 128th Field "artillery Battalion, MNG, Marshall, Missouri. When
[381]SUBJECT returned to KMSC approximately 15 September 1981, HE told Source that
[383]HE had failed to attend HIS AT, (NFI). SUBJECT.further.stated HE had. attended .
[384]airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, from August 1981 to September 1981,
[385](NFI). In September 1981, SUBJECT'S financial trouble led to HIS disenrollment
[386]from KMSC, which subsequently led to SUBJECT being disenrolled from the ROTC
[387]program, (NFI).
[389]In approximately February 1981, Source was informed by. Thomas McCarthy,
[390]Professor, KMSC, that SUBJECT and McCarthy debated the benefits of National
[391]Socialism " (Nazism) during McCarthy's American Government class. SUBJECT'S
[392]support for Nazism enraged the other students and further widened the gap with
[393]SUBJECT'S peers, (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United
[394]States, but, because of HIS beliefs on Nazism and Communism, HE was branded
[395]"Anti-US" by HIS peers. Source, personally could not recall any occasions in
[396]which SUBJECT specifically denounced the United States Government. In approx-
[397]imately May 1981, Booker T. Washington, SUBJECT'S former. Cadet Commanding
[398]Officer, A Company, KMSC, told Source that he was having trouble with SUBJECT.
[399]Washington related that because of SUBJECT'S beliefs in Nazism, and HIS
[400]“superior” attitude over HIS peers, HE was alienating HIS’ peers against HIM.
[401]Washington related further that SUBJECT had gone AWOL overnight in approx-
[402]imately April 1981 to attend a debate between the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux
[403]Klan (KKK) and a representative of the National Association for the Advancement
[404]of Colored People (NAACP), The debate was held in Columbia, Missouri.
[405]Washington also advised Source that SUBJECTThad National Socialist reading mate-
[406]vial in HIS barracks room, (NFI). Source did not know Washington's present
[407]address, only that Washington may be in the Berkley or Oakland, California
[408]area, (NFI).
[410]Source believed SUBJECT was mentally stable, but emotionally immature.
[412](continued)
[414]5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[416]RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group
[418]D A 1 apa 52 3 4 ] REPLACES WD FOR" OF P. rentie in Fl 0 NEY tr GP: “e sroreor/ae,
[422]NW 88613 Docid:34531351 Page 6
[424]AGENT REPORT —
[426]For uco of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Offies of tha Aceictant Chief of Staff far Intelligence.
[427]4. N@ME GF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT - 2. DATE SUBMITTED
[429]22 September 1982
[431]WHITE, Joseph Timothy
[432]PFC, 92-60-2196
[433]5 Nov 61, St Loui
[435]4, REPORT # FINDINGS
[437]Source believed SUBJECT felt HIS peers were against HIM because of HIS "rightist"
[438]views and therefore, HE would not interact with them. SUBJECT also believed in |
[439]the "Nietzsche Philosophy" of superior beings and that HE was one of the .
[440]"Chosen Few", (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States
[441]because SUBJECT never made any disloyal statements in his presence. Source
[442]provided no information regarding SUBJECT'S use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or
[443]adverse involvements with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT was of high moral
[444]character and integrity.
[446]Source was willing to provide a sworn statement and appear before any
[447]court or administrative hearing which may arise concerning SUBJECT.
[449]AGENT'S NOTES: Source was shown a copy of message, DTG 0822002, SEP 82,
[450]SUBJECT: WHITE, Joseph Timothy, PFC, 492-60-2196, DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis,
[452]| MO (U), and was asked to review the message and to comment about what areas could
[453]be attributed to SUBJECT. Source replied that the message did contain areas
[454]attributable to SUBJECT, The following statements were identified by Source:
[456]A. "...My deep conviction."
[458]B. "...U.S. troops were being sent to South Korea to ‘protect’ South Korea
[459]from ‘aggression’ from the North."
[461]C, "...People like me have no hope in the United States after being dis-
[462]charged from the Army."
[464]5, TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 4. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[465]fuss sono | aul 9 Fongny
[466]DA 1 ee 3 4 1 REPLACES WD we sco BAR. ‘OF co BOR OPT Ep “Tl SF ON “te gro: 1970 390-907/248
[468]NW 88613 Docid:34531351 Page f | [1]©
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194-10013-10141.pdf | [1]Cc ©
[2]Date : 07/25/96
[3]Page : 1
[5]UFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[8]AGENCY INFORMATION
[10]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[11]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10141
[12]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : .Z2F000003W - PAGES 1183-1184
[15]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[17]ORIGINATOR : USA
[18]FROM :
[19]TO :
[20]TITLE : SWORN STATEMENT
[21]DATE : 10/03/82
[22]PAGES : 2
[23]SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[25]WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY
[26].[ RESTRICTED ]
[27]AFFIDAVIT
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[30]RESTRICTIONS :. 3 '
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[35]COMMENTS - :
[37]NW 88613 Doctd:34531352 Page 1
[39]|
[41]SWORN STAT EMENT
[43][os of The Deputy pli Qf Staff for Personnel.
[44]COLY MELA LOUSSOGLE 3 OTe LZ
[45]LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDOLE NAME SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, GRADE/STATUS A
[46]La SrEle AEM CANE : Cor |
[47]Ble MAREWCOD DL COLUM EIA flo é520/
[49]NEN Y D. Gea STB, 647 76-1070, CPLA, LEONE AT Be
[50]MAPLEWOOD DP, COLUMBIA MISSO.RE AUSHOKIZE RLECEASE Or AEE
[51]re PAUL F. £0 ZANO, 902' MI GROUP CON CEFENIVG = TOSELY FIULHY
[52]WHITE, TO Me MORVAL cw Mn) WHITE FR (fA THER OF FOSEAM THoTA
[54]ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
[56]1, LEWOY ONINEC__ GLAU TEL SANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
[57]REMRT DA foRM 341, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1982, SUGUNNTEO BY
[58]ware) CBD //// 11/6 6 ENO OF STRATE OEE JALECE OSS
[60]1183
[62]| Coys
[63]OF BE RSC Oe,
[64]CONTINUED.*”
[66]ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING “STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT _ DATED __' TH *
[67]BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND
[68]BE INITIALED AS “PAGE___OF__PAGES."" WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE ! WILL
[70]| BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORN.
[72]DA: FOP 2Q23 — surenseoss 04 ron sone, 1 san se, wich wit ex USED.
[74]NW 60613 Docid:34531352 Page 2
[76]t ‘STATEMENT (Continued)
[78]q
[80]HAVE READ
[82][MENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE t AND ENDS ON PAGE Ze. . | FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT
[83]MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. | HAVE INITIALEO ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
[84]CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. | HAVE MACE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHO
[85]OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR U
[87]7 St 3
[88]WITNESSES: (Signature of Person Making Statement)
[90]Subscribed ond ewern to before me, o persen euthorized by |.w
[91]te administer oaths, this “3 dey AOCTDELL . wA2_
[92]Le, CSSOH
[94]at
[95]NORGANIZATION OR AOORESS 2 BAe
[96]; 7 7 LY. of 2 am q
[98]RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group
[99](Typed Name of Person Adminiatering Oath)
[100]ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Article 136(b), UCMJ
[103](Authority To Administer Cathe)
[105]®U.S. G.P.O. 1980- OOP IPARTT
[107]NW 60613 Docid:34531352 Page 3 | [4]
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[48]”~—COPG
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[102]
[104]
[106]
[108]
[109] |
194-10013-10144.pdf | [1]C O
[2]Date : 07/25/96
[3]Page : 1
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[10]AGENCY INFORMATION
[12]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF oe so
[13]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10144 -. : an
[14]RECORDS SERIES : -DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS ;
[15]; AGENCY FILE NUMBER © .ZF000003W. - PAGES 1190- 1191 :
[17]See Se pe eo ee et ee ee ee ee ne
[19]DOCUMENT AINFORMATION,
[21]ORIGINATOR : USA.
[22]mo _ FROM: : -STCRRO’ CI/SIGSEC SPT BN. .
[23]me TO : HODA . a a
[24]“TITLE : MESSAGE ~—. ue oo. os
[25]. DATE : 09/11/82 ta a
[26],.. Js + PAGES : 2 ee
[27]_ ;}SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[29]a ; WHITE; JOSEPH TIMOTHY. , wR >
[31]J . ' . a i t '
[32]. [ RESTRICTED ] bo, . Os
[33]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Be oo
[34]CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL .. | ; So ae
[36]RESTRICTIONS : 3 ; ; , ™,
[37]- CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED. WITH DELETIONS” , a
[38]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95, ;
[39]OPENING CRITERIA 7 oe
[40]7 COMMENTS : PAGES 1190- 1191 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP
[41]94. _
[43]NW? 68613 Docld:34531355 ‘Page 1-
[46]NW 60613 Docid:34531355 Page 2
[48]PROBLEMS.
[50]clST_-PHILOSOPHY. OF EQUALITY.
[52]*DEDICATED To «=
[53]*EXCELLENCE IN «
[56].
[58]PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
[60]OTTCZOVW RUEAUSAGS20 2541633
[61](DMMEDIATESPRIOR ITY
[62]‘OP 1116302 SEP 82
[64]Fa SICRRO CIASIGSEC| SPT SH _CFGGM) oR aan DEVENS. MA TITAGPA-A-DE//
[65]TO HODA WASH OC (/0AM1-C1//
[66]INFO CDR USAINSCOM FT MEADE MO //TAOPS-OP//
[68]COR9O29 MI GP FT MEADE HD //TAGPA-OP-I//
[70]CORCI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-A-OPI//
[71]CDRMID CI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MONMOUTH id //IAGPA-A-MO//
[73]8T
[75](ON ADDRESSEE: NITE ACTION REQUIRED
[76]INFO ADDRESSEES: DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR
[78]Me ;
[79]SUBJECT: WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY, PFC, 492-860-2196, DPOS: 5 NOV 61,
[80]ST LOUIS, HO (U)
[82]A. MSG, IAGPA-OP-1, 0912407 SEP 82, SAB.
[84]CE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE RELEASE OF HIS IDENTITY TO
[86]t.
[88]2. (U) ON 10_SEP_82, JOSEPH C..MERLINO, 027-54-4638, 2LT., USAR.
[90]DPOB: 26 APR™GZ, “BOSTON MA~-COMPANY.- “h,-20- BATTALION, 104TH. INFANTRY
[91]MASSACHUSETTS-ARMY..NATIONAL GUARD) - “WAS INTERVIEWED AT THE UNIVERSITY
[92]‘OF MASSACHUSETTS CAMPUS, AMHERST, MA, CONCERNING SUBJECT. SOURCE
[93]PROVIDED SUBSTANTIALLY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (MSG PARA 3 THRU 12
[94]3. (U) MERLINO-FIRST-MET. WHITE-ON .28.AUG-80, WHEN BOTH ARRIVED AT
[95]KEMPER MILITARY SCHOOL & COLLEGE (KMSC), BOONVILLE, WISSOURT, AS
[96]FRESHMEN (PLEBES), ASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT COMPANIES. .MERLINO‘S-LAST
[97]CONTACT_WITH “WHITE WAS ON. ABOUT. 26 SEP -B1, TWO DAYS BEFORE WHITE”
[98]“DROPPED” OUT OF ASC THROUGHOUT ACADEMIC, YEAR. 60=81-AND- MO cas IGk
[100]THEY ALSO MET BRIEFLY AT THE AIRBORNE SCHOOL, FT BENNING, GEORGIA, IN
[101]JULY 1981, THEY WERE WELL ACQUAINTED, BUT WERE NOT CLOSE PERSONAL
[102]FRIENDS.
[104]4. (C) KERLIHO DID NOT KNOW OF WHITE'S FAMILY BACKGROUND OR FINAN-
[105]CIAL SITUATION, ALTHOUGH WHITE DID_NOT-APPEAR. TO HAVE. ANY. FINANCIAL
[106]WOR_DID_MERLING_KNO IF WHITE USED NARCOTICS:-OR- ABUSED”
[107]“ALCOHOL. WHITE” WAS” PHYSICALLY™ REAL THY-AND”FIT, BUT NOT ATHLETIC. HE
[108]DID-NOT_ APPEAR..TO-HAVEANY_DEVIANT_ SEXUAL. TENDENCIES. OR..HANG=UPS,..10
[110]TNOIVIOUAL” WHO" VALUED: HIS.-OWN HONE STY_AND_ INTEGRITY HE WAS ~EXCEPT~
[112]TOALLY-BRIGHT. AND CONSISTENTLY. EARNED-HIGH-GRADES.IW.ACADEMIC SUB-
[113]JECTS AND MILITARY SCIENCE.
[115]5. (C) WHITE WAS ALSO A VERY SERIOUS, EXTREMELY INTENSE, AND HIGHLY
[116]IOEALISTIC. PERSON... HE WAS-USUALLY-HILD=MARNERED. BUT WOULD’ GET” ~”
[117]“QUITECAGITATED-DURING SERIOUS. DISCUSSIONS: IN PAPERS HE WROTE AND
[118]DURING” DISCUSSIONS IN HISTORY CLASS, .HE-EARNESTLY_DEFENOED_THE.MARX-
[119]TN OTHER DISCUSSIONS” HE” REVEALED -AN—
[120]"ADMIRATION.FOR-HOM- ADOLF HITLER. HARNESSED -THE ENERGIES. AND. HATIONAL-
[122]“WADE” WHITE THE BUTT OF OERTSION AND PRANKS AT XNSC.
[123]-CIZED_AND UNIVERSALLY DISLIKED.
[125]FOR WHOM HE HAD LOST RESPECT. THIS TENDENCY LEO TO AN
[127]INCIDENT AT ROTC ADVANCED CAMP AT FORT RILEY, KANSAS, IN THE SUMMER
[128]OF 81, WHEN WHITE REFUSED TO OBEY A CADET'S ORDER (WO FURTHER INFOR-
[129]MATION), AND WAS ALMOST BOARDED OUT OF THE CAMP.
[131]7. (C) WHITE'S SERIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTENSITY SEEMED
[132]THREATENING TO SOME CADETS AT KMSC. HE TENDED. TO REMAIN ALOOF FROM
[133]HIS PEERS. O€ TOP OF THIS, HI5-POOR. “SKIN COMPLEX 10N;= NERVOUS” MANNERS
[134]TSMS,_AND ERRATIC.DRESS ( ONE DAY - EAT, THE NEXT"OAY ~~ SHABBY)
[135]HE-WASOSTRA-
[136]HIS PEER RATING AT ROTC ADVANCED
[138]“CAMP"WAS"REPGRTEO-T0-BE-LOW.--—
[140]8. (C) WHITE .TRIED-HARD-T0- SUCCEED. IN.EVERYTHING_HE.DID. HOWEVER,
[141]HIS SELF-ESTEEM WAS CONSTANTLY BATTERED BY THE ATTITUDES OF HIS PEERS
[142]AND A STRING OF DISAPPOINTMENTS. DURING HIS FIRST YEAR AT KMSC HE
[143]GOT INTO SEVERAL FIGHTS WITH OTHER CADETS., ALSO, HIS GIRLFRIEND (NFI)
[144]BROKE-OFF THEIR RELATIONSHIP, ALLEGEDLY” UNDER PRESSURE FROM HER
[145]PARENTS. (WHITE PAPERED A MYRIAD OF PICTURES OF HER ON HIS DORMITORY
[146]WALL.) WHITE DATED SELDOM, IF AT ALL. ONE OF HIS INSTRUCTORS, &
[147]CAPTAIN DAVID, REPORTEDLY GAVE WHITE A ZERO FOR TURNING IN A PAPER
[148]LATE, BUT DID NOT PENALIZE OTHERS WHO HAD DONE SO, AS SEVERELY.
[150]CPT DAVID WAS THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO EITHER LIKED OR HATED OTHERS,
[151]a TT SEEMED THAT HE DISLIKED WHITE INTENSELY FOR UNKNOWN REASORS.
[153]B
[155]TSW-OE-THE GERMAN_PEOPLE. HOWEVER, WHITE-DID-NOT APPEAR TO-8E PRI- = BY CDA Lo-@ .3Cute FOWPO |
[156]HATI-OR-ANTI=SEMITIC. IN FACT, Hé_,SEEMED-TO-BE” SYMPATHETIC TO HIN-
[157]“ORTTY-GROUPS IN"THE'U:S. . AND THEDR 810" FOR EQUALITY.“ =~ AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1F
[158]<g~"(C) WHITE NEVER. SHOWED ANY DISLOYALTY TO THE U.S., ALTHOUGH DUR-
[159]ING CONVERSATIONS” HE WOULD-CONSTRUCTIVELYCRITICIZE. AND_CRITIQUE
[160]“BOTH AMERICAN SOCIETY. ANDTHE SOVIET-GOVERIMENT': HE TALKED SERIOUSLY OY
[161]“ES THOUGH HE’ HAD HIS OWN” PROGRAMS” FOR IMPROVING THE LOT OF OTHER t
[162]PEOPLE, WHITE:NORMALLY-RESPECTED. SUPERIORS .ANO. THEIR-AUTHORTTY, AS A P
[163]LONG AS THEY MADE SENSE TO HIM. BUT, HE WOULD BALI” AT-O6EYING SCMEONE f
[165]ACTION Danica) (") ep At
[166]INFO AOC-DAMI WATCH(1) SCB REVIEW(1) pl \")
[167]SECTIONAL(1) uN
[168]TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 6
[169], 1 ‘ arn
[170]i?
[171]MCN=82254/ 13958 TOR=62254/17012 TAD=82254/1855Z COSN=MAP 183
[173]ARMY SECTIONAL MSG
[175]PAGE oh,
[176]1116302 SEP 8
[178]SECT 01 OF O02
[180]i
[182]NW 886192 MGch SUH A SS Paige 3
[184]“DEDICATED TO «
[186]mEXCELLENCE IN ~ Oe
[187]| ECCNMLNECAT IONS =
[188]PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
[189]OTTCZOVW AUEAUSA4921 2841633 AND LOCATING SOURCE.
[190]IMMEDIATE CLAS BY INSCOM PAM 380-6
[191]O P 1116302 SEP 82 REVIEW ON 11 SEP 92.
[193]BT
[194]FM SAICRO CI/SIGSEC SPT BN (FGGM) COR FT DEVENS MA //IAGPA-A-DE//
[195]TO HQDA WASH DC //DAMI-CI//
[197]INFO COR USAINSCOM FT MEADE MD //IAOPS-OP//
[198]CDR9O2D MI GP FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-OP-I//
[199]CORCI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MEADE MD //IAGPATA-OPI//
[200]CORNID CI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MONMOUTH NJ //IAGPA~A-KO//
[201]aT :
[202]QQ
[203]FINAL SECTION OF 02
[204]9. (C) AFTER WHITE'S NEAR FAILURE AT ROTC ADVANCED CAMP,—HE-WAS-RE-
[205]-CVCLED-AT_ATRBORNE. SCHOOL-FOR-FAILING-THE-PTTEST. HOWEVER, “HE
[206]RECOVERED AND COMPLETED THE COURSE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO KMSC IW
[207]SEP Bi, HE WAS DEEPLY UPSET UPON LEARNING THAT HE WAS ONLY A CADET
[208]SERGEANT FIRST CLASS AND NOT AN OFFICER. WHITE WAS IN SOURCE'S
[209]COMPANY (SOURCE WAS A CADET MAJOR). ON ONE OCCASION, DURING LEADER-
[210]SHIP LAB, SOURCE CORRECTED WHITE WHO WAS IMPROPERLY EXECUTING THE
[211]HIGH AND’ LOW CRAWLS. WHITE REACTED INDIGNANTLY AT FIRST? BUT AFTER
[212]SOURCE EXPLAINED WHAT HE DID WRONG, WHITE ADJUSTED AND CONTINUED TO ~
[213]PERFORM. ALSG IN SEP 81, ANOTHER CADET (NEI) TOOK ONE OF
[214]WHITE'S BOOKS FROM HIS ROOM . VIOLENTLY ANGRY, WHITE DRAPED TOILET
[215]PAPER ON THE CADET'S DORMITORY OOOR AND SET IT ON FIRE. SOURCE
[216]CAUGHT WHITE IN THE ACT OF SETTING THE BLAZE AND LAUGHING ABOUT IT.
[217]MERLINO VERBALLY CENSURED WHITE AKO THREATENED TO GET HIM DISMISSED
[218]FROM KMSC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHITE AOVISED THAT HE WANTED TO
[219]LEAVE SCHOOL. HE WAS COUNSELED 8Y COLONEL JOHNNY PARKER, SCHOOL
[220]COMMANDANT. PARKER ASKED SOURCE FOR HIS RECOMMENDATION. SOURCE
[221]SYMPATHIZED WITH HHITE BUT COULD NOT RECOMMEND HIM FOR A COMMISSION
[222]IN THE US ARMY BECAUSE OF HIS APPARENT IMMATURITY.
[223]40. (C) AROUND 26 SEP 81, BEFORE WHITE LEFT KMSC, HE TOLD SOURCE HE
[224]WAS LEAVING THE SCHOOL. WHITE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE AN OFFICER,
[225]BECAUSE HE WAS “FED UP WITH THE BULLSHIT AND THE ASS-KISSING™. KE
[226]ADDED THAT HE-WAS GOING TO ENLIST-IN-THE-ARMY..AND -BECOME.°THE BEST...
[227]_DAWN-NCO_HE-COULD-BE.~~ BY HIS COMMENTS “AND HIS”TONE”OF VOICE DURING
[228]THIS-AND-OTHER-CONVERSATIONS, WHITE INDICATED THAT HE WASN'T GETTING
[229]WHAT HE DESERVED FROM SOCIETY. SOURCE WISHED HIM LUCK AND NEVER SAW
[230]OR HEARD FROM HIM AGAIN,
[231]11. (C) SOURCE-WAS-NOT.-TOTALLY--SURPRISED-WHEN-HE..READ-OF-WHITE:'S
[232]DEEECTION-TO-NORTH-KOREA.. IT SEEMED TO FIT-IN WITH HIS PERSONALITY,
[233]SOURCE GUESSED THAT WHITE'S ACTION RESULTED FROM THE CULMINATION OF
[234]HIS DISAPPOINTHENTS. WHITE-PROBABLY-BECAME-DIS ILLUSIONED_WITH-THE,
[236]‘DEFECTING-FOR;SOME-TIME. HOWEVER, —IT-WAS-MOST-LIKELY- ONE. PARTICULAR.
[237]"TNC IDENT THAT-PROMPTED-HIM-TO-TAKE” ACTION: NHERE-ONCE-WHITE-WAS “A,
[238]FATLURESIN-U-S=- SOCIETY..-HE-GAINED-NOTORIETY- AND-AN INTERNATIONAL
[239]AUDTENCE THROUGH-HIS: DEFECTION: SOURCE -BELIVEO-THAT_THE TEXT-OF
[240]THE-REMARKS-ATTRIBUTED_10-WHITE-BYTHE GOVERNMENT OF_NORTH KOREA.
[241]SOUNDED-LIKE_NHITES-WORDS-AND-MANNER=OF- SPEECH, “AND_COULD_VERY WELL.
[243]"HAVE BEEN-AUTHORED-BY-WHITE AT, LEAST THEY PARALLELED-WHITE’S“~——*
[244]IDEALISTIC” BUT NAIVE SOCIO=POLITICAL VIEWS. ;
[245]12. (U) OTHER SOURCES FROM KMSC WHO KNEW WHITE BETTER OR WHO COULD
[247]CONTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INCLUDED: COL JOHNNY PARKER, ‘
[249]~ (TEL: 816-882-5623), RICHARD J. HATCH, 2LT USAR, A NATIVE OF PENN- REG CLASSyIeD
[250]SYLVANIA, WHO KNEW WHITE BETTER THAN ANYONE, CAPTAIN NICHAEL R. N é
[251]BASISTA, SGM JAMES MCKANE, AND MSG STEPHEN 6. HINK. BY CDA UO 308" en.
[253]13. (UW) 2OC-FOR-THIS~REPORT—IS-S/ Ac ALFRED-M=~MEMOLE-—FORT_DEVENS, ~ AUTH Pare 7. robte FOUPO
[254]<RESIDENT-OFFICE,, AV 756-2001, (ON LEAVE 13 THRU 17 SEP 82). - ara
[256]14. (UY DELAY IN REPORTING AROSE FROM OIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFYING
[258]ACTION ARMY SECTIONAL(1) (m)
[259]SECTIOBAL(L)
[260]: TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED . 1
[262]1191
[264]MCN282254/13955 TOR=82254/1654Z TAD=82254/1854Z2
[266]603 DOD 5200.18
[268]COSN=MAP 182
[270]PAGE 1 or 2
[271]1116302 SEP 82
[273]SECT O2 OF O2 | [4]
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[54]*=COMMUNICAT IONS *
[55]
[57]
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[63]
[67]
[69]
[72]
[74]
[77]
[81]
[83]
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[164]€
[172]
[174]
[177]
[179]
[181]
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[185]
[192]
[196]
[235]'ARMY-OR_HIS_UNTT-AND_HAQ” PROBABLY_ENTERTAINED-THOUGHTS-ABOUT
[242]
[246]
[248]
[252]
[255]
[257]
[261]
[263]
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[272]
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[275] |
194-10013-10152.pdf | [1]Date : 07/25/96.
[2]“Page : 1
[4]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[5]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION
[9]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[10]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10152
[11]RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZFOQO003W - PAGES 1203-1204
[14]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[16]ORIGINATOR : USA
[17]FROM : SSO
[18]TO : SSO DA
[19]TITLE : MESSAGE
[20]DATE : 09/08/82
[21]PAGES : 2 ‘
[22]SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[23]i \
[24]WHITE, JOSEPH T.
[26]VIDEO TAPE
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 3
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
[33]OPENING CRITERIA
[34]COMMENTS
[36]NW 88613 Docid:34531363 Page 1
[38]~ 7
[40]a
[42]BUIGIIIGIUIIIIIIOIOIOIUISIIIUIIIUIIIIIGIIIOIIII III III ICING IIIOII I IIE II i IOI Soi i itiniW i ti iiriet
[44]UNCLAS E FTO
[45]FOSS IIIISISIIOIIOISI II IIIS HISIIUISI SSSI SIIOIISISI SISSIES ISIIOIOIOSISIOII I Din
[47]ZCZCRPG324 PAGE
[48]DANS 296-043001
[50]INPUT CDSN = DKA925
[51]TOR 8819342 SEP 82 TOT 810347 SEP 82
[53]OTTMZYUW YATHRA 8192 251 995a"MNSHomVYEKDOO,
[54]ZNY MMNSH
[56]ZKZK 00 SQA DE
[58]Q—#BU9ANZ_SER— Be
[60]FM SSO KOREA//CS//
[62]TO sso DA
[64]B j
[65]it? 'y
[66]ZEM f
[67]UNCLAS. £& F 7.0
[69]EYES. ONLY//EYES: ONLY? eves ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONL Y//EYES ONLY it
[70]$880 OA FUR -MS™E SS ITCONNOR, OAMOmQ00) SSO KOREA FROM MG HUGAGHERy ,
[71]Cs, USPRUEUSK
[73]SUBJECT? VIDEO TAPE = PFC WHITE
[74]1, ENROQUTE TO YOUR LOCATION I8 A VIDEO TAPE: COPY. OF THE: TeLevYséo
[76]NORTH KOREAN PRESS CONFERENSE PFC WHITE: HELD IN “PYONGYANG, |
[78]2, THE TAPE IS BEING HANDCARRIED BY LTC ROBERT TURPIN, a7 4m26— =2297,.
[79]USA,.LTC TURPIN IS SCHEDULED TO ARRTVE. YASHTINGTON NATIONAL: ATRPORT
[81]AT 2155 LOCAL, & SEPTEMBER, ON TWA FLIGHT 240,
[83]Se REQUEST AN OFFICER FROM YOUR OFFICE MEET HIM UPON HIS ARRIVAL
[85]HE- IS ORESSED IN SHORT SLEEVE CLASS A UNIFORM,
[87]4. LTC TURPIN HAS RESERVATIONS AT THE HOLIDAY INN, NEXT” ‘TO MILPER=
[89]CEN HG IN ALEXANDRIA, SHOULD HE BE MISSED AT TRE AIRPORT,.
[91]5, TAPE MUST BE CONSIDERED CLUSE HOLD NOW, BUT, OO NOT oBJECT To
[92]PERMITTING PARENTS TO VIEW IT UMDER DA CONTROL. WITHOUT ‘PRESS INVOLVES.
[93]MENT, NEWS MEDIA MAY HAVE TAPED INTERVIEW AND SEEMS: ‘BEST TO GIVE *
[94]PARENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW FROM GUR SOURCE FIRST RAYNER THAN THEM
[95]SEEING IT ON EVENINGS NEWS, PARENTS SHOULD BEF REQUESTED TO NOT DIS.
[97]CUSS THE TAPE or ITS CONTENTS AITH NEWS MEDIA, AS SUCH ACTION MIGHT
[98]JEOPARDIZE OUR 143 SEPTEMBER EFFORTS TO. TRY AND ARRANGE A FACE TO FACE
[99]INTERVIEW WITH WHITE,
[101]6, USE CF THE TAPE IN CONNECTION WITH NEWS MEDIA MUST BE CAREFULLY
[102]CONSICEREO, WE BELIEVE THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD DA ALLOW
[104]THE PRESS TO VIEW THE TAPE WITHOUT EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE PARENTS,.
[106]TO DO OTHERWISE VIOLATES COMMON COURTESY, MOREQVER, THE TAPE WAS NOT
[107]PRODUCED BY 000 FOR RELEASE BUT HAS SIMPLY FALLEN INTO. OUR POSSESSION
[109]AND YHUS PRESS HAS. NO UP FRONT RIGHT TO IT. ‘THE INTERVIEW WILL: NOT
[111]| oe , fet
[113]WW Fe a eA NRT ae AOS ME Wee ie Rae fe i ie aii ie ii ee we we ee
[115]UNCLAS E FT 0
[116]FEISS ISIS IO IIIS IIIOEI III ISI III ISIE IGOTIOO III IID IE
[118]q
[119]a
[121]HEBERT IIIT IS IOI IAI IIIT IODISI TOIT IOI IIIA IIE
[123]NW 88613 Docid:34531303 Page 2
[125]. WACLAS EF T 9 ; ;
[126]thee ee eee CPPCC CACC PPS E CES TS SESE L CSCS OLS CSOCLSLOTICLOOCCOCL LST ELS TTY
[128]PAGE 2
[129]BE SHOWN ON SOUTH KOREAN Ty AND IT 18 IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE US
[130]NOT TO ATO NORTH KOREA IN SPREADING THEIR COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA,
[131]OFFERING TO PROVIDE A SCREENING OR COPIES OF THE TAPE WELL PROVIDE
[132]THE NORTH KOREANS WITH A AUCH LARGER AUDIENCE THAN THEY MAY OTHER®
[133]4ISE ACHIEVE, COMMON SENSE DICTATES THAT WHATEVER WE CAN 09D TO DOWNe
[134]PLAY THE INCIOENT AND LIMIT THE PUBLICITY WILL PRUSTRATE COMMUNISTS
[135]EFFORTS TQ SPREAM THEIR MESSAGE, IF FEELING AT DA IS THAT TAPE
[136]SHOULG BE TURNER GYER TO PRESS, URGE TJAG ANO/OR GENERAL COUNCIL
[137]BECOME INVOLVED TO RULE ON THE NECESSITY TO DO $0.
[138]7. PLEASE RESPOND YHEH THE TAPE IS IN YOUR POSSESSION,
[139]8, WARN REGARDS,
[140]$S0 NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
[141]#8192
[143]NANA
[145]TRIIIDISIIINIOIIIINIOIIIIIIOISOIIIIISIGISIIIIGI I IISIUISIIIIIIIIIINIIOIGI IIIS IUIOR RE Herne k eee
[146]UNCLAS EF T 9
[148]APP ee eee RPP RSP PPS ASSES PEPE PCP SS PLETE Lercrcrerrrrerrrirrrariy ©)
[152]3
[154]NW 60613 Docid:34531303 Page 3 | [3]
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[156] |
194-10013-10155.pdf | [1]AGENCY
[3]RECORD NUMBER
[4]RECORDS SERIES
[5]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[7]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[9]ORIGINATOR
[10]FROM
[12]TO
[14]TITLE
[16]DATE
[18]PAGES
[19]SUBJECTS
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE
[22]CLASSIFICATION
[23]RESTRICTIONS
[24]CURRENT STATUS
[26]‘DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[27]OPENING CRITERIA
[28]COMMENTS
[30]| NW 88613 Docid:34531366 Page 1
[32]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[34]AGENCY INFORMATION
[36]INSCOM/CSF
[37]194-10013-10155
[39]DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT
[41]ZFOOQO0003W - PAGES 1208-1209
[43]USA
[45]SSO
[47]SSO MEADE
[49]MESSAGE
[51]09/07/82
[53]2
[55]SLOVODA, VLADIMIR
[57]WHITE, JOSEPH T.
[58]MILITARY PERSONNEL FILES
[60]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[61]CONFIDENTIAL
[63]3
[65]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[66]03/20/95
[68]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[70]Date : 07/25/96
[71]Page : 1
[73]PAGES 1208-1209 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP
[75]94.
[79]. os toe se - tot ‘ toe : bos rr rr
[80][ERE RES ELE OE SEE PRES EERE RE REE ERE LRA EE ESE EERE EE REE EERE SER EATER RE REE ES
[82]IDtTIStT Tier TTT TTT etiti etre eh titer et Titre Tit iii r err
[85]DANS 296maxn206 :
[87]INPUT COSN =: KDABO7: .
[89]TOR @714935Z SEPi a2 TATA 07479357 SEP 82 245~— Ine Say
[93]ZNy MMNSH _ it
[94]ZKZKi O0:.804 DE. Gata i
[95]087121072 SEP! 82 ZyH 4
[96]FM 550 LVNWORTH : :
[98]TO 880 MEADE:
[99]INFO. S80. INSCOM
[101]880 SAM
[102]880 DA//DAMT@CIC//
[103]ZEM
[105]aang. .
[106]HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS’: $80 MEADE PASS: TO COR, 9920 MIGP//TAGPASOP//.
[107]8S0 INSGOM PASS INFO TO ‘COR, USAINSCOM//TAOPS=P//,. :SSO 'SAM PASS° TD ; {
[108]$3, CI/SIGSEC SPT BN, 9020 MIGP//TAGPAsBeOP//,.
[109]SUBJECT! WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY
[111]PFC, 492n6Gm2196
[113]- pPOBE: 5’ NOV. -61, ST LOUIS, MO
[114]1, ON 1 .SEP 82, THE RESERVE! OPPICERS: TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) MILITARY:
[115]PERSONNEL: FILE QF JOSEPM TIMOTHY WHITE, PFC 492—60902196, LOCATEDIAT.
[116]THE KEMPER: MILITARY COLLEGE, BOONVILLE, MG 65233.WAS FURNISHED :BY”
[117]JOHN E, PARKER, LTC, INF, PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCTENCE: AND DISCLOSED:
[118]THE FOLLOWINGS.
[119]A. WHITE: ENROLLED. IN, THE KEMPER MILITARY COLLEGE: (KMC) .ON -@ JUNE F9a:
[120]WITH THE: ROTC PROGRAM,
[121]B, WHITE: ATTENDED BASICCANP FROM 9 JUN a0 ‘TO 14 JUL'‘86 AT FTNOX). _.
[122]KY 40121,. ON £9 JUN 6@, WHITE WAS: APPREHENDED BY ‘THE FT KNOX MILETARYS
[123]POLTCE:. (MP) AND CHARGED: RITH A UNTFORM VIOLATION. ANDJDISOBEYING A. .
[124]LAWFUL: GENERAL’ ORDER,. (MP REPORT WITH HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT BY WHITE: i
[125]FORWARDED UNOQER SEPARATE. COVER), WHITE! WAS: HELD. AT MP STATION FOR!
[126]APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS, AT WHICH TIME. HE: WAS: RELEASED. TO ‘HIS - UNETS
[127]COMPANY By ATHOBRIGADE, STH BATTALION, FT KNOX,. KY,
[128]C. ON £2 FEB. €4, WHITEVENLISTED IN. THE! US. ARMY NATEONAL) GUARD, FORA:
[129]PERIOD ‘OF SIX (6) YEARS, WHITE: WAS: ASSIGNED TO BATTERY C, 2S?
[130]BATTALION, 126TH FIELD ARTYLLERY, MARSHALL MO 653404. :
[132]TTT TETETITITITTTITTIT LITT LiriLiTiLLisrirriiritirrirriiii tii iti iti i
[134]CREP ROSELL OSOLOCEE OOOO OLAIO ESE LE eS TEEPE Ter SCPE ers ke
[136]AUTH Para 1 vata DOD. 5200. aR
[138]| NW 88673 Docid:34531306 Page 2
[140]6
[141]n
[144]Trerr Te TrrrTrorverrTTv ‘TTOTirirr rit iirrrrrLisre iri rh ti i eet
[146]TT ETETTTTITITITTTTTITTLILI TTT PITTI TTT LLL LULL LLL kl
[148]PAGE 2 |
[149]D, WHITE BEGAN STUDIES AT KMC IN SEPTEMBER 1981, SUBJECT'S SCHOLAS-
[150]TIC RECORD CUA FORM 134, FORNARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER) INDICATED
[151]"6" AVERAGE FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR AanBl,
[152]—&, WHITE ATTENDED ADVANCED CAMP FROM 5 JUN 81 To 15 JUL 84 AT rT
[153]RILEY: KS, ON 43 JUL 84 A BOARD OF OFFICERS HAS CONVENED UNDER THE
[154]PROVISTONS OF AR 1586, AR 14594 AND TRADOC REG 14581 IN ORDER TO
[155]DETERMINE IF SUBJECT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FROM THE CAMP HUE TO HIS. POOR
[156]PERFORMANCE, aA COPY OF THE BOARD PROCEEDINGS WITH SWORN STATEMENTS
[157]FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER,
[158]F, WHITE WAS GRANTED A SECRET CLEARANCE, ON 1@ SEP 61, BASED UPON A
[159]NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK,
[160]G, ON 15 SEP B1, SUBIECT WAS DISENROLLED FROM THE ROTC PROGRAM AT
[161]KMC FOR FAILURE TO ATTEND CLASSES,
[162]H, WHITE WAS BISCHARGED FROM THE US ARMY RESERVE GN 21 OCT A414, IN
[163]OROER TO ENTER ON ACTIVE DUTY ON 22 OCT 61, WHITE WAS ASSIGNED, FOR
[164]BASIC TRAINING AT FORT JACKSON, SC,
[165]2, ON 1 SEP 82, JOHN EDWARD PARKER, LTC, A468"62m4137, INFANTRY,
[166]PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCZENCE (MPS), KEMPER MILITARY COLLEGE (KMC),
[167]BOONVILLE, MO 45233 WITH RESIDENCE AT RURAL ROUTE 3, BOONVILLE, MO
[168]65233, “aS INTERVIEWED IN WIS OFFICE AT KHC,. PARKER ASSUMED THE
[169]DUTIES AS PMS IN AUG 81 AND HAD ONLY ONE COMTACT WITM SUBJECT, WHICH
[170]WAS ON 45 SEP. 92, WHEN WHITE WAS DISENROQLLED FROM ROTC, PARKER
[171]STATED THERE WAS NO ONE AT KMC. PRESENTLY, WHO WAS ASSIGNED THERE:
[172]DURING HHITE'S ATTENDANCE, PARKER DID STATE THAT CPT CARL J, OAVIO,
[173]SUBJECTIS FORMER INSTRUCTOR, WAS ATTENDING TRE COMBINED ARMS. AND
[174]SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL (CASS), FT LEAVENWORTH, KS 86027 (NFL), AND:
[175]THE PREVIOUS PMS, EUGENE C, MURKINSON, LTC (RETIRED), WAS RESIDING.
[176]AT 619 KROHN, BOONVILLE, Ma 68233,
[177]3, ON @ SEP 42, FUGENE ff, MURKINSON, WAS CONTACTED TELEPHONTCALLY
[178]REFERENCE SUBJECT, MURKINSON STATED HE WOULD BE WILLING TO BE
[179]INTERVIEWED BUT HE HAD HAD WO CONTACT WITH SUBJECT,
[180]4, ON 3 SEP 82, AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT BG (RETIRED) LOYD , RHIDOLES:
[181]HOOVER MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, RHIDOLEHOOVER IS PRESENTLY TDY ANO
[182]WILL OT BE AVATLABLE UNTIL 9 SEP 82,
[183]S, ON 3 SEP 62, AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT CPT CARL J, DAVIO AT CASS, PT
[184]LEAVENWORTH, KS, MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, CPT DAVID DEPARTED FT
[185]LEAVENWORTH, KS ON 3 SEP 82 ENROUTE TO HOS, 3 BN, 64ST ADA, 3D
[186]ARMORED DIVISION, APO NY, NY @9076,
[187]6, RECOMMEND THAT MURKINSON ANDRHIOOLEHQOVER NOT BE CONTACTED AS
[188]THEY KOULD NOT HAVE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH WHITE, ANY INFO THEY MIGHT
[189]FURNISH WOULD BE HEARSAY,
[190]7, ACTION OFFICER, S/A JOHN HARDY, AV 58292490/5289, REG NCLASSFFIED
[191]REVIENs 7 SEP 92 ON
[192]#9005 BY CDR Uo~81S00h FO1/PO
[194]AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R
[196]Wee te ie de Ye ge aria ie ae eee ee ee ITTTITTTETT LILLIE TLL TLL Li Li
[197]IHGISIISSISIIIEISIEIIIEISIEIIEIO IIIS IIS IIE RD FIG III Ret R EHR e HH ERENT e
[199]TOES TELICLCCILETILICCIC TT CI CIE CL LATICES CLES CECE L LEPC SES ELEC LEE LEE ES
[201]NW 60613 Docid:34531306 Page 3 | [2]
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[84]ZCZCRPOSSA ‘PAGE 4-
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194-10014-10116.pdf | [1][\e4-10014-10116, [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992]
[2]bow “ae aaa
[3]7 fee x
[5]te . =
[7]Date : 09/02/98
[8]Page : 1
[10]° JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[11]os | IDENTIFICATION FORM ;
[13]AGENCY INFORMATION
[15]AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
[16]RECORD NUMBER : 194-10014-10116
[17]. RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
[18]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AA851401WJ - PAGES 20-21
[20]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[23]ORIGINATOR : USA
[24]i FROM :
[25]| TO : :
[26]. TITLE : INFORMATION REPORT
[27]_ DATE : 00/00/00
[28]_ PAGES : 2
[29]SUBJECTS : CHARLES, CLEMARD J
[31]UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
[33]7 DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[34]co , | CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
[35]; - RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
[36]-. . CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
[37]» DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/15/98 - — .
[38]OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA FOR RELEASABILITY
[39]’" COMMENTS : DOCUMENTS DECLARED "NOT BELIEVED RELEVANT" BY THE CIA
[40]AND AGREED TO BY THE ARRB, PER MEMO DTD 14 AUG 98.
[42]NW 68037 Docid:34517497 Paget . a
[44]poe becouse prior to his rclcasa from prison the Haitian authoritics (no addt-
[48]a ne al
[51]qNW 68037 Docid:34517497 Page 2
[53]ec sn amngatee Bhd Lan ealaanin ee bomb SOE te ipsa A eas ata aati i TRE,
[57]f oe (ea
[59]ae | “as mint a |
[60]INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION leit cay w|i
[61]| CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Me et ae
[63]This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espiohage Laws, Title: *.
[65]18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. ,-
[67]a
[69]- . C-0-FF-LD-EEA-TAE | ve
[70]CONTROLLED DISSEM CIA WTENNAL USE ONLY NO DISSEM ABROAD
[72]() 22
[73]COUNTRY Baata REPORT NO. od xcae /1b068-68
[74]subECcT Clemasd Jescogh-Charles Rust Raise us ¢503 DATE DISTR. . he 7
[75]Gnencond Tciore Da Can Roca 1a Banking And Other ; 73)
[76]savesica/Cmice O? Charles's Plens/Prcsident NO. PAGES @ 4?
[77]Duvalicy Reportedly Loges To Improve Hie Imcge And U .
[79]fo kstract Foroiga Capital fini Business Activity/ — rererences DOS Case re b7 540
[80]Tuners Contin Concorning Possible Reorganization Supplement to: oclp-323/an105-6b
[82]Of Haoltica Governzant
[83]DATE OF INFO. Bray 68
[85]PACE 8 PATE ACQPart~nu-Prince, Tnttd, ray 6B —
[86]___THIs 1S U EVALUATED INFORMATION
[88]SOURCE Naturaliced US citizen of Hoitian birth. Gource maintains close conta
[89]with Haltdons in the US and with pravinent business and political/Tigares
[90]in Haft’ end travels at irregular intervais to the Caribbean countries. -
[92]1. Clemard Joscph-Chorles was released fron pricon during the evening of 25 Apr
[93]63 in rotura for a “xaasaa” of US $603 thousand.
[95]@. Gharlcs bos teen given wotdil 2) Nay 69 to produce the US $505 thousaml. This
[96]cua must ba ia on irrovaceble ictter of credit an en Acoricon tank in favor
[97]of the Nablonal Eank of tha Republic of Haita. It has boon inticated that |
[98]tho 24% May 63 dcadline can be extended, chould Charles te exparfencing any 4
[100]‘really umucual difficultics in producing the requircd monzy. ._
[102]3. In order to obtain his rolease from prison, Charles bad to sign o mcooranium
[103]of urferstanding that ho would produce the UB $605 thousand plus sam
[104]unideatificd real property. These terms were agrecd to by both Charles and
[105]his wife pricy to tha rolease. At tho sama tins, Charles wrote a personal
[106]-lLottor to President Duvelicr esking for release and promising to hand over ;
[107]ths money and property iu qucsticn. .
[109]4, Charles is now under house arrest in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
[111]5. Charles's imucddate resources consist of obout US $100 thousand 4m coach in
[112]two U3 banks (no eiditlonal date avalicble), various haces, tusincsscs
[113]_ (essen$ial o1l0, en cutcnobile dealership and others (no additional dota avail-
[114]_ ~ able)), tadidings, lond ond about US $800 thousand worth of Haltdan covermnent
[115]’ onda. Ho @20 bave encther US $300 thoucond in porconal funds in Haiti. He
[116]can no loncsor count on this moncy to help raise the US $505 thousond, however,
[118]Ne
[120]tional data avalichle) canfiscated it.
[122]6. Charles hag egrecd to raise the US $605 thousand on confition that {tbo used , |
[123]to pay cff legitimate claims of depasitore in his Banque Cammcredale dHaits.
[125]Es haz etatcd that he will permit the money to be paid out only to those an
[126]dopesitera who are able to produce documentary proof that they had deposited
[127]|
[129]funds ip his bank.
[131]EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL —
[132]DECLASSIFIGATION SCEEDULE
[134]f
[135]ao WB oe h Ut
[137]— 020 oo
[138]TFORMAVION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT]
[140]oo commmmaL/6sh Sone un- ch Is) |
[142]the dissemination of this document is limitad to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components
[143]ot the USIB member agencies, and to thosa senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled
[144]1s accordance with paragraph 8 of UCID 1{7, it may be reloased to thosy componunts of tha depatimunts and agencies of the U. 8. Government directly
[145]pustipating in the production of National tntolligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organiza:
[146]wnt ef personnel, uicluding consultants, under a contractual relationship to tha U. S. Gevernment without the written permission of the originator, ,
[151]CONTROLLED DISSEM courmmmrnsn/exa isrennaL usR outyNO Bis 3
[155]| \
[157]7. Charics cml coveral essoofates noy Fecyose to reozciniza ths Cangue Camerefale
[158]. Oaiti, fcocucely his private Trescava, inte O ccigarate cutiiy aul to fnsore
[159]Paces 20 $9 th3 U3. Gis eosoclatcs pica to raise U2 (500 Choucard for thée
[160]toy cUipaasica. ‘his com will te coparate frca the U3 $503 theater’ end ehh
[161]Scrvye $0 pub tho cov toning carparatica dato tesirces. Coorcterscl holp end
[162]ct iccss com of tho Giz dixcctcrs of? the CcGipaceion will ba Ga eftigens,
[163]‘ko GP the Gércctorsa will be Charles hiscele ec Louls Iovec—3.
[165]8. Presiécat Duvalior 49 reportedly cost interested in tha cou yorture ex’ is
[166]curicus to cco &% cuecccd. Ea has faroliy rcaliccd thas tho ccommle cttuation
[167]in Eagti hos Cstericratca co tally during the post 10 conths thas bo cost do
[168]Gousthing tofara total toulwuptsy ceeura. Accordingly, Freodtcnt Dovaltor waate
[169]to Saprove bis “inags" 4m the cyes o? tha cutsdds world, particuiczly ia the us,
[170]cul by Colog co bopes to attract duvestmontes end buotncss activities fran cut<
[171]oide Haiti. Ho apparently hopes that the now, inccrporetcd, Dongue Commerciale
[172]Q'iisiti, will help attract such activity to Hait’ and is therefore permitting
[173]Charles to proceed.
[175]9- /CoMcctor's Kote: O0-B-321/12106-68 desardbed a posoible rcorcenicatien in
[176]the Tnitdon govermscut. Tints tocrganizabica, cpousercd by Duvolicr, would
[177]place Duvalicr ca tho clovated plone of epiritcal clvisor ond fcthor of the
[178]Poole and would, on the cuxches, at least, tum over to o prosidcnt the day=
[179]towisy rantguncat of faltlan goverm=ont effaira. Vorlous coocs have been
[180]ecutioncd for tho positicn of preaiécut unter the poccdble now cysten. 7 the
[181]na of Lue-Albort Foucara has recently boon mentioned frequently im Haiti as
[182]the possible now presides umler the cunorcd reorganization of the goverment.
[183]Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Beit’. He is in charge of
[184]tourica. Som say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to @ degree,
[185]influenced by nim. i doubt this very strongly.
[187]a = end «
[189]021
[191]DEGLASSIFIGATION wit ADU
[193]CONPIDENEIAL/CIA IMTRHEAL USE ONLY
[195]w
[196]JEGLUDED FROM CRNERAL _ .
[199]NW 68037 Docid:34517497 Page 3 | : a {| | [4]
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197-10002-10190.pdf | [1]197-10002-10190 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]oe Date : 05/20/97
[4].¢ Page : 1
[6]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[7]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[9]AGENCY INFORMATION
[11]AGENCY : USA
[12]RECORD NUMBER : 197-10002-10190 .
[13]RECORDS SERIES : HEADQUARTERS FILES, PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : .
[16]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[18]ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[19]FROM :
[20]TO :
[21]TITLE : CIA TDCS-3/566,305
[22]DATE : 00/00/63
[24]PAGES : 3
[25]SUBJECTS : WEST GERMANY: SOVIET MILITARY ALERT FOLLOWING KENNEDY
[26]ASSASSINATION
[28]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[29]CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
[30]RESTRICTIONS : 1B
[31]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[32]DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / /
[33]OPENING CRITERIA :
[34]COMMENTS
[36][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[38]HW 50955 Docld: 32261398 Page 1
[40]epod ma HCE -3/566,305
[41]cIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO,
[42]pescepincg — DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR
[43]41g DOCUMENT
[45]; RELEASE DO
[46]er okINCesS AS SANITIZE SANITIZE Gy
[47]— 9, sf477
[49]20-26 NOVEMBER 1963
[51]_ GERWA r) /
[52]NY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER
[53]WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/ FLD REPORT NO. EGR.
[54]EXCE PY 27396
[56]WEERLY SUMMARY :
[57]\ : i " NO 5 48763, COVERING THE PERIOD. oF 20-26 NOVEMBER
[58]“fe DURING )
[59]. oe THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICAT! °
[60]TION FOR ATTACK: ‘BY. SOVIET BLOC FORCES _
[62]2. PART A, GENERAL.
[63]LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE RAINING. ACTI .
[64]2 SE AND TRAINING A (aie spy
[65]. “ACTIVITIES IN. THE: SOV
[66], Mean ee ne SOVIET BLOC
[68]“SECRET.
[73]IT 13 EXPECTED THAT IW Toe PRESENT situation sovitt TACTICS
[74]Im THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.
[75]3. SART B. AQXSO FORCES.
[76]A, USSR/CAST GERMAN, +
[77]1/ -ON THE NIGHT -OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERT
[78]" MEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG-GARRLSON FOR NVA *
[80]UNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS_/SEVERAL B/F-3/.
[81]GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE.WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN IN “
[82]CONNECTION WiTH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. « IT
[84]7 APPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO eae AREAS
[86].B. EAST. GERMAN.
[88]-. Tf SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLED
[89]HINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO
[90]KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS,
[91]/SEVERAL Fo3/. gasp ee Fm I
[93]marer PART C C,
[95]A, Soviet.
[96]Ad) SUMMAPS GERM GERWAN_ COMMENT. ON TRAIN NO LORS.
[98]TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND wuncrous ORIVENS
[100]| 818, LNOTEATIVE 0 ALCRY
[105]CIEKC HSCS, PRESUMASLY AT ALSIetRtAL REVEL, At tre arcs =f)
[106]MEISE AND ALTENGRASOW TROOP TAAIEINSG ROUSE.
[107]+ SINCE 26 MOVEMBER, THEA HAVE BftN TENTATIVE INOICATIONS.
[109]: OF ACTIVITY QUTISIDE GARRISONS oF CLEMENTS OF THE 34TH
[110]ARTILLERY Olv. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE Bete. MADE AS YET
[112]F_EXERCISES.W TH FULL’ Units “PARTICIPATING, .
[115]eet sn eG AER paw rast aaa _
[117]AIR FORCES. NO 1 HIGHLIGHTS + PROVIDED.
[118]6..: PART E.. NAVY,
[119]7 soviet,
[120]1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUT
[121]'PT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. 1 Be 2/
[123]_7.. PARTF, LoGtsti¢s TG. PsycHol -
[125]No HIGHLIGHTS. PROVEDED.
[127]FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOM
[129]navy, Ay, NS ificte) | [2]
[5]
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198-10004-10076.pdf | [1]198-10004-10076
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]JFK Assassination System
[6]Identification Form
[8]Date:
[10]6/24/201
[12]AGENCY :
[13]RECORD NUMBER :
[15]RECORD SERIES :
[17]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[19]ORIGINATOR :
[20]FROM:
[21]TO:
[23]TITLE :
[25]DATE:
[27]PAGES:
[29]SUBJECTS :
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[32]CLASSIFICATION :
[33]RESTRICTIONS :
[34]CURRENT STATUS :
[35]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]COMMENTS :
[43]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[45]Agency Information,
[46]ARMY
[47]198-10004-10076
[49]CALIFANO PAPERS
[51]Document Information
[53]ARMY
[54]JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[56]00/00/1963
[57]123
[59]EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND
[61]CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
[62]NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
[64]U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]Secret
[69]1B; IC
[71]Redact
[73]07/24/1997
[75]Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.
[77]J TEK Acsossrcten Local
[79]oct of the Army EO 13596
[80]Declassify Exclude © Exempt
[82]Review Date By
[86]Page 1
[88]A
[91]me . a
[92]. apes ‘ t, )
[94]: pe v => f
[96]NO. .SUBJECT . a . . DATE
[98]i CLA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 9 . 17 Jan 63
[99](SECRET -NOFORN) oo
[101]2 «Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec: Comm(C) 22 Jan 63
[103]_w/6Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)
[105]3 Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy 23 Jan 63
[106]Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe).
[108]4 .~ Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63
[110]5 Memo for NSC Exec (Gomi, subj as’ above, from 23 Jan 63.
[112]DeD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE) _
[113]6 DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards 23 Jan 63
[114]Cuba; Cy 2:of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/l
[115]Incl, Coord of Cuban. Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,
[116]. Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)
[118]7 Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for . 24 Jan 63
[119]NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan.63.(TOP SECRET)
[121]8 National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and _, Undtd
[122], Closed) (TOP SECRET) — :
[124]9 ; Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63
[126]_ tion of Principal Sources of. Policy and Contingency
[127]_ Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET- -SENSITIVE)
[129]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 2
[131]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 3 .
[135]February 4, 1963
[137]Peo +: 8/P ~ Jebn @. Pord
[139]Examinetion of Epping Sources ot * Folley
[141]z have yeviewsd the aein seurese of poldey on Guba. The problem
[143]ao ZT define it as follows:
[144]the Proble
[146]Peier te the establishnen
[147]lag Comaittes of eaban a Affeixe, | ane?
[149]. werk bec been done on Gaba,
[151]beth in the policy and eoutingerey fields. The purpose of the
[152]curvent exercige ig te review end identify the mie aources of
[153]sueh policy ami cootingency planning im en effert te deternine
[154]if any of the work previaiely doae will be ef value te the
[155]efiieers of your eommlctes af we go forward with implementation
[156]of the newly stated
[158]Cuban policy and ecbjestives.
[160]The principe! soureas of policy aad contingency plaming
[161]which wey of my aot be of value te the work of your committes ere
[162]ag follows:
[164]i. The dstiomal Security éotion Hemorendea emanating
[165]from the Waite Howes
[167]2. ‘the Actions of the Hetieaal Security Ceunci1
[168]3. The Bagie Bational gacurdty Policy o2@ the 0.2.
[169](eeu awaiting finel stages of forasl clearance
[170]before presentation te Netiossal Sacurity Council).
[171]& The Records
[173]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 4
[175]ne of the Interdepartmental Coordinet-
[177]Do
[181]8C deeieion or &
[183]4, The Reterde of Action of the Recentive Gommittee
[184]of the Setional Security Council as they pectain
[186]3. The Seporte of the dub-Gomilateae of EXGR -
[187]éuring the Guben Uriede.
[189]& The Resolutions of the Orgauizetion of American
[190]States and the Punta del Este Conference.
[192]7. Bublic Stetesante of Government Officials, in
[193]Paveiculer Proce Conference of President Zennedy
[194]of September 13, 1962.
[196]i &. Meeting of Secretary Rock with Yoredgn Ministera
[197]: ef Latin Awerice during Guben Orisis.
[199]%. Recently Approved Rew Palley Statement and
[200]Objectives es Drewa Up by the Interdepartwental
[201]Gomaltrae of Guban Agiaixs.
[203]10. Guben Guideliaca Paper.
[204](& guidelines paper es auch doos not axlat on
[205]Cubs an te the otae in a majority af other
[206]aountries. >
[208]There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with
[209]Gaba, pexrtiewlarly thet generated du
[210]thie review 1a nearing completion, aud I am eagrevating particular
[211]teportes which may be of value bo the eembers sf your comaitece
[212]#9 we go fotward with implementation of tae new policy and
[213]objectives. Im the attached decumentatium, I heve sagregated —
[214]thoge National Seewrity Council deciztons and Batdodel Security
[215]Ssetion Nenorsads ubtoh ave carried as ponding or clesed in the
[217]of ©. partment of Seta, Whete ection on a vartievlar
[219]th SaP hee been tranefarved fo ZKOOM, section
[220]reapousibility ot these decisions would epeear aed te be within
[221]the purview of your Courdinating Committees. Trom my review
[223]to date,
[225]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 5
[227]the recent Getcber crisis.
[230]. €@ date, 12 appedig Chat all of these éeeielons call for action
[231]whieh hove already been conaidered by your Gommittes. You @Lil
[233]note that ig séae iaatences gotion veegonaibilicy an aa REC
[235]decioign or RASAM bes bean trimeferrved to the Seoeeiel Group
[238]List of Pending anal Close
[240]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 6
[243]g
[245]C)
[247]|
[248]|
[249]|
[251]Page Tf
[253]32276061
[255]HY 40955 Dacld
[257]HY 450955 Dacld: 32276061
[259]Page 6
[262]483 NSC 24228
[263]5/5/64
[265]483 NSC 24224
[266]5/5/61
[268]483 NSC 24226
[271]433 NSC 2422¢
[274]453 HSC 24221
[275]5/5/61
[277]483 NSC 2422
[278]3/3/61
[280]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 9
[282]Agreed that US policy toward —
[283]Gube should eim at the downfall
[284]of Castee regime.
[286]Status
[288](Pending)
[289]According te
[290]files, out of
[291]this NSC direct-—
[292]ive grew a policy
[293]paper, to be ;
[294]hendled different!
[296]guidelines papers
[298]oa each country.
[300]ag @f 9/4/o2, uhite Beuse
[302]was ingerned that aetion on this
[304]HSC¢ divective would be reportad
[305]im eompliance with NSAM 181
[306]which transferred certaia Néc &
[307]HASAN actions to apecial group
[308]{Alexis Johazen) .
[310]Importance President
[311]attaches to obtaining,
[312]adequate iatelligence
[313]on Cuban pilitery
[314]g¢apabilicies.
[316]Importesce Prealdent
[317]attaches to publication
[319]ie free world prese of
[320]termeriet ectioens of
[322]Gsetre regime, ete. and
[324]te possible pelitice] ection
[325]to end current texroz.
[327]Reletions with Cuban
[328]Revolutionary Council
[329]should be improved.
[331]Cubsen vefagees to be given
[332]wefugea atatua; refugees in
[333]Wiaml to be relocated;
[334]vetagees to be eligible te
[335]apply for teevel privileges.
[337]Initiation of negotiations
[338]te enlarge willingness of
[340]other Aneglean states to
[342]join in ackfon ageinst Castro,
[344]setion to be
[346](Pending)
[348]veported in
[349]coupliance with _
[350]NASAM 181 |
[351](Jehusen channel)
[353](Pending)
[354]Action trang~
[355]ferred to EXCOM
[357]_ (Pending)
[358]Setion trance
[359]ferred to EXCON
[361](Pending)
[362]Action trang+
[363]fevred to EXCOM
[365](Pemiias)
[366]Section trang-
[367]ferred to EXCOM
[370]Substesce Status
[372]&B3 NSC 24622m USTA #211 expand 1 (Pending)
[374]8/3/64 ptogron, but not initiate Action trans-
[376]. éleetzonie warfare againet ferred to
[377]Caetee;, means ef propaganda Jebnson channel.
[378]should be madeoyallable Per MASAM
[379]to nemelS groupe. €iGi.
[381]463 BSE 24228 US military officers under . (Cleved}
[382]5/5/61 general guideace te be eéupleted aetion
[383]prepared by Dept of State, ag of 11/28/61.
[384]would diseuse Cagtre thresc :
[385]£o ahh bids with bee Bie orfivers.
[386]463 USC 24220 Dept of State should prepare (Closed)
[387]5/8/61 a report on a possible new $/P paper
[389]justeiank & epee tor effective “eosdible new
[390]ti~eoumunier a Beads for Antie«:
[391]Communist Action"
[393]7/28/61
[394]483 NS@ 2422p Rebert Noodmard’s assumption Clesed.,
[395](5/3/63 of vesponsibilicy of Task Force
[396]en Cuba on apnoenceneat of
[397]appointment.
[398]683 MSG 24226 Re US milleary intervention Closed.
[399]5/5/61 . wow. Do sothing which would
[400]foveclese posedbliiey allitary
[401]intervention in future.
[402]483 HSC 2422¢ He naval bleckade ox alewar Closed.
[403]5/3/64 ageiaee Cuba,
[404]683 MSC 24232 Detailed study te be aade Slesed.
[405]5/3/61 by CIA with ether Departments Bissell memo to
[406]ef possible weeknesses and éehilies
[407]vulnerabilities in eleneats 11/21/61 we:
[408]which control Cuba. "Sitnation and
[409]Preapeecte in
[410]Cabe"by Shermen
[411]. Rent 11/3/61.
[412]Gim SECRET
[414]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 10
[416]SS LS a a
[419]483 NSO 2422h
[420]5/5/62
[422]&63 NEC 24224
[423]5/5/61 .
[425]483 NSC 24291
[426]5/3/61
[428]MASAN 196
[429]10/2/62
[431]10/3/61
[433]3/44/62
[434]BA HAGAM G16
[436]8/26/62
[438]HY 450955 Docld:32276061 Page 11
[440]Glesad,
[441]DEY rereumended
[442]te Pree ocra kt
[444]Ho separate Cuban military
[445]forces should be orgenized.
[446]ie 0.3. Guben natie
[448]be encourcged enlist in OS pregran be
[449]Avwed Porees. terminsted
[450]6/30/62 dee to -
[452]modéat resulta. —
[454]ho iamedlate trade embargo
[455]én Cuba.
[457]Closed,
[458]with Preaident's
[460]éeclering otal euberge on trade
[461]with gba with exception
[462]nedieina ang feed on fueontitarian
[464]grounds .
[466]Allience for Pr
[467]strengthened,
[469]go Maite Beuse.
[471]Polley Toward non-ble
[472]ships Ried an trade (Action
[473]& peopases to
[474]take with vegetd to
[476]sbhipplag te Cubs.)
[478]Contingeacy Plenmiag for
[479]Cobs.
[481]US Government aust heve wendy
[482]4@ Waite Paper en Cuba and be
[483]Seedy to give aseletenme to
[484]Cuban Poteliote in similar
[485]effort.
[487]yea only « Lindted Dletrib=
[489]wbion. feporting te be through
[491]another chaanél and handled —
[492]petconally by Beputy USecy
[494]Jobascn _fundexatond this. authorised vesponse
[495]DE, 3 pening ESC Actions, 2
[499]Closed,
[500]Weekly report
[501]now trom ALD
[503]Pending.
[504]Action tverne~
[505]eeread ta
[507]Pending
[508]Action trane-
[509]fervad te .
[510]Jebnsen cheomel,
[512]Closed,
[513]Paper prepared
[514]and translated:
[516]“The Castro
[517]Regime ie Ceba™
[519]| BAGSMs thera
[521]CUBA HASAM 196
[522]40/22/82
[523]CUBA NAgAM 208
[525]42/6/62
[527]1/8/63
[529]HY 40955 Dacld: 32276061
[531]A RR TST a ae oe a TorTe TOPO NE A RE SOT NN
[533]Establishment of NSC Executive Closed,
[534]Committee .
[536]Cuba Gverflights. (This Report Submitted.
[538]Pxevidential directive
[540]egproved aon attached
[542]Guidelines for the Planning
[544]of Cuban Qverflights, and
[545]wequested CLA te come up with
[547]en estimate of the adequacy of
[549]such « ayetes of intelligence
[550]eellection te weet the eriteria
[552]set forth, om assumptian it ia
[553]supplemented by energetic collection
[554]of informetion by all other evaileble
[555]seana.)
[557]interdepartuental Orgenization Clesed.
[558]of Cuban Afiaixe - with
[560]cespousibliity yasted ta «
[562]Coordinator of Cuban affairs
[564]Le Department of State,
[566]Page 12
[568]4
[571]4 a
[572]a ond
[574]lo ne ~ ee ee et em - Poor che es 2 Ane = = Z
[575]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 13 . :
[578]“el
[580]Loe
[584]TOP_SECRET ATTACHMENTS
[585]DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[587]January 24, 1963
[589]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORCE BUNDY
[590]THE WHITE HOUSE
[592]Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee
[593]Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.
[595]Attached are two revised papers "Summary. of
[596]Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States °
[597]Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to -. -
[598]members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-
[599]tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,
[600]January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8
[601]‘for, the paper entitled “United States Policy Toward. ~
[602]the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted
[603]on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be. con-
[604]sidered at the Friday meeting. They are"United States:
[605]Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States”
[606]and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."
[608]LY, a ee
[609]Mele
[610]ne (a
[612]Executive Secyétariat
[614]Attachments:
[616]As stated.
[617]Copy No. .
[619]TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS
[621]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 14
[624]\ G a oo . @
[625]f
[627]@@m SECRET
[629]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[631](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
[633]FROM : _ Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[635]SUBJECT: — United States Policy Toward Cuba
[637]United States Policy
[639]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
[640]Lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in _ the
[641]following words:
[643]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[644]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[645]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[646]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[647]communist purposes, there will be peace in the
[649]_Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
[650]neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
[651]hemisphere. ' ;
[653]“We will not, of course, abandon the political,
[654]economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
[655]subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
[656]the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
[657]these policies are very different from any intent to
[658]launch a military invasion of the island.”
[662]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 15
[664]@mgm SECRET
[668]Objectives
[670]Accordingly, the objectives of United States
[671]policy with respect to Cuba are:
[673]1. Protecting the security of the United States
[674]and the other states of the Organization of
[675]American States (OAS) by assuring that
[676]offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
[677]Cuba;
[679]2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[681]3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[682]military action against other Caribbean states;
[684]‘4, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[685]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[686]within the other Hemisphere states; ee
[688]“ §. .Encouraging and supporting any developments | within
[689]Cuba that offer the possibility of sivoteing
[690]. the. Cuban Government from its support
[691]‘Soviet Communist purposes; . MP
[693]6. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[694]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[695]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[696]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
[697]it being understood that our ultimate...
[698]objective. : is replacement of the regime “by
[699]one’ fully compatible with the goals of the
[700]United States;
[702]‘Qap SECRET
[704]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16
[706]10.
[708]@@m SECRET
[712]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[713]supporting the Castro regime;
[715]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[716]Castro regime from other free world states,
[717]and especially from states of the OAS.
[718]Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
[719]should be multilateral, preferably based upon
[720]the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[721]or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization
[722]of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[723]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[724]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[725]value and which might split the hemisphere;
[727]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[728]appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[729]logistical support, the wide variety of
[730]military contingencies that may arise from
[731]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[733]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[734]to the above objectives.
[736]Supporting Actions
[738]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[740]A.
[742]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
[744]U. S. Government will be prepared to increase
[746]the political economic, psychological and
[747]military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
[748]present themselves or can be created. The
[750]actions listed below are those requiring immediate
[751]approval and would be initiated in the sequence
[752]set forth below. Recommendations for further
[754]SECRET
[756]Page i7
[758]on _ SECRET
[761]actions based upon the re-examination of
[762]existing programs and upon the development
[763]of new programs related to the foregoing
[764]objectives will be forthcoming. :
[766]1. In addition to current covert program, such
[767]as intelligencé collection, recruitment of
[768]Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
[769]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
[770]and other exile group activities and infil-
[771]tration of propaganda materials:
[773]a. Intensify covert collection
[774]of intelligence within Cuba, ‘especially
[775]within the regime;
[777]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
[778]exiles, who are associated with |
[779]the original aims of the 26 of July
[780]Movement and who believe that the
[781]Castro regime.can be overthrown from
[782]within in order. that they may:
[783]1) cause a split in:the leadership
[784]of the regime at the national or
[785]provincial levels; and 2) create a _
[786]political base of popular opposition ~
[787]to the regime; and, 3) secure
[788]intelligence;
[790]c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[791]capability to Launch balloons carrying
[792]leaflets and other propaganda materials
[794]_ from international waters into Cuba.
[795]. Launch propaganda balloons. after an
[796]“operational capability has been
[797]established.
[799]qm SECRET
[801]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16
[803]HG 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 19
[805]SECRET |
[809]With respect to the actions listed below,
[810]the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
[811]negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
[812]the 20-odd American prisoners should first
[813]be ascertained, If these actions were taken
[814]before the conclusion of the negotiations
[815]they could jeopardize the release of the
[816]Americans.
[818]If these negotiations fail, or when the
[819]prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
[820]following timetable:
[822]Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
[824]of the proclamation of the four point _
[825]shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[826]the orders to go into effect in five days).
[827]These orders:
[829]a. Close United States ports to all
[830]vessels of a country whose vessels
[831]engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
[833]b. Close United States ports to any ship
[834]which has carried goods in the Bloc-
[835]Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
[836]it. seeks to enter a United States port;
[838]c. Prohibit all United States flag ships
[839]and all ships owned by United States
[840]nationals or residents from entering
[841]any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[842]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[844]GP SECRET
[846]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[848]Page 20
[850]te SECRET
[854]d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[855]department of the United States from
[856]being shipped on vessels owned or
[857]controlled by persons who own or
[858]control vessels engaged in the trade
[859]between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
[861]At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
[862]Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
[864]a later date dependent on the Donovan
[865]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
[866]another representative of the President
[867]will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
[868]and Brazil to convey to them the importance
[869]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
[870]hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
[871]the following resolutions:
[873]a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
[874]its actions which continue to endanger
[875]the peace, deploring refusal to allow
[876]inspection, condemning the presence of
[877]Soviet troops, recommending continued
[878]surveillance and continued vigilance
[879]against subversive activities, and
[880]terminating the invocation of the Rio
[881]Treaty on the missile crisis, together
[882]with
[884]b. An OAS resolution which would
[885]recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
[886]to all items of trade except food and
[887]medicine (fall back position: extension
[888]of arms embargo to all strategic items);
[890]@@G SECRET
[892]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[894]Page 271
[896]ina SECRET.
[898]2) prohibition of ships of OAS
[899]member states from transportating
[900]embargoed ‘items and deny uSse-of '
[901]ports:to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[903]3)* denial of Soviet over-flights and
[904]transit rights for flights to Cuba; _
[905]and 4): a.call on other states’ to mee
[906]take. similar action. ¢
[908]After obtaining the 1 maximum possible
[909]support of the key countries of Mexico,
[910]Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
[912]members will be approached in Washington
[913]and in their respective capitals,
[914]simultaneously. It should be possible
[915]for this corisultation and OAS action on
[916]the resolutions to be completed within
[917]ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
[918]of the resolutions, we will inform our’
[919]NATO allies of the > impending OAS action.
[921]At the first NATO: meeting after ‘formal °
[923]OAS action on the resolutions, we will
[924]request that NATO include Cuba on the ;
[925]list of countries to which shipment °
[927]of. €OCOM list (strategic). items > Prohibited.
[929]After | ‘WATO decision on our cocom request’
[930]we will seek to get epreement from Free
[931]World industrial nations to prevent
[932]shipping of critical spare parts and
[933]equipment to Cuba, ‘not on the COCOM list.
[935]Sos
[937]In addition to the four point shipping
[939]resolutions, and action under Section
[941]107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
[942]to press Free World nations to keep their
[943]shipping < out of: Blac- Cuba trade.
[945]eee SECRET
[947]= SECRET
[951]B. Contipency Planning
[953]New opportunities for accomplishing our
[954]objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
[955]action in other parts of the world; as a result
[956]of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
[957]by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
[958]result of uprisings or internal conflict within
[959]Cuba.
[961]Our contingency planning, which will be
[962]undertaken immediately, should include preparations
[963]for increased multilateral and/or bilateral ,
[964]political and economic measures, large scale use of
[965]Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
[966]air activity including both high and low level
[967]flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[968]and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[969]have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
[970]government and keeping the Castro forces on ,
[971]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[972]appropriate, including the imposition of a
[973]POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
[974]other countries; severance of communic ations
[975]to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[976]destined for Cuba and on key installations to
[977]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
[978]the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
[979]feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
[980]Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8. militarily-
[981]trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
[982]those Latin American nations desirous of
[983]participating in the U. S. effort.
[985]@@8 SECRET
[987]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 .Page 22
[989]SECRET =
[993]Our programs should be designed to encourage
[994]the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
[995]community and engage in constructive pursuits
[996]pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
[997]them some special assistance but not to the extent
[998]that they become a perpetual privileged class
[999]within the community, Presidential action on their
[1000]behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
[1002]SECRET
[1004]HY 50955 Doclad: 32276061 Page 23
[1006]MEMORANDUM FOR THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[1007](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1753, 10 a.m.)
[1009]i
[1011]FROM: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[1012]SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
[1014]. \
[1015]1.
[1017]U. S.. Policy Objectives
[1018]--«* The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
[1019]respect to Cuba: ,
[1021]a. Protecting the security of the United States
[1022]and the.other states of the Organization of
[1023]American States by assuring that offensive
[1024]weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
[1026]b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[1028]c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[1029]military action against other Caribbean states;
[1031]d, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[1032]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[1033]within the other OAS states; _ oo
[1035]e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[1036]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[1037]divorcing the Cuban Government from its
[1038]support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes,
[1040]f. Encouraging and supporting any developments.
[1041]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[1042]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[1043]‘that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
[1045](SECRET
[1047]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 24
[1049]j.
[1051]SECRET
[1055]being understood that cur ultimate objective
[1056]is replacement of the regime by one fully
[1057]compatible with the goals of the United States;
[1059]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[1060]supporting the Castro regime;
[1062]Maximizing the politicai isolation of the
[1064]Castro regime from otner Free World states,
[1066]and especially from states of the OAS. When-
[1067]ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should
[1068]be multilateral, preferably based upon the
[1069]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
[1070]resolutions adopted. by the Crganization of
[1071]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[1072]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[1073]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[1074]value and which mighc splic the hemisphere;
[1076]Being prepared to meet, with the employment
[1077]of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[1078]logistical support, the wide variety of
[1079]military contingencies that may arise from
[1080]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[1082]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[1083]to the above objectives.
[1085]2. Supvorting Actions
[1087]Actions .in support of these objectives and their
[1088]time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
[1089]entitled "U..S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
[1090]four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
[1092]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061
[1094]SECRET RET
[1096]Page 25
[1098]SECRET
[1102]action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
[1103]to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
[1104]shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
[1106]Existing programs will be reviewed and further
[1107]recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
[1108]variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
[1109]at once, , ,
[1111]In addition to current covert programs sich as
[1112]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
[1113]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
[1114]other. exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
[1115]materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are.
[1116]recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
[1118]a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
[1119]within Cuba, especially within the regime;
[1121]b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
[1122]return the 26 of July Movement to its
[1123]original aims.
[1125]NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
[1126]foregoing actions may impair our ability
[1127]-to.accomplish objective b. (Removal of
[1128]remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
[1130]_ taking these actions could provide the
[1131]U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
[1132]its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval
[1133]of the foregoing actions is recommended.
[1135]3. Suban BELEaes
[1137]Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
[1138]specially tailored civilian and military program for
[1139]Brigade members.
[1141]SECRET
[1144]HW 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 26
[1146]SECRET
[1150]The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
[1151]and individual members urged to accept civilian training
[1152]or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program
[1153]for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
[1154]Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
[1155]members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
[1156]community would be avoided.
[1158]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 27
[1160]HY 450955 Dacld: 32276061
[1162]Page 26
[1165]: “Top SECRET
[1169]THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF. DEFENSE
[1170]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[1172]January 23, 1963
[1174]MEMORANDUM FOR MR, VANCE
[1176]SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1178]Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the
[1179]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC
[1180]Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now
[1181]been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m... The revision
[1182]consists essentially of what is now denominated as
[1183]"ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy
[1184]and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple-
[1185]mented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at
[1186]the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This
[1187]supplemental material is derived from portions of the text
[1188]of “ALTERNATIVE If" in the original paper.
[1190]At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed hiyn
[1191]the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my
[1192]reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to
[1193]include the supplemental material referred to above. He,
[1194]in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will
[1195]thereafter be in touch with you. if possible, will you let me
[1196]khow by noon tornorrow where you ‘and he stand with regard
[1197]to the revised paper.
[1199]Enclosure
[1200]SIGii.
[1202]ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
[1203]ce: Mr. McNamara
[1204]General Taylor
[1205]Mr. Yarmolinsky
[1207]Pena te RL 2 bane econ
[1209]EXCLULED FROM AUTOMATIC
[1210]REGRADING; DOD BIR 5200.10
[1211]DOES NOT APPLY
[1213]. “GA sy @o3/ cera SECRET COPY a OF ‘ COPTES.
[1215]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 29
[1217]rr ae = ERS SAA SE
[1218]ea ©
[1220]KA
[1222]_
[1224]a a, ™ =e ee
[1225]\ \ oo CO) a DOD | |
[1227]_ | , 9 P SECRET
[1229]M _ . DRAFT/23 Jan 63
[1231]PY9.3 53. DUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
[1232]us GOMMITTES
[1234]BRAM : Geordinater of Cuban Affairs
[1236]SUBS ECT: United Staten Policy Toward Cuba
[1238]Po United Stateo Policy
[1240]Vn November 20, the Preoident set forth the broad guidelines of
[1241]United Stateo policy with reopect to Cuba in the following words:
[1243]"Ac for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[1244]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[1246]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[1248]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggrecaive .
[1249]communist purposes, there will be reace in the Caribbean.
[1250]And, ao I caid in September, 'we shall neither initiate
[1252]nor permit agerescion in thic hemisphere’.
[1254]"We will not, of course, abandon the political, econcznic
[1255]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[1256]from Cuba, nor our purpese and kere that the Cuban people
[1257]shall come day be truly free. But chess policies are very
[1258]different from any intent to launch 2 military invasion of
[1259]the island,"
[1261]Objectives
[1263]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with eeapect to Cuba
[1264]ARG: : . .
[1266]i, Protecting the security of the United States and the
[1267]other atates of the Organization of American States
[1268](OAS) by acouring that offensive weapons are not
[1269]reintroduced into Cuba;
[1271]‘Ge SECRET
[1273]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 30
[1276]Romoval of remaining Soviet fercon from Cuba;
[1278]Proventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[1279]action againot othor Garibboan otaton;
[1281]Reducing the capabilitios of the Castro zeRgime to direct
[1282]and oupport oubvorcion and inourroction within the
[1283]other OAS otateo;
[1285]Zacouraging and oupporting any developments within
[1287]‘Cuba that offer the pocolbility of Mvorcing the Cuban
[1289]Government from its Ouppost of Sino-Seviot Communist
[1290]purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
[1291]which would accomplick thio purpose; .
[1293]Maximising the coct to the Soviet Union of cupporting
[1294]the Castro rogime;
[1296]Marimizing the political ioolation of the Castro regime
[1297]from other free world states, and especially from
[1298]states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
[1299]against Cuba cheuld be multilateral, prefe rably based
[1300]upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance {Rie Pact)
[1302]or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
[1303]American States, The newly-won hemiophe ric
[1304]solidarity on the Cuban isoue chould not be joopardized
[1305]by secking OAS actions of marginal value and which
[1306]might split the hemiophoro,
[1308]Being prepared to mect, with the employment ef
[1309]Appropriate U.S. combat claments and/or logictical
[1310]oupport, the wide varioty of military contiagencies
[1312]that may orice from purouilt of tho foregoing objectives;
[1315]5
[1317]WR SECRET
[1321]Oe re ~ === STEERS eet 7
[1323]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 31
[1326]cere em
[1328]Y
[1329]S
[1331]sen eT YT
[1335]Be
[1337]CY ‘(GMB SECRET ©)
[1338]3
[1340]ma
[1342]9. Producing comprehencive intolligence related te the above
[1343]objectives,
[1345]‘Our ultimate objective with beopect to Cuba remains the overthrow
[1346]of the Castro/Communiot regime and its replacement by one compatible
[1347]with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poosible, sharing the aims X
[1351]hel
[1353]of the Free World. To achieve this ebjective, the U.S. Government ay n
[1354]will be prepared to apply increacing degrees of political, oconomic,
[1355]poychological and military preaaureo, ac appropriate opportunitico prosont
[1356]themselves or can ba created, until the Cactro/Communist regime is
[1357]overthrown.
[1359]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
[1360]regime through the oxereiog of all fcacible diplomatic, econemic,
[1361]psychological aad covert actions may achieve the immediate objoctives
[1362]and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward
[1363]our ultimate objective,
[1365]Supporting etions 7
[1366]The chowine actions chould be initiated in the sequence set forth /
[1367]below: .
[1369]1, Await reoults of Mr, Donovan's imminent nogotiation with
[1370]Fidel Cactveo for feceing the 20-0dd American prisoners,
[1371]Prior aggressive U. &, action could jeopardize their release.
[1373]2, - If theoa negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered,
[1374]proceed om tho following timetable:
[1376]3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve kcurs in advance of the proclamation
[1377]of the four point chipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[1378]tho ordora to go into effect in five days). Theoe orders:
[1380]a close United States ports to all veasels of a
[1381]country wheoe vessela engage in carzying AFMO
[1382]to Guba;
[1384]& close United States ports to any chip which has
[1385]carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days
[1386]of the time it cecko to onter a United States poxt;
[1388]6, prohibit all United Statco Mag chips and all ships
[1389]owned by United States nationals or residents from
[1390]entering any porto of Cuba aad from carrying any
[1391]geods bound to or from Guba; and
[1393]ER SECRET
[1397]HY 60955 Docld:32276061 Page 32
[1399]Bey
[1401]& prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[1402]department or agency of the United
[1403]States ¢vom botag shipped on vessels
[1404]owmed ox controlled by persons who
[1405]om or control vessels engaged in the
[1406]erade batwoea Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
[1408]a
[1410]4, , At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission
[1411]Confercacc im El Salvador oa January 28230
[1412]Aseistant Seexctary Marcin will visit the Presidents
[1413]of Calle, Mexieo and Brazil co convey to chem the
[1414]importance President Rommedy attaches co maintaining |
[1415]hemispheric solidarity by cupporting the sollowiag
[1418]a. An OAS resolution condesming Cuba for its
[1419]netiens waleh' contimuc to endanger the peaco,
[1420]deploring refusal te allew iaspection,
[1421]condomaing the presence of Sevict troops,
[1422]eocemmendiag continued surveillance and i
[1423]continued vigllaace against subversive
[1424]activities, and terminating tho imyecation
[1425]of the Ris feeaty on the missile crisis,
[1426]cogecher with
[1428]b. dm OAS resolution which would ececcmmend
[1429]1) axtension of axms embargo to all items
[1430]of teade cxecat food and medicine (fall back
[1431]position; extension of ames embargo to all
[1432]atrategic items); 2) prohibition of AR
[1433]ships €com transporting eabargecd icems and
[1434]deay usc of ports to chips ia Bloe-Cuba
[1435]exade; 3) demtal of Soviet over-flights ‘and
[1436]evomeit rights for flights to Cuba; apd
[1437]&) a call om ether states bo take similar
[1438]aeCLon.
[1440]8, A€ter obtaining the wmaximua pesclble cupport of
[1441]the key countries ef Moxleo, Galle and Beagil, the
[1442]ether OAS mewboro will be approachod in Washington
[1444]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 33
[1448]OQ © |
[1450]Top SECRET
[1452]@Se
[1454]and in their respective capitals, simulcancously.
[1455]Zt should be possible for this consulcation and OAS
[1456]action on che resolutions to be completed within
[1457]ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the
[1458]resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the
[1459]impending OAS action.
[1461]At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action
[1462]on the resolutions, we will request that NATC
[1463]include Cuba on the List of countries to which
[1464]shipment of COCcoM list (steacegic) items is
[1465]prohibited.
[1467]After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will
[1468]seek to get agreement from Free World industrial
[1469]nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts
[1470]and equipment co Cuba, not on che COCOM list.
[1472]in addicion to four point shipping vesolutions,
[1473]‘and action under Sectiim LOF ck the Foreign Assistance
[1475]Act, continue tc press Prec Woertd nations to keep
[1476]theix shipping cu> of Elsce-Cuba trade.
[1478]In addition to current covert programs such as
[1479]intelligence ecilection, radio broadcasts,
[1480]vecruitment cf Cuban cfficials as agents, support
[1482]of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
[1483]and infileratic= of propagarcs materials, the
[1484]following are vocommended for approval and immediate
[1486]initiation:
[1488]a. Intensify to maximum degree possible
[1489]iatelligence and counterintelligence coverage
[1491]of Guba;
[1493]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
[1494]who ave associated with the original. aims of
[1495]the 26 July Movement and who believe that
[1496]the Castro regime can be overchrown from
[1497]within in order that they may: 1) cause
[1499]qm SECRET
[1501]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[1503]Page 34
[1506][i
[1508]a apes
[1509]Vai SECnne
[1510]Bae
[1512]a split in the leadership of the regime
[1513]at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
[1514]2) create a political base of popular
[1515]opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
[1516]intelligence;
[1518]ec. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[1519]capability to launch balloons carrying
[1520]leaflets and other propaganda materials from
[1521]international waters into Cuba. Launch
[1522]propaganda balloons after an operational
[1523]capability has been established.
[1525]HW 450955 Docld: 32276
[1527]061
[1529]Page 35
[1532]Q en”
[1534]‘ Tn addition to these immediate actions, we should make
[1536]preparations now so that we are able to seize Opportunities for more
[1537]positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
[1538]the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise °
[1539]either as a‘result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, asa i
[1540]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/ j
[1541]Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal / ‘
[1542]conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
[1543]with these situations, '
[1547]| . i
[1549]Our contingency planning should include preparations for large- }
[1551]scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including |
[1552]both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[1553]and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
[1554]embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on *
[1555]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the
[1556]imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other
[1557]countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of |
[1558]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
[1560]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S, .
[1561]military forces. {
[1563]We should be in a position to respond with open military support
[1564]{to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
[1565]Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
[1566]forces), to a request for ezeistan-o from any anti-Castro/Communist
[1567]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
[1569]which threaten the present regime, and whose alms are compatible
[1570]with those of the U.S.
[1573]i
[1575]To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
[1576]Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
[1577]and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
[1578]participating in the U.S. effort. ;
[1580]tee SECRET
[1582]HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 36
[1584]o> a
[1585]— a
[1587]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 37
[1589]He ee
[1593], is Ll wok
[1594]; MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
[1595]NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
[1597]on (Prepared for the Meeting of Thureday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.) co
[1599]- FROM : Department of Defense Representative. on: the Inter = cm 7
[1600]departmental Coordinating Committee On Cuba My,
[1602]-°° SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1604], "Policy mo —
[1605]Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the . : =: |
[1606]| overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement -
[1608]by. one compatible with the objectives of the U. S.. and, where —
[1610]- possible, sharing the aims of the. Free World, . To achieve this.
[1611]“objective, the U.. S. Government will apply increasing degrees. of |
[1612]. political, economic, paychological. and military pressures, as
[1614]‘ appropriate opportunities present themselyes or can be created,
[1615]7 %
[1617]_ until the. Castro/Communist regime is overthrown, Our immediate 7
[1618]; objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free a Poe
[1619]: World and from . the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal wie
[1620]° dissension, erode its domestic political, gupporti frustrate ite ssub- he
[1621]versive activities; negate its. influence in. the hemiepheres increase
[1623]“the cost ‘to the Bloc. of custaining | the regime; and obtain. a the withdrawal pe
[1625]ke.
[1627], Sof Russian troops from Cuba,
[1629]EXCLUDED PRO AUTOMATIC FRORADING “)
[1630]“DOD DIR 5200.10 DOSS HOT APPLY =,
[1634]HW 509055 Docld: 32276061 “Baye 38
[1636]ty ae
[1638]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist on
[1640]regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
[1641]psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
[1643]a . and could create propitious conditions in Cuba. for further advance
[1645]- ‘toward our ultimate objective.
[1647]We should be. ina position to respond with open military sup- a
[1648]port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and
[1650]“Special Forces: support and, 3 if necessary, up to. the full range of
[1652]fompaste wit those of.the U.S. i”
[1654]Invasion of Cuba by U. ‘S. military forces, as distinguished.
[1656]from military support upon weauee° of indigenous forces, should
[1658]hemaephere,, This does not t preclude appropriate | Ue Ss. retaliation
[1660]HW 50055. Docld: 32276061. Page 39
[1663]' To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces. employed
[1665]© “against Cuba should be accompanied by U. s. militarily- ~trained
[1667]desirous of participating in the UL.S. ‘effort.
[1669]Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence
[1671]"og the national intelligence. effort.
[1673]Whenever possible, U,.S, actions against Cuba should be
[1675]7 multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
[1677]7 Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking’ OAS actions. of
[1679]“marginal value and which might split the hemisphere. | _
[1680]Overt. and covert annexes of specific actions in support 0 of |
[1684]., this policy » will be’ prepared.
[1686]Discussion
[1688]“6
[1690]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 40,00 ~ 7.0 _ S
[1692]* free Cubans and by the armed forces of those. Latin American nations 7 7
[1694]gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified asa primary objective 7 fa.
[1696]oo Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization — a _
[1698]“\of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity o on. the a a
[1701]-and military actions. .Such actions might include. leaflet dropping; —
[1702]. propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; ,
[1703]a psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of.
[1704]«Cubans in. the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive -
[1705]- : air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed
[1706]toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also .
[1707]have-the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping -
[1709]_ the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro~., =
[1711]; priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of.
[1712]- Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications. to ©
[1714]Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on .-
[1716]key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ‘ultimately, - a a
[1717]- the use of U.S. military forces.” a a _ Se So o Te ce fe
[1718]In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut ..
[1719]of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert. actions, : v : a :
[1721]: such a as OAS. sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified
[1723]” surveillance. of and publicity concerning Castro/ Communist subversive: seat
[1725]i
[1727]- activities | in ‘Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric- | 7
[1729]tions and other economic: sanctions, and ¢ a series of actions designed
[1731]- ‘to. obtain, “to. the ‘greatest. extent possible,’ multilateral approval of and : 7
[1733]‘ participation i in the campaign to unseat ‘the Castro/Communist regime,
[1735]ne
[1737]Se a ee te Ce Cae
[1739]seremenaene i
[1741]HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 41
[1743].
[1745]This course of action has the advantage of attaining the
[1747]‘objective more rapidly and.under more controlled conditions than. °°"
[1749]” the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the cps j
[1750]_ _only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. 7 a. - oo “|
[1752]: : It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure _
[1754]of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel,
[1756]From. the standpoint of international politics,. the U.. S,
[1758]owill probably be subjected to criticism for aggression fromthe 2: 2"
[1759]“uncommitted nations. ' It. is difficult to predict | the reaction of
[1760]; ‘the Latin. American governments, They may attack the U.S. for = a
[1762]“intervening” or they may react: favorably {as- they did during the
[1764]missile crisis). To a large ‘extent, the reaction of the nations
[1769]“
[1771]i
[1772]an
[1776]an
[1777]J
[1778]|
[1780]throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, -
[1781]will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For - _
[1782]example, there may even-be advantages to the fact that our active “e
[1783]policy and the courses of action. under it may eventually become |
[1784]Impossible to conceal, | if properly handled, the overt aspects of ,
[1785]this policy may serye! not E only: to ) mitigate any unfavorable reactions _
[1787]. from other countries, but also to gain, ‘particularly in Latin America,
[1789]a ; \ increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba.
[1791]Ww -50955 Boold:32276061 Page 4a
[1793]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that
[1795]“ "the UL S.. will not permit.the maintenance of a communist base in pen.
[1796], “the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the - |
[1797]_ more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from
[1798]. ' the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures
[1799]on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to
[1801]overthrow the Tegime, Ue 5S. prestige becomes more deeply
[1803]involved. . The further we ¢ progress along this route, the more |
[1805]The successful execution of this policy will require careful |
[1806]timing : and | coordination of our actions and the development of detailed oa et
[1808]While such plans would be- designed to bring about the over="
[1810]. plans. =.
[1813]. throw ‘of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning
[1815]: purposes, they would have to. be sufficiently flexible to accommodate.
[1819]=. changes to the international situation,
[1820]. j :
[1822]we),
[1824]os *. ’ Bape
[1826]In any case, at.crucial points along the way,.it will be neces=" :
[1827]sary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions 7
[1828]already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages
[1830]of ‘continued and escalated activity against the. disadvantages and
[1832]sgh CO BR
[1834], dangers of such activity. -
[1836]‘HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 43
[1838]eee S Senet
[1840]Commitment to this course of. action does not exclude the
[1841]— possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of of the ‘Castro regime o
[1843]. from the Bloc. a 3 . 7” ~
[1845]' Coordinator's Recommendation
[1847]I do not concur | in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. — a:
[1848]| The objectives stated in the ( ‘Coordinator! & paper do not sufficiently ~ 7
[1849]‘commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. .
[1850]> The Coordinator! r) paper degonds too much upon events outside the
[1851]_ ne - control of the U. S,. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate
[1853]“the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/_
[1855]: ‘Communist regimes. The specific actions recommended in the
[1857]Coordinator’ 5 paper are . consistent with the policy recommended in 7.
[1859]this paper and, in many. cases, would be "among the initial steps that |
[1861]would be taken in executing that t paler, we
[1863]‘Recommendation vale
[1865]1 recommend. that the e policy. stated above be adopted as ‘the. a
[1867]y United States policy tow: : rd Cuba,
[1869]HW 50955 DocTd:32276061 “Page 44:
[1871]¢ C) ReP=SECRET QC
[1873]DRAFT/23 Jan 63
[1875]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
[1876]: COMMITTEE
[1878]FROM : Coordinator of Cubam Affairs
[1880]SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
[1882]United States Policy
[1884]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of
[1885]United States policy with respect to Cuba im the following words:
[1887]so “As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems aré
[1888]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[1889]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[1890]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[1891]communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
[1892]And, ae I said in September, ‘we shall neither imitiate
[1893]nor permit aggression im this hemisphere’.
[1895]"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
[1896]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[1897]from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
[1898]shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
[1899]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
[1900]the island, “
[1902]Objectives . 2
[1904]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with reapect to Cuba
[1905]are: ,
[1907]i, Protecting the security of the Umited States and the
[1908]other states of the Organization of American States
[1909](OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
[1910]reintroduced into Cuba;
[1912]7 sateen nes a eye EE
[1913]ye
[1915]HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 45
[1917]O @OT SECRET O
[1919]Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[1921]Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[1923]action against other Caribbean states;
[1925]Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
[1926]and support subversion and insurrection within the
[1927]other OAS states; ,
[1929]Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[1930]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
[1931]Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
[1932]purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
[1933]which would accomplish this purpose;
[1935]Maximising the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
[1937]_ the Castro regime;
[1939]Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime
[1940]from other free world States, and especially from
[1941]states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
[1942]against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based
[1943]upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[1945]or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
[1946]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[1947]solidarity on the Cuban issue should net be jeopardized
[1948]by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which
[1949]might split the hemisphere.
[1951]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[1952]appropriate U.S. combat clemente and/or logistical
[1953]support, the widd varisty of military contingencies
[1955]that may arise from Pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[1956]and;
[1958]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 46
[1961]a OQ. WP SECRET O
[1963]3
[1965]9, Producing comprehensive intelligence related to tac above
[1966]objectives. ‘
[1968]Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow ~
[1969]of the Castro/Communict regime and its replacement by onc compatible
[1970]with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poooible, sharing the aimo
[1971]of the Free World, To achieve thio objective, the U.S. Government
[1972]will be prepared to apply increacing degroes of political, sconomic,
[1973]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate eppertunitico procont
[1974]themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is
[1975]overthrown,
[1977]Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communict te
[1978]regime through the exercioe of all feanible diplomatic, economic,
[1979]poychelogical and eevert actioas may achieve the immediate objectives
[1980]and could erento prepitious coniitieas im Cuba fos furthor advances toward
[1981]our ultimate objective.
[1983]Supporting Actions
[1985]The following actions should be initiated ia the sequence set forth
[1986]below:
[1988]1, Await results of Mz. Donovan's imminent negotiation with
[1989]Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American prisoners.
[1990]Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
[1992]2, If these negotiations fail, or when the prisemers ars recovered, |
[1993]proceed on the following timetable:
[1995]3, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours im advance of the proclamation
[1996]of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calle for
[1997]the orders to go into effect in five days}, These orders:
[1999]a clese United States ports to all vessels of a
[2000]country whose pesesls engage in CaErying arEAo
[2001]e Cuba;
[2003]b. cleas Uaited Statoo porto to any chip which bas
[2004]carried goods im the blec-Guba trade within 120 days
[2005]of the time it seeks to onter a United States port;
[2007]ic. prohibit all United States flag chips and all ships
[2009]i owned by United States nationals or residents from
[2011]entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any
[2012]goods bound to or from Cuba; and “
[2014]Gee SECRET
[2016]HY d0955 Docld: 322776061 Page 47
[2018]re
[2022], Qo.
[2024]Se
[2026]é prohibit any cargo sponsored by aay
[2028]department or agency of the United
[2030]States frem belag shipped on vessels
[2032]ewned or controlled by persons who
[2034]own or control vessels engaged in the
[2036]trade between Cuba and the Sewlet bloc.
[2037]8 the coralantion of the U. 8. Exiogo 8 ilsoten
[2038]Conforcace fa BL Salvader ea Jonmary
[2039]Assistant Secretary Martia will visic the Presidents
[2040]ef Calle, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the
[2041]importance President Kennedy attaches to malataining
[2042]hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following
[2045]a. 4m OAS resolution condeaming Cuba for its
[2046]actions which centinue to endamger the peace,
[2047]deploring refusal to allow inspection,
[2048]condeming the presense 6£ Seviet troeps,
[2049]recommending continued surveillanse and
[2050]continued wigilence against subversive
[2051]activicies, and terminating the invocation
[2053]- of the Rilo Treaty on the missile crisis,
[2055]together with
[2057]db. Am OAS resolution which would recommend ©
[2058]1) extension of arms embargo to all items
[2059]ef trade except food and medicine (fall back
[2060]position: extensica of args embargo te all
[2062]' eteacogie fecneds 2). peohibielen of AR
[2064]‘ships eem traneporting embargead iteas and
[2066]deny use o£ ports to ships im Bloe-Cuba |
[2067]trade; 3) deaial of Soviet evor-flights and
[2068]transie rights for flights te Cuba; aad —
[2069]6) ao call om ether states to take similar
[2070]aetion.
[2072]' A€eer obtalning the maximum pessible support of
[2073]the key countries ef Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
[2074]ether OAS menbers will be approached in Washiagton
[2076]HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 48
[2079]| | GE) SECRET
[2080]<5
[2082]and in theixy respective capitals, simultaneously, —
[2083]It should be possible fer this consultation and OAS
[2084]action on the resolutions to be completed within
[2085]ten days, Prior te formal COAS eppreval of the
[2086]resolutions, we will imform our NATO allies of the
[2087]depending OAS action.
[2089]~ 6. At the Cirse RATO meeting after formal OAS action
[2090]eon the resolutions, we will request that NATO
[2091]imelude Guba on the list. of countries to which
[2092]. shipment of COGOM List (strategic) items ie
[2093]prokibitod.
[2095]7, A&tor NATO deelolon on our COCOM request, we will
[2096]sack to get agreement from Free World industrial
[2097]nations te prevent shipping of critical spare parts
[2099]3 Of immeme eo (Gaba, Ree Ca the COC WAGE 0° .
[2101]in. eddiedon: ee four point. chipping resolutions,
[2103]and. action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
[2104]Aet, continue te press Free World nations to keep
[2105]thelr shipping ouc ef Bloc-Cuba trade.
[2107]In addicion to current covert programs such as
[2108]intelligence collection, radie broadcasts,
[2109]xecruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support ,
[2110]of the Cuban Revolutionary Coumeil (CRC) activities,
[2111]and. infiltration ef prepaganda’ materials, the
[2112]following are regonmended for approval and immediate
[2117]Go Intensify to maced masa éegree possible
[2118]yj ; intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
[2119]a of Guba;
[2121] & Support the efforts ef certain Cuban exiles,
[2123]who ave associated with the original aims of
[2124]- ghe 26 July Movemsat and who believe that
[2125]|: « @he Castze zogime cam be overthrewa. praraey 3)
[2126]_ withia im order that they may: 1) cause
[2129]Pn
[2131]@e@_ SECRET
[2132]a Geo
[2134]a split in the leadership of the regime
[2135]at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
[2136]2) create a political base of popular
[2137]opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
[2138]intelligence;
[2140]Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
[2141]capability to launch balloons carrying
[2142]leaflets and other propaganda materials from
[2143]international waters into Cuba. Launch
[2144]propaganda balloons after an operational
[2145]capability has been established.
[2147]HY 40955 Dacld: 32276061
[2151]Page 50
[2154]In addition to these immediate actions, we should make
[2155]preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more
[2156]positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
[2157]the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise
[2158]either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a
[2159]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/
[2160]Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal
[2161]conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
[2162]with these situations.
[2164]Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-
[2165]scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including
[2166]both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
[2167]and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
[2168]embarraasing the Castro government and keeping the Castre forces on
[2169]continual alert; retaliatory meagures, as appropriate, including the
[2170]imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other:
[2171]countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
[2172]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
[2173]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.
[2174]military forces,
[2176]We should be in a position to respond with open military support
[2178](to imclude such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
[2180]Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
[2181]forces), toa request for assistance from any anti-Castre/Communist a
[2182]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
[2184]which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible
[2186]with those of the U.S.
[2188]To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
[2189]Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
[2190]and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
[2191]participating! in the U.S. effort.
[2192]i
[2194]€EP SECRET /
[2196]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 51
[2199]ALTERNATIVE II
[2201]United States Policy i :
[2203]1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is
[2204]the overthrow of the Castro/Commnist regime and ‘its
[2205]replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the
[2206]U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free
[2207]World. \To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
[2208]will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
[2210]‘psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[2211]opportunities present themselves or can-be created,
[2213]until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.
[2215]2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the
[2216]Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from
[2217]the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal
[2218]dissension, erode its domestic political support;
[2219]frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence
[2220]in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of
[2221]sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian
[2222]troops from Guba.
[2224]3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting .the
[2225]Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all
[2226]feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and
[2227]covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
[2228]and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for
[2229]further advance toward our ultimate objective,
[2231]4. We should be in a position to respondwith open
[2232]military support (to include such items as materiel,
[2233]advisors, training, and Special Forces support and,
[2234]if necessary, up to the full range of military forces),
[2235]to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
[2236]group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an abllity to
[2237]survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose
[2238]aims are compatible with those of the U.S.
[2240]5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as
[2241]distinguished from military support upon request of
[2242]indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the
[2243]absence of aggression or other Castro/Commmist and/or
[2245]Soviet
[2249]HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 52
[2252]- 8 ~
[2254]Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
[2255]hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S.
[2256]retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ ,
[2257]Communist or Soviet forces.
[2259]6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces
[2260]employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S.
[2261]militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces
[2262]of those Latin American nations desirous of participating
[2263]in the U.S. effort.
[2265]7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligene
[2266]gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a pri
[2267]objective of the national intelligence effort.
[2269]8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba
[2270]should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty
[2271]of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions
[2272]adopted by the Organization of American States. The
[2274]‘ newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue
[2276]should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of:
[2277]marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
[2279]Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in @&
[2280]support of this policy will be prepared.
[2282]Discussion
[2284]The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in-
[2285]volves a phased and controlled series of political,
[2286]economic, psychological and military actions. Such
[2287]actions might inclgde leaflet dropping; propaganda urging
[2288]sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho-
[2289]logical operations urging defections; large scale training
[2290]of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside
[2291]Guba; extensive air activity including both high and low
[2292]level flights primarily directed toward suyveillance and
[2293]collection of intelligence, and which may also have the
[2295]effect
[2297]ep SECRET
[2299]HY 450955 Docld: 32276061 Page 53
[2302]| WW §0955
[2304]eG? SECRET
[2307]A
[2308]Y
[2310]effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the
[2311]Gastro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[2312]appropriate, including the impesition of a POL blockade;
[2313]harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries;
[2315]severance of commmications to Cuba; major acts of
[2316]sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key
[2317]installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,
[2318]ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.
[2320]In addition, this course of action would involve a
[2322]_ broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psy-
[2324]chological and covert actions, such ae OAS sanctions,
[2325]Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance
[2326]of and publicity concerning Castre/Comaunist subversive
[2327]activities in Latin America, application of Four Point
[2328]shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and
[2330]a series of actions designed to ebtain, to the greatest
[2331]extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation
[2332]in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.
[2334]This course of action has the advantage of attaining
[2335]the objective more rapidly and under more controlled
[2336]conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.
[2337]Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will
[2338]accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater
[2339]visks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of
[2340]money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.
[2342],- From the standpoint of international politics, the
[2344]ww. &. will probably be subjected to criticism for
[2345]‘aggression from the uncomaitted nations. It is difficult
[2347]“to. predict the reaction of the Latin American fovernments.
[2351]Z
[2352]f
[2354]They may attack the U. S. for “intervening or they may react
[2355]favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a
[2357]vAarge extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the
[2358]‘world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will
[2360]depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For
[2361]example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our
[2362]active policy and the courses of action under it may
[2366]Bocld: 327776061 Page 54
[2369]ME SECRET
[2372]eventually become Impossible to conceal. If properly
[2373]hendled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not
[2374]only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other
[2375]countries, but alse to gain, particularly in Latin
[2376]Awerica, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/
[2377]Communist Cuba.
[2379]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
[2380]thet the U. 5. will net permit the maintenance of a
[2381]communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of
[2382]military posture, the more active approach may be
[2383]subjected to counteractions from the Sine-Soviet Bloc
[2384]elsewhere. As we Increase the pressures on Castro/Communist
[2385]Guba and the extent of our commitment te overthrow the regime,
[2386]U. &. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further
[2387]we progress along this route, the more significant will be.
[2388]the loss of U, 5. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
[2390]The successful execution of this policy will require
[2391]careful timing and coordination of oux actions and the
[2392]development of detailed plans. While such plans would be
[2393]designed te bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
[2394]within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
[2395]would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
[2396]changes to the international situation.
[2398]In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will
[2399]be necessary fer the highest levels ef our Government to
[2400]review the actions already taken and these contemplated and
[2401]to assess the advantages of continued and escalated
[2402]activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such
[2403]activity.
[2405]Commitment to this course of action dees not exclude
[2406]the possibility of actively pursuing the isclation of the
[2407]Castro regime from the Bloc.
[2409]eB SECRET _
[2411]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 55
[2414]‘wee SECRET
[2417]COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION
[2418]ea EEE PEA SSE NRA EP SeeaM HORACE
[2420]iI recommend approval of Alternative I.
[2422]STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE
[2423]SR ARTETA mA IER fo eer aa tac
[2425]I do not concur in the policy recommended by the.
[2426]Coordinator, Alternative I dees not make the overthrow
[2427]of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. §.
[2428]In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently
[2429]contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the
[2430]downfall of that regime. The specific actions
[2431]recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the
[2432]policy recommended in Alternative IT and, in many cases,
[2433]would be among the initial steps that would be taken
[2434]im executing that poliey. I recommend adoption of
[2435]Alternative II.
[2437]HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 56
[2440]an
[2441]Ny
[2443]()
[2445]HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 57
[2447]oo rn pe Te
[2448]ee. SECRET .
[2450]"MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ‘COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMME TTEE
[2452]Prepared, ‘for ‘the > Meeting of Thursday, January, 2, 1963, 10 Be asm.) ook
[2454]a FROM = “Coordinator of Cuban ‘Affairs:
[2456]Super: United States Poliey.’ ‘Tovar cuba Q
[2458]Oe! 3 .
[2460]“There | are - submitted ‘for your consideration two “alternative :
[2462]‘statements of policy and related courses of action with respect’
[2464]-to Cuba. . Alternative I was prepared by the Department — of State.
[2465]oe, Alternative Il was prepared by the Department of Defenses’.
[2466]* Coordinator! s Recommendation that Alternative I be approved,
[2468]‘and the Department. ‘of Defense | non-éoncurrence “appear at the.
[2470]- "end of this paper.
[2472]ALTERNATIVE I:
[2474]ated | ‘States Policy
[2476]ines of United States Policy » with, A respect to. Cuba, in the.
[2477]following words: a a er
[2479]'As ‘for | our ‘part, ‘te ‘all ‘offensive ‘weapons. ‘systems
[2481]are removed from ‘Cuba and kept out.o of ‘the hemisphere —
[2483]-in the future, “under ‘adequate verification and safe~
[2484]‘guards, a and if Cuba is not used | for the export of.
[2485]aggressive communist. purposes, there will be peace ‘in |.
[2486]‘the Caribbean, ; And, as [> said in ‘September, . "we | shall -
[2487]either initiate. nor: “permit aggressi n ine this i
[2489]hemisphere’ a
[2491]"We will’ ‘not, “of course, “gbendon ‘the political,”
[2492]‘economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to-
[2493]halt subversion from Cuba, “nor our . F Purpose. and
[2495]é.
[2497]AW 50955 DovTd: 32276061. Page [5B ee
[2499]The. op
[2501]‘On November 20,. “the President. ‘set “forth ‘the ‘proad- guides on
[2504]| @gp SECRET
[2508]‘and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be
[2509]truly free. But these policies are very different — .
[2511]- >. from any. intent: fo _taunch a military. invasion, of the
[2512]vi ieland. " ee ne oS en:
[2514]9 Objectives ;
[2516]ve ‘Accordingly,’ the’ objectives, of ve. 8. “policy with |
[2517]respect. to Guba are: ; a
[2519]“L. Protecting the security of the United States and.
[2521]"+. the other states of the Organization of American.
[2522]States (OAS) by assuring that offensive. weapons ..
[2524]al are not reintroduced into Cuba; mE ats
[2526]Removal, of venaining Soviet forees from ‘Guba;
[2528]3.) Preventing Cuba. from taking : any “ageressive ailicary
[2529]action against other Caribbean states; -
[2531]“Reducing ‘the capabilities ‘of the Castro regime | ‘to
[2533]‘the other OAS states; me, Oe Be
[2535]* Encouraging and supporting any developments. within os
[2536]Cuba that offer the possibility of. divorcing: the
[2537]“Cuban Government from its, support of | SinoeSoviet :
[2538]‘Communist purposes or replacing the .Government with |
[2540]a regime which. would accomplish this Purpose.
[2542]‘Maximizing the: cost to the. Soviet ‘Union of.
[2543]Supporting. the Gastro regimes. ee
[2545]“Maximizing the political isolation of the noe
[2546]~~ Castro regime: from other free world states, and
[2547]especially from § states of. the OAS; .
[2549]. Being prepared ‘to: mest, with the employment of
[2550]~ appropriate U. $4: combat. elements_ and/or logistical
[2551]‘support, the wide variety’ ‘ of/eontingencies that. a
[2552]may arise: from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[2554]HW “50955 Docid:32276061 Pa
[2556]‘direct and support subversion and insurrection within _—
[2560] Q@BBRSECRET
[2561]Be
[2563]Oe Producing. conprehensive intelligence related
[2564]to the above objectives... pe .
[2566]Supporting Actions.
[2568]coe The following actions should be intttated in the .
[2569]_ Sequence set forth below:
[2571]Le Await results of Mr. Donovan! s inminent negotiation .
[2572]‘. s with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
[2573]-.. prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action. could -
[2574]_» jeopardize - their releases wy tt
[2576]. te these negotiations fail, or: when: the: ‘prisoners... +
[2577]“are recovered, Proceed « on the following timee~
[2578]“tables oo! %, to
[2580]“Inform NATO. and OAS. ‘twelve ‘hours in advance of i
[2581]© the proclamation of the four point shipping orders...”
[2582]» (The proclamation calls for the orders to, BO into.
[2583]effect: in five days). These orders? °
[2585] elose United States ports ‘to: yal vessels. :
[2586]- of a country whose vessels engage in a
[2587]“earrying arms.to Cuba; 6 +>" “
[2588]‘close United States ports. to ‘any ship -
[2589]which has carried goods in the bloceCuba
[2591]trade within 120 days .of the time it seeks:
[2592]to enter a United ‘States: ports. a
[2594]“prohibit. all ‘United States ‘flag ‘ships and
[2595]- all ships owned by United States nationals
[2596]or residents. from entering any ports of
[2597]_ , Cuba and “from carrying. any goods bound to
[2599]HOE from Cuba; and. wes
[2600]ar
[2602]@WP SECRET.
[2604]CNW. 50955 . DocTd:32276061 . Page 60.
[2607]de prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
[2608]department or agency of the United
[2609]ee “States. from being shipped on vessels
[2610]eee ae . owned oF controlled by persons who wo |
[2611]"own or control vessels engeged. in the |,
[2612]‘trade between Cuba and- the Soviet blee.
[2614]At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission ~~
[2615]Conference in E1 Salvador on January 28-30. ee
[2616]-' Assistant Secretary Martin will visit’ the Presidents -
[2617]’ of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the oe
[2618]7 importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining -
[2619]“ hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following ,
[2620]‘resolutions: | Ne
[2622]Sa. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
[2623]wo actions which continue to endanger the peace, ©
[2624]. deploring refusal to allow inspection, me
[2625]-eondemning the presence of Soviet troops,
[2626]- recommending continued surveillance and /
[2627]“ ceontinued vigilance against subversive.
[2628]~~ aetivities, and terminating, the ingocation a
[2629]_... o£ the Rio Treaty on the missile.crisis, 9.
[2630]“> gogether with 90 nr ne
[2631]* An OAS resolution which would recommend 1
[2632]-L) - extension of ‘arms. embargo to all items
[2633]of trade except food and medicine (fall back .—
[2634]position: . extension of arms embargo to all
[2635]strategic dtems);. 2). prohibition of AR
[2636]“ships fro transporting embargoed items and
[2637]‘deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
[2638]“trade; .3)- denial of Soviet. over-flights and
[2639]7, transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
[2640]““" 4) ‘acall on other states to take similar
[2642]actions on
[2644]‘After obtaining the maximum possible support of
[2645]“a: the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
[2646]“other OAS members will be approached in Washington
[2649]rage Ol. | a ' SECRET
[2652]SECRET
[2656]~~ and in their respective capitels, simultaneously. a
[2657]It should be possible for this consultation and OAS’ **.
[2658]action on the resolutions to be completed within
[2660]. ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the ~.
[2661]ee -oa5. J. vesolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of. the
[2663]oe eves 8. impending OAS action. * o a
[2665]; wo 5" 6 At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action -
[2667]ye , ss 1, on the resolutions, we will request that NATO ° .
[2669]_ ne , include Guba on the list of countries to which |
[2671]’ shipment of COCOM list (strategic) | items is.
[2672]prohibited. ;
[2674]7.° After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will
[2675]“geek to get agreement from Free World industrial
[2676]', nations to prevent shipping ‘of critical spare parts
[2677]+ and equipme nt to Cuba, - not on | the coceM Aiste
[2679]‘e-—-iIn addition to four’ point shipping resélations,
[2680]“and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
[2681]— Aet, continue to press Free World nations to keep .
[2683]oo their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba | trade. wh
[2685]“In addition to current ‘covert programs - ‘such as ae
[2686]. intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, ee
[2687]. reeruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support
[2689]Of the Cuban Revolutionary Cor uncil, (CRC) activities
[2691]and infiltration of propaganda materials, the »
[2692]following are recomended for. epproval: and immediate |
[2693]initiation:. Ste ee are
[2695]-- Tatens ify to maximum degree possible
[2696]intelligence. and counterintelligence coverage
[2697]of Cubas Foe TE oo
[2698]© Support the efforts of | certain. Cuban exiles,
[2699]: who are associated with.the original aims of
[2700]~ the 26. July Movement and who believe that
[2701]_ i the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[2702]ce within’ ‘in \ order that hey may? 1) - cause
[2704]lb lee ge a
[2708]“HW/90955 Docld:32276061 Page 62 |
[2711]50955": Docld:32276061 |
[2713]Assist Cuban exiles in developing a.
[2715]: ~eapability I has been established.
[2717]SECRET
[2719]aba
[2721]a split in the leaders! nip. of the regime .
[2723]. at the national or provincial levels; and).
[2725]2} ereate a political. base of popular -
[2727]. opposition to. the regime; and, 3); secure
[2728]a intelligence; ; ; oe
[2730]capability to launch balloons carrying
[2731]leaflets and other propaganda materials fvom
[2733]» imternational waters into Cuba. Launch
[2735]propaganda balloons after an operational
[2738]be created,
[2739]Tere
[2741]2. Our immediate ©! : _
[2742]Castro/Communist regime fror: Ere vom
[2743]the Bloc; weaken it sconomir
[2744]‘dissension, erode its domest
[2745]_ frustrate its sebversive act
[2746]“in the nemisphere ; increase the cost
[2748]ustaining the regime; and obtain +h
[2749]trope. from Cuba, ... .
[2751]3. Isolating, undermin
[2753]feasible diplomatic, economic, ads
[2754]covert actions may achieve the inme a ay 5
[2755]and could create propitious conditions in Caba for
[2756]further advance toward our ultimate objective, re
[2758]_ 4. We should be ir a position to respon?
[2759]ttary ‘support (to inciude such items as mat:
[2760]ore, training, and “+ Forces support
[2761]es . ‘ange of military “88 } es
[2763]2e (rom any anti-Castro/Commmi«:
[2764]whic. demonstrate an ability to
[2765]sed th threate:: the gresent regime, and whose |
[2766]tible with those of the U.$.
[2768]wees, as
[2770]a
[2773]“other Castro/Comi.'
[2775]. ° . . a
[2776]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 64 i 8
[2778]sencche peace or sec
[2779]mot preclude appropriat
[2780]“hostile acts by the C
[2782]empioyed aga Z
[2784]_militer?ty- <t ined, free Gsbans and by the, arned
[2785]. of, those acti asierican aations desirous of ‘pat
[2786]in the U.S, effort.
[2788]7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing 2: ¢,
[2789]_ gathering in depth on :@ should be identified as a pxix
[2790]objective of the natios ince.lligence effort.
[2792]3%, actions against Cuba .
[2793]~ably based upon thelTreaty
[2794]- Pact) or on reeoiufions
[2795]tion of American States
[2796]sa Marity on the ‘Cuban
[2798]8. Sihenever poss
[2800]“newly-won hemispher
[2801]should not be jeopa:
[2802]marginal value and which ‘night split the
[2804]Overt and covert annexes of specif’:
[2805]support of this policy will be prepare«:
[2807]Discussion
[2809]The act!
[2810]‘volves a phased
[2811]economic, neyehological “snd military aétions.
[2812]actions might’ inclgde leaflet Gropp ins
[2813]sabotage, strikes, and opposicion to
[2814]‘logical operations urging defections
[2815]‘of Subans.in the U.S. anc’ the use of * gach “Cub
[2816]‘Cuba; extensive air activit% including both hi ‘
[2818]level flights primarily directed toward surveil ian:
[2819]eter idection of: ‘intelligences and which ay” also have the
[2821]~~ ~ oe effect
[2825]| HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 65. — Jo ee
[2827]trPolss and,”
[2829]. H
[2830]the use or U.
[2832]broad gx awe of on efuliy t big
[2833]chological and covert 2ctiz
[2834]Saribbean security arrange:
[2835]of and publicity concerning Sa
[2836]ectivities in Latin America, app laewche
[2837]shipping restrictions and other economic senc cions, and
[2838]a series of actions ssigned to obtain, to the Breet est
[2839]extent possible, rx:
[2840]in the camealgn to us
[2842]4
[2843]4
[2844]|
[2845]BI
[2846]i
[2847]4
[2848]al
[2849]i
[2850]1
[2851]i
[2853]; io This course of action has the advantage of attaining
[2854]Fee o, the ebjecuive more rapidly and under more ce vatrolled
[2856]. conditions than the alternative stated by chs Coordinator,
[2857]indeed, this may be the only course of acting that will
[2859]4 ' gecemplish the ulcimate objective, it inve greater
[2860]yo: *. gisks; and, in the short run, a greater exp: ture of
[2861]oa ae money and material end far Bre numbers o£ -sergonnel.
[2863]sCional politics, the
[2865]> eriticism for
[2867]as. It is difficult
[2868]LB American governments,
[2869]xvening™ or they may react .
[2870]“he aissile eri neuen oe :
[2872]_ From the standpoint
[2873] S. will probably be sur
[2874]«geression from the wncommit
[2875]| ‘go predict the reaction of :
[2876]| They may attack the U. S.
[2877]1
[2879]i
[2881]Favera ably Aes eee did during ¢
[2883]{NW 50955 Dochy: 32276061 Page 66
[2885]wel. .L£ properly
[2886]policy may serve not
[2887]seiy to micigate any uniavorable reactions from other
[2888]acumtvies, but alse to sain, ticularly in Latin
[2889]‘erica, increasing appreciation ek the: threat of Castro/
[2890]Comeunist Cuba. -
[2892]The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
[2893]‘ thet the U. 8. will net permit the maintenance of a
[2894]. communist base in the hemisphere. rom the standpoint of
[2895]“military posture, the more active approach may be —
[2896]“ subjected to counteractions from the Sinc-Soviet Bloc
[2897]° elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Commnist
[2898]> Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,
[2899]-U. S. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further ,
[2900]we progress along this route, the more significant will be |
[2901]' the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
[2902]The successful execution of crhkis policy will require
[2903]' careful tiaing and ccordination of ovr setions and the
[2904]development of detailed plans. While plans would be
[2905]designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
[2906]within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
[2907]_ would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
[2908]“ ghanges to the internationsi situation.
[2910]In any case, at crucial noints along the way, it will
[2911]be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to
[2913]review w the actions already texen and those contemplated and
[2914]toe assess the advantages of continued and escalated |
[2917]‘ty against the disadvantages and dangers of such
[2918]aA : . : . . ‘
[2919]ra
[2921]action does ist exclude
[2922]ng the isolatisn of the
[2924]WW 50955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 67°
[2926]| GR PY ATS
[2928]Ut RS COMMENDATION
[2930]acer
[2932]“?'--LT xecomnend approval of Alternstive I,
[2934]2
[2936]Seb tee
[2938]STATEMENT UF DOD REPRESEN TAT:
[2939]ie ecient a acmenrnt onan tage it eet ERS
[2941]2:
[2943]ats
[2945]; . I do not concur in the policy recommended by the -
[2946]_. Goordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow _
[2947]of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S..
[2948]in addition, Alternative 1 does not sufficientiy
[2950]contemplate the creation oi opportunities to effect the
[2951]' downfall of that regime. The speclfile actions
[2953]# would be among the initial steps that would &
[2955]daw 50955° Doct: 32
[2957]recomnended in Alternative I are consistent with the’™
[2958]policy recommended in Alter:x fe iL-and, in wany cases,
[2960]'. in executing that policy. I recommend adoptic:. of
[2961]- Alternative II. 7 os
[2963]; an a : E27 prey pares
[2964]. ee Mere es
[2965]é a vot,
[2967]276061 Page 68°
[2970]; HW $0955 Docld: 32276061
[2972]Page 69
[2974]. e@ . SECRET, Dot Draf¢23 Jan 63
[2975]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[2976](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.),
[2979]SUBJECT: United States Policy. Toward Cuba
[2981]United States Policy _ 7
[2982]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines
[2983]of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following
[2984]words : |
[2985]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[2986]removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[2987]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[2988]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[2989]communist purposes, there will be peace, in the Caribbean.
[2990]And, as 1 said in September, ‘we shall~néither initiate
[2991]nor permit aggression in this: hemisphere. '
[2992]“We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic:
[2993]and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
[2994]-from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
[2995]shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
[2996]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of |
[2998]the island.
[3000]Objectives
[3005]Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
[3007]_ Cuba are:
[3009]HY 50955 Docld:32276061. Page 70
[3012]4
[3013]A
[3014].
[3016]@ ee oe .
[3017]ee. SECRET _ al
[3018]1. Protecting the security of the United States and the .
[3019]other states of the Organization of American States
[3020](OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
[3021]reintroduced into Cuba; _ .
[3022]2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3026]3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[3028]EASA plat hetdeath Set tigtowad® auptvaste.. Des Daslbag tS tang cag b a it neice ee
[3029]ENE hL eet StL SS titer Mit ae iy Latch a lena a lla ais calle ee tk and atin i le Snalate atti adis
[3031]action against! other Caribbean states!
[3033]|
[3035]Ae Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
[3037]Hemisphere
[3039]other DAS states;
[3041]‘ and support subversion and insurrection within the
[3043]’ 5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within. .
[3044]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban |
[3045]Government fom its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
[3046]purposes; * | | |
[3047]6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[3048]Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban
[3049]Government with a regime that vould break with the
[3050]\ : Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our
[3051]ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by
[3052]one fully compatible with the goals of the United
[3053]States; | ‘
[3054]7. Maximizing] the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
[3056]|
[3057]the Castro) regime; —
[3059]MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 71 | , : ; 8.
[3061]& - | | - — a ; &
[3062]| fifty SECRET |
[3065]8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
[3066]regime from other free world states, and especially
[3067]from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. s.
[3068]actions: against Cuba. should be multilateral,
[3070], preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
[3072]. Assistance. (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by.
[3073]the Organization of American States, The newly-won
[3074]hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not
[3075]be jeopardized |by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[3076]value and which might split. the hemisphere.
[3078]9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[3079]appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
[3080]support, the wide variety of military contingencies
[3081]that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[3083]. and; . | | | | |
[3084]“10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
[3086]5
[3088]-above objectives.
[3090]"supporting Actions | | .
[3091]A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
[3093]ment will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic, /
[3094]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[3096]a | | opportunities
[3098]. ge SECRET
[3100]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 72
[3105]Ll 4e
[3107]| opportunities present themselves or can be created, The actions
[3108]listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would
[3109]be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations=
[3110]for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing
[3111]programs and upon the development of new programs related to
[3112]the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
[3113]1. In addition to current covert program,. such as
[3115]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban
[3117]officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of
[3118]the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other
[3119]exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda .
[3120]materials: |
[3121]a) continue to intensify covert collection of
[3122]intelligence within Cuba, especially within
[3123]the regime;
[3124]b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
[3125]who are associated with the original aims of
[3126]the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
[3127]- the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[3128]within in order that, they may: 1) cause a
[3129]split in, the leadership of the regime at the
[3131]national or provincial levels; anc#2) create
[3133]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 73
[3135]re
[3136]. . @i SECRET ©
[3138]a political base of ‘popular opposition to
[3139]the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
[3140]e.. Assist Cuban ‘exiles in | developing a capability
[3141]to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
[3142]propaganda materials from international waters
[3143]into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an
[3144]operational capability has been established.
[3145]WiTw KESPECT T0 THE ACH ONS LISTED BELO, THE
[3146]2. Awet, results of Mr. Donovan' s imminent negotiations
[3147]with Fidel ai Fe for freeing the 20-odd American
[3148]prisoners Le Oe TLE: cet tetow, ES bee
[3149]active quit. taken before the conclusion of the, negotiationgygbuta
[3150]jeopardize the release. le Loesteceaug
[3151]3. If these negotiations fa¥l, or when the prisoners are
[3152]recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
[3153]4, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
[3154]proclamation of the four point shipping orders, .
[3155](the proclamation calls for the orders to go into
[3156]_ effect in five days). These orders:
[3157]a. close United States ports to all vessels of
[3158]a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms
[3159]to Cuba; ° a | .
[3160], b. co
[3162]QB SECRET
[3164]WW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 74
[3167]on | at —_ . | @
[3168]| _ Qe SECRET
[3170]b. close United States ports to any ship which has
[3171]carried. goods in the bloc+Cuba trade within 120
[3173]days of the time it seeks to enter a United
[3175]S9 CTSA TD ee tree per git en ernment
[3177]‘States port;
[3179]ears
[3181]e
[3183]c.é prohibit all United States flag ships and all
[3185]i
[3187]i
[3189]e
[3190]a
[3191]fe
[3193]‘ships owned by United States nationals or residents
[3194]from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[3196]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[3198]SP Oma rede IE
[3200]on
[3202]norman yore
[3204]y
[3210]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 75
[3212]ee SECRET
[3213]~J- ,
[3214]d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department
[3215]or agency of the United States from being shipped
[3216]on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own
[3217]or control vessels engaged in the trade between
[3218]‘Cuba and the Soviet bloc. |
[3219]5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference
[3220]January 20-30, or at a later dateg dependent on the Donovan
[3221]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representa-
[3222]‘tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile,
[3223]Mexico and Brazil. to convey to them the importance
[3224]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric
[3225]solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
[3226]a. ‘An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions
[3227]'. which continue to endanger the peace, dep loring
[3229]refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence
[3231]any
[3233]of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance
[3234]- and continued vigilance against subversive
[3235]activities, and terminating the invocation of the
[3236]Rio Treaty on. the missile crisis, together with
[3237]“b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension
[3238]of arms embargo to all items of trade except food
[3240]oe. SECRET
[3242]HY 50955. DoclId: 32276061 Page 76
[3244]qm SECRET
[3245]. . -8-
[3246]and medicine (fall back position: extension of
[3247]arms ‘embargo to ‘all ‘strategic items); 2) prohibit-
[3248]ORS AremGer Holes
[3249]ion of 4 ships, from transporting embargoed items
[3250]‘ oe and deny use of ports to- ‘ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; -
[3251]3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit
[3252]rights for flights to Cuba; and
[3253]4) a call on other states to take similar |
[3254]action. 7 | |
[3255]' 6. After obtaining the maximum possible’ support of the key
[3256]countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
[3257]. members will be approached in Washington and in their
[3258]respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be
[3259]possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
[3260]resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
[3261]formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform
[3262]our NATO allies of the impending OAS action..
[3263]7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
[3264]* resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the
[3265]list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic’
[3267]items is prohibited.
[3269]8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek
[3271]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 7 = .
[3272]. . ms OUrOTT
[3276]to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
[3278]to prevent shipping» of critical spare parts and equipment |
[3280]to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 7 a
[3281]Ape |
[3283]9, En addition to, four point shipping resolutions, and
[3285]action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
[3287]continue to press Free ‘World nations to keep their
[3289]deci, necnneenanpas 4 emt SER TRON PLD TEE TE
[3291]shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
[3293]f ‘Be Contingency Planning
[3295]New 7 opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise
[3297]fr. either as a result of Bloc action in other: parts of the world; as a
[3298]4
[3300]result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the
[3302]‘internal conflict within Cuba.
[3306]| Castro~ -Communist, regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
[3310]Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
[3312]\ should include preparations | for increased multilateral and/or
[3313]. ;
[3314]bilateral political and. economic measures, large scale use of
[3316]Cubans who are nop/ inside Cuba; more ‘extensive air activity
[3318]7 ~ including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward
[3320]|| surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[3323]‘ have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
[3325]the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[3327]appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-
[3329]AW 30955 Docld: 32276061
[3331]Page 7&
[3333]@® SECRET.
[3335]S0955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 79
[3337]| QP SECRET
[3341]ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
[3342]‘communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping _
[3343]"destined. for Cuba’ and on key’ installations in Cuba; intensive
[3344]naval patrols} and, ultimately, ° the use of U. ‘S. military
[3345]force. To the extent. feasible, v. Ss. military forces employed
[3347]against Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8, militarily-trained
[3349]free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin Anerican nations.
[3351]art
[3353]desirous of participating in: the U.S. effort.
[3355]«oe
[3358]@P_SECRET ofraff23 Jan
[3360]oe - a, . ¥ . _ = i
[3361]- pee FOR THE cane is COUNCIL"S EXECOTIVe comarrez:
[3363]AO ye 1G O81 1563, Y. P om a
[3365]- FROM . Coordinator ° Cuban Affairs
[3367]SUBJECT: ‘United States Poltey Toward Gaba
[3369]United States Policy —
[3370]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines [aa
[3372]a ‘of United Statea poltey. wich respect to Cuba in the following
[3374]words!
[3376]“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[3378]renoved from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
[3379]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[3380]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[3381]commynist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean,
[3382]And, ag I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate |
[3383]nor permit aggression in thie hewlsphere.
[3385]We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
[3386]_and other efforts of this hemi sphere to halt subversion
[3388]_ from Guba, nor our purpese and, hope thet the Cuban people
[3390]. shall sone day be truly free. But these policies are very
[3392]different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
[3394]the feland.. . | | _
[3395]“Oblectives | | — | a
[3397]- Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
[3399]“Cuba are i
[3402]4, ‘Protecting the security of the United States and the
[3403]| other states of the Organization of American States
[3404](OAS) by assuring, that offensive weapons are not
[3405]| reintroduced into Cuba; .
[3406]2, Removal of remaining Soyiet forces from Cuba;
[3407]3, Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
[3408]action against, other ‘Caribbean states}
[3409]Reducing - the capabilities of the Castro regime to ‘direct
[3410]and semen and insurrection within the
[3411]other OAS avatess
[3412]Encouraging: and supporting any developments within
[3413]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the. Cuban
[3415]Government from tes support of Sine-Soviet Communist
[3417]t
[3419]. purposes;
[3420]Encouraging and supporting any developments within
[3421]Gaba that offer the possibilicy of replacing the Cubap
[3422]Government with a regine that would break with the | |
[3423]Sino=Soviet Bloc it being understood that our |
[3424]witimate objective is replacement of the regime by
[3426]one fully compatible with the goals of the United
[3428]States;
[3432]- Maximizing the cost #@ the Soviet Union of supporting
[3434]the Castre regime;
[3436]A,
[3438]Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
[3440]regime from other free world states, and especially
[3442]. from states of the OAS, Whenever possible, U.S.
[3444]actions against Cuba should be multilateral,
[3445]preferably based upon t the Treaty of Reciprocal
[3446]Assistance (Rio. Pact) or on resolutions adopted by
[3447]the Organization of American States, ‘The newly-won -
[3449]hemispheréc solidarity an the Cuban issue should not
[3451]be jeopardized. by. seeking OAS actions of marginal
[3453]value and which might split the hemisphere.
[3455]Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[3457]appropriate U. Ss. “combat. elements and/or logistical
[3459]support, the wide variety of military cone ingencies
[3461]that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
[3462]and; . _
[3464]Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
[3466]above objectives.
[3468]Supporting Actions
[3470]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
[3472]. Ment will be prepared to increase the political, .economic,
[3474]psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
[3476]opportunities:
[3478]aaa SECRET
[3481]present themselves or can be created. The actions
[3483]- opportunities
[3484]oval and would
[3486]ow are those requiring immediate appr
[3488]listed bel
[3489]t forth below. Recommendations:
[3491]-pe initiated in the sequence se
[3493]etions based upon the re-examination of existing
[3495]for further &
[3496]t of. new programs related to.
[3498]progrems and upon the developmen
[3500]the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
[3502]1. tn addition to current covert program, | such &
[3504]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban
[3506]officials as agente, radio broadcasts, support of
[3508]the Cuban Revolutionary Coune!1 (cRE
[3509]and infiltration of propaganda
[3511]) and. other
[3513]exile group “activities
[3516]atensify covert collection of
[3518]a) continue ‘to! fn
[3520]intelLigence within Guba, especially within
[3522]the regime} _
[3523]in Cuban exiles,
[3525]b) Support the ‘efforts of certa
[3527]who are associated with the original aims of
[3529]the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
[3531]the Castro regime can be overthrown from
[3533]within in order that they may? 1) cause &
[3535]split in the leadexship of the regime at che
[3537]national or. provincial levels; afd. 2} cweshes |
[3539]wm mevse,
[3540]a be,
[3542]a political base of popular opposition to |
[3543]the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
[3545]— Assist ‘Cuban exiles in developing a capability
[3546]to launch balloons carrying leaflets and sther.
[3547]propaganda matertals from international. waters
[3549]into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an
[3551]operat ional capability has been established.
[3553]2. Await results of. Mr. Denovan' @ imminent negotiations
[3555]zapubelshios 2,
[3557]with Fidel’ Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American
[3558]prisoners, Any of the actions Lteted below, if
[3560]see Fark aC I seh
[3562]taken before the conclusion of tre negotiations could
[3564]ry S
[3566]jeopardize their release.
[3568]od ote
[3570]If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are
[3572]recovered, proceed on the following timetable;
[3574]&. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
[3576]Pe eer eT ee
[3578]proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
[3580](The proclamation calls fer the orders to go taco
[3582]effect in five days). These orders:
[3583]a. close United States ports to all vessels of 4 i
[3585]a country whose vebiels engage im carrying arms
[3587]to Cuba;
[3588]be:
[3590]a2 bots he
[3591]. Lett ate
[3593]- =" 6 - :
[3595]b. close United States ports ‘to any ship when hae
[3597]carried. pode. ‘in the blossCuba trade within 122
[3599]days of. the ine te seeks to enter. a United
[3601]States ports
[3603]prohibit. all United States lag entps end all
[3605]ships owned by United ‘States nationals ox residents
[3607]“from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[3609]any: good ‘Wound. te or from Cubs; and
[3613]cad
[3614]a
[3618]<e
[3620]Q
[3622]or
[3624]3
[3628]the
[3634]lo
[3636]9
[3638]st
[3640]a
[3642]ned
[3645]6.
[3647]and medicine (fall Back position: extension of
[3648]‘arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit
[3649]Lon of AR. ‘ships from transporting embargoed items
[3650]and deny. use of ports to ships in Bloc- Cuba trade;
[3651]3) . “denial, of Soviet over-flights and transit
[3652]rights for. flights. to Cuba; and
[3653]4) a call oni other states to take similar
[3654]action, -_
[3655]After obtaining, the maximum possible. support of the key
[3656]countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, ‘the other OAS
[3657]members will be approached in Washington and in their
[3658]respective capitals, simultaneously. Ic should be
[3659]possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
[3660]resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
[3661]formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will infora
[3662]our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
[3663]At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
[3664]resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the.
[3666]list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategie)
[3668]items is prohibited.
[3671]. om ) SECRET
[3672]po
[3673]to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
[3674]to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
[3675]to Cuba, not on. the cocom, list: .
[3676]9; dn addition to: four point shipping resolutions, and
[3677]action under Section 107, of: the Foreign Assistance Act,
[3679]continue to press, Free World. nations to keep their
[3681]shipping out of Bloc~Cuba, trades
[3683]B. Contingency Planning —
[3685]New opportunities for ‘accomplishing our objectives may arise
[3686]either as a result of Bloc ‘action ‘in other parts of the world; as a
[3687]result of aggressive moves “(or Asolated hostile actions) by the
[3688]Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
[3689]internal conflict within Cuba.
[3691]Qur contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
[3692]should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
[3693]bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
[3694]Cubans who are nop inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
[3695]including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward
[3696]aurveillance and collection of. intelligence, atid which may aleo
[3697]have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
[3699]the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[3705]-ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
[3707]communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[3709]destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba: intensive
[3711]naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military
[3713]force, To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
[3715]against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
[3717]desirous of
[3719]a a
[3721]HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 90
[3723]og (wim evisiws)
[3724]; =P OENTIAL
[3726](WITH TOP £2 7RET “NCLOSURES)
[3731]January 22, 1963 .
[3733]. Mo ONDUt FOR: Tne Honoval e Mele... ce “ume,
[3734]oe . .
[3735]foo a Te : All Members of she NSC Executive Committee
[3736]aeees ae . 3 CUBA - Back-up ?apers and a Summary of-
[3738]Recommendations of the Coordinator
[3739]of Cuban iffairs
[3741]; The enclosed navers are submitted by the Coordinator
[3742]of Cuban Affairs.
[3744]1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
[3745]2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
[3747]3. United States Policy. in Cuba in the Organization
[3748]‘of American States.
[3750]4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigace.
[3751]5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.
[3753]It is understood that the recommendations will be
[3754]considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on
[3755]Thursday, January 24.
[3757]Enclosures:
[3759]As stated.
[3761]CONFIDENTIAL
[3762]_ (WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURzS,
[3764]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 91
[3766]x BE
[3767]. SECRET
[3769]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[3771](Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 19532, 10 a.m.)
[3775]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[3777]SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
[3779]1. _U. S. Policy Objectives
[3781]The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
[3782]respect to Cuba:
[3784]a. Protecting the security of the United States
[3785]and the other states of the Organization of
[3786]American States by assuring that offensive
[3787]weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
[3789]b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3791]c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[3792]military action against other Caribbean states;
[3794]d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[3795]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[3796]within the other OAS states;
[3798]e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3799]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3800]divorcing the Cuban Government from its
[3801]support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
[3803]f. Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3804]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3806]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[3807]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
[3809]SECRET
[3811]NW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 92
[3813]Ps,
[3815]SECRET
[3817]Ja
[3819]being understood that cur ultimate objective
[3820]is replacement of the regime by one fully
[3821]compatible with the goals of the United States;
[3823]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[3824]supporting the Castro regime;
[3826]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[3827]Castro regime from otner Free World states,
[3828]and especially from states of the OAS. When-
[3829]ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should |
[3830]be multilateral, preferably based upon the
[3831]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
[3832]resolutions adopted by the Crganization of
[3833]American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[3834]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[3835]jeovardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal
[3836]value and which might split che hemisphere;
[3838]Being prepared to meet, with the employment
[3839]of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[3840]logistical support, the wide variety of
[3841]military contingencies that may arise from
[3842]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[3844]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[3845]to the above objectives.
[3847]2. Supvorting Actions .,
[3849]Actions in support of these objectives and their
[3850]time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
[3851]entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
[3852]four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
[3854]HY 50955 Docla: 32276061
[3856]SECRET
[3858]Page 93
[3860]HW 50955
[3862]SECRET
[3866]action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
[3868]to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
[3869]shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
[3871]Existing programs will be reviewed and further
[3872]recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
[3873]variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
[3874]at once.
[3876]In addition to current covert programs such as
[3877]intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
[3878]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
[3879]other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
[3880]materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are
[3881]recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
[3883]a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
[3884]within Cuba, especially within the regime;
[3886]b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
[3887]return the 26 of July Movement tc its
[3889]original aims.
[3891]NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
[3892]foregoing actions may impair our ability
[3893]to accomplish objective b. (Removal of
[3894]remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
[3895]taking these actions could provide the
[3896]U,S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
[3897]its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, avproval
[3898]of the foregoing actions is recommended,
[3900]3. Cuban Brigade
[3902]Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
[3903]specially tailored civilian. and military program for
[3904]Brigade members.
[3906]SECRET
[3908]Docld: 32276061 Page 94.
[3910]a ~
[3912]The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
[3913]and individual members urged to accent civilian training
[3914]or to enlist in the existing U. 5. military program
[3915]for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
[3916]Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
[3917]members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
[3918]community would be avoided.
[3920]SECRET
[3922]HY 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 95 -
[3924]se. SECRET
[3926]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATICNAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[3928](Prepared for tne Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
[3930]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[3932]SUBJECT: United: States Policy Toward Cuba
[3934]United States Policy
[3936]On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
[3937]lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
[3938]following words:
[3940]"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
[3941]removed from Cuba and kent out of the hemisphere in
[3942]the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
[3943]and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
[3944]communist purposes, there will be peace in the
[3945]Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
[3946]neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
[3947]hemisphere. '
[3949]"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
[3950]economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
[3951]subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
[3952]the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. -But
[3953]these policies are very different from any intent to
[3954]launch a military invasion of the island."
[3956]oor SECRET
[3958]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 96
[3960]GOP SECRET
[3964]Objectives
[3966]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061
[3968]Accordingly, the objectives of United States
[3969]policy with respect to Cuba are:
[3971]1.
[3973]Page 97
[3975]Protecting the security of the United States
[3976]and the other states of thé Organization of
[3977]American States (OAS) by assuring that
[3978]offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
[3979]Cuba3
[3981]Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
[3983]Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
[3984]military action against other Caribbean states;
[3986]Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
[3987]to direct and support subversion and insurrection
[3988]within the other Hemi gphere states;
[3990]Encouraging and. ‘supporting any developments within
[3991]Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing
[3993]the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
[3994]Soviet Communist purposes;
[3996]Encouraging and supporting any developments
[3997]within Cuba that offer the possibility of
[3998]replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
[4000]that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
[4002]it being understood that our ultimate
[4003]objective is replacement of the regime by
[4004]one fully compatible with the goals of the
[4005]United States;
[4007]@e secart
[4009]10.
[4011]@ SECRET
[4015]Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
[4016]supporting the Castro regime;
[4018]Maximizing the political isolation of the
[4019]Castro regime from other free world states,
[4020]and especially from states of the CAS.
[4021]Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
[4022]should be multilateral, preferably based upon
[4023]the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
[4024]or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization
[4026].of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
[4028]solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
[4029]jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
[4030]value and which might split the hemisphere;
[4032]' Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
[4034]appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
[4035]logistical support, the wide variety of
[4036]military contingencies that may arise from
[4037]pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
[4039]Producing comprehensive intelligence related
[4040]to the above objectives.
[4042]Supporting Actions
[4044]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061
[4046]A,
[4048]To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
[4050]U. S, Government will be prepared to increase
[4052]the political economic, psychological and
[4053]military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
[4054]present themselves or can be created. The
[4056]actions listed below are those requiring immediate
[4057]approval and would be initiated in the sequence
[4058]set forth below. Recommendations for further
[4060]SECRET
[4062]Page 98
[4064]@Qp SECRET
[4068]actions based upon the re-examination of
[4069]existing programs and upon the development
[4070]of new programs related to the foregoing
[4071]objectives will be forthcoming.
[4073]1. In addition to current covert program, such
[4074]as intelligence collection, recruitment of
[4075]Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
[4076]support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
[4077]and other exile group activities and infil- .
[4078]tration of propaganda materials:
[4080]a. Intensify covert éollection
[4081]of intelligence within Cuba, especially
[4082]within the regime;
[4084]b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
[4085]exiles, who are associated with
[4086]the original aims of the 26 of July
[4087]Movement and who believe that the
[4088]Castro regime. can be overthrown from
[4089]within in order that they may:
[4090]i) cause a split in the leadership
[4091]of the regime at the national or
[4092]provincial levels; and 2) create a
[4093]political base of popular opposition
[4094]to the regime; and, 3) secure
[4095]intelligence;
[4097]c. Assist Cuban éxiles in developing a
[4098]capability to launch balloons carrying
[4099]leaflets and other propaganda materials
[4100]from international waters into Cuba.
[4101]Launch propaganda balloons after an
[4102]‘operational capability has been
[4103]established,
[4105]SECRET
[4107]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 99
[4109]HY 30955) Docld: 32276061
[4111]@ SECRET
[4115]With respect to the actions listed below,
[4116]the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
[4117]negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
[4118]the 20-odd American prisoners should first.
[4119]be ascertained. If these actions were. taken
[4120]before the conclusion of the negotiations
[4121]they could jeopardize the release of the
[4123]‘Americans.
[4125]Page 100
[4127]Lf these negotiations fail, or when the
[4128]prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
[4129]following timetable:
[4131]Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
[4132]of the proclamation of the four point
[4133]shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
[4134]the orders to go into effect in five days).
[4135]These orders:
[4137]a. Close United States ports to all
[4138]yessels of a country whose vessels
[4139]engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
[4141]b. Close United States ports to any ship
[4142]which has carried goods in the Bloc-
[4143]Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
[4144]it seeks to enter a United States port;
[4146]ec. Prohibit all United, States flag ships
[4147]and all ships owned by United States
[4148]nationals or residents from entering
[4149]any ports of Cuba and from carrying
[4150]any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
[4152]SECRET
[4154]ee SECRET
[4158]d. Prohibit any carge sponsored by any
[4159]department of the United States from
[4160]being shipped on vessels owned or
[4161]controlled by persons who own or
[4162]control vessels engaged in the trade
[4163]between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
[4165]5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
[4166]Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
[4167]a later date dependent on the Donovan
[4168]mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
[4169]another representative of the President
[4170]will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
[4171]and Brazil to convey to them the importance
[4172]President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
[4173]hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
[4174]the following resolutions:
[4176]a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
[4177]its actions which continue to endanger
[4178]the peace, deploring refusal to allow
[4179]inspection, condemning the presence of
[4180]Soviet troops, recommending continued
[4181]surveillance and continued vigilance
[4182]against subversive activities, and
[4183]terminating the invocation of the Rio
[4184]Treaty on the missile crisis, together
[4185]with
[4187]b. An OAS resolution which would
[4188]recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
[4189]to all items of trade except food and
[4190]medicine (fall back position: extension
[4191]of arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4193]Po SECRET
[4195]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 101
[4197]HG 50955 Docld: 32276061
[4199]Page i102
[4201]SECRET
[4203]=~J=
[4205]2) “prohibition of shi 3 Of OAS.
[4206]‘member * states. “from evdveporteting
[4207]embargoed © ‘items and deny use of
[4208]ports ‘to ships: ‘in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4209]3) “denial of Soviet ovér- flights and
[4210]transit rights for flights to Cuba;
[4211]and 4) “a call on other states to
[4212]take similar action.
[4214]After’ obtaining the maximum ‘possible
[4216]support of the key countries of Mexico,
[4218]@ and Brazil, the other OAS”
[4220]inembers will be approached in Washington
[4222]and. in their respective capitals,
[4224]simultaneously. ‘It ‘should be possible
[4226]‘for this’ consultation and OAS action on
[4228]‘the resoluti fons, to be completed within
[4230]Prior: ‘to formal COAS approval
[4232]Of the’ resolutions, we will inform our ©
[4233]NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
[4235]‘at thé first: NATO meeting ‘after formal
[4237]OAS action on the resolutions, we will
[4239]Yequest . that NATO includé Cuba on the
[4241]list of countries’ to which shipment’
[4243]PE OSE (strategic) items prohibited.
[4245]shipping of critical spare parts “ahd
[4246]equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
[4248]In addition to the four point shipping
[4249]resolutions, and action under Section
[4251]107. of the Foréign Assistance Act, continue
[4252]to press Free World nations to keep their
[4253]shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
[4255]@g@ SECRET
[4257]B.
[4259]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061
[4265]Contigency Planning
[4267]New opportunities for accomplishing our
[4268]objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
[4269]action in other parts of the world; as a result
[4270]of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
[4271]by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
[4272]result of uprisings or internal conflict within
[4273]Cuba. |
[4275]Our contingency planning, which will be
[4276]undertaken immediately, should include preparations
[4277]‘for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
[4278]political) and economic measures, large scale use of
[4279]Cubans whto are now inside Cuba; more extensive
[4280]air activity including both high and low level
[4281]flights. primarily directed toward surveillance
[4283]* and collection of intelligence, and which may also
[4285]vhave the ‘effect of embarrassing the Castro
[4286]“government and keeping the Castro forces on
[4287]continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
[4288]appropriate, including the imposition of a
[4290]POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
[4291]other countries; severance of communic ations
[4293]to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
[4294]destined for Cuba and on key installations to
[4295]Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
[4296]the use jof U. S. military force. To the extent
[4297]feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
[4298]Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
[4299]trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
[4300]those Latin American nations desirous of
[4301]participating in the U. S. effort.
[4303]oe SECRET
[4305]Page 103
[4307]oo — SecRET
[4308]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[4310](Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)
[4312]‘FROM + Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.
[4314]SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of
[4315]American States. .
[4317]2 8, invoked the RIS “MSaty’ on’ Setober’22, "19625" int
[4318]thereto. “se Council of the OAS {COAS) continues to.act provisi
[4319]ally as tue Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (0G)
[4321]Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanii
[4322]cassed'a resolution calling for the withdrawal of ali. cffensi
[4323]apons from Guba, recommending that member states take such ac
[4324]including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to preve
[4325]continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prever::
[4326]the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere.
[4327]In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti-
[4328]tuted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican
[4329]Republic cooperated with us inthe quarantine and 3 others offered
[4330]their assistance. and facilities.
[4332]With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the
[4333]Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Con+
[4334]sultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing
[4335]to concern themselves with subversion and possible. extension of
[4336]economic sanctions, the other American Republi¢s are waiting for
[4337]some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken,
[4339]COURSES
[4341]SECRET
[4343]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 104.
[4345]SECRET
[4347]2
[4349]COURSES OF ACTION |
[4351](1) Continue the Coas/oc in being ‘under the Rio Treaty but
[4353]‘take no further action at present.
[4355]Considerations:
[4357]The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being
[4359]for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis.
[4360]If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either
[4361]be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed
[4362]circumstances.
[4364](2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC_which
[4366]condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, .
[4368]deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of
[4369]Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued
[4370]vigilance against subversive activities.
[4372]Considerations:
[4374]This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would —
[4375]represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step. following the
[4376]conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.
[4378]Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is
[4379]believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.
[4381]Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insur-
[4382]rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.
[4384]It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently
[4385]vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put
[4386]the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis-~
[4388]phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to
[4389]_ the Soviet Union.
[4391]' (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This
[4392]would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions
[4393]‘TI and VIII of Punta del Este. (Which provided for a Special Consul-
[4394]tative Committee on Sgcurity and a a Special ala to study» ‘the
[4395]further suspension of trade. )
[4397]Considerations:
[4399]This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was”
[4400]called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.
[4402]Taken
[4404]SECRET
[4406]‘HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 105
[4411]Considerations:
[4413]action.
[4416]_ SECRET
[4420]Taken by itself, this course of action might maise doubts
[4421]concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are
[4422]continuing our surveillance. ;
[4424]Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would
[4425]appear aS though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence
[4426]of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification
[4427]surrendered (on-site inspection and -re~introduction of offensive
[4428]weapons) O
[4430](4) Combine (2) and (3).
[4432]Considerations:
[4434]. This combination of actions is feasiblesand is likely to
[4435]obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.
[4437]The termination'of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the
[4438]resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.
[4440]Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed
[4441]resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3).
[4442]‘Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom
[4443]panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic
[4444]sanctions, ,
[4446]_ (5) Seek .to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was
[4447]invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a
[4448]Fesolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.
[4452]With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able
[4453]to obtain a substantial majority. .
[4455].. Such action would’ give a better basis for urging such addi-
[4456]tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).
[4458]It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless
[4459]we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement
[4461](6) In addition to (5 seek authorization under the Rio
[4462]Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force,
[4464]to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba if the
[4466]- OAS call is not heeded. :
[4468]Considerations:
[4470]SECRET
[4472]HW 50955 DBocld:32276061 Page 106
[4474]4
[4475]4
[4476]|
[4477]|
[4478]a
[4479]i
[4480]if
[4482]i
[4483]4
[4484]|
[4485]4
[4487]Considerations:.
[4489]; This action should be seriously considered only if we are
[4490]determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet
[4491]troops. ;
[4493]While it should be possible with adequate consultation and
[4494]preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political
[4495]and ecoriomic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet .
[4496]troops, it would be difficult to-obtain the necessary 2/3 majority
[4497]for authorization of the.use of armed force.
[4499](7) Seek a resolution in.the COAS/Octo sever_all diplomatic
[4500]and consular relations with Guba (probably possible o in con-
[4502]Considerations:
[4504]_ This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase
[4505]the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies ;
[4506]encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.°
[4508]Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for
[4509]such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would
[4510]be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile,
[4511]Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments’ would have some appeal.
[4513]Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained
[4514]for this. . : ;
[4516](8) Seek_a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all. economic.
[4517]and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba .
[4518](probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).
[4520]Considerations:
[4522]The severance of all economic and commercial relations would
[4523]go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides
[4524]for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the
[4525]U.S..to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
[4526]Such action would: expose us to charges of inhumanity and would
[4527]probably nullify our. public statements that we have no quarrel
[4528]with the Cuban people. ,
[4530]A momber of telecommunications between Latin America and
[4532]_ Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services
[4534]would interrupt commnications vital to many of our Latin American
[4535]friends. Further, U.S.. communications with Cuba should be main-
[4536]tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national
[4537]interest and those for humanitarian reasons. _—
[4539]These
[4540]SECRET
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[4544]HY 50955
[4546]@ SECRET & |
[4547]5
[4549]These considerations would make it extremely difficult to
[4550]obtain a 2/3 majority in the COoAS/OC.
[4552](9) Seek resolution in . COAS under Resolution. VIII of Punta
[4553]del Este which would recommend: .
[4555]~(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
[4556]food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of
[4557]arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4559](b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed
[4560]items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4562](c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air-
[4563]eraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also
[4564]be added to No. (8).)
[4566]Considerations:
[4568]This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could
[4569]be taken independently of other steps.
[4571]With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity.
[4572]should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual
[4573]effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned
[4574]4s more psychological than practical because Latin American countries
[4575]ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement
[4576]and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an
[4577]appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps. .
[4579]It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. |
[4580]unilateral steps in’controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the
[4581]Foreign Assistance Act, and for ‘urging other states to control Soviet
[4582]flights to Guba. |
[4584](10) Intensify through COAS and. SCCS programs of recommended
[4585]controls over subversive activities. Seek. COAS resolution warning .
[4586]Castro that continued subversive activity may 2 result in action
[4587]under Rio Treaty. a ;
[4589]Considerations:
[4591]The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being.
[4592]presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and
[4593]should be continued... However, it would be difficult to get unani-
[4594]mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because
[4595]of the reference to the Rio Treaty
[4597]Myatt
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[4602]den hin gins AW ea Paha SER al
[4604]SE a ERAT ant Bene IB wi eb
[4606]‘MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 109. |
[4608]SECRET
[4609]“
[4611](11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued
[4613]subversive activities. ,
[4614]Considerations:
[4616]If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs.
[4617]the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be. neces-
[4618]sary to invokethe Rio Treaty since the present functions given the
[4619]COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under
[4620]Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil-
[4621]lance and recommendations to governments for control measures.
[4623]The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in
[4624]the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive -
[4625]activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become
[4626]a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing
[4627]possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection
[4628]in Latin America.
[4630]The basis of any such action should consist of the production
[4631]of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in
[4632]subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, in«
[4633]sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS
[4634]menue (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under
[4635]way - oo
[4637](12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory _
[4639]Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board {IADB}.
[4641]This could be done: 7 ;
[4643](a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to.
[4644]the IADB; ;
[4646]. (ob) by the CoAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or
[4648](ce) having the OAS member governments designate their
[4649]representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.
[4651]Considerations:
[4653]As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred
[4654]to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover,
[4655]amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and
[4656]requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governnents.
[4658]As to (b), this-is a feasible course of action which the
[4660]' COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi-
[4662]cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the
[4663]Council of the desirability of such action, —
[4665]As.
[4666]SECRET © .
[4668]—— SRORET .
[4672]As to (ce), member governments could take this course on an_
[4673]individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that
[4674]“exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this fl
[4675]. action under the OAS Charter. ST ,
[4677]COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION |
[4679]In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with
[4680]respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international |
[4681]complications were key factors which I have carefully considered. |
[4683]Courses of action: (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance
[4684]us toward our objective, would. be politically feasible, and would
[4685]involve minimum adverse international efféets. We could probably.
[4686]obtain a near-unanimous vote in thé OAS for these courses except |
[4687](10) and (12)...
[4689]Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (411) and (12) would advance us
[4690]considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11)
[4691]particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would
[4692]involve adverse international effects, including alprobable acute
[4693]confrontation with the USSR.
[4695]I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best
[4696]interests at this time.
[4698]T recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).
[4700]Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio
[4701]Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to
[4702]endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns
[4704]- the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil-
[4705]lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and
[4706](b) terminate the coas/OC on the missile crisis. This would still
[4707]leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII
[4708]of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative
[4709]Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suse.
[4710]pension of trade. oo ,
[4712]— .
[4714]Course: (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution
[4716]VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:
[4718](a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
[4719]food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of
[4720]arms embargo to all strategic items);
[4722](b)
[4724]ERE QTE ARON EOE RTE eC NN MI ETE TE TTS IT AUT IIH GT TE FUME LET WALES CTE ERE REE TES
[4726]SECRET
[4728]oe BREET
[4730]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 110
[4733]8.
[4735](ob) prohibition of AR ships from transporting. embargoed items
[4736]and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
[4738]“ (e) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air-
[4739]eraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.
[4741](a) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar
[4742]actions.
[4744]Rationale
[4746]- ‘The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our
[4747]objective, carrying the OAS with uss without committing us to any
[4748]‘further action.
[4750]' After these initial measures are in effect, 1 we should assess
[4751]the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with
[4752]any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which
[4753]may be opened ‘to us by events.
[4755]‘I believe we should. develop our pressures steadily and gradu
[4756]ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation
[4757]under constant review for the optimum opportunity. to initiate
[4758]additional measures.
[4760]‘I do not: believe we should take’a track now utiich will break
[4761]heint spheric cuilty$ We may need unity later in. an. emergency.
[4763]Neither do I “Believe we should push the OAS into probable
[4764]acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.
[4766]_ Both. of. sthese prices the U. 5. may find it necessary to: pay.
[4767]: for action, ata later date ‘but not NOWs in my opinion..
[4769]SECRET
[4771]HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061. Page 1a
[4773]we ® _ ®
[4775]SECRET -
[4777]MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTLVE COMMITTEE
[4779](Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)
[4781]FROM 3 Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[4783]SUBJECT: — Cuban Brigade
[4785]PROBLEM
[4787]“To determine the future of the Cuban
[4789]Brigade (participants in the Bay of
[4790]Pigs invasion recently released from
[4791]Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who
[4792]participated in or trained for the
[4793]invasion. To determine the future of
[4794]existing Cuban training programs.
[4796]DISCUSSION
[4798]Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay
[4799]of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great
[4800]majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over
[4801]1100 were released. —_
[4803]- & decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and
[4804]- other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically
[4805]_proceed from whatever over all policy the U. 5. adopts
[4806]‘toward Cuba. .
[4808], A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively _
[4809]marginal military value because of its quantitative
[4810]Limitations and restricted military capability, but its
[4812].” SECRET
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[4817], «
[4819]2 HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 113
[4821]SECRET
[4825]politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban
[4826]resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate
[4827]for its limited military utility.
[4829]Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be
[4830]weighed.
[4831]COURSES OF ACTION
[4832]Three courses of action appear |
[4833]feasible with respect to the
[4835]'Brigade's future.
[4837](1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military
[4839]unit, with no: further U. S. special assistance.
[4841]If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and
[4842]their families would be eligible for the benefits now
[4843]accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area
[4844](approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent
[4845]to those received by American citizens in Dade County,
[4846]Florida who are in need. The principal ones include:
[4847]financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family
[4848]and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization
[4849]and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals
[4851]for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities;
[4853]employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation
[4854]and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied
[4856]' children; special English and refresher courses for doctors
[4858]and Lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program
[4860]. for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides .
[4862]vp to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade
[4863]County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of
[4864]cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary |
[4866]and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part
[4868]of special language courses and vocational training; and
[4870]_ physical examinations and inoculations at time of
[4872]entry into the U. 5.
[4874]SECRET
[4879]DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the
[4880]a U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18
[4881]and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program
[4882]for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides
[4883]20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they
[4884]are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve ‘status.
[4885]They are not required to know English. A‘two week period.
[4886]for resettlement is also provided at the termination of
[4887]the training.
[4889]Another DOD program enables former officers of the
[4890]Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly
[4891]selective basis for programs in the U. &. Armed Forces.
[4892]Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is
[4893]necessary.. The officers are in civilian status. They
[4894]receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and
[4895]a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer
[4896]available. :
[4898]Considerations:
[4900]This course of action would provide the simplest and
[4901]most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide
[4902]equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent
[4903]to benefits offered to American citizens.
[4905]Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for
[4906]service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill
[4907]and country knowledge could be distributed through various
[4908]U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.
[4910]The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that
[4911]it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade
[4912]as a result of Administration statements and actions; it:
[4913]would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique"
[4914]the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying
[4915]Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would
[4916]probably engender some adverse political. reaction
[4917]domestically as well as from the Brigade and its
[4918]sympathizers: Also it might have an undesirable effect
[4919]on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the .
[4920]Free World concerning the determination of the United States
[4922]SECRET _
[4925]a
[4926]po
[4927]OES
[4928]b
[4929]. he
[4930]Re
[4931]i
[4933]Ee
[4935]‘a
[4936]Ey
[4937]be
[4938]e
[4940]i
[4941]4
[4943]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 114 .
[4945]- SECRET
[4947]when
[4949]to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to
[4951]arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence
[4952]with the Castro regime.
[4954](2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a
[4955]unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve
[4956]component of the U. S. Armed Forces.
[4958]Considerations:
[4960]Under this course of action whater "mystique" the
[4962]. Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps
[4963]‘be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used
[4965]to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile
[4969]‘community.
[4971]It would constitute an immediate political and
[4972]psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans
[4973]within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin
[4974]Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a
[4975]striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the
[4976]present Cuban regime.
[4978]It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed
[4979]by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit
[4981]_ among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with
[4983]the statements and actions of the Administration in
[4984]connection with. the future of the Brigade.
[4986]But it would inevitably become a focal point for
[4987]Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and
[4988]morale, discipline and esprit. would be difficult to
[4989]maintain over the long term without early employment to
[4990]retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and
[4991]military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups
[4992]in the U. S. armed forces reserve: component. There is a
[4994]SECRET
[4996]HY 50955 Docldad: 32276061 Page 115
[4998]ry 2
[5000]SECRET
[5002]756
[5004]risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members,
[5005]as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of
[5006]serious embarrassment to the U.S .
[5008](3) Tailor a special civilian and military program -
[5009]for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue —
[5010]as_a ''fraternal'' unit similar to the "Flying Tigers".
[5011]Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current
[5013]military training program for Cubans to establish a
[5014]Brigade military reserve component which other U. S.
[5015]militarily-trained Cubans could join.
[5017]Under existing authority, HEW could provide the
[5018]following additional benefits for Brigade members in
[5019]need, over and above those now offered: special emp Loy-
[5020]ment counseling and placement service; extended student
[5021]loans to provide for all institutional costs such as
[5022]tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per
[5023]year (living costs to be provided by another agency);
[5024]expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased
[5025]financial assistance to needy persons while in training;
[5026]increased distribution of surplus food (with approval —
[5027]of the Department of Agriculture).
[5029]The following additional programs could be under-
[5030]taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such
[5032]_ action would contribute to the defense and security
[5034]of the United States or advance its foreign policy
[5035]interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for
[5036]vocational training anywhere in the United States; an
[5037]expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of
[5038]Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost
[5040]of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure
[5042]of $2,5 500 ‘per person per year would be about $2.5 million.
[5044]SECRET
[5046]HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 116
[5050]SECRET
[5052]-J~
[5054]Establishment of additional programs, after a
[5055]Presidential determination, would increase’ costs even
[5056]more, and be subject to wider criticism as “unnecessary”
[5058]‘privileges for Brigade members. .
[5060]COORDINATORS 'S RECOMMENDATION
[5061]1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored
[5062]program for Brigade members.
[5064]2. I recommend against a Presidential determination
[5065]providing broader privileges for Brigade members.
[5067]3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military
[5069]training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve
[5071]unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should
[5073]be permitted to join. —
[5075]4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than
[5076]forced to accept this proposal, and intend.to arrange ©
[5077]consultation with them immediately if this course of
[5078]action is approved.
[5080]Rationale
[5082]Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we
[5083]should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the
[5084]future desire the presence in the U..S.. Armed Forces of
[5085]militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade:
[5086]members to enlist in the existing. military training |
[5087]program for. Cubans and to enter-a U.S. Reserve Unit
[5089]thereafter.
[5091]SECRET.
[5093]an 50955 BDoclda: 32276061 Page 117
[5095]SECRET ©
[5099]Our programs should be designed to encourage
[5100]the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
[5101]community and engage in constructive pursuits
[5102]pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
[5103]them some special assistance but not to the extent
[5104]that they become a perpetual privileged class
[5105]within the community, Presidential action on their
[5106]behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
[5108]SECRET
[5110]AW 50955 Doclda: 32276061 Page 116
[5112]SECRET
[5114]‘ MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[5116]a0,
[5118]oO (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, (1963 at 10 a.m)
[5120]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[5122]SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba
[5124]Ll. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
[5125]' 2. Removal. of Soviet troops: from Cuba.
[5127]3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons PRE
[5128]Mr. Robert. Geddes, British subject married to a
[5129]Joc U. S. citizen. ae
[5131]~ +. & © Cuban subversive activities in the Western
[5132]Hemisphere. : .
[5133]poo ce — p. dd wade ;
[5134]: : De Future activities of Mr, Donovan. Af
[5136]6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a
[5137]political weapon against the Castro regime.
[5139]7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban
[5140]Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
[5142]8. Preparation of a’ Psychological Annex to the basic X
[5143]' paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.
[5145]7 9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in -
[5146]intensified intelligence collection; Policy on
[5147]illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
[5149]| ; 10. ‘ Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia
[5150]_ flights to Cuba.
[5154]HY 50955 Docld: 322376061 Page. 119
[5157]‘ a“
[5159]HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 1270 .
[5161]QE
[5162]s,
[5163]= hissdgdumeat consists or
[5165]a
[5167]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GkMcuee le —Sepies, z
[5169]° _Utie moatertal contatus information affecting the National Defense of the United Guates within the meaning of the Fsptenare Laws, Tithe
[5170]18, U.S.C, Gees. 793 and TH4, the trancmiasion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised petson {a probibited by law.
[5172]S-E -C- R-E~T: . .
[5173]“NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKG TROUND USE ONLY
[5177]THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL CF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE,
[5179]country Cuba. a "REPORT NO. = CS DB-3 /652,924
[5180]"SUBJECT Analysis of the Cuban © DATE DISTR. . 17 January 1963.
[5181]a Situation by the Italian . . a
[5182]Embassy in Habana .. : “ NO. PAGES 4
[5183]eo : REFERENCES RD~W-2088 GO :
[5184]Te ce a - RD-W-2107 4
[5185]DATE OF - | 6 December 1962 | . :
[5186]INFO - co
[5187]PLACE & italy, Rome . . } pedeed |
[5188]DATE ACQ. (21 December 1962) | ; FIELD REPORT NO.
[5190]al
[5192]source: -.-A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the
[5193]Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of :
[5194].Content: 2, that the document is genuine, ~ | . : oo
[5196]The following is a translation of a report dated
[5197]. a 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in,
[5198]ee Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aftairs,
[5200]In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the.
[5201]_ conSiderations. regarding the consequences which the recent
[5202]‘> erisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I
[5203]'. ‘will now add some comments on the ‘conjecture which has been
[5204]reported by some members of our representations. , Soe
[5206]1) The possibility that there will-soon be a loosening of -
[5207]: . the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me .
[5208]_.t0 be nil at this time. The fuct that the talks with Mikoyan
[5209]were long-and-difficult and that Castro expressed in private
[5210]- his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still
[5211]alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce ‘that |
[5212]Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance
[5213]cannot be replaced by the Chinese.
[5215]Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have a
[5217]‘done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and
[5219]in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspéction).
[5220]“Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is
[5221]intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR
[5223].in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me
[5225]that /China7 can furnish more than it has furnished to date,
[5227]which consists of second quality foodstuffs, yather shoddy ©
[5229]Po : gemeeR-EeT .
[5230]' NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY.
[5232]herr 1
[5234]GIour ya
[5236]“ LGecheded free yoo}
[5240]! . Se . estate Weuibeetion
[5243](Note: Washington distribution Indleatod by “X") Fleld distribution by “F203.
[5245]HY 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 171
[5247]FE a RT EER AR RE EERE
[5249]oN
[5251]. . > S-E-C-R-E-T
[5252]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DIS _M ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSE%,3ACKGROUND USE ONLY &
[5254]& o
[5258]“wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores ;
[5259]im Habana are full. AS for machinery and spare parts, /China7
[5261]is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied
[5263]by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. : ;
[5265]In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined
[5267]aS pro~Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in.such a way that he
[5268]cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this”
[5269]regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during
[5270]the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations,
[5271]he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends ; : ;
[5273]Of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations. Lf
[5275]Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director ©
[5276]of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a ‘good aa
[5277]resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for ~ a
[5278]some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character a
[5279]and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by ._.
[5280]Moscow.’ b) The USSR will continue ‘to give all its economic ot
[5282]support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a. - y
[5283]grave , blow particularly in Latin America. ,
[5285]2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that .
[5287]_ ° the revo luv ionary regime of Castro can be changed into.a . CoA
[5288]“- "Pitousi” regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador me 4
[5289]Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some
[5290]Latin American countries desire’Such a change and ‘are doing
[5291]everything possible to provcke it. It is also possible that
[5292]* gome Cubans share these sentiments, But, in my opinion, it
[5294]is impossible that such a change can take- place while Castro -
[5296]is in power. AS I pointed out in my previous report, it is
[5298]not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned",' to
[5300]imitate anyone, and even less to’take Tito as a model.
[5302]Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this
[5304]possibility seems very remote.
[5306]3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for
[5307]Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime
[5308]will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate -
[5309]subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated
[5310]-by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including
[5311]Mexico) are taking Strong meaSures against the dissemination
[5312]of thie propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can
[5313]do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the
[5314]security of other countries, if only because he lacks the.
[5315]necessary funds, I tend to. share tHe opinion of the
[5316]Ambassador -to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to
[5317]concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and
[5318]that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, includ-
[5319]ing the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note
[5320]in passing that, according to what was told me by the afore-
[5321]_- mentioned Ambas ssador, ‘during the recent meeting of the OAS the
[5322]- Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the’
[5323]_ recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish
[5324]' proof, he was unable to do so. He
[5326]It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious
[5327]pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely
[5328]Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in
[5330]Ba ‘ .
[5331]. . ae :
[5332]\ De er
[5335]No FOREIGN DISSEN/NO DISSEM. ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5341]) BW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 122
[5343]i
[5345]_ ‘
[5346]NQ-- FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DLUUEM
[5348]NN §_BeclRUE-?
[5350]o
[5352](= 3 - CSDB-3/652 ,924
[5356]Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The.”
[5358]ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5360]countries which could do it do not have the necessary material —
[5362]means. <A partial scluticn would worsen the situation and a
[5363]definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. [-
[5365]. think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by.
[5366]“material Strength can obtain results in Cuba. : ; -
[5368]In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is
[5370]necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament
[5371]of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the. —
[5373]" population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United
[5374].. States. - It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary
[5375]‘regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example —
[5377]*-for other Latin American countries. This would not take into
[5379]. Daily Worker, "this is a battle to tho death with the United
[5381]_ adversary."
[5383]"account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly
[5385]their. chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to.
[5387]imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another.
[5389]path. AS Guevara said the other day in an interview for the
[5391]States in which the most possible damage must, be done to the.”
[5393]Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November,
[5395]day and therefore the revolutionury regime needs the
[5397]“ assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a
[5398]a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who. 7+ 0.7:
[5399]“heads ‘the most important institution of the country ~ the wo 05)
[5400]“Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go-°
[5401]«first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that ;
[5402]“new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits,
[5404]n
[5406]. . Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this
[5407]., Gescent will last no one can say today, The only certa@in —
[5408]thing is that the economic Situation is getting worse every...
[5410]ports
[5412]to permit the Cubans to last through 1963,-which will cer-
[5413]‘tainly be the most difficult year,
[5415]But economic assistance cat permit this country to
[5417]'. survive, not resolve its problems. - For a definitive solu-
[5419]tion it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans
[5421]~.to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the
[5423]machines which they have, Agricultural production, princi-~
[5425]“ pally sugar cane, aS has been recognized even by the.
[5427]. ..fanaties of industrialization, constitutes the basis of
[5429]-the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good
[5431]“which should last ten years are ‘unusable after two years?
[5433]sent
[5435]harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary
[5437]~{t is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime
[5438]solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer
[5440]+ from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But? for another
[5442]year they will find a,way. to get by.
[5444]Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent
[5445]policy. followed by the United States in the recent months
[5447]"is the best and perhaps the oniy policy. After the danger
[5449]of Strategic weapons has. been €liminated, the wisest measure
[5450]is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will
[5452]§~E-C-R-E-T OO .
[5454]woe
[5456]SOLAS
[5458]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO, DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY .
[5460]penne SE
[5462]5
[5464]so - —_ o
[5466]HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 123
[5469]ee Cc S-E-C-R-E-T Ne oe
[5470]NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DYSSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY.
[5472]-4-° — -CSDB-3/652, 924
[5474]‘present Some more “headaches" to the United States; but the ~.
[5475]atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the ,
[5476]hypothetical coup d'etat of-Castro which would force the Bones,
[5477]~ Solution of the probiem - one can hope for a perhaps not too
[5478]distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the
[5479]‘Cubans. insist on the known five points and the United States
[5480]. . refuses any puarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to .
[5481].: feed Castro to permit his Survival, the less uncomfortable...’
[5482]‘position appears to me-to be that of the. Government.ins':. —
[5483]|, Washington. . , : rr
[5485]oy, .
[5487]Jee S-E-C-R-E-T _ 7
[5488]WO. FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[5490]S
[5492]Se ™
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[1918]
[1920]
[1922]
[1924]
[1928]
[1934]
[1936]
[1938]
[1944]
[1950]
[1954]
[1957]
[1959]
[1960]
[1962]
[1964]
[1967]
[1976]
[1982]
[1984]
[1987]
[1991]
[1994]
[1998]
[2002]
[2006]
[2008]
[2010]
[2013]
[2015]
[2017]
[2019]
[2020]—
[2021]
[2023]
[2025]
[2027]
[2029]
[2031]
[2033]
[2035]
[2043]vegolutions:
[2044]
[2052]
[2054]
[2056]
[2061]
[2063]
[2065]
[2071]
[2075]
[2077]
[2078]
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[2100]
[2102]
[2106]
[2113]initiation: /
[2114]
[2115]/
[2116]
[2120]
[2122]
[2127]
[2128]
[2130]
[2133]
[2139]
[2146]
[2148]
[2149]=a
[2150]
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[2163]
[2175]
[2177]
[2179]
[2183]
[2185]
[2187]
[2193]
[2195]
[2197]
[2198]~ 7 «
[2200]
[2202]
[2209]
[2212]
[2214]
[2223]
[2230]
[2239]
[2244]
[2246]
[2247]@@® SECRET
[2248]
[2250]
[2251]
[2253]
[2258]
[2264]
[2268]
[2273]
[2275]
[2278]
[2281]
[2283]
[2294]
[2296]
[2298]
[2300]
[2301]
[2303]
[2305]
[2306]~ Px:
[2309]
[2314]
[2319]
[2321]
[2323]
[2329]
[2333]
[2341]
[2343]
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[2350]
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[2356]
[2359]
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[2364]@ee SECRET
[2365]
[2367]
[2368]
[2370]~10e
[2371]
[2378]
[2389]
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[2404]
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[2416]
[2419]
[2421]
[2424]
[2436]
[2438]
[2439]
[2442]
[2444]
[2446]
[2449]
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[2475]
[2478]
[2480]
[2482]
[2488]
[2490]
[2494]
[2496]
[2498]
[2500]
[2502]
[2503]
[2505]
[2506]oP ow ~
[2507]
[2510]
[2513]
[2515]
[2518]
[2520]
[2523]
[2525]
[2527]
[2530]
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[2541]
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[2548]
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[2559]
[2562]
[2565]
[2567]
[2570]
[2575]
[2579]
[2584]
[2590]
[2593]
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[2601]
[2603]
[2605]
[2606]
[2613]
[2621]
[2641]
[2643]
[2647]
[2648]HW 50955: BocTd:32276061 page 64,0 0° = cee
[2650]
[2651]
[2653]
[2654]5a!
[2655]
[2659]
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[2729]
[2732]
[2734]
[2736]
[2737]
[2740]
[2747]
[2750]
[2752]Castro/Communist regime thre:
[2757]
[2762]
[2767]
[2769]
[2771]
[2772]" undertal Le ae
[2774]
[2777]
[2781]
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[2791]
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[2824]
[2826]
[2828]
[2831]
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[2852]
[2855]
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[2916]
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[2954]
[2956]
[2959]
[2962]
[2966]
[2968]
[2969]
[2971]
[2973]
[2977]FROM : Coordinator of Cuban-Affairs:: *~
[2978]
[2980]
[2997]
[2999]
[3001]
[3002]‘
[3003]*
[3004]
[3006]
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[3024]*
[3025]
[3027]
[3030]
[3032]
[3034]
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[3038]
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[3063]—— :
[3064]
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[3071]
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[3087]
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[3104]
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[3161]
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[3207]
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[3209]
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[3305]
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[3308]\
[3309]
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[3322]
[3324]
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[3332]
[3334]
[3336]
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[3339]-10-
[3340]
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[3479]
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[3490]
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[3497]
[3499]
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[3517]
[3519]
[3521]
[3524]
[3526]
[3528]
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[3669]
[3670]
[3678]
[3680]
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[3684]
[3690]
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[3701]@@ SECRET
[3702]
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[3774]
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[3780]
[3783]
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[3818]
[3822]
[3825]
[3837]
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[3865]
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[3890]
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[3911]
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[3921]
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[3935]
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[3955]
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[3961]
[3962]-2-
[3963]
[3965]
[3967]
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[4014]
[4017]
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[4027]
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[4067]
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[4079]
[4083]
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[4114]
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[4151]
[4153]
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[4157]
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[4231]
[4234]
[4236]
[4238]
[4240]
[4242]
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[4254]
[4256]
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[4260]
[4261]@@ SECRET
[4262]
[4263]-8-
[4264]
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[4405]
[4407]
[4408]crests ance ee nye pre ennene meat =
[4409]
[4410]
[4412]
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[4415]>. ._
[4417]
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[4419]
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[4570]
[4578]
[4583]
[4588]
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[4601]
[4603]
[4605]
[4607]
[4610]
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[4615]
[4622]
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[4671]
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[4732]‘ ‘SECRET
[4734]
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[4759]
[4762]
[4765]
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[4780]
[4782]
[4784]
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[4788]
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[4797]
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[4820]
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[4823]-2-
[4824]
[4828]
[4834]
[4836]
[4838]
[4840]
[4850]
[4852]
[4855]
[4857]
[4859]
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[4865]
[4867]
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[4873]
[4875]
[4876]ape neem pce ety
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[4968]
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[5049]
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[5090]
[5092]
[5094]
[5096]
[5097]~8-
[5098]
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[5109]
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[5113]
[5115]
[5117]
[5119]
[5121]
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[5152]bo ae SECRET
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[5237]
[5238]> i deengradiag ang
[5239]
[5241]REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #
[5242]
[5244]
[5246]
[5248]
[5250]
[5253]
[5255]
[5256]~2- CSDB-3/652 ,924
[5257]
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[5301]
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[5325]
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[5333]
[5334]— oer Sa -C-R-E-T
[5336]
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[5355]
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[5426]
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[5439]
[5441]
[5443]
[5446]
[5448]
[5451]
[5453]
[5455]
[5457]
[5459]
[5461]
[5463]
[5465]
[5467]
[5468]
[5471]
[5473]
[5484]
[5486]
[5489]
[5491]
[5493]
[5495]
[5496] |
198-10004-10207.pdf | [1]198-10004-10207 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[2]: JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: “ARMY
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10004-10207
[11]RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR: ARMY :
[18]FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[19]TO: MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
[21]TITLE: | INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON
[22]THE STATUS OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION
[24]DATE: 01/10/1964
[25]PAGES: 62
[27]SUBJECTS :
[28]COUNTERINSURGENCY
[29]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[30]LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
[32]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[33]CLASSIFICATION : — Secret
[34]RESTRICTIONS: = IC
[35]CURRENT STATUS : Redact
[36]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 10/07/1997
[38]OPENING CRITERIA :
[40]COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Army memo from Joseph Califano to Mr. Crimmins on status of
[41]actions to counter Cuban subversion in Latin America with other related documents.
[43]PFE Aeescesination Kh eco./th heuer
[45]Department of the Army EO 13826
[46]Declasslfy [ Exolude Exempt
[48]Authority,
[51]review oat AIPA py REL, ADA
[53]v9]
[55]a
[57]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 1
[59]i
[61]SECRET
[63]Lt Col Haig/78029/8 Jan 64/md
[65]4 0.
[66]“RAN 19649
[68]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
[69]Coordinatoy of Cuban Affaire
[70]Department of State
[72]SUBIECT: interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
[73]Affairs: Report on the Status of aplemaentation of
[74]Actions Designed to Counter Subversion
[76]Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Statue of Implernentation
[77]of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the pericd 1 December
[78]1963.1 January 1964. The format of this report adheres to the topic
[79]outline dieseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion,
[80]September 13, 1963,
[82]It ie requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the
[83]final report, It is assumed that each of the representatives will have
[85]an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.
[87]Signed
[88]“joseph A. Califano, Ire
[89]Joseph A, Califano, Ir.
[90]General Counsel
[92]Enclosure e,
[93]As Stated -
[95]Mr. Califano
[96]Lt Col Haig
[97]ASG
[99]DOWNGRADED AT 3 YE. INTER VALS:
[100]DECLASSIFIED AFTE2 12 YEARS
[101]_ BOD DIR 5200.10
[103]HY 50955 Docld: 322776192 Page 2
[105]¥SO
[111]E9/OE/T Mal
[114]EE RR TR
[116]STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN
[117]BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO
[118]COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE
[120]PERIOD 1 DEC 63 -.1 TAN 64
[122]3. Control of Cla
[124]wwiestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.
[126]a. General A. BP, G'MMeara, USA, Comumander+ineChief, US
[127]Southern Command, met with Vice Admiral Ray ©. Neadhaa, USN,
[128]Chief of Staff to Comrmander+-in-Chiei, Atlantic and members of their
[129]respective staffs duving the peried 11 to 15 December 1963. Discus-
[130]sions encompassed methods of improving the existing survelllance/
[132]intercept system thoughout the Caribbean, Existing US plans were
[133]reviewed, continuance of the hip visit program inetitated in Novem~-
[134]ber 1963 was agreed wpon, and combined exercisas to test country
[135]eapabilitics te intercept simulated intruding shige were planned for
[136]early execution. Discussions by Genoral O'Meara were continued
[137]with the Secretary of the Army and with representatives of the State
[138]Department, CLA and the foint Svaff, Joint Chiefe of Staff,
[140]b. Commander Mine Division 44 with minesweepers USS
[141]STURDY and USS SWERVE complated visits to Central American
[142]porte in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Deficieacies in tha
[143]capabilities of all thres countries to counter gubversive infiltration
[144]were reported. Additional visite, dewigned to asaist in correcting
[145]deficiencies, are planned. USCINCSO alse plane, through Cormmandera
[146]of US Military Groups, te aegiet in developing existing capabilities.
[148]&. Based upon information from CAS Panama representative
[149]on 8 Novernber, USCINCSO directed US operations to find a small
[150]beat which rapertedly left the Colon Free Zone with a carge of arms
[151]destined for the vicinity of the Colombian-Venesuclan border. Day-
[152]light vieual aerial surveillance flights were inetituted immediately,
[153]with radar-equipped aircraft taking over surveillance during hours
[154]of darkness. Colombian and Venesuelan authorities were notified
[155]through US diplomatic channels, but no direct cormmunications
[156]between US eurveillance aircraft and Colombian forces in the
[157]vicinity of the probable landing area were established bafera termi+
[158]nation on 14 Nevember. This effert, though not succeseful, has
[159]evoked considerable effort by US State Department, Defense Depart-
[160]ment and CLA activities ta iraprove capabilities and procedures.
[162] DOWNGALLD RL a vray CU ERVALS:
[163]DECLASSIFIED ar erg 12 YEARS
[164]DOD DIR 5200.10
[166]sf]
[168]E
[170]HY 50955 Docld: 322776192 Page 3
[173]SECREL
[175]d. Action wag commenced in the Colon area to provide means
[176]to keep track of ships and beate entering or leaving the Colon Free
[177]Zoue in order to monitor the movements of those suapected of cdyrying
[178]contraband. Asgsistance te USCINCEO was provided fram the continental
[179]United States in carrying out surveys as to equipment required on ac
[180]secretive a basic 2s possible, and special optical equipment to include
[181]probable night television wae appreved by the Secretary of the Army
[182]for expedited delivary to USCINCSO.
[184]e. A joint survey and mobile training team from USCINCSO
[185]continued aocistance to Venesuelan authorities in luproving indigenous
[186]eapablilties for surveillance end interception of intruders.
[188]& A US Southern Commdind Operations Plan 60-63 was developed
[189]to provide fer three levels of operational aesistance to Venesuela in
[190]curveillance and intercept cparations. Representatives of the US Strike
[191]Command apd the Air Defense Cormmand visited USCINCSO to agsist in
[192]developing detailed supporting plana.
[194]g- Information was obtained by USCINCSO concerning in-country
[195]communications capabilities of Colombia and Vanesuela to receive and
[196]Giageminate surveillance information provided by US forces.
[198]5. Stroagthening of Counterlnsuzgency Cap
[200]abilities.
[202]a US Aemy training included the following: 13 students from 6
[203]countries completed Cl operations courec ia the Canal Zoue; 8 etudents
[204]from 5 countries completed Ci oxientation course in the Canal Zone;
[206]24 shidents from & countrice completed Military Intelligence course
[207]in the Canal Zone; 11 Chilean students completed especial Military
[208]intelligence orlentation course; three Canal Zone-based Cl Mobile
[209]Training Teame (MTT) caveled out training programs in Ecuador,
[210]Peru and Vemerucla; and one Canal Zone-based Cl MTT commenced
[211]a training program of Panamanian National Cuardemen.
[213]&. US Navy training included the following:
[214](1) The Smalh Craft Inspection and Training Tear
[215](QCIATT) completed training the third class of Central American
[217]eationals, bringing to 63 the total auraber of students trained since
[218]May 1945.
[220]2
[222]SECRET
[224]AW 50855 Daocld: 32276192 Page 4
[227]SECRET
[229](2) The semiannual reciniosaace check of tro
[230]ananion £0. foot Coast Guard Utility Bests (CGUBa) waa com-
[231]menged on 16 December by an onsthe-~job training (OST) program,
[232]Werk should bo completed by 10 January 1964,
[234]43) Work waa temporarily sugpended on two 49 foot
[235]GOUSs in Costs Rica due te the lock of critical apare parte. It is
[236]anticipated work will be completed by 15 January 1964,
[238]& Increases in the stock levels of the Canal Zone stockpile
[239]of clot contrel equipment ware directed on 20 December 196%. In-
[240]ereases will enshice USCINCGSO to respond to urgent requests from
[241]Latin American governments. Buildup concerned primarily tear
[242]gos grenades, gae micke, carbines and ahetgum emmunition.
[244]a. Final arrangemcats were made with the Bertram Beat
[245]Company of Miami for delivery of 10 outheard-inbeard fiber glasa
[246]boate to Cabamis, Veneruela for use in the Lake Maracaibe area,
[247]Beats, spares and an MTT will be dellwered to destination by
[248]14 January 1964.
[250]¢. Action has bean taken to expedite the shipment af radie«
[251]slectronic gear to Jaméica for use in the joint surveillance progeam
[252]designed to combat Caatro-inspired insurgency in the Caribbcan
[253]area. Equiprmont should arrive in Jamelca within the nest dew weeke.
[255]& &#& US Airy Fores Air Gommande MTT deumonetrated in
[256]Asuncion, Paraguay.
[258]8. Other Special Actions.
[260]a. Latin American Military Gommunications System (LAMCS)
[261]in Ecvuader and Nicaragua and the Ground-+te-Air facilitics in Reuador
[262]have buen completed.
[264]b. Authority to proceed with the LAMCS in Honduras waa
[265]received from the US State Department on 17 December 1963. This
[266]facility should be completed within 120 days.
[268]e. Emergency power units to improve reliability of US Army
[269]and Aig Force Migsion radio stations in Colombia and Vanesuela,
[270]ghipped from: the United States, arrived in Bogota and Caracas res~-
[271]pectively.
[273]3
[274]SECRET
[276]HY 50955 Docld: 322776192 Page 5
[279]353 091.411 020 031.2 201
[280]CUBA” : pone Staff pw 3S Reynolds, John
[281]~ SECRET . me :
[285]jh wOO ws: |
[289]From: John Reynolds, KCS
[291]To: C/Staff
[292]Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Comte of Cuban Affairs: Rpt on Status of
[294]Implementation of Agtions Designed to Counter Subversion (U) ;
[296]rw Incl: None
[297]Dis: Cole Haig 13-64 OSA 3004
[298]FW 1-30-63 a
[304]€9-OE"T Ma
[306]OSA FORM 3 . THIS PAPER BELONGS TO:
[307]31MAY 49° | Administrative Support Group Division, Office of the
[308]Secretary of the Army
[310]* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: i963—683865
[312]HY $0955 Docld: 322776192 Page 6
[315]SF
[317]AW 50955
[319]. wy we .
[321]CONFIDENTIAL
[323]. . SAOGC/ LtColHaig/le/ 59856/18Dec63 -
[325]December 18, 1963
[327]MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WADE ROBERT
[328]Office of the Secretary of Defense
[329](international Security Affairs)
[331]SUBJECT: State Paper Entitled “Terrorism in the Latin
[332]American Gountries on the Critical Insurgency List"
[334]Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by a member of the
[335]Cuban Coordinating Committee at the Department of State {Mr,
[336]William Bowdler, 182-3736) for use by the Department of State
[337]representative at the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting on
[338]December 19, 1963. The paper was provided to this office by State
[339]on December 18 with the request that Department of Defense
[340]comments, particularly on the basic memorandum, he obtained.
[341]Although thie office is very much concerned with the aspects of the
[342]paper which deal with the problem of Castro-inspired subversion,
[343]the breader implications of the paper pertain to the Latin American
[344]area and the military assistance programs related thereto, These
[345]are, of course, matters of primary concern to your office. There-
[346]fore, the attached paper is forwarded to you for appropriate action
[347]with the request that your comments, if any, be coordinated with
[348]this office eo that they can be correlated to actions currently under
[350]the purview of this office,
[352]Signed:
[353]A. M. Haig
[354]Lt Colonel, Usa
[356]oseph A, Califano, Jr.
[357]General Counsel
[359]Enclosure
[360]As Stated
[362]OSA, ASG
[363]Mr Califano
[364]LtCol Haig
[366]CONFIDENTHA
[368]Bocld: 32727761392 Page 7
[370]eo70cel Ma
[372]van €S€ VSO
[374]C9°BT°ZT
[377]CONFIDENTIAL
[379]SAOGC/ LtColHaig/1c/59856/18Dec63
[381]December 18, 1963
[383]MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E
[384]Office of the Secretary of Defense
[386]SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America
[388]The Iuterdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
[389]Affairs (ICCOCA) has recently considered a CIA proposal to provide
[390]guidance to US firms in Latin America confronted with Castro-
[391]communist inspired sabotage of their facilities and assets. CIA has
[392]contracted for the preparation of a report which will consolidate the
[393]experiences of several US firms in Latin America in combatting
[394]sabotage. After consideration by the ICCOCA this report will be
[395]furnished through our country teams in Latin America to local US
[396]firms to assist them in instituting appropriate anti-sabotage programs.
[398]I would be most grateful if you would prepare a brief report
[399]designed to supplement the CIA project which would include enumera-
[400]tion of general guidelines which might be adopted by US firms in the
[401]Latin American area in combatting sabotage. In particular, an
[402]enumeration of known appropriate anti-sabotage devices available on
[403]the commercial market together with the manufacturer's names would
[404]be most helpful.
[406]A member of my staff has discussed thia project with Mr.
[407]Phelps of your staff, who hae indicated that DDR&E might be of agsist-
[408]ance in this matter based on.a recent field trip to Venezuela where
[409]problems peculiar to that area were studied at the request of the US
[410]Ambassador. It is also possible that commercial devices developed
[411]for South Vietnam would have applicability in Latin America, Because
[412]this. project ie designed for distribution to several Latin American
[413]‘countries, it is requested that where possible guidelines be developed
[414]which might have general application throughout Latin America, but
[415]with emphasis on key subversive target areas. Present plans antici-
[416]pate finalization of this project by December 23, 1963.
[418]Signed:
[420]Ae M. Haig
[421]Ut Colonei, Usa
[422]fosegh Bre Galifano, Jr.
[423]OSA, ASG NN General Counsel
[424]Mr Califano
[426]|
[427]teat akg CONFIDENTIAL
[431]HY 50955 Docld: 322776192 Page 6
[433]van €S€ vsoO
[435]C9-OET Ma
[437]C9°ST@21
[440]97 DEC Wwe
[444]Iuterdepartmental Coordinating Cantimittee of Cuban
[446]Afizira: Ragort on the Status of implementation of
[447]Aetens Designed to Counter Subversion
[449]Saclased herewith is the Repert on the Statue of baplementation
[450]of Actions Designed to Couter Subvereian for the period 1 Nevesiber-
[451]i December 1963. The format of thie report adharea to the tepic out-
[452]lime diegeminated at the faceting ¢ eat fe Subcomanities om Subversion,
[454]September 13, 1963.
[456]itis vequested that this office be provided with 12 copies af the
[457]final ¢eport, [iis agaumed that exch of the representatives will have
[458]an appertanity to consider the final report before it ig forwarded.
[460]nelosure
[461]Ae Stated
[463]Mr, Califano
[464]Lt Col Haig
[467]OSA, ASE Cont
[469]HY 50955 Docld: 322776192 Page 9
[471]rl i ROA.
[473]Signed
[474]Joseph A. Califane, TPs
[475]Mi,
[477]dgnegh A. Galilean, In.
[478]General Counel
[480]@ECHELYBA OL (HE VEWA
[481]HIBE
[483]ah wits
[485]DEC 1G g Br yy eg
[487]GoOBDINY Bay hyo
[489]Seeney 0
[491]DOD DLR 600029
[493]PP >OE~)
[495]van> ese Vso
[497]Geordinater of Cuban Affeice _
[498]Deparkaent ef State
[500]BorL tet
[502]Md
[507]SECREL
[509]STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN
[510]BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DETENSE TO
[511]COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE
[512]PEBLIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963. ;
[514]3. Gontrol of Clandestine Movement of Guerrilias and Arms.
[516]a. On 9 November 1963 the Commander-in-Ghief, US
[517]Southern Command (USCINCSO) advieed the Jolut Chiefa of Staff
[518](JCS) of reports concerning euspected eubversive arma emuggling -
[519]into Veneguela or Colombia from the Colon Free Zone, Panama. y
[520]USCINCEO initiated surveillance at firat ght on 9 November 1963
[521]to detect and track surface vesoela which might be engaged in the
[522]subversive traffic. The ICS directed the Coramander-in-Chief,
[523]Atlantic (CINCLANT) to commence surveillance with radar equipped
[524]aizeraft aad to keep USCINCSO advised of all information. Sue~
[525]pected erat were not poaitively identified ar intercepted; however,
[526]there were indications thet dn unidentified surface veasal off the
[527]Ric Hacha areca of Colombia and in Colombian waters was probably
[528]ia contact with small boats operating from the Colombian coastline
[529]at Bight. —
[531]. b.. An directed by the Joiat Chiefs of Staff, USCINESS
[532]éeveloped a plan under which the United Stetes could provide asatat-
[533]ance te Venenuelan forces, on three levels of participation, designed
[534]te prevent the sutreptiticus movement of Castre-Cormmunist arrag
[535]and pergonnel into Veneguela. To be fully effective, the plan calls
[536]for US elements operating from Veneauelan territery which ia not
[537]considered a likely aubject for approval by the Government of
[538]Veneguela at the present time.
[540]c. A joint survey and mobile training team. of eleven men wae
[541]provided by USCINCSO to Vencaucla on 22 November 1963, upon
[542]apgtoval of the concept by the Government of Venezuela. The purpose
[543]of the team ie to teain Venezuelan military personnel in organizing
[544]and operating a joint operations center; in improving capabilities
[545]in the plotting and coordination of intelligence data, and aerial photo-
[546]graphy; and in coordinating all Venezuelan military and paramilitary
[547]organizations invelved in surveillance and intercept operations.
[549]DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
[550]DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 vEARS
[551]DOD DIR 5200.10
[553]i
[554]GD
[556]as
[558]t
[559]a
[561]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 10
[564]q -
[566]a. Two minssweepers from the US Atlantic Command, uss
[567]STURDY and USS SWERVE with Commander Mine Division 44 em-
[568]barked, commenced a echeduls of visite te Caribbeaa porte in Costs
[569]Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Visits are intended to assist each |
[570]country in bxproving ite coastal and offsshore eurveillanca effart,
[572]to improve intercept capabilities with reepect te the prevention of
[574]infiltration of arma and subversive persounel through the countrics'
[575]territorial waters, and to establish procedures which would provide
[576]for US aesistance in final interception when requested, Visits in
[577]November, under the supervision of USCINGEO, covered Puerto
[578]Limon, Costa Rica; Blucfields and Puerto Gabezan, Miedragua; and
[579]Puerto Barries, Guatemala,
[581]b, Seventy-eight Latin American officere, praviougly on-
[583]. Polled, were in attendance during November at courses stressing
[585]counteringurgency conducted by the US Army Canal Zone school.
[586]Two officers graduated from the US Army Counteringurgency Course
[587]at Port Bragg, Nerth Carolina on 12 November 1963 and two addi-
[588]tlenal officers are now in attendance.
[590]«, Geven US Aemy Countetingurgency Mobile Tvraieing Tearme
[592]based in the Canal Zone, consisting of twenty officers and thirty-five
[594]ealiated men, previded training in seven Latin American countries
[595]during November.
[597]d. Wine enlisted sen from Chile were in attendance at
[598]Marine Cerps echools at Camp Pendleton, California in November.
[600]e. 03 Coast Guard training in small boat operations was
[601]provided in the Canal Zone for fifteen students fram five Caribbean
[602]countries in the operation and maintenance of feorty-foot Caast Guard
[603]utility beatae. A Coast Guard mobile training team of one officer and
[604]twe enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training in
[605]Costa Hica for the reconditioning of Coast Guard utility boats. Five
[606]members of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil are receiving on-the-job
[607]teaining in conagction with reconditioning of the boats.
[609]2
[611]SECRET
[613]AW 50855 Docld:32276192 Page ii
[616]ERSTE
[618]SECREL
[620]i. AUS Air Force counterineurgency team of five officers
[621]and eight. enlisted rien, based in the Canal Zone, provided training
[622]for Ecuadorian Air Force pergonnel in Ecuader.
[624]g- At the request ef USCINGO, and with the enthusiastic
[625]support of the Venesuclan Government, a small boat program has
[626]been initiated to provide security for the Lake Maracaibo ragion.
[627]Arrangements have been made theeugh tha US Navy under Military
[628]Credit Sales agreement for the manufacture of dix (6) 25-foot and
[629]four (4) 31-foot inboard-outbeard, fiberglass bull beats by Bertram
[630]Boat Company, Miami, for delivery in Decembar 1963 or early
[631]January 1964. A SEAL-trained Mobile Training Team (MTT) of
[632]one officer and five enlisted men will be provided by the Navy and
[633]will repost to the equipment supplier in time to become fully ac-
[635]quainted with the boats by 15 December. The MTT will accompany
[637]the boats to Venezuela and will remain up to two montha in country
[638]to provide necessary familiarization training.
[640]6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Surveillance.
[642]a. Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to suspected arms
[643]mmuggling from the Canal Free Zone, Panama into Colombia ox
[644]Venezuela, the USCINCSO relayed thia information to Colombia and
[645]Venesuela by the Military Alerting Syetem. The US Ambassador ta
[646]Colombia conveyed the information to the Goverament of Golsmbia.
[647]Colombias Navy and Air Force elements were assigned increased
[648]surveillance missions in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia by
[649]Colonbian military authorities and reaults of theixy surveillance
[650]activities were provided te USCINCSO by the US Military Group
[651]Commandor in Colombia. The results of US alr surveillance of
[652]thé expected route and landing area, undertaken by US Air Force
[653]end Naval air elements were tranamitted to the US Military Group
[654]Gommander in Colombia for paseage to the Colombian military
[655]authorities.
[657]b. The moter vessel BLUE STAR, af Panamanian registry,
[658]wes apprehended by Ecuadorian authorities in Novesaber 1963 as.
[659]it wae attempting the clandestine introduction of toutraband articles
[661]3.
[663]SEGRET
[665]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 12
[668]SECRET
[670]inte Ecuador. Ship mevoement isformation had been provided to the
[671]US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the
[672]fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent invelvement of
[673]Gubda areig or Cuban trained personnel in this instance.
[675]7%. Other Speciat Actione.
[677]& Construction is now in progress on the Latin American
[678]Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Quite, Eeuador; the
[679]tetminal station is empected to be completed in December 1963.
[680]The station in Nicavagua is expected to be completed in early
[681]December 1963.
[683]b. In response to a sequest by USCINCSO, action was taken
[685]Gn 18 Nevember 1965 te expedite delivery of communications equip-
[686]thent required to implement a Jaraaican integrated coastal surveillance
[687]eyetem, The aystem wae originally approved aa part of the $560
[688]thousand one-time grant of Militery Agsigtance material divected
[690]by the President in April 1963, but world-wide shortages af specific
[691]itexae threatencd to delay dhipment in seme cages vatil FY 1965, in
[692]view of the urgency of thie tequirement, priorities were adjusted
[694]te provide delivery by 1 January 19464. The items include:
[696]2 AN/GRE radios and instaliation kits
[697]3 AN/ARC § radios
[699]i AN/PSM 6
[701]3 Wattmeter
[703]¢. The Joint Chiefa of Staff and the Office of Public Safety,
[704]State-AID, ave studying the poselbility of imereaping the stock level
[705]of certain itema of Riot Contrel Equipment ia the Ganel Zone, in order
[706]to mect rapidly and effectively maltipte contingencies that may occur
[707]in Latin Arserice, In the past, the sige of some requests have neceski-
[708]tated shipment of certain iteme directly from the United States, with
[709]resultant inercase in cost and time. . “BSCINeso kas been acked for
[710]hie: recommendations on etock levels,
[712]SECRET
[714]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 13
[717]TAL
[719]OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[720]: WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
[722]INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
[724]2 DEC 1963 ,
[726]In reply xefor tor
[727]2+28596/63
[729]fhe enclosure to your F dat
[730]has been received. The report appears to be
[731]_ Stiiplete end appropriate for Gubadseion to the President.
[733]SIGNED
[735]Frank K. Sloan
[736]Deputy Assistant Secretary
[738]DECLASSIPIE
[740]DOD DIR 5200.10
[742]Lacan cen are te
[744]a
[746]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 14
[748]im Ho. 81, subject ad ebove, dated
[750]z=zt €and Se WSO
[752]E9“OE=T A/F €9
[755]OSA, ASE 5 Cantal Mier -
[759]56 NOV 4963.
[761]Sy
[763]ORANDUM NO. €1 FOR GENERAL DARLS G. WHEELER cs}
[765]2S. FPRARIC A, ELOAM, Dep dust Sec/Del i546
[767](Beglonal Atiairs)
[768]MAIGR GENERAL J. ©. ALGEE, USA
[769]BEAR ARMURAL ee. FP. & WES, USN
[771]MAZJOR GREEEAL J. W. CARPENTER, 01, USAF
[772]BRIGAINDR GENERAL €. J. QUILTED, UGace
[774]SUBJECT: pattmental Coowdineting Committee of Cuban Affaten:
[776]Repout on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to
[777]Geunter Subversion (i)
[779]“Reference: OA Meme #64, subject aa shove, dated September 19, 1963
[781]Attached herewith is a fimal drait of tha Report to the President of
[783]the Subconmittue on Coban Subversion on Pregrens Made During Septembas
[785]1963 ta Garbiag Cutan Subvercion in Latin America,
[787]it le requesind that comments, Mang, bo provided thie office by
[788]1260 bowers, 2 Detember 1963. The Department of Defense. portion of
[789]subject report io based on. snbmieatons ‘provided in veogonne te relewencad
[790]SemeorendaEs.
[792]Signed
[794]_ d§éseph A. Califano,Jr.
[796]Sesapha Ay Califaae, de.
[797]General Cospsecl
[799]eC: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
[801]Lt Col Haig ent, ot
[803]Mr, Calif
[805]“ASG=, mene . SECR _& EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RechaprNe
[806]Sane nee . Jpcrgeingte (ae ; DOD DIR 5200.10 BOES NOT APPLY
[808]i
[810]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 15
[814]E~T_ A/S €9-9e7TT
[816]C97 O0C"T
[820]“41/13/63
[821]nae a oF Tan sunecoanrrm
[822]| os o - 9g CUR SUBYEESTON
[823]( ASTION teen puaIEs spore 1958 3 ‘aN ouREENG
[824]| giyeas sunverst ON TN LATIN AMERTCA
[826]‘ni AS atm WE 9.02 ot
[828]a ; a . .
[830]ve 7 that ara] beratlos : flights to Cuba vould be Pornitted to.
[832]a use Com onalsey fonilities, and to express eur concern at Shee
[833]—_ service tee Cuba via Conakry.
[834]a and report on ‘alleged landing and refuelling of ¢ bana
[836]oe! with the Shell Soxpany, the supplier of the fuel, | tee 7
[838]“HW. 50955 — Docla: 32976192. Page a7 ap Se
[840]- of the Foreign Mintatey our concern at incressed evidence
[842]- pe enetration or Africa. °
[844]Ge Instructed Consulate Yort. ag France to 9 Savostigate: a
[846]. aireratt at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked strectiy.,
[848]to use ¢ French Garibbean Aependencies for r eLights ‘to and
[850]RAPT
[852]Ga. : tastructed Eubasay qunks te call to the attention
[854]of seroflot attespts to establish North Attica routes: to. .
[856]ebay especially through Algeria, and our conviction chat oS
[858]an Tantoia bas a valid case in 1 eincerting any Bloc civil ale
[860]-Tasteucted Enbassy Conatary to contact Gutneen Govern= 2 i :
[862]ment officiais, reainding then of. thete past as surances
[864]a recent indications that Jerefiot was preparing to. establish ‘s a
[866]” Ingeructed Eubassy Paria to query the French Coverrment ee
[867]abou! ¢ alleged Gghens use of the Gu: adeloupe facility, and
[869]te expres S esr concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt
[871]7 Econ
[872]y “SECRET © * we:
[875]| _ 2) SkeRET
[876]ne ar
[878]fcom Lat ein J sexton. ee oh Ee ce a _ :
[880]: or “Instructed Enbass; ¥ Ro to make a Bow » approach to -
[882]oa the Brazilian Foreiga Ministey to express our concera pOE
[883]ae at Cuba’ 1's continuing use ef “charter fligh 1t8 to Brazil
[884]. and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of.
[886]a : passengers. During the course of the mevat the Prectlian
[888]| “Goverment began tightening controle against Cubana 7
[889]fltg ghts. Specifically, all requests foe landing pemmiesion _
[890].. were henses orth to be proces sed by the Foreign Office, ae oe
[891]7 with appre spriste delaya. " Alse tig ater passenger, erew - oa
[892]and cargo controls. were to be institated ‘when & Subans, a :
[894]flight ds peruieted to use ‘Brasilien facilities. 7 a Wes
[896]oe. Determined that the 8. ake had specifically warned |
[897]Sabana that. no avincion Sack wiht available in Basbados end a:
[898]“thee Hi 1G. would, ia the future, respect Sheil Cospany" 7 se
[899]decielon te deny fueling to gubana plaves, —
[900]og 4 patinued iuter-Departisents tal efior te to pe rovent
[902]: oo resumption of of ferzy service beter Cuba and the. u 8.
[903]| vail a British et tlzen, Harold Derber, bas been we: : a
[905]ing te establish (Saring the past several month.
[907]ge
[909]‘HW 50955 © DocId: 32276192 Page 18.2.”
[911]ee dite OR eainne Gon Katte ee en me ne
[913]: . toe Bet
[915]SECRET
[916]Pod as
[918]7_ Loe 7 ge _Taetructed Consul Eeorgetows te investigate’ and -
[920]o xeport om ev tdened ‘the Bepartaent received whieh indicates
[921]7 chat Saba is planning ‘to sell merchant wessela to ‘British
[922]» Guiana is order to facilitate the estabLishaent of 8
[924]regular service for. peesongers ond CAT EO. Lae oe
[926]f
[930]a ae. Ta connection with the Seventh congress ‘of che |
[931]“International Gaion (UEAY veld da Habana Septenber 29 7 — oa
[932]- October 3» 1953 the Buenos Aixes ‘Station: ee
[934]xeh) encour: aged the Acgentine ational Federation, = .
[936]° a of, _anehitects to oppese degentine attendance at the.
[937]. . Habane neeting, with the result that 25 of the 39
[938]a practic’ ing architects who hed A pléwaea to attend wane
[939]oo celled theiz participation; . : CS
[940]i & arrange ed to prevent the “attendance of any”
[941]: 7 off ielatly authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana
[942]8 mee LINZ, bist, encouraged the attendance of an ‘official ~
[943]cpentine delegation ox enti-Commumist coloration at an. e : ah
[945]im int! vernotional : architects mecting to be held int s Mexico |
[947]ia Getober; |
[949]fa
[951]|HW 50955.» Docld: 32276192 | page.19 ee
[953]‘MW 50955 DocTd:32276199 Page 20°). |
[957].. [22 -
[959]of
[960]& beg
[962]7 a a - _ . @ delivered an memena andum ‘to the Minister of
[963]. : Enterta « concerning Cuban charter ‘flights to. Brag: i whieh |
[964]supported the Ambassador" 8 request that the segeatine
[966]Es JO cmant express concern over such ¥:) ighte. : 7 x : -
[968]Be - Rho de Jancizo Station coutinued to furnish :
[970]Hi
[972]the patsy wits data on Cuban ‘flights to Brazil used |
[974]ars vepresentations te the ‘Braciiten Foreign Office, © : a
[976]a Als SO induced Rio. alcport officials ‘te impose sertagent
[977]- "passport control and ‘paggene efforts. | These efforts
[979]oS 7 contributed te the Brazilian Goverment? ‘8 failing to
[981]“ dgeue landing permits fox * Sabena ana flights on Septenber
[983]: an, 24 and 23, 1965 foveing thelr cancellation. hen.
[985]©, Gubars, because of haragament at Bio, be acan using the : So
[987]ar landL ‘ fac ileies on Sao Paula where controle le were.
[989]non ox istent 7 CIA initiated and obtained a ‘local Matson ~
[990]-egrerinent for similar t harassment in che event, of future
[991]a - Gabans ana flights t 2 Sao Paulos aoe | .
[992]| ¢, HMexler eity etation incpired & press campaiga
[993]of hoof and wouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior
[995]te the Avchitects Congress to discourage partied patton
[997]dn the Habana meeting. The meaulting Guarantines and
[999]_ tnnoculations : i
[1001] SBoper.< 2).
[1003] ‘SESRET Pe
[1004]- 3 aap :
[1005]imnoculations were a gastor tn dlecoureging 32 of the wee
[1006]60 Mexican professional arc! nitects vehi were s expected to os
[1007]go ) to Habans from attending the congress. 7 i eee
[1009]Ii. Control of Nevewent of Procayanda —
[1011](ie. Burd EB Cet, Gah i . ea Uy UT ee
[1013]HW 50955. DoeId:32276192 Page 21:.-
[1015]HW 50955
[1017]Docld:32276192 Page 22
[1019]i.
[1021]“fegue eigalpa wi teh th Gove sanent of Honduras for the
[1023]Control of Clandest
[1025]and sens
[1027]Made the necessary arrangements | through Embassy
[1029]- dtspateh of three ue oS. helleopters to give logistical
[1031]wo border.
[1033]“asoistance. to ‘the Honduran Army in its effort to. locate °.
[1035]and eliminate the bend of gverzilias allegedly operating 7
[1037]. &
[1039]in ‘the Patuca River ared slong the ondsran-Hicarapuan
[1041] Bepaymment of Defense » St
[1043]o Honduran armed forces eonducting counter-Ineurgency
[1045]y opexations ka the Patuea River area, A total of 27 sorties...
[1047]Taree CH-13 helicesters fron USSOUTECOM supported — a rey
[1049]wee € hewn yeaulting in delivery of 3925 pounds of supplies, ae
[1051]ue paasengers $o points in the operational atee, and:
[1053]_ recovery of 409 pounds of suppl es fron the 2 operational _
[1055]- evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, 3 atvlift of 49,
[1057]area.
[1059]Te
[1061]Department. r of Beate |
[1063]a. lastructed Embessy Houles eit oy to infos the 05
[1064]: Mexioan aigline EAESA ‘that theie proposal to purchase oo
[1066]‘sarplae Guban aireratt would in fact result in the.
[1068]aceruah to Cuba. of a significant amount of hard currencys
[1069]and the U Se would have to oppose the trenesction. wee
[1070]“Further, if dollars were involved in the pare chase,
[1071]| de would be 3 violation of the Cuban Assets ; Control
[1072]Reg jilations. |
[1073]be taformed eam of Teasur Ys , Foreign Assets we
[1075]Ce ezel office, ak the activities of. Sonondelp Enterprises,
[1077]2a Milam tien engaged 4 te sending renittances te persons, oa
[1078]in Caba in vidlation of the Guban Assets Control tee ,
[1079]Begulations.
[1081]“ge, Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform
[1085]ia Richard Joyeey ad Averioon sational, that bis
[1087]“gonnerciat cransactions with Guba were in violation :
[1089]. of the Cuban Asseta Control Regalations and that be
[1091]: te erohibiced frou engaping in such trade.
[1093]HW 50955" ‘DocTd:32776192° Page 23.007 |
[1095]daveb ndacrabecemegssr ni
[1097]: ve. ° Streneth ronine of £ Count excInsuxgeney 6 Cavabt died eg
[1098]' Bepartment cf Detense : |
[1099]a. 7 Thirteen Latin Auseis oT officers gra eva. , fuated | £ from . -
[1100]the counter-ingurgenty Gperations Course of the U8.
[1101]Avay School fox Latin dmarctoa it tle Panama Canal Zone
[1102]en 20 September . Baving. the sontl & tatal of 91 Latin
[1103]me, Ameriean officers enzoiled in courses “stressing counter=” wo yy
[1104]ta meungene y at the Ana Samual done school. no
[1105]ws a b. Ets ght U.S. Agay counter~inourgency mobile
[1106]eveiniag t keane were providiag teainiag te the Armed
[1107]: ‘Forces: of five Latin démerican count tries during the period.
[1109]" 8,86 ide Perea counters insurgency training teams: we re a
[1111]- in two entries. . .
[1113]fo = — es In the Canal Zona, 15 students front five countries
[1114]were under instruction im the operation of oust: guard |
[1116]ee ee patrol exatt used | fox eoastal surveiiienee.
[1118] treining in the UsdcedSératea
[1120]z
[1122]dé, AUG. Heavy counter-inse eqoney tra ining nam
[1124]as agist im ieproving che security
[1125]of sil imetellations in Lake Maracaibo. 7 OS,
[1127]HW 50955 DocId:32276192 “Page 24
[1129]@. . Costa Rica and onduzas tere provided one
[1130]Cees sna 285 alvevate eaeh fox nodical eivic action and
[1131]inveroat security PULPOSeS » ; . : 7 |
[1132](£4 On May 23, 1963, thvee MaiGb KAMAN helicopters |
[1133]7 were provided te the ‘gevermiont a af Colombia on a 60-day
[1134]© toan. the ¢ Coloubian fovernuent veduested an extension 7
[1136] 68f the doan and 2 B0aday extension has been approved. |
[1137]Aneawy
[1139]-. Sentral Intel Mireace
[1141]wih itil . .
[1142]& ean tears Mktg station has reoruited, on a
[1144], vist nests, & fowner * eniver of the 13 Novanber geersiiia
[1145]“group and debet iefings ave in process. “Megotiations oo,
[1146]o continue with the Goversment of Guatemala for the |
[1147]£8 oruation of a now internal scourkey service.
[1151]4. Line Sestion has agreed te furnieh the Peruvian |
[1153]oo inves tig gations Folice (PIP) with cad outboard motor
[1154]to ineveses their petrol <a spabil ity on vivers crossing bo
[1155]- ' the Relivien fvontier. Oae intigraation is thas ¢ ue:
[1156]“gh vere eressing this frontier have prov. idea the ¢ prisary
[1157]_aveoues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry —
[1159]of personnel and weapons into Peru.
[1161]cu Som ret ce -
[1162]sroner:.
[1164]HW 50955 Docld:39276192. Page 85 0 I ei aon
[1166]. SESR reads Sangh Bes Ee
[1169]Vie Eychance af Enteliizence on Cubon Subversion
[1171]Yovaytus & of Sefense
[1172]- Eagine acing installation work con tinaed on radio
[1174]stations fox Hanaga y Micars ea AT nd 7 eguelgalpas
[1176]: Honduras. “Be further progre & hes been made In yeaching : :
[1177]7 anreements with colowhi a and Eeugder for rights to
[1179]este bligh vadie stations in those countries. “Installation
[1181]of the new # transesthalan counercial cable in Penama _
[1183]is x nearing eoupl ations °
[1189]. CEA Stations continued thelr ex achange of “AncelLigence oy
[1190]information with local inteliigeuace axe BLES The.
[1191]following eetlung ere of special significances. © : 7
[1193]a. The CI4 Station in Buenes Aires furnished the ; 7
[1195]Avgentine State , Zatelidgence Sexvice (SIDE) with
[1197]txavellers on theie return whenever feasible. SILE
[1199]Sm 88
[1201]peovided the traces, but did met comfuct any debricflnes.
[1202]The Staion hes not fele it feasible to trey to remedy
[1204]this omleston in view of the " Pexaonnes ehad axes “eapecte
[1207]utbhdn SIDS after the new govdrenent de installed on.
[1209]te
[1211]MH 50955 ‘DocTa:3g7@I2o@age 26 °° gpepwp »
[1213]HW 50955
[1215]Docld: 32376192 Page 27.0 ||
[1217]< Se. 2U UPS
[1218]SERRE
[1219]a
[1221]bb. . ag a result ee information passed by the Bogota nd
[1222]‘Station te the Adwinistrative Department of Security
[1223](B45) eomeerninge Colomzian treveLlers to Cuba, & number
[1224]of passport violarions have ‘been discovered tn 2» which
[1225]erave teve to Cuba are using passporte issued te other -
[1226]7 persons. There je @ xeluctanse, however, on (the part —
[1227].9€ the Coloulian Government te prosecute this type
[1228]of violation. » .
[1229]| a At the urging of the Git Station in Line, the :
[1230]-. Bat onal intelligence Servies (St a} instructed é ene of
[1231]its penetrations ef lefeiet groupe to cang saten for a eeif
[1232]te sba a oxdar ts receive guerrilla warfare erdiuing.
[1233]: “Pete asset he 6 been offeved, and hts accepted, an opportunity: .
[1234]: | to ake the erip by the Leftist R evolution ry torent a
[1235]CE, wrinary vehicle of tuber subversive activities: a 7
[1236]fin Peru. Seleting ead dotirieting of the aseet will be
[1237]sone nm 7 the SER. .
[1238]the Peruvian Navel int elligence “Service (nts) has, -
[1239]da eenponse & to the efforts of the Station ta Lisa, sent
[1241]one of its agents te Chile where he wlll sign aboard
[1243]% sey ath * 2 oe 8 ny 3 5 A » ta
[1244]Chiiesa freighter chliing at Habana. The aeget hee been
[1245]given opesiiie ty
[1247]stelligense © requizenents te eeLtilt, .
[1249]w
[1250]an
[1252]the.
[1254]“oe
[1256]Ld * : . .
[1257]whe co @ a a
[1259]| the Prise Minis ter and Mint iete t of Government and
[1260]Police hea sequested froe the ora gepresentative in
[1261]Lima. 2ary inforaati m thet he might supply on subversive
[1262]elenente posing @ threat to the Covermment: of Peru.
[1263]The sequest has opened an additional shanael toa the
[1264]hit eet Level of the < Soveranent wlth & concomitant
[1265]prospectior eiieetive | eetion when needed.
[1267]3 a
[1269]seh repelas I adaos chaunels, the Veneauel Lan
[1271]é, Through rer
[1272]General Wieecterate of Police (OLGEPOL) has boom provided
[1274]by CIA with the names of G12 Vencauelens aoe to. have
[1278]; evavelled te Gube from Februacy _throagh fuse sust 1963. .
[1279]Thia antivity will be eageied out Ga a cont inating bates
[1281]the names Gre mow belay ince vated inte the cemslar
[1283]wateh Let kept at intermationsl air eports: aay Vonesuela. ,
[1284]ThE far, at jeaat three returrneos have been axvested
[1286]. on the bache of the inc formatles supplied Lo BIGE 20. a
[1287]DLGEPOL ine indleated ite appreci ation of the daca nar -
[1289]being sapplied avd desieves that the arr agement: be
[1291]WIE, Sp itianee of Cube felon Smale. Commercial and faltura i
[1294]e
[1297]special actions og report. - mo oo
[1298]. WEBS
[1300]HW 50955 Docld: 32276192, Paye 28
[1303]yVulz.
[1305] £ile service te uSts offices througneut Latin America .
[1307]Sesete for the o ouster of the Gaban Charge a'Aftaires, a
[1309]BEGREY
[1310]| Aipreairrhen does Teint Se tt
[1312]Other Sometal Aatis A: tions -
[1313]“Se sim 2%
[1314]Unites States Eaforn: tion Agceuey
[1316]a. The Agency 8 press service tranenitred seven
[1318]ett cles relating Oo Guben subversion on its wireless ©
[1320]for placement ie thi xe Looak newepapers. . " Pevelepuents
[1322]reported ta these articles included demands by che Bolivian
[1326]terror ian aad goverment countensetion in Venoxuela,
[1328]the selzure in © Beuador ex a ome and axplooives cache
[1330]reportedly recetved ftom Gaba, § SOVES ral articles on the
[1332]Internationa] Unton of Avchiteccs Consre: ese dz Habens
[1334]5
[1335]ie]
[1336]ce
[1337]4
[1338]B
[1339]3]
[1340]is
[1342]Fea
[1343]ce
[1344]{2
[1345]th
[1346]g
[1347]Be
[1349]pee
[1350]se
[1351]ta
[1352]Fe
[1353]is
[1354]2.
[1355]Ea
[1357]Be
[1358]es
[1359]2
[1360]s
[1364]me
[1365]fF.
[1366]7
[1367]a
[1368]ed
[1369]g
[1370]7
[1371]Bo
[1373]2} articles and cosmentaries du ring Septeuber on | the
[1375]# the most
[1377]f
[1379]i,
[1380]NE
[1383]2
[1385]oS
[1386]ey,
[1388]a
[1389]B
[1391]na
[1392]e
[1394]6
[1398]pa.
[1400]pa
[1402]G
[1404]g.
[1406]a
[1408]part with economic and political con elon ingide the
[1410]x
[1411]a
[1413]coimtzy aa ovidenced by the re sine's oun B adutesdons and
[1415]ee ga gi Fatt : . a
[1417]HW 50955 Docld:32276192- Page 29 spore - ; Be
[1419]a
[1422]* Pha he
[1423]Bes
[1425]. € . &
[1427]B The Voice of America Spanish broadseste to Larin
[1428]4mevica curing September carried a total of 26 news
[1430]es 8
[1434]pea
[1436]analyses, comeentarles, press round-ups, and Interv
[1438]Led
[1440]BB
[1443]th
[1444]eS
[1446]SA
[1448]ER
[1451]Siete
[1452]i
[1454]Lies
[1455]G
[1457]£ Gaben subversion. Sema af
[1459]4
[1460],
[1463]tess ‘Bi, tek Ba Be es aM ons a 2g. :
[1464]the cevelopmente treated inciuded the {ollewing: .
[1466]a
[1468]A qumitetary on communist eubasales as channels for
[1470]eubyersions a mews analyais on the U.S. students who
[1472]t
[1474]wed deat Peet Ae ad ote pe PS oy eager ary Beaty Ney ays: ot 3 ;
[1475]wielted Cubah Assistant Secretary Mertin’s Les Angeles
[1477]speech; & neve antiveia on Cubans aubversion aa an obstacle
[1479]im the norualiestion of U.5.-Sevler relations; a threae
[1481]Part series aw university autenuny. ia Latin America;
[1483]“
[1485]‘@ feature on the latter of a Colaublan student whe.
[1487]4
[1489]werk to Cuba on @ scholarship end wee digillactoned by
[1491]a
[1493]the communlet indecerieation; a comeentery on Che Guevara's |
[1495]e
[1497]eesent article ow revolutionary stretegy; and 2 emmentary—
[1499]z vrenbest YB yey Tee bea Me oom cane EE ged .,
[1500]ou guerrilla training im Gaba. Many of these items were —
[1503]oo on tha broadeaets. The “Rendesyous ..
[1505]with Cubs howe earried four or five Gommentaries ghee 9°:
[1507]oa 9 st ea pte " “s Z. ar a )
[1508]gatiy on deonandc and peiitical
[1510]La : cs n .
[1511]. eee: ang. sy GE were coy ogy SE
[1512]ee peed 3 sroery lews SE
[1514]éevelosne @£ epeelal note, the Geban
[1516]gedeted anerily ta Voice of
[1518]3S wages eps qg Prycrttcn Ph gh Bo pene Ta ey ry ar ee os, + Beak Be ee
[1519]@morica bronde@ets chout Che Casvara*a axvtiele end ta con-
[1520]‘mae Sedan Gee Patna hed - ok cower ments anya feryuns ant :
[1521]monteries €2at Cube hed accepted en agrieulteral role in
[1523]x
[1525]SECRET an 7 the»
[1527]HW 50955 Docld:32276192 Page 30 | BEC
[1529]ne
[1531]y
[1533]ite plans 2
[1535]ed
[1537]ye
[1538]is
[1540]Zlegh,
[1542]mo DOS
[1545]ee.
[1547]On September 27, the Agency issued ¢ cf
[1549]Fie
[1552]Hage:
[1558]a
[1560]Si
[1561]beak
[1563]its
[1567]ta al
[1575]insets
[1579]2%
[1583]i
[1585]ef attention te opportunities fer publ.
[1587]Ge
[1592]Chee to sup
[1594]ne
[1596]requestdz
[1598]ad
[1601]port thi
[1603]La
[1605]4
[1606]ES
[1610]a
[1612]w
[1614]en to implement th
[1616]‘te
[1617]Be
[1619]ons Es
[1622]‘Ars
[1626]Bp
[1628]Llowew
[1630].
[1631]Go
[1635]his was done as 4
[1639]SAM
[1643]e origins
[1647]“4
[1648]we
[1650]DVE
[1654]me
[1656]as issued April
[1658]Fe
[1659]ob
[1663]S28
[1665]sate.
[1668]ban au
[1670]Gu
[1672]A
[1673]id
[1675]ton ew
[1677]strut:
[1679]“a
[1680]age
[1682]Pets
[1683]See
[1685]sab
[1687]as & wo
[1689]3
[1694]a)
[1695]a
[1699]Peres ©
[1701]Xe
[1703]1963.
[1705]x
[1709]a
[1710]Ye
[1714]i
[1716]ated in the”
[1719]ar,
[1720]oe
[1722]PSE
[1724]3
[1726]toot
[1728]os
[1730]oh pastic
[1733]2
[1737]a
[1738]Ae
[1739]7
[1741]BeLd in Por
[1746]ah
[1747]Buy
[1749]os
[1751]Es
[1752]yen to the
[1756]at
[1758]» es
[1760]atececy % shy Bin gery ed tt, HY Rs
[1761]ahem passet-beil ta
[1763]c
[1765]ct
[1767]ok
[1769]i
[1773]e oF
[1775]BRO
[1781]Only
[1783]mt
[1785]ar
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[1792]eee Conk
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[1798]E206 t
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[1808]BE
[1810]Page 31
[1812]32276192
[1814]HW 50955 Docla
[1816]HW 50955
[1818]Gniy one of tkosa Inter: seabed acnitted te way i nvo Lvencnt
[1820]4 ot
[1822]with the captured
[1824]doniad that he wae
[1825]ef Cuatensla wets
[1826]_@ later date.
[1828]e, CEA Station
[1830]. Anterview Getween an Oey
[1832]officer and @ tecent
[1834]meget fence F ancy gm
[1835]wbacsy der ing
[1837]aay ees Deeps, egal ied tao = a Desecs epyeaee oath fae mM
[1838]yersive qativity in Geugmiy. S¢ 4%
[1840]|. the HOG has dirceted
[1842]@ spacial comuigaion
[1844]cs
[1846]cr j Sade Sheseve “
[1847]Srowid gee Gevecmnen
[1849]BooctTda: 322376192 Page 32
[1851]imvelvad in any wey.
[1853]“ 5 eee, eis erga Het Pate Hcy enn qe’ E
[1854]vod @ Segert containing this
[1856]=: 4 8S cere
[1859]. 0 iS shatters Kd ae Oita nme ut
[1860]decmeents, the Communist Party,
[1862]ing else that sould be construed
[1864]gee whe did adalt knowledge
[1866]Prey,
[1867]22%
[1869](3
[1870]g
[1871]i
[1872]b
[1874]3
[1875]ct
[1877]tg interrogate thie perdén again at
[1881]Bee
[1883]° e.
[1885]Meutevidee arranged for an
[1887]a co | .
[1890]which estencive information regarding
[1892]-cive antivicies wee ravenled, The Uruguayan
[1894]data and
[1896]Sovernment whieh -
[1898]concern over eoummnist sub
[1899]*eeult of this report,
[1901]the Hindeter of Interior te appoint -
[1903]2 problea of Comuniet
[1905]Bags fo Say wth or
[1906]mo atoy
[1908]3
[1909]Rewer
[1911]nedeorne ae to wheal oomrse
[1913]eyes
[1915]s Uyeruayan Govervenent..
[1918]¢wieh to prece for pecsage oF -.
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[1922]4
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[1926]. on
[1927]& ed
[1928]s 4 2
[1929]B8 a =
[1930]wo & , : :
[1931]% pt a3 a “s
[1932]S$ 8 ¢ & 5
[1933]sol gel : o& 8 :
[1934]eB Bee g °
[1935]a mio
[1937]we 28 & 4 a.
[1938]© @ @ 8 q.
[1939]= § 2 a a
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[1942]fan ; 2 Lt -
[1943]er a
[1945]aon G&G wo
[1947]weld ub B ona °
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[1950]Cain & F ® & 9 eS
[1951]oa er rn re | i
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[1953]4 5 bes Bx er ,
[1954]& f “ue og.
[1955]; om G&S
[1956]$ 8 @ | €
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[1958]e ei fe ome a
[1959]a 8 @ “ o g
[1960]gm. - oa .
[1961]i ean 3
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[1964]a:
[1965]Bort § fa ES =
[1966]a» gg 8.8 FF - a
[1967]6) ry £34] ron e =)
[1968]test GB a
[1969]| 2] Rog wt wl Pa
[1970]> ON
[1972]a
[1973]1
[1977]ir]
[1979]on
[1980]|
[1981]ra
[1983]|
[1985]SO SECRET
[1987]29 October 1963
[1988]MEMORANDUM FOR: THE GENERAL COUNSEL
[1990]SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
[1992]Report on Status of Implementation of Actions: Designed to
[1993]Counter Subversion (0)
[1995]1. 0) ‘The following information is submitted in response to Memo-
[1996]randum No. 64, General Counsel, dated 19 September 1963.
[1998]2 €S) Reference Topic 5 (Strengthening of Counterinsurgency
[1999]Capabilities):
[2001]a. Canal Zone -
[2003](1) ~Ftfteen students from six Latin American countries are
[2004]attendees in the ten weeks Couaterinsurgency Operations Course of the U. S$.
[2005]Army School of the Americas which began 30 September 1963..
[2009](2) There are 24 students from eight Latin American cousitetes
[2011]attending the 16 weeks Military inteditgence Course which began 23 Augrst
[2012]1963.
[2014]b. CONUS -
[2016](1) Three students from three Latin American countries are
[2017]attending the Special Warfare Course at Fort Bragg, N. C.
[2019](2) One Peruvian student is attending the Civil Affairs
[2020]Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. ;
[2022]ce, In the month of October 1963, ‘eight Counterinsurgency Mobile
[2023]Training Teams (MIT) (14 Off-48 EM) were deployed in six countries to
[2024]conduct counterinsurgency training.
[2026]d. AU. 8. Army officer is attending the Command and General
[2027]Staff School of the Uruguayan Army and upon completion of this course in
[2028]December 1963, will be assigned to the QUSARMA, Uruguay. He will perform
[2029]intelligence advisory functions as an additional duty.
[2031]e. An additional officer has been assigned as assistant USARMA
[2032]‘in Guatemala, a: the capability for intelligence assistance in
[2033]that country.
[2035]USA. ASG, CONTROL NO. aac Aes ME Ze fn ) y
[2036]aes AT 42 YEAR [TER HALS:
[2037]OT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASEIF‘ED |
[2038]O05 DIR 52¢0.19 . SECRET —
[2040]£9°6Z°01
[2042]ta
[2044]Be
[2046]vend se vso
[2048]RBY
[2050]HW 50955 Docld:32276192 Page 34
[2052]CQrOErT Ma
[2055]- : SECRET.
[2057]OPS Sw OP ‘
[2059]SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affaire:
[2060]Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to
[2061]Counter Subverdion (U)
[2063]in 3. (S) Reference Topic 6 (Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Sub«
[2064]version): ‘
[2066]a. The number of intelligence exchange agreements between the
[2068]ue 8. Arny and local military services in Latin America has been increased
[2069]to 13.
[2071]b. The additional officer assigned as Assistant USARMA, Guatemala,
[2072]raises the collection potential in that nation and may develop information
[2073]which can be exchanged with Latin American countries.
[2075]Je BD. ALGER
[2077]Major General, GS
[2079]Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
[2080]for Military Operations
[2082]for Special Operations
[2084]G. S. BLANCHARD
[2085]Colonel, GS :
[2086]Director of Special Warfare
[2087]ODCSOPS
[2089]SECRET
[2091]HY 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 35
[2094]a SECRET
[2096]Lt Col Haig/78029/290ct63/md
[2098]2
[2099]On
[2100]Octaber 29, 1963 =
[2102], Q
[2103]a
[2104]= i.
[2106]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOMN CRIMMING 5
[2107]Coordiaater of Cuban Affairs oe
[2108]Lepartment of State SI
[2109]Ww
[2110]SUBJECT: interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban |
[2111]Affaiva: Revision of the Paper Entitled “Training of
[2112]Latia Americans ia the United States
[2113]Ata meeting of the Subcommittes on Subversion on October 10, vf
[2114]1963, the Department of Defense (DOD) Representative was requested =
[2115]te review and up-date the DOD portions of pagea 4, 5 and 6 of snbject a
[2116]report. Enclosed herewith ig a lize in line out revision of the report. ey
[2117]A revision bas also been made te page 7, which is designed to make =
[2118]the DOD portions of the report. current. w
[2119]Signed ¢ 7
[2121]As M. Haig ac
[2122]bs Colonel, US#
[2124]opeph A. Galifane, Ie.
[2125]Gesezal Counsel
[2127]Attachment
[2128]Ag Stated
[2130]a yr OE
[2131]3 Mr, Califano ancyes! ok”
[2132]AY Lit Col Haig
[2133]ASG’ . ch *
[2134]_ |
[2135]“vatay ike BRE i
[2136]Lew} a 1 ee BR
[2138]OSA see Aare ve Ry s “h i . af +)
[2139]wh ASS contrat 89, 2 od @/ FILE arret, yegod?
[2140]oe om adh \_ an
[2141]cdo VRS) oe
[2142]eT A BE
[2143]STOMATIC REGRAOPAG, ©
[2144]EXCLUDED TROM AUTOHOTTS REGRECLR Soa, |
[2145]SECRET DOD DIR 5200-10 DOLS < ARE C ys y's |
[2147]aN eke PR
[2149]HY 50955 Docld:32276192 Page 36
[2151]GOR Revisian to Paper Entitled
[2152]“Training of Latin Americans in the United States"
[2154]3. Miltary Assistance Erograms —
[2155]At the presenttimee end of FY 63, 8,222 1791
[2157]Latin
[2158]American military students ave were receiving, o ace-pregparomed-ts-
[2159]veaelte have received training in nm the United States under the Miltary
[2160]Assistance Program. Gouraee vary in length from two-week orientation
[2162]tours to §3-week fying training courses. However, the majority of
[2164]inetruction is for periads of less than siz months, and is distributed
[2166]in fields as followa:
[2168]Flying Ingtruction (8-83 weeks) a33 154
[2169]Command, Staff and Operational 348 638
[2170](direction and control of
[2171]armed forces, 4-23 weeka)
[2172]Communications / Electronics 66 36
[2173](6-29 weeka) :
[2174]Equipment Maintenance and 336 232
[2175]Bepaiz (5-28 weelke}
[2176]Legisties (2-14 weeks) 46 33
[2177]Adzainigtration (4-40 weeks) a z
[2178]Professional Specialised 806 ig3
[2179](Engineering, Medical, Lagal
[2180]ete., 4-29 waeks)
[2181]Orientation (2+3 weeks) 596 498
[2183]OSA ASG, ComTRSL wo Owe
[2185]HW 50955 Docld: 32276192 Page 37
[2188]“SOREL
[2190]7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available Milite
[2192]Quotas in the United Statsaa.
[2194]The failure of Letin American. countries te take fall advantage
[2196]of military quotas offered has been a persistent problem. In 1962, for
[2197]example, 25 per cent of the quotas offered were wnfilled. Thie unfaver~
[2198]able aituation derives frem many causes. using-the current diseal
[2199]yeas -lé per-cant of aunfiled- Army -quotacshave-boon due-te inability so.
[2200]Moot course pre—Teguiciies:-232 per cont bocause of lackot efilcient.
[2201]fundey-and-23 pet-sent because-af solitiesl upheavalgs The atrsed forces
[2202]of the average Latin American country are smell, and the availability of
[2203]qualified candidates who cas be spared for extended periods of ebligated
[2204]service and the lack of a profeagional non-commissioned officer carps
[2205]also tends to discourage the training of enlicted men in United States
[2206]scheols, since large sums from lizsited budgets te train enlisted men
[2207]who will romain in service only a brief time. Another significant
[2208]deterrent is the per diem rates required by daw to be paid by some
[2209]countries to service personnel sent outside theiz howelend. in
[2210]Aggeatina, Brasil, Colombia and Uruguay the legal rates fer person.
[2211]nel serving abroad are too high to he supportable by defense budgete;
[2212]while ia ether countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard
[2213]Fates are too late to provide a reasonable ving for students.
[2215]HY 450955 Docld: 32276192 Page 36
[2220]Gleculated hetewith for information ip a sepert af the ¢ whee >
[2221]1963 maotiag of eubje : Sete
[2223]ene stated |
[2225]WDENTIAL
[2229]K
[2231]CON:
[2233]Gatebar 13, 4963. -
[2235]Bag ADMIRAL WHA. ‘WERDT, ~l
[2237]interdopartmental Coordinating Committes of Ceban Affaire:
[2239]Report af Meating of Subcomuniiivs on Subversion. .
[2241]4 eubiomunttien,
[2243]Signed .
[2244].. se@seph A, Califano, Jr.
[2246]| Saneph A. Saliéans, a.
[2248]ec: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)- «pu
[2249]Mr. Califano
[2250]Lt Col mae | goed, We
[2251]A Se ret
[2252]AEUY SLB t Pel
[2253]Qed,
[2255]HW 50955) Docld: 32276192
[2257]CONFIDENTIAL
[2259]Page 39
[2261]LATOR GENERAL 1. W. CARPENTER, i, Shay
[2262]BACIER CLMERAL WILLIAM K. JOR, woe
[2264]gus &
[2266]YS#e
[2268]€ 9-61-00 ¥BNID
[2270]CD OE -/ LP —f
[2273]—C pawrem <4
[2274]- DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[2276]“<. - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY”
[2277]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[2279]" October 14, 4
[2281]~ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD >
[2282]" SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee. on Subversion,
[2283]ae October 10, 1963 *
[2285]7 Outlined below is a summary of deliberations of subject sub-.
[2286]committee during the meeting of October 10 at 1430 hours in Room o
[2287]6273, New State, Agenda is at Tab A. a
[2289]can Agenda Item 1
[2291]: The Final Subcommittee Report for the months of July and ;
[2292]. August was circulated, The report has been circulated to points ‘of |
[2293]“contact by separate correspondence,
[2295]- Agenda Item 2
[2297]The Subcommittee discussed the sccs letter which referred to —
[2298]- the recent trip of US students to Cuba, (Attached to enclosure 1) It was
[2300]‘The Chairman stated he would provide.the SCCS with the substance of
[2301]State's telegram 647, which outlines actions undertaken by the US»
[2302]Government against the students.
[2304]Agenda Item 3 -
[2306]a. CIA, in coordination with the Esso Corporation's Chief of
[2307]Industrial Security, will prepare guidance data for distribution to Latin
[2308]America which could be utilized by US commercial firms for the pro- |
[2309]- tection of their facilities against sabotage. The DOD representative Ooh
[2311]» cial protection devices which might be applicable for use in Latin :
[2312]America against sabotage attacks. The CIA representative stated he
[2313]“believed ARPA had developed some devices for this » purpose, .
[2315]apparent to all that criticism of the US could be implied from this letter, —
[2317]_ Was requested to ascertain whether ARPA had available some commer = as
[2319]AW 50855 Daocld:32276192 Page 40
[2322]_ b.. State will prepare a circular telegram to all Latin American ~
[2323]. Ambassadorg requesting that an immediate review of Country Team
[2325]- Emergency and Evacuation Plans be conducted to insure that plans were
[2326]~ adequate to meet a stepped-up campaign of Castro-inspired sabotage.
[2328]Pa A genda Item 4 : sO
[2330]In lieu of a written report on the Honduran guerrilla problem, a
[2331]* the DOD representative proposéd a firsthand report to the Subcommittee, ©
[2332]Colonel Walter Hutchins, who has recently returned from assignment as
[2334]US Military Attache to Honduras, presented a review of the subversion
[2336]. situation in that country and then answered questions from the Subcom- ee,
[2337]mittee. The general thrust of Colonel Hutchins! remarks confirmed that
[2339]. there has been considerable Castro subversive activity in Honduras, The
[2341]- most serious inroads are achieved through communist radio and press
[2343]- and communist educators. Colonel Hutchins commented that recent
[2345]|, Suerrilla activity along the Nicaraguan border was probably limited to
[2347]a groups totaling between 100 and 200 men, He emphasized that Cuban-
[2349]-. trained Honduran guerrillas are successfully transiting by air through
[2350]Grand Cayman Island and British Honduras with some transiting Havana :
[2351]to Jamaica via Belgrade, In Fesponse to a query from a State representa ~
[2353]« tive, Colonel Hutchins pointed out that he believed that both Honduran. |.”
[2354]‘thilitary and commercial interests were genuinely concerned with Castro.
[2355]subversion and that some of their leaders were perfectly capable of
[2356]- discerning the true nature of the communist threat to Honduras.
[2358]- Agenda Item 5
[2360]The Chairman stated that the paper for training Latin Americans ©
[2361]‘in the United States (included inthe "Krulak Report''*) was too broad in.
[2362]scope for implementation by the Subcommittee and proposed that it be —
[2363]‘rewritten under narrower parameters. In this regard, the Defense a
[2364]-Tepresentative was requested to review pages 4, 5.and 6 of the paper ~
[2365]on training contained in the report with the view : he.
[2367](toward bringing the”
[2369]. Defense portion up-to-date, i a oo, So
[2371]Miscellaneous’ |
[2372]mene te Re OUus |
[2374]: The Chairman stated that preparatory actions on the Isthmian
[2375]meeting at San Salvador tentatively scheduled for the second half of
[2376]‘November would be held in abeyance pending further developments in
[2377]the Honduran situation, :
[2379]t
[2381]mene
[2383]a.
[2385]PEE LLLP . . ;
[2387]Ce A, we Lt Colonel, GS fe
[2388]7 2 _ - *Report prepared by the Subcommittee o Castfo-Communist Subversion . o
[2389]CONFIDENT [Al containing a series of action programs designed to impede. the Castro- a
[2391]Communist subversive. effort in Lati uAmerica,
[2393]HY $0955 Docld:32276192 Page 41
[2395]CONFIDENTIAL
[2397]-. Oetober 9, 1963. 7
[2399]"MEMORANDUM FOR: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion. —
[2400]-~ SUBJECT: Meeting of October 10.
[2402]L, ae
[2403]a “You are invited to a meeting of the Subcommittee on :
[2404]: Cuban Subversion of the Interdepartmental Coordinating -
[2405]' Committee of Cuban Affairs to be held on Thursday, = =: -
[2406]. October 10, at 2:30 P.M. in Room 6263, State Department
[2407]“GRA Conference > Room). Le
[2409]“AGENDA |
[2410]Ls Consideration of draft of monthly report for ‘Septenber.. A
[2412]“Discussion of letter (copy attached) from SCCS | Sof -
[2413]Pan American. Union.
[2415]Status of papers on contingency planning.
[2416]Report by DOD on Honduran guerrilla problem. |
[2418]Consideration of the paper on training of Latin :
[2419]., Americans in the United . States...
[2421]CONFIDENTIAL ~
[2423]AW 50955 Daocld: 32276192 Page 43
[2425]THEE Qn St euainye
[2426]2 SUORE SEGURIOAT
[2427]Looe SEOURANGA
[2428]GN SUR LA SECU RITE
[2430]a PARE ARSE Re 2 ES UMM
[2431]Washington 6, Dp. Cl, u. S.A.
[2432]“Gable address: PAU WASH oc
[2434]ra ‘Ag you now, the Special Consultative Committee o n Security 4 ise
[2436]; “presently holding the first of its regular meetings, in accordance with |
[2438]“the statutes appre ved by the Council ef the Organization on April 23 of |
[2439]PRE HERE co SS : Ss ve eR NT
[2441]or the better fulfillment of ite work, and in accordance with Article,
[2443]‘13 of thesé statutes, the Committes in tends to request of the governments
[2444]lye of the member states of the Organiz ation any information that they may have:
[2446]o regarding spec ~ifie active tes of international communion in th, 6 homlaphers,
[2448]; Among. the important activitl lag of thia Jind are the trips. that many
[2449]Aedividuals make to Cuba for well-know ulterior purposes, In thie ‘connece
[2450]‘thom, Lshould grea tly aepresiais it if you would furnish the Committes with — .
[2451]whatever. information + FORE government may deern it advisable to present.
[2452]rogarding. the trip that a large ; group. of U.S, citizens recently mada to’ Cuba.
[2453]at the invitation of that ¢ country’s goverment, about which the Committee
[2454]has learned through newspapar reports that have recently appeared in this:
[2455]con untry and in Latin America. Thia information would be treated with the:
[2456]confidence that your government deemed appropiate,
[2458]Thanks you in advance for your - valuable assistance in thie matter,
[2460]ceapt, Sir, the aasurance of my highest consideratio
[2462]“Jullo Cesar Doig Sanchez.
[2463]ce Chairman oo!
[2464]Special Consultative Committee —
[2466]/ on Security
[2468]Mero Ward P, Allen (0 0,
[2469]Alternate Representative of the United ‘States.
[2470]Council of the Organization of American St ates
[2471]Wa hington,, D.C. pos
[2473]HY 50955 Docld:32276192 Paye 43
[2475]SECRER
[2477]24 OCT 1963
[2481]RANDUM NO. 71 POR CAPTAIN ©. BR. AUMWALT, IK., USN (OSD)
[2482]MAJOR GEREBAL J. ©. ALGER, USA
[2483]BEAK ADMIRAL WY. WENDT, BON
[2485]MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, Hi, usar
[2486]BRIGADINA GENERAL YW. KB. JONES, UMC o
[2488]ON
[2489]SUBJECT; interdspartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: nan
[2490]Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Ceban
[2491]Subversion in Latin America a
[2493]Attached is the Gaal report of the Subcoramilites om Subversion an _
[2494]Actions Taken Busing Jaly-Augest 1963 in Curbing Caban, tebveraton: in. o
[2495]Letia America, S
[2496]Signed
[2497]Joseph A. Califano, Ire
[2498]Joseph A. Califane, Jr.
[2499]General Counsel
[2500]Attachment
[2501]Aa Stated
[2504]Zin. Gere a C asd) ON
[2505]ee: DIA 1 Nigra)
[2507]Mr. Califano
[2508]we Col Haig
[2510]OSA, ASG Control Noxd. 33 & He A ILE
[2512]— egtyrep WHEN SER! ATED
[2513]y st
[2515]SECREURecran= UNCLASSIETE spenosutas
[2517]FROM CLASS if
[2519]HY 450955 Docld: 32276192 Page 44
[2521]nao iE a nt sean oP A CRAPS
[2526]HRS.
[2528]is
[2530]sty
[2532]URING JULY-AUGUST’ 1963
[2534]his
[2538]‘IN: ION. IN
[2540]Bia ieaye
[2544]et
[2546]2 Bese,
[2548]tes gi ge
[2550]SECRET
[2552]SR kas
[2554]2276192
[2559]SECRET’
[2561]- Control of Travel to and from Cuba
[2563]“oy
[2565]Central. Intell ence ency.
[2567]a. Developed highly useful information on Frequency
[2568]‘of Cuban “chartered flights to Brazil, names and nationali-
[2569]‘tiles of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control |
[2571]‘followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this informa~
[2572]‘tion to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the
[2573]-non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.
[2575]oe be. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
[2576]uba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin ve
[2577]Americans during July and August. :
[2579]c. Asa result of information furnished to him by
[2580]the: CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging;
[2581]the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would
[2583]make. every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attend-
[2584]ing the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.
[2586]d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy:
[2587]the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an 4
[2588]order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba | or.
[2589]other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.
[2591]e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
[2592]station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
[2593]entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second.
[2594]Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled: to
[2595]take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the
[2596]factors which led to postponement of the Congress.
[2598]f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station.
[2599]“and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa |
[2600]“Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican
[2601]Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel |
[2602]to Communist countries to have their travel approved by. a
[2603]newly created Costa Rican security agency.
[2605]Be CIA Station - -in Mexico. City developed information ©
[2606]concerning | the clandestine arrival of. Passengers, in Vera Cruz.
[2610]on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made. to obtain
[2611]‘more information and to encourage | stricter controls by: the
[2613]Mexican authorities.
[2615]- Department_of State CNY
[2617]a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade’
[2619]Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by
[2621]flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a.
[2622]temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights:
[2624]at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own
[2625]refueling facilities at Conakry.
[2627]b. ‘Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
[2628]authorities to express, our deep concern at the growing
[2629]frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request:
[2630]their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our
[2631]Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA
[2633]‘station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those.
[2634]‘countries travelling on these flights to local authorities’
[2636]‘and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their
[2637]‘own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their —
[2639]concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil
[2641]as ‘away station for transporting subversives.
[2643]c. As a result of representations made to the
[2644]British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands
[2645]carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed
[2646]an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the
[2647]use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit..
[2649]points for passengers. The British intend to require transit.
[2651]visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to
[2653]reject applications for such visas except in certain special
[2655]cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from
[2656]leaving their aircraft, ‘or * would be returned to their * Point
[2657]of. origin. ee
[2661]od. Instructed: Embassy Mexico City | on August 29 ‘to
[2663]-) inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is
[2664]“opposed to a a proposal. that CMA operate | charter flights, te
[2667]‘carry ‘refugees from Habana to Central America.’ MA, as
[2668]‘result, stated that they had-no. intention of proceeding”
[2669]urther with this project.
[2671]e. ‘Instructed our missions in Curacao: and the. Hague
[2672]‘to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew ~
[2673]‘scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US -
[2674]‘opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. . KUM assured
[2675]‘our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate. > service,
[2676]Scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana. .
[2678]oe £. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong -
[2679]‘objections to a proposal; that a Cubana charter flight pick:
[2680]up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them”
[2681]:to Cuba. The flight. was not authorized.
[2683]g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate
[2685]‘Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission
[2686]reported on August 1 that the Governor hed no knowledge of |
[2687]my talks between the B.G. Ministry of Ccmmunications. and -
[2689]planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire
[2690]urther and to keep us advised. London reported that neither
[2691]he Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the
[2692]ssue of landing rights with H.M.G.
[2694]h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
[2695]‘and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government |
[2696]‘in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58
[2697]‘American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also | —
[2699]nformed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban
[2700]equest for a PAA charter’ flight to fly the students: from:
[2701]abana to New York...
[2703]i ‘Instructed our missions at Port of Spain. and
[2704]arbados on several occasions to approach these governments
[2705]“0. “express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban:
[2706]nterest in: ‘the use: of their. aviation. facilities: Bete Ts
[2708]Embassy Port ‘of Spain ‘discussed with the Foreign Secretary
[2709]: legal. moves available | ‘that would enable
[2712]GOTT ‘to control movements of aircraft within their territory,
[2713]‘citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada
[2714]and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that
[2715]the list of suggestions be made available to the. aviation |
[2716]officials concerned. “ ;
[2718]: he During a previous reporting period Embassy _
[2719]Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to>
[2720]Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin
[2721]American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean
[2722]capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obiain Chilean
[2723]visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to.
[2724]the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting
[2725]had been postponed.
[2727]k. Sent general instructions to our missions in
[2728]countries which participate in the International Union of
[2729]Architects asking them to urge the coop:zation of governmental”
[2730]authorities in preventing or discouragins the attendance of
[2731]their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habena, | September’
[2733]29 = October 4, 1963. Followed this up with ins tructions to
[2734]individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade _
[2735]architects from free world countries from serving on: the: jury
[2736]for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument. ;
[2738]1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
[2739]commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis
[2740]that would have required the establishment of. scheduled
[2741]weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.
[2743]‘Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda.
[2745]Central Intelligence Agency
[2747]Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police
[2748]of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of
[2750]“For example, some 50° pounds of. printed -
[2751]Propaganda was" apne from the various passengers who: arrived
[2754]3 Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
[2756]Department of Defense
[2758]oa “Continued surveillance of the | area surrounding.
[2759]Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate
[2760]and with the same emphasis as prior tol July 1963.
[2762]b. Continued ° ‘to maintain U.S. “Forces, primarily: ‘from
[2763]within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other -
[2764]Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious crak
[2765]in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such ~~ ;
[2766]requests were received from any other government during the —
[2767]period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did kee
[2768]track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter ’
[2769]MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and:
[2770]arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK
[2771]was under U.S. surveillance: from its departure from Habana
[2772]until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this
[2773]ship > under surveillance upon its approach to Georgztown,:)
[2774]British Guiana. Subsequeatly, British police ‘search of |.
[2775]MITCHURINSK in British Guiana .waters revealed nothing of | a
[2776]suspicious nature.
[2778]“ Central Intelligence Agency
[2780]. At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima,
[2781]the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti
[2782]terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five |
[2783]years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla
[2784]activities or in the ‘Allegal 0 manufacture of - weapons or .
[2785]explosives.
[2787]The Peruvian National Intelligence Service . is ‘workin
[2789]on'a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning:
[2790]200.;ton vessel reportedly involved. in arms traffic
[2792]" Denarinene of State
[2795]Control of Transfer. of Funds -
[2797]Department of. State
[2799]Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office
[2800]of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls |
[2801]with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July oy 1963.
[2803]5. Strengthening of Gounter= Insurgency Capabilities |
[2804]> Depar tment of Defense
[2806]. a. Continued the installation of military communicas
[2807]tions facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for
[2808]the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua;
[2809]‘ Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delaved to 15:
[2810]October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of:
[2811]new engineering and contractual requirements. ‘ Negotiations
[2812]are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation
[2813]of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new —
[2814]commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone
[2815]within the coming month is expected to improve military —
[2816]communications within the United States and the Commande
[2817]in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command. ~
[2819]b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. .
[2820]Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organiza-
[2821]tions and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been
[2822]disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.
[2824]ce. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week -
[2825]uty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean .
[2826]eduntries in conjunction with implementation of the military
[2827]alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S.
[2828]Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared,:
[2829]trained personnel (this center is the military focal point :
[2830]for relaying information concerning the movement.of — —
[2831]subversives)... Filled, Pavtiallys
[2834]‘the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took
[2835]‘under consideration the problem of an increase in. the bille
[2836]structure in the Center. The Commander-i in-Chief, U.S.
[2837]Southern Command together with his intelligence officer
[2838]visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no
[2839]significant problems existed which would interfere. with
[2840]effective operations in those countries.
[2842]: - de Action previously initiated by the Commander,
[2843]U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish
[2844]a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a
[2845]contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progress*
[2846]ing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard
[2847]personnel to SCIATT in: the Canal Zone has been ‘approved: and.
[2848]the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate’ implementing _ ;
[2849]actions. ;
[2851]Be During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
[2852]ducted. an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
[2853]Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil:
[2854]of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
[2855]Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned. as.
[2856]replacement crew members. -
[2858]f£. <A quarterly inspection ‘and evaluation of the ‘CCUBs.
[2859]provided other Central American countries was conducted
[2860]during the period 17,to 31 August by a mobile training team —
[2861](MIT) made up of SCIATT personnel. .
[2863]g. Continued efforts» ‘to improve the internal security
[2864]of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
[2865]Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14.
[2866]Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter~.
[2867]subversion. ;
[2869]he ‘During the reporting period MTTs conducted ‘train-
[2870]ing ‘in: -counterinsurgency. for the armed forces of Colombia, -
[2871]Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador :'
[2873]: Civic Action MITs were ‘sent. ‘to ‘Guatemala,
[2874]Colombia,' El. Salvador ,: Jamaica and | Ecuador..- -:
[2877]- Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion ;
[2878]"Central Intelligence Agency : - .
[2880]CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in :
[2882]“a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
[2883]_ Security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
[2884]-tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
[2886]nformation as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement:
[2887]“Of funds, arms and propaganda material. In. many instances,
[2889]he’ furnishing of information to the internal security
[2891]ervice by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of;
[2893]imilar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador
[2894]or his representative. The response to this information has.
[2895]‘varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general,,.
[2896]-began to pay greater attention to the information and act on
[2897]it. At the other extreme; the Brazilian Government during =
[2898]‘the. reporting period showed little inclination to follow up
[2900]nm the information. Lovey
[2902]" Departnent of State
[2904]a. -Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru. our
[2905]interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
[2906]brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that, this
[2907]action be taken as soon as possible.
[2909]bb. Urged the Government of Guatemala: ‘to. eubmit
[2910]evidence of communist activity to the OAS . Ee
[2912]“Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultura
[2914]Missions
[2916]Department of State
[2918]"Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow 1 up closely. on.
[2919]charges of involvement by the. Cuban mission in. internal . |
[2920]‘policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion;” to”
[2921]-point out to Bolivian officials -the opportunity for a. possible
[2922]break. in. relations with Cuba. _Embassy. La. Paz was. “not able: to:
[2925]‘press for | a break when the evidence of Cuban “intervention
[2926]id not prove to be as conclusive as: originally ‘reported.
[2928]Other Special Actions -
[2930]Department of State
[2932]Po Obtained action by the COAS on july 3 on “the
[2933]‘Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the
[2934]‘governments and urging them to implement the spect fie and-
[2935]‘general recommendations contained | therein as goon as -
[2936]Possible. — oy
[2938]. b. “Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
[2939]overnment of the matters which we wanted to have considered.
[2940]uring the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
[2942]‘Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August :
[2943]‘26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the .
[2944]Managua Security Conference countries later: this year.
[2946]. Explained © in detail the nature of the: ‘Cuban
[2948]reat and the related policy objectives of the U.S.,- during
[2949]onversation in London and in Washington with Mr. ‘Adam Watson
[2950]ewly. appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.
[2952]: United States Information Agency
[2954]a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
[2956]“period transmitted 12 articles,..commentaries, and back-
[2957]‘grounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts through-
[2959]ut Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and.
[2961]he Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America © --.
[2963]arried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject
[2964]of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed | to
[2965]‘alert people in Latin America, ‘to the _ dangers of this
[2967]‘In response’ to standing Agency instructions ‘to
[2968]give special attention to. developments related to Cuba~based
[2969]‘subversion, USIA posts. in Latin America were prompt in -
[2970]‘reporting incidents and. in providing. editorial comments: from
[2973].the Latin American.press, all of which was used. in the
[2974]Agency’ s radio and press output.
[2976]‘The main developments treated in the Agency’ s radio.
[2977]‘and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging.
[2978]revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist
[2979]weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuaderean Vice
[2981]“the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive
[2982]elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the. University of a
[2983]Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba,
[2984]Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests.
[2986]e. In apport ‘of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based’
[2987]subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
[2988]three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report ©
[2990]of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
[2991]himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress) »
[2994]Travel to and from Cuba
[2996]“Brazil
[2997]Chartered Cubana airlines. flights between Cuba and...
[2998]Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuba
[2999]Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights:
[3000]since late July have carried nearly | 400 non~( Cubans .
[3002]The first of the recent series -- on 25 July --
[3003]brought 7i Latin American passengers to Havana for the
[3004]26. July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15,
[3005]22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin
[3006]Americans to Brazil frem Havana. Some of the aixcraft
[3007]‘involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passen-
[3008]gers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had |
[3009]been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had
[3010]apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had
[3011]‘probably received training there. Of the passengers on
[3012]these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of
[3013]Caribbean area countries. ‘Their circuitous travel through
[3014]Brazil was evidently designed to
[3015]that: they had been in Cuba +:
[3017]Costa Rica
[3019]Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a
[3020]‘chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana
[3021]at Grand Cayman on 11 July. 1963. One. was Luz Marina —
[3022]Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to.
[3023]have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla |
[3024]warfare instructor. -She had been in. Cuba since September
[3025]1962. “The other Costa Rican passenger ‘was. Carlos Guillen
[3026]former head’of the Costa Rican Society of Friends. of
[3027]‘the Cuban. Revolution,, who had been in Cuba. since Novenber
[3028]1962, : :
[3031]junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can
[3032]be expected'to follow the guidance of the Embassy and.
[3033]the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and
[3034]the Soviet bloc. The-activities of Cuban subversives'
[3035]in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly
[3036]inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-
[3037]Cubans and. by the outlawing of the Communist | Party. by.
[3038]the junta.
[3040]» Honduras,
[3042]It is reported that ‘the Honduran’ ‘Communist: Party
[3043]has issued.orders to its members not to attempt to. -:
[3044]travel to Cuba at the-present time. This action= is °
[3045]apparent ly the result of the increasing wigilance of.
[3046]thé Honduran government and the greater: Amplementatt
[3047]of stricter travel controls.
[3049]- Movement of Cuban Propaganda
[3051]Guatemala
[3053]According to an unconfirmed report received in July
[3054]a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of |
[3055]Guatemala is being. formed in collaboration with Prensa
[3056]latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects
[3057]to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print
[3058]‘bulletins for distribution by radio stations. . This may
[3059]indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt .
[3060]to distribute on @ more Clandestine. basis An’ other
[3061]in, latin America.
[3063]Honduras _
[3065]It was ‘reliably reported ‘that in mid- July, 1963, al
[3066]small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist
[3067]propaganda | on the northern coast of Honduras , the boxes.
[3069]‘report. has not, been confirmed
[3071]er
[3074]- Movement of Guerrillas and Arms:
[3078]“Extremist members of the Peronist Party, “apparent I
[3079]under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon,
[3080]and John William Cooke, were reported to: be receiving |
[3081]ennouragément, and promises of large sums of money from
[3082]Cuba in support of their efforts to train and crganize —
[3083]subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated.
[3084]that his plan.calls for expanding and aécellerating
[3085]subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a
[3086]complete take over within two years. There is no indica:
[3087]tion that Peron himself has agreed to this pian. It has.
[3088]“been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of
[3089]Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of .
[3090]‘the Castro zesime to support the revolutionary Peronists.
[3091]without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina
[3093]_ It is reported that the so-called Army of National
[3094]Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively
[3095]small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by -
[3097]John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating,
[3098]for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachin
[3099]guns, bazookas and other Sa. how Dr, two or three privat
[3101]The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23
[3102]August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires’.
[3103]in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miner
[3104]during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign
[3105]Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need
[3106]not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break -
[3107]diplomatic relations with Cuba... There has,.in fact, ‘beer
[3108]no hard..information linking the Cuban Embassy: with ‘the
[3109]present ‘mining: erisis in spite. of some unconfirmed - :
[3110]reports : £.Cuban., support. :
[3113]‘Brazil
[3115]“
[3117]Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is |
[3118]reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league
[3119]leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in |
[3120]“northern Brazil. ' According to some reports efforts are’
[3121]being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident. .
[3122]elements under the general direction of Juliao. — Other:
[3123]“reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is...
[3124]>providing guidance and possibly. financial support. to the’
[3125]‘movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension
[3126]lin the Leagues. .
[3128]From Colembia reports have been received of incre-
[3129]asing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training
[3130]courses by instructors "who have been trained in Cuba,
[3131]to the Worker-Student-Feasant Movement (MOEC). A small:
[3132]guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian arny in
[3133]July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band ©
[3134]were killed and two others captured. A smali quantity:
[3135]of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlet
[3136]on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro,:
[3137]Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins ‘of
[3138]the MOZC were found at the camp site. Recent reports.
[3139]have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts o
[3140]the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from’ Ch
[3142]‘Nicaragua. . For example, in mid-July an increased numbe :
[3143]‘of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica.
[3144]“by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan °. *:
[3145]:revolutionary leader and member . of the FIN (Rat tone
[3148]SECRET
[3149]- 5 -
[3151]anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August,.
[3152]Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, ©:
[3153](reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the
[3154]Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border.. Another report indicated
[3155]that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Coste Rican agitator was.
[3156]supposed to have left. San Jose in mid-August for the
[3157]Nicaraguan border to supervise’ the passage of Nicaragua
[3158]guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes,
[3159]who recently returned from attending the May Day celebra
[3160]tions in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this — ;
[3161]responsibility by the Costa Rican Communis t Party. .
[3163]‘So far as we know, the CON, which is normally wall
[3164]informed and highly sensitive to such activities. on its” :-“
[3165]borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise-. ‘signified
[3166]concern or Sswareness of these reported activities.
[3170]‘The Honduran armed forces began to move agzinst a_
[3171]group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the
[3172]Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the:
[3173]Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guar
[3174]has been conducting operations on its side of the border
[3175]against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and
[3176]difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of,
[3177]both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.
[3179]Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and
[3180]conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of t
[3181]National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated
[3182]and Cuban-supported revolut Lonary organization active
[3183]primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall: of
[3184]1962. The strength. of the force. is. not known :
[3186]| Nicaragua
[3188]“Front - a Communist- dominated, Cuban: supported, antic ©.
[3189]Nicaraguan. ‘group) confessed that he was a member of al
[3190]£'.46.
[3193]said that their mission was to establish a base camp.
[3195]the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in —
[3196]order to indoctrinate. the peasants and to train them in.
[3197]guerrilla tactics. -He admitted that he had. received six
[3198]months ' guerrilla warfare > training in: Cuba and. that “other
[3200]British Guiana
[3202]_.In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation
[3203]“(Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment
[3204]‘deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation fer goods to —
[3205]be deliveved to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn,
[3206]loaned this money to the Government of. British Guiana.
[3207]Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major
[3208]stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex
[3209]has indicated that Gimpex will be able to ‘secure additiona
[3210]loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan
[3211]government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also —
[3212]reported that Gimpex plans to buy. aircraft, spare parts
[3214]sand other machinery . in the. United States for reshipment,
[3217]KNOWN TRAVEL | OF
[3219](UL
[3221] NATTONAL
[3224][COSTA RICA
[3226](LOM, REP,
[3228]NICARAGUA.
[3229]PANAMA’
[3231]| PARAGUAY
[3233]! PERU_
[3235]| rernzpan’
[3237]| URUGUAY.
[3238]1 VENEZUFLA
[3240]| LATIN. AMERICANS |
[3242]26th of July ¢
[3243]26th of. Jul
[3244]26th of
[3246]‘26th of Jul
[3248]26th of. July
[3249]26th of July
[3251](30-Football team.
[3256]Celebrations
[3257]Celebrations:
[3258]Celebrations
[3262]3-to 26th of Jul.
[3264]“duly Ce
[3266]‘Jul
[3268]“Fury
[3269]July
[3271]26th of
[3272]26th of
[3274]Celebrations.
[3275]Celebrations
[3277]Host attending will remain
[3278]: .
[3280]Ew
[3281]a
[3282]<4
[3283]oO
[3284]x
[3285]n
[3287]COLOMBIA
[3288]COSTA RICA
[3289]DOM. REP.
[3290]ECUADOR
[3292]EL SALVADOR
[3294]GUATEMALA |
[3297]PARAGUAY.
[3299]RINIDAD.
[3301]URUGUAY
[3303].., VENEZUELA °
[3305]8
[3307]“physical Ea.
[3309]Seminar ~ 7
[3311]from 26. July Celebrations.
[3313]9
[3315]“Returning wer
[3317]~Seeking funds = ‘o-Returning
[3319]_were members of (MIR).
[3320]guerrilla training | [3]
[5]
[7]
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[14]
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[26]
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[50]& Refer.K
[52]
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[75]
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[104]
[106]
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[108]
[109]"9 /ot/t
[110]
[112]
[113]
[115]
[119]
[121]
[123]
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[139]
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[169]
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[174]
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[197]
[199]
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[228]
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[263]
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[277]
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[283]yi
[284]
[286]
[287]1-263
[288]
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[443]
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[455]
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[466]ete
[468]
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[505]
[506]
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[557]
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[563]
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[589]
[591]
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[741]
[743]
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[747]
[749]
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[756]
[757]~ Seeney
[758]
[760]
[762]
[764]
[766]
[770]
[773]
[775]
[778]
[780]
[782]
[784]
[786]
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[811]
[812]€9-9Z-11 eang £6¢ v¥0
[813]
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[865]
[868]
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[873]
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[906]
[908]
[910]
[912]
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[917]
[919]
[923]
[925]
[927]
[928]ae General Intelbicones deons
[929]
[933]
[935]
[944]
[946]
[948]
[950]
[952]
[954]
[955]ff
[956]misc
[958]deta
[961]
[965]
[967]
[969]
[971]
[973]
[975]
[978]
[980]
[982]
[984]
[986]
[988]
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[996]
[998]
[1000]
[1002]
[1008]
[1010]
[1012]
[1014]
[1016]
[1018]
[1020]
[1022]
[1024]
[1026]
[1028]
[1030]
[1032]
[1034]
[1036]
[1038]
[1040]
[1042]
[1044]
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[1048]
[1050]
[1052]
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[1056]
[1058]
[1060]
[1062]
[1065]
[1067]
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[1076]
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[1083]tay
[1084]
[1086]
[1088]
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[1092]
[1094]
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[1119]
[1121]
[1123]
[1126]
[1128]
[1135]
[1138]
[1140]
[1143]
[1148]
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[1150]
[1152]
[1158]
[1160]
[1163]
[1165]
[1167]~ i0-
[1168]
[1170]
[1173]
[1175]
[1178]
[1180]
[1182]
[1184]
[1185]ge: mera tinteliiz
[1186]
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[1188]
[1192]
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[1198]
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[1258]
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[1268]
[1270]
[1273]
[1275]
[1276]=
[1277]
[1280]
[1282]
[1285]
[1288]
[1290]
[1292]
[1293]cies
[1295]&
[1296]
[1299]
[1301]
[1302]
[1304]
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[1311]@ <b
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[1319]
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[1504]
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[1591]
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[1600]
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[1609]
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[1755]
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[1780]
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[1788]ve
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[1850]
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[1858]
[1861]
[1863]
[1865]
[1868]
[1873]&
[1876]
[1878]
[1879]——
[1880]
[1882]
[1884]
[1886]wa whittary intelligence’
[1888]¢ fvom the Hontevides
[1889]
[1891]
[1893]
[1895]
[1897]
[1900]
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[1912]
[1914]
[1916]
[1917]BexSa Giighy’ Yeats nr Saris ys
[1919]
[1921]
[1923]
[1936]So ot & & &
[1941]gas é ¢ o- ‘
[1944]yoy € 8 &
[1946]@® wf @ bk @
[1949]wim 8 § @ & - ©
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[1974]=
[1975]=!
[1976]=|
[1978]: wi
[1982]
[1984]
[1986]
[1989]
[1991]
[1994]
[1997]
[2000]
[2002]
[2006]
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[2008]
[2010]
[2013]
[2015]
[2018]
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[2030]
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[2039]
[2041]
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[2047]
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[2067]
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[2076]
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[2081]
[2083]
[2088]
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[2092]
[2093]
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[2097]
[2101]:
[2105]}
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[2184]
[2186]
[2187]
[2189]
[2191]
[2193]
[2195]
[2214]
[2216]
[2217]
[2218]SUBIEGT:
[2219]
[2222]
[2224]
[2226]
[2227]rl
[2228]
[2230]
[2232]
[2234]
[2236]
[2238]
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[2247]
[2254]
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[2258]
[2260]
[2263]
[2265]
[2267]
[2269]
[2271]
[2272]
[2275]
[2278]
[2280]
[2284]
[2288]
[2290]
[2294]
[2296]
[2299]
[2303]
[2305]
[2310]
[2314]
[2316]
[2318]
[2320]
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[2327]
[2329]
[2333]
[2335]
[2338]
[2340]
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[2344]
[2346]
[2348]
[2352]
[2357]
[2359]
[2366]
[2368]
[2370]
[2373]
[2378]
[2380]
[2382]
[2384]
[2386]
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[2401]
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[2414]
[2417]
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[2422]
[2424]
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[2433]
[2435]
[2437]
[2440]
[2442]
[2445]
[2447]
[2457]
[2459]
[2461]
[2465]
[2467]
[2472]
[2474]
[2476]
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[2480]
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[2487]—
[2492]=
[2502]
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[2506]
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[2518]
[2520]
[2522]
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[2524]
[2525]tis
[2527]
[2529]
[2531]
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[2537]
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[2557]
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[2560]
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[2564]
[2566]
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[2582]
[2585]
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[2609]
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[2616]
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[2648]
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[2660]
[2662]
[2665]
[2666]
[2670]
[2677]
[2682]
[2684]
[2688]
[2693]
[2698]
[2702]
[2707]
[2710]
[2711]
[2717]
[2726]
[2732]
[2737]
[2742]
[2744]
[2746]
[2749]
[2752]
[2753]
[2755]
[2757]
[2761]
[2777]
[2779]
[2786]
[2788]
[2791]
[2793]
[2794]
[2796]
[2798]
[2802]
[2805]
[2818]
[2823]
[2832]
[2833]
[2841]
[2850]
[2857]
[2862]
[2868]
[2872]
[2875]
[2876]
[2879]
[2881]
[2885]
[2888]
[2890]
[2892]
[2899]
[2901]
[2903]
[2908]
[2911]
[2913]
[2915]
[2917]
[2923]
[2924]
[2927]
[2929]
[2931]
[2937]
[2941]
[2945]
[2947]
[2951]
[2953]
[2955]
[2958]
[2960]
[2962]
[2966]
[2971]
[2972]
[2975]
[2980]
[2985]
[2989]
[2992]
[2993]
[2995]
[3001]
[3016]
[3018]
[3029]
[3030]
[3039]
[3041]
[3048]
[3050]
[3052]
[3062]
[3064]
[3068]
[3070]
[3072]
[3073]
[3075]
[3076]~ Argentina —
[3077]
[3092]
[3096]
[3100]
[3111]
[3112]
[3114]
[3116]
[3127]
[3141]
[3146]
[3147]
[3150]
[3162]
[3167]
[3168]~ Renduras
[3169]
[3178]
[3185]
[3187]
[3191]
[3192]
[3194]
[3199]
[3201]
[3213]
[3215]
[3216]
[3218]
[3220]
[3222]
[3223]{COLOMBIA ”
[3225]
[3227]
[3230]
[3232]
[3234]
[3236]
[3239]
[3241]
[3245]
[3247]
[3250]
[3252]
[3253]_guly ¢
[3254]
[3255]Celebrations::
[3259]
[3260]Ceiebrations:
[3261]
[3263]
[3265]
[3267]
[3270]
[3273]
[3276]
[3279]
[3286]
[3291]
[3293]
[3295]
[3296]ip
[3298]
[3300]
[3302]
[3304]
[3306]
[3308]
[3310]
[3312]
[3314]
[3316]
[3318]
[3321]
[3322]
[3323] |
198-10005-10017.pdf | [1]198-10005-10017 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[2]— JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[4]Identification Form
[6]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: ARMY
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10005-10017
[11]RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
[13]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[15]Document Information
[17]ORIGINATOR: = CIA
[18]FROM:
[19]TO:
[21]TITLE: CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT
[23]DATE: 04/10/1962
[24]PAGES : 6
[26]SUBJECTS :
[27]ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
[28]MRR GROUP
[30]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[31]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[32]RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
[33]CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
[34]DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 10/07/1997
[36]OPENING CRITERIA :
[38]COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 2. Draft copy of Cuba Project Progress Report, 4-11 April 1962,
[39]regarding clandestine resistance groups in Cuba.
[41]Department of the Army EO 13526
[42]Declassity “ Exclude © Exempt
[44]Authority
[46]& Refer To
[47]Review Dato JIGS By LGW,
[49]vO] 1]
[51]HW 50955 Docld:32423735 Page i
[57]ciate of Fidel ©
[59]a he Tole of Piz
[61]‘ {Huber at. pre@ent, we will aa eos
[63]3
[68]under the” direction. of. 4
[70]a Isc
[72]Sornit ide ‘Defensa: 6 “ths “informant sys
[74]the Cuban “Telephone Company described a swit , nel-in the -
[76]“Principe plant'Tin Havana which waa monitoring. '20'or 30°posltions. "
[77]“These informants, their chiefs, meennere:of th militia, G2, Nehivates "
[78](proves cation agents), and other, Castre- Bappo rt tere are now ge 38. rally
[79]labeiad by the populace a6 communists rather thas Caatroiats.
[83]9. While the network, of informants protecte the home front,
[85]officials of the: ‘National Dir aproend of the’ IntegratedRevolutiona ry
[87]‘Organisation (ORD) are ine ea cingly vecupied with the: export of Castrotet- a
[89]communi om to the Western {phe re. “Flight mi nife ste of Cubana.
[91]‘Airlines show that “hand rede of Latin Americans are being brought to”
[94]addition to regular comme retal
[96]hese persone are being run
[98]. ao
[99]ge6ports, these persons are given visas
[102]botege of suga? fields by burai
[104]a small inceadiary device made. of golatia, match heads; | [3]
[5]
[7]
[10]
[12]
[14]
[16]
[20]
[22]
[25]
[29]
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[37]
[40]
[43]
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[48]
[50]
[52]
[53]
[54]cn
[55]
[56]
[58]
[60]
[62]
[64]
[65]
[66]‘
[67]
[69]
[71]
[73]
[75]
[80]
[81]’
[82]
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[107] |
198-10005-10018.pdf | [1]198-10005-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]AGENCY :
[4]RECORD NUMBER :
[6]RECORD SERIES :
[8]AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
[10]ORIGINATOR :
[11]FROM:
[12]TO:
[14]TITLE :
[16]DATE:
[17]PAGES:
[19]SUBJECTS :
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE:
[22]CLASSIFICATION :
[23]RESTRICTIONS :
[24]CURRENT STATUS :
[25]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[27]OPENING CRITERIA :
[29]COMMENTS :
[33]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736
[35]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[37]Identification Form
[39]Agency Information
[41]ARMY
[45]CALIFANO PAPERS
[47]Document Information
[49]MULTIPLE
[51]00/00/0000
[52]123
[54]ARMS SMUGGLING, CUBA
[55]LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
[56]CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION
[58]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[59]Secret
[61]4
[63]Redact
[65]10/07/1997
[67]Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of
[68]Communist subversives in Latin America.
[70]~JFE Khecort or ee
[72]* Department of the Army EO 13526
[73]SDeclassity “I Exclude “ Exempt
[75]Authority,
[77]I Refer To _. ef ,
[78]Review Dates/ £2) 2019 By
[80]Page 1
[82]Page 2
[84]324239736
[86]HY 40955 Daocld
[88]Sa eo re
[90]ta, With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Ble
[92]dina 2 ADSL, Cue
[94]i Recovered 21. 0,0. erns im the hands of the pomdlace
[96]_ -@evernnent ptodke which emild be chipped ta aiwersive aroups
[97], in other coumiwies.. Tdentigiention of these arms with Cuba woul
[99]te 4 tists coubedne thve Shows: a) we reports alledsing orm
[100]eunigel: crea aad by aoans of food meicuets shinged to
[101]es whieh indtectes thet a Cuber armas
[102]pandl, lé aot of Cuban origing and (3) Teo
[103]ant amine & Cuban erdemal, purportedly being used to
[104]snveviek of fawtk Anerien,
[106]te
[108]oo;
[110]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 3
[113]SECRET
[115]Guiaos tee without founietion end the second iten which
[116]ea the soport contained in the Life Maguzine avtdels
[118]SECRET
[120]]
[122]a oe - moe oe . eee ek -: : ee a ee
[124]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 4
[126]Docld: 3274273736 Page 45
[128]50955
[132]_ . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ©
[135]bo ad material contains infarmation affecting fhe Notional Defente of the United States within the meaning of- “the Espronage ews, ‘Tate 18, USS Secs.
[136]3 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorited person it, prohibited by Jew. .
[138]p,m e GLASSIFIGATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[139]CHES getC-O-N-F-1-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[140]ye CONTROLLED DISSEM
[142]COUNTRY CuBA/LAT IN AMERICA
[144]REPORT NO. TOCS DaL3/653, 152
[146]_ SUBJECT POSSIBLE. _CONCEALMENT. OF WEAPONS ‘DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963
[147]FOR. “SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA. _
[150]DATE OF LATE 1962 REFERENCES in. 62553
[151]INFO. . aa 35871 eg
[152]PLACE & UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963) Cg an .
[154]- DATE ACO. . oe . .
[155]APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO,
[157]THIS is UNEVALUATED-RIFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[158]U.S. OWNER Cc) F A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER,
[159]FROM THE BROTHER OF AN ‘EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.
[161]SOURCE
[163]— 1. .IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT. A_CANNERY IN’ SAN
[165]Ferner ag mme
[167]IN NYLON AND <> BEDDED IR SURERDEDCOCONU? IK J A_CAN WHICH HAD SAD TELE
[172]“UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE
[173]CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.)
[174]‘AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE.
[175]OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND
[176]AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.
[177]= 2. cere’ ‘COMMENT: “aN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY ~
[179]OCTOBER 1962 ‘THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY, IAS GURCULATING ISM.
[181]GROUP t
[183]downgrading ond
[185]declasuifcanon
[187]” “ CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
[188]C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T~I-A=L
[189]» “CONTROLLED DISSEM
[191]FORM 1 Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
[192]i pT
[194]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 6
[196]EE ee de
[198]. O_O
[200], LT tee CLASSIFICATION ~- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ot * , wet ve
[202]on Pe a IN
[204]reba. “-C+0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L. ... . ,. . [TDCS DB 3/888, 152 35871
[205]. oe CONTROLLED DISSEM cL . 7:
[207]| | ) o 7 .
[208]V ’ .
[209]. “ANDRES, ANI ISLAND POS POSSESSION OF. “conompra, THAT A PISTOL ‘HAD
[210]BEEN. FOUND_ EARLIER CONCEALED, INSIDE A A FROZEN ¢ CHICKEN. WHICH
[211]HAD E BEEN 1 PART OF A. SHIPMENT 1 RECEIVED FROM CUBA. Do ,
[213]7 | 3. FELD DISSEM: _CINCARIB, CINCLANT.
[215]oo sp wane”
[217]CLASSIFICATION —< DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ~ _ tee . 4 -
[219]“CONTROLLED DISSEM ©... a 7
[222]f .
[223]one cman alta Ay capiyt nmmaane saemmprenetne ana
[225]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 7
[227]SECRET
[228]WO FOR... wISSEM
[229]An atua cache of maeponi end ammmition sevently discovered at the
[230]Idgas Camponesas guetrilis training center in tha iiterter of the
[231]Bresilion étate of Goias is believed by US Eibassy and OAS officers te
[232]be of Brazilien vathor than Cuban arms, despite a Brecilien newspaper
[233]Suggestion that they vere Cuben, ‘There were ales Gigsevered about 125
[235]goples of Commimist publications ineluding Che Gueverats wellmown
[237]treatise on “Guerrilla Verfere". ‘The trainitig center was described aa
[238]organized sccording to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries
[239]edded that “neribers of the center wank to be the Bregilien equivalent
[241]of those vho fought in the Siere Meestra and se bring the hard Chinase-
[242]Cubsa type evolution to Brasil.” Same 90 to 95 peveons in the locality
[244]| axa reported menibersé of or aympathetic te the ligas Camponedas activities,
[245]bo but only @ of the 24 for whom verrants wore issued have yet been teken
[247]| inte eustedy. (Am im, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 Decexber, CONFIDENTIAL,
[248]and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 Decenber, SUCKED NOFORN)
[250]SECRET
[252]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[254]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 68
[257]_ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Ey p of 9 leer.
[259]Thar Material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within ‘the 4 fe of the De Lave Tie
[260]1, HD, Soo TD and 74 © transmission or revelation of Which in eny manner.to an unauthorised percon is proaibited by dbw,
[262]0 S-E-C-R-E-T VAAN
[263]NO FOREIGN, DISSEM os - Ott \
[265]verte nema Cc RT Se Le ee at aaa
[267]coun Cuba/USSR/Latin merioa “REPORT NO.” eua/aso/aee
[269]suect . 1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats DATE DISTR. 11 Décember 1962
[271]to Transport . Arms to: Latin 3
[272]America ° "NO. PAGES Od.
[273]2. Belgian Arms * Dealer in Habana ,
[274]a | REFERENCES * RD ~W-2107
[275]{Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; - , ae
[276]‘[Para. 3; August 1962 me “RD~ACQ=01258
[278]aras, 1, 2: France, Paris; _
[279]Para. 3; Spain, Madrid — _ 38937
[280]Paras. 1, 2; 23 ae 1962; fre. REPORT NO.
[282]- THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT = THMATVE
[284]Paras. 1 & 2: ~-An. official French service: ‘Para. 3: CC 1167,
[285]Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatié
[286]. 0. service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August” 1962,
[288]' - Appraisal of Content 3." —
[290]“Soviet fishing. boats, “wnder cover of ‘fishing Atlantic waters, .
[291]“.-are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. *,°
[292]‘, The boats are met. outside the territorial waters of those
[294]' countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities.
[296]' On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few
[298]Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who
[299]- pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American
[300]_ manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista
[301]‘. regime and those.taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The
[303]Soviet fishing boats also carry. propaganda, and pamphiets
[304]-- containing, military instructions, the same type of material
[306]' being .sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.
[308]A Belgian in Habana: who: says he represents, a Belgian ‘firm, -
[310]": of arms for payment in dollars, The Belgian has made a
[311]°- Similar offer of .sale of arms to a representative of an
[312]’. anti-Castro group in Habana. _ vo
[314]2 In August 1962 a fisherman in. - Santiago de Cuba said that
[316]“on several occasions he had been forced by the Government
[318]to use his boat for transporting. small groups of men, in
[319]civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of
[321]“ other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men
[323]- and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other
[324]- boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long. as four or
[325]' five days, The fisherman did not know the purpose or final
[326]destination of ‘the men and arms. i
[329]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[331]awageading and
[332]declostihcation
[334]RY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 9
[336]- has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality fo
[338]coer |
[340]SECRET XN ae FOREIGN DISSEM
[342]CIA INFORMATION REPORT €S-3/532,138.
[343]“COUNTRY: CUBA _ 26 December 1962
[345]7 SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED 0 INVADE A
[346]: CARIBBEAN COUNTRY ; ,
[348]bo DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962
[350]|. SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)
[352]"APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: '3
[354]- HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: _ . ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS
[356]OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE SKBX
[357]"SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI, SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE
[358]_NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE,
[360]_ THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL
[362]Rocks IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) | IN LATE | NOVEMBER. THESE XEKS VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED
[363]a
[364]10 PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION 6 OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY,
[366]<>, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[368]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 10
[370]SINE ENTS
[372]SOnERTIL we |
[374]1 gat
[375]fi OFA
[377]wok
[379]UG OMPIDEETIAL
[381]CUDA -
[383]| Sipe of war satarteh for ts + 39 damasy 2962
[384].. §moxhos (3) ee wot
[385]7 cr
[387]oa tacly donsexy 3962 Hone
[388]_. Rabsnay cf2T January 62. Loe gag
[389]: Ot — Bug
[391]eee ce ia deb2 |
[393]f ‘2s. Gource reports on atvonal or stoc chilling of wor ‘pateriel at Casehlonga, &
[394]ohana District, northeast shore of Bebana 3 Bayy Hebana Province ;
[396], DOW AGAA DED aa 32 YEANS
[398]lo Rerauey bocLacsnstep *
[399]“pen DIR $2020
[401]9 SON FIDE Tab
[403]AF VARA ae
[405]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 11
[407]Be Source bas head vais materiel in targeted for am invasion of So8th inoricae = :
[410]Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms’ UCacne-——. a
[411]en mn EL EF .
[413]HW 50955 Doctd:
[415]The Venezuelan Government —- in a raid on a small
[416]Village near Caracas on 5 January --, uncovered a
[418]large cache of arms and equipment which it claims
[419]belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National
[420]Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-
[422]military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party,
[423]several tons of explosives and large quantities
[425]of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized ss well
[426]&s a nearby clandestine Communist radio
[428]transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
[430]SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (0U0); PRESS
[432]|
[433]20 Jan 63 ' DEA Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 7
[435](REVERSE BLANK)
[437]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[439]TT sere imipt ee perrgie rnin ny oe nate Fence meagre oe eae
[441]32423736 Page 12
[443]C
[445]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 13
[447]12 Feb 63 "All the information avaliable to Ker Majesty's Government
[448]and to the British euthorities in British Gulena indicates that there is
[449]no truth whatever in the contimuing reports thet arms are belng shipped
[450]| to the colony from Cubs. Similar stories have appesred from time to tine
[451]| in the pest, birt upon examination all have been found to be without
[452]foundation.” .
[454](British Eubssuy in US to Reuters, AP end UPI),
[456]J
[457]Sud
[459]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 14
[464]Open) GENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[466]oy a matecial contains informeti ‘on effecting the Nati ‘onel Defente of
[467]“a
[469]the Unis tat NSKsGe a Pie ta, U.S.G Seas.
[470]end. 794, the transmission of revelation at which in any. manner to s United States withia the mosni aaa 29e bews, A ‘
[472]2
[473]|
[474]aa uaa uthors zed persen is prohibited fi, as
[476]s
[477]E
[479]CON FIDENTIAL ° icon DISSEMINATION CON
[481]Ee he Hog Ie \
[482](When Filled da mai SSE.
[484]) Honpuras-/-cosTaTR Fea ts CUBA "REPORT NO, _ TOSS, aaa, 035
[485]“SUBJECT PLANS TO. LAND. ARMS, FROM. GUBA.. IN, HONDURAS 7
[487]: DATE OF 9 JANUARY 1963 Ape :
[488]2 INFO, »
[491]feu PRECEDENCE =» ROUTINE. - ma
[492]st . gt ? gt fee
[493]aie . . . ‘ . . yA if
[495]U REFERENCES”, IN, 50531 “ee
[496]. ao be . its a
[498]PLACE & - NICARAGUA, -MANAGUA .(15. JANUARY-1963)-> re Beye
[499]: DATE ACO, , vibe
[500]. aoe
[502]f APPRAISAL: 3 : -_FigLD ReroRT NO, UNM=729
[503]THis Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE
[505]counter NICAL wire
[507]"> pate piste. 16 SARUARY 1963 _ yr
[509]DEFINITIVE, APPRAISA OF CONTENT: IS.TENTATIVE,
[511]: A NICARAGUAN. JOURNALIST. (¢) ‘FROM. A Nioansevet Gi \ 4N: : SAN vOsES. FROM is
[512]“CESAR AUGOSTO. MIRLAREAL, CABEZAS im
[514]Se BEL E 7 eae AREA =
[516]1. ON’ 9 UANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL caBezis, A NIEARAGUAR
[517]REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN ‘SAN, Ose, SAID “THAT HE WAS AWAITING. INSTRUC.
[519]$00 RCE
[521]a
[523]St TONS, TO GO TO PUERTO. CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A ‘SHIPMENT OF ARMS _
[524]WHICH WILL COME- ‘FROM CUBA on THE "CORK _c", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF. LUNKNOBN
[526]REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE: INSTRUCTIONS: TOGO TO PUERTO CORTES: wn
[527]FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. “EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIAS
[529]“2s THE. "CORK. cH WILL: UNLOAD THE ARMS AT: CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY
[531]“y Wet ‘BE, RECEIVED BY, GRIFFIN, (ENU) WHO LIVES » IN PUERTO CORTES. | ”
[532]. GRIFFIN WILL, DELIVER, “THE, ARMS, To. VILLAREAL, AT. PUERTO. CORTES.
[533]vere Be. THE. ARMS WiLL, BE: TAKEN, FROM. PUERTO. coRTES TO. PUEBLO NUEVO,
[535]woe HE
[537]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:'
[539]it FU at eee ee
[543]Sire rT
[544]Ty °
[546]71
[550]BW 50955 - ‘pockasozanava
[552]ATL
[554]Bage 17.0.)
[556]|
[558]i | Ce At ~ SI RERTON = TETOATTTOR CONTROLS
[559]| JCORMDENTIL 59 pepeieat UISSEE
[561]= OCS 3/538, 035
[562]ER ad Bicoeal | .
[564]“NICARAGUA BY “VILLAREAL, “JUL to VELASQUEZ VELEZ,
[566]AND ‘DRy. HERNAN | SILVA.
[567]ARGUELLO- WHERE, ‘THEY Witt BE TURNED ‘OVER TO DR.. EMILIO
[569]Ok, € SOURCE COMMENT:
[570]‘KNOWN.
[572]"FLORES - [SBREGON,.
[573]“THE DATE OF ARRIVAL, OF THE "Conk cn 1s UN.
[575]CARLOS’ FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER
[577]|: IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME: SYSTEM, |
[578]FELD DISsEM: STATE: ARMY, CINCARIB CINCLANT.,
[580]ACTIONS, ACSI,
[581]“-TNFO. + DCSOP"
[582]DA INS» 82
[584]“NAVY, AF, JCS; 0sD.
[586]CLASSIFICATION -— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS a
[588]; : fen f SS ee
[590]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 18
[592]CENTRAL INTE:
[593]asa of the United States within the meeni ing of the Expr
[595]This material contains information <° jecting die ary ete
[596]793 and 794, the transmission of reve.stion of Whi eats! anner ia an unauthorued person is prohibited by le a
[597]x.
[600]vonage Laws, Title? |
[602]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[604](63 FES 9 AL at
[606](When Filled inj
[608]VENS 7UELA
[610]REPORT NO. ToCs-3/536, 942
[612]AAD- ” ‘ .
[613]DATE DISTR. 9 FearuARY 1963
[615]pc: SLE SHIPMENT OF rene FROM CUBA AND |
[616]powam TO WESTERN VENEZUELA.
[618]i
[619]i
[621]PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[623]i re-auary 1963 REFERENCES IN 64876
[624]bs VEN CO UJELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963) os . oe
[625]DALE ACG. : .
[627][PEPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. “Hvc~2651
[628]THIS 1S 3 UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE:
[629]SURCE 4S MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.
[630]Ne |
[631]Rae)
[632]NE
[634]y 1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
[636]Aur ‘N.
[637]Ne |
[638]RT!DO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUN | ST PARTY
[640]“EOMMITTSS OF THE PA
[641]OF VENEZUELA) _ IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS ~
[643]SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PAR CA te Is. AWAITING A A SHIPMENT OF
[645]END THAT STATE,
[646]_ ARMS FROM. CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL iS STILL
[648]RE KNOWN
[650]co
[652]-QURCE COMMENT : ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF “ARMS A
[654]SINKMOWY
[655]IT 1S POSSIBLE THAT THE
[657]SQNLY ro mafOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE,
[658]x AROUND LA CONCEPC iON AND” LA PAZ; “TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
[660]BND. WEST, RESPECTIVELY» ‘OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO,
[662]SITES). (F LELD COMMENT : ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL
[664]GROUP
[666]” oc
[667]: ; CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[669]-. is-a0)
[671]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 19
[673]a
[676]u
[680]N
[682]La
[684]AW
[686]Hn
[687]gina
[688]MS
[689]id
[690]he
[692](2, FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AiR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
[695]a ee SSL EE ee : oo —
[697]Z
[698]Qo CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 1 .
[699]sero Tt , ,
[700]CORE |
[702]wm Filled In)
[704]iYTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY
[706]‘63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).
[708]DOF MESSAGE
[709]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[711]50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 20
[714]4. pEPARTI: SENT OF THE AIR FORCE
[715]STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION -.
[716]_ INCOMING MESSAGE "RETRANSMITTED 70: SAC, TAC,
[717] GONAD, AFSC, MATS
[718](per req Mr Ke
[719]25rop62 d oleh a: :
[721]A/D a2 NAVE-2, CMC“): es: fe)
[723]OSD/SDLU-1;-STATE-79 CIA-11,_NSA-T -
[725] XPD-3, «ISI-2,, 22) (112) (Risd. by
[726]Mr Kerp-CIN-4o8e 62).
[730]1127 USAF FAG Ft BELVOIR v/s
[732]INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
[733]USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA aa
[735]BT |
[736]CON FIDE NT 1 AL XX CITE CHARLI
[738]E "DASH NINE -$@D “HARRIS: Pant
[739]ITED. MEXICO ve us
[741]MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACGRED
[742]ING. RECD INFO FROM: To DIFFERENT.SOURGES,
[744]D DEPARTED BITHER SANTIAGO. DE, CUBA
[745]IVE MINUTES: NORTH. SEVEN FIVE.
[746]ONE ‘ONE. TO. ONE. SEVEN
[747]“NORTHEAST, BRAZIL
[749]EPORTED Two TWO FEB HAV
[750]HAT. CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS KA
[751]OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR F
[752]XERO unNuTES yest DURING VEEK OF,
[754]"HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR’
[756]BLE CONF IR PARA ‘SOP DASH THREE =
[758]ALLE
[760]ADIN
[762]F 50955, Dovti:32423736. page 21 ay
[764]SECRET ..
[766]The British cousul in Santiago de Cubs has informed Washington
[767]and the Governor of British Guiene that two alleged US citizens,
[768]Join ALivem Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margene’. Frances Jotncon,
[769]were leaving Ciba on 3] December on the Cuban vessel, BANTA Dm TARA
[770]destined for deorgetow, Bricish Guiana, On board with then were 17
[773]nsme, ingluding two lsree wod erates understood to ba
[774]“viwy gimiler to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship
[776]in Sentiegs de dubs." Tho Britieh congul notes the unlikelihe
[778]L of
[779]US elidaens" leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt aa to
[780]their veal ldentities and intentions. (Uritish Porsign Office te
[781]Washington, No. S759, 31 Decetber, 1962 (SuoREr))
[783]SECRET
[785]WH 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 22
[788]‘ eM
[790]CENTRAL NTHLUGENGE 3 AGENCY
[794]‘ COUNTRY. Cuba/British cutene. 7 _ REPORT.NO. = 0O= K-3,210,108
[796]~ SUBJECT | Shipment of ; Weapons to. British Guiena DATE DISTR. . @L Feb 62.
[798]. / o _- €D/00 Case = 2 2/08616/65
[800]DATE OF _ Se . , Case -
[801]DATE OF aes a960. oe | Gase 62 78/rwu/DOM 61/cx.
[802]{PLACE& . wags Dec 1962» .
[804]DATE ACQ._ OT m
[806]. Me This material contains. information affecting the National. Defense of the United States within. the meaning of the Espionage, Laws, Title ee
[808]i U.S.C. Secs: 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unevihorized | person is. prohibited by low. _ won
[810]C-O-RAP-I-D-BN-T- eleAcL_.
[812]- REFERENCES a oe
[814]THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
[816]"Cuban national, A 12 88% 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
[817]: Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to undergrour groups in Cuba.
[819]- [This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office io
[820]of preparation. ]
[822]x was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, 7
[823]“"Bohia ade Nipe" left Cuba for British ‘Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo
[825]. shipment of weapons. ‘The. boxes containing this equipment, were stored —
[827]in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with nattresses and canvas.
[829]a8 cargo of sugar bags win misced on. top of the ‘weapons.
[831]50955 Docld: 32423736 Page by 7 7 ci ee ae :
[833]“280G. mca | Department of State = 7 02 | 47.
[835]eos piconet ;
[836]"Tp cnaaa 10. _
[838]uname oFFICAL USE” - mA ae ..
[839]| | practi a, a Fee & 10 6 A
[840]2 Ota AREION: snatveaey Qx0nGenO%s 286 7 oe
[841]; = so - : oo - UNCLASS! FIED MESSAGE REFERR
[842]me a cae . «TO THIS MESSAGE BY CiTE rem b
[843]WILL BE DESIGNATED : EFTO
[844]che Feb 8 ‘edition of LIFE contains story on. Cuba with follexing
[846]- a eremmrrn oe
[847]caption under ‘Bhoto of Ruigedan freighter: - .
[849]But refugecs: aboard’ the ‘sha ploy Lykes said two bts pat out fron
[851]: Mariel | (Cuba) 6 only last: week with holds loiided with weapons: sent by
[853]Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE &
[857]" Woula a appreciate any: r avaslable @ comport,
[859]ve nates
[860]a
[861]t
[862]om
[864]“ACTION: “STATE (ARMY :ACSI) 0...
[865]OSA, JCs::
[867]a. N 827722.
[869]Felegraphle wansmissloa and
[870]+ | classification approved bye
[872]*. . REPRODUCTION FROM This:
[873]" EGPY IS PROHIBITED
[874]_ UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED",
[876]LIMITED OWFTATAT. TAR | |
[878]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page 24
[882]54
[883]Action
[884]EUR
[886]oy Info
[888]G
[889]. SAL
[890]~ ARA
[891]P
[892]USIA
[893]SCA
[894]NSC
[895]INR
[896]CIA
[897]~ NS
[898]OSD
[900]NAVY
[901]AIR
[903]\.
[905]‘HW 50955
[907]INCOMING TELEGRAM = Department of State’
[911]3 ~Gontral: 4682 /
[912](05 ‘Rec'd: February 7, 1963
[913]. 953. 12:57 PM
[914]FROM: Georgetown - ’
[919]TO: Secretary of State
[921]NO: 245, February 7, NOON
[923]Reference: Department's 286 February 6.
[925]Neither harbor master nor shipping companies” have. any
[926]knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-
[927]Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always
[928]notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary
[929]arrangements at RMB wharf can be made, It denies having
[930]received any notice recently. Governor also reports
[931]negative results his inquiries. ; _—
[932]CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI
[933]18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press)
[934]Department can give. ne
[936]MELBY
[938]TEK/18°
[940]REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS.
[941]CONFIDENTIAL ———. PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[943]Docld: 327473736 Page 25
[946]“FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[947]" PARIS AFP IN’ ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1965 7 FEB 63 E
[949]- €EXCERPT) GEOR >GETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN 4 STATE OF NEAR PANIC.
[950]TODAY AFTER. NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A
[952]WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS
[954]FULL OF SOVIET ARMS/TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED
[956]THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED.
[958]<A SPOKESMAN IN THE. HOME AFFAIRS. MINISTRY SAID. THE: GOVERNMENT
[960]- EXPECTED NO" ARMS, FROM THE. SOVIET. UNTON OR CUBA.
[962]“7 FEB 749? FG/OP | Co N. rn ee
[964]‘HW 490955 Doold: 32423736 Page 26
[966]‘OUTEO
[968]ING TELEGRAM Department of State Ly
[970]e"GE TO : : 3 s
[971]at - | ‘CONFIDENTIAL tA f e
[972]9 | fc
[973]“2 Orie ACTION: AmConGen GEORCETOW! 293 os
[974]. EUR . 8
[975]J defo: x, _ cee
[976]“8s | | oe ae
[977]SR UrTel 2h5 = _
[978]oe intelligence a
[979]% ‘Sp Washington inpesiieotion agencies have no information to contin
[980]o JE
[981]SAL alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown. a
[982]AR : . / oO
[983]STR” Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to
[984]_P effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG.
[985]USTA ,
[986]> SCA O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story
[987]. INR * wee . ~ ee aoe _ im . aoe 7 .
[988]pra as-basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official
[989]NSA ~ confirm: ‘story as O'Leary alleged in article. x
[991]Drafted bys
[993]Iv repeat if Department is asked ty press » we plan Say we have
[995]no information but are making inquiries.
[997]Telagraphic transmission and
[999]SUR: BNA: RJTepper: 14a : 2/8/03 ctassification approved by: Bun iA - kX. Y“ordon Knox
[1000]Clearances: . j 2 oo.
[1001]INR - Mr. Packman 7 mm/s - Mr. Simmons. . hoe. “BRAcceod pace
[1002]- ~ “BUR/P Mr. McGowan a Ts ~ ye, COA = Mr. Polles a
[1003]Ce, ee REPRODUCTION FROM THIS \
[1004]Oe ae PROHIBITED ae
[1005]CCONPEDENTEAL, 4 ee UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”, 1
[1007]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 27
[1009]i
[1011]NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1013]aterial contains information affecting the Nationa! Defense
[1014]S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of whic
[1016]CENTRAL |
[1018]of the United Stores within the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title
[1019]h in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1021]O~O-N-P-T-D-E-N-P-T-A-L
[1023]2 \ 4 .
[1025]os o . iy : .
[1026]COUNTRY: British Guiana/Cuba REPORT NO. © OO— B--3, 247, 34d q
[1027], . a as
[1028]. 11 Jan 63 rari oF 4
[1030]SUBJECT = dagan'’s Political-Rconomie Viewpoints
[1031]; propriation of Foreign Proverties Lin
[1032]to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagants 5-
[1034]Plan/Psoples Progressive Party Infiltration
[1036]t
[1037]of United Front, Arus. Saugeling irom Cuba fw REFERENCES i
[1038]Filariasis Diseas@ Conon in Gui Fala ; i
[1039]DATE OF Country. ; : . i
[1040]INFO. Taru Oct 62 (
[1041]PLACE & - ‘
[1042]DATEACQ. British Guiane/Taen Ort 62
[1044]THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION *
[1046]OURCE: “US national, executive in a US aluainua company 4
[1048]' Source bas frequently treveled to and within British Guiena in connection |
[1049]» wita geologicel surveys for his company. He nes known dagen for about
[1050]| wine years, aud on ais latest trip ned several conversations with Jagan.
[1052]" On tue basis of any conversations wita Chedid Jagan (isostly concerning
[1053]‘possible iavestiuents by wy coucany in Britisa Guiana), I an convinced
[1054]tnat he is not « Communist. Ia fact, dagen oes not know what re is.
[1055]He is siuply Looking for anytulug uew thas il bels to pull up ais.
[1056]people quickly. In this context be sees Soviet and Chinese Communisn
[1057]as the two principal Twentieth Century econouic experiuents ~-/ eat as
[1061]~ Se0n0uie experiments be is willing to try then.
[1063]. to talking with ue, Jegan has wade clear that he is not a “Castro Type.” .
[1065]‘He wants hélp from anybody. Tie one thing ict might in the futare
[1066]seriously winder nis getting econoxte aid fron the USSR is that he
[1068]. Gevands that aid be without strings.
[1070]dagan would hesitate to do anysoing (such as confiscating foreign pro-
[1071]perties in an ettampt to inereese revennes ) which would ofiend the US
[1072]or the UN for fear of ruining any fubare chances of obtaining US or UN
[1073]aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that se is still under tas UK
[1074]_and that it is therefore wmiconstitutiorsl for aim to expropriate anything.
[1075]After British Guiana achieves independence, Ilan confident Jagan would
[1076]not expropriate. anything if he is getting aid trom the US or the UN --
[1077]_, that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence )
[1078], Jagan is receiving no such aid and DAS no prospects of receiving suca
[1079]-aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this sowewhat
[1080]uepressing estimate of Jagan by commenting thet in 1953 when he entered
[1081]_ office, ne was something of a wild-syed fanatic without direetion, ;
[1082]Since then he has matured considerably, © 2) - eat
[1084]' Bota Jagan and ais Trade Miaister » Frank Hibbard, nave told we that
[1086]The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of Britisna
[1088]“Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiserluinately wants dil kinds of factories.
[1090]His “Five Year Plan" is no.plan at all. fa his eagerness to do souething (\y .
[1092]. for British Guiana, dagan thinks he ought’ to build any kind of factory \ °
[1094]~ that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he \
[1095]just tells a subordinate to add it to ‘tne Plan. But there is no one in NN
[1097]the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing reeeareh, etc., \ .
[1099].whish 1s necessary for any such investment. Oy
[1101]f Excluded from automatic
[1102]downgrading and“
[1103]- Coclassifcation
[1105]GROUP f } ry
[1107]ROIS
[1109]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 26
[1111]C-O0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[1114]00~B-3, 247, 3lb
[1116]§.- In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples
[1117]Oh Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party
[1118]< (uP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular
[1119]iz _ 4 + democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact |
[1120]thet the UFP mewbership was “growing,” it was “obvious” that Jagan
[1121]was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Gulanese who were
[1123]working for Jagan.
[1127]I vas in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip.
[1128]Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the
[1129]hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-
[1130]educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that armg were
[1131]; } being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He aid not go into any
[1133]: detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were ;
[1134]is,mewbers of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought
[1135]xms into their home, kept them for a while, and then.disposed of them.
[1136]ti The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the _
[1137]» Situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.
[1139]6.
[1141]Te. Malaria isnot a factor now. Even well into the interior there. is
[1142]Ope than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast
[1143]filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my
[1144]Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day- .
[1145]-time were harmless but mosquito blies at night would infect with
[1146]: f{lariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him.
[1147]“The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs
[1148]“to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not
[1149]‘exactly encouraging.~ T. never-did understand why, but my doctor said -
[1150]“that to be effective in detecting the disease a-blood test must be
[1151]~made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 asta), and analyzed
[1152]; “quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual. prowess
[1153]--s,@an be saved.:,.We found’ that the disease is very common throughout
[1154]‘the’ country. a era - oe
[1156]CO _ os QeQ-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-ASL en Soak,
[1157]oe CONTROTIED_DISSEM_.. NO DISSEM ABROAD +)» NO_FOREIGN DISSEM
[1159]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 29
[1161]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
[1163]One material contains. information offecting the National. Defense of the United States within the meaning ‘of the Espionage ‘Laws, Title
[1164]18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelatio
[1166]in of which. in -any manner to on unauthorized, person is. prohibited by low. .
[1168]y
[1170]ce C-0-PAT-D-SAio-EaAcd
[1172].00- K-3,210, 102
[1173]DATE DISTR... 21 Feb 62
[1175]COUNTRY cuva/Britien 6 Guiana u
[1179]SUBJECT ~~ Salmment of Weapons % to British Guiana
[1181]NO. PAGES One |
[1183], REFERENCES
[1185]Ce _ eD/oo case ce 22/05676/¢5
[1186]el Dec 1962: oe . os @ 3566 78/Iww/DoM bi/ox
[1187]/PLACE & --3 Dec 1962 |
[1189]DATE ACQ._
[1191]THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION a .
[1192]source: | Cuban. national, A 12 88% 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
[1194]Source. is an electrical engineer and advisor, to undergrouril groups in Cuba.
[1196]a [This report was: Aeveloped by. an Arny representative assigned to the office
[1197]on - of preparation.} . -
[1199]x was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter,
[1200]De "Bohia de Ripe" left Cuba for British Guiena on 22 Dec 1961 witha cargo.
[1202]shiment of weelpons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored . - a
[1204]in the bottom of the ship’ s hold and. covered with mattresses and canvas. .
[1206]io . A cargo of. sugar > bage ‘wes placed on. : top of ‘the. weapons. _
[1208]ile as
[1212]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page 30
[1214]_ SNOLELVOTNNNWOD
[1216]a
[1217]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 31
[1219]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 32
[1221]ahdy of @ devolution in Beardly howwver, the Brazilian toverment
[1223]hee nt tales wale Hote of the dotumiat..
[1225]cECRET
[1227]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 33
[1230]ft em
[1232]‘ OFT
[1234]4
[1235]HY 50955 Daocld: 3274239736
[1237]Page 34
[1240]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32493736
[1242]Page 35
[1244]EE TRE AEP ESE RET
[1246]SECRET
[1248]SECRET
[1250]SSIS a EP EE
[1253]CONFIDENTIAL
[1255]DAL
[1256]genteel Stan” Radio cransttting Station, 7 50 donuary 1962”
[1257]| Sancho Boyeras Aaports Habana. Proviso, (2° 4
[1258]bof.
[1260]we ‘120 Sasary 1962 ~ Sons
[1261]“Rancho Boyares, Jan 6 tas
[1263]a8 BE6/3ToSR oe EE ee
[1264]Ze Subsiource sorerts ahat the &
[1266]vernaent of Cubs had planned to ineuarete a
[1267]Genin padie tranemitting station ob
[1268]Fated
[1270]in & the Rancho Boyeres Airport, south ef
[1271]ona Clg, on the 19t ta or 20th of damary 19 See =
[1273]news 26 Tho puspoze off the station waa to be concanieation betweon cubs cad
[1274]geclzalpes, Horetarasy ¢ os the 9677. Sreinsneye
[1276]. Bos SFORADED At tz baer AIG
[1277]TSTESV AL BOF AU De
[1278]HAT GAULY DELASSISTED
[1280]oe DoD TER 5200010,
[1284]#50955. Docld; 32423736 .P,
[1286]4 C, ao CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1292]ATION REP
[1294]aA IWAN
[1296]This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[1297]- 18, U.S.C, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to ar. unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1300]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1301]COUNTRY .: Dominican Republic/Cuba , REPORT NO. CS.3/535, 788
[1302]“SUBJECT... Clandestine Radio Receiving DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963
[1303]oe Station in Santo Domingo . ;
[1304]a NO. PAGES 1
[1305]‘ REFERENCES RD
[1307]DATE OF © 22 January 1963
[1308]_ INFO.
[1310]PLACE & Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo
[1311]DATE ACQ. 22 January 1963 | FIELD REPORT NO. HDC-~553
[1312]THIS 18 UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT iS TENTATIVE,
[1314]-_ SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican
[1316]political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.
[1318]One of.the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages
[1319]from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle .Espaillat 56:
[1321]repair shop there.
[1323]"Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu} is probably identifiable -
[1324]with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Com-
[1325]munist member of the. Agrupacion.Politica.Catorce de Junio.
[1326]{APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS~3/511,814,.of
[1327]24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from
[1328]an official British service, which reports -on a clandestine
[1329]group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with
[1330]‘Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo...
[1332]The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician' s
[1334]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 37
[1336]yo aie Tz a
[1339]HW 50955 DBocld:32423736
[1341]Page 36
[1344]20 thet sone efforte
[1346]VIA gtetion in Rio de Janeiro hes repor
[1347]may be mide to put pressure on President Gowlart te wieliély take some
[1348]Rote of the Cuban intervention in Brasil's internal affairs, allegedly
[1350]shown by sone 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the
[1352]Verig plane exach which carried a Guben delegation to thetr deaths da
[1353]Novauber. The docun
[1355]ante are conaidered by o Brazilian gouree who nade
[1356]then available to the CIA wtetion to be “explosive, since they prove .
[1358]the Cubans are eponsoring reveluvion in Brazil." Parepbrassa of those
[1359]domuments have apped
[1360]President Gouls
[1362]ed in thé Lime preas) but i4 46. unt
[1364]ely that
[1365]et wil. give ony support to publigiizing then. (cra,
[1366]Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, @ January, SECRET MOYORN)
[1368]SECRET
[1369]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1371]Ww 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 39
[1374]Prt ne ee ee
[1376]ww 50955 Docld: 32742735736
[1378]Page 40
[1381]DRE INE OR MAI TION Rie SPORT
[1383]if, U.S.C.
[1385]COUNTRY
[1387]i SUBJECT
[1389]DATE OF
[1390]oS INFO.
[1392]' PLACE &
[1393]DATE ACG.
[1395]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1397]‘his material contains informstion affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[1399]Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[1401]S.-B-C~R-E-T
[1402]NO FORE(GN DISSEM
[1406]Pacaguay/Cuba REPORT NO. CS -3/536.454
[1407]Paraguayan Travelers to and DATE DISTR. 7 February 1963
[1408]‘From Cuba | ;
[1410]NO. PAGES 2
[1412]REFERENCES RD
[1414]December 1962 - 20 January 1963
[1415]Paraguay, Asuncion
[1416](24 January: 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HYA-833
[1417]THIS iS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[1419]SOURCE
[1421]web a eet shonin ee een a one ek ews
[1423]oe Ge
[1425]on
[1427]Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of She Paraguaya7
[1429]Communist Party (C). Appraisal _of Content: 2,
[1431]On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partide
[1432]Comunista Paraguayo (PCP ~ Paraguayan Communist Parity) in
[1433]Paraguay,1 met with five rural leaders of the PCP from ;
[1434]areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, an
[1435]Guarambare. These leaders received political instructic
[1436]from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive
[1437]military and political training in rural organizaticn.
[1439]Lopez (fnu)2 is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Accasta3
[1440]is the leader from Tebycuarymi.
[1442]Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy.
[1443]eniered Paraguay from Cuba in the firs: half of December to-
[1444]assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacian
[1445]Nacional (FULNA « United Front for Natienal Liberation).
[1447]Anibal Garcete4.a% ceturned to Paraguay. from Cuba tc organize
[1448]| the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading
[1449]“as a member of the Colorado Party.
[1451]i. Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a persona
[1452]whose True name is unknown.
[1454]Source Comments
[1456]“4, Lopez was born about 1937.
[1458]3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time
[1459]member of the PCP. ; oO ‘
[1461]innate iad,
[1463]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 41
[1466]- CS-3/5236, 454
[1468]. WAS reported in June 1960
[1469]ive in the labor dispute in
[1470]4e the sugar cane worker's
[1472]as mentioned in confidential
[1473]jich time he was an officer in
[1474]r Cane Workers.
[1476]ww 50955 Docld: 324233736 Page 42
[1479]SECRET NO Fone .SEM
[1481]On 4 Deceuber Brasilien Prestdent Goulars telephoned General Alves,
[1482]tera in Rlo de Janeiro and
[1484]comender of the Piret Army with headquas
[1485]the highest renking extmone leftist 4a the Brastlien amed foreda,’ He
[1486]toll Alyes to choowe four or five junior officers of his. abeolute con-
[1487]fidenes to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba vle Bolivia,
[1488]Joulart paid the people were coming with “mich auteriel." (OTA, Sao
[1489]Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SEORER mOROR)
[1491]SECRET
[1492]NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[1494]‘HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 43
[1497]SECRET wo rozees Uireeyy
[1499]Hight Doniniean pro-kstro leadera vere shoard the Czech airlines
[1500]flight to Guba which transited Shannon Aleport on 14 Decenber, sceording
[1501]-to en official Irish service, The Danial wis dneinded Maximo Lopes
[1503]Tomas Pansonio Eriekeon, and Gustave Ricert, leadera of the
[1505]outlawed Deminiten Populex Movemint (MPD), oné of the moot ective pro-
[1506]Commmist groups in the Dowiniean Republic. The eight. Deninioans were
[1507]among the ten who vére deported from the Dominican Republic to France
[1508]eetiier thi year, Another sourea reported last Novenher that. the Cuban
[1509]eabnatador’ in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dosinican deportes to
[1510]iistuse helping then travel to Cuba without passports, {CTA Dublia,
[1511]"HCH 3/551, 991, 21 Decesber, SECREL/NO FORELGY Disem)
[1513]SECRET
[1515]|
[1517]NO FOREIGN DISSED
[1519]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 44
[1521]Promiex Castro is te deliver the closing speech at the Congress
[1522]of Women 6f the Americas on 15 damuery tn Havanese. Hevana Radio
[1523]ammounéed thet the congress, achedpled to begin 11 Jeouary, will be —
[1524]attended by more than 200 delegetes from Latin America, the U. @.,
[1525]and Cenada, a8 well as by guects from many other nin-American countries.
[1526]akia, North Rores,
[1528]Delagations from Communist Ching, Albania, Gzechoslo
[1529]ahd North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 Jenuery. (FSIS 03 and 51,
[1531]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 45
[1534]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 46
[1536]siege ndasions im the U.8.p (2) A report chet
[1538]age & sient te the uts)e ena, (8) Repox
[1539]ettemst +o Bebotage @ bridge tm Venewucla.
[1541]Ls ined be the Meracadbo: secbe te
[1543]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 47
[1546]WW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 48
[1548]SECRET NOCEOREIGN DISSEM.
[1550]#m, éxpart Cuban electrical technician in the Borjite sugar mi1i
[1551]has told q former cloke mogociate who 16 now a Fegular clandestine
[1552]“souree thet Cubs Le training personnel in the techniquesie? using
[1554]plosives price to ending them to the United States on sabotage missions.
[1555]Et is. tubended ;
[1557]‘waged, aod the dabotage will bé 80 arranged that in acme eases 1% vill.
[1558]be teken to be merely aeetdenta, ‘the electrical techadeian addsd that
[1559]there 16 5 impge Commniist espionage ring operating with a fing in the
[1560]United States serosa the berder, with several plane already wider way.
[1561](CTA ppp I 29527, & December, SEOREY ROTOR) —
[1563]. that such persong wih go in the galee ef antiath
[1567]NO FOREIGN DISSEN
[1569]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 49
[1572]SR SRST EB TEE er
[1574]‘BECREN, =, -ameignt DISSEM
[1576]A Yontnicen exita in Cuba repos
[1577]about wid-becenber that Dominican
[1578]Tominicen Republic to sdbotage the eane fields there. (CIA, Panam
[1579]City, IH 46599, 11 January, SECREP NOFORE)
[1581]‘SECREL, un AogiGN DISSEM
[1583]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 50
[1585]told @ source whe vas there
[1586]Commnieta ars Leaving Cube for the.
[1589]MING TELEGRAM Department of State
[1591]Agehd 82. 6 25 45 CONFIDENTIAL
[1592]a - Control: 1171
[1593]Action ce Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, I 1962
[1594]RA a | 11:29 P.M,
[1595]FROM: CARACAS
[1597]Info
[1599]Ss TO: Secretary of State
[1601]SP “NO: -548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.
[1603]/ SAL |
[1605]; ane)
[1607]OR NLACT |
[1609]Bop. DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT
[1611]_ INR core tGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS “ME HE WILL ARRIVE
[1612]WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC
[1613]MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN. INSPIRED
[1614]SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.
[1616]HE WILL PRESENT | NTERCEPTED. _CABLE..TO-VENEZUELAN STUDENTS
[1617]AND OTHER EVJ-DENCE..WHI-CHHE.HOPES OBTAIN FROM !NTERIOR
[1618]MINISTRY HE ASKS -1F DEPARTMENT CAN ROV).DE HIM. ‘SUNDAY
[1620]AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY. WITH..TRANSCRILET
[1621]— STATEMENT AFTER. MARACAIBO. S, SABOTAGE. IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS .
[1623]RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT, . en
[1627]SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE, THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS
[1628]| NTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.
[1630]_FALCON?S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAiLABLE
[1631]’ VENEZUELAN’ EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES.
[1632]HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.
[1634]"STEWART
[1635]SMD:
[1637]NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT i //be.
[1638]i MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOVWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
[1639]ee «12: i A. Mas 11/4/62 -TEM,
[1641]_ REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY 1S
[1642]CONF | DENT! AL PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[1644]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 51
[1646]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[1648]ASD i eats
[1649]THs ‘material contains iments aliectin
[1650]74 and 774, ‘tha transmission of revelation of which in any manner to an unauthon ited person is prohibited by LE
[1652]rdso 7
[1653]EG) &
[1655]CLASSIFICATION —- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[1658]. “ : he. Bowen hes acer
[1659](When Filled In) . i . ah. AOE De BoEN
[1661]VENEZUELA
[1663]"REPORTNO. TOCS -3/537,176
[1664]CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST DATE DISTR, . 13 FEBRUARY 1963
[1665]ACTIVITIES ,
[1666]PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
[1667]8 ano 12 resruary 1963 - So REFERENCES IN 67419
[1668]VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)
[1670]2 Hve 2655
[1672]FIELD REPORT NO.
[1674]PARA 12 FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE
[1675]NATIONAL GUARDS ‘PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE
[1676]VENEZUELAN MILITARY. _ So
[1678]. ON THE. "EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NAT 1 ONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PRO-
[1680]. ENTRANCE TO-TUNNEL NUMBER 1. WHO WERE ATTEMPTING, TO DESTROY. TURNPIKE
[1681]_ BRIDGE NUMBER" 1. FIRE: WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY, MINUTES, BETWEEN:
[1683]none oa
[1685]a POUNDS OF. DYNAMITE: “WAS FOUND BELOW THE privae. “
[1687]2, “TWO CAR LOADS: OF. GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE. WA HYONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS
[1689]PENINSULA, AND LAKE MARACA NBO,” STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA,
[1691]ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 198 SHOTS, WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE - QUERILLAS ESCAPED.
[1693]7 co aK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ;
[1694]i. Fal tate ie eevee en LOREAL =
[1696]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 52
[1698]q the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 16, U.S.C Sect.
[1701]Ce-tectine THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE |
[1703]- THE SOLDIERS: AND: THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER, A ‘BOK CONTAINING ABOUT 5
[1705]“h
[1707]oat. DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY,, IN THE PARAGUANA et
[1709]2h]
[1710]|
[1711]‘|
[1714]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[1715]Siumemey es we , +
[1717]|SECRET | en _per . |!
[1719](When Filled In}
[1721](FIELD: COMMENT + TERROR | ST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREAS ING IN oe
[1723]2 penta, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION
[1725]NAC TONAL (FALN, ARMED. FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY
[1727]_- POSSESION | OF. THE OFF ICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE |
[1728]LOS ALTOS, ABOUT. 26 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE
[1729]POLICEMEN: ON: GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED. THE WALLS WITH ANTI=
[1731]. GOVERNMENT, SLOGANS. ‘ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL — |
[1732]JOSE. ANTONIO. GONZALEZ, “COMMANDER OF THE. ‘MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED .
[1733]iN A WELL-TO- “DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY MNoTHER
[1734]“ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABL1SHING ROAD |
[1735]‘Clocks: AND SENDING. TROOPS “AND POLICE INTO THE AREA, ON THE
[1737]-- MORNING OF 3 FEB. AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION -
[1738]GARBLED WILL Fwo) “WHERE. OFFICES WERE SET ON. FIRE ‘AND “EQUI PMENT DESTROYED pe!
[1740]— AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB. ‘SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY
[1741]DESTROYED BY ‘MEMBERS OF THE ALN, THREE BRIOGES ON THE -PAN AMERICAN
[1743]| HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE ‘DAMAGED BY BOMBS... a
[1744]ON 12 FEB: AND AN ATTEMPT, WAS MADE ON: THAT DAY To BLOW UP A CREORE® GE. LINE, |
[1746]IN CATIA LA. MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLORED.
[1747]CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES) .
[1749]—s FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY. NAVY, AiR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
[1751]* 5. HEADQUARTERS: COMMENT ¢ MISSING | ‘PORT LON. WELL BE DISSEMINATED: ONLY AF. iT MATER ALLY
[1752]AFFECTS THE SENSE ‘OF THIS REPORT. aan , Lo.
[1756]- e) { .
[1757]- "SLASSIFIGATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS .
[1759]4 AVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[1761]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 53
[1763]Ww 50955 Docla
[1767]Page 54
[1770]Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela
[1772]“-Venezuelaihas been afflicted over the past several
[1774]_months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
[1775]“Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are:
[1776]connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, 4 -
[1777]‘the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces ,”..
[1778]“of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group
[1779]-eredited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil ,
[1780]fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are
[1781]“probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betan-~-
[1782]“court Government.
[1784]The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
[1786]-in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
[1788]to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists
[1789]“responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing ..-
[1790]: supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
[1791]warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of.
[1792]guerrilla bands operating in: the Falcon area of .
[1793]“northwestern Venezuela. °°) 0 7S
[1794](CONFIDENTIAL) 2 vee mennesiees
[1796]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 55
[1800]Ni
[1802]COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
[1803]FOR LATIN AMERICA
[1805]|
[1807]Page 56
[1809]324239736
[1811]50955 Docld
[1813]J
[1816]Tnformetion on the Communist apparatus for Letin America and ite
[1818]relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc de lergely derived from
[1819]highly classified intelligence which is provided separately, From the
[1820]reports tonteined in thie section, it may be ceneluded that the organine-
[1821]tional Links vary fyom country to country depending upan,
[1823]amine other
[1824]factors, the legel atatus of the Coumuniet party, whether diplometie
[1825]fepresentation 16 located in a eaumtry, the relative atrength of Comaundat
[1826]alliences with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of
[1827]ourrent goverment leadership in theae countries, Next atteched ie an
[1828]uncliuseified report prépered in Orteber for release ug « White Payer.
[1829]Although thie paner wae not relensed due to the elacile erisie, it repre-
[1830]sents en agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communiot
[1831]apperstue in Latin America. The report containd wriefs on Commmies
[1832]activities in each of the Latin Auerican sountries,
[1834]The reports vary with respect to the country pHiority for Castiro/
[1835]Commmist ection in latin America. Braid, Venesuele, ond Britien Guiena
[1836]are wontioued most fréquentiy es the Likely priority tergete, There are
[1837]also conflidting veperte on the relative independence of Castre fron the
[1839]Soviet Union and indicstions thet the publicized Sino Boviet disegreecents |
[1841]ae reflected in local Comminiet orgenizetione throughout Letin America.
[1843]TAB Suban Relationships and Polistes Toward Latin American
[1845]Tals tab eantelne relevant exeerpts from the drart NIB
[1846]nov under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this ites and
[1848]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 57
[1851]SRST PS TT IE Se
[1853]the most current egreed positions will be made avaliable
[1854]to you in the event there is any dignificent change.) Alec
[1855]included et this tab are « number of significant reports
[1857]indieating the probable orlentation of Castro/Commmist actions
[1858]directed toverd Letin America. ‘The last item at this tab |
[1859]aumatizes the vneuccessful armd Ineuraions of 1959 (Panem, |
[1860]Wicaragua, and Dominicen Republic), |
[1862]TAB 2 Goviet Activities and Conflicts
[1864]Thies teb contains a number of items indicating posaible Guban+
[1865]Soviet conflicté as reflected in Ietin America, The last two
[1866]items reflect the concern attached to the possible establich-
[1867]ment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba,
[1869]TAB 3 Situstion in letin America
[1871]This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent
[1872]background reports on verious Latin American countries in the |
[1874]folleving order: Central America, Panama end Mexico} Bolivia; . ; |
[1878]Brazil (4)) Colombias Costa Rica; Ecuador} Heitt; Mexico: Panama s
[1879]Peru (4); and Venezuela (3). |
[1881]“B-
[1883]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 58
[1885]—_) 4 October 1962:
[1887]terial support i¢ being given
[1888]oe ‘Chart. @uch dscistance ts
[1890]ae 0 Gibe's example,
[1892]ae eves ely stated ;
[1894]te Rect, however,
[1896]pee: in every ven of the ‘19 other Tetin
[1897]vegi s beoone a ay etbeattes instrument
[1899]state 4 2 fon and eset eup
[1900]groups has besa 2a in ve)
[1902]; 1 - : effort 4 deupetatic
[1903]polities. “institutions in latin , Amaricae
[1905]2, Cuban subversion has beaome more subtle Stace 19995 when e Cutan
[1906]x "vasion fovees" left Cuba: for abortive | sid “om on the "governments.
[1907]ME» gua, and Haiti. ‘Row Cuban _ gubversive efforts generally fall
[1908]in three eatagorien:
[1910]Be
[1912]a. bomimed. at Iatin. Auerics, by Cuban
[1913]nH printed meterisl and
[1914]awa” agency, ands
[1916]given oubvercive groups in
[1918]38 Feel 1 Castro announced on O duke 2 1961 that his government would
[1919]000 scholarships to "poor students” from other Latin Auerican
[1921]acuniy £ Prey axt school tei and LOO scholarships to students from
[1923]other i cnerlen of the worlds. Hundreds of young latin Americans have been
[1925]4 a. St imation. In addition to whatever foal :
[1927]twoining ‘they receive in Subs, miny of them recelve training in | 4tis.
[1928]arfere ond other techniques of wevolution,
[1930]be Cubon refuges vho have arrived recently in the United Bistes have
[1931]tad Le information om the troining programs offered to some of
[1933]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 59
[1936]@. Gne refugee, a deserter fron Castro's aruy, reported. from
[1937]personel Imoyledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students fron
[1938]Kouador, Argentina, Guatemala, end-Braci1 Living is a Her :
[1939]iho rogularly abtended Glagses ii Merzisn-leninion, aropag techniques,
[1940]and other subjects te prepare them for active yevolublonary roles in their
[1941]homelands, He reported that. these mle studeite who were betueen 16 end 20
[1942]peers Of age were Gont as part OF theiy training to the Minas éel, Frio
[1943]‘ : 2 BKC + During this phase of thele training they
[1944]Javigation in the use of emall. erms and hiked to the top of
[1945]iuptain, Pleo Ty »» iu. the Sterna, Maestra, the locale of
[1946], warfare against the Batista Aiotetanshp
[1948]y_ learned Label
[1950]us trading of students from other Iatin American countries
[1951]sy Oriente, The trainges receive instruction in
[1953]LLitary % villa verfare, subversion, sebotage, propaganda, and
[1955]Comaniat ide Ther x ‘efugee da not Imow how many Latdn Americana were
[1957]involved, wat beloved the duration of each course was about Sight weeks, after
[1959]which another group veplesed the tne that had been training.
[1961]3s Mush of the travel of latin American studetite to Cuba for training
[1962]end indoctrination ia handled by the Tnatdituto Cubano. de Amistad con los
[1963]Pushios (TOAP ~ Cuban Institute for Prtendship. with Peoples).
[1965]6; ide is. aise e w&jar talwore point for latin Americans traveling to
[1966]aid from the Stao-Sevlet ble, Over 400 Lex wicca returned fron last
[1967]July's Coumuniet-dporicored, Youth Festival re Wensine sbourd. @ Soviet padssenser
[1968]vessel with the Looeman Cuban delegation. Whey dieenberked in Havens and
[1969]stayed. ix Cue tame Works bef re Some (of them began returning to their home
[1971]8, b . x Pempining In Cubs. fox dome tine,
[1973]a1. Wwowleaste by Giban vedio atatléns madntadn BS
[1974]meende. Level at all times, with regular
[1975]eg mtries ao well a6 genevel. trangmiesLone
[1976]” he general thems of @11 these Drosdeneta is
[1977]fn exemple’ Gl id Guekening the “people” of Iatin America to
[1978]n Op tu nity for revolutionary action against. the “eorruptcregimes in
[1980]se and against "Yankee rialism" which allegedly supports then,
[1982]8. There are regular programs beamed by Havens radic to Stesrague,
[1983]the ey minLoan n convent Guatema By. wey. | he They ‘
[1985]specifi a are apparently dixected end produced with the
[1986]mee o exiles trem the countries concerned resident in Guba.
[1988]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 60
[1991]Be The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is annouseed
[1992]- a the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program
[1993]. 38 eptitied Patria Libre. At predent, Radio Havana beams the 20 iante
[1994]' Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays.
[1996]dust prier to the progrom, the Radio Havana aniouncer explaiie that the,
[1997]atation is meking ite facilities aveileble te the MLD for its program.
[1998]There are gomg areat in the Dominican Remiblic where, due to the sbsente
[1999]of local redio etations, the Caben broaddasts are the only ones heard.
[2000]Lest July, the subversive content. of these broadcasts to the Deminican
[2001]Republic led the Dominiean government to protest to the Organization of
[2002]Sierieen States.
[2004]18. ‘he content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals
[2005]* of #bhé "Volee of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the programa which ie regulerly
[2006]beamed by Redio Havane to Wiceragua. On 31 fAuguet thia program celebrated
[2007]its first anniversary by repeating ita original statement of its purposes:
[2009]"The Volee of Revolutionary Nicaragua hee set iteels the goal
[2011]of contributing to pointing ‘owt the real way to Nicarague’s
[2012]liberation fvtm tha dominion of Yankes duiperdeldan and the
[2013]Somoze tyrenny. Ekections (scheduled for next February to
[2014]choose President Semoza's successor) with the Somozes in power,
[2015]and under the State Department's economic and political control
[2016]of Wicerawue, will be a fares. Without. « & prior revolutionary
[2017]overthrow of the Scmoza. tyremiy there can be no free elections
[2018]in Wiewragua nor ean a popular govermiont be ¢eteblished. This
[2019]progrem will be et the service of the revolutionerien and
[2020]egeinet the eleetioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua
[2021]will defend the Cuben revolution because it is an important
[2022]part of the Letin American people's liberating revolution.”
[2024]il. Guban propeganda io also disseminated threugh the offices of
[2026]“Pressa Latine, the Cuban-eubsidiaed international ew agency” whith
[2028]has close wor! working relation with TASS, the New China News Agency, ad other
[2029]propagands medie for the Gino-Seviet bloc.
[2031]32. Cuban printed material ia ctrevlated throug the herve;
[2032]Che Guevara's book on guerrille warfare has received wide distribution.
[2033]Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, hag been
[2034]obliged to confiscate large quantities of propangtinda meterials from Latin
[2035]Americans paseing through that country enroute from Cuba te their homelanda.
[2037]igs Cuben covert aupport. for Cemmmmdst or pro-Cotmuniet groupes in
[2038]other Latin American seuntries is provided in a muubér of ways. In the five
[2039]Latin American countries where Ciben diploemitic migaions are still resident
[2040](Mexica, Brazil, Uruguey, Chile, and Bolivia), these misaions have often
[2041]been the channel. fhe Cuban enbessy in Mexico ig known to have provided
[2043]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 61
[2046]“peek gna!
[2048]frequent eseietance to extlee from Guateskia, Nlearagua, and other Central
[2049]Amerieean countries living in Mexieo. In. other instences, assistance is
[2050]provided through travelers coming from Cube end through Prenga Letina —
[2051]represeutetives.
[2053]o
[2055]i4. The assievance is voudbly finenciel. ‘The Cuban’ appear to have
[2056]been eareful einee 1959 to avoid being caught in a bletent act of subversion
[2057]pe used to justify concerted inter-Awericén action. inancial
[2058]sesiatance is often dust ag useful aml much lege rieky than actual weapons
[2059]deliveries. In « number of Anerican countries, emel), arms end other weapons
[2060]eré available for @ price. Unserupulous or cirelegs arms dealers in thé US
[2061]heve also eontributed to the arma traffic from which pro-Castre groups have
[2062]benefitted, directly or indirectly.
[2064]. 25. Aa the following country-by-country rundowa indicates, Cuban support
[2065]for subversive activity hes affected in varying degrees every one of the 19
[2066]other Let dn Amer isan countrtes.
[2068]a. Apgentinat Ernesto "Che" Guevara, en Argentine by birth,
[2069]han vetalnedlite deep Interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May,
[2070]the Argentine national holiday, he eddreased the group of Argentine citizens
[2071]vesident iu Cuba and told them thet he hoped that next year they would be
[2072]eélebreting in Argentine under “the flag ef gocielign." At enother point
[2073]in. this address he gaid: “Our revolution is one which needs to expand ite
[2074]ideas...and other people sre helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere
[2075]get engry and take up arms or seize power and ald us am this task which is
[2076]the teek of the satire hemlephers and of hunenity.”
[2078]the éxgentine comamity in Cuba isst. April organized the
[2080]"Cubsn-Argentine Friendship Ingtitute” with headquarters in Ravens. One
[2081]of the leaders is dahn Williem Cooke, who was for 4 time chief of former
[2082]Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cecke continues
[2083]active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action
[2084]with the Argentine Commuiets. Cooke malataing regular contact with sympathizers
[2085]inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife,
[2086]Alieia Eguren de Cooke, a résident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently
[2087]has resular meine of eomunieation with individuals in Argentina. Argentine
[2088]eitizsens bave been recruited through this channel to go to Cube for tr ;
[2089]There are also strong indiestions that terrorist activities by Argentine
[2090]Peronists aml Commniets havé been eneouraged end perhaps eusieted through.
[2091]this channel.
[2093]Fria Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba -
[2094]iast February, the Guban exbassy in Buenos Alves provided financial esaietence
[2095]te antl «government groupe there. An’ Argentine jownalist whe hee contacts in
[2096]the Commmniat party there reported lest Decexber, for inetence, thet the
[2097]Argentine Commuist party had reeelved the sum of 50,000 pesos from the
[2098]Cuban exbasuy as & contribution to the railway workers whe were then on
[2099]Strike in the provines of Cordoba.
[2101]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 62
[2104]Though the @uben embassy is no donger in Buenos Aires, Cuban
[2105]clandestine assistence to Argentine Peronist-Commmist groups continues, On
[2106]19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Adres reported the un-
[2107]earthing of 4 center of Commniat and Peronlet eetivities in the capital,
[2109]Two Buenos Aires policeman were shot and killed at a surburben warehouse in
[2110]June. Tnveatigetionus revealed that a quantity of explosives snd propapanda
[2111]were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of ona Jose
[2112]Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and oue Mario
[2113]Magsl, owner of the firm which owed the warehouse. It wes revealed that
[2114]Masei hed been maintaining contact. with Cuban Commusists, with John Williem
[2115]Cooke, and with an unidentified women agseciated with the Cuban exbassy in
[2116]Uruguay who was probably Alicia Bguren de Cooke referred to above. According
[2117]to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citigens had been
[2118]sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in
[2119]guerrills warfare. On their rebun to Argentina, these men were to be used
[2120]-in planned activities in the provinces of Farmosa, Tucuman, Salte, and the
[2121]wooded Gress of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were appre-
[2122]hended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity
[2123]revealed in these investigations.
[2125]be Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuben
[2126]attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "seholarships" in Cube this
[2127]year--between 130 and 150-- appesra dispropertionately high. Tha Bolivian
[2128]government felt obliged to véguest the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares
[2129]in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Gerela Trians in 1961 for blatent iatervention,
[2130]in internal Bolivian affairva, ingluding support for Bolivien Comimiste and
[2131]attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing BNR party to leava
[2132]the party. In June 1961, the Bolivisn government published e series of
[2133]dccumente linking the Cuban exbassy with a Commmist conapiracy to seize
[2134]control of the government. One of these documents, a ateatewent by en arrested
[2135]Bolivian egitater who had been in close comtact with the Cuban exbassy,
[2136]gave the nemes of a number of Bolivians whe hed received financial support
[2137]from the Cuban embassy. This evidence vas used to justify the request for
[2138]the Cuban charge‘e recall.
[2140]The present. Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, hes also been
[2141]active though perhaps a bit more discreet than hie predeaeasors. He has
[2142]been particularly energette in cultiveting relations with Bolivlen campesines.
[2143]The peasant union in the Clize Valley of Bolivia has been reported te be the
[2144]recipient. of Cuban financial assistance.
[2146]e. Brazii: During the pasttwo years the Castro regime hes
[2147]developed increasingly close ties with Frencieco Julise, self-proclaimed
[2148]Marxist and leader of the Peegent Leagues in the troubled northeast region
[2149]of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cube, has
[2150]traveled there on several ctcasions; and a number of his esscetetes and rank «
[2151]and-file members of the Leagues have gone ta Cube for agricultural
[2152]training which i@ undoubtedly heavily lerded with ideological indoctrination.
[2153]Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cubs. has been provided by
[2154]Bubana airlines on at least one occasion. Cireumatantial evidence strongly
[2155]suggests thet Juliso has received financiel asaistence for his movement from
[2156]the Cuban government. Bracilian Commmist leaders heve privately stated, in
[2158]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 63
[2161]feet, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but alao
[2163]shipments of emall arms from Cube. ‘hese Brazilian Communist leaders also
[2164]said thet the reason Juliano sent bis family to Cuba was his fear that they
[2165]might be endengered in the civil war he expecta to erupt shortly in Brasil:
[2167]The Cuban government has also during the pest year cultivated
[2168]particularly close relations with leaders of the disaident Commmist Party
[2169]of Brezii (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who heé visited Cubs lest May
[2170]told a friend of a long converestion he hed had with Fidel Castro in late
[2171]Mey.. Cactro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazdiien
[2172]Communists end criticized the regular Commmist party for its failure "to
[2173]take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the
[2174]22nd party congress of the Costmnist party of the Soviet Union. Castre
[2175]approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leadsrs to
[2176]organize guerrills activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil
[2177]“as soon 68 possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against
[2178]revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only :to increase populer dis-
[2179]content in Brezii and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised
[2181]CPB leaders to give special emphasie to securing agvwide a base a8 possible — ~
[2183]enong agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rurel ereas.
[2184]The Cuban enbussy in Rio de Jenetro, like Cuban embassies
[2186]elsewhere in Latin
[2187]pro~Commmist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported dis=
[2188]cussions in the Brasilien cabinet on the subversive activities being directed
[2189]by Cuben enbessador Joagiin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are
[2190]reported te have expressed particular concern over Hernandes' setivities.
[2192]d. Chilé: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's
[2193]Commmist~dominated populer front and a leading presidential aspirant, hes.
[2194]made at least two trips to Cubs.
[2196]The Cuban exbessy in Santiago is the source of propaganda
[2197]support fer pro-Commamiet groups, mostiy these aseceiated with Allende, who
[2198]are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution.
[2200]Orlende Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban eubagsy, is known te be supers... -:
[2202]vising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in
[2203]the home of Julie Bocenegra, who alse prints propagenda for the Chiiean
[2204]Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long
[2205]ago as Aggust, 1961, Chileen officials investigating political agitation
[2206]énd resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the
[2207]area by a Cuban diplomat thé previous month, pro«Cuben propaganda was being
[2208]distrivuted in the araa, and Commmists and pro-Commnists there vere soying
[2209]“The mountains of Selemanca are going to be the Chilean Sterra Maestra."
[2211]__ Last March, when Cuban Minigter of Education Armando Hart
[2212]went to Chile for en international conference he took with him several sacks
[2213]of prepagands.
[2215]_ @+ Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR),
[2216]ergenized early this year by Colonbian extremists, ig believed to have
[2217]received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of ereating
[2218]® guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Coloubien
[2220]6
[2222]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 64
[2224]America, has been a source of assistante to Commnist and
[2227]citizen who has contacta among PUAR menbere reported last June that Fidel
[2229]“Castro bad just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial
[2231]aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader
[2232]and the deughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in
[2233]19h8 sparked the digaatrous Bogota rioting, 1s a long-time personal friend
[2234]of Fidel Castvo. He hes vieited Cuba frequently end probably returns to -
[2235]Colombia with specific advice snd assletance from the Cuben government.
[2236]The FUAR has aueceeded in drawing menbers from the extremist wing of the
[2237]regular Colenbien Commmist party who are dissetiefied with that party's
[2238]reluctance to engage in ipen yevolutionary action.
[2240]%. Costa Ricat The small Costa Ricen Comumist party, the
[2241]Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the.
[2242]selection of young men to be traivéd di Guba. Riboberte Carmons and Jose
[2243]Murille, PVP menbers, left Costa Rica lest June for tilinine under this
[2244]program, end PYP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla treining prograns
[2245]in Costa Ries under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training
[2246]in Cuba. os
[2248]; &- The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State,
[2249]which is preparing the country for ifs firet free elections this Decexber
[2250]in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuben aubversion. A
[2251]eadre of Dominican Communists. is headquartered in Cuba, end elandestine con-
[2252]tect is probably mainteined with sympathizers ineide the Donindcan Republic.
[2253]Broadcasts to the Bowiuiean Republic from Cuba have helped incite the
[2254]frequent riote in Bante Domingo. The feet that broadcasts from Cuba have on
[2255]occasion réferred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly
[2256]suggests the presence of clandestine rddio contacts between the tvo courxtries.
[2258]h. Ecusdor: ‘The Commnist party of Eeusdor has formed the
[2259]nucleus of 4 smell guerrilla organization. This greup was drewn largely from
[2261]| the pro-Castre Revolutionary Union of Heuaderean Youth (URJE), which was
[2263]involved in a two-day battle with government forces lest April. ‘the leader
[2264]ef the April affair, a6 well es several other Ecuadereand involved ia sub
[2265]versive activities, haa received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader
[2266]told a friend last June that this organization hag eo far in 1962 recaived
[2267]$22,000 in financial ald from the Cuban government.
[2269]Memel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Comimunist former Beusdorean Minister
[2270]of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Commnist .
[2271]China, appearé to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received
[2273]& considerable amount of money from the Cuban govermment for his efforts,
[2275]according te a private statement by the URJE Leader.
[2277]_ 4. El Saivador: On 1 Merch 1961, the Salvadoren government
[2278]broke relations with the Castro regime after it hed received evidence of _
[2279]conversation between the Cuban ¢harge, Roberto Lessalle, and leading Salvadoran
[2280]Commaniste in which Leséele urged inereased revolutionary activity.
[2282]_§+ Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuben arrived in Mexico with a
[2283]message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Cormuni at -infinenced
[2285]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 65
[2288]13 Novenber group, which hed recently engaged in querrilia aebivity. in
[2289]Guetemala. The Cuban gave hin $4,000 which be said was the first instell-
[2290]ment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilia front
[2292]in Guatembla. On 8 March, Castro’s emiasary geve the Guetemalens the balanne
[2293]ef the $10,000 and told one of the 13 Novenber leaders that the decision ta
[2294]provide then with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro,
[2296]he eadd, had sent inetructions thet the group did not have to account, for how
[2297]the money was spent, thet no strings were ettached, and that he hopes they
[2298]ere successful so he can provide them with additional, assistance.. Leter the
[2299]Cuban exiseary met with Leaders in Mexico of the orthedox Guatemalen
[2300]Communist party. These Guatemalan Commniste hed apparently complained that
[2301]the Cuban money wae not. going te them. They wore told that. Castre wanted
[2303]the money te go to the 19 November group because this group hed demonstrated
[2304]ite capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, © eepacity which the
[2305]Guatemalan Commuiists had not shown. The Cuben sada: "It is not a matter
[2306]of atéeding arcund with Arab fatelien waiting for events to take place---
[2308]Ve should act efficiently gc as to precipitate the death of imporlalim.
[2309]Because of this we are ready to help anyone vho may decide te struggle against
[2310]imperialisn anywhere.”
[2312]Cuban propaganda medio have sought through publicising the
[2313]activities of the 13 Hoverber group to increase its prestige and chances for
[2314]success: A Prenga Latina reporter published an alleged interview with
[2315]13 Hoverber Leader Yon Sosa.
[2317]k. Helti: A cadre of Haitian Comamists led by Rene Depestre is
[2318]resident in Cuba, am end many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern
[2319]Cuba are now being subjected to Comamict regimentation and indectrination.
[2321]3. Hondwrag: Prior to the breek in Cuben-Honduraa diplomatic
[2322]yélations in April 1961, Cuben personnel under the cover of consuler and
[2323]aiplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of
[2324]Honduras: Hondyreas now is the target of a gartiowlarly vicious regular radio
[2325]program beamed especially to Hondurad by Reto Havana, Many Hondurens are
[2327]4n Cuba under the - "atholarghiy” program.
[2329]it Mext ot The Cuban embassy in Mexteo City, the consulate in
[2330]Merida, end the "(iban-Mexican Cultural Center” in Merida have ell g¢ —
[2331]engaged in propeganda activities designed te snecurege the pro~commist cause
[2332]in Mexteo, perticularly the Commnict-infiwuenced Natiogal Liheration Move«
[2333]ent (neta). Former Cuban avbagsador in Mexioo Portucnde im reported by people
[2334]in close comtact with MLN tesders to have concluded an agreement whereby
[2335]fone of the money sent by Havana te cover the expense of the embassy is ear-
[2336]parked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexieon officials were disturbed et the
[2337]participation of Cuban exbessy officiala in inciting the anti-US demon-
[2338]@brations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican euthoritics
[2339]heve periodically impoundsd quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through
[2340]Mexico to other Latin American countries. The moet important aspect. of
[2341]Mexico in Cubon propaganda and subversive operations in Latin Aweriea le ite
[2342]use by the Cubans ap a ‘way station or jumping off place between Cuba iteeir
[2343]and the reat of Latin Americé.
[2345]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[2348]ne Nicaragua: A esdre of Wiecaraguen Commmiste 1s based in
[2350]Cuba. Contect between them and pro-Castro Micaragudns in Niearagua and in
[2351]exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is matwtetned at leaat on a
[2352]sporadic basis. A matber of Nicaraguans perlodically have traveled to Cuba,
[2353]and some have received training there in guexrille teetics. Reliable reports
[2354]indicate that some of these Cuba-treained Micaraguana have been among the
[2355]small guerrilla tands that have infiltrated Nicaragua acroas the largely un-
[2356]guarded Hondruen border: The Elearaguan government is the target of a
[2357]regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as
[2358]the program of “free Nicaraguan."
[2360]©. Panam: Cuban finaneial assistante is believed to be
[2361]channeled to the pro-Commmist National Action Vanguard (VAN) 4n Panama. One
[2362]of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is o frequent traveler to Cuba and
[2363]claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.
[2365]; cagusy: Peraguayen exifes in Uruguay and Brezil have
[2366]received Cuban financial asgistance. Four nenbers of the United Front fer
[2367]National Liberation (FULNA), e Commmist Paraguayan éxile group in Uruguay,
[2368]vecelve the equivalent. of $230 monthly each from the Cuben exbassy in
[2369]Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro. aetivities in Uruguay, according
[2370]to & Paraguayan exile in Uruguay whe ia in close touch with FPULNA.
[2372]q “Peru: Abt least eleht Peruvians traveled to Cuba by wey of
[2373]Mexico last June to receive training and indectrination in that country.
[2374]Other Peruvian Commmists or pré-Commmiats have long been in Cuba and a
[2375]regularly broedeast Redio Havana program te beamed to Peru.
[2377]z. Uruguay: The Cuban exbassy in Montevideo hag been. engaged
[2378]in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan govern-
[2379]ment was obliged te declare the Cuben ambassader persona non grata for
[2380]intervening in intermal Uruguayen affairs.
[2382]; 8 Venezuela: The Castro regime hag been extremely vitriolic
[2383]in its propaganda blests agsinst the Betaneourt administration in Venezuela.
[2384]Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant oppesition
[2385]Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which 16 attempting to develop a
[2386]guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the eid of tts ally, the regular Vene-
[2387]guelan Commmist party. While there is Little evidence to indicate direct
[2388]Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the lead-
[2389]ing figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, ara kuowa to heve traveled
[2391]to Cube, where they provebly received financial and other assistance in
[2392]addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities,
[2394]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 67
[2397]. .
[2398]1
[2399]it
[2400]4
[2402]i
[2403]Ha
[2404]i
[2405]4
[2406]Pa
[2408]D
[2410]: i
[2413]i wp
[2414]i m
[2419]N
[2420]} a
[2421]' s
[2423]i re)
[2424]iH a
[2425]i a)
[2426]i
[2427]os
[2428]6
[2429]th
[2430]| =
[2431]| rr
[2432]| =
[2435]SEGRE!
[2436]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2438]Policies Toward Latin America
[2440]42, Here Castro has more capability for independent
[2441]action than in any other fleld except the internal politica of Cuba,
[2442]Gastre is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection
[2444]throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has
[2446]"a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution
[2448]be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that
[2449]@ successful revolution in another Latin American country would give
[2450]great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also conseli-
[2451]date his own regime in Cuba. In trying te foment insurrections, he
[2452]apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct
[2453]military assistance to them, nor does he seer te consider it impor -
[2454]tant whether he has or has not Soviet support. Fo# the Soviets,
[2455]however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position
[2456]and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American
[2457]Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the
[2458]Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for
[2459]penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confronta-
[2461]ton with the US.
[2463]WW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 69
[2466]. SECRET
[2468]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2469]16. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely
[2471]limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could
[2472]probably not undertake an overseas operation on a seale larger than
[2473]one battalion. For political ag well as military reasons, the Castro
[2474]regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature.
[2475]It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support te
[2477]local insurgents.
[2479]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 70
[2482]- SEURET
[2484]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIB 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2486]3L. The decline of bie prestige has at least for the moment
[2487]reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and
[2489]moving thera inte action against their own governments and
[2491]against US interests., Local fidelistas have encountered greater difficulty
[2492]in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations
[2494]on other than local fasuea.
[2496]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 71
[2500]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 8563, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2502]32. Nonetheless, Castro contiques his appeal fer vevolution in
[2504]Latin America on the Guban model. Those Latin Americans who are
[2505]cormmiltted to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help,
[2506]particularly from his training program in Cuba and hie large-scale
[2507]dissemination of printed and broadeast propaganda. Communi st
[2509]agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas,
[2511]as they have done in Peru recently, In addition, there has been an
[2512]increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists,
[2514]of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet
[2515]designed to provoke drastic countermeasuraa by governments and to
[2516]increase popular anti-government sentiment, These widespread
[2518]activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communista to engage
[2519]in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban
[2520]“and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castros prestige or upon their
[2522]_
[2524]opinion of his doctrines and policies,
[2526]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 72
[2529]SR Sa a TET EE
[2531]Che Guevera's mother, who lives tn Argentina, told a clandestine
[2532]roe in mid-December thet during her recent visit to Guba her son
[2534]told hex thet Cuban leaders now feel they will heve to rely more ond
[2535]mnist penstration in South
[2537]more on theiy ovh efforte to promote Con
[2539]Ameriea, Guerrillas will be used on o lavgd seale atter they pave
[2541]received training in Cuba, Guevara caid, Be explained to bie mother thet
[2542]thic te necessary since both he and Castro feel. Khrushchev “let them
[2544]_ Gown" end hes mo further interest in epreading Comamien in South Anerion.
[2546]Guevers addad that he and Castve belleve they and the Chinese ere
[2547]better Commmists than Karushchey, (CIA Db/P Buenos Adren, 19 December,
[2549]sant)
[2551]Comment: This reyort. is consietent with reeent publie speeches by
[2553]Guevere which have emplasiged the important role of Guba with redpect
[2555]to the “antd-impertelia
[2557]% revolution” in Ietin Ameriea, (SHRED)
[2559]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 73
[2562]seCRe NO FOREION DISSEM,
[2564]CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome
[2566]Translation of report deted 6 Dec 62 from Italien Embassy Havana to
[2567]Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is
[2568]difficult for Castro to remain calm. Wherefore the revolutionary regine
[2569]will continue with all means at ite disposition to disseminate mbversive
[2570]propaganda in the whole continent, a¢ demonstrated by the fact that all the
[2571]gtates of Latin Amertea (including Mexies) are tekiug strong measurés
[2572]ageinst the dissemination of this propagends. But it is doubtful that
[2573]today Castro cen do much wore and snot /soetttubes &@ real menece to the
[2574]security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds,
[2575]I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brasil thet the Cuban
[2576]leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforta in one
[2577]country, and thet they heve selected Vendsuela for varleus reasons, in-
[2578]eluding the old 111 feeling between Castro and Betancourt. E note in
[2579]passing thet, ateording to whet was told me by the aforeumtioned
[2581]Ambassador, Guring the recent meeting of the OAS the Venesuelan representative
[2583]accused the Cubang of promoting the recent ettempte in his country but, when
[2584]eeked to furnish proof, he wae uneble te do so.”
[2586]SECRET (SOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)
[2588]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 74
[2591]SECREL
[2593]A polative of a leading Communist ia Cuba (whe has greviewsly
[2594]given reliable alivendée informetion of 4 conte) oxpressed
[2596]enmtiries which will masquerade ae “national revolutions” go as to
[2597]iigete the actuention of Cuban conplicity, Im fact, however, these
[2598]revalutions will be dissected frou Cubs through revolutionaries fron
[2600]ed. io Cubs, (CIA po/p IN Léy2r7,
[2602]oument: Thin polite wp whet is probably the most effective
[2603]mean’ of Cuben subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds.
[2604]ané perhaps thousands ef Latin Americans in Guba, (SECRET)
[2606]- SECREE
[2608]n
[2610]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 75
[2613]| ee. > CREIGN DISSE
[2615]f
[2617]fhe recent apate of public addresses ‘by leadive Cubea offietals
[2618]on the gubjech. of Jnsurverticr
[2620]in other Latin Amerdean countries refieets
[2621]& mOre agressive shance than prior te the “missile erisis” ond euguests
[2622]that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive gripe in other
[2623]letin dmerless cowtried my be uider discussion within the inner sivele
[2624]of Cuban. leaders.
[2626]Che Guevara and Ducation Minleter Armano Mart heve been in the
[2627]forefront sives late November in publicly expressing the view thet the
[2629]wily food to the “Ditberetion” of ‘the Latin Auertean peo,
[2630]inmurrection, Fidel
[2632]e8 16 the road of
[2634]Castro's earlier public line hed been to deny the.
[2635]necessity for Cuba to “export” ite revolatlany Ciba te "exem example” was
[2637]gugticlent, This line 26 given only perfunctory attention in thé recent
[2639]r Guevera and Hert epgachen. ‘The Line aes ing in these epedches anveare
[2641]vetedn aivcumstences
[2642]tated eoslitions could come to power by peaceful. méans. The
[2643]whole toner of the recent speeches suggeats that Cubs intends to provida
[2645]every astietence within ite mane te l
[2647]attention given in the Cuban press to develomments
[2648]weeks strongly duggeste more than acadenle intevest in sevelopuente there.
[2649]Canadian Avhasteder Etdd, |
[2651]ane) revolution” spparent. in @ 21 November ax
[2652]echmented that Cuban leader
[2653]ation of the withdrawal
[2655]ech by Armando Hert,
[2656]6 may be ettenpting to counter “the mumlli+
[2657]of the Rusgian misailes" by me
[2659]‘Lng senewed aftorta .
[2660]te aa revolutionary fires in neighboring countries.” (Conment ont |
[2662]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 76
[2665]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2667]SUPPLEMENT
[2668]THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA . .
[2670]Despite diminished prestige, especially among government
[2671]leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically
[2672]‘unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by
[2673]Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority
[2674]of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim
[2675]to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee
[2676]imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide
[2677]subversive activities throughout Latin America. :
[2679]The degree to which Cuba is involved in, current
[2680]hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and
[2681]Communists of various Latin American countries, however,
[2682]have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro
[2683]indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to l, 500
[2684]are believed to have received intensive education ‘and training
[2685]in sabotage and ‘guerrilla warfare. Significant representation
[2686]has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
[2687]Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite
[2688]C “ proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups,
[2689]. _ but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial. support are
[2690]reliably reported to have been furnished.
[2692]Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency
[2693]for cpen rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the
[2694]Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first
[2695]of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca,
[2696]Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are
[2697]among those calling for revolutionary violence. The ,
[2698]"Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a
[2699]primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high
[2700]priority. * The use of the Prensa Latina organization and
[2701]the agent network already in existence makes it virtually
[2702]sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities...
[2704]Latin American governments are generally now more alert to
[2705]Castro's threat. _ Inadequate security forces and widespread
[2706]poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain
[2707]that Cuban-supported: insurgency will have an.effect out of.
[2708]proportion to the number of people involved.
[2710](SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) ;
[2712]8 Feb 63 pIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (1)
[2714]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2716]Ea “oi aan
[2718]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page 77
[2722]a ST
[2724]fee erat git Hemline te oh tate neon
[2726]BW 50955
[2728]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[2730]Cuban Developments
[2732]Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in
[2734]Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban
[2735]- Che Guevara
[2737]speakers are emphasizing the same theme
[2739]told a group of Central American delegates in Havana
[2741]recently that they must prepare for simultaneous
[2743]revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed
[2744]to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution.
[2746]Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January,
[2748]praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent
[2749]acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban
[2751]support for the struggle of the people against the
[2753]Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a
[2754]major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's
[2756]remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge
[2758]of Communist activity there.
[2760]ue oe wee ob
[2762]28 Jan 68 . DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page
[2763](REVERSE BLANK) .
[2764]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM ©
[2766]2
[2768]cnn Si ri een a eS A a
[2770]Docld: 327473736 Page 75
[2772]2. Armed incursions.
[2774]Me scouer had the Reveluitionary Government of Cuba taken pover
[2775]than it lemebed a pregram for exporting ite revolution to other countries
[2776]in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of
[2777]the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of
[2778]the Dominican Republic; following clesely upon one enother in the spring
[2779]end summer of 1959 are obill fresh. Support of Cuban officials for
[2780]military expeditions againat the Governments of these countries,. although
[2781]vehemently denied, has béen esteblighed beyond reasonable doubt. With
[2782]thé invasion of the Dominican Republic came the r¢alization among the
[2783]American Reptblics thet guternational tensions. in the Caribbean axes,
[2784]to which Cube. had significantly contrivuted, hed risen to the extent that
[2785]a Meeting of Consultation of Minteters of Foreign Affaire of the American
[2786]States was necessary.
[2788]The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS,
[2789]aéting provisiowally aa Orgen of Congvltation under the Inter-American
[2790]Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama cage in June, 1959 con
[2791]cluded “that the Republic of Panania was the victim of an invasion,
[2792]organized ebroad, that sailed from « Cuben port and was composed almost
[2793]entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman
[2794]of the Committee was able to confimm thet 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders
[2796]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 79
[2799]were Cubans. Further, the Government af Panema, prior to the departure
[2801]of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports
[2802]about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Hebann Convention on the
[2803]Duties and Rights of States dn the Event of Civil Strife. ‘the Cuban
[2804]Foreign Minister in turn assured Paneme. thet the Guben Government would
[2805]teke the necessary preventive measures.
[2807]_ 4% connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions
[2808]of Nicaragua from Covta Riea énd Hondures‘in ume, 1959, end the
[2809]individusls organizing them, docunettery and other types of evidence
[2810]which came to light demonstrated Cuben officials support in the form of
[2811]arn and finencial contributions. .
[2813]a Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Remiblic
[2814]in the seme mouth was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, ana
[2815]equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An
[2816]officer on eetive duty with the Cuban Revel Army was ode of the expedi-
[2817]tion's leaders. The Cuban favy escorted the three landing craft used
[2818]by the invading force on thelr voyage to the Dominican Republic.
[2820]Even during the Fifth Meeting of Congultation in Santiago, Chile,
[2821]® report was reeeived of the invesion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a
[2822]group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Heitlen Government after the
[2823]Santiago meeting expressed ite fears of furth
[2825]© daveeion attempts. Fb
[2826]charged that the Aygust 13 invasion from Cuba wes @ violation of the
[2828]i928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of
[2829]Givil Strife. The sesistance of Cuban officials, ducluding the Cuban,
[2831](2)
[2833]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 60
[2836]eras aa a Sa Sra eae
[2837] SEAEnEIemece: ea
[2838]PRETO S a RREE
[2840]Ambassador to Haiti end his five wilitery attaches, in the attempt to
[2841]overthrow the Heitien Goverment was denounced by that Government, he
[2842]Cuben Government, though edmitiing that the invasion was leunched in
[2843]Cube and all but ene of the participants were Cubans, convendently dis-
[2844]avowed the sets of the Cuban citizens involved.
[2846]a”
[2848](3)
[2850]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 61
[2853]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 62
[2855]SECRET
[2857]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2859]33. There have been indications of disapproval of Gastro«a
[2860]policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties
[2861]whith are committed ta a more gradual and legs violent approach to
[2862]revolution. Castro has shown himgelf willing te collaborate with any
[2863]group, Cormmuniat or not, willing to resort to vielence and in so doing
[2864]to clreumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the
[2865]latter resent euch tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against
[2866]Castro, It seem@ likely that the question of relations with other
[2867]Lgntin Aweuticen Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics,
[2868]is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America
[2870]and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.
[2872]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 63
[2877]SECRET
[2879]EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 65.63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
[2881]49. ... Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion hag
[2882]tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and
[2883]away frem internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented
[2885]Communists and fideli atas.
[2887]SECRET
[2889]AW 50955) Docld:32423736 Page 64
[2892]p
[2894]- REGRET.
[2896]Panamanian Comamist Party (POP) leader Riperte Thomas? recent
[2897]trip to Cube was evidently am effort to persuade Castro to mupport the
[2898]POP rather than the mere activist Panamanion pre-Commnist vate group.
[2899]When he returned to Penas on 14 December, Thome reportedly said that
[2900]Jorge Turner, who also went to Havens in September and has not returned,
[2901]weinet the POP in Cute.
[2902]Bowever,. the Cubans claim to heve told VAI lenders they must cooperate
[2904]5
[2906]aud other VAN lebders are a¢1Ll campadenitp
[2908]with the PEP to get. Castro support.
[2909]t seems consistentiy to favor the VAN with
[2911]jal trips. The Cubens mey distrust the POP's poor
[2912]ovganivetion and bélieve VAN charges that the PUP te infiltrated. However,
[2913]the VAN da a tether unsteble sroup and the Cubans ave probably trying te
[2915]keep on good tems with both, Thomwed oaid be received no militery trading
[2917]but wes taugit a Pow things like how to dlememtle a mehine gun.
[2919]‘Theumes commented that no pertiqular
[2921]group deemed te be tn command.
[2922]iu Cuba, resulting In auch dleorder that it was « wonder the revolution
[2924]head survived, He believes the ORT ts merely a mechanion,
[2926]Mexico would not igaue Thotes o vids, 60 he rétuened to Penama vie
[2928]Prague where he talked with Czech Commmist officials and may have
[2930]pleaded the POP case against VAN with thee. (CIA Ponema Clty p0s.3/
[2932]531,754, 20 Dee, SECRET) —
[2934]NW 50955) Docld: 32473736 Page 65
[2936]2MATION REPORTED:
[2938]F}
[2939]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[2941]C This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espronage Laws, Title 18, UGC Se
[2942]> » 722 and. 384. the transmissizeurer,revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is orohibiied by law. wee
[2944]rn re a CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[2945]ane a * , vi
[2946]we Le S EC R E i
[2948](When Pili? Inj .
[2950]COUNTRY | VENEZUELA «EAST GERMANY REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537} 107
[2952]SUSJECT = VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE DATE DISTR, 12 FEBRUARY 19
[2953]a ' .° EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PART a
[2954]oe Hs PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[2956]| DATE OF ; REFERENCES IN 4 6562
[2957]' INcO, JANUARY 1963
[2959]PLACER . pas
[2960]1 DATEACO. VENEZUELA, cARacas (7 &-7 FEBRUARY 1963) .
[2961]“4 APPRAISAL. 2 - FIELD REPORTNO. ave 2652
[2965]i
[2966]4
[2968]THIS is UNEVALUATED ix TIGN. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT {S$ TEN
[2969]SOURCE PARA Uf . A MEMBER: (8) OF THE COMMUNIST. PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLO
[2971]_ | MEMBER WHO WORKS [N THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
[2972]-PARA 21. A mMemBeR (8) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO
[2974]JESUS
[2976]WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCY,
[2978]“AND OLGA | LUZARDO FYNOL, SECRETARY OF
[2980]WERE TwO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUN | S.7
[2982]ARTY [CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN 63. THEY RETURNED TO VE NEZUELA WITH A
[2984]LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL
[2986]DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR,
[2987]THIS DOCUMENT 1S BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.
[2989]“2 “POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV,
[2991]E VENEZUELAN “AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST
[2993]ON. 1 FEB SAID THAT
[2995]GROUP t
[2996]Excluded from avtomath
[2997]downgrading ond
[2998]deciaawiccnon
[3000]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[3002]“SECRET
[3004]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[3006]LASSIFICATIO
[3008]“GERMAN ‘COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE
[3009]; DIFFE RENCES BETWEEN. CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN
[3010]| COMMUNIST PARTY. REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSIT! ON OF
[3011]| as THE USSR, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST. PART! AT THE
[3013]tos | CONGRESS CAUTIONED- THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN usINe
[3014]|| QUERRILLA FORCES. 7
[3016]ye 7 3. FIELD DISSEM: “STATE ARMY NAVY. AIR CRNCLANT CINCARIB.
[3018]Por -
[3020]ACTION: . ACSI, NAVY,-AF,JCS, 08D. 8
[3021]INFO: DCSOP,DtAPe
[3022]DA IN. 16376)
[3024]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 67
[3026]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSE M
[3028]Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)
[3030]The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday
[3031]included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air
[3032]formations. The most significant display was that
[3033]of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles. .
[3034]Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western
[3035]Army, units of the National Militia, and other
[3036]infantry onits in a "new parade step" resembling the
[3037]goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy
[3038]artillery, multiple rocket launchers an@ AA artillery.
[3039]Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and
[3040]assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible
[3041]. Cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.
[3043]The air formations included helicopters, propeller-
[3044]type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.
[3046]Scviet participation in the parade has not been established,
[3047]although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of
[3048]the aircraft.
[3050]Premier Castro's spsech following the parade brought
[3051]no surpbrisés aside from its unusual brevity. He
[3052]made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air
[3053]defense system, including the SA-2's, and, ina
[3054]probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said
[3055]there could be an incident "at any time".
[3056]Castro reiterated the five demands he first made
[3057]after the announcement that the Soviets would
[3058]withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He
[3059]inciuced his usual anti-US statements and slurs at
[3060]President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for
[3061]"osity" within the Communist Bloc.] H He called for
[3063]ge some
[3065]é revolution in Latin America, with special en
[3066]Rea
[3068]a on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task
[3070]i. _of-serving as an example" for that revolution
[3071]“In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-
[3072]Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet
[3073]spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would
[3074]"never leave Revolutionary Cube alone in distress.
[3076](CONFIDENTIAL)
[3077]SOURCE: VARIOUS
[3079]3 dan 63 DIA intelligence Bullet in Page 1
[3081]SECRET—-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3083]BULLE SORE 2 a ete oe
[3085]it
[3086]ol bag
[3088]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 66
[3090]a
[3092]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3094]ra
[3096]reportedly continues, the threat cof retaliatory action from forces
[3097]rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently
[3098]diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports
[3099]President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to:
[3100]leftist ex-—President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the
[3101]presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor.
[3102]The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want
[3103]to replace Ydigoras with a Civilian-military junta and call new
[3104]elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March, Should
[3105]Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his
[3106]candidacy and the coming months may be critical, —
[3108]Honduran President Villeda Moraies, although not a strong
[3109]leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal
[3110]Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections,
[3111]and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado,
[3112]President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders,
[3113]has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces
[3114]regard nim as the least desirable and.a developing anti-Rodas
[3115]coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading
[3116]candidates would probably follow the present government's policies,
[3117]including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists,
[3118]while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their
[3119]influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's
[3120]Gisconraging political, economic, and social conditions.
[3122]El salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about
[3123]two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, .
[3124]but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who
[3125]assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional
[3126]government, still has widespread Support and military backing.
[3127]The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but
[3128]there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes.
[3129]Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still
[3130]retain a subversive capability particularly among labor anda
[3131]student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a
[3132]pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of sub-
[3133]version and intrigue.
[3135]Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and
[3136]politically stable-countries in Latin America but there are
[3137]reverberations sf unrest stenming from the deteriorating economic
[3138]Situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was
[3139]returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested
[3140]but peeceful election, represents the liberal left, although it
[3141]inciudes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some
[3142]members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small ana illegal
[3143]bus well organized ana effectively led. It recently instigated
[3144]disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat,
[3145]has Long-range potential sheuld economic conditions worsen,
[3147]I
[3149]7 28 Jan 63 - DXA Intelligence Bulletin _ Page (2)
[3151](REVERSE BLANK)
[3152]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3154]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 69
[3156]uses}
[3158]° - SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3160]Penama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to
[3161]receive any commitment for 4 Long-sought yenegotiation of the
[3162]Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and
[3163]some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US
[3164]propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, py the
[3166]recent petition, filed by 4 Communist Lawyer, requesting the Supreme
[3168]Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari
[3169]has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation
[3170]during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President
[3171]Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption
[3172]continues; the cabinet is @ivided by conflicting loyalties and
[3173]ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and
[3174]the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.
[3176]fhe stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of
[3177]Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually
[3178]peing eroded, Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are
[3179]‘yyine for domination. In attempting to placate poth, President
[3180]Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies,
[3181]‘pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an
[3182]increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Tudependent
[3183]Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is
[3184]associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the land-
[3185]less peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically.
[3186]To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land
[3187]distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next
[3189]year. ithough this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian
[3191]sector, yising population and mounting unemployment will continue
[3192]to be major problems. ~
[3193](SECRET )
[3195]28 Jan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (3)
[3196]. (REVERSE BLANK)
[3198]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3200]HW 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 90
[3202]Construction of the fishing port im the Bay of Havana, whose
[3204]snnouncement a a Soviet undertaking caused so mich concern last fall,
[3205]will be dlreeted by a team of Soviet techuioiens and Cuban engineera
[3206]and will start in February ~ eccovding to a Havana radio announcement.
[3207]The port ie te be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 millicn
[3208]poses, vhich vill be met by loan from the Seviet Union, te be amortiecd
[3209]over 1O yeers, The port ia expected to serve 130 vessela of the Soviet
[3210]fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuben fleet, It will have
[3211]installations euch as freezer plants for 10,000 toms of fish, factories.
[3212]for processing ses products, machinery for making no lees than 56 tons
[3213]of ice a day, a floating deck to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and
[3214]well-equipped repair shops. ‘The emouncement emphasized that the port is
[3215]to be operated by and will be the “absolute property of the Cuban state."
[3216]Tt has @leo been announced that Poland has now formileted plans for
[3217]wudlding the shipyard enviaaged in the port of Meriél, The ingtallation
[3218]WALL be mariaged by Cuban technicians vho are presently receiving training
[3219]in Polish shipyards on the Baltic, Ship construction will reportedly
[3220]resoh a level of 70,000 tons per yoar, (RBIS 98, 17 January, end Daily
[3221]Report, 16 Jemary, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
[3223]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 91
[3226]manentc
[3227]today the
[3228]USSR Eur
[3229]torpe ado bi arin
[3230]supplied . chins as. having Ot
[3231]' fishing industry‘: as well as presen
[3232]_problem, He asked whether t
[3233]~. information on these
[3235]built "Ei shing base"
[3237]Per
[3239]_concerned « over, cep
[3241]ac
[3242]es
[3244]rn
[3246]in Cube,
[3248]Ta view of reports
[3249]ection on dscidine 2 ang oliciz
[3250]waters in order { to avoid incident
[3252]ee mE
[3255]potential
[3256]Ovential |
[3258]us could provide”
[3259]ships which would operate from Sovietce
[3263]ep Ak tPinesr 4
[3264]fet bree .
[3265]amare ES Bin realy HeUbato
[3266]K, 2
[3269]© Ministry told Embassy
[3270]s it had received: that
[3271]Shing -v sels, but also
[3272]S. He foresaw Souler.
[3273]verse ie effect on _Jamaican
[3274]possible security
[3275]more detailed -
[3277]urge. Cabinet to te
[3279]PRES OREE ysee
[3281]of L
[3282]Soviets and ‘Cubans,
[3284]He is cons idezing ‘recommending to Cabinet. that, Jamaica claim
[3286]ferritor ial _ Waters of _Six-and-six x miles,
[3288]claing ‘three-mile limit,”
[3290]Although Gog obviously counting on
[3291]ment,
[3292]ovimerily ‘by desire to speed
[3293]to view Jamaican approach ag
[3294]|. technical leve e} beginning .to
[3295]Cuban _problen..
[3296]ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
[3297]INFO; BCSOP, _OSA,. MGS, “USDEL
[3298]‘ EN: 16465:
[3299]1 SMD: CT -
[3301]4
[3303]COMP IDENT LAL
[3305]receipt Us military equip-.
[3307]seems unlikely that ‘this expression GOJ concern motivated
[3308]up delivery,
[3309]healthsome indication GOJ et
[3310]appreciate. wami fications of
[3312]Embassy. ‘inclined
[3314]TADB . - DOHERTY.
[3316]REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
[3317]PROMIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED”
[3319]Jamaica now apparently
[3321]HW §0955 Docld: 324233736 Page 92
[3324]BW 50955 Dorcld: 32423736
[3326]Page $3
[3329]* | SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3331]THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO
[3332]Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are a
[3333]under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs
[3334]of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19
[3335]: . March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having
[3336]: ‘ ‘.elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is
[3337]threatened;. and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem
[3338]throughout the area.
[3340]During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to
[3341]center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integra-
[3342]tion of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives
[3343]of the Alliance for Progress Program ~- will undoubtedly be em-
[3344]‘phasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater
[3345]political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integra-
[3347]‘tion, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by
[3348]1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top
[3349]priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as
[3350]one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.
[3352]On 8 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for
[3353]the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate
[3354]who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the
[3355]government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the
[3356]Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective oppo-
[3357]sition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party --
[3358]Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections
[3359]because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The
[3360]only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute
[3361]candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN),
[3362]whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the
[3363]government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-
[3364]Communist.elements, militant conservatives and others may ‘attempt
[3365]to create disorders before or during the elections, but the
[3366]Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of. controlling
[3367]any troubles short of .a general uprising or wel 1-coordinated
[3368]rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.
[3370]Oo.
[3372]Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registra-
[3373]' tions and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although
[3374]Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza ‘puppet , opposition
[3375]suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of
[3376]Generali Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.
[3378]Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air
[3379]Foree revolt have not been too serious. Although ‘plotting
[3381]ie 28 Jan 63 “DIA Int telligence Bulletin a Page (1)
[3382]- (REVERSE BLANK) . ,
[3383]SECRET-NO PORE EIGN Di ISSEM
[3385]“h
[3387]NW 450955 Docld:32423736 Page 94
[3389]e ‘ Ms at : e i e 5 a :
[3391]‘ Ss. ME a va 1
[3392]50955 Bocld:3 3796 Page 95 bs ° . OE
[3394]a an | i . ° ’
[3397]Campesino ‘Strike. Scheduled in Bolivia’
[3399]A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today .
[3401]could iead to violence if it. occurs. The Government
[3402]reportedly plens to block all entrances into La Paz
[3403]and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling
[3404]and arming to counter the strikers who are led by
[3405]pro-Communist Torribio Salas, A government spokesman
[3406]claims that ‘the Cuben and Czechoslovak Embassies are
[3408]financing the strike and that the Cubans are training |
[3410]campesino militia in other areas as well.
[3412]President Pag has reportedly said he wili do every-
[3413]thing to prevent the strike but will call on loyal
[3414]campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict
[3415]develops between the two groups of campesinos,
[3417]the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in,
[3418]President Pag might also have to take action sfainst
[3419]trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to
[3420]avoid,
[3422](CONFIDENTIAL)
[3424]SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)
[3426]28 Jan 63 DIA (igeelli gence Bulletin | Page
[3428](REVERSE B
[3430]SECRET-NO FORE! TCR DISSEM
[3432]an i Oe a
[3434]HY 50955 Dacld: 327423736
[3436]Page $7
[3438]/N
[3440]_—___. SECHIEAL pisseit
[3441]Three top WEkien Communist Party offiediala, including tude
[3442]Carlos Prestes, are teported Leaving for Cuba vie Prague prior to
[3443]15 Jenuary to dlsouss certain political problems with the Cuban.
[3444]im activities in the different Latin
[3446]Commuiiets vesponsible for pro-Cul
[3448]Awerlean eountrics, Before leaving they planed to be briefed by 2
[3450]Bregilian Communist Party méxber whe hes just returned from « viait to
[3451]perty leaders in Uruguay, Argenting, Chile, Peru, and Bolivie to get their
[3452]opinions shows holding the “Latina Awertoon Congress in Support of Cubs,”
[3453]now rescheduled for Maxéh, dn Rio or Sac Paulo, (CIA, Rie de Janeiro,
[3455]TN 42868, 31 Beoexbor, SHCrEr noroRN)
[3457]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 96
[3460]SEGRE, =H FOREIGN DISSENT
[3462]The Wational Executive Commission of Brasil's orthodex Commmist
[3463]Party (P0B) reported;
[3464]perty position im relation te Franaisco Julies, Bredilian Peadent-League
[3466]alae
[3468]planned to meet on f January ta discuss the
[3470]leader who hes been cloder to Bragil's diseldent herd-Ling Conmmmist
[3471]Party than to ite orthodox group (CPB), The POB leaders planned to
[3472]eonciders the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to
[3473]Cube to confer with Fidel Cagtro, not. only to improve relations but
[3475]to protest a maport that Cuttvel is supporting duldeo. (CIA Seo Pauls,
[3477]THeS.35 3904, 9 Jenusry, SECREP)
[3479]Comment: Cuba has for sew time had a divisive influence on
[3480]Bragiiian Communist affeiee. The diasident Commniet Party formed in
[3481]late 1951 hes ~ dike duliao ~ favored & nore revolutionary Lind and has
[3483]apparently received considerably mere support from Cuba than bas. the
[3484]orthodsx party. Anothex' indlestion of the divisive influence of Cube
[3486]wt that Frencisco Leives Otero, POR leader responsible for
[3488]matters pertaining to Cuba, attecked party mibservience to the Grou
[3489]a national POR conference on 29 November, Lefvas maintained that the
[3490]PCE showld digeuss the Sine-Soviet dispute with complete independence,
[3492]rather then waintein silenced on it as it had been doing, (SECRET)
[3494]CN DISSENT
[3496]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 99
[3499]“rah eaten ea cy
[3501]This matesist contains informotion effecting thd Netions! Defensa of the United States within the “meaning of the Eipionage ‘Laws, Tue ta, Us.c- Soce. * at
[3502]793 and 795. the transmission or ravalation of which in any manner fo en una uihon zed persona is prohibited by, law, __ !
[3504]SECRET
[3506]i (Wren Pulled In}
[3510]J]. COUNTRY vexico/arazin | a REPORT NO, TORS =3/537,107
[3512]SUEJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO’
[3513]TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS$ -REASONS. FOR |
[3514]LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL
[3516]oe. ah t
[3517]ATE ngTR, - TH Feeruary 1963
[3518]tt my . ay ;
[3519]4 .
[3521]PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
[3523]_ DATE OF REFERENCES IN mn
[3524]INEC, (12 FEBRUARY 1963 we : . : 67594
[3525]-. PLACE &
[3526]DATE ACO, MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEERUARY 1963) By
[3527]APPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. HMM ~ 7016
[3529]rris is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SCURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,
[3530]SOURCE a PERSON (2) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO», a4
[3532]t
[3533]4
[3534]i
[3536]ai
[3538]4
[3539]a
[3542]“4
[3544]“|
[3545]4
[3546]4
[3547]3
[3549]4
[3551]le “ON 12. FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO: TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL
[3553]BERT 0 ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF, ADOL FO
[3555]CONFERRED WITH HU
[3556]Lopez MATEOS, PRESIDENT. OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED |
[3557]“THE PR RESIDENT TO KNOW: ABOUT ‘HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS”
[3558]GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LE EAVE
[3559]AND EXPECTED TO BE
[3561]~Lowtact HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE
[3563]MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS
[3565]GROUP I
[3566]Excluded from automate
[3567]downgrading ead
[3568]declanification
[3570]CLASSIFICATION ~~ DISSEMINA
[3572]cl Ei Re
[3573]at TUE EIOl
[3575]a ORMATION
[3577]TION CONTROLS
[3579]REP ORT
[3581]GERRY
[3583]. 4
[3584]ku! Yb i
[3586]FORM Th " OBSOLETE PREVE US EDITIONS. ee . 3 . 45-20)
[3588]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 100
[3590]SET TSS RSS SO
[3592]. . x u
[3593]QO . : _ +) “CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.” i so rn ne ie
[3595]RPA! - ;
[3596]SECRET of A OISSEM wes -3/537, 187
[3598]SE
[3599](When Filled In}
[3601]2 TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.,
[3603]By! LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO
[3605]' BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND
[3607]INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO SE HELD —
[3608]/ IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS
[3609]“OF THE CONGRESS ARE: | | -
[3610]“7A TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA,
[3611]BL To EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN
[3612]AMERICAN COUNTRIES:. IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC |
[3614]DEVELOPMENT OF - LATIN AMERICA, 7
[3615]S03. LOMBARDO. SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE,
[3617]APART. FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND
[3619]SEPARATE COMMIT TTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE. THE SAME, AND
[3621]THAT A ‘SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GRCUPS.
[3623]LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE
[3625]ASKED ME TOGO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE: N, THE MATTER, To TRY TO ORGANIZE
[3627]A SING Le UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARAT LONS_ FOR THE
[3629](OLDING OF* THE CONGRESS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE. ITS SUCCESS." _ LOMBARDO
[3631]ID "THE COMRADES: IN EUROPE” SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENT INE, A CHILEAN;
[3633]URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING
[3635]LIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, “AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE GAN
[3636]STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT: SATISFACTORILY.
[3637]pe
[3639]T &
[3641]LOMBARDO oe ROMER 0 THAT IF THE CONGRESS 1S HELD IN. MARCH AS
[3643]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i101
[3648]fons ee no ~ a 7 4
[3649]7 i
[3650]oe ;
[3651]: t
[3652]H Me
[3653]a °
[3655]wh i
[3658]' |SECRE
[3660](When Filled
[3662]| 1083/5375 181
[3664]‘ SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" |
[3665]"| AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND | AM NOT ONE OF :
[3666]THOSE. " ROM 4ERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK, LOMBARDO ‘ P
[3667]SAID, "I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT 1S MY i
[3668]MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN TTEND. " I
[3669]5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY | ;
[3671]FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED. ) ;
[3673]6, FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.
[3675]me b
[3677]. a
[3678]‘ is
[3679]i 5
[3681]t &
[3683]i Fg
[3684]a io
[3686]t ’
[3688]ACTION: ACSi, NAW, AF, JCS, CSD
[3690](NFO. .s 8CSOP
[3691]‘DA EN 17084 |
[3693]hoe Be END OF MESSAGE
[3695]‘CLASSIFICATION — - et MINATION CONTROLS
[3697]RCE
[3698]Sen \
[3700]HW 50955 Docld:32493736 Page i102
[3702]DEPARTMENT GF STATE
[3704]GRAM
[3706]: HANDLING INDICAT
[3708]j
[3709]as
[3711]‘| ne o
[3714]—_ i
[3716]Hi P38) a
[3718]4 a
[3719]KER om Fas
[3721]FROM, ot Amcongen, SAO. PAULO | “DATE: . February 65 1963
[3723]FAR
[3726]|suaecr . Sample survey of worker sentiment . shows receptivity
[3727]>. toward communism; ‘S80 Paulo business leaders re>
[3728]REE + ported by one observer as generally unconcerned over ee
[3729]ee Communist danger. os os as
[3731]7 Two straws in. the wind ‘that have come » recently to my atten: ro
[3733]j tion indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism . ae
[3734]on the part of at least some segments of So Paulo! s working and’ -
[3735]—i managerial classes. - Further indications in support of or in refutation.
[3736]of the se signs will be submitted as they are noted,
[3738]PS ‘On January 31, L was visited by the two top Z American ex-
[3739]' ecutives of a- Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation. §
[3740]| They said. that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ~
[3741]} ago.of. periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had
[3742]i; just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted ©
[3743]| Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers |
[3744]to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil ;
[3745]| of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was 9.7
[3746]_} 30 shockingly different fromm that of earlier pulse-taking that these :
[3747]| executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty °
[3748]' percent of the workers. approached had indicated that while they did not -
[3749]_ {| pretend to know: much about communism, they. thought they would be =
[3750]-t bettet off under a communist regime than they-are at present. Among.”
[3751]: the reasons most commonly given were that things were sO badin ..
[3752]i Brazil that any change would be for the fEsyyxand that communism
[3753]i would put an end: to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent.’ -:
[3754]The other twenty percent thought that communism would be ‘bad for the.
[3756]country,
[3757]LEN Names withhele at their “request.
[3759]OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[3761]OUIeR(S ang Uiassiiication Pps
[3763]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 103
[3765]ESE Dee Flo.
[3766]_ OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
[3767]-2-. _
[3769]‘The company executives attributed the pro- ~communist
[3770]“sentiment. ‘as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties ex-
[3771]perienced’ by, low~income families as a result of the rampant,
[3772]inflation. | They said their. labor relations were good, that while |
[3773]their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries,»
[3774]‘some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of |
[3775]' their. knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work
[3776]among their x employees. : ;
[3778]- Not ‘long before this visit I was lunching one day at the
[3779]Y Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker-and
[3780]“pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES
[3782]'. (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal demo-=
[3783]cratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him *-
[3784]at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures ‘of ©
[3785]_ sdo Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, | _
[3786]“Apart from the two.of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who.”
[3787]“is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil. = °°
[3789]No. conclusions, ‘obviously, should be drawn fromsuch | |
[3790]slender: ‘indications: _It has been my observation, however, that :
[3791]; “most Brazilians either believe that a communist take- ~over would
[3792]be impossible, in Brazil, or. believe that even if it occurred, it.
[3793]a would take. a. relatively mild form. with which they could live. The a
[3794]'“-Brazilian's’ boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances-
[3795]‘a vir tues, could in the. Present, state of: affairs be the cause of his undoing.
[3797]‘Daniel Me. “Braddock ’
[3798]C ns L General “
[3800]FFICIAL USE ONLY.
[3802]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i104
[3804]eee -
[3806]SHG 18 mcanl TON” IA a
[3807]rae : _ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3809]This material containa infoxmation affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3810]18, U.S.0, Secs, 793 and 704, the tranamission or rovelotion of Which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[3812]S-E-C-R-E-T
[3813], NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[3815]'-- country, Colombia/Cuba «=. | REPORT NO. CS -3/536,069
[3816]1 SUBJECT Cuban Support of Guerrillas DATE DISTR, | 4 February 1963
[3817]in Colombia ,
[3818]NO. PAGES 1
[3819]REFERENCES RD
[3820]. DATE OF October 1962
[3821]a INFO. —
[3822]“2. PLACE & Germany, Munich
[3823]a DATE ACQ. (14 December 1962) FIELD REPORT NO.
[3824]} THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3825]4 "SOURCE: An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source
[3827]‘with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.
[3829]1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the
[3830]leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader
[3831]of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia. 1 Gruber,
[3833]a Polish Jew, was formerly a commiSsar in Spain. His wife
[3834]is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin
[3835]Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia,
[3836]Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic pass-
[3837]port identifying him as "traveling inspector of the
[3838]Bolivian Foreign Ministry."
[3840]2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by
[3841]Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One.of his
[3842]liaisom officers to the Communist Party.of Colombia is
[3843]Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the _
[3844]‘Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952. . wl
[3846]oy, Headquarters Comment. ‘An official British service
[3847]“reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality |.
[3848]unknown, waS training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area;
[3849]Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a
[3850]‘Cuban passport in the name of, Jose Blanco and might
[3851]-have had other passports of different nationalities.
[3855]Abaca ann setinaaitnt a Bie cade avnbrow adatoms duu lav dad af tle cnedaiwaudase shaadi
[3859]I
[3861]i
[3863]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 105
[3865]EN Rtg ones
[3867]Wi FSP a ce BE fE TBS A reer ENTE conn Bm is MTR gp PV ENG
[3868]LIMMIMEKOUNE = BEG) eB NUTCCR RIM. AST GHNI
[3870]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3872]contains information affecting the National ‘Defense of thé United States within the
[3873]cs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an
[3875]. This ‘material
[3876]18, U.S.C. Se
[3878]meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3879]unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[3881]__SeH-CoReE-T _
[3884]COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba REPORT NO. CS -3/534,724
[3886]SUBJECT Departure of Costa Rican Communist to DATE DISTR.
[3888]22 January 1963
[3889]Live in Cuba
[3891]NO. PAGES i
[3893]REFERENCES RD
[3895]DATE OF November 1962
[3896]INFO. . .
[3897]DATE ACQ, (23 Nowertee eyo FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3006
[3899]; SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3901]source: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Comn
[3902]: circles. Appraisal of Content: 2,
[3905]unist Party
[3907]Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very
[3909]active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of
[3911]Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on WwW November, on his
[3912]' way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.
[3914]ra
[3916]a
[3918]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 106
[3920]Sant EB inabats ae erate
[3922]nee tana deat han abba tee ute
[3924]j
[3925]7
[3926]4
[3927]i,
[3929]u
[3930]4
[3932]4
[3934]TESA cisinisb ka bitecoant samen
[3936]Few inw Hasan
[3938]“REPORT itNFORMAT
[3940]‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
[3942]10
[3944]s
[3946]N
[3948]‘This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
[3949]18, U.8.0, Secs..793 and 704, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person 1s prohibited by law.
[3951]7
[3953]C-O-N-F-1I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[3955]COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America / REPORT NO.” CS=3/535,791 . -
[3956]SUBJECT Request by Cuban Diplomat in DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963
[3957]. Chile to Member of the - ST -
[3958]Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean NO. PAGES |. lL
[3959]Youth for Information on Leftist Ce
[3960]Activity in Ecuador REFERENCES © RD -W-2107
[3961]DATE OF ae OS .
[3962]"INFO. Mid-January 1963 ‘
[3963]PLACE &
[3965]- DATE AC@, Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO, HEG-2108
[3966]THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
[3967]souRCcE:; Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of ‘Ecuadorean Youth. —
[3968]Appraisal of Content: 3. Se — .
[3970]Cc “" Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council |
[3972]’ of the. Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his
[3974]‘- ‘expulsion from URJE during its National: Convention held in early -
[3976]-.- January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, .
[3977]First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in ;
[3978]‘whiéh he asks” Véra™to“send”a person to Chile to inform him on
[3979]current leftist activity ‘un Ecuador. Vera plans to send
[3981]- Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can. be-:
[3983]', raised for the tri a oe °
[3985]a
[3987]_-Field-Commen
[3989]activities\in Chile, Peru,*and Ecuador. 0.
[3990]. - a een cease ont sans BETES a . : a a : a
[3992]. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive |
[3994]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page i107
[3997]ne Lich 7 "Siwmme'ts " @ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3999]his material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 1a, USC Secs. *
[4000]a and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in ony monner to an unawthorued person it prohibited by law
[4002]—_ CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS mat
[4003]SECRET _GGNTROULED DISSER ur. Rowen bee 9088
[4004](When Filled inj Z
[4006]“COUNTRY CUBA HAITI REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/653, 274
[4008]“SUBJECT. PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW™™ ?<0~0=~. «DATE piste... 14.
[4009]Pa PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI ; _
[4011]JARY 1963
[4012]_. PRECEDENCE ‘ROUTINE
[4014]“DATE OF
[4016]: REFERENCES IN 4
[4018]> INFO. & resruary 1963 67457
[4019]“PLACE & |
[4021]~ DATE ACQ.-UNITED STATES (28 vanuary, 8 resruary 1963)
[4023]APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO,
[4025]me THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 18 TENTATIVE, aa
[4027]a SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF ‘NEWS. DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; -FROM A COLLEAGUE: OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL. |!
[4029]Die -PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, 1S PLANNING] Fey
[4030]‘TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALI ER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY | FMRa—
[4032]COUP.» MAGLOIRE CLAIMS. TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY,
[4033]THE DATE OF THE couP |S EXPECTED TO SE SET AT A SECRET MEETING
[4035]© WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 2 FEBRUARY.
[4037]2, MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOME
[4038]oo FROM C CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE, “ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL,
[4039]a FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, 1S LINING@UP. CUBAN EXILE SUPPO!
[4040]eo RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT’ ROLE, THEY
[4042]CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4044]| “SECRET CONTROLLED DISSER
[4045]: TZ
[4047]TREASURY FBS T&NS REPC INCLANT
[4049]GROUP t
[4051]FQRM K. 7 ssc Bauviovs 38 EDITIONS.
[4055]Nw 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 106
[4057]SERSSTPICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 2. 00 UO
[4059], SECRET. ___ GONTROLLED DISSEN
[4061]- MIGHT BE G GIVEN A BASE: ROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO
[4063]aN THE, FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE
[4064]BL 26) JULY MOVEMENT IN: PUERTO" PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS
[4065]: NAMED ) AMBASSADOR TO HAITE BY FADEL CASTRO RUZ.
[4067]ee we IN LATE 1959.
[4068]RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO. ESCAPE ASSASSINATION), | Soak
[4070]3 EUSEBIO MUJAL. BARN OL OF THE CONF EDERAC 1 ON DE TRABAJADORES DE,
[4071]CUBA eN EXILIO (CTCE- ~CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS iN EX1LE) |
[4072]is ASSISTING: RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE,
[4074]“EELD ) DISSEMs STATE, einetant, CINCARIB.
[4076]ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, “AF, JCS, OS
[4077][NFO°: -DCSOP-
[4078]DA IN 17056
[4080]“END OF MESSAGE
[4082]- CLASSIFICATION = , DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ©
[4084]ic rane Sane aS
[4086]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 109
[4091]HY 409545
[4093]information
[4095]fleeting
[4096]Diet
[4098]by
[4100]1? DECEMBER 196
[4102]DAN Etre
[4104]PANS
[4106]BY TE oymawe we.
[4107]fo. THE CUBA mires
[4108]PAR OURRTN anne
[4110]the Notional
[4111]of reveletion of which
[4113]eit tee
[4114]mae
[4116]an DIssim
[4118]O PROPOSE To ES7,
[4120]we}
[4122]OS OF MILITARY ‘SHIPS. THRO
[4124]UCH THE PANAMA caxar,
[4126]THOMAS Wy
[4128]GSslense of the United o¢
[4129]in any mosagr ig
[4131]CLASSIFICATION TE
[4133]Docld: 32423736
[4135]Page 112
[4137]Sao Verse
[4139]teen
[4140]re rr
[4141]OISSEMI
[4143]ca
[4145]3D TO
[4147]vies With 2
[4150]ATION CONT
[4152]“+ NEP WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN,
[4154]megain
[4155]a
[4157]1g Of the Espionage
[4158]filted Se tase
[4160]RUA G
[4161]LaOMAS
[4163]Laws,
[4165]Tae 4
[4167]6,
[4169]OLS . —
[4171]i
[4172]n
[4175]So ce Sma?
[4177]+. spam tatnesinnenrrenpt naman ma
[4179]: . : - mo rtes : _ ;
[4181]ca me roe tine a7 4 SS AR aERRPIESE oye PTE I
[4183](EN) OF THE FD 1 BER EU ee ne
[4185]“|
[4186]mie 7 OT eT ES _ |
[4187]THAT HE EAD COMiLA- |
[4188]. |
[4190]ETARY OF ORCANT
[4194]~ weeny
[4195]boiate n 7
[4196]rat, GEGRETARY+CENERAL OF Th
[4197]ON AG DLA A
[4198]ots mee oT ULD USE me
[4199]SAVING TONG AS THE POP COULD USE THE I
[4200]LT oem a 7 :
[4202]SSED FULLY av
[4204]seat 00
[4206]A SNAMA
[4208]WER ZURICH
[4210]VER
[4212]MOUS! E ‘EUROPEAN 1
[4214]eat wo
[4215]NAVY, « Eaeme'e sy ome
[4217]END OF MESSAGE
[4221]HW 50955 Dacld:32493736 Page 113
[4223]nears
[4225]~~ “a = 3 5 Ss “= | i 5 y j -
[4226]IRMATION REPORT. RAM | /
[4227]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ve
[4229]basons eed 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauihoried person is srohibited by fw.
[4231]a £50 Tritt material conteing inforrnation affecting the Nations! Defansa of the United State: within She meaning of the E:pronege text, Tithe (8, US. Secs.
[4232]i
[4233]s
[4235]Y CONTROLS :
[4236](When Filled in; |
[4238]REPORT NO. TDCS. =3/537,185
[4240]J. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE DATE DISTR, 4 reeRUARY: 1963
[4241]COMMUNISTS a, ,
[4242]2, COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER- IN -GUARDIA CIVIL - PRECEDENCE ROUT INE
[4244]REFERENCES in 67565
[4246]WE ACO, Peru, Lima {12 FEBRUARY 1963)
[4247]. . . ae
[4248]PRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO, HPL 2756 ;
[4249]THIS is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT iS TENTAT
[4250]COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B). yo a
[4252]de MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL
[4254]JUDGE TO. TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF
[4255]PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME:
[4256]RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO 7atal.. HE INTENDS TO
[4258]ELEA
[4259]ELE:
[4261]THEM ON 1
[4263]{ FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE
[4265]Soh,
[4267]avers tie JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HiNOSTRO zAs
[4268]APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE
[4269]JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT
[4270]SOLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR
[4271]f] THE CASE.
[4273]ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. WITH GOOD
[4275]cROUP I
[4276]Excluded from automanc
[4277]downgrading ond
[4278]declowFicahon
[4280]Knee cane iON -— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4282]“BA EM
[4284]staTe/ine | o1a [army/acsi| NAVY | A
[4286]TK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS. EDITIONS. ; Cal (15-20) 2
[4288]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 114
[4290]SECRET
[4292]. (When Filled In}
[4294]CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY iS PLEASED
[4295]HAT Ofe2 CANSE co iN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER
[4297]WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE, PARTY IN THE NI NETEEN FORTIES. PARTY.
[4299]RECO RDS FURN [SHED BY. THE POLICE IN 1958 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS
[4301]Neewtlne ade etter eta ta ea alata ere Band Tee vy
[4303]A PARTY MEMBER). .
[4304]2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVICIO DE
[4305]|NTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH
[4306]THE PRESIDENT OF THE. JUNTA. AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE. RELEASE
[4307]oF THE COMMUNISTS... JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE
[4308]| SECURITY DIVISION, OF THE POLICIA DE~ INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS
[4309]| THAT THE. GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSLONS,
[4310]ON WHICH! TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED D!SAPPOINTMENT
[4311]UAT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, ~
[4312]BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.
[4313]ig FIELD DiSSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB, a
[4315]ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[4316]{NEO BESO:
[4317]DA IN 17081
[4319]END OF MESSAGE
[4321]CLASSIFICA
[4323]SECRET | GE
[4325]N— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[4327]HY 50955 Docld: 324235736 Page 115
[4329]yelieble end qudeitent couree, acme the Leaders of the 17 Decembe
[4330]ike violanse ot the US-omed Cexro ap Poses mine da i Quoya, Pave.
[4332]af verchiand in the Peruvian hig! a ty Andoen Tnitenis,
[4334]indigne wore sald te hewe plamed te synelnonis
[4336]mogaigh vith the violenée ageinet Cuawe de Psono. Me duck Anettante
[4338]hove been reported yet. (SEGREE)
[4340]2 GiJer now seiaure
[4342]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 116
[4344]bas alea been active dn promoting the seleurc
[4347]Peruvian
[4349]Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities
[4351]Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting
[4352]aside their differences and moving toward closer
[4353]co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction,”
[4354]believed to be leading the recent outbreak of
[4355]disorders. The groups are reportedly ce-ordinating
[4357]‘previously random plans to carry out extensive
[4359]Gestruction of industrial and agriculteural
[4360]installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and
[4361]other Latin American nationals as well as Havana
[4362]and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be
[4363]instrumental in this latest development.
[4365]Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed
[4366]serious concern over the internal situation
[4368]and hinted that they favor strong action. Although
[4369]constitutional guaranises have been: suspended-in a
[4370]fourth department ,and several Army units have been
[4371]moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has
[4372]taken no further action. It has requested riot
[4373]control equipment from the US and says it is
[4375]Yeady to embark on an anti-Communist program upon
[4376]assurance that the equipment is forthcoming.
[4377](SECRET)
[4379]SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); ATRA LIMA C-1 (Cc)
[4381]gan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page
[4383]ee (REVERSE BLANK)
[4384]SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4388]8
[4390]KW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1i7
[4393]SECRET—-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4395]Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move
[4397]Continued Communist—incited disorders and an alleged
[4399]Havana~Moscow plan to take over the government >
[4401]prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional
[4402]guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state ‘
[4403]'of siége early on 5 January. Military commanders
[4404]assumed political control in their respective zones, :
[4405]and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro- :
[4406]Communist subversives have been arrested. The :
[4407]Lima headquarters of several Communist and
[4408]Communist-front organizations, as well as their
[4409]publications, have been closed.
[4411]According to the Communist plan, subversive activity t
[4412]was to have been intensified between 15 and 20
[4413]January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on i
[4414]banking and commercial institutions, military |
[4415]garrisons, vital communications facilities, and i
[4416]universities. A clandestine radio station operating |
[4417]on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct '
[4418]and co-ordinate this activity.
[4420]O -The junta has regarded members of the leftist but
[4421]non-Commmist American Popular Revolutionary '
[4422]Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the
[4423]Communists and originally tended to blame them
[4424]for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA . ;
[4425]has been involved in anything but legititmate :
[4426]strike activity. Suspension of constitutional
[4427]guarantees would enable the junta to strike at
[4428]“APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled
[4429]elections next June. (SECRET)
[4433]‘SOURCET BME LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)
[4435]a ; .
[4436]7 Jan 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
[4437]- (REVERSE BLANK )
[4439]SECRET — NO FORE! GN DISSEM
[4441]eo ee oo ce Te . Plo eee ” . woo
[4443]HW 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 116
[4445]oo
[4446]A
[4447].
[4449]€R
[4450](Ae
[4451](o
[4453]=—=NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4455]SUPPLEMENT
[4457]THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION
[4459]Y
[4461]A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of
[4462]the year have publicly called for revolution,in other Latin
[4463]American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country
[4464]with top priority.
[4466]Coinciding with these appeais have been reports that the
[4467]Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist
[4468]activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US
[4469]visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included
[4470]attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the
[4471]burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part
[4472]of this campaign.
[4474]Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of
[4475]National Liberation (FAIN). The PALN, although purporting to
[4476]represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent
[4477]Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV
[4478]with its main strength in the Caracas area.
[4480]Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but
[4482]there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated
[4484]with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with
[4485]air support, have been used in a recent campaign against
[4486]these guerrillas.
[4488]The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining
[4489]internal security and of defending the nation's borders
[4490]against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports
[4491]conustitutionality and is leyal to the Betancourt government.
[4492]The armed forces would not ‘hesitate, however, to take over the
[4493]government in order to maintain order or to forestall a
[4494]Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly
[4495]frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-—
[4496]instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to
[4497]take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong
[4498]support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has’ overcome
[4499]much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of
[4500]the government is greater now than it was six months ago.
[4502]The officer corps is generally free of Communist
[4503]penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the
[4504]Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved
[4505]in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962. ~
[4506](SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4508]13 Feb 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page (1)
[4509](REVERSE BLANK).
[4511]SECRET—~NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4514]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 119
[4516]a Ces
[4518]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[4520]C Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela
[4521]Veneznela has been afflicted over the past several
[4522]_months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
[4523]Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are
[4524]connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left,*
[4525]the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces
[4526]of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group
[4527]ro, credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil
[4528]fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are
[4529]probably designed to discredit and weaken the Bétan-
[4530]court Government.
[4532]i The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
[4534]: in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
[4535]to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists
[4536]responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing
[4538]- supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
[4539]warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of
[4540]guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon. area of
[4542]H northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
[4544]’ SOURCE: VARIOUS
[4547]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1270
[4549]io
[4550]ie 50955 Docld: 32
[4552]ee eR i
[4554]SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM ,
[4556]Venezuelan Communists Plan to Yucrease Violence
[4557]ES
[4559]As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan
[4560]Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth
[4561]anniversary of Betanccurt's presidency on 13: February
[4562]by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other
[4563]Communists are to see to it that the capital is
[4564]flooded with propaganda that day. According to un-
[4565]confirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have
[4567]charged the Castro government with ordering the recent
[4569]terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an
[4570]extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity
[4571]in both countries. Colombian military authorities’
[4573]have reportedly erawn up a plan to prevent terrorism
[4575]in Colombia's cities. :
[4577](SECRET) ~
[4579]SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)
[4581]——— eerie etn re EE tt be Ste a err
[4583]433736 Page 171
[4587]By 4
[4590]|
[4593]Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/fre os |
[4594]; . OO on. |
[4596]SUBJECT: Alternetive US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America
[4598]a. Although our public’ posture on subversion in Latin Anerlea may . oo nce
[4600]be 400 firmly esteblished for instant end radical revision, the following - i
[4602]‘enalysis is offered on the assummtion that sowe change in emphasis is
[4604]both possible and desirable, now or et soue time in the future.
[4606]‘2. Given the existence of a Commnisé sta zte, of.elther mnjor per- ; i
[4608]suasion, what is the likelthood that if will en. age in subversion toward —~,
[4610]ne eignboring states?
[4612]ay Potal. ALL experience of the pest forty years demonstrates | 4a
[4614]“that @ Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanatés heat. a : 5
[4615]b, But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion ere involved:
[4617](1) Hardwere-centered - that is, fumds, guns, tools of _ bE
[4619]sabotage.
[4621]. (2) Egalitarian end libertarian idesils.
[4623]3, How mich does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the prob-
[4625]“epi ity cf Commnism spreading to target countries? |
[4627]" Subversion is never a a suffieléat condition - - vend frequently | - a pS
[4629]“not @ ne cessary ones : Aes
[4631]lr ‘Subversion is | really dangerous: to a 2 target Btate, there
[4633]Po 8 $a pes bE sonething seriously yrong in that atete, | (Prance's "Wasser:
[4635]Fellecy” of 1956; France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption |
[4637]ie in Algeria would magical ly
[4639]= - ‘thet if Wasser vere disposed of, the t+
[4640]\ .
[4641]diser Sean, ‘Although the game was not pleyed cut, few would dispute the
[4643]coriclusion thet France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter,
[4645]Seem _QmARnn oO SENRTDTVE,
[4647]HW 50955 Docld: 32493736 Page i122
[4649]that France would have been in an even deeper worass if her military
[4651].
[4653]forces hed nanaged with the British to cemmy Cairo.)
[4656]AY How feasivle is it to control subversion at the source without
[4660]destroying the Commpniist State?
[4661]Usually st is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive.
[4662]For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which
[4664]‘gould prevent the export bot’ of nerdvere-ortented en and idéa subversion,
[4666]oe
[4668]would be very high, even if the activity were aceepted by Cuba and the...
[4669]Soviet Union, This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every
[4670]traveler, -forcing planes down for inspection, ete. We submit (a) that
[4671]“ideas would still be exported end (») that by so doing we would mesnify
[4672]the importance of Cuba beyond imagination, Te would becomes a kind of
[4673].. forbidden trait. ‘The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to
[4674]“mind, This course involves ean increment of prestige and lure to Cuba
[4676], . ‘vnten would be Likely “to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution, in
[4677]- the expert of trained. Subversives and associated haravere, ‘Furthermore >
[4678]~ given the success of such an effore by the obvious Soviet ‘counter would be
[4679]: to use other: channels voick we. could not surveil without tWajor Rast-
[4681]; o West conzrontation. “the Cuben. su ubversion exp port orgmization might well
[4683]“move, to Hoscow, Progue endfor even Péiping, Therefore, to take & public
[4685]. “stance opponed: to cuban subversion srbthows having, resolyed on invasion
[4687]ds to be committed to a policy bound tc demonstrate US Impotence.
[4689]5. If we want to control eubversion at the source by déestroving
[4690]the Commnist State » Cuba, hov useful ls 16 for us publicly to emphasize
[4692] hardware-centered, subversion ss the reason?
[4694]to
[4696]‘SNCRED - SHISTUIVE”
[4699]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 123
[4706]Be For mony people outside of the US, even the export of
[4708]>. gubversion by foreé and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, _
[4710]eS weil ad funds, arms, end other eouipment, (We, for example, are
[4711]not ashened of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.) 9
[4712]b, Usually attitudes toward viclent subversion depend on
[4714]ebtitudes toward thetarget, (Bxemcle: acts against Jimines, Trujillo .
[4716]aid not offend US/ wost of Latin Ax serten/ 1 most of the world; the paral-—
[4718]“Jel todey: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser); We run the danger of felling
[4719]na into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion
[4721]“directed against the Dutch govermzent would outrage not only all Americans,
[4723]“'put also all non-Comnmist Europ ites legitimacy ts total, . But the
[4725]same can not be said for most Lt Yhe difference La decisive
[4727]and perhaps ‘sonetimes neglected.
[4729]d, We in the US tend %o Look at subve: reion in Letin America
[4730]fron the point-of-view of hardware. Bub a great deal of ‘she subversion
[4731]tn Latin norton is or at deast Sppears as iden-centered, not hardware-
[4733]conte ee The export of “armed sagresst "by, dedicated revolutionaries
[4735]: ds only a é port. of the ‘process, Another paz dart, watch is sat ‘Least as impor-
[4737]: tant, and probably more 80,. is the export ¢ of ‘propaganda, This, he ver,
[4739]to much ‘of the world, ‘tetudine Letined mores outside of ‘the oligerchies,
[4740]will appeer as an export of idens and ideals (perheps wrong, bub never-
[4741]7 theless 4deas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the
[4743]SB | ot
[4745](BoP SECRET ~ BENSTTIVE
[4747]_@, Most people generally recognize thet when violent subversion -
[4750]i
[4751]p.
[4752]i
[4754]i
[4756]4
[4758]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1274
[4761]SECHET -
[4763]“lating viewpoints, We are very close to putting ourselvee into the
[4765]- position of “the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute foree against
[4766]the power: of idens. The tre ap is that we may seem thereby to be acknow~
[4767]edging thé decline and duminent fall of our own ideas.
[4769]cry . One consequence e of thie line of reasoning would be that,
[4770]Lf we ever find it necessary to invede Cubs, we‘ should do “$0 in stop
[4771]7 the firing squads," “to guarantee free elections," -~ but not to’ save
[4773]_Bonoza
[4775]6 ‘How feasible is it for us to comtrol both-kinds of subversion .
[4777]at. the ‘tanget rather then at ‘the source?
[4779]fully controlled subver sion except in t the dubious case of S. Vietnor
[4780]Even tn the: difficult ease of Greece » we succeeded aa a - combine tion of
[4782]military ond economic measured.
[4784]vig the problems» rather it is often practicable and also often the mos’
[4785]sirable way a ~ 2 Ce 7 ak :
[4786]’ Suppose ‘that. we decided to invade cuba to control Subversion
[4788]sen the result (Comes eases):
[4790]2, That ve. “vestored, the st eo agte Castro. |
[4792]be: . Theat ‘for. seesons of expedicney we try to maintain Castro's
[4793]yeforus” -+ 1.a., what many ‘Letinoes) ‘would régerd as "socialism."
[4794]e, That ve gave the Cuban peovle an chvious free choice, no
[4796](— —_ matter whet ensued. -
[4798]nism in the Western Hemisphere
[4800]How would the prospects for Cav
[4802]a
[4804]“ye affected? -
[4806]7
[4808]So AS _ semen seonrderipersrst
[4810]Be is often feasible. This is how we have in fact succesé~ | a
[4812]2’, The point is not that this is always a fensible wey of hand-
[4814]m
[4815]HY 50955 Docld:32423736 Page 125
[4817]Casé Bs There would be strong popular Latin American support,
[4818]et
[4820]“.. $ome governmental outrage , but the prospects for Commmism would be
[4822]diminished,
[4824]Case C: Paradoxically, the reault would depend on what ensued,
[4826]because most Latin Americans do not trust~the, US: (and particularly would
[4829]be skeptical of "roe elections" if US seldiers were present }:~
[4831]oo * goNeLsTONS 2 | .
[4833]2, Conditions in most parte of Latin America ere such that sub-
[4835]‘version (oxen or > Bloo or - poth) is really dang Zerous,
[4837]2, Since this is 80, the US ‘ublic posture should not recomize
[4839]Mats; and. we should abstain frou public pronouncezents that subversion
[4841]is conceivably a casus belli,
[4842]4, The point-of-view Bet forth in this paper, insofar as it can
[4844]be made opefative, may tend to bring & fundamental eLignnent between the
[4846]“US publi ¢ posture and LA opinion,
[4848]ood, the us course . of ac tion towards ‘any Ll country has to veign the
[4849]catvant ages and dtendventoses, , in any Ge ven case at any given tine 7 or
[4851]gubversion eontrol () at gource or ()-2 at +! point of. impect.
[4853]5. Te satus principles. ‘vould apply af another comamist-oriented
[4855]goverment 1 were to: “eone to power tn any part of latin ‘America,
[4857]TOP s sucker - _ SINSTTIVE BO aa
[4859]Cese As Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the — : arn
[4861]‘prospects for Comumisn, Bg ea
[4863]Si
[4866]HY 50955 Docld: 32423736 Page 1276
[4868]a | [2]
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198-10007-10013.pdf | [1]198-10007-10013 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[4]Identification Form
[6]AGENCY :
[7]RECORD NUMBER :
[9]RECORD SERIES :
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[13]Agency Information
[15]ARMY
[16]198-10007- 10013
[18]CALIFANO PAPERS
[20]ORIGINATOR :
[21]FROM:
[22]TO:
[24]TITLE:
[26]DATE:
[27]PAGES:
[29]SUBJECTS :
[31]DOCUMENT TYPE:
[32]CLASSIFICATION :
[33]RESTRICTIONS :
[34]CURRENT STATUS :
[35]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[37]OPENING CRITERIA :
[39]Document Information
[41]CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
[43]00/00/0000
[44]17
[46]CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
[48]CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
[49]CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS
[50]AND ARMS
[52]EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
[53]SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL
[54]AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
[56]STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY
[57]CAPABILITIES
[59]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[60]Secret
[62]1B;4
[64]Redact 5
[65]04/09/1998
[67]COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder 6. Draft report concerning control of access to and surveillance of
[68]Cuba.
[69]nt of the Amy EO 18526
[70]Pa Decl cI Exclude © Exempt
[71], ARUt Ot
[72]NO STATE OBJECTION Refer To By LL: CAG
[74]TOD
[75]BY.
[79]HW 50955 Docld: 32424006
[81]DATE
[83]SSIFICATION Review Date
[84]epiyla
[86]Page 1
[88]BRAPT
[90]a. Developed highly useful information on feequency
[91]of Cuban “chartered flights to Bragdl, names and nationalities
[92]of passengers ead orew, oad lax measures of control followed
[94]by Brasilien authorities. Transmitted this dafermation to
[96]@ation ehiefs in the Letin American countries ef the nen-
[97]Breailiens travelling on these flights.
[99]b. Maintained cloge watch over travel to and from
[101]€ubs. See Amex 3 fer table of known travel of Latin Americans
[102]during July and August. |
[104]¢, 4g @ result of information furnished by him by the
[105]CIA Station in Buense Aires end with the Station's urging, the
[106]Atgentine Minister ef Interie: tudiested thet be would make
[107]every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the
[108]International Union of Architects Cengress im Havana.
[110]a. At the urging of the CIA Statden end the Snbasey
[111]the Bolivian Mindeter of Interior issued in mid-July ea orde¢
[112]prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on erher
[114]| blec countries te Bolivien naticnals.
[116]SEGRED
[118]HY 50955 Docld: 32424006 Page 2
[121]@, Partly ae a result of the efforts of the CIA
[122]etetion im Santiago, the Ceverment of Chile prohibited the
[123]| ban sponsored Sacend
[124]Congress, which bad been achedeled to tke
[125]place in Sautiage in August, ‘Thie was ome of the fectors which
[127]entry inte Chile of or;
[129]tatie 2
[131]led to postponement ef thet
[133]£, After considerable prodding by the CIA Station |
[135]and the Lebessy the Minister of Publie Securiey of Costa Rice |
[136]ee presented legislative propesa )
[137]which will gequive 211 persens intending to travel te Communi
[139]lg t¢ She Coata Rican Assembly
[141]| countries te have thelr travel appr
[142] Seata Rilean wocurtty agency
[143]g. CIA Station ia Moxie
[145]ing the elandestine errivel of passengers fa Vera Crus
[147]‘Guban merchant ships, #fferte are bet:
[149]guade to ebtein more
[151]information and to encourage atrictar
[153]authorities,
[155]Gulneen suthorities to deny use of aixpert feetiieles by fiighea
[156]on Esbana-teaced route, These efforts achieved « temporary
[157]withholding of pernlesion for future regular flights, at least
[159]HY 50955 Docld: 327424006 Page 3
[161]until such time es the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities
[162]at Conaxry,.
[163]> Enettected Embassy Blo te approach Braci lian
[165]a
[167]authorities to eapress our deep concern at the growing frequency
[168]o£ Cuban non-echedulad flights te Breedi and request their
[169]cooperation im curbing then, Alao instructed eur Eubaseies
[171]is several latin American countries to work with CIA etation |
[172]thiefe in furnishing the names of nationale of those
[173]travelling on these flights to lecal authorities and weging
[175]eon erles
[177]thea: (1) co dmetdeute tighter controls on their ow eitiaens
[179]travelling te Cube, aad @ iv euprese theiy concern te the
[180]- RN MEW T
[181]neaoeet é Brantt wer Cuban use of Bragil aa a way station
[183]fev transporting dubversives.
[185]@, As @ vesult of sepresentetions wade to the Brinich
[186]goverment about Cuban flighte to the Cayman Islends carrying
[187]latina fueriecan subversives, the British developed an sduindeteative
[188]echona which will offecetvoly peobible the veo of British
[189]Caribbean dependencies by Cubana eg transit polats for passengers.
[190]The British taten
[192]. to wequive teaneit vieas of passengers pacsiug
[193]through their areas, and to reject applications for auek wises
[194]eucept in certain special cases, Parsons not posecosing vieas
[196]would be prevented from leaving their atxeragt, ee would be
[198]HY 450955 Docld:327424006 Page 4
[201]Mesles City oa August: a te
[202]anferm the Mexican eislinc CMA that the United States is
[204]opposed te a proposal that GA operate oharter lights te caxry
[206]vefugees from Havana to Central Avex 103, eh, as a result,
[207]atated that they hed us intention of procecding furchar with
[209]this project,
[211]ucted U.S, Miselone im Curaces amd the Ha gue
[213]bat REM was. ploneiag te venew «6
[214]tights and to reiterate
[216]‘ean US opposition
[218]088 mptlon of aie service to Ceba, KLM agcured cur Eabeesy
[219]thee there do 20 “plan to initiate dervice, scheduled or nonq
[220]scheduled, to Hebans,
[222]om Suguse 1 thet the Governor had no knowledge of any talks
[224]betucen the 8,6, Mindeery of Commmleations and the. Cuban Gov
[226]ment vegardiag Lending rights for Cubana py:
[228]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 5
[231]sed elie te refuse te agelet the Ceben goverment
[233]otte to fied & ghoxt seute for zetumnf the a8 American
[234]‘by Gamers } Cube, Also Jaferned Pan
[236]& that wo were eppseed te « Cuban request for
[238]gions at Sort of Spain and
[240]ades on guveral ecensions te appreseh these govexomente to
[242]cam of the 0.8, at iedlentions of Gubso daverest
[244]in the use of their aviation fectiivies,
[246]expresa the oe
[248]diable that would enable
[249]vereats of alzewatt vithia their turmricery,
[251]cated caceptivences to the progessi et
[255]HY 50955 Doold:327424006 Page 6
[257]announcing during Auguat that the meeting bed beoa posteoncd,.
[258]k, Semh general instructions to eur miagionas im cuumiries
[259]whieh pactieipate ia the International tm
[261]Lon of Architects aching
[262]thes to urge the cooperation of gov
[264]asmeatel authorities in
[265]preventing ey discouragiag the attendance of they citizens to
[266]the VEE UIA Congeese fin Habana, Septenber 29-0eteber 4, 1963.
[268]i this up with fostruectone to individual geste te bey
[269]2 feasible to dissuade architecte from free world countries
[270]from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs
[272]SORECORE
[274]HY 50955 Docld: 32424006 Page 7
[276]Responding te the urging of the O1A Seatton aolice
[277]of the State of Guemsbara seized large quantities of grape
[278]ganda brought inte Brazil by passe
[280]agers on the spectal Cubéas
[282]flighta. For exemple, soma $0 pounds of printed propaganda
[284]was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16
[285]Aaguat Cabena flight.
[287]a Continued eurveillencse of the area surrounding Cuba
[288]uring the month of July at the seme cate and with the same
[289]emphasis es pelex to 1 July 1963.
[291]&. Continued te maintain U.S. Forces, peimarily from
[293]within the Atlentie Comend, available te assiet other Caribbean
[295]srnments ia the interception of suepleious craft in
[296]territorial watexe, a8 might be requested. Be euch requests were
[298]weeelved from aay other govern
[300]ment during the perfed covered by
[301]this report. However, U.S. Perces did keep trapk of the
[302]location of the Soviet werchant freighter METCHURINSE, which
[304]HY 450955 Docld: 327424006 Page 6
[307]ves suspected of caprying subveusives and erue from Gcbe te
[308]British Guieme ia sid-Joly. MITCHURINGK was under U9.
[309]auxveillance from ite departura from Havens witil Ueited
[310]Kingdom forces aesumed the task of heeping this ship wader
[311]survellianee upon ite epproach to Georgetown, British Guiana.
[312]Subsequentiy, Beitish police search of MITCHURINGE in Beittich
[313]Gulane waters revealed nothing of suspieious nature.
[315]&A¢ the repeated urging of the GLA Station in Idma
[317]the Peruvian Government law in August publiehed a new anti~
[318]terrorists lew providing a penalty of no less then five years
[319]‘inpeteonnant for paredns who pertielate ta guerrilla setivities
[320]ex in the illegel mmutace
[322]ine of weapons or explosives.
[324]The Pemivien Mational Intelligence Service is working
[325]o8 6 lead formished by che CLA Station in Lime concerning 2
[326]200 fon vessel teportediy tuvelved in axene tragfte,
[328]cructed our Consulate General in Geergetewn to
[330]investigeta reports that commercial eargoes (which could coneeal
[331]diliet® arms
[333]traffie wut of Cube) bad developed between British
[334]Gulans and Culie. Investigations ta date have been negative.
[336]HY 50955 Docld:327424006 Page 9
[339]Coeperated with the Foreign Assate Control Office of
[340]the Treasury Department in developing blocking eonteols with
[341]respect te Cuba whieh went inte effect on July 9, 1963.
[343]& Continued the inetellation of military comuniea~
[344]tions Kecilities in Levin America. Cperational dates for the
[345]wulti-channel radio stations te be iustalled im Menegua,
[347]‘Weerague and Tegucigelpe, Headuras have been delayed to 15
[348]Geteber 1962 and 18 Decerber 1963, feupectively because of new
[349]engiasering and eontenctual tequirementa, Hegetlattens are
[350]continuing with Coloubie end Eeuador for installation of U.S.
[351]wilitary adie facilities. Con
[353]wietion of a now commereial treng-
[355]istimian cable in the Pang
[357]sa Cone fone within the cesing meath,
[358]ie expected to Improve militery eommunientions within the
[359]~in-Chlef, U.S. Sewthern Command
[360]b. Continued the surveillance of Guba by U.S. Forces ,
[362]reporting ae before te 0.8. ndazs, orgentsationa end agencies.
[364]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 10
[366]al
[368]BSeporta of gurvedlieneé kava been dieseniuated to all whe have
[370]& tequirement te know.
[371]@. Eotabliiehed 2 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty
[373]waten et the 0.8. Milidtery Grevps in the Caribbean coumtries in
[375]conjunction with tuplementetion of the military alerting system.
[377]Continuad efferte to staff the U.S. Southers Command Intelligence
[378]Center wlth preperly cleaged, trateed personnel (thia center is
[379]the wilitary fecal point toe relaying information couceraing
[381]the movement of subversives). Piiled, partially, the authorized
[382]billets in the U.S. Soothera
[384]took wider consideration the problem of en imeresen im the billee
[386]etrueture in the Centex. the Commaz
[388]Command together with bis tetelligence officer visited Bondures
[389]aad Nicaragua aud datermined thet wo eignificant preblems existed
[390]which would interfere with e€ective operations ta these
[391]countries.
[393]€. detion previously initiated by the Commander, U.S.
[395]Reval Forces, Southern Commend (COMUSNAVSO) to eastebiieh a Beall
[397]seit Inepeetion and Training Team (GCIATT) es « contribution tc
[398]the Caribbean Surveillance Syaten is progressing satisfactorily.
[400]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 11
[403]jignment of U.S. Coast Guoré personnel to SCIATT
[404]im the Canal Zone has been aperoved and the 0.8. Coast Guard
[406]hag teken appropriate implementing actions.
[408]@. During the perlod of thie zeport, the SCIATY con~
[409]ductes an ourthe-job training course at Pumtsrenes, Coste
[410]Rica. Traiming wee given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
[411]ef Coste Riea whe wore. either eawly asgiened to the 40 faor.
[412]Goast Guard utiliey beate (CG@UBe) or were to be abetgned as
[413]geplacenest @raw members.
[415]&. A quavterly inepection and evalestion ef the cauns
[417]provided ether Central Anerican countries waa conducted ducing
[418]the perieé 17 to 31 Augest by a aebdle training team @tTT)
[419]made up of SCLATT persormmel.
[420]. @. Contiaued efferce to improve the internal security
[421]of Latin deerican armies through the mrevision of intel Ligenes
[422]ivisote. Presently these are ouch advisors segigned te 14
[424]| ‘Latia countries, emphasising counterintelligence aud counters
[425]subveraion.
[427]h. uring the reporting period HiTs cenducted tralaing
[428]in eounterineurgerey for the armed foxces of Coloubia, Bolivie,
[429]Venasusle, Tera end £1 Salvador.
[431]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 12
[434]i. Givyie detlon MTTe were sent to Cuatenale, Bolivia, i
[435]Colonbia, 21 Selvader, Jamaton aad Teudder.
[437]GIA Stations througheut hands fmerieca continued in a
[438]great majority of countries to fureieh co the local daternal
[439]jnom they axe in Liaison informe
[441]tion comeerning travelers te and from Cuba, ag well as such
[442]information es came te CIA's attention comeeraing the movenent
[443]of funds, ami and propagende waterial. Ia meay inetances, the
[444]fureiehing of information to the inte:
[445]the GTA Station was paralleled by tha Surmiehtar of similes
[446]information te the fotelen offices by the Aebescader of Ais
[448]i security service by
[450]repregentative. The gesponse te thie inforestion hes varied
[451]greatly. The Centeal deeriean countries, in geueral, begen to
[452]pay attention te the information ond teke action on de. At the
[454]éuring Che reporting period
[456]te follow ep on the iafermetion.
[458]a. RBeitereted te the Porelen Minister of Pera our
[459]imterest in having the facte of the Puerte Meldonade incident
[461]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 13
[463]brought. te the attention ef the O49, and urged thet this action
[465]hon 9 soon oe paseibie.
[466]be Uxged the Goverment of Guatemala te submde avideace
[467]e€ communist activity to che OAS,
[469]cen ee . . Lo . Lo. . cnet oe tele
[471]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 14
[473]Rivernctnncanceen
[476]intteucted imbesey Le Pan to follow uo elosely oa
[477]charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal polities
[478]of Bolivia, and, at the Bubs
[480]say's disewetion, te point out to
[481]Bolivien officiale the opportunity for a possible aveck ia
[482]uéletions with Cuba. Rebaesy Le Pex was not able to press’.
[483]for @ break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did aot
[484]prove to be se conclueive ce originally reportad..
[486]Report trenenithiag the deeument to the goveramente
[487]and urging then te ispleneat the epecifte and general recom
[488]nigtions ¢ontained thereia as soon a6 possible.
[491]raat of the matters which wa wanted to hawe eoasidexed
[493]magua informed the Mlearseven
[495]duting the inforusl meeting of the Winieters of Security end
[496]interfer of the Iethuian countries hald im Mengeua, duguat
[497]26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
[498]Neneacve Se
[500]uzity Conference countries later thie year.
[502]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 15
[505]&. Resssured President Schick of Wlearegua fin tho
[506]most eephatic tarmm that the Nuclear Test Ban Trenty did net
[507]mean thet our attitude toward Cagtre hes altered in che
[509]slightest, end eteessed cur interest in seeing steady eroprese -
[511]by all the Isthelen coumeries im iuplemeating the recoumenda~ —
[512]tions of the Mandgue fee
[513]subversive efforts.
[515]city Conference to bieck Cuban |
[517]é Eepletined tn detail the asture of the Cuban theest
[518]and the celeted poll
[520]“y Gbjectives of the U.9., during conversa-
[522]mad ton with Me. Aden Wateon, newly
[523]appointed Unitish Aubasseder to Cuba.
[525]be Agency's pregs service during the reporting
[526]period trenemitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounder:
[527]on ite wireless file service co USTA posts thicoughe wt i
[529]ica Spanish broadeasts to Latin Ameriece carried « total of
[530]28 commentaries and features on the sulject of Cuben-based
[532]subversion in addition to the weguler reporting of develoguents
[534]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 16
[537]&. In vessense to steading Agency ingtruetians eo give
[539]epectel attention to develooments veleged te Cuba~based
[541]gubveraion, USIS poste in Latin, America were prompt ta reporting
[543]inedéents ond in providing editerial comments fren the Letina
[545]feaglesa press, all of whieh wes used in the Ageney's radio and
[546]the main developments treated in the Agency's redie and
[548]prase eoverage included Castro’s July 26 2
[550]patch urging revelu-
[551]tions in Latin dmeriea, the diewovery ef terrecist seapons
[552]fectories iu Guayaquil, the Bouse « Vieo President's encushon
[554]Cuban tenponsibiliey for terrerdam, the statensnt by State
[556]Departaent Prees Officer Richerd Phillips that “poential
[558]gubversive agente” trem Cube te the Carfbbeaa area were passing
[559]through Gren Caymen, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader
[560]for veeaiving fondle toon Cubs, Castwe-trained tercariecs ia
[562]Honduras, /Relivien protests againuet unddidug by the Coben Eebaan;
[564]a. preying reporter fa
[565]tomtes on the,
[567]da the miner’s strike. <A Voles of Ameri.
[569]Letin dueries provided aeveral ceperte ad:
[571]gubversion picture in countries he viedted.
[573]e. Te auppert of the dgemey’s effort on Cuban-based
[574]subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
[576]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 17
[578]L
[580]Pas Sy .
[581]thres peuphlets during the pariod besed on Castro's report of «
[582]hie visit to the Soviet Uelon (showing that he coneradieted
[584]laien of Soviet progress) .
[585]wider Castro, and tha fate
[587]the losses suffered by Cuban Labor
[588]ef political gpgisosare im Cuba. “hen completed, thea pacphlers
[589]will be reproduced and distributed in quantity thrawwhewt the
[591]area.
[593]HY 50955 Docld:32424006 Page 18 | [2]
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198-10007-10021.pdf | [1]198-10007-10021
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]AGENCY :
[6]RECORD NUMBER :
[8]RECORD SERIES :
[10]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[12]ORIGINATOR :
[13]FROM:
[14]TO:
[16]TITLE:
[18]DATE:
[19]PAGES:
[21]SUBJECTS :
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[24]CLASSIFICATION :
[25]RESTRICTIONS :
[26]CURRENT STATUS :
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[29]OPENING CRITERIA : .
[31]COMMENTS :
[35]HY 50955 Docld: 32424014
[37]JFK Assassination System Date:
[38]Identification Form
[40]6/24/201
[42]Agency Information
[44]ARMY
[45]198-10007-10021
[47]CALIFANO PAPERS
[49]Document Information
[51]ICCCA
[52]CHMN, SUBCMMT ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
[53]MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
[55]REPORT FOR JULY-AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST
[56]SUBVERSION
[58]09/30/1963
[59]23
[61]ENHANCEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN
[62]SUBVERSION
[64]STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY
[65]CAPABILITIES
[67]CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
[69]CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
[71]SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL
[72]AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
[74]CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERILLAS
[75]AND ARMS
[77]CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
[79]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[80]Secret
[82]1B; 4
[84]Redact
[86]04/08/1998
[88]Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion to the _
[89]members of the Committee re: Report for July-August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist
[90]Subversion.
[92]TERK LereJ
[94]partment of the Army EO 13526
[95]ideclassiy [3 Exclude — Exempt
[97]Authorlty,
[99]© Refer To , a
[100]Review Date ae 3075 py (es :
[102]30
[104]Page 1
[106]os
[108]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 2
[110]Alt
[112]SECRET
[113]September 36, 1963
[114]TO; Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist .
[115]Subversion,
[116]FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion
[118]SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to
[119]Combat Castro-Commumnist Subversion,
[121]Attached is a draft of the Subeommittee's veport for
[122]July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-
[123]communist subversion in the hemisphere. ‘The draft has been
[124]prepared on the basie of the material which you furnished
[125]with certain modification, The CIA menbers will note that I
[126]have extracted from his submiasion the iteus of action taken
[127]and pleced these in the body of the report. The intelligence
[128]information contained in the subuission I. have made inte an
[129]amnex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence
[130]data form part of the report, and request that in the future
[131]the CIA member prepare his submisiion in two parts.
[133]May I have your comments on the draft by close of
[134]business October 1, 1963.
[136]€oples to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
[137]DOD - Gol, Haig (2)-—“7eG AF 0
[138]USIA - Mr. Wagley (1)
[139]RAR ~ Mr. Hart (1)
[141]Justice - Mr. Geogheghan (1) 2 OP 63 —
[142]Luffe Calli
[143]tech Gililed tatty o- Aigpl of
[145]V-3B -Car Slip tee
[149]RA t Exclud cA
[150]9/30/63 d ed from atttomatig
[151]and ;
[153]5 Owngradin ng
[156]SECRET
[159]aCe of awd coples
[160]GROUP J _
[162]Excluded fr My . *
[163]Om au atte"
[164]downgrading and tomart
[168]a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
[170]of Cuban “chertered™ flighte to Brasil, names and nationalities
[171]of passengers and crew, and lax measures ef eantrel followed
[172]by Brazilian authorities. Tranemitted this infermation te
[173]gation chiefs in the Letin American countries of the Rnon=
[174]Erasilians travelling on these flighte.
[176]-b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
[177]Guba. See Annex B for table of known txavel of Latin Americans
[179]éuviag July and Auguet.
[181]¢. AS & result of information furnished by him by the
[182]CLA Station im Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the
[183]Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make
[184]every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the
[185]fnternational Uniew of Architects Congrese ia Hevena.
[187]d. At the urging of the CIA Stacien amd the Eubasey
[188]the Bolivien Minieter of Interior isaued in mid-Jely on order
[189]prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cube om other
[191]blee coumtries to Bolivien nationale.
[193]HY 450955 Docld: 327424014 Page 3
[196]@, Partly as a result of tha efforts of the CIA
[197]etation in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
[198]entry inte Chile ef orgraizers of the Cuban sponsored Second
[199]latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to teke
[200]pleee in Santiago im August. This wie ome ef the fectere which
[201]led to peatponement ef theCongres
[203]£. After considerable predding by the CIA Station
[204]and the Embessy the Minister of Public Seeuricy of Costa Mica
[205]i presented legislative proposals to the Gosta Rican Assenbly
[206]which will require ali persons intending to travel te Communiet
[208]-eounteLes te have theirs trevel approved by a newly created
[209]| Costa Risea seeurlty agency.
[210]a. CA Station in Mexice City developed information
[212]eonceraing the clandestine arrival of piigcengers in Vera Crus
[213]on Gaban merchant hips. Efforts are being made to obtain more
[214]fafermation and te encourage stricter contzola by the Mexican
[216]authorities,
[218]@, FInetructed Embassy Conskry to mry to persuade
[219]Guinean authorities to deny use of aixport facilities by flights
[221]about . These efferte achieved a temporary
[222]withholding of permicsion for future regulaz flighte, at least
[224]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 4
[229]«ntti such time as tho Soviets develop theiy oom refueling facilities
[231]at Conekey.
[232]b
[234]lL. authorities to expres
[236]o€ Cuban non-scheduled elights te Broad] and request thely
[238]eooperation in curbing then, Also instructed our Eubass’,
[240]in several latin American countries to work with GIA atation
[241]chiefs in furnishing the nameo of nacionale of those conmerios
[242]travelling on these flights to lecal
[243]tthe 2) to inotitute tighter coutrole on theiy own citizens
[244]seavelane to Cuba, end (2) to express thety evarer
[245]vy Ge ve Rum ENT
[246]s& BraciiSver Cuban use of Braud] ae a way station
[248]a to the
[250]e, Ag a reeult of representations made to the British
[251]cvercncit ehout Cuban flights to the Cayaan Islands carrying
[252]gun subversives, the Brieish develeped sn adwinierrative |
[253]echeme whieh whit etinotively oni bLe the use of Britich
[255]The Brdcish intend to. requir
[256]through theix arens, and to reject applications for auch visas
[258] teamelt wlase of paadengers peseing
[260]except in certain special cases, Persons not posseseing visas
[262]would be prevented fcom leaving theie abrereft, or would be
[264]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 5
[266]between the B.G, Ministry of €
[268]veturned to their point of origin,
[270]a, Instructed Bubassy Mexieo ity on August ap to:
[271]iaformm the Mexiean airline CMA that the Ualted Btates is
[272]opposed te @ proposal that (@& operate chaxter flights to carry
[273]vefugees fron Havana to Central Aneries, as, ag & reeult,
[275]stated thet chey had ne iacention of proceading further with
[276]” this project,
[278]e, Inetzwsted 8.8. Missions in Curaca
[280]te invedtigete e report thet ELM was planning te venew sb.
[281]echeduled Curacso-Habane flights and to reiterate US epposition
[282]te xesumption of afr services to cubs + KEM acgured our Embassy
[283]that thera 16 no plan te initlete service, schadvled or nen-
[284]scheduled, to Habaua,
[286]£, Inetructed Eubassy Ottawa to ozpress our strong
[287]ebjections te a proposal that a Gubagse charter light pick up
[288]& seeond group ef 0.8. students im Mentreel to fly them to Cuba.
[289]The (light wis not authorized.
[291]@. Tnstructed Consulate Georgetown to lavesticate
[292]2 Approaches to sceure flight facilities. Miesien reported
[294]en Auguct 1 thet the Governor hed no knowledge of any talks.
[295]communications and the Cuban Govern-
[296]ment regarding landing eights for Cubans planes. The Governor
[298]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 6
[301]| Barbedos on several occasions te approach
[303]adyiced,
[305]ner the Cubea nor the Brivich
[307]mmments of Hexles, Canada, Jonaies
[308]“ge to apsiet the Cuban, government
[309]ashore route for return gfthe So American
[310]etedents whe sttepiaty travelled to Cube, Also informed Pan
[311]ixenys that we ware opposad te a Cuban request for
[312]@ PAA charter flight te fly the students from Hebons te Hew York,
[313]4. Instructed ony edseieas et Port of Spain and |
[315]ehesa govermments to
[316]arn of the 0.3. at indteations of Gui
[318]ban dacerese
[320]im the wee of theis aviation fackiietes.
[322] *Babsasey Fert of Spain discussed with the Foveiga §
[323]idad variouy legel moves available that would eaable
[324]mente of alveraft within their territory,
[326]emmples of auch controle inetituted by Mextec, Cansda
[327]@ad Irelend, We indieaved teeeptivenass te the prepeeal that
[328]the list of suggestions be made avatlable to the avia:
[330]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 7
[333]wged the government of Chile to refuse visas te Cuban delegerée
[334]$0 @ preparatory meoting planaime for the TI latin American.
[335]Youth Congress echeduled fer August ia the Chilean capital,
[337]iosbiiity of Cuban delegates to obtain Chiifan vieae for this
[339]meeting io one of the contributing factors te the Cuban eponsore
[341]necunoing duriag August that the
[342]&, Sent general instructions to eur missiens in countries
[344]which partieipate in the Intereatienal tinten |
[346]preventing or dlocouraging the attendance of theie citizens to
[347]the VIE UIA Congress fa Babana, September 29-Oeteber 4, 1963.
[348]Follewed this up with instructions to individual peste to try
[350]where feasible to dissuade architects from
[352]mecting had been postponed.
[354]af Architects acking
[356]then to urge the «
[358]free world countries
[359]mg om the juxy fer the selection of a Bay of Pige
[361]that world beve required the establisimant of scheduled weskly
[363]charter £lighte by Canadian planes.
[365]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 6
[368]2»
[370]Responding to the urging ef the CEA Station police
[372]of the Stete of Guanabara selaed ierge quaatities of prepa~
[373]ganda brought inte Brasil by passengere on the special Cubane_
[374]flights. For exemple, some 50 pounde of printed propaganda
[375]wae taken from the various passengera whe arrived on the 16
[376]dugust Cubana flight. |
[378]3.
[380]a Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba
[381]during the month of July at the seme vare and with the eone
[382]euphasies as prier te L July 1963.
[384]bs Continued te maintein 0.5. Forces, primarily from
[386]within the Atlantic Command, available to asciec other Caribbean
[388]govermients in the inteveaption ef suspieious craft in
[389]territorial waters, 4s might be requested. No euch requests were
[390]vecsived from any other govermmant during the period covered by
[391]this report. However, U.S. Forces did heep track of the
[392]Lecation of the Seviet merchant Freighter METCHURINGE, which
[394]HY 50955 Docld: 327424014 Page 9
[397]was suspected of carryiag sulwersives and arms fram Cube to
[398]Britieh Goiene in mid-July. MITCHURINSE was under U.S.
[399]surveillance from its departure from Heavens wtti Gaited
[400]Ringdom forces assumed the task of keeping thie chip under
[401]surveillance upon its appreach to Georgetown, British Cotena.
[402]Subsequently, British poldee ssexch of NITCHURTNSE in British
[404]Guiane waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.
[406]AC the repeated urging of the CIA Beation in Line
[408]the Peruvian Government
[411]terrerists law providing a penalty of as less than five years
[412]inpriscment for perseas who partieiate in suersilla setivities
[414]ox in the illegal manufacture of weapene or explosives.
[416]Lidgence Service is working
[417]on a load ferntiched by the CIA Station ta Eames concerning e@
[418]200 ton vessel ceportedly tnvelved in ames traffic.
[420]ingtructed our Consulate General in Georpetewa to
[421]investigate eports that coumércial cargoes (whieh could conceal
[422]illleit amas traffic out of Cube) had developed betwean British
[423]Gulene end Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.
[425]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 10
[428]fa. Continuad the inetelletion of military commonieas
[429]tions faeili¢ies im Latin America. Gperational dates for the
[430]multi-channel tadio stations te be ingtalied fe Menagua,
[432]| Niesragua and Tegucigetpa, Hondures have been delayed to 15
[433]Seteber 1963 and 15 Desexher 1963, vespectively because of new
[434]engineering and contractual, requirenente. Regetiations are
[436]continuing with Colosbta and He:
[438]aader for inetallation af U.S.
[439]military radie fecilicies. Coupleation ef a new cormercial traiee
[440]istheien cable in the Panene
[442]Canal Zone within the eaming u
[444]4s expected to inprove wilitery communications whthia the
[446]Wer-in-Ghies ». 8.5. Southern Command
[448]b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forcas,
[450]taporting ae before tO GBs RAT dere organdenté ous end agencies.
[452]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 11
[455]“Loe=
[457]Reports of survelilenee have been disseminated te ali who have
[458]a TeqGiretest to imow. , |
[460]e. Established « 24 hour pex day, 7 deys per week duty
[461]wateh et the 0.8. Military Groupe im the Carthbean coustries ta
[462]conjunction with implementation of the eliitary alerting system.
[463]Continued afferte to staf the 0.8. Southern Cow
[465]mond Intelligence
[466]Center with properly cleared, trained pévsonnel (thie center te
[467]the militery focal point for relaying imforzation concerning
[469]the movenent of subwersives). Filled, par
[471]ially, the authorizad
[473]biliets ts the 0.6. Soutiewn C6 pret vs intelligence Center and
[475]took under consideration the problem of an inérease in the biliet
[476]etrueture ia the Cente oineChied, U.S. Seutharn
[477]Command tegether with hie intelligence officer visited Houduras
[479]crmined thag ae ¢ignificant problems existed
[480]whieh would Interfore with effective operations in these
[482]a. Aetion previsusly initiated by the Ceumander, U.8.-
[484]eval Forees, Sovthera Commend (COuUSt,
[486]AVSO) to establish a Small
[487]reft inseeetion and Training Team, (sciarr) #8 @ contribution te
[488]the Cavibbean Surveillance System
[490]he progressing satiefertori ly.
[492]a
[494]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 12
[497]and pergomel to SCLATT
[498]in. the Canal fone has been eporoved and the .3. east Guard
[500]has taken appropriete feplemanting actions.
[502]wring the pariod of this repert, the SCIATY con-
[503]custed an on-the-job training course at Pontorenss, Costa
[504]Ries. Tradmiog wos given to 13 me
[506]era of the Guardia Civil
[507]of Gosta Rilea whe were aither sewly assigned te the 40 foot
[509]wd willicy beate (COUBs) or were toe be assigned aa
[511]replacement erew monbers.
[513]& A quavterly inspection and evaluation of the eGlEs
[514]previded othar Central Anerican countries was eendueted during
[515]the peried 17 te 31 August by « mobile traiming team (FFT)
[516]made up of SCLATT porscimell, .
[518]g» Continued efforts te improve the interns] security
[519]of Latin snextenn aruies through the prevision of Tntelligenca
[520]Agvleors <. Presently there aca guch advisers assigned to 14
[522]' Leeda éountries, enpheniging counterintelligence and counter-
[523]eubvereion. |
[525]h. During the reporting period MI%s conducted training
[526]in counterinsucgency Cor the armed feress of Colesbia, Bolivia,
[527]Venesuele, Yeru and 81 Sabvader.
[529]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 13
[532]oi?
[533]i. Civie Action MITs were gent te Guatemala, Bolivia,
[535]great majacity of countries te fursieh to the local internal
[537]security or gare
[539]nehlens with when they are in idaieson taforme-
[541]tion concoming travelers to end from Cuba, ae well as such
[543]information as eae te CIA's attention concerning the moveuent
[544]ot fuads, aews and propagenda material. In tony instances, the
[545]furnishing of informatio:
[547]ernal security service by
[548]the CIA Station was garalleled by the furnishing of etmiler
[549]information te the foreign offiee by the Aubaseader or his
[550]veptésentetive. The respente te this inferention has varled
[552]éounteies, im gemereal, began te
[554]pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the
[555]. a curing the reperting seried
[557]to follow up on the informacion,
[559]& RBeiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru oar
[560]interest in having the facts of the Pusete Maldooade ineddent
[562]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 14
[565]brought te the attentlim of the GAS, and ereed that thie ae¢ion
[567]be teben e¢ soon ae posetbie.
[569]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 15
[572]ingtructed Embasay La Pas to follow up clegely on
[573]charges of Lovolvement of Cuben mlasion is internal politics.
[574]at Bolivia, and, at the Bubaesy’s dtecretion, ts. point out to
[575]Bolivien ¢ffleleis the opportunity fox 4 possible break in’
[576]relations with Cube. Eabagsy Le Paz wae net able to press
[577]for a break whea the ‘evidence of Cuban intervention did not
[579]prove te be es conclusive as originally ceported.;
[581]Bs
[583]and urging them te duplement the spacifSe end general recom
[584]mendations contained thereia es soon as poagibie.
[586]b. Through Embassy Menagua ieformed the Nicaraguan
[588]vernment of the matters which we wanted to have considered
[589]curing the informal meeting ef the Minieters ef Sacurity end
[591]interler of the Isthmian countries held in Managua
[592]26-28 in preparetion for the second formal meeting of the
[594]Managua Security Genference countries later thie year. :
[596]pin og
[597]& RE ni:
[599]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 16
[602]c. Reateured President Schick of Nicaragua in the
[604]moot emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban fraaty did pot
[605]mean that our ateliades rower:
[607]Castre hes altered in the
[608]lightest, and atvesaed our interest ta seeing steady progresa
[609]by all the Isthelen cour
[611]teles in implementing the recommends
[612]tions of the Managua Security Conference to bieck Cobar
[616]. Explained in detail che netuxe of the Cuban threat
[618]emi the related poliley objecetves of the U.S.5 duming converse<
[619]tion ie London and in Ww
[621]dagton with Me. Adam Watson, xewly
[622]eppolated Gritieh Ambassador to Cubs.
[624]ce during the reporting
[625]period transmitted 1% articles, commentaries, and baskerounders
[626]on its wixeless fle service te USIA posts thraughout Latin
[627]AnaxLes for placexent 2
[631]mwepepers and the Volee of
[633]‘movies Spanish breadessts to Latia America cervled a total of
[635]48 conmontarios end features oa the gubject af Cubaa-based
[637]subversion in addition te the regular reporting of developments
[639]im the hourly newseasts.
[641]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page i7
[644]&. iu wesponse to standing Ageusy instructions to ive
[646]special attention to developments colated to Cubarbecad
[647]subversion, USIS pests in Latin America were prompt in teporting
[648]incidents and le providing editerial commeate from the Latic
[649]imeriem prees, all of whieh ws used ia the Agesey's wadle and
[651]PFESs output.
[652]the mpin developments teeeted in the Agency's vedio and
[654]press coverage ingluded Casero's July 26 ap
[657]tions in Latin America, the discovery of terverist waapone
[659]edon Viee Pracddent’s. aveushon
[661]festeries da Guayaquil, the Reval
[662]of Cuben ceaponslbiliey for nerverdon, che stare:
[664]ent by Stata
[665]Department Press Offiver Richerd Phillips thet “potential
[667]80 the Caribbean erea were paseiag
[668]a, Che expuleion of a Solivies youth leader
[670]subversive agente” from Cuba
[672]for recalyiag funds from Cuba, Castro-erained tercoriats in
[673]Houdurag,/Bolivian proteste apatnet meddling by the Cuben Embassy
[675]& Velee of America roving reporter in
[677]Latin Amerlea provided several ceports adztuantes
[678]subversion pleture in countries he vietted,
[680]c. In support ef the Agency's effort on Guban-based
[682]HY 50955 Doold:32474014 Page 16
[685]hede penmehlers during the period based on Castes report, of
[686]ais visit te the Soviet iinten (show!
[688]ring that be contradicted |
[689]hisselg ‘ta some of bie extravagant eletme RE Soviet ‘ptogtots) » :
[691]the losses suffered by Cuber labor 1 under Gasteo, and the fete
[693]of political prieonsrs in ¢ Cube. thon coupieted, theese pamphiets
[695]will be reproduced and étetributed in quantity ehrowghout the |
[699]HY 40955 Docld: 32424014 Page 19
[702]GROUP I~ - . ~
[703]Excluded from sutonatua Ore etry | :
[705]downgrading and...
[706]dsclassificatio: Pr spit
[707]ar |
[709]“Chavrered Cebans Airlines <¢ flights between Cuba ond
[710]we become & uajor means of transporting ‘gon-Cuban
[711]hats jeans to and from Cuba. ‘The five sue flights since
[712]lite disly have carvied aeariy 400 #on-Cubsas.
[714]the fivet of the reeent eerles «« on 25 Jily =~ brought
[715]ameriean passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebra~
[716]a, “the other pour & flights ow om ES, 22, 28 om 29 August «-
[717]wane pe a latin dveriecans to "Brash fvom Beveas.. .
[718]Soma of ‘the airerafe involved semumnad to Ouhe with erealler
[719]munberd of may pet OO Latin American posvengers
[720]aS, bus others hed
[721]and gowe had probably
[722]Paid ‘these aes flights
[723]et wee oar Theie
[724]gh Eveell wee evidently designed to help
[725]hey had been im Guba,
[727]redal: ining theve, Of 1 the passengers ‘5
[728]te Brazil, 75 were natives ef Gart é
[729]— JB: a6 ok eh : ough Be
[731]3. One wae Lox } lacine : Rernandes calenee,
[732]; wom Seown te have bean aace te Cuba for
[733]moe Ale warfare ineteveter, Sie had been fn
[734]nce September 1962. The other Coata Rican passenger wae
[735]los Geillen, formex head of the Costa Rican Society of
[736]Friends er = Cuban Revolution, whe had been im Cuba since
[738]# -
[740]The CIA Beuthon tn Qudte rep
[742]junta, whieh sesuuec ree Saat the mi ldtary
[743]ge Cum x
[745]power tn euador on TL duly, can be expected
[747]HY 50955 Docld: 327474014 Page 20
[750]ar The
[751]| éebwer: atves in. *eeusdor, | at lease for the
[753]stly dubibited by the anaes arreste af
[754]ibine end by the outlawing of the Commundeec
[756]: ne ee los.
[758]onduran Commun ee party hes
[759]be acme to tre
[761]at he present ‘tin @,
[762]the ieewensias see ion
[764]coming to an uncenZimeed veport vecetwed in duly,
[765]ation of the Comamiet Party of Custemnle ta
[767]Sees oo] a with | EEanes pes See aad is te ae
[769]| Ge was reliably veported sha ie mid-July 1968, é
[770]smell coat L freighter landed Late ee of Cor
[771]needs . ort the northern enaet. ©: f Henturas, the boues heeds
[773]: & contr: moubere of the Perentet Party; epperently
[774]wader the lgadershie of such figures ag Hector Viliglon and
[775]Soba Williem Seoke, ave appatently ecelving onceurapement aod
[776]wean. ef isege sume of feom Cuba in support of their
[777]efferss to train and oxgenize subversive g@roups in Argentina.
[781]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 21
[786]Villalon has stated thet his plan e@lle for expanding aud
[787]eecellereting subversive sctivities in Argentine eulninating
[788]in & complete take over within two.years, There is no indica-
[789]tion that Peren hinseld has agreed to this plan. It has Been
[790]weported that leadeve of the Communist Party of Argentina have
[791]been greatly danoyed by the tendency of the Cagtirs regime to
[792]Suppert the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted
[793]-¢ha Communities Parry of Argention.
[795]oe? is. weported thet the soecalled Amy of ‘National
[797]me of Aveonting, which ie a relatively suall
[798]epinization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke,
[799]has ts recent weedke been ncegotieting for the purchase of arms
[800]and hes been offered qubuachine guns, basdokaa and other weapone
[801]by two or three private suppliers. it was teported, however,
[802]that the ANL wes haviag éifflewlty getting enough dellers from
[803]Cuba to sake slendficant purchases peceible.
[805]The Bolivian Minletry of Forelga Relations on 23
[806]Auguet protested formally to the Cuben Charg6 @'Afimires in
[807]or Pea a again the Cuban inbagey support to the miners duriag
[809]Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister
[811]the Guba: spe that he aeed mot fear that
[812]‘4 of tolivia would break diplomatic celations with
[813]Cubs, There hag, ia fact, bees ao hard information linking the
[814]Coban Enbasay with the present mining crisie ia epite of some
[815]unconfiemead reports of Cuban Support.
[817]Cuban ambassador to aeankt, Reul Roa Kourl, is reperted
[818]to heave antempted to encourage peasant league leedex *Prancisce
[819]Sulieo te vevitalice the leagues In uorthern Brasil. According
[820]te geome reports efforte are being made te unify the leadership
[821]‘and bring diseident elenente under the general divection of
[822]Jolieo, Other wepertte indicate that, although the Cuben Enbassy
[823]ie providiag guidance and possibly financial support te the
[824]movement, it bad not yet gesolved the internal dissension in
[826]the leagues.
[828]HY 50955 Doold:32474014 Page 22
[831]PLN (See
[833]. Peon Coleubla reperta have bean received of inereasing
[834]Guben eesiatence, pricarily in thea form of training courses by
[835]iusteuctors who have been trained in Guba, to the Vorker«Seudene-
[836]Peasant Movement (MO8C). A enmali guervilia bend encountered
[837]by the Coloubian arwy ia July 1963 was brokea up when five
[838]members o£ the band wave killed and two others captured, A
[839]small quantity of arnb and a considerable amount of books and
[840]panphiets.on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Bidel Castro,
[841]Camilo Clenfuages and Mee Tse-tung, and bulletina of the HOEC
[842]were found et the camp site, Recent reports haye indicated an
[843]iutreace in the terrerist efforte of the MORO and inereased
[844]pronises of atwletance from Che Guevara with regard to the
[845]training of additional NOEC meabers,
[847]ia mid-July on iueressed muanber of guerrilias were
[849]teportediy being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena,
[851]well-knowm Micaraguan gevolutionary leader and member of the
[852]Jational Liberation Front «= 2 Commundst-deminated, Cuban
[853]Supported, anti-Miosragua sevelutienary gvoup). In early
[855]August, Alberto fermato, leader of the FLN im Costa Rica, left
[856]with @ group of Nicawaguans for the Couta Ricen-Nicaraguan
[858]border. The purchase of acme and supplies and the reoruLtnent ‘
[859]of Miecaraguans for @ movement agdinst Slearagaa are also reportedly
[860]underway in Costa Rica,
[862]; Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican egitator, left Sen Jose
[863]in mid-August for the Miearaguan border co supervise the passage
[864]of Mesraguan guervillas from Costa Rica into Mearagua.
[865]Bogantes, who recently veturned fyom atvenddlng the Mey Bay
[866]celebrations im Cuba, wae as a thd sali
[867]Costa Rican Commualiet
[869]Honduras
[871]_ fhe Honduan dumed forces began te move against a group
[872]ef pro-Cagteo guerrillas operating ageinst the Nicaraguan Govern-
[873]ment enc setive in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-iond “am border.
[874]the Nicaraguan Wetionel Guard has been conducting operations
[875]om its side of the berder against the ineurgente since July.
[877]The dease jungie and difficult terrain, however, will impede the
[879]efforts of both foress to eliminate the guerri lias.
[881]HY 50955 Doold:32474014 Page 23
[884]; Information on the guerrd ila ferce i6 acanty and
[885]conflicting, It is + rene posed of membere of the Netional
[886]Liberation Front (FLN), a Com st-deminated and Cubon-supported
[887]revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduves and
[888]Ricaregua eince the fail of 1962, The strength ef the force
[889]de net known.
[891]jets A 4 captured guervilia of the FLY (National Liberation
[892]: Commeiet-deminated, Cuban-supported, anti~-Niasraguan
[893]ezo-up) eonfassed thar be wae @ member of @ group of 46 who
[894]autered Siearague from Bendures on 22 July. He sadd that thedy
[895]uiasion wae to establish a bace damp in the Issbella mowttaine,
[896]Department of Jimotega, in order to indoctraimeta the peasants.
[897]and to train chen in guerrilla tactics, He admitted that he
[898]hed euceived of wonths’ guerrilla wefere trataing in Cuba and
[899]that other FLY leaders bad received éinllar tveining. He aleo |
[900]peta that the FL ¢rateing camp tonducds wae near EL Lagarte,
[901]on the Patuea River.
[903]p _Taip eet diary corporation
[904]at deposited
[906]Progressive Party is the maser ate FS
[907]ieagox of Ginper, has indleaced that Cimpex
[908]able. te geeure addieional leano from Cuba in amounts sufflelent
[909]to tide the Jagan givermment over any foreseeable crieis. Te
[911]wae also reported thet Ciupex plane to buy alveraft, epere parte
[912]gad other machinery in the United States for cenhipnent te Cubs.
[914]Banos continua to be received from many places indicating
[915]that the eulccase full of currency fs still one of the moat
[916]common methods used by the Cubans for tranemicting fimds for
[918]7 wpoxting subversive eetivities throughout the héed sphere.
[919]Instances whaze such funds have been confiscated by the police
[920]have ecewered recently in El Gealvader, Panawa and Eeusder,
[922]HY 50955 Docld:32424014 Page 24 | [2]
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[147]ABA tWGBowdler: 4g
[148]
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[154]°°la8sification ue
[155]
[157]
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[161]
[165]
[166]declassificatiog =
[167]
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[409]
[410]Auguet published @ uwew anti-«
[413]
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[424]
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[435]
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[656]ech urging tevola>
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198-10007-10022.pdf | [1]198-10007-10022
[3][2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992)
[5]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[7]Identification Form
[9]AGENCY :
[10]RECORD NUMBER :
[12]RECORD SERIES :
[14]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[16]Agency Information
[18]ARMY
[19]198-10007- 10022
[21]CALIFANO PAPERS
[23]ORIGINATOR :
[24]FROM:
[25]TO:
[27]TITLE :
[29]DATE:
[33]SUBJECTS :
[35]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[36]CLASSIFICATION :
[37]RESTRICTIONS :
[38]CURRENT STATUS :
[39]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[41]OPENING CRITERIA :
[43]COMMENTS :
[45]Document Information
[47]ARMY
[48]JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[49]ICCCA
[51]ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER
[52]SUBVERSION
[54]07/18/1963
[55]17
[57]CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[59]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[60]Secret
[62]1B; 4
[64]Redact
[66]04/08/1998
[68]Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Califano to ICCCA re: the Report on the Status of
[69]Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion. Also appears in Califano Box 6, Folder
[70]lt.
[72]UWF K Roview
[74]Deparment of the Army EO 13526
[76]BX deciassity “ Exclude & Exempt
[77]PY
[78]i Refer To _..-f
[81]HW 50955 Daocld: 3274274015
[83]31
[84]Page 1
[86]SECREL
[88]MEMORANDUM NO. $9 £OR GREURAL RARLE &, wHENLes Woe)
[90]CAPTAIN E.R. EUMWALA, OR. , UEN (oon)
[91]BAIGR GENERAL oe aan, BEA,
[93]SGRIES Es: oe i Aion of Cuban Atistes
[94]Beport ¢ os, : Statue of louplons es 4 of Aetions Hesigesd te
[95]Opester fubversion ()
[97]Reterenees: 2. Seeley EGER, eubl: LOCCA: WMowsment of aubversives
[98]aud Sebveresive Trainees, dated 19 Mor 63,
[99]be Spec Acet te Seaway wuRtia, bahi: MOOG: Reger’ om
[100]the Ctetas of | dangles metion of ations dypprorud by The
[101]Peasident, & 1 2o War Oa.
[102]& Bpen Adet te Eat davay meme, abl: 2OGCGA: Rapart on —
[103]the Status of Actlons Apgreved by the Pregident, dated
[105]aS Aga $3,
[106]& Spee Agst te Uenhemy mae, — fGCGca: Report on.
[107]Setee of Ieagie on of Aetiens Dueigned te Cemstar
[109]fabvexaion, 27 Jan 3,
[111]Attached herewith ie a fiunt draft: e€ the Report te the Broeldent af
[112]the (ubcomumition on Cates Subversion om Progress ade Dustiag the Aorii-
[113]dune Paviod in Gurhiag Cohan, Subversion is Lotte Queries.
[115]Ste wequested that comments, LM ony, be provided thie piGer by
[116]1200 aceve, a July 1968. The Dep af Defense portion of eubject
[117]epgert is. band OG gabmileslens foraished in vaupenes be telerence d,
[119]OAS Contra: Nog 3g
[121]SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
[122]tren DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
[124]Vinee ne ~ aoe a oe ee ae _—
[126]HY 450955 Docld:327424015 Page 2
[129]SECRET .
[131]ce: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
[133]Mr. Califano wot ene
[134]Lt Col Haig
[135]ASG
[137]Signed
[139]Joseph A. Califano,ir.
[141]Aa:
[143]SECRET
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[148]SECRET
[150]REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
[151]ON PROGRESS MADE DURING APRIL-JUNE PERIOD
[153]IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA:
[155]SECRET
[157]Usa, ASG Control No. ZG Z2_¢
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[161]SECRET
[163]l. The Department of State:
[165]A. Participated in the preparations for and the
[166]holding of the Managua meeting on subversion, which was
[167]held April 3-4,
[169]B. Headed an inter-departmental team which visited
[170]the Isthmian countries to encourage implementation of the
[171]recommendations for curbing subversion which were agreed
[172]on at the Managua meeting.
[174]C. Prepared a report on the inter-departmental
[175]team's suvery of the Central American countries,
[176]containing recommendations for further action in this
[177]field, and advised affected U. S. agencies and foreign
[178]service posts of the guidelines for operation of the
[179]military alerting system. :
[181]D. Worked in the OAS in drafting a report containing
[182]practical recommendations to cuunteract Castro/communist
[183]subversion in the fields of the movement of travel,
[184]propaganda and funds, :and prepared the ground for a
[185]COAS decision to transmit the report to member Governments
[186]urging them to implement the recommendations contained
[187]therein. a”
[189]E, Drew official and public attention in Latin
[190]American countries to the capture of Peruvians who were .
[191]returning from Habana ‘by an overland route through
[192]Bolivia, and urged the Peruvian Government to make details
[193]of this case known to the OAS.
[195]F. Helped publicize the capture of .an Ecuadoran
[196]subversive who was returning to Ecuador from -Cuba by
[197]wey of Prague with $25,000 in cash on his person, and
[198]requested the Ecuadoran Government ‘to make an official
[200]‘ report of this matter to the OAS.
[202]G. Sent a U.S. Consul to Gran Cayman to investigate
[203]Cuban flights to that island, and secured the cooperation
[204]of the Costa Rican Government in preventing ‘the use of
[205]LACSA aircraft to transport subversives to San Jose
[206]off-landed in Gran Cayman. ;
[208]H. Approached the British Government various times
[209]to seek its cooperation in preventing the use -of Gran
[211]Loy
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[219]Cayman and its other Caribbean possessions as traffic
[220]refueling or transit stops for planes flying to and »
[221]from Cuba. sa
[223]I. Continued pressure on the Dutch Government
[224]and KIM airline officials not to resume KLM flights
[225]to Cuba, thus limiting the access to Cuba by Free World
[226]airlines.
[228]-.- oJ. Obtained the cooperation of CMA airline
[229](Mexico) to keep its mail and cargo flights to Cuba
[230]on an unscheduled basis and to avoid carrying
[231]passengers on the Habana-Mexico City leg of its
[232]service. ;
[234]K. Continued efforts with the Canadian and
[235]Mexican Governments to secure their cooperation
[236]in preventing Cubans from introducing Russian IL-
[237]18's on flights between Habana and their countries.
[239]L. Urged the Brazilian Government not to grant
[240]landing rights for Soviet Bloc or Cuban planes servicing
[241]Cuba, and continued efforts to keep Brazil from signing
[242]a civil air agreement with Cuba. , ; .
[244]M. tought cooperation of various African Govern-
[245]ments in preventing the use of African airports as
[246]transit points for regular USSR-Cuba air service with
[247]TU-114's or as refueling stops for ferrying IL-18's
[248]to Cuba.
[250]N. Initiated action to request US-owned and
[251]controlled oil companies in the Caribbean and Latin
[252]America to refuse bunkers voluntarily to vessels and
[253]aircraft in the Cuba trade. ~~ »
[255]0. ‘Requested the Spanish Government to limit or
[256]eliminate service to Cuba by Iberia airlines and
[257]Spanish shipping companies. |
[259]P. Blocked initiation of an ocean ferry service
[260]between Habana and Florida by employing various delaying
[261]and obstructing tactics.
[263]Q.- Ordered, as of April 1, that all U.S. passports
[264]be marked snot valid for travel to Cuba to insure that
[265]ban on travel to Cuba would be more effectively enforced.
[267]SECRET
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[270]SECRET
[272]‘R. Informed the Mexican Government that Americans.
[273]were not-permitted to travel to Cuba without authorization
[274]-and requested their assistance in preventing U.S. citizens .
[275]‘from transiting Mexico enroute to’ Cuba.
[277]‘S.. Instructed posts in Latin America to encourage
[278]host governments to take appropriate measures to dis-
[279]courage participation of their nationals in Cuba's
[280]May Day celebrations, and to prevent charter flights
[281]from their country to Cuba for. the celebration.
[283]T. Informed affected governments of the names
[284]of their nationals who had returned from Cuba on the
[285]Cuban plane which flew the new Cuban Ambassador and
[286]vhis party to Brazil, and suggested that they take
[287]“this matter up with Brazil. Also called this Cuban
[288]action to the attention of the Brazilian Government.
[290]U. Worked through Chilean Government and university.
[291]circles to block the holding of the Communist-inspired
[292]II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for Santiago,
[293]Chile in August 1963.
[295]V. Encouraged the President of Honduras to have
[296]his immigration officials request clearance from our
[297]Embassy in Tegucigalpa before granting visas to Cubans
[298]wishing to enter Honduras from Cuba.
[300]W. Encouraged the Benelux and Italian Governments
[301]to maintain visa requirements for Cubans travelling
[302]to their countries despite Cuba's having done away
[303]oe visa requirements for ‘their nationals who. visit
[304]uba.
[306]SECRET
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[310]SECRET
[312]2. The Department of Defense:
[314]A, Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at
[315]the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that
[316]date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance
[317]was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the
[318]Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of
[319]Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions in
[320]Haiti.
[322]B. Centinued the installation of military communications
[323]facilities in Latin America. Due to noncommunication difficulties,
[324]the multi-channel radio station scheduled for installation at
[325]Managua, Nicaragua by 1 July 1963 will be completed on or about
[326]27 July 1963. Entry negotiations have been completed with Honduras,
[327]with the military radio facilities installation scheduled for com=
[328]pletion on or about'10 October 1963, Negotiations are continuing
[330]in Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio
[331]facilities. .
[333]C, Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U. S, forces,
[334]reporting as before, to U. S. commanders, organizations and
[335]agencies, Reports of subversive movement, obtained by U.S.
[336]surveillance have been made available for immediate transmittal
[337]through U. S. military alerting system,
[339]D, Reached agreement with CIA on steps to be taken to prevent
[340]duplication of effort in operating a U.S, military alerting system
[341]and furnished guidance on this matter to USCINCSO and CINCLANT,
[342]After clarification of the role of the U. S. Military Groups by
[343]USCINCSO the military alerting system was again placed in operation
[344]effective 15 June 1963,
[346]E. Maintained U. S&S. forces, for the most part from within
[347]the Atlantic Command, available to respond to assist in the final
[348]interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, upon the
[349]request of the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned
[350]by the United Commander involved to meet the singular problem
[351]encountered. In somewhat similar circumstances, U. S, forces of
[352]Atlantic Command have responded to this requirement in the cases
[353]of the Venezuelan ship ANZOATEGUI and the Italian ship CANNA REGIA,
[355]F, Had the U. S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MIT) report
[356]for duty in the Canal Zone on 15 May 1963 to perform as a Small
[358]SECRET
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[362]SECRET
[364]Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT). Members of the SCIAIT
[365]accompanied by a representative from the staff of Commander U, S.
[366]Naval Forces, Southern Command (CCMUSNAVSO) have completed an in-~
[367]country evaluation of 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) in
[368]five Central American countries and a detailed program through
[369]mid-November has been prepared for improving the material readiness
[370]and handling of. the CGUBs provided by.MAP. Action is underway to
[371]expedite delivery of spare parts required for maintenance of the
[372]boats.
[374]COMUSNAVSO has now initiated a request to establish SCIATT
[375]billets with permanent personnel for an initial period of three
[376]years in order to fully develop the Central American CGUB program.
[377]The success of this program would be a major contribution to the
[378]Caribbean Surveillance System. U.S, Commander in Chief, Southern
[379]Command (USCINCSO) has recommended approval of COMUSNAVSO's request
[380]to CNO and action is being coordinated with OSD/ISA, JCS and USCG
[381]to obtain approval and appropriate funding for permanent billets.
[383]The 40-foot CGUB permanently assigned to the U. S$. Naval
[384]Station, Rodman, Canal Zone, for use by the SCIATT has been
[385]delivered and is in the process of being activated.
[387]G. Continued efforts . to improve the internal security
[388]of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
[389]Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14
[390]latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
[391]subversion,
[393]H, Continued, through its intelligence agencies, work on
[394]studies concerning Castro/Communist subversion directed against
[395]latin America,
[397]I. Inereased to 12 the number of Latin American countries in
[398]which there are intelligence exchange arrangements between U. 5.
[399]and local military services.
[401]tA
[402]te
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[408]SECRET
[410]3. The Central Intelligence Agency:
[412]A. Completed efforts to improve U.S. government communica-
[413]tions in Latin America by the installation of the remaining
[414]two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and
[415]Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA
[416]radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary
[417]duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities
[418]in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line
[419]cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the
[420]bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These
[421]facilities, known as Joint Communications Centers, are now
[422]being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to
[423]all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled
[424]by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased
[425]from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000
[426]groups handled in March 1963.
[428]B. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement
[429]of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A
[430]summary of actions by country follows:
[432]1. Argentina - Station, in conjunction with the Embassy,
[433]has continued to press the Argentine government to enact
[434]effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures
[435]recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security
[436]of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is
[437]being furnished to the Argentine government by the station.
[438]Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and
[439]are being assessed by the station. Information from three
[440]recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings.
[441]Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls,
[442]all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now
[443]via Prague. The Argentine Security Service has informed the
[444]station that mail censorship and customs controls at the
[445]docks and airports are 95% effective in preventing the
[446]entrance of Cuban propaganda through these channels. Local
[447]dissemination of propaganda is regulated by an Argentine
[448]inter-agency committee, which reviews any new propaganda
[449]items and takes action to stop dissemination of any item
[450]judged to be pro-Cuban or pro-Communist. During May the
[451]Argentine government issued a new decree which restricts
[452]Communist activities within Argentina. The station has continued
[453]to press. the Security Service to urge regulation of travel
[454]to Cuba, but the adoption of such measures has been delayed
[455]pending government receipt on an official basis of the OAS
[456]recommendations. Through several assets the station is working
[457]on leads which it is hoped will reveal the basic sources of
[458]illegal arms sales in Argentina.
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[467]2. Bolivia - Station has been urging Bolivian government
[468]to adopt stricter travel cnntrols, without apparent results
[469]so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba
[470]are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far,
[471]no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian
[472]government on the strength of such information. Station comments
[473]that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information
[474]available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting
[475]Bolivia to do something about it. The station has also
[476]furnished considerable information, including some
[477]surreptitiously acquired documents, to the Ambassador for his
[478]use in urging Bolivian government action against Cuba.
[479]Considerable information is also being obtained through the
[480]interrogation of Peruvian guerrillas captured attempting to
[481]cross into Peru early in June.
[483]3. Brazil - Information on Brazilians who have received
[484]subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the
[485]National Security Council through CIA liaison with the
[486]NSC's Security Service. While the Brazilians have stated
[487]that the information is "of interest," there is no firm
[488]indication to date that they have the capability or desire to
[489]really follow up on the information furnished. .
[491]An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position
[492]to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances
[493]where the station is able to tip him off regarding their
[494]destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in
[495]advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate
[496]information to him promptly. The station has indicated that
[497]in spite of its increased efforts, there are no indications
[498]of any basic change in the Brazilian attitude toward Cuba, ~
[499]and it is unlikely that the Brazilian government will take
[500]adequate steps to combat Cuban subversion.
[502]4, Chile - Chilean internal security authorities, at
[503]urging of station, are trying to impede and harass travellers
[504]to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport
[505]applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned
[506]in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress
[507]is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and
[508]that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced
[509]in recent weeks. Station and Embassy are continuing pressure
[510]on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to
[511]Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them
[512]to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration
[513]be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations
[515]SECRET
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[519]SECRET
[521]against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean
[522]surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected
[523]and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station
[524]has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme
[525]militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending
[526]three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence
[527]missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non
[528]grata during April for using false identity documents, and
[529]the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his
[530]own government. Two new sources have recently been recruited
[531]by the station who are in a position to’ furnish valuable
[532]information concerning not only certain aspects of the situation
[533]within Cuba, but details concerning travel to and from Cuba
[534]by both legal and illegal means. The station is now in the
[535]process of debriefing an asset who recently returned to
[536]antiago after spending one month in Cuba as a trainee.
[537]Efforts are being made to have other station assets included
[538]in future training programs.
[540]5. Colombia - Chief of Customs has indicated to station
[541]his willingness to institute an improved travel control
[542]system. Station believes it has identified a courier operating
[543]between {olombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to
[544]uncover his Colombian contacts. One station asset is now
[545]in Cuba attending guerrilla warfare training, another is
[546]being debriefed after his recent return from Cuba, and a
[547]third expects to depart soon for two months training in
[548]Cuba. The station is continuing to develop leads provided
[549]by one recent returnee, and thus far this investigation has
[550]involved members of both the Colombian Congress and the
[551]Bogota municipal government. A Colombian Civic Action
[552]Group, composed of influential local businessmen, which is
[553]subsidized and directed by the station, has established an
[554]anti-Castro propaganda unit. This group is actively
[555]collecting evidence of Cuban subversion in Colombia to
[556]support its propaganda campaign.
[558]6. Costa Rica - Local authorities appear to be inclined
[559]to cooperate in a program of harassing travellers to Cuba.
[560]A station asset in the Costa Rican Security Service has been
[561]confiscating the passports of persons returning from Cuba
[562]and has cooperated in other ways. One station asset is
[563]expected to travel to Cuba soon for training. The "Kennedy
[564]Groups," which were organized at the time of the President's
[565]visit to Costa Rica, are being encouraged to collect
[566]information of all sorts cnncerning Cuban subversive activities,
[567]and to participate in propaganda activities aimed at Cuban
[568]subversion. Other station propaganda assets have kept up a
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[576]steady campaign against Cuban activities, and the Costa Rican
[577]Security Service, at the urging of the C1A station, has destroyed
[578]tons of propaganda brought into the country from Cuba.
[580]7» Dominican Republic - Efforts to get Juan Bosch to
[581]take active steps against Communists and travellers to and
[582]from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts
[583]to establish a new and effective internal security organiza-
[584]tion in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost
[585]his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but
[586]efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for
[587]the service are continuing.
[589]8. Ecuador - Station reports that, largely as a reault
[590]of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S.
[591]agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion
[592]has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government,
[593]however, is no more inclined to take action than before.
[594]The National Director of Immigration has stated that he
[595]personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel
[596]to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but
[597]present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third
[598]countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals
[599]against citizens who return from Cuba. He has checked
[600]a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA
[601]from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not
[602]one name or passport number corresponds with official
[603]Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of
[604]fabrication of passports by Cuba. ,
[606]A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited
[607]by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made
[608]in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made
[609]a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the
[610]station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive
[611]as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for
[612]terrorist activity in Ecuador.
[614]The station chief has accompanied the American
[615]Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense
[616]and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed
[617]subversion. - - .
[619]Approximately 7,000. pounds of Communist propaganda
[620]are being destroyed. monthly as a result of a unilateral
[621]operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.
[623]SECRET
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[630]There have been at least two recent cases of
[631]Ecuadoran returnees from Cuba being arrested upon their
[632]arrival, one of them having been found in possession of a
[633]large sum of U.S. dollars, and another allegedly having a
[634]plan of revolutionary action found on his person. In both
[635]cases the Ecuadoran authorities had been informed of the
[636]pending arrivals of these individuals by the CIA station.
[638]9. El Salvador - The station has called to the
[639]attention of the Chief of the Salvadoran Security Service
[640]the fact that the stamping of passports "not valid for
[641]travel to Cuba" is not being done on a regular basis, and
[643]received assurance that the Foreign Office and Immigration
[644]Police would be reminded of their obligation to do this.
[646]. The station is embarking on an expanded program of
[647]assistance to Department 2 of the Ministry of Defense,
[648]which is in fact the Salvadoran Clandestine Internal
[649]Security Service. That service has indicated a willingness
[650]and desire to combat Cuban subversion, but-so far it has
[651]lacked both know-how and equipment to dd so.
[653]10. Guatemala ~- The CIA station in Guatemala City has
[654]found its efforts in this field hampered considerably by
[655]the apathy and disorganization of the Guatemalan government.
[656]Early this year the only effective Internal Security
[657]Service in Guatemala was disbanded by President Ydigoras,
[658]and no adequate organization has been established since ©
[659]the Peralta government came into power. Through unilateral
[660]assets the station has been able to keep itself
[661]reasonably well informed concerning guerrilla activities
[662]and travel to and from Cuba. However, it has been unable
[663]to bring about any effective counter Cuban activity on the
[664]part of the Guatemalan government.
[666]11. Jamaica ~ New and more stringent regulations concerning
[667]travel to Cuba were adopted by the Jamaican government during
[668]. May, partially as a result of the urging of the CIA station.
[669]The Jamaican Internal Security authorities have shown a
[670]willingness to do everything they can to control such travel,
[671]and have indicated a high degree of cooperation with the
[672]CIA station.
[674]le. Haiti - Because of the continued political crisis
[675]in Haiti, the CIA station activities there with regard to
[676]Cuban activities have been severely limited and have
[677]consisted primarily of checks made by unilateral station
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[683]oe, Se @
[684], SECRET
[686]assets who have reported from Cape Haitien, Port de Paix
[687]and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands that they were unable
[688]to uncove any evidence of travel to or from Cuba. No
[689]cooperation between the station and Haitian authorities
[690]can be expected under the present political circumstances.
[692]13. Honduras - The CIA station in Tegucigalpa has
[693]persistently prodded security elements of the Honduran
[694]government in an effort to persuade that government to
[695]undertake the actions agreed to at Managua. The govern-
[696]ment has now begun stamping most new passports “invalid
[697]for travel to Cuba." However, revalidated passports are
[698]not being so stamped. Station assets have succeeded ‘in
[700]. publicizing some Cuban subversive activities, including
[701].the return of eight leftist labor leaders from a trip
[702]to Cuba and the sabotage of a fishing vessel which was
[703]being used by anti-Castro Cuban exiles to surveil the
[704]northern coast of Honduras. Several alleged Cuban agents
[705]are now being held in jail pending legal proceedings
[706]against them.
[708]14. Mexico - A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy
[709]has continued to issue visas on pieces of paper separate
[710]from the passport, but the government's practice of
[711]stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has
[712]largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the
[713]stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico,
[714]whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas.
[715]This is not true of other nationalities, who need no
[716]visa if in transit. The government continues to
[717]confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at
[718]the airport. The government recently refused visas to
[719]five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress
[720]in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled
[721]to Cuba for intelligence purposes. Through unilateral
[722]penetrations of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, the
[723]CIA station continues to acquire information on types of
[724]Cuban visas granted to travellers, as well as some
[725]advance travel data, ;
[727]15. Panama - At the urging of station, the Guardia.
[728]Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance
[729]concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them
[730]from establishing an effective organization. Several
[731]recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding
[732]their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are
[734]HY 50955 Docld: 324274015 Page 15
[736]ts | SECRET
[738]expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training.
[739]CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel coritrol
[740]functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three-
[741]man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing
[742]its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel
[743]controls. ; ;
[745]16. Nicaragua - The Nicaraguan Security Services with
[746]whom the CIA station is in liaison have been cooperative
[747]x in their efforts to take suitable action based on the
[748]Managua resolutions. Cuban activity in. Nicaragua appears
[749]to be at a minimum, and the government has the will and
[750]ability to control it.
[752]17. Peru - Through the cooperation of a Peruvian
[753]intelligence organization, CIA officers have been able to
[754]participate in the interrogation of several Cuba-trained
[755]guerrillas who were recently captured when they attempted
[756]to enter Peru near Puerto Maldonado. The interrogation
[757]should provide additional data on guerrilla training,
[759]Soviet activities in Cuba, and particularly on Cuban
[761]support to guérrilla activities in Peru, Further infor-
[762]mation has been obtained through a unilateral asset of
[764]the station who is active in guerrilla activities of the MIR.
[765]An investigation of small arms manufacture in a machine
[767]shop in Lima is underway at the urging of the station. The
[768]station has furnished additional technical equipment to
[770]the Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service to increase its
[771]capability to intercept clandestine radio communications from
[772]Cuba, and partly as a result of CIA station urging, that
[773]organization has been able to obtain 12 investigators
[774]assigned by another Peruvian internal security service to
[775]assist in the investigation of subversive activities in
[777]the port areas of Peru. A Communist penetration agent, who
[778]is being run jointly by the Peruvian Internal Security
[779]Service and the CIA station, has been offered an opportunity
[780]to go to Cuba for training. Considerable information
[781]concerning the Peruvian MIR plans for financing the
[782]acquisition of arms, communications equipment and other
[783]information concerning MIR guerrilla activities has been
[784]acquired through a unilateral asset of the station.
[786]_ 18. Uruguay - Station has.made arrangements with local
[787]service to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good
[788]conduct certificates - which are needed to secure passports,
[789]and must be renewed every six months - in cases where
[790]information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans!
[792]SECRET
[794]HY 50955 Docld:32424015 Page 16
[796]gs g
[797]nn SECRET
[799]own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba.
[800]-Pertinent information from'CIA unilateral operations is being
[801]passed. regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station
[802]has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to
[803]Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with
[804]the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, °
[805]he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor |
[806]delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in
[807]Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers
[808]to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer —
[809]and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on
[811]past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station,
[812].was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by —
[813]Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National
[814]Council of Government. nee
[816]19. Venezuela - Travel information from the Caracas
[817]Airport is:now-being received on a daily basis by the CIA
[818]‘station. Venezuelan internal security officials have
[819]‘indicated a strong disposition to take all possible steps
[820]‘to repress Cuban subversive activities.: The station has been
[821]passing pertinent information from unilateral sources to
[822]‘appropriate Venezuelan officials and, in some instances,
[823]action has been taken in accordance with the stations's
[824]‘request. Four Venezuelan officials have been trained in
[825]covert mail intercept techniques by a CIA technician and
[826]‘one additional Venezuelan security official is now ,
[827]undergoing training in the United States in the field of
[829]. police administration, clandestine operations and audio
[830]‘surveillance. Venezuelan student teams, operating under
[831]‘the control of the CIA station, are intensifying their
[832]‘efforts to spot and recruit members of extremist youth
[833]‘groups who ‘are likely to be sent to Cuba for training
[834]“purposes. - a a
[836]HW 50955 Docld:32424015 Page 17.-
[839]-. 7 * 9 o &
[841]a SECRET
[843]4. The U.S. Information Agency:
[845]A. Issued a detailed information policy guidance to all its
[846]Washington media divisions on March 28 setting forth the basic
[847]themes to be followed and types of materials to be developed
[849]in exposing Castro-Communist subversive activities in the
[850]hemisphere. This was followed on April 3 by a circular
[851]instruction (USIA CA-2819) to all USIS field posts in Latin
[852]America urging each to stimulate local press and radio atten-
[853]tion to evidence of Cuban-based subversion and to report promptly
[854]local developments, official comment, and editorials, for cross-
[855]play to other countries.
[857]B. . Broadcast over Voice of America a total of 26 features and
[858]commentaries on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in its
[859]Spanish-language transmissions to Latin America during the three
[860]month pericd, This was in addition to regular reporting of
[861]developments on the subject in the Voice's hourly newscasts.
[862]Prominent attention was given to the Managua Ministers Meeting,
[863]the OAS reports of the Special Consultative Committee on Security
[864]and the Lavalle Comnittes, the capture in Bolivia and Peru of
[865]Cuban~-trained guerrillas, the discovery of a subversive plot in
[866]Ecuador, and terrorism and counter-measures in Venezuela. Special
[867]features included editorial round-ups from the Latin American
[868]press on subversion, a dramatization of an incident in Ecuador,
[869]a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a
[870]history of subversion. In the usual Voice of America ‘practics,
[871]these features and commentaries were sent to USIS field posts in
[872]' tape recordings after short-wave broadcast for placement on the
[873]hundreds cf local mediumvave stations in the area.
[875]GC. Transmitted by teletype th nrcough its press service a total
[877]of 33 articles on Cuban-bassd subversion during the three-
[879]month pericd to USIS posts th hrovghout Latin America for placement
[880]in the lccal prass. inciuded news stories, commentaries,
[882]and backgrounders cn ntlally the same developments which were
[883]treated by the Voices clca. The Agency's Information Officers
[884]in each country wu ided with copies of the OAS reports for
[885]use in theiz 3 tacts with press and radio personnel.
[887]A pamphlet based te) oot ters from the Guatemalan ex-communist
[888]leader Carlos i Poliecer to Castro and Khrushchev in which
[890]he revealed communist oversive vactics was developed by the
[891]Agency's publications < in Moxico for reproduction and
[892]distribution thre 2. Work was completed also oh a
[893]eartocn book, a story of two young Cubans who
[894]tour the coma ntoring oppression and food shortages
[895]and return hous ecnditions developing in their
[896]own country. is being distributed in over a
[897]million cepies t:
[899]SECRET
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198-10007-10029.pdf | [1]198-10007-10029
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]AGENCY :
[6]RECORD NUMBER :
[8]RECORD SERIES :
[10]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[12]ORIGINATOR :
[13]FROM:
[14]TO:
[16]TITLE :
[18]DATE:
[19]PAGES:
[21]SUBJECTS :
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[25]CLASSIFICATION :
[27]RESTRICTIONS :
[29]CURRENT STATUS :
[31]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[32]OPENING CRITERIA
[34]COMMENTS :
[37]HW 50955 Docld: 32424022
[39]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[41]Identification Form
[43]Agency Information
[45]ARMY
[46]198-10007-10029
[48]CALIFANO PAPERS
[50]Document Information’
[52]CIA
[53]C. TRACY BARNES
[55]REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
[57]06/25/1953
[58]15
[60]RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA
[62]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[63]Secret
[65]1A; 1B
[67]Redact
[69]04/03/1998
[71]Califano Papers, Box I, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio
[72]Broadcasting by CIA. ;
[74]AEK Ravise
[76]Department of the Army EO 13526
[77]CADeclassifty [ Exclude Exempt
[78]Authority.
[80][= Refar To
[82]Review Date 2/2615 By AST Wrg
[84]38
[85]Page 1
[87]a ; Bo SECRET
[88]; Security Information
[90]se . | 25 June 1993
[92]MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below) |
[93]SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
[95]‘Lo We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadeast] ;
[96]inp in the cold war mission of CIA. ‘The essential parts of the report .
[97]and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated
[98]15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast~
[99]ing by CIA". .(Operational information and other sensitive matter con»
[100]tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep~ |
[101]arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)
[102]_20 The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved
[103]by the} Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:
[105]ao Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, 3
[106]country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and
[107]television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their
[108]penetration, where feasible, or.an explanation where it appears
[109]not to be feasible. ,
[111]bo Develoo and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate
[112]personnel and training offices, a plan for the reernitment and
[113]training of officers qualified fer covert broadcasting operations.
[115]co Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a
[116]joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency
[117]and economy, material derived from escapee interropations and other
[118]intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to suppert all UoSe
[120]_propapanda efforts. ; ;
[122]do. Develop. and recommends in collaboration with area divisicns,
[123]an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy
[125]-guidance to. the field.
[126]oe. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland,
[127]'@ project to producé broadcasting devices capable of electronic
[128]intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques
[130]for their useg and to contime research and development of other
[131]unconventional methods of breadeasting suitable to our migsion.
[133]3e Chief of Op: rationa,
[135]; SECRET
[136]HW 50955 Docld:32424022 Page 2 ;
[138]SECRET
[139]Security Information
[141]ia
[143]. 3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of
[144]tre attached material with the request that -you cooperate in the carrying
[146]out of the Dn/Pts directive. Particular attention is called to. item 2. ao
[147]ah OVE 6
[149]: he Mr. Co Lloyd Egmr, assisted by Mre. Stanley 1 P. Riciardscny huve
[150]‘ been assigned the résvonsibility for staff coordination of these matters
[151]on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning
[152]and sunnerting broadcasting onerations.
[154]/s/ C. Srag Barnes.
[155]C, TRACY LARK S
[157]. Chicf . -
[158]Political and Psycholorical
[159]Werfare
[161]Attachment
[163]As stated above -
[164]Tistribution. |
[168]AQ @ 1]
[170]Cliefs, All Areas = 7 Gao
[171]Cries, Senior Staffs - 1] ea
[172]r/Tr at
[173]PY /¢/OPS. el] ;
[174]PE/CFY = 1 ,
[175]rr /C/PAD ~ 1 7
[176]r/Mr. Femr = 2
[177]Ri «#1
[179]a
[181]oo . SECRET
[182]HW 50855 Docld:32424022 Page 3° .
[184]SECRET
[185]Security Information
[187]15 May 1953
[189]MEMORANDUM FCR: CITLF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
[191]SUBJECT : Report Gn The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
[193]Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting ss @ cold
[194]war weapon. It is grouped inte the following sections: - ;
[196]; 1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MLDIUM IN TH COLD LAR.
[197]ft shows in the main that the countrics having the most to fear from
[198]Conminism are doing the Icast to counter its radio propaganda o
[200]2. Seetion 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABTLITIFS, It embraces a
[201]discussion of the techniques available to CTA,
[203]3. Section 3, Pare 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our -
[204]current and vlanned activities arainst them.
[206]4. Section lh, Page l, deals with the principal PROFLEMS peculiar
[207]to covertly direeted broadcasting, and their solution.
[209]So. Section 5S, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of
[210]princivles to govern over-all CTA volicy in its present and future
[211]activities in this field. : ;
[213](For a detailed statement, of present CIA radio broadcasting
[215]assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953,
[216]entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS C6669.)
[218](The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Rudio Broadeasting.
[219]" from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,
[220]Se) . a
[221]\ , (The data on broadcasting hours by caintries was ebtained fron
[222]FBID and VOA, that on available reeeivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that -
[223]on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)
[225]‘By Cl,
[226]TS Ohly
[228]t
[230]/s/ Go Lloyd kgner
[231]«LLOYD BCNER
[232]Attachment, as stated. _ — . . an |
[233]PP/CLEsha -
[235]r
[237]HY 50955 Docld:32474022 Page 4
[239]ow
[240]ti
[241]Ob
[242]be
[244]ie)
[246]SECRET
[247]Security Information
[249]15. May 1953
[251]REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
[253]le Radio As «a Medium in the Cold War
[255]a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, prosdesat
[256]te countries outside the Orbit 15395 hours per week of aggressive psych= _
[257]olexical warfare o
[259]bo. The free world ‘responds with 11,018 hours per weeks
[261]&o ‘This gives the. enemy & numerical. advantage of approxinetely
[262]seven to five, In reality, the Communist advantage is.much greater .
[263]because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the
[264]Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own vsoples
[265]for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures
[266]reduee the effectivensss of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as mich,
[267]if not more than, 50 percent. fn illustration. is that the Commmists
[268]devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-
[269]casts, There is no jamming of Orbit broadeasts. to the Western worlds nor
[270]any restrictions on listening to them.
[272]. de Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in
[273]the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BRC and Canada together
[274]brosdeast 238 hours per week arainst the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries
[275]combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North
[276]America, the: United Kingdom, and ‘the Pacific area
[278]6e In the vest of the world, the balance is drastically in
[279]favor of the Commmiste. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to ali
[280]other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a
[281]mere 26); hours broadcast to all Orbit countrd ies by. non-English speaking
[282]nations of the free world,
[284]£. Of the total of 1,015 vroadeast hours beamed by all the free
[285]world to the Orbit, CIA, throug rh TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine
[286]stations, breadeasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles
[287]from. Commnis’ dominated APERSo
[289]ge The, greatest disparity in effort is most notiteable- in
[290]Western Furope. France, which receives @9 hours ef broadcasts per week
[291]from the Orbit as-a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy
[292]receives 97 hours from the Orbit but breadcasts only Lh to it, Spain 9h
[293]to 12, Greoce 89 to 9, Turkey 3, to 7. Even relatively aggressive
[294]Yugoslavia receives 19h brcadcast hours from the Orbit against its outout
[296]to the Orbit.of o &9 hours. -
[297]my h. The one-sided
[299]HW 50955 Docld: 32424029 Page 5
[301]SECRET
[302]Security Information
[304]he The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison
[305]of the breadeast output of the USER alone, without the satellites,
[306]arainst Europes It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for
[307]instance, to 10 hours of broadeasts per week. ‘The combined broadcasts
[308]of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per
[309]weeks France and Turkey who, together, reecive 6, hours per week from
[310]the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR. -
[312]i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the
[313]international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows
[314]that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western
[315]Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it. should in .the radio
[316]propaganda battle with the Orbit. ,
[318]26 Capabilities
[320]Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio
[321]broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.
[323]ae Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under
[324]cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique rormally
[325]would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and
[326]the use of miltiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly
[327]and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition
[328]and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.
[330]i a i a ae
[332]bo. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or
[333]*eaptive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing
[334]a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents
[335]more manageable security and control problems, delivors a Signal in spite
[336]of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on
[337]listeners and presents special problems.in avoiding interference with
[338]‘broadcasts of friendly countries. — :
[340]eH RE RH H
[342]; ¢.o Subsidigation of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Comminist,
[343]religious broadcasts» 2M dk at .
[345]; da. Through covert nenetration and/or support, the manipulation
[346]of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng=
[347]thening their antieCommunist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (23 influence
[348]ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their
[349]domestic services. -
[351]. This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine
[352]operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no
[354]problems concerning
[355]2
[356]g
[360]SECRET
[362]HY 50955 Docld:32424029 Page 6
[364]a SECRET
[365]“Security Information
[367]problens concerning besos ‘and management, ‘end requires relatively
[368]em2ll investrents and @XPense Tt would be advantageous beyond the
[369]_ dumediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist
[370]infiltration, spot forthcoming politcal. changes by observing changes
[371]- dn povernnent prepaganda direetivas, recruit agents with reliable
[372]cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for
[373]dental of the facilities to an enény in the event of hostilities.
[375]We believe at should be the agency's established policy
[376]to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can
[377]be createds A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the |
[378]immensity of this field ‘of potentialities, ‘poth as coneerns the ~~~
[379]countries on the peripheries. of the USSR and Communist China ia -
[380]Europe, the Near East and Far Eastg and in Latin America as welle .
[381]We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area ©
[382]_Divigions, on a country~by-country survey of possibilities in this .
[383]area and that action he taken to achieve penetration wherever this
[384]study indicates it my be foasibles
[386]ne RR RR ane
[388]- -@e5. Use ‘of purchased or free time through covert channels
[389]on existing radio systems in: friendly COUNTIES ot eS
[391]f. Electronic penetration of enony - proadeasts. y, maples
[392]the "Ghost? . Voice operations of World War Ir. This techn sue is .
[393]discussed in. para. 5ateo(S) below.
[395]ge To exploit the amateur [rast proadcasters, Large
[396]numbers of whom dstist in Russia, * * + A Droject is being Grafted
[397]te explore the possibilities ef this technique.
[399]; hho Broadcasting from . airplanes. Thia has been carried out
[400]‘experimental ly in two areas with digappointing results due primarily
[401]to operational and equipment-limitations which make. for Limited aude ~
[402]‘fence coverage at best. It is, morenver, very ‘costly and-alse pre=
[403]sents ‘special gecurity problems. It is not recommended, except for -
[404]possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used
[405]‘on occasion to similate messages from agents inside: ‘the USSR or sate |
[406]ellites. This ie a desention technique rather ‘han broadcasting: but
[407]shoulds we believe, be explored. . -
[409]3. Targets in n onder of, importance o, with optim of Ade quecy
[411]* YSSReosRadio is the only consistent: medium for. picre~ .
[412]ing the Soviet ‘von curtain. It.is estimated that there are approxi=
[413]‘mately 4,000,000 receiving sete in the USSR, of which 75 to 60 per
[414]cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of
[415]receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of then. readily
[416], veeeive hong | and medium wave signals. Wot ell of these receivers are
[418]in the hands of
[419]HW 50955. DocId: 32424022 Page 7 y $ £ “oer EG. .
[421]SECRET
[422]. Security Tnfermatina
[424]in the hands of private individual! however} and the’ number of those
[425]having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly ©
[426]deereasing due to Soviet efforts t6,increase group listening by means.
[427]of wired networks. Nevertheless, at would appear that there will be a .
[428]sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three
[429]-Wee bands for som» time to: come. One indication of this is the
[430]fact, that at present the USSR is bréadessting approximately 900 hours
[431]per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own peoples
[433]‘Many of these transmissions are to areas and over Frequencies which lie =
[435]within our transmitting capabilitics.
[437]Our assets: for exploiting this potential audience,
[438]; reladtng projects still ‘in the Planning Stages | are far from adequate
[440]be ‘Communist China e=<Like tlie USSR, the Communist government
[441]of China relicS heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with
[442]" @he peovies It utilizes more than. con fational ‘and. regional stations
[443]_. for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and Long wave bat to
[444]' some extent, also, on shortwave o % # He
[446]mh em A ae oe
[448]Be cari Satellites «<The preponderance of CIA broade
[449]casting efforts are cent ered ia area, % % ;
[451]7 de The Free Worl.d.--Hany countries afford opportunities
[453]for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration. of
[454]indigenous broadcasting systems: and use of free or purchased. times * ROE
[455](See, Parae 20 d.)
[457]bbe Problems ¢ x of * Covert. Broadcasting
[458]as cover oO
[459]: --°- (1) 8 radio transmitter that ean 1 be heard cannot be
[460]fidden. Put another way, there are no known methods. for concealing —
[461]fom téemical monitors the’ geographical : “gource of broadcasts, eithough
[462]the non-technicdl listening public can +e and often is deceivede .
[463]Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable
[464]protieme Autonomoue emigre organizations, which offer the most _
[465]eredible. cover, generate. factionalism ag well as ‘control, security —
[466]and manager: “nt problems. © ese difficulties ‘gould, however, be ~
[467]minimized by positive agency y control through a compartnentel ization
[468]whieh separates the cover organization from program and transmitting
[470]operations and lays dam strict requirements on security, budget
[471]control, and high professional atandarde.7 See Charts Annex IT.
[473]( 2) Religious broadeasting presents few cover heade
[474]aches, but is of doubtful. propagenda Values - — ;
[475]G) The best cover
[477]ep h : tae :
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[482]Security enrornesion
[484]Oh The: best cover is afforded by covert. penetration
[485]of friendly systems, (a-Western European nation. ‘talking back to > USSEp
[486]€t., a8 discussed in’ 2ode above)s .’
[488]a “(4)” Commercial proadeasting cover presents some. » possi
[489] palitdes ‘in. the free ‘world but none ‘for hroadeasting to. the Soviet
[490]Orbite- -”
[492]“Be Bases,
[494]. aay Becauge governnenta object to providing bases for
[495]ageressive psychological. warfare which they do not influence or control,
[496]it is difficult to: find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the —
[497]Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to
[498]plan, build, . and staff ‘and long temre is therefore | important c How-»
[499]. ver, the political Climate of a ‘country can change: abruptly, with |
[500]_ wegulting. uncertainty as to length of tenure. . Munich, for. instance,
[501]which once furnished.an excellent base for a variety of broadéasta —
[502], targeted t to the Orbits. appears: to be becoming | less and less satisfactory.
[504]a Cover and control problens are ‘elesely’ related to
[505]this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be
[506]less difficult. to obtain than for a deosely organized ONG «
[508]“ay Seaborne transmitters offer mech in nobility but
[509]‘antenna ‘Limitations restrict their effective powere As in the case:
[510]6f the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are: vequired for
[511]maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problen. becomes: the sane
[512]as for land transmitter bases, and.costs in investaent and méintennance
[513]are. considerably higher. than land. based operations, Moreover, the. =.
[514]difficulties of providing ‘eredible cover for a covert seaborne operation
[515]are manifest. While this office wil] contime to study VOA experience
[516]in this field, it. SeeS no Prospect ‘of any: agency use for ite ¢
[518] £ 3) The OA. presently controls numerous broadcasting
[519]bases and are developing additional bases,. in areas of the world”
[520]sulteble for our purposes. The netessary agreements with host:
[521]countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transporta=
[522]‘ion and. other..logistics. have been provided.. The present: manage=
[523]mont of YOA are symoathetic to sharing these bases’ with . CIAs °.
[525]_ In addition to the’ saving in cost, thie vould furnish us secure.
[526]: Sreas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems,
[527]If the difficult but not ingurmountable problem of cover canbe 7
[528]resclved, ‘gueh, ‘Locations: would be. Adee’ ‘for our: PUPpOBes . « a
[530]“Informatien Support .
[532]- €)y To supplemerit: available normal news | sources, a:
[533]wosdeasting t to Orbit countries is dependent for program material,
[535]upon: intelligence _
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[543]upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees
[545]and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flew of intercepts
[546]from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, intere
[547]eating, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast rotential resources
[548]‘and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is
[549]far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, Vor,
[550]and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the
[551]Sane or Similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the
[552]same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained
[553]in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only
[554]for all radio but all other Pi activities better and faster. A cleared
[555]consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro-
[556]dueed on abundance of exesllent support information and evaluation
[557]data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,
[558]could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt Fil effort
[559]targeted to the same area,
[561]This complex problem needs a high level decision
[562]by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers —
[563]experienced in both FW and interrogation work with power to devise
[564]an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resovrces.
[566]de fo Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard
[568](1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts Yaises
[569]serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that
[570]can be heard above the jamming. ‘Te be sure, some of our breadeasts
[571]get through becauge they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts
[572]in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transe
[573]mission at ell hours.
[575]For future planing purposes, however, these factors
[576]seen clear:
[578]{a} Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and
[579]on the increase.
[581](b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re=
[582]lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on
[583]their interests, Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda
[584]are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.
[586]{c) We have no present capsbilities to monitor
[587]their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areag-=
[588]low-powered local jammers.
[590](2) Prudent planing would, therefore, require that
[591]any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting
[592]transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure
[593]our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.
[595](3) What techniques
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[605](3) What techniques are available to meet this requiree
[608](a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be
[610]heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a
[611]Jomepoueeed and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering _
[612]unintelligible « signal of substantially higher power from a distant
[613]pointe The greater the power of ovr transmitter the more complicated
[614]the installation and the more exoensive the investment. And the more
[615]diffieult becowes the cover and securlty problems as well as the
[616]political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the
[617]enery is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would
[618]therefore be fighting e losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out!
[619]on & power basis only.
[621]{(b) Jamming evasion turough the device of vary=
[622]ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay--
[623]ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamaing. This —
[624]method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must
[625]assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient
[626]to overcome tue annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination
[627]with appropriate programming techniques and the use of tuo or more
[628]frequencies similtaneously Liis has so far proven to be the most
[629]effective means of jamming avoidance ¢
[631]Such frequency shiftines cannot be accomplished
[633]within the legal. rules laid down for international broadcasting.
[635]These mst, therefore, be "black" broadeasts in the sense that they
[636]can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the fovernnent
[638]of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies
[639]proccrces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to
[640]whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while
[641]fully justified in the ease of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,
[642]must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friendss
[644]Our proadeasts using this technique have so
[645]far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very lew
[646]pover, This Limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit
[647]target and that only on the periphery. The same vechniques can be
[648]used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. —
[649]fe-aveid interference with friendly nations! broadeasts the base
[650]mast be located in an area which, ‘with the proper antenna adjust-
[651]rents, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly
[652]countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting
[653]‘pass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts te the USSR, the facility would
[654]have to be engineered sc that its signal wonld not interfere with:
[655]lecal. broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in
[657]between.
[658](ec) The development ot 4 unconventional broadeasting
[659]techniques for
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[666]techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting
[667]services might well enable us to evercome the handicaps imposed by -
[668]the jamming of our conventional breadcasts to the Soviet orbit and
[669]seize the cold war initiative in the radio ophere It is a field
[670]which has been neglected thus far.
[672]' Sone possibilities in this area are described
[673]in 1 the te Troy” report of the Massachusetts Institute of
[674]Technology Vol. 1, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.
[676]no Among then is the "intrusion," or "gide=bana
[677]injeetdon,” ‘technique which wes used successfully by the Russians
[678]‘against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude ..
[679]our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on |
[680]“enemy Home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the |
[682]- Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences. over enemy facilities
[684]or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort —
[685]to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda
[686]broadcasts to Western Burope to the advantage of our friends. ‘The ‘Troy
[687]report observes as to’ the technique itself: od
[689]“This would be an effective and annoying
[690]technique which would be extremely difficult, te counter."
[692]Utilization of this technique appears to. be
[693]within our. _gapabtlities at the moment.. It has been field tested
[694]and is yeady for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations
[695]tan be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved
[696]in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being
[697]explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.
[699]. _ Another unconventional technique being devel-~
[700]oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing
[701]‘4s the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that
[702]we can transmit an interfering sigaal into an orbit domestic radio. -
[703]sorvice which will cause the listening audience to shift to our
[704]nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference. on his:
[706]our: home program. | .
[708]Other unconventional 1 means of - carrying the .
[709]cold war to the Orbit by means. of clandestine radic might. be cap-
[710]able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical
[712]. potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.
[714]This office is convinced that emphiagis must
[715]be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-
[717]. Wiques if the cold war of the air waves is not to-become more one-
[718]sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel-
[719]oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro-~
[720]cess of perfection and those which might be invented mignt even be
[722]: . the means of
[723]=B~
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[728]Security infomation _
[730]the means of shitting the whole radio propagandd war balance dn our
[731]favor. They would be indispensablé in the: event . of hot war. We,
[732]therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci«:
[733]ties in this direction to the utmost. and proceeding inmediately with
[734]the covert procurenent of bases amet equipment needed fer the task.
[736]. | Bo recapitulate, 4b would. diem desirable for. .
[737]_ CIA to Limit ite present and future conventional, radio broadcasting
[738]acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new: undertakings.
[739]. should provider -
[741], i “A mascinmam transnitter power of
[742]200,000 watts capable of ‘eccommodating: ©
[744], - 2 Bult an - jenming evadiion capabili-
[745]' t1esg ani
[747]ee 3 baste in unconvontiond broodeasting
[748]apepiitieee .
[750]& Bases in secure and 1 protected areas:
[751]which permit tiie - use of the jamming evasion teshnique without inter-
[752]ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is
[753]now being nasle by this office, — , _
[755]Bo Lad Lead Time
[757]. @) (a) Radio| ‘proadeasting gacilitiée cannot be created
[758]_ over night. From the time that plans are finally. approved, it takes
[759]' 12 to 18 months to design, construct. and install & transmitter.”
[760]Prior to such approval time.is required for the planning cycle, negobia~
[761]tion for bases, the staffing problem, eteo
[763](b) Deep. cover penetration of” existing radio sta~
[764]tdons or ‘eyatens likewise require tine for development. °
[766](2) All in all; it would be prident, to. estimate that
[767]upwards of two years arc. required from the conception of a project
[768]for broadeasting and its impLehentation. Hence, the planning must
[769]bs long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil—
[770]ities for targets of opportunity, gach as Stalin's death.
[772]fo and Management, ~
[774](1) Control by CZA of the substance of broadeast, and
[775]the management of broadcasting cperations should be absolute and through
[776]| efficers directly responsible to agency control. —
[778](2) The doctrine of. compartnentalization : should be
[779]strictly enforced. No. ones excepting the handful of technicians required
[781]to eperste ;
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[790]to operate a transmitter, should‘ be allowed near the transmitter
[791]site. The delivery of tapes, ete., should be through a cutout. . Likes
[793]wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the
[794]operation of the transmitter as well as from ‘any other activities of
[795]the cover organization... If two or more language groups use the seme -
[797]facilities they should be compartmented fron ach other. ® # #
[798](Soe Para, 4u8.(1)) | |
[800]g Evaluation - me oo
[801]; - GQ) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting —
[802]| (25 February 1953-85 86889) -attention was called to the need for a
[803]continuing evaluation of all radio broadeasting- operations with partic-
[804]ular referencé to coverage am impact, and sources for the essential
[805]information were outlined, = ,
[807]___ , (2) PP/OPS, in ecllaboration with this office, has -
[808]initiated this much-needed underteking, _ ;
[810]he ° Personnel,
[812](2) There is a shortage of proféssional and. technical
[813]personnel qualified for covert radio broadeasting. A program of
[815]selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any
[816]plans for new radio projects. — cS
[818]+ " (2): A training program in covert. broadcasting techniques
[819]should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe
[820]houses by detail- of qualified instructors from covert training for basic
[821]indoctrination; te be supplemented by area‘instruction by the area desks
[822]and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office. , .
[824]5. Recommendations =
[826]' Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the
[827]. old war we have made certain assumptions ag to. the criteria which
[828]should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting. -
[830]Our théalis is that CIA should use radio Broadcasting in
[831]covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:
[833]Be! That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other ©
[834]overt media.°- , : : : ,
[836]_ bo ‘That any contemplated operation follew strict cone
[837]septs for clandestizie operations, including ©. me
[839]ae (1) Positive and direct agency control of both
[840]management and policy. + oO, : se
[842]. ‘.. (2) Strict security requirements ineluding ecome=
[843]partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.
[845]=10= (3) Maintenance of
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[854]- (3) Maintenance of sufficient sover to permit oo
[855]eredible dental of official connection by U.S. or: host t country govern-
[858]&, ‘That no direct brbadcast opereiton be undertaken by
[859]GIA untdl ever; possibility has been exhausted to have the task under-
[860]taken by another country (or countries) through ; ‘penctration, manipula
[862]ton and/or cuntrel aid or covert: -parchase of time on, Andigenous radio
[863]ot faedlities.
[865]Our foremost objective 5 should be to eqlott the :
[866]brosdeastin, syatens of friendly a and neutral countries. This generally
[867]is possible in “te wy
[869](2). fo stimlate. sur friends. ‘te greater aggressive
[870]effort ia their international broadcasts to the. Soviet orbit; and
[872](2) To influence the output ef the domestic ser
[873]vices o! friendly and neutral. states in the interests of the: ‘Western
[874]- eanse.
[876]os within this frame. of referencé we made the following
[879]a (1) Proceed 448! eiiott the tiga possibilities to.
[880]Be indigenous ratio systeng in- -fedondly and néutral. nations with the
[881]objectives of (a) increasing the smount and effectiveness of their ..
[882]propaganda éfforts against USSR aad the satellites, (b) exposing and
[883]_dihibiting Commun‘st fifth colum activities end & ‘the maintenance.
[884]ef. pro-US. anid pro-Western attitudes. a
[886]mS These missions should be undertelcen in closest
[887]7 collaboratdon with the USIS missions to the en that all that. can be .
[888]decompl ished overtiye a
[890](2) ndertekce. a recruitment: and training progran to
[891]make availab:. © highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers
[892]preferably with natural. cover to undertake and ‘to support such ndasions.
[894](33 tn ecoperadon with Staté, develop a positive
[895]pro. eam for information. ‘euppert of all propaganda sotivities Chrough
[896]neximim use of intelligence and defector sources» .
[898](4). Strengthen and streamline. the machinery for
[899]; policy , guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for. broad
[900]policy only and the field missions to be given the widest. poasible .
[901]latitude in the application of: those policies to local sequirements |.
[902]arid the exploitation of targets a opportunity. A mature staff officer.
[903]‘experienced in'P We should be-dvailable in the miasion to (a) feed
[904]propaganda Mines, (o) expedite Pls ‘Support (ce) coordinate with USIS |
[906]and (a) generally
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[913]and (d). generally backstop the operation. .
[915]. (5) Botablish machinéry for evaluating the ewhetence,
[916]eoverage, impact and management. of radio operations. oo.
[918]5. (6) - Proceed, with thio @evelopnent of capabilities to
[919]electronically imsrude upon: and otherrise exploit the Cosmuniat radio
[920]broadeasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important. BO -
[922]. . hewe these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible
[923]. use. in the ecld war—lot to have them available at the outbreak of .
[924]“hot: war would be a tragic mistake.
[926]seea re eas u&
[928]ote: Reecumendatdons with respect to speeific
[929]‘tardsts haye been transmitted. to the © SEPROPFAStS ,
[930]divisions
[931]: (10) a ‘anal staf? element should be, ereated to
[932]supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting.
[933]‘This’ staff. should be lnstructed to expedite the implementation of
[934]the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CTA
[935]Policy and Progam for the use of this Hedia..
[937]le. “ioyd Ener
[938]“6, Low BGRER
[940]"5 May 1953
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[877]Pecomendatiéns:
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198-10008-10119.pdf | [1]'[198-10008-10119
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[5]JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
[6]Identification Form
[7]Agency Information
[8]AGENCY: ARMY
[9]RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10008-10119 ~
[10]RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : :
[12]Document Information
[13]ORIGINATOR: ARMY
[14]FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[15]TO: CAPT. ZUMWALT ET AL
[16]TITLE: = ICCCA: ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION
[17]DATE: 10/14/1963
[18]PAGES: 20
[19]SUBJECTS :
[20]COUNTERSUBVERSION PROGRAM
[21]TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO CUBA
[22]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[24]CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
[25]RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
[26]CURRENT STATUS : Redact
[27]DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 06/01/1998
[29]COMMENTS :
[32]HY 50955 Doactd: 324274608
[34]OPENING CRITERIA :
[36]Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo No. 71 from Joseph Califano with attached report of
[37]Subcommittee on Subversion. :
[39]VEK faview
[41]Se Declassity
[43]Authority,
[45]Review Date AUIS. Py Lkden fo 9
[46]NO STATE OBJECTION
[48]apartment ot ha EO tee
[49]ude EA Exempt
[51]TO DEGLASSIFICATION
[52]BY_gf bare WEG
[54]Page 1
[56]82 OCT ies |
[58]MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN =. a. RUMWALT, 3IR., USN (SD)
[59]“ Ait. D ALGER, USA
[60]W. WENDT, USN
[61]GENERAL 3. W. GARPENTER, Wl, UGAP
[62]BRIGADIER GENERAL Ww. ow JONES, USMG
[64]SUBIEGT: interdapartenantal Coordiusting Committers of Gahan Atfainet
[65]Actions Taken During July-August 1963 ta Curbing Cuban
[66]Sabvercion in Latin America
[68]Attached is the finel report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on
[69]Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Guban Gubversion in.
[71]ieatin America.
[72]Signed
[73]Joseph A. Califano,Jr.
[74]doeeph A. Califans, Je.
[75]General Counsel
[76]Attachment
[77]Ae Stated
[79]oo.
[80]wee Boe eating (OSD)
[82]Mr. Califano
[84]Mt Col Haigs i
[85]ASG
[86]Wa
[88]seer wR PROG |
[89]RECRADED | UNCLASSTFIED WHEN SEPARATED
[90]SECRET FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
[91]a
[93]HY 50955 Docld: 327424608 Page 2
[96]Le
[97]— @ This a) He
[99], nt consist
[100]SECRET No43. or Le S of LG Pages
[101]— “*F Copies, Series
[103]REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:
[104]ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963
[106]IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[108]SECRET
[110]364, ASG Control! Nor. 3 24.
[111]Win by GRoUP 1
[112]Excluded fr
[113]downgrading
[114]declassifica
[116]OM automatie
[117]and
[120]HW 50955 Doold:323474608 Page 3
[122]SECRET
[124]1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba
[126]Central Intelligence enc
[128]a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
[129]of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationali-
[130]ties of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control
[131]followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this informa-
[132]tion to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the
[133]non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.
[135]b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
[136]Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin
[137]Americans during July and August.
[139]c. As a result of information furnished to him by
[140]the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging,
[141]the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would
[142]make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attend-
[143]ing the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.
[145]d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy,
[146]the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an
[147]order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or
[148]other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.
[150]e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
[151]station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
[152]entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second
[153]Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to
[154]take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the
[155]factors which led to postponement of the Congress.
[157] £. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station
[158]and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa
[159]Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican
[160]Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel
[161]to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a
[162]newly created Costa Rican security agency.
[164]g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information
[165]concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz
[167]GROUP 1 SECRET
[169]HY 50955 Docld:32424608 Page 4
[171]SECRET
[172]“De
[174]on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain
[175]more information and to encourage stricter controls by the
[176]Mexican authorities.
[178]Department of State
[180]a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade
[181]Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by
[182]flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a
[183]temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights,
[184]at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own
[185]refueling facilities at Conakry.
[187]b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
[188]authorities to express our deep concern at the growing
[189]frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request
[190]their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our
[191]Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA
[192]station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those
[193]countries travelling on these flights to local authorities _
[194]and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their
[195]own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their
[196]concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil
[197]as a way station for transporting subversives.
[199]c. As a result of representations made to the
[200]British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands
[201]carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed
[202]an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the
[203]use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit
[204]points for passengers. The British intend to require transit
[205]visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to
[206]reject applications. for such visas except in certain special
[207]cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from
[208]leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point
[209]of origin.
[211]d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to
[212]inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is
[213]opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to
[215]. SECRET
[217]HW 50955 DBocld:32424606 Page 5
[219]SECRET
[222]carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a
[223]result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding
[224]further with this project.
[226]e. Instructed our missions in Curacao. and the Hague
[227]to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew
[228]scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US
[229]opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured
[230]our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service,
[231]scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.
[233]£. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong
[234]objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick
[235]up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them
[236]to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.
[238]g- Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate
[239]Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission
[240]reported on August 1 that the Governor bad no knowledge of
[241]any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and
[242]the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana
[243]planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire
[244]further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither
[245]the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the.
[246]issue of landing rights with H.M.G.
[248]h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
[249]and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government
[250]in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58
[251]American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also
[252]informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban
[253]request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from
[254]Habana to New York.
[256]i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and
[257]Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments
[258]to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban
[259]interest in the use of their aviation facilities.
[261]Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary
[262]of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable
[264]SECRET
[266]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 6
[268]SECRET
[269]Ge
[271]GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory,
[272]citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada
[273]and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that
[274]the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation
[275]officials concerned.
[277]j. During a previous reporting period Embassy
[278]Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to
[279]Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin
[280]American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean
[281]capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to chtain Chilean
[282]visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to
[283]the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting
[284]had been postponed.
[286]k. Sent general instructions to our missions in
[287]countries which participate in the International Union of
[288]Architects asking them to urge the coop:ration of governmental
[289]authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of
[290]their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September
[291]29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to
[292]individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade
[293]architects from free world countries from serving on the jury
[294]for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.
[296]1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
[297]commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis
[298]that would have required the establishment of scheduled
[299]weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.
[301]2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda
[302]Central Intelligence Agency
[304]Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police
[305]of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of
[306]propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special
[307]Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed
[308]propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived
[309]on the 16 August Cubana flight.
[311]SECRET
[313]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 7
[315]SECRET
[317]3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
[319]Department of Defense
[321]a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding
[322]Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate
[323]and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.
[325]b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from
[326]within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other
[327]Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft.
[328]in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such
[329]requests were received from any other government during the
[330]period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep
[331]track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter
[332]MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and
[333]arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK
[334]was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana.
[335]until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this
[336]ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown,
[337]British Guiana. Subsequeatly, British police search of
[338]MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a
[339]suspicious nature.
[341]Central Intelligence Agency
[343]At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima,
[344]the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-
[345]terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five
[346]years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla
[347]activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or
[348]explosives.
[350]The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working
[352]on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a
[353]290 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.
[355]Department of State
[357]Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to
[358]investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could
[360]SECRET
[362]HW 50955 DoclId:324274608 Page 8
[364]SECRET
[366]conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed
[367]between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date
[368]have been negative.
[370]4. Control of Transfer of Funds
[372]Department of State
[374]Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office
[375]of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls
[376]with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.
[378]5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
[380]Department of Defense
[382]a. Continued the installation of military communica-
[383]tions facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for
[384]the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua,
[385]Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delaved to 15
[386]October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of
[387]new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations
[388]are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation
[389]of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new
[390]commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone
[391]within the coming month is expected to improve military
[392]communications within the United States and the Commander-
[393]in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.
[395]b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S.
[396]Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organiza~
[397]tions and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been
[398]disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.
[400]ec. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week
[401]duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean
[402]countries in conjunction with implementation of the military
[403]alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S.
[404]Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared,
[405]trained personnel (this center is the military focal point
[406]for relaying information concerning the movement of
[407]subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in
[409]SECRET
[411]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 9
[413]SECRET
[414]-J-
[416]the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took
[417]under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet
[418]structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
[419]Southern Command together with his intelligence officer
[420]visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no
[421]significant problems existed which would interfere with
[422]effective operations in those countries.
[424]d. Action previously initiated by the Commander,
[425]U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO0) to establish
[426]a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a
[427]contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progress-
[428]ing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard
[429]personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and
[430]the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing
[431]actions. ,
[433]e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
[434]ducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
[435]Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
[436]of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
[437]Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as
[438]replacement crew members.
[440]£. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs
[441]provided other Central American countries was conducted
[442]during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team
[443](MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.
[445]g- Continued efforts to improve the internal security
[446]of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
[447]Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14
[448]Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
[449]subversion.
[451]h. During the reporting period MITs conducted train-
[452]ing in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia,
[453]Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.
[455]i. Civic Action MITs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia,
[456]Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.
[458]SECRET
[460]HY 50955 Docld:32424608 Page 10
[462]SECRET
[466]6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion
[467]Central Intelligence Agency
[469]CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in
[470]a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
[471]security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
[472]tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
[473]information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement
[474]of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances,
[475]the furnishing of information to the internal security
[476]service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of
[477]similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador
[478]or his representative. The response to this information has
[479]varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general,
[480]began to pay greater attention to the information and act on
[481]it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during
[482]the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up
[483]on the information. ,
[485]Department of State
[487]a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our
[488]. interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
[489]brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this
[490]action be taken as soon as possible.
[492]b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit
[493]evidence of communist activity to the OAS.
[495]7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural
[497]Missions
[499]Department of State
[501]Instructed Embassy La Paz to foilow up closely on
[502]charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal
[503]policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to
[504]point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible
[505]break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to
[507]SECRET
[509]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 11
[511]SECRET
[514]press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention
[515]did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.
[517]8. Other Special Actions
[519]Department of State
[521]a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the
[522]Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the
[523]governments and urging them to implement the specific and
[524]general recommendations contained therein as soon as
[525]possible.
[527]b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
[528]Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered
[529]“during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
[530]Intericr of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August
[531]26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
[532]Managua Security Conference countries later this year.
[534]c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban
[535]threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during
[536]conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson,
[537]newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.
[539]United States Information Agency
[541]a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
[542]period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and back-
[543]grounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts through-
[544]out Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and
[545]the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America
[546]carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject
[547]of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to
[548]alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this
[549]subversion.
[551]b. In response to standing Agency instructions to
[552]give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based
[554]subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in
[555]reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from
[557]SECRET
[559]HY 50955 Docld:324274608 Page 12
[561]SECRET
[564]the Latin American press, all of which was used in the
[565]Agency's radio and press output.
[567]The main developments treated in the Agency's radio
[568]and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging
[569]revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist
[570]weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice
[571]President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism,
[572]the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive
[573]elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a
[574]Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba,
[575]Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests
[576]against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike.
[577]A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America
[578]provided several reports on the subversion picture in coun-
[579]tries he visited.
[581]c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based
[582]subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
[583]three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report
[584]of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
[585]himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress),
[586]the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the
[587]fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these
[588]pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity
[589]throughout the area.
[591]SECRET
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[595]SECRET
[596]ANNEX A
[597]CIA Intelligence Annex
[599]1. Travel to and from Cuba
[601]“Brazil
[602]Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and
[603]Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban
[604]Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights
[605]since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.
[607]The first of the recent series -- on 25 July --
[608]brought 7i Latin American passengers to Havana for the
[609]26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15,
[610]22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin
[611]Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aixcraft
[612]involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers cf passen-
[613]gers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had
[614]been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had
[615]apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had
[616]probably received training there. Of the passengers on
[617]these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of
[618]Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through
[619]Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact
[620]that they had been in Cuba,
[622]Costa Rica
[624]Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a
[625]chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana
[626]at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina
[627]Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to
[628]have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla
[629]warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September
[630]1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen,
[631]former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of
[632]the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November
[633]1962.
[635]SECRET
[637]HW 50955 Docld:32424608 Page 14
[639]SECRET
[640]- 2
[642]Eecvador
[644]The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military
[645]junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can
[646]be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and
[647]the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and
[648]the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives
[649]in Fevador, at least for the present, have been greatly
[650]inhibited by the mass arrests of Commmists and pro-
[651]Cubans and by the outlawing of the Comaunist Party by
[652]the junta.
[654]Honduras
[656]It is reported that the Fonduran Communist Party
[657]has issued orders to its members not to attempt to
[658]travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is
[659]apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of
[660]the Honduran government and the greater implemertation
[661]of stricter travel controls.
[663]2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda
[664]Guatemala
[666]According to an unconfirmed report received in July,
[667]a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of
[668]Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa
[669]Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects
[670]to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print
[671]bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may
[672]indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt
[673]to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas
[674]in Latin America.
[676]Honduras
[678]It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a
[679]small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist
[680]propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes
[682]having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The
[683]report has not been confirmed.
[685]SECRET
[687]BW 30955 Docld:32424608 Page 15
[689]SECRET
[692]3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
[694]Argentina
[696]Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently
[697]under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon
[698]and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving
[699]encouragément and promises of large sums of money from
[700]Cuba in support of their efforts to train and crganize
[701]subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated
[702]that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating
[703]subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a
[704]complete take over within two years. There is no indica-
[705]tion that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has
[706]been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of
[707]Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of
[708]the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists
[709]without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.
[711]It is reported that the so-called Army of Pational
[712]Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively
[713]small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by
[714]John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating
[715]for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine
[716]guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private
[717]suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was —
[718]having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to
[719]make significant purchases possible.
[721]Bolivia
[723]The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23
[724]August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires
[725]in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners
[726]during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign
[727]Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need
[728]not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break
[729]diplomatic relations with Cuba, There has, in fact, been
[730]no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the
[731]present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed
[732]reports of Cuban support.
[734]SECRET
[736]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 16
[738]SECRET
[741]Brazil
[743]Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is
[744]reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league
[745]leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in
[746]northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are
[747]being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident
[748]elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other
[749]reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is
[750]providing guidance and possibly financial support to the
[751]movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension
[752]in the leagues.
[754]Colombia
[756]From Coletkia reports have been received of incre-
[757]asing Cubai assistance, primarily in the form of training
[758]courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba,
[759]to the Worker-Student~-Feasant Movement (MOEC). A small
[760]guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in
[761]Juiy 1963 was broken up when five members of ithe band
[762]were killed and two others captured. A smali quantity
[763]of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets
[764]on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro,
[765]Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of
[766]the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports
[767]have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of
[768]the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che
[769]Guevara with regard te the training of additional MOEC
[770]members.
[772]Costa Rica
[774]There have been a number of unconfirmed reports
[775]alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on
[776]Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in
[777]Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number
[778]of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica
[779]by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan
[780]revolutionary leader and member. of the FLN (National
[781]Libération Front -~- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported,
[783]SECRET.
[785]HY 50955 Docld:32424606 Page 17
[787]SECRET
[788]- 5 -
[790]anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August,
[791]Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Cdsta Rica, ©
[792](reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguaéng’ for the
[793]Costa Ricdan-Nitaraguan border. Another téport indicatéd
[794]that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was
[795]supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the
[796]Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan
[797]guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes,
[799]who recently returned from attending the May Dey celebra-
[800]tions in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this
[801]responeibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.
[803]So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-
[804]informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its
[805]borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified
[806]concern or awareness of these reported activities.
[808]Honduras
[810]The Honduran armed forces began to move agsinst a
[811]group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating egainst the
[812]Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the
[813]Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard
[814]has been conducting operations on its side of the border
[815]against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and
[816]difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of
[817]both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.
[819]Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and
[820]conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the
[821]National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist~-dominated
[822]and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active
[823]primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of
[824]1962. The strength of the force is not known.
[826]Nicaragua
[828]A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation
[829]Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-
[830]Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a
[831]group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.
[833]SECRET .
[835]HG 50955 Docld:32424608 Page 16
[837]e &
[838]SECRET .
[841]He said that their mission was to establish a base camp
[843]in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in
[844]order to indoctrinate the peasants. and to train them in
[845]guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six
[846]months’ puerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other
[847]FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said
[848]that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near Fl Lagarto,
[849]on the Patuca River.
[851]4. Transfer of Funds
[852]British Guiana
[854]In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation
[855](Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment
[856]deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation fcr goods to
[857]be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn,
[858]loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana.
[859]Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major
[860]stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex,
[861]has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional
[862]loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan
[863]government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also
[864]reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts
[865]and other machinery in the United States for reshipment
[866]to Cuba.
[868]General
[870]Reports continue to be received from many places
[871]indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one
[872]of the most common methods used by the Cubans for trans-
[873]mitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities
[874]throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds
[875]have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently
[876]in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.
[878]SECRET
[880]HY 50955 Docld: 32424608 Page 19
[884]os
[885]QO
[886]by
[889]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JULY.1963
[891]JULY. ~ PIBPOSE_OF_TRIP TO CUBA___________. ..|
[892]i. TO FROM | _. |
[893]ARGENTINA to. ___0 26th of July Celebrations. -|
[894]BOLIVIA | aa | 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. _. — |
[895], BRAZIL | 25 | o | 26th of July Celebrations. t
[896]; RR, GUIANA | oo | oo ee
[897]| CHILE | 1 26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
[899]COLOMBTA |_29 | ,.26th of July Celebrations. eeeneneneeneentene nen nen
[901]4
[902]ICOSTA RICA
[904]2.
[906]_ jp oth of July Celebrations. — ec recemire ereepeeenges
[908]DOM, REP. 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. | _
[909]| ecuADOR | 2 0 | 26th of July Celebrations. |
[910]PL SALVADOR | 4 L__{ 26th of July Celebrations.
[911](GUATEMALA 6 0 i _
[912]| HAITI | 0 0. r
[914]| HONDURAS io 0 i “ _
[915]| JAMAICA } 33 1 30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations, |
[916]MEXICO 65__| 28 | 26th of July Celebrations,
[917]NICARAGUA 5B | 0 H 26th of July Celebrations. __ |
[918]; PANAMA | 15 | 0 _} 26th of July Celebrations. - |
[919]| PARAGUAY 3 | o | 26th of July Celebrations. _
[920]| PERU . ~ | 4 a 1 _
[921]| TRINIDAD an) : _ oo oe
[922]{ URUGUAY, | az 15 26th of July Celebrations. °*' @tteeguyg pitt remain
[923]1 VENEZUELA 22 0 _26th of July Celebrations. a
[924]SPOTALS 319 «| 47 -_ ee
[926]seo oN EThehth
[928]SECRET
[930]Page 20
[932]HW 50955 Docld: 32424608
[934](>
[935]we
[937]t
[939]Aen
[941]SECRET
[943]KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA ~ AUGUST 1963
[945]NATIONALITY | Avot, | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
[946]| Avot, |
[947]ARGENTINA ce 26th July Celebrations.
[948]BOLIVIA .
[949]BRAZIL oo 22-Returning from 26th.. Faly Celebrations.
[950]BR, GUIANA Herder Institute in Leipzig. .
[951]CHILE’ 22 8-Physical Ed, Seminar = 1-Seelking: ‘funds - 10-Returning
[952]from’ 26 July Celebrations -
[953]COLOMBIA 14 ; : ‘
[954]COSTA RICA . [26th July Celebrations.
[955]bow. REP,
[956]ECUADOR
[957]EL SALVADOR OO 7 fa
[958]_—— earners ea)
[959]GUATEMALA 1-Study at University of Sofia. ms
[960]OO A ren OD
[962]HAITI
[963]HONDURAS Hee
[964]MEXICO tS
[966]| 0 |
[967]PANAMA | 6 |
[969](Seen July Celebrations:
[971]au Tel
[972]L
[975]| 26th July Celebrations. wR, coe : /
[976]IPARAGUAY fo | 7 re: |
[977]Pew |? 9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received vA
[978]: guerrilla training. vo ; va
[979](TRINIDAD .€] . . . | ene nnn
[980]URUGUAY 10 | 16 | 26th July Celebrat ions. —
[981]VENEZUELA 3 0 | 26th July Celebrations. a
[983]roTALS floa | 214
[985]Docld: 32474608 Page 21
[987]HW 50955 | [2]
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[31]v9.1
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[50]© eter te
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[118]tion
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[641]
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[681]
[684]
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[688]
[690]-~3-
[691]
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[695]
[710]
[720]
[722]
[733]
[735]
[737]
[739]-~4-
[740]
[742]
[753]
[755]
[771]
[773]
[782]
[784]
[786]
[789]
[798]
[802]
[807]
[809]
[818]
[825]
[827]
[832]
[834]
[836]
[839]-~6-
[840]
[842]
[850]
[853]
[867]
[869]
[877]
[879]
[881]
[882]i=
[883]ical
[887]wa
[888]
[890]
[898]im | —— : Jiplomé
[900]
[903]
[905]
[907]
[913]
[925]
[927]
[929]
[931]
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[989] |
198-10009-10098.pdf | [1]198-10009-10098
[3]| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[5]AGENCY :
[6]RECORD NUMBER :
[8]RECORD SERIES :
[10]AGENCY FILE NUMBER ;
[12]ORIGINATOR :
[13]FROM:
[14]TO:
[16]TITLE :
[18]DATE:
[19]PAGES:
[21]SUBJECTS :
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE:
[25]CLASSIFICATION :
[26]RESTRICTIONS :
[27]CURRENT STATUS :
[28]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[30]OPENING CRITERIA :
[32]COMMENTS :
[35]HY 50955 Baocld: 32424708
[37]JFK Assassination System
[38]Identification Form
[40]Date: 6/24/201
[42]Agency Information
[44]ARMY
[45]198-10009-10098
[47]CALIFANO PAPERS
[49]Document Information
[51]ARMY
[52]JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
[53]MULTIPLE
[55]ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER
[56]SUBVERSION
[58]11/26/1963
[59]19
[61]ICCCA - SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
[62]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[64]RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
[65]SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
[67]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[68]Secret
[70]1B
[72]Redact
[74]05/15/1998
[76]Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Sloan, Alger, Wendt, Carpenter,
[77]Quilter re: attached paper concerning status of implementation of actions designed to counter Cuban
[78]subversion.
[80]TFK Heview
[82]apariment of the Army EO 13526
[84]Declassity — Exclude Exempt
[85]Authority
[87]© Refer To
[89]21
[91]Page 1
[93]. SROREE
[95]26 NOV 1962
[97]MORANDUM NG, 01 POR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (9CS)
[98]ME. FRAME B. SLOAN, Dep Avast See/ Del ISA
[99]| Mideive)
[100]Boe a we Cuet CEMERAL En am ALGER, ALA
[101]BEAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WEMDT, Uaw
[102]MAIGR GLNERAL J. 8, CARPENTER, Hi, USAy
[106]anintad Coordinating Gorsemiltee of Cuban Aflaira:
[107]: tue od implementation of Actions Designed to
[108]Counter Subversion qu}
[110]Raterence: DA Meme 74, subject aa above, dated September 19, 1963:
[112]Attached hovewith io a Anal dralt of the Report te the President of
[113]the Subcomed tien on Cuban Subversion om Prog: e During September
[114]1963 in Curbing Coben Gubversion iv Latin Aunerica.
[116]St io requested teat rearrange if any, be provided this efice by
[117]1200 boars, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of
[118]subject report is haced on eubvelusions provided im Feaponse to referenced
[120]wmomnotamdatii.
[121]a ee sexin A. Califano, TPo
[122]Jovesh A. Califano, Jr.
[123]General Counsel.
[124]Eaciosera
[125]Ae Stated
[127]ce: Mr, Yarmolinsky (OSD)
[129]Lt Col Haig. 7
[131]Mr. Califano Sees
[132]ASG Se RXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
[133]ay OES NOT APPL
[134]SECRET pop DIR 6200.10 DOE
[136]OSA, A5e Contral ln zeit
[138]HY 50955 Docld: 32424708 Page 2
[141]11/13/63 -
[145]REPORT OF Tis sua-coMirrER
[147]on CULAN SUBYERSTON | |
[148]Y. AGIION ! TARER DURING SESPOBER 1963. IN CURRENG
[150]QURAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN avertca | ~”
[155]‘ AV us/e 63
[158]iS
[160]Be Gontrol of Travel to and Pron Cuba. i
[162]Department fs State
[164]Instructed abacay Tanks to call to. ‘the attention 1 :
[166]: of the Foreign Miniotry out concern at increased evidence
[168]ef Agzoflot attempts te establich Moreh Africa routes to.
[169]os Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our : conviction that 7 oa
[171]Tunisia bas a@ valid case in Bmerting any Bloc civil, ais : - -
[173]: "penetration of Africa.
[175]; Be Tasteucted Babassy conakey to contact Guinean « Covera~ oS a
[177]menk officials, ‘eninding then of their past assurances -
[178]2 that 20 Astotlos Zlichte to Cuba vould be permitted to.
[179]ss use Conats <y facilitis GBs and to eupress our concern at |
[181]Feoent indicat! ions t? sat &e
[183]coflok wie preparing to establish a —
[184]mo sezvices to Subs via: Conakry. oS :
[185]“Ge “Instructed Consulate fort au Franee to tavastigate
[186]we and veport. om alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana )
[188]a aiveraft at Guadeloupe, Also double-checked Aisoctly |
[190]x
[192]with € n@ Shell Company’, the supplier of the fuel, _ - eee
[193]instrusted Enbassy Paris te query the Srench Government :
[195]ae altegsd ‘Cuba spa uBe of the Guadeloupe factlitys and
[197]te expre 8S OUT concern at this evidence of Cuba’ 6 attempt cea
[199]- to use Prench caribbean dependencies for Flights: ‘to. and
[201]‘NW 50955 Deca: 32424708. ‘Page a fe groney
[203]HW 50955
[205]fos Latin America. So
[207]- ode “Instructed Bubassy nie ¢ to make @ new epproaeh to oe
[209]aa passengers. Daring the course of the month: the Brazilian.
[211]‘cabena e ate no aviation fuel wae available ia Barbados and 2
[213]_ £. Con ablaued intor-Departmental efforte to Prevent
[215]. xeoumption of fersy service betuces Cuba end the U8. ce
[217]Docld:32494708 Page 5.0000. |
[219]ae ae - SEGRET | ore Spent!
[221]oe De
[223]"the Brasilien Foreiga i Hints try to express our concern ge
[225]at. Cube! s continuing ase of “eharter" flights ts Brazil
[227]and the laxity of Brezilian offietals ‘te tne control of.
[229]Goverment began tightening contrels agatast ‘Cubana
[231]flights. Specifivaily, all requests. for landing permtosion : .
[233]' were henceforth to be proces sod by the Foreign Office, ie -
[235]with appropriste delaya. Also tighter passenger, ervey ao
[237]a and Cae gS controls were te be institeted when a Cubans, os ae
[239]os : flight is pemicted to use Brasilien feellities.. a cle : on
[241]“Determined | that tho OK. hed specifically ‘wiened
[243]thet 4.4.¢. would, im the future, reapect Shell 1 Sexpany*s, =
[245]decision te deny fueling to Cabana planes,
[247]watel & British citizen, Bavold Derber', bia bet On attenpte
[249]imy to es seablish during the past several wont.
[252]os : Be. | “Instructed Conzul Georgetown te , investigate and.
[253]i report: on evidence the Departaant xeceived which indicates,
[254]that cuba is planging to sell merchant vessels ‘to Beteioh :
[256]-. Galana in order to faclii wate the cstablictnant « of ae
[258]regelar service for. Passengers 3 and CAE EO.
[260]“ta ‘connection with the Seventh Congress: of che ”
[262]- International Tnion (JIA) held in Habsns Septoaber 29 ee eS
[264]; Cetober 3 1853 the fuenos Alves Station:
[265]oe -@) encouraged
[267]| . : ofA architects to oppove Argentine attendance at the
[268]- Babane meeting, :
[269]gras reins architects woo nad planned te attend canm : i
[270]gelled ‘thelr participation; ve 7 .
[271]. oe ay arrenged to prevent the attendance of any - -
[272]"seeing authorized sxgentine delege ation at the Mebane *
[274]- meetings bat Ens couraged the attendance of an official
[276], Arges eL
[280]| NW “50955 “Decta: :g2apa708. “Page. 6.
[282]the Be cgenting Natt
[284]onal Yederation oe
[286]eels chat 25 of che 39
[288]me delegation of guti~Commmnt ae coloration at an
[290]interne ational architects necking to be held fa Mearico
[293]ae Interior concerning Suban charter flights to ‘Brasil whieh «|
[295]dn representations te the ‘Brasilien Foreign Office. a
[297]: 2, 24 and 25, 1963 foreing ‘their cangeblations hen ©
[298]“Sabana, because of harassment at t Rio, began sing the
[299] danding fac cilities ja Ssa Paule where soutrols were -
[300]gen existent, CIA iuitieted and obtained & local Matson
[302]. Guhans flight ts to Sas Paulo.
[304]Ss
[306]‘MW 50955 DocTd:32424708. Page 7
[308]6) delivered a memore ndua =) che Miniover of
[310]bony
[312]"supported the aebsssedor? 8 request that the fugentine cae
[314]government express concern over such flights.
[316]be Rio de Janeizo Station continued €o furnish a
[318]“the Eabassy with data oR Cubans flights to Brazil sed
[320]. Alse induced Bo sizport officials te impose stringent ee
[321]--paesport control and baggage efforts. - ‘These efforta -
[323]a contributed to ‘the Sraztlian Covers moat? & fatling to oe
[325]sue landing permits fox Cubans. flights on Septenber. i
[327]agredment fox similar harassment da the event of fatare
[329]te “Hexles city station inopixe . & press cespaiga |
[331]a,
[333]© heoft anced mouth and amalloox epideni es tn Cuba, Prior” _
[335]te the Architects Congrens to discou: age participation
[337]du the Habana necting. The eeoulting guarentines and -
[339]“tanoeelattons |
[342]SEDRNE
[343]echisveceeenin
[344]a oe
[346]innoe lations were a fa acter ta a discouraging 52 of the
[348]ode
[350]a 6a can professional arel hitects wah. were expected ‘to
[352]gp to Hatens from strending the Congress.
[354]‘Il. Control of Neyerent of Propayanda
[356]itera b Cates, Gah
[358]‘HW 50955 Docld: 32424708. Page 8°
[360]» TEL: Controd of Glandest ine Hovenent of SuereiMae: ek Oe
[362]HW 50995
[364]““Docld: 32424708: Page 9.
[366]- and ares |
[368]. Deparment ge Shate . |
[369]_. ade the ahcessary arzangenmts through Eobassy
[370]Tegucigalpa with © the: Goveriment ef Hondurae for the
[371]- dispateh of three u.8. helizopters to give logistical _
[373]“- agsistanee. to the Honduran Amay in its. ef fort te. locate
[375]and elininare the band of guerritias allegedly operating
[377]ivan the Fatuca River area Stong the Honduran-Hicaragsan 8
[379]on
[381]- border.
[383]Departement of Defense .
[384]Three (8-13 hellespters fram USSOUTECOM cupported
[386]Hoadaran arned forces | conducting counter-Ineurgency
[388]epena ations in. - the Patuce River area, A total of 27 sorties
[390]were flown resulting in delivery et 3928 ‘pounds of eupplies,
[392]a evacnatter fia sick eves an soldiers, aivlife of 19°
[393]Base engexrs to points in ¢ the 2 operational area, and.
[395]- recovery of 400 pounds of owplies groan ‘the operational
[397]eae 8
[398]ad
[400](BECE. oe na oo Oe cea
[402]Wer
[404]° Skerry
[406]ap u
[409]or te
[411], enennien’, Be State
[413]a Instructed Eubansy Kexieo City to inform the -
[414]Mexiean aixline SAESA that thele propesal te purchase _ - oe
[415]sucpias Caban: fiverafe would in fact venuit in the. |
[417]acerual to Cuba of a ‘signifleant anount of herd currency, - 2 Sted
[418]; and the ¥.3. ccothe he Ae ‘to oppose the transaction. 7
[419]wrcther, if agliare were involved in the purchase,
[420]de ee void be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control
[421]Re salations. =
[422]Be Tater ea Departuent of Treseury, Yoretgn Assets
[424]| Gentrol Offtes, of the activities ef Senendelp Enterprises, pie
[426] @ Blend firm engaged in sending rani ttances to ‘persons | o oe
[427]: dn Cobs in violation of the Cuban Assets Control “
[429]Re yglations é
[431]“es instructed Sonculate, Belize to inform ~
[433]. Me. Richa ra Jayeey at American sational, thac his “a a
[435] gonmer evcial transactions with She were in violation a
[437]of the © whan Agsete Control Re: oalations and that he
[439]+ de pre ohibited from en waging iy cuch trede.
[441]HW 50955, DocId: 32424708. Page 10°. 7S rs
[443]Are seat EMER ee VRE gece > elamhCaemdrnis Mohit iabedd hen Palins He MD a Me eet Re hd eae eat sea eI
[447]of Counter-Insurrency Capabitities | |.
[449]'Bepactment of £ Defense
[450]a. Thirteen Latin Anerican off ‘leare graduated from =
[451]| che counter-ingurgency Cperations s Course of the U.S.
[452]Aavay School for Latin Ameren in tle Panama Canal éqn2
[453]- oh 20 September. Baz fing. the conth, a tata aL of OL Latin
[457]Anariean officera ensolled in courses stressing counter”
[459]a,
[462]in surgency & & the Aemy ¢ Gamal cone achool.
[464]: . yb Htahé B.S. aney eounter-inourgency wobile —
[466]. . training teans were provi diag’ taainiag to the Araed - .
[467]‘Forens of five Latin American - countries daring the period. .
[469]ans. Ade Force counter izsurgency trataing toms vere _ woe
[471]in teo countries.
[473]be Be in the Cmmal Zone, 15 studente from five countries
[475]nerve onder insteuation in the epexation ef coaet guard os
[477] gediiey patrol areft ase for woes tah surveillance,
[478]Six students from tid countries were sadexgoing sinter - ;
[480]a - tesining in the Gaite pocates
[484]ad, AUS, Navy combersinsurgency exaining team —
[486]is in Vereousta to aselet im dmpeoving the eecurity
[487]of of1 instellationa ia Lake Hawaralbo. ts
[488]HW 50955 Docld:32424708 ‘Page 4% 0000
[491]HH 50955
[493]Ee a | - 7 _— aes °
[494]aor me oes so =
[495]_ : ee cota Rica and Hondaraa were provided one
[496]“Gensmes 183 aizeragt each fox medical civic aetion and -
[497]| internal Hee curity perposes. . | 7
[498]_£.| Oa May 25, 1963, three MeL3B cn stance”
[499]were provided to the government of Colarbie on a SQ-day : -
[500]loan. the Colexbian Ge werrnent requested an extension
[502]of the loan er aa 3G-ca3 ¥ extension has boon approved.
[504]City Station ‘nos recruited, ona
[507]a erial nasis, & former wenber ef the a Hovexber puccnita
[508]| 7 group and devrielings are in process. Hegotiat fons
[509]continue with the Government of Guatemala for che |
[510]format ion of a now internel security Bexvhee.
[511]‘b Lime Station has agreed te furaish the Peruvian
[513]. Investig ations Police (PIP) with an outheard motor -
[515]te dime Tease ‘chetr patvel qnoab bility on. rivers crossing _ 7 oe
[517]7 the Solivien frontier. Oar infer raation is chat the
[518]etvers eressi: ge ¢his front ies have provided rhe primer;
[519]avenues fort recent attempts to gain cl stine entry
[523]asa personnel and weapone into Peru.
[525]: Oe ras curcikca a
[526]* . RRC ae Oe . yy
[527]Nae . mo on
[528]- .
[530]DocId: 32494708 | Page 12
[533]eT
[534]ha
[536]Exehence of Tné colt Leoree ae caten Sabverston
[538]Depertuent of Defense
[540]Reve iy ineering in tallation work continued ¢ on radio
[542] gtetions fox Manag iat ‘Biles anagua and Tegucigalpa,
[544]Hondures.. No ferther progress: hes been mide dn reaching
[546]| agvenments with Colowbia and Ecuador for rights to
[548], Zeneral Inteli4 Ae Ags ——
[550]egiabligh vadio stations in these countries: installation oo
[556]€ che a any | trans seictimian comercial cable fa Panama a
[558]is néesrios compl etton,
[560]. i
[562]oad Meret nee au aiceoes
[564]ena Stations continued thelr exchange o
[566]oe
[568]inteliigence
[570]information sith Local intelligence agencics. . Tee
[572]folicw! ine actions are of special significances 0 i
[574]&. The CIA Station iu Bueno Aires furnished the /
[576]oo Argentine State Intelligence | Service (BIZ) with .
[578]HW 50955" DocId: ‘sh& Ootolmede 13 - SHORE?
[580]guested that SLOE préevide mame tra. 28 aad debrief these oe
[582]a
[584]infermation on the travel of Axgentines » to Gaba, and res .
[586]ed
[588]travellers oa their return whenever fea: sible, SIDE oe
[589]provided the traces, but did mot canduct any debriefings.
[590]@ Station bas not felt it feasible to try to remedy
[592]this omflesion in view Gt che personne ate henses expected .
[595]within SEBE after the npw g government ig i installed on
[597]*.
[599]ge
[600]a
[601]coy
[603]7]
[604]8
[606](S
[607]a
[608].
[610]eule of information paased by the Bogota
[612]‘Scation to the Adainistrative Department of Security
[614](DAs } concerning Colombian “evavellers to €xba, a nuuber
[615]of passport violations F hove ‘bean discovered in whieh
[617]tvaveliere te Cuba are using ¢ eusports ismaed to ether
[618]persons. Thewe is a reluctance, bow saver, on the part .
[619]of the Colonbian Covernacat te prosecute this type
[621]oF viol lation r
[623]. Be, At the urging of the Cra Sration In Lins, che
[624]» Ratio mal Invelld igeace Servies (SIN) instrwcted one of
[626]es penetrations of vecete groups te campaign for a erig 7
[627]to Saha ia osder to receive guorviila warkare trainin nge
[628]The asst has been offerad, ami has accepted, an opportunity”
[629]to outka the te 4o by the Leftist Revolutions ry Me renee
[630](8), griemry vakicle of Cuban subversive activ ities
[632]‘tn Pe othe ‘Briefing and debriefing of the as get whll be
[634]The Fe smavisa 1 aval Intelligence 2 Service oo) iis Sy |
[636]in tesponsa to the efforts of th ® Station ia Lima, 5 sent
[638]goo af its avents te Chile where ke wAlt sien abcard a
[639]e
[641]5.
[643]“HW 50955 DocId: 32494708 Page 14.
[645]ie nister # Gove eenment and
[646]Police has 3 requested from the cIA rep "agen lat ive ia
[648]| Lisa any inf forastion that he rbght supply oxt subversive
[649]| elementa posing & threat to the Goveranent of Ferite |
[650]a sequest has opened an adédietonal channel to the
[652]| nighost is ra oF ho & Gover renee we heh a concomal tant
[653]pres spoction effective action when needa ie
[655]. | a. . Throa ash gegulex Liaisos channels, the Venezuolen |
[656]General E Divest “orate of Follce (ptczroL) nas beca provided |
[657]by CTA + shel the nenee of all Venemuelons: — to have:
[658]tragell ed to Gute fram Yelruary cheowgh August 1983
[660]. thie activity will be carried est oa a continuing baotes _
[661]the names ace now beleg dneegcraved inte the cogeler
[663]water Lat kept ae intexsational aivports in Venezuela. . .
[665]Cat, at lest three wate wes have been axrosted
[667]om the basis ef ¢he inferantion # spplied te DIGEPOL,
[669]DIGEPGL has indioncad ite appreciation of ‘the data
[671]being gupplied aod desives that the arrangement be
[672]gomt in
[673]VIL. 1 and Cutturat
[674]“Re special aatlor as io veperte | a Se
[675]. ~. WEE,
[677]HW 50955 -Docla:32424708 Page, i5 Bet eeeter Tee ooo
[679]VIL. Cther Spectal Actions
[681]Fy
[683]ba
[685]nited States Informition Areney
[686]Pires A
[688]a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven
[690]articles relating to Cuban subversion em its wireless
[694]ile service te USIS offices ‘throughout Latin America 1
[696]s
[698]or piscenant ism the lscal newepapers. Deve lopnente
[700]a
[702]voported fa these articles ineluded demands by the Bolivian.
[703]- Sesete for the ouster of the Cuban cheegé d'agsaizes, |
[704]> gervortiam and soverrmnent counteraction in Venenuela,—
[705]th 2 seizure in Eouador ef an. arua and- explosives eachs
[706]weporte diy received feon Cuba, . several articles on the |
[707]. International Caden of Agvehitents Congrese an Hlahena
[708](emphas iadng the invest of the Gastro regime to oe
[709] fongres sé as a forum Eor ite propaganda ol cidima) ». and -
[710]. restos Ee ecretary lectin’ s Los Anselas epee oh in uindeh ae
[711]he podeted out the vegine's ailinicy fox chinese: conmantst
[712]deetrtn TO g and fis eontinacd enphasis on violent revolution
[713]sent gubve eeton,. In. ald, the prees service tranemitted
[714]2? articles and commentaries during Septet ex on the
[715]. Subject of tubs, the ether arric noe ests for the most
[716]pert with econemie and polltiesal conditions inside. the,
[717]commtesy Ge evidenced by the regime’s own 3 admissions and
[721]“the x reports. of 2 siagoce..
[722]NW 50955 Docld: 32424708 Page 16. _SecRer
[725]Bo The Votes et dmerion Soarmish broadaest te to y Latin
[727]Acne aries durin ng September carricd a total of 20 news
[729]AMBAIVSES , commentaries » Press round-ups, an d int erviews oo
[731]s
[733]velated te the sebfece of Cuban subvevaion, Seme of
[735]3
[737]the developpents treated Ineluded the fallowine:
[739]& qumtentary on comuniat embaaed Les. as channels for
[741]iversion; @ news anclysis on the U.S.
[746]Wialted Cuba: Avsistane & Leerotery Me artin's Les aAmgeies
[748]Presa; & newe ansiyaés on Cuban subversion es an obstacle
[750]a
[752]ast ene more ralization oe
[754]U,3,-Seviet relations: a threc=
[756]: part series om aniversity austonany in Latin America:
[758]& See ature oF ea the etter of a delembien etudent whe .
[760]oe went te Gerba om @ scholarship and was sigiile an sloned by
[761]the communist Indectrimation; a ccomentary on Che Cucvera! © |
[762]tecent avefele on revolutier wny Strategy; and 2 comentary
[763]on guerrilla treining ia cu. Kany of chase items Were
[765]_ Sepented several tines tn tha broadcasts. The “Rendezvous |
[767]with Guba" hou carried fo az 2 Ebve honmentanies Biome
[768]fate and inveeviews aight hy a aconemic an nd political
[769]tone Lonmomts inside Seba. Gf speelel mete, the Castes
[770]eraly up Voloe of
[772]A a bracd aevara "a sxticie and te com
[774]‘agedet eltapel role in
[776]HW 50955 pacla:32424708 ‘Page iv. CO BECRBE = the
[779]the comumndst bios and head poutroned dite plane ae)
[780]induatrisiize. |
[781]c, On September 27, the Asency issued a circular
[782]instruction to Sillite Latin Anerican nest te urgion
[786]great ae ttention Ee Gop S65
[790]gigs
[791]cs
[797]etiv ities to error bie
[799]nts of Fisié eet
[801]de format Lon
[803]ore
[805]noatht 9 segs & taken
[807]Inge ction. | This was don
[809]ruetion on Cuban eubve
[811]at
[813]sisted im the.
[815]Lleses
[819]Seer LS
[821]2 195
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[827]Nie Bo oe
[829]in Powte Ales e on & &
[831]£ the Satan basket
[833]‘ Docld: 32424708 |
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[869]ination ee a Guban athelete Reberte Fe ones Cadarse
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[902]*e ¢ (€ oS . ey ake = , 3 ca ; ; ;
[903]me & 9 > Oo 8 @¢ & ¢ 68 & SG “@ %% 8
[904], » o £ & #2 3 i os B es 2 _ of 78
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198-10009-10099.pdf | [1]198-10009-10099
[3]: | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESID
[5]ENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[7]AGENCY :
[8]RECORD NUMBER :
[10]RECORD SERIES :
[12]AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
[14]ORIGINATOR :
[15]FROM:
[16]TO:
[18]TITLE:
[20]DATE:
[23]SUBJECTS ;
[25]DOCUMENT TYPE :
[26]CLASSIFICATION :
[27]RESTRICTIONS :
[28]CURRENT STATUS :
[29]DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
[31]OPENING CRITERIA :
[33]COMMENTS :
[35]Identification Form
[37]JFK Assassination System Date:
[39]6/24/20 1
[41]Agency Information
[43]ARMY
[44]198-10009-10099
[46]CALIFANO PAPERS
[48]Document Information
[50]MULTIPLE
[52]02/00/1963
[53]153
[55]CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
[57]SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA
[59]PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN
[60]CUBA - 1962
[62]CUBAN SUBVERSION
[64]SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]Secret
[69]IB
[71]Redact
[73]07/15/1998
[75]Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony
[76]concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in
[78]Cuba, etc.
[80]FEK Kee ed
[82]Department of the Army EO 13528
[83]Bt eciassiy Ci Exclude ©! Exempt
[84]Authority.
[86][ Refer To : .
[87]Review Date L By. A
[91]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709
[93]22,
[95]Page 1
[97]. a)
[99]CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART Il
[101]10.
[105]12.
[106]13.
[107]14..
[109]15.
[111]16,
[113]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709
[115]SUBJECT;
[117]Statement. by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA
[118]before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC
[120]’ Statement by the DirCIA ‘for use.of the staff of the
[122]Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
[123]Stennis .
[125]SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
[127].SecDef testimony before House Appropriations: Cmte
[129]SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
[131]SecNayv testimony before HASC
[133]Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState
[135]with attached statement by Mr. Martin before
[136]the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject
[138]‘of communist subversion of the hemisphere
[140]SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.)
[142]SecNav testimony before HASC
[144]‘Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell
[146]D. Taylor, ChJCs
[148]Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC.
[150].SecDef testimony before SASC
[151].Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC
[152]-SecDef testimony before SASG (Cuba) |
[154].Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff.of the
[156]Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
[158]‘Stennis (Cuban. Subversion in LA)
[160]‘Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent
[161]Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on -Govern-
[162]ment Operations - U.S. Senate
[164]Page 2?
[166]DATE:
[168]Undated
[170]7 Jan 63
[172]ll Feb 63
[174]‘12 Feb 63
[176]13 Feb 63.
[178]18 Feb 63
[180]19 Feb 63
[182]"19 Feb 63
[184]19 Feb 63
[186]20 Feb 63
[188]20 Feb 63
[190]21 Feb 63
[192]“21 Feb 63
[194]22 Feb 63
[196]26 Feb 63
[197](Transmittal
[199]Slip)
[201]13 March 63
[203]CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY: - PART II (Cont'd)
[205]NO, SUBJECT: DATE:
[207]17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert .& Mar 63
[208]Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4,.5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
[209]11, .12, 13 and 14 included as attachments
[211]18. Study on Cuba as a Base for -------- prepared by Bob Undated
[212]Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara
[213]at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def
[215]19, Memo for Mr, Robt A, Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63
[216]Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US
[217]Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano
[218]w/draft of President's message atchd
[220]_ Sub
[222]20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm Undtd
[223]ef Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military
[224]Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8) -
[226]HW 50955 Docld: 327424709 Page 3
[228]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 4
[230]= AANSMITTAL SLIP |?" 267 rep 6(~
[233]; Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance
[234]ROOM NO. BUILDING
[235]3E985 Pentagon
[236]REMARKS:
[238]FROM:
[239]CIA - William A. Tidwell
[240]ROOM NO. BUILDING
[242]EXTENSION
[244]Codell. 6614
[245]FORM NO 7] 44 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO : 1957--O~439445 (Cr)
[246]tFEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
[248]HY 50955 Docld: 327424709 Page 5
[252]286
[254]J
[255]u
[257]Gs
[259]STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
[260]STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
[262]SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS
[264]OA, ASC Control Me Sy9__ noRET
[266]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 6
[269]25 February 1963
[270]CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
[272]I..- Introduction
[274]The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
[275]daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
[276]from our intelligence, sources within Communist and
[277]other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
[278]phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel
[279]Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com-~
[280]munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow
[281]and seize control of the governments in Latin America.
[283]Even before the October missile crisis=--and with
[284]increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been
[285]exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and
[286]terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban
[287]support takes" many different forms, but its main thrust
[288]is-in the. supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the
[289]training, and the communications and technical assist-
[290]ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.
[292]In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from
[293]other Latin American countries: | "Come to Cuba; we _
[294]will pay your way, we will train you in underground
[295]organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab~
[296]otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you
[297]get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we
[298]will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup~
[299]port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,
[300]training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret
[301]communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-
[302]ized demolition equipment. " Castro is not, as far as
[303]we know, promising these ‘other Latin Americans any Cu-
[304]ban weapons or Cuban personnel-~either leaders, ad-
[305]visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them;
[306]"If you succeed in establishing something effective
[307]by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,
[308]if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con-
[309]front regular armed forces, then we may consider more
[310]concrete forms of assistance."
[312]So far, it should be noted, none of the movements
[313]in South America has reached this. final stage=--and in —
[314]fact even Castro! 's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had
[316]SECRET
[318]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 7
[320]. * £3 SECRET @
[322]to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-
[323]mations which might have required more advanced weap-
[324]ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.
[325]In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version
[326]of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
[327]ing revolution wherever it flourishes,
[329]We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-
[330]ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part
[331]in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We
[332]know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,
[333]from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We
[334]know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that
[335]some guerrilla ferces in Peru, for instance, are equipped
[336]with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.
[338]Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-
[339]ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the
[340]recent meeting of Communist front organizations for
[341]Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both
[342]emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in
[343]speeches in January. One of our established sources
[344]of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-
[345]zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee
[346]agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres-
[347]ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."
[349]This same source reported that Communist guerrilla
[350]and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-
[351]der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates
[352]activities with the other militant extremist groups in
[353]Venezuela, The result has been the creation of the
[354]Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or-
[355]ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist-
[356]ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter
[357]ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate
[358]shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres-
[359]ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,
[360]of course, they failed.
[362]The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized,
[363]The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done
[364]with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has
[365]reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go
[366]out at night in some sections of the capital. But it
[367]is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that
[369]SECRET
[371]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page &
[373]HW
[375]50955
[381]this level of activity is not the sort of thing that
[382]will bring down the government unless the president
[383]or other high officials are assassinated, The FALN
[384]has not reached a point where it stands up to the
[386]-armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-
[387]ings.
[389]We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-
[390]ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any
[391]other country. Our estimate is that more than 200
[392]Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of
[393]these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and
[394]others were rounded up and given long prison sentences
[395]when they committed themselves prematurely last spring
[396]in a countryside where the rural population strongly
[397]supports the Betancourt administration. One of our
[398]best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela
[399]tells us that at present the unified command has less
[400]than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated
[401]groups of 15 to 25 men each.
[403]II, The Cuban Plan
[405]For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-
[406]ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin
[407]American revolution, with the implication that nothing
[408]more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac-
[409]tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on
[410]July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue
[411]making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera
[412]of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
[413]continent.." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro
[414]said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-
[415]turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be
[416]in the Sierra Maestra., For the past three months,
[418]Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both
[419]in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-
[420]munists which have been repeated to us, have been in-
[421]sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve
[422]power in Latin America only by force,
[424].The Cuban effort at present is far more serious
[425]than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that
[426]the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into
[427]such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-
[428]aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first
[432]SECRET
[434]Docld:37474709 Page 9
[436]s @SECRET @
[438]eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today
[440]the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more
[441]covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-
[442]‘craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced
[443]Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including
[444]veteran Spanish Communists.
[446]The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-
[447]ganda effort, The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-
[448]vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of.
[449]public record, It may be worth noting that the postal
[450]and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on
[451]the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda
[452]coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes
[453]into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the
[454]airport or in the post office and destroyed.
[456]. The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla
[457]trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form
[458]of booklets. .There are thousands of copies of the
[459]texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che
[460]Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents
[461]‘have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,
[462]about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques~
[463]tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil
[464]War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba,
[466]) and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with
[467]100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo’s
[468]books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and
[469]mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5.x 8, and in-
[470]cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as
[471]well as charts for calculating the force of. various
[472]explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's
[473]book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of
[474]Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-
[475]guerrilla organization in Colombia.
[477]All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla
[478]must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how
[479]to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary
[480]preparations from materials that he can obtain easily
[481]and sometimes even openly at home.’ -They stress that
[482]his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come
[483]from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces
[484]in his homeland.
[488]SECRET
[490]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 10
[492]yO @ SECRET @
[494]IIL. Training
[496]We estimate that: at least 1,000, and perhaps
[497]as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962,
[498]from all the other Latin American countries with =
[499]the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-
[500]logical indoctrination. or guerrilla warfare train-
[501]ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the
[502]limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.
[504]The largest contingents have come from Vene-
[505]zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some
[506]of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed
[507]to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-
[508]tended some conference or celebration and done a
[509]little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as
[510]a year, and may include intensive training in such
[511]things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological
[512]warfare.
[514]We have devoted a great deal of effort to
[515]monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the
[516]main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.
[517](Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM
[518]may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great
[519]lengths to conceal the fact that some of these
[520]trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they
[521]stayed, However, we know a great deal about this
[522]travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-
[523]ties, from controlled agents we have been able to
[524]maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and
[525]from cooperative travel control authorities in
[526]Latin American countries, The Cuban Embassy in
[527]Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate
[528]piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes
[529]home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.
[530]We have a record, however, of those who fly on to
[531]Cuba, In other cases, particularly in the case of
[532]travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, ©
[533]the Cubans furnished passports under other names
[534]for travel by way of Curacao,
[536]We derive some of our figures from travel con-
[537]trol points, and another set from the information
[539]we receive from penetration agents of established
[540]reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the
[544]SECRET
[546]NW 50955 Doold:32424709 Page i1
[550]Latin American governments are also able to maintain
[551]fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to
[552]have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-
[553]checking from lists of names furnished us by several
[554]of our agents who have undergone training, and in
[555]confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in
[556]Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we
[557]come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known
[558]to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.
[559]We have to make allowance for some who did not re-
[560]ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-
[561]posite direction for those whose names have escaped
[562]our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust-
[563]ments by the cross-checking information mentioned
[564]above,
[566]Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,
[567]by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using
[568]Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships
[569]as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This
[570]is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in
[571]some cases permits further indoctrination and train-
[572]ing in Bloc countries. ,
[574]Under the circumstances we consider that our
[575]estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees
[576]in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that
[577]the scope and volume of this training is being stepped
[578]up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.
[580]The basic training covers cross-country movement.
[581]of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general
[582]guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took
[583]such a four-week course more than a year ago, under
[584]cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned
[585]to his Havana hotel every few days during the course
[586]to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An
[587]Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then
[588]was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great
[589]deal of detail on the type of training. He reports
[590]that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The
[591]Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-
[592]tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na-
[593]tional units from a particular country, in effect
[594]forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to
[595]the homeland to'lead a "Liberation Army."
[597]-G-
[599]SECRET
[601]HG 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 12
[603]e SECRET ®
[605]A trainee whe recently returned to Peru after
[606]several months of training in Cuba, said that all
[607]his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and
[608]other similar demolition targets on detailed maps
[609]of Peru. They were also required to fill out :
[611].lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-
[612]ities for subversion of police, methods. for illegal
[613]entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-
[614]ply, possible points of attack against police and
[615]military posts, and similar information necessary
[617]for directing subversion and insurrection.
[619]Numerous reports come to us indicating that in
[620]such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,
[621]where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either
[622]in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-
[623]bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors
[624]or advisors for these forces. These reports are in-
[625]variably second-hand, and we have not been able to
[626]confirm any of them. In Some cases, it has turned
[627]out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas
[628]referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and
[629]was training others, rather than a Cuban national.
[630]However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals
[631]were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,
[632]Peru, last December, which culminated in several
[633]million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of
[634]the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.
[636]One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed
[637]invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by
[638]land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con-
[639]tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to
[640]crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the
[641]complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that
[642]they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-
[643]structors, but found there were none, This came to
[644]light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,
[645]relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in
[646]the wreckage of. the Varig airliner which crashed in
[647]Peru in November.
[649]IV. Weapons
[650]In general, the Cubans appear to be following
[652]the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision
[653]of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous
[657]SECRET
[659]HW 50955 Docld:32494709 Page 13
[661]So @ = SECRET ®
[663]sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare
[664]students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-:
[665]ons at home.
[667]One of our agents who was in the original group
[668]of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively
[669]in. the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle
[670]and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His
[671]group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian
[672]guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture
[673]from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-
[674]gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors
[675]told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because
[676]there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-
[677]termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.
[678]Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and
[680]-Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have
[681]been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing
[682]to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.
[683]Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is
[684]reported to us by our agents in these Same groups,
[686]mat .
[688]We have recently again checked with all of our
[689]stations in Latin America to review what evidence we
[690]have of military shipments|from Cuba. In Peru, radio
[691]transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.
[692](In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen
[693]last fall that this was unnecessary} ) In 1962, Cuba
[694]furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-
[695]gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees
[696]who were rounded up in the: Huampani-Satipo incident
[697]last March had been issued kits containing a Czech
[698]rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.
[699]Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla
[700]hardware turned out to have been bought or stelen
[701]locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country.
[702]We do:not have a single case where we are certain
[703]of the Cuban origin. of captured arms.
[705]This is not to say that we are positive weapons
[706]have not been Sént from Cuba. Latin America has a
[707]long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in-
[708]numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,
[709]and inadequate security forces to control all such
[710]channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been
[711]telling guerrilla leaders |that. Cuba will soon send
[715]SECRET
[717]HY 50955 Docld: 324274709 Page 14
[719]. SECRET ®
[721]them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that’
[722]he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,
[723]but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making
[724]this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment,
[726]In summary, we have evidence that in principle
[727]Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons
[728]to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have
[729]no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do
[730]so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-
[731]ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless
[732]to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser-
[733]ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that
[734]comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to
[735]Latin American countries,
[737]Vv. Funding
[739]Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
[740]America is easy to ascertain and hard to document, Our
[741]evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers
[742]carrying cash. The following are a few examples of
[743]these operations,
[745]A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned
[746]from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several
[747]witnesses to have large quantities of US currency
[748]stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-
[749]case. There is no law against bringing currency into
[750]Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-
[751]mine how much he had brought in, Ojeda later was cap-
[752]tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.
[754]A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
[755]carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-
[756]tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over-
[757]fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was:.found to
[758]be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was
[759]bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.
[761]Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
[762]training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-
[764]rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary
[765]Ecuadorean Youth, The leaders of the group admitted
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[771]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 15
[775]having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together
[776]with funds to support their activities. One item
[777]of $44,000 was publicized in the press.
[779]A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
[780]iast November has given us a specific account of :pro-
[781]cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-
[782]ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also
[783]have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers
[784]by. which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American
[785]front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-
[786]tivity. In some countries where the. Cubans still have
[787]diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-
[788]ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing ef front-
[789]group propaganda.
[791]In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to
[792]receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked
[793]up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying
[794]to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex-
[795]posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man
[796]‘admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him
[797]the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla
[798]camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the
[799]communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues,
[800]which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.
[802]‘The principle that guerrillas must be self~sus-
[803]taining has obviously been applied to finances as well,
[804]Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-
[805]beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. .The most
[806]Spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-
[807]urb last year which netted almost $100,000, From
[808]the participants, who have been caught, we know that
[809]the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-
[810]rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot
[811]fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals
[812]has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed
[813]to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo
[814]Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank
[816]. in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000
[817]by men wearing FALN armbands,
[819]VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts
[821]International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations
[822]maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all
[826]SECRET
[828]HW 50955 Bocld: 32424709 Page 16
[832]times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-
[833]casts to specific countries as well as general trans-
[834]missions to all Latin America. The general theme
[836]of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example” is
[837]awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-
[838]portunity for revolutionary action against the "éor-
[839]rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"
[840]which allegedly supports them. Within the last two
[841]months there has been an increase in the aggressive-
[842]ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.
[844]The official .Cuban international service called
[845]“Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-
[846]Tet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-
[847]tion broadcasts weekly a total of I87 hours and 50
[848]minutes of propaganda in languages which include
[849]Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and
[850]Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter-
[851]ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.
[853]Radio Havana's. international service was in-
[854]augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly
[855]since that time and is now Latin America's first in-
[856]ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.
[857]Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week
[859]Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hr
[860]Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min
[861]English to Europe ; - 9 hr 20 min
[862]English to the Western Hemis- - 17 hr 30 min
[864]French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min
[865]French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min
[866]French to Mediterranean - 3-hr 30 min
[867]Por tuguese to Brazil . _~ 7 br
[868]Spanish to Europe - 16 br 55 min
[869]Spanish to the Americas. a 108 hr 30 min
[871]-Ll-
[873]SECRET
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[879]In addition to the regularly scheduled” inter-
[880]national service, Radio Havana has been Known to -
[881]broadcast special programs in order to take advan-
[882]tage of unique political situations. When serious
[883]disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in
[884]‘late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating froma
[885]self- -styled “clandestine” station which said it was
[886]located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the
[887]overthrow of the Dominican government, The station
[888]went off after about a week, but not before direc-
[889]tion finder bearings and other technical clues in-
[890]dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio
[891]Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.
[893]Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities
[894]available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-
[895]can countries so they can beam programs to their home-
[896]lands. These programs, which have the evident intent |
[897]of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are
[898]presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week
[899]schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-
[900]public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua
[901]and Honduras until last September when they were
[902]replaced by a single program with wider targets now
[903]programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-
[904]emplified by the programs transmitted te the Domini-
[905]can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto"
[906]by Dominican Communists (whe are based in Cuba) on
[907]the recent election of the “demagogic imperialist
[908]agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-
[909]public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist
[910]group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National
[911]Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican
[913]‘university students to demonstrate against the Con-
[914]stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.
[916]There are also two special programs beamed to
[918]the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one
[920]hour a week transmission in English aimed at US
[922]Negroes, The other program, "The Friendly Voice
[924]‘of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a
[925]' wider audience, Both programs can be heard well in
[927]Florida and also in many parts of southern United
[929]States.
[931]The technical facilities of Radio Havana are
[932]at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles
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[938]HW 50955 Docld:324274709 Page 16
[942]southwest of Havana, At present, no more than four
[943]shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the
[944]past as many as five have been observed on the air
[945]at the same time. These transmitters range in power
[947]- from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to
[948]be heard all over the world. Programs are being
[949]sent from studios to the transmitter site by means —
[950]of microwave relays,
[952]‘VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion
[954]Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-
[955]viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-
[956]cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy: It
[957]has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping
[958]but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be-
[959]tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--
[960]call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step
[961]back"--~is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin
[962]American countries, Thus Cuba at present not only
[963]Seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival
[964]servants in its Latin American subversion,
[966]Castro's views on what is good for socialism
[968]and revolution in Latin America are more in line with
[969]those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. |
[970]Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are
[971]totally committed to terror and revolution, In spite
[972]of differences over tactics and timing between var-
[973]ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-
[974]liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-
[975]nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser-
[976]vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent
[977]on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible
[978]-and by subversion rather than by force.
[980]Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly
[981]increasing. An excellent example of this was. the set-
[982]ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in
[983]the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose
[984]‘of this institute is to raise the study of the prob-
[985]lems of Latin America, which in their own statements
[986]the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest
[987]possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese
[991]SECRET
[993]BW 50955. DoclId: 32424702 Page 19
[999]languages is to be stressed in the institute and
[1000]throughout the school] system. A list of subjects
[1002]on which this institute intends to publish shows
[1004]that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for
[1005]Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro-
[1006]gram in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We
[1007]have been reliably informed that posters have been
[1008]placed in some Colombian universities referring to
[1009]the problems of the "national liberation and work~
[1010]ers' movements in Latin American countries" as top=
[1011]ics which will be studied by the institute. Re-
[1012]sults of these studies will be published in the
[1014]near, future in a magazine called America Latina,
[1015]intended especially for distribution in Latin: America.
[1016]A pamphlet, . apparently to be distributed by the in-
[1017]‘Stitute, and entitled Alianza para el. Progreso, will
[1018]in the words of its hera. Sy Winmask the economic ex=
[1019]pansion of. the. USA" in Latin America. The institute
[1020]also’ expects to enter into close. contact with leading
[1021]Latin American scientists and academicians, during
[1024]One of the most important Communist assets in
[1025]Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic
[1026]and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur-
[1027]ther..Communist subversive activities even in coun-
[1028]tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.
[1030]The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well,
[1031]have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, _Argen=
[1032]tina, and Uruguay... ‘The USSR. maintains yelations |
[1033]with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba
[1034]maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia,
[1035]Uruguay, and Chile. ‘The’ Chinese Communists have no
[1036]diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba.
[1037]That fact aloné would make Cuban missions important
[1038]to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries-~
[1039]Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
[1041]. Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru~-have no official ties
[1042]whatever with any bloc country.
[1044]Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com~
[1045]munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-
[1046]tance the Communists attach to them, We have found
[1047]that Communist. subversive activities -in Uruguay are
[1048]not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity
[1049]against the government.: In this case even the Cu-
[1050]bans appear to be much more interested in retaining
[1051]the good, will of the. government. so that they can con-~
[1052]tinue to use ‘the country as a base of operations
[1055]SECRET
[1057]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 20
[1059]_ @ SECRET’ @
[1061]against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo-
[1062]matic missions, however, are active in supporting
[1063]local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re- .
[1064]tain enough leverage within the country so as. to
[1065]prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a
[1066]break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan
[1067]government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly
[1068]tolerant of the activities of these missions. and
[1070]of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of
[1071]the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis- |
[1072]sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so blec personnel.
[1073]In addition, couriers and travellers can go back
[1074]and forth between this city and the bloc countries
[1075]and Cuba at any time.
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[1083]. e SECRET @
[1085]ANNEX A - ARGENTINA
[1087]A participant has given us a detailed account
[1088]of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course
[1089]given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July
[1091]' to December 1962. Instruction included such sub-
[1092]jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com-
[1093]munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla
[1094]strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and
[1095]open order drill. The trainees practiced with
[1096]Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns,
[1097]Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a
[1098]57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group
[1099]reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were
[1100]given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean,
[1101]and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.
[1103]Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that
[1104]they had raided a warehouse which had served as head-
[1105]quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron-
[1106]ists and Communists. According to the police, the
[1107]gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into
[1108]Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel
[1109]of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and
[1110]had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds,
[1111]weapons, and explosives.
[1113]A special. Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay,
[1114]_ provides false documentation for Argentines and
[1115]Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train-
[1116]ing.
[1120]so SECRET
[1122]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 22
[1126]Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a po-
[1127]lice patrol stopped to investigate, they found he
[1128]was:carrying a number of rifles. in his. car.
[1130]In the last’ week of January, another of the ori-.
[1131]ginal batch of trainees'in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues
[1132]‘Lima, was arrested by national security police at an
[1133]airport. He was carrying-a suitcase full of ammuni-
[1134]tion for some of the camps which apparently are still
[1135]operating. - Jeronimo Rodriguées‘at first refused to
[1136]talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced |
[1137]he would tell his whole story. So far, according to
[1138]the press, he has revéaled that a woman attorney ‘in.
[1139]Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had
[1140]bought another farm to continue the Peasant League _
[1141]guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for
[1142]the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in
[1143]his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends
[1144]‘to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the
[1145]farm, and work it.
[1147]=Qe
[1149]SECRET
[1151]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 23
[1153]—- = SECRET a
[1155]ANNEX B - BRAZIL
[1157]Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now
[1158]have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement’
[1159]in subversion directed against Brazil. These. are the
[1160]so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori-
[1161]ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-—
[1162]gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro
[1163]on’ 27 November.
[1165]‘The documents, a letter and attachments from
[1166]"Gerardo" to “Petronio,” comprised a report from a Cu-
[1167]ban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover
[1168]hame, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it
[1169]plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by
[1170]‘Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to
[1171]set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the
[1172]framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization.
[1173]The report, which relays complaints of some of the
[1174]guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear .
[1175]that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued
[1176]by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu-
[1177]‘ban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.
[1179]Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police
[1180]official checking on possible clandestine landing fields
[1181]in the interior, ran across evidence of the training
[1182]camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be-
[1183]fore the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up
[1184]no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps
[1185]happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-
[1186]Petronio correspondence, The Varig document provided
[1187]the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources
[1188]matched their details perfectly, and it has become im-
[1189]possible for the. Communists and the. Peasant League to
[1190]obtain serious consideration for any claim that the docu-
[1191]ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their
[1192]authenticity.
[1194]The Peasant League operation, which was staffed
[1195]by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take
[1196]guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues
[1197]to provide evidence against Cuba, Although the ‘Cubans .
[1198]apparently have done their best to avoid all contact
[1199]with the ‘guerrilla organization since the exposé, Bra-
[1200]Zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications
[1201]of the operation, The second-in-command of the Peasant
[1202]League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir
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[1208]@ SECRET a
[1210]ANNEX C - CHILE
[1212]On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis-
[1213]sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly
[1214]in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean
[1215]police who searched the apartment found four members
[1216]of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6
[1217]cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38
[1218]fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.
[1220]One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had
[1221]his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed
[1222]with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these,
[1224]_ Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares,
[1226]. have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of-
[1227]ficers. The Chilean police told the press that the |
[1228]group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and
[1229]residence, US firms, and local public utilities, This
[1230]incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana
[1231]broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack
[1232]US property and installations wherever possible in ~
[1233]Latin America.
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[1237]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 25
[1239]; &B SECRET a3
[1241]ANNEX D ~- ECUADOR
[1243]Well-placed and reliable agents have reported
[1244]that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had
[1245]given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution-
[1246]ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare
[1247]training. .
[1249]More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including
[1250]three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean para-
[1251]troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp
[1252]at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles
[1253]west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to
[1254]Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez
[1255]Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain
[1256]Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive
[1257]guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.
[1259]When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January
[1260]arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in-
[1261]volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re-
[1262]store full Communist control, newspapers reported that
[1263]the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists
[1264]of wasting Cuban funds.
[1266]Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio
[1267]Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962,
[1268]was reported to have photographs showing him under-
[1269]going guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel
[1270]Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee
[1271]and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians,
[1272]was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed
[1273]a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by
[1274]Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also
[1275]Shown. a key which he boasts is the ignition key for
[1276]a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon
[1277]as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.
[1279]Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at
[1280]least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for
[1281]guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees
[1282]listed by name.
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[1288]mr - @ ~~‘ SECRET Gg
[1290]ANNEX E -— PERU
[1292]The ruling military junta in Peru started in
[1293]February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists,
[1294]including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indict-
[1296]ment, the government charges that the extremists have
[1297]attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla
[1298]forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in
[1299].San. Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted
[1300]in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-—
[1301]spaced pages. .The security forces have given us no
[1302]“evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is
[1303]'ample evidence of Cuban involvement.
[1305]The trials center on the activities of the Move-
[1306]ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza-
[1307]tion for extremist militants founded by De La Puente
[1309]_ Uceda in 1961, De La Puente had just returned from
[1310]-Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the.
[1311]revolution in Peru with economic and technical help
[1312]from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment
[1314]' conforms with reports our.agents received at the time
[1315]from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of
[1317]‘the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched
[1318]by the junta early.in January. We believe he is in
[1319]Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, .
[1321]- which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian
[1322]associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.
[1324]Although the government did not move against
[1325]the Communists and other extremist groups with any.
[1326]great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion
[1327]goes back. at least as far as March 1962, Peruvian
[1328]police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains
[1329]into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible
[1330]only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously
[1331]raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from
[1332]which trainees were being sent to the camp. AS a re-
[1333]sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including
[1335]Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for
[1336]dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates,
[1338]‘ and two radio transmitters brought in from. Cuba. The
[1339]custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact
[1340]a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this
[1341]incident were released, but have been picked up again
[1342]in the January roundup and are to be included in the
[1343]mass trials.
[1345]SECRET
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[1349]i il SECRET @
[1351]An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba
[1352]last fall has provided a detailed account of his
[1353]training, lists of other trainees he could identify,
[1354]and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans
[1355]apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it
[1356]is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla war-
[1357]fare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint
[1358]possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large
[1359]map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information
[1360]on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to
[1361]Subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry
[1362]into and travel in Peru, the problems of Setting up
[1363]business firms to cover espionage and agent opera-
[1364]tions, and information on location of and access to
[1365]police and military installations.
[1367]Three major guerrilla groups, according to
[1368]good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-
[1369]lice, appear to have reached agreement on 2 plan for
[1370]coordinated action. This may be one factor that per-
[1371]suaded the junta to move against the. extremists.
[1373]- The main guerrilla strength at present is a
[1374]force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate
[1375]to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla
[1376]force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru-
[1377]vian authorities to have received his guerrilla train-
[1378]ing in Argentina, If in fact he has 2,000 men, this
[1379]figure includes landless peasants and Indians,
[1380]largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to
[1381]believe that more than a small proportion are trained
[1382]and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are
[1383]almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are
[1384]with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops be-
[1385]cause the local police detachments have been unable
[1386]to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and
[1387]agent reports have established that the guerrillas
[1388]are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo-
[1389]livian military and smuggled across the frontier
[1390]into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com-
[1391]munist. share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.
[1393]AS One example of the activities of the co-
[1394]ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the
[1395]Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer-
[1396]villas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the
[1397]village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima,
[1398]and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas
[1399]with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three
[1400]local banks and retreated to the hills.
[1402]-2.
[1404]SECRET
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[1410]ANNEX F - VENEZUELA
[1412]. _ Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban
[1413]Subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing.
[1414]Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking
[1415]Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963,
[1416]told various visiting Latin American Communists that
[1418]' Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin
[1419]America, Venezuela is receiving priority attention
[1420]from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re~
[1421]gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods, ©
[1423]It would appear from the meager evidence avail-
[1424]able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists
[1425]‘have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban
[1426]involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic cam-
[1427]paign which is being waged in the country. The wave
[1428]of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela
[1429]has physically exhausted the handful of competent men
[1430]in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or
[1431]‘no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-
[1432]- volvement.
[1434]Support from Havana can be inferred, however,
[1435]if only from the expert character of. the sabotage
[1436]carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was.
[1437]discovered that the Communists have begun to use
[1438]Shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines.
[1440]- Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo-
[1441]sives.
[1443]The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-
[1444]munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis-
[1445]sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has
[1446]been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts
[1447]of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad-
[1448]vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges,
[1449]pipelines and pumping stations, All of these acts
[1450]_have been well planned and professionally executed,
[1451]There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist
[1452]sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and
[1453]November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana
[1454]to attack all American installations in Venezuela as
[1455]a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.
[1457]Last November a Venezuelan military court tried
[1458]139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto
[1460]SECRET
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[1464]~ @ SECRET (lb
[1466]Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences,
[1467]Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba.
[1468]One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time
[1469]been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban arny
[1470]maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large
[1471]sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several
[1472]trips there. He was also the recipient of large
[1473]quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda,
[1475]Venezuelan police early in January raided a
[1476]house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com-
[1477]munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba,
[1478]and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach-
[1479]ing Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested
[1480]attempting to enter the house. The armed forces
[1481]have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be
[1482]located on the grounds of the Central University in
[1483]Caracas, communicating with another station which they
[1484]believe to be in Cuba,
[1486]Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader
[1487]in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo-
[1488]lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for
[1489]procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When
[1490]the man himself was arrested, police jfound a radio
[1491]transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.
[1493]We have received reports from a reliable source
[1494]that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili-
[1495]tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last
[1496]September for assistance. Castro reportedly had prom-
[1497]ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How-
[1498]ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez
[1499]$50,000 instead, and offered to train| some of Martinez’
[1500]men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable
[1501]to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not
[1502]permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was
[1503]further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia
[1504]Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000
[1505]to finance sabotage operations against North American
[1506]business installations in Venezuela. | Mrs. Martinez was
[1507]visiting in Cuba at the time that she| received these
[1508]funds,
[1512]SECRET
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[1518]Page 31
[1521]INVESTIGATION OF
[1522]THE PREPAREDNESS PRCGRAM
[1524]INTERIM REPORT BY
[1525]PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
[1526]SUBCOMMITTEE
[1527]Of The
[1529]COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
[1530]UNITED STATES SENATE
[1532]Under The Authority Of
[1533]-S. Res. 75
[1534](88th Cong., lst Sess.)
[1535]| On
[1536]THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1538]5812 CF)
[1540]QATSD(LA) CONTROL NUMBER ~~~.
[1542]sECREI
[1544]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page 32
[1546]TOT pe eet
[1548]as
[1550](A
[1552]ae a
[1553]SECRET
[1555]COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
[1557]Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman
[1559]John Stennis, Mississippi Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusette
[1560]Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia Margeret Chase Smith, Maine
[1562]Stuart Symington, Missouri J. Glenn Beall, Maryland
[1564]Henry M. Jackson, Washington Barry Goldwater, Arizona
[1566]Sem J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina Clifford P. Case, New Jersey
[1568]Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
[1569]Clair Engle, California
[1570]Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
[1571]Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
[1572]Stephen M. Young, Ohio
[1573]Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
[1574]Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk
[1576]PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
[1578]John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman
[1580]Stuart Symington, Missouri Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts
[1581]Henry M. Jackson,..Waghington Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
[1582]Strom Thurmond, Carolina Barry Goldwater, Arizona
[1584]James T., Kendell, Chief Counsel
[1586]SECRET
[1588]HW 50955 DoclId: 32424709 Page 33
[1590]HW 50955
[1592]ad SECRET ©
[1594]LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
[1596]U. S,. Senate,
[1597]Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
[1598]Committee on Armed Services,
[1599]May , 1963.
[1601]Honorable Richard B. Russell,
[1602]Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
[1603]U. &. Senate
[1605]My Dear Mr. Chairman:
[1607]There is transmitted herewith en interim report by the
[1608]Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate
[1609]Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.
[1611]In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received
[1612]testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence,
[1613]the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the
[1614]Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report
[1615]transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military
[1616]developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection
[1617]with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have
[1618]been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.
[1620]The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry
[1621]into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more
[1622]subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.
[1624]It is necessary that this interim report to the full
[1625]Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the
[1626]Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security
[1627]purposes and will have the report printed and released to the .
[1628]public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security
[1629]matters have been deleted.
[1631]Respectfully,
[1633]JOHN STENNIS,
[1634]Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
[1636]SECRET
[1638]Bocld:324274709 Page 34
[1642]CONTENTS
[1644]INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1646]Page
[1647]I. Introductory Statement c.vccccerecscscccceveccevsnecesces 1
[1648]II. Summary of Major FIndingS .ccccccccerevececcauasesceseses 3
[1649]IItI. Situation Prior to Mid-July, LQ 2 se cecevevccnssseencens 7
[1650](aA) Cuban FPOPCOS sacccesesesossccesssososesersesoees 7
[1651](B) Intelligence Activities and Operations.....0.5. 8
[1652]‘IV. Situation’ From Mid-July to October 22, 1962... .ssseceeees 10
[1653](A) Buildup im Soviet Forces and Equipment,.....s05. 10
[1654]_ (B) Identification of Specific Weapons ..... -
[1655]and Equipmentssscssveseseoseseveecvaveresnees 1
[1656](1) SA=2 SATS oc vvenenesccvenccecnseseserens iz
[1657](2) Cruise: Missiles .csseccccresvcccavcecvaae il
[1658](3) MIG-21 Fighters sieseveccevecsscvvcceooss 12
[1659]{8} TL-28 (Beagle) Bombers..ssessssecccteses 12
[1660]5) Medium Range and Intermediate’... ...:..
[1661]Range Missiles, .. 000.00 0 ees ol®
[1662](C) Failure'to Identify Soviet Organized
[1663]1 . ‘Combat UDLts .ccccccccccaserseccceserereteeoes 13
[1664](D) “Alleged Photographic Gap..ssccccssenssesevanees 15
[1665](F} Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC..seae0. 16
[1666]‘(F) Intelligence Activities and Operations ;
[1667]Generally scsserenssceceeecescsectinessccesees 17
[1668]V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of |
[1669]Removal ‘of IL-28 Bomber scssvvsceesvessrencessreseeess el
[1670](A) Intelligence Activities and Operations |
[1671]Generally.svocveccerevcccecsuenecsasssessrsce al
[1672](B) Identification of Organized Soviet
[1673]‘Combat. Units ssccscncvcccccvcecceerersvesssses al
[1674](c) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers..eessees. 21
[1675]VI. Current Military Situation in CUA, cccconcerscvevssvnees ee
[1676]- , (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations
[1677]Generally.csccccteccccccerrecvessestenssteees Oe
[1678](B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and
[1679]“Equipment Now in Cubficscssesesvevecovesveeees 23
[1680](1) Types and Numbers of WeaponS.cessserees 23
[1681](2) Strength ard Capabilities of Forces..., 26
[1682](3) Reports of Concealed Strategic
[1683]Weapons in. Cuba..cscrecseecsrevcecves 28
[1684](4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal....s...- 30
[1685]{c) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet. _
[1686]Presence io CUBA cccccescvssuccesssssieernoes 31
[1687]_ (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion....csss 32
[1688]VII, Concluding Statement, vescsrsecovessvessssccevenenscoooge 34
[1690]SECRET
[1692]HW 50955 DoclId:32424703 Page 35
[1695]INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
[1696]I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
[1698]The dramatic eventa which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are
[1699]now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic
[1700]and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba end President
[1701]Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive
[1702]weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.
[1704]However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation hee not
[1705]subsided, There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still
[1706]maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other
[1707]underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in
[1708]numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports
[1709]also abound with respect to the use of Cuba ag a base for subversive, agita-
[1710]tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.
[1712]The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness
[1713]Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation inte the entire subject
[1714]matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still
[1715]continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at
[1716]this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments
[1717]and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early
[1718]1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discus-
[1719]sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included
[1720]in a subsequent report. .
[1722]Broadly speaking, the term “intelligence commmity" includes the Central
[1723]Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections
[1724]of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of
[1726]State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
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[1731]ep SECRET eo
[1733]- 2
[1735]Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, howéver, ine
[1736]somewhat more’ ‘Limited sense; Where the term appears in this report it primarily
[1737]refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
[1738]Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Foree. Other
[1739]agencies are, of course, impliedly included in ‘our use of the term to the
[1740]extent that they particlpated in or contributed to any of the activities or
[1741]operations discussed,
[1743]Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive
[1744]bearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen.
[1745]Joseph F, Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General
[1746]Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear
[1747]Admiral Vernon L, Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General
[1748]Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief. of Staff for Intelligence, U. 5. Air
[1749]Force,
[1751]The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written
[1752]reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the
[1753]Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have
[1754]also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Securit,
[1755]of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution-
[1756]ery Council.
[1758]In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation
[1759]and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official
[1760]positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent
[1761]approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.
[1763]Information has‘also been received from individual Senators and Menbers
[1765]of the House of Representatives.
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[1771]eo SECRET Ee
[1775]This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from
[1776]the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subconmittee. It does, however.
[1777]include some information from other sources.
[1779]Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any
[1780]overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, -:~
[1781]based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence
[1782]activities during the military buildup have been incorporated, Our general
[1783]recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all
[1785]activities taking place in Cuba.
[1787]II, SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
[1789]1, While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli-
[1790]gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some
[1791]areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems
[1792]were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance
[1793]characteristics spelled out in @ limited period of time despite adverse weather
[1794]and an almost completely closed society.
[1796]2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this
[1797]capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence
[1798]of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those
[1799]involved in ‘this mission.
[1801]3, While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting
[1802]intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several
[1803]substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of
[1805]the information and data which was accumulated.
[1807]SECRET
[1809]HW 50955 DoclId: 32424709 Page 38
[1814]4h, Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com-
[1815]munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with
[1816]Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence.
[1817]judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were.
[1819](a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on
[1820]October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that
[1821]organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our
[1822]plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces-
[1823]sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous
[1824]Cuban defense forces.
[1826](>) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under-
[1827]estimated throughout the crisis, On October 22nd, our intelligence people
[1828]estimated that there were §000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that,
[1829]at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on
[1830]the island.
[1832](ce) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on
[1833]October 1lith that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles
[1834]had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October lth negative
[1835]judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment
[1836]as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installcc
[1837]were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing
[1838]factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to
[1839]discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.
[1841]5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges
[1843]and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to
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[1849]HW 50955
[1851]coe SECRET ge
[1853]- 5 =
[1854]October lth, The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion
[1855]that such charges are unfounded.
[1857]6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli-
[1858]gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2
[1859]high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 1kth were also closely
[1860]inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to
[1861]support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from
[1862]the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock
[1863]or friction between the agencies.
[1865]7. To aman the intelligence chiefs atated that it is their opinion
[1866]thet all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However ,
[1867]they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that
[1868]offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They
[1869]also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from
[1870]penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that,
[1871]based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern.about
[1872]the matter.
[1874]8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the
[1875]Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment
[1876]of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports
[1877]continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activi-
[1878]ties have been noted with reference to @ number of them but it is the view of
[1879]the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the
[1880]storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage
[1881]of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a
[1883]substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence
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[1891]SECRET
[1893]confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.
[1895]9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been
[1896]withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to detenmine whether or not strategic
[1897]missiles are now concealed in Cube. The criticality of this is illustrated by
[1898]the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip-
[1900]ment pre-lecated, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could
[1902]‘be made operational in a matter of hours.
[1903]10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet .
[1905]personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving,
[1906]according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of hooc
[1907]to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelii-
[1909]gence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as
[1910]"technical reasons,” the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is
[1912]unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the
[1913]Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate.
[1915]There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as
[1916]to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree
[1918]that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with
[1919]the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.
[1921]12. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate
[1922]that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of
[1923]hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall,
[1924]we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any
[1925]real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the
[1926]opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
[1928]12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban
[1929]forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe
[1931]opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any
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[1941]internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear
[1942]that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require
[1943]large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.
[1945]13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
[1946]weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the
[1947]Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the
[1948]United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in
[1949]Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive
[1950]evidence.
[1952]14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring,
[1953]aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout
[1954]the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous
[1956]threat to the peace and security of the Americas.
[1958]IIT, SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962 = ‘
[1960]A. Cuban Forces
[1962]It was estimated by intelligence sources that et the beginning of 1962,
[1963]the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve
[1964]of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability
[1965]of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it
[1966]was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training,
[1967]they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat
[1968]team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units
[1969]larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained
[1971]primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any
[1973]attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500
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[1983]-6.
[1984]Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba,
[1986]By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the
[1987]acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in
[1988]bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG i's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40
[1989]propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.
[1991]The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially codstal patrol type.
[1992]Several of these craft in the sib-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been
[1993]received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed
[1994]Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.
[1996]It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July,
[1997]1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba
[1998]for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then
[1999]the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and
[2000]eguipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World
[2001]War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether
[2002]the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this
[2003]time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then ;
[2004]constituted.
[2006]B. Intelligence Activities and Operations
[2008]The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962,
[2009]consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais-
[2010]sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from
[2011]refugees, exiles, and other human sources,
[2013]For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelli-
[2015]gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of
[2017]Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early,1962, two flights
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[2023]ee SECRET ge
[2026]were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the
[2027]number of flights was increased.
[2029]Algo, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic
[2030]flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters
[2031]put not over the Island of Cuba itself.
[2033]In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports
[2034]were collected and assessed, Included in these reports were many which con-
[2035]tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet
[2036]ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the
[2037]greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation
[2038]of such activities.
[2040]In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the
[2041]intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities
[2043]‘and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to
[2044]Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month.
[2045]The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization
[2046]of Cuba, However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment
[2047]of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the
[2048]activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or
[2049]strategic weapons were discovered.
[2051]The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba
[2052]were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that
[2053]it might probably be expected that the TL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be
[2055]supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.
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[2064]IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO ocToBER 22, 1962
[2066]A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Bijui pitent
[2068]In late July and early August, oui intelligence noted a significant
[2069]change in the situation ini Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet
[2070]Union became clearly evident, Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger,
[2071]increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average
[2072]of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped
[2073]to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during
[2074]the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.
[2076]While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa-
[2077]tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and
[2078]impact was not clear to the intelligence community.
[2080]During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile
[2081]activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as
[2082]scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent
[2083]and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confir-
[2084]metion of them.
[2086]At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships
[2087]were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel
[2088]being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in
[2089]small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known
[2090]to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore
[2091]eould not be confirmed.
[2093]Human. source reports also alleged that the nature and character of
[2094]the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that
[2096]some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,
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[2107]physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of
[2109]fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and
[2110]other human source reports suggested that, in cohtrast to the earlier artivals,
[2111]the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com-
[2112]munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and
[2113]trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with
[2114]improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi-
[2115]cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized
[2116]into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information
[2117]brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet 'per-
[2118]sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.
[2120]B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment
[2122]1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated
[2123]by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention
[2124]on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high
[2125]altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab-
[2126]lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at
[2127]two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from
[2128]August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system
[2129]can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a
[2130]slant range of about 25 miles.
[2132]2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation
[2134]was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional
[2136]‘cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping
[2138]missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th
[2140]KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile ‘launchers each were identified in Cuba.
[2142]SECRET
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[2147]-j1e2-
[2149]3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air
[2150]Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962 » the pre-
[2151]sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture
[2152]obtained on September 5, 1962.
[2154]4, IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelli-
[2155]gence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle)
[2156]light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on
[2157]September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's
[2158]aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was
[2159]disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.
[2161]5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been
[2162]indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed
[2163]reports and rumors from human sources about strategic misslle-related activity
[2164]in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It
[2165]is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile,
[2166]which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi-
[2167]fied, still appears large to the untrained observer.
[2169]However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced
[2170]into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse
[2171]the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--
[2172]apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect
[2173]medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a
[2174]result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October
[2175]14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and
[2176]emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range
[2178]ballistic missile complex.
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[2185]~ 13 -
[2187]Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many
[2188]ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce-
[2189]nent that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi-
[2190]dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic
[2191]missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned
[2192]to introduce.
[2194]Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range
[2195]ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance
[2196]missions flown after October 14, Six MRBM sites were located, all of which
[2197]had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling
[2198]of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated
[2199]that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational
[2200]pefore being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become
[2201]operational by December 15.
[2203]The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100
[2204]miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles
[2206]C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units
[2208]As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of
[2209]the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith~-
[2210]standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis-
[2211]ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre-
[2212]sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25
[2213]when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-
[2214]analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were,
[2216]in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.
[2218]SECRET
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[2222]HW 50955
[2228]The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people
[2229]to be about 5,000 men.
[2231]In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba
[2232]was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on
[2233]October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli
[2234]gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand.
[2235]The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-
[2236]up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This
[2237]is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate, One
[2238]factor in.the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in
[2239]October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally
[2240]loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and
[2241]that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger
[2242]ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is pelieved that additional
[2243]Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to
[2244]doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great
[2245]quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.
[2247]The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units
[2248]in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present
[2249]there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our
[2250]plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantial-
[2251]ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading
[2252]forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter
[2253]is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained,
[2254]powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking
[2255]power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States
[2256]commanders until several days subsequent to October 25,
[2258]SECRET
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[2264]- 15 -
[2265]In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer~
[2267]tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for-
[2268]ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher
[2269]price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba -than had been anticipated.
[2271]Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of
[2272]the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily
[2273]armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his
[2274]actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from
[2275]the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles,
[2277]D. Alleged Photographic Gap
[2279]There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in
[2280]our photo, raphic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5
[2281]to Seeudaber 1. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and
[2282]have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of
[2283]the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be
[2284]sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here..
[2286]The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted
[2287]in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.
[2289]On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and
[2290]eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por-
[2291]tion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference
[2292]to the eastern end of the island.
[2294]A flight was planned for September 10th but this‘ was not flown.
[2296]On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions,
[2298]it was not wholly successful,
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[2306]~ 16 -
[2308]Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights
[2309]were flow on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These
[2310]flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte.
[2311]as requiring early attention.
[2313]Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14, On October
[2314]12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2
[2315]high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October ik, it flew
[2316]the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic
[2317]missiles in Cuba.
[2319]E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC
[2321]There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con-
[2322]flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com-
[2323]mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights.
[2324]These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA
[2325]and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the func
[2326]tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that
[2327]this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.
[2329]These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been
[2330]found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any
[2331]conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph?
[2332]coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being
[2333]operated by CIA prior to October rhe
[2335]Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the
[2336]two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whor.
[2338]the flights should be flown.
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[2345]SECRET
[2348]The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of
[2349]the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites
[2350]in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whici
[2351]was flow on October l4ith was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the
[2352]possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it
[2353]was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be ecnduct.
[2354]ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason-
[2355]able and proper.
[2357]It is a Pact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the
[2358]one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without
[2359]explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern, However, after
[2360]inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi-
[2362]cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.
[2364]‘F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2366]As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over
[2367]Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September.
[2368]The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out-
[2369]lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October bth were flown by the CIA.
[2371]After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there
[2372]Was @ concentrated effort to determinethe precise nature of the missile buildup
[2373]and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis
[2374]sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle:
[2375]a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiat«
[2377]until October 23, the day following the President's message.
[2379]SECRET
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[2383]HW 50955
[2385]SECRET
[2386]- 18 -
[2388]During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over
[2389]international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using
[2390]refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
[2392]In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub-
[2393]committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how-
[2394]ever, our intelligence did quite well. The MREMs were discovered while they
[2395]were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered ina
[2396]very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they
[2397]were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had
[2398]been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden-
[2399]tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before
[2400]they became operational in a very compressed and limited pericd of time despite
[2401]adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost
[2402]completely closed society,
[2404]The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited
[2405]by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis
[2406]commencing in mid-September, It is certain that these air defense missiles
[2407]had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2
[2408]plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and
[2409]Major Anderson was killed.
[2411]CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo-
[2412]graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence
[2413]operations. They ultimately piaced in the hands of the President, his advisors
[2414]and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the
[2415]presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet
[2416]government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part
[2417]in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep-
[2419]tanve of the correctness of our position.
[2420]SECRET:
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[2424]SECRET
[2427]Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only
[2428]a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important on
[2429]It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period
[2430]of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deploy.
[2431]ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and
[2432]other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other
[2433]SOUrces »
[2435]The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have
[2436]done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor-
[2437]mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appear:
[2438]to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove:
[2439]there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence com-
[2440]munity to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had
[2441]been gathered.
[2443]In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the
[2444]most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information. available.
[2445]This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the
[2446]worst situation which might be established by the accummlation of evidence.
[2448]There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence
[2449]people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports: This was based on
[2450]the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili-.
[2451]tary observers, thelr frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible
[2452]among those things which were within their power of observation as to time,
[2453]place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest
[2455]of the Cuban sources.
[2456]SECRET
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[2461]~ 20 -
[2463]Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets
[2464]would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc:
[2465]a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.
[2466]The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent
[2467]events. The danger that such pre~conceptions will control the weighing of the
[2468]facts as events unfold is evident.
[2470]The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc:
[2471]judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A
[2472]few of these will be mentioned.
[2474]The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that
[2475]organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba, until pho-
[2476]tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related
[2477]fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated
[2478]throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.
[2480]‘It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate
[2481]that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con-
[2482]firmation was obtained on October 1bth. It appears that, on this point, the
[2483]analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it
[2484]would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.
[2485]In retrospect » it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given
[2486]proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile:
[2487]complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to
[2488]the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile
[2489]installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for
[2491]the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.
[2493]SECRET
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[2501]VY. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS
[2503]Ae Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2505]On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23,
[2506]1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted
[2507]effort to obtain detailed information poth about the entire island and selected
[2508]targets. .
[2510]During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com-
[2511]mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov-
[2512]ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air
[2513]Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties,
[2515]B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Conbat Units
[2517]As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro-
[2518]vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored
[2519]task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute:
[2520]to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was
[2521]thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized
[2522]by the Cuban forces. .
[2524]C, Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bonbers
[2526]To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October
[2527]crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic
[2528]nissiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment,
[2529]and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.
[2531]A comprehensive and concentrated serial reconnaissance and fleet obser
[2532]vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip-
[2533]ment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom-
[2534]panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over
[2535]Cuba end Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.
[2537]SECRET
[2539]HW 50955 DoclId:32424703 Page 56
[2544]The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of
[2545]the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites
[2546]to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it
[2547]arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.
[2549]As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic mis-
[2550]siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed
[2551]by the USSR, However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to
[2552]the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible the
[2554]despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.
[2556]VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA
[2557]' ‘A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
[2559]Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers
[2560]the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of
[2561]the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue
[2562]on @ regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been
[2563]no further attempt to interfere with our serial reconnaissance, The reason
[2564]for this one incldent amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re-
[2565]mains a matter for speculation. |
[2567]The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources
[2568]available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the 111-fated
[2569]‘Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveil-
[2570]lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur-
[2571]face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon-
[2572]naissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the
[2573]aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that
[2574]radar range permits.
[2576]SECRET
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[2580]SECRET
[2582]123 -
[2584]A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might
[2585]become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated ru-
[2586]mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related
[2587]to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial
[2588]fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe
[2589]that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.
[2591]Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide
[2592]temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex-
[2593]tend their time on station away from bloe nation ports, and to facilitate thei:
[2594]operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficieni
[2595]depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa-
[2596]tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home
[2597]for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of
[2598]the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con-
[2599]siderably. The use of shore-~based long range communication systems end infor-
[2600]mation from surface and shore~based radio and radar nets would greatly facili-
[2601]tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt
[2602]to evade detection. |
[2604]B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba
[2606]1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was tes~
[2607]tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion
[2608]level with the effective modern weapons for such units, Including rifles, ma-
[2609]chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an
[2610]organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized
[2612]equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.
[2614]SECRET
[2616]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page 58
[2619]~ oh .
[2620]They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light
[2621]antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of
[2622]the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned
[2623]above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated,
[2625]The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen-
[2626]tiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit
[2627]perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar
[2628]to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed, Their fire control system is
[2629]also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a
[2630]large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite
[2631]complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive
[2632]training, Including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to
[2633]replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites
[2634]for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites,
[2635]are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in
[2636]by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are
[2637]manned by Soviets is apparently not known.
[2639]There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about
[2640]30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part
[2641]of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment
[2642]of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews, As an added feature
[2643]of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba,
[2644]far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching
[2645]sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have
[2646]been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and
[2648]thus failed to reach Cuba,
[2650]gE CRET
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[2654]© . SECRET ag
[2656]- 25 -
[2658]The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-
[2659]speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are
[2660]each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated
[2661]to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but
[2662]Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar-
[2663]ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe-
[2664]dition.
[2666]The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with
[2667]almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of
[2668]these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor~-
[2669]ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in
[2670]surprisingly large numbers, As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed
[2671]to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships
[2672]of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy
[2673]tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of
[2674]almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200
[2675]57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field
[2676]artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost
[2677]100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple laun-
[2678]chers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already
[2679]in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor
[2680]vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.
[2682]To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Aruy tactical missiles
[2683]The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10
[2685]and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,
[2687]SECRET
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[2691]HY 50955
[2695]~ 206 -
[2696]which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST
[2697]JOHN, .
[2699]According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi -
[2700]mately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet
[2701]fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar
[2702]to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-
[2703]sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system,
[2704]SA-2 and fighter.
[2706]2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces
[2708]The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same
[2709]level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in
[2710]the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.
[2712]The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by
[2713]their orgenization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup-
[2714]press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents
[2715]obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help
[2717]given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern
[2719], highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United
[2721]States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza-~
[2722]tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced
[2723]pattalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long
[2724]duration.
[2726]The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to
[2727]consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other
[2729]eoastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been
[2731]SECRET
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[2735]HW 50955
[2737]@ SECRET | @
[2739]- 27 -
[2740]somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is
[2741]not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol
[2742]activities.
[2744]The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of
[2745]about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters,
[2746]about 16 propeller-driven tactical bonibers , a considerable quantity of antiair-
[2747]eraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters
[2748]The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to Imve been
[2749]turned over to the Cubans.
[2751]The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The
[2752]assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics.
[2753]The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to. action
[2754]against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real
[2755]alr cover or air defense capability.
[2757]The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel-
[2758]ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000
[2759]are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile
[2760]sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting
[2761]Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments.
[2762]About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which
[2763]includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated
[2764]7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and. equipment of the Soviet Army contin-
[2765]gent in Cuba. |
[2767]At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of
[2768]the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official
[2770]estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some
[2772]SECRET
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[2776]HW 50955
[2779]~ 2B -
[2781]4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu-
[2782]racy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present con-
[2783]siderably higher estimates ~-some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in
[2784]mind the substantial underestimation of last Oetober we can only conclude that
[2785]no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles -~knows how many Russian
[2786]troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
[2788]In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with
[2789]the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. ‘The
[2790]air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The
[2791]coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the
[2792]Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary
[2793]launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This
[2794]gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft.
[2795]The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well
[2796]coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could -
[2797]offer severe opposition to any attack, This opposition would be sufficient
[2798]to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any
[2799]desired air-borme effort in order to be sure of success, The public evidence
[2800]of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina-
[2801]tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in
[2802]the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.
[2804]Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
[2805]weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe
[2806]that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States
[2808]or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may
[2810]SECRET
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[2814]oe @ SECRET ap
[2815]~ 29 -
[2816]or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack
[2817]of conclusive evidence.
[2819]It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of
[2820]provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and
[2821]present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic
[2822]Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the |
[2823]smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery.
[2824]light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons,
[2825]grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter,
[2826]Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced
[2827]and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen-
[2828]trally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace
[2829]to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, The use of Cuba as a
[2830]pase for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.
[2832]3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba
[2834]Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the
[2835]strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed
[2836]in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these
[2837]reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all
[2838]strategic weapons are withdrawn.
[2840]It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to
[2841]the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is
[2842]grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of
[2843]the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a
[2845]result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The
[2847]SECRET
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[2851]HW 50955
[2853]SECRET
[2854]- 30 -
[2855]current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on
[2856]| the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This
[2857]of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 1k,
[2859]There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns
[2860]in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con-
[2861]cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It isalso true
[2862]that military activity has been osserved in connection with these caves. Our
[2863]intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact
[2864]utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic
[2865]missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.
[2867]The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res-
[2868]pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best
[2869]be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump-
[2870]tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel
[2871]were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi-
[2872]ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of
[2873]hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba,
[2874]the danger is clear and obvious.
[2876]The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already
[2877]been discussed.
[2879]4, Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel
[2881]Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to
[2882]5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since: the first
[2883]of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons"
[2884]the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba
[2886]remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that
[2888]SECRET
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[2892]SECRET
[2893]- 31 -
[2895]there is @ low level of confidence in the criginal estimate. There is also
[2896]some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num-
[2897]ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected
[2898]arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated
[2899]their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-
[2900]imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we
[2901]have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the
[2902]matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does
[2903]not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction
[2904]in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence
[2905]that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have
[2906]been withdrawn. .
[2908]C, Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba
[2909]Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence
[2911]Taman presents to the Americas is as follows:
[2913]1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and
[2914]agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity
[2915]to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin
[2916]America.
[2918]2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been
[2919]withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc~
[2920]tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet
[2921]forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.
[2923]3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR. .
[2925]4, "The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities
[2927]based on Cuba.
[2929]“SECRET
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[2933]HW 50955
[2935]SECRET
[2937]32 -
[2939]5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat~-
[2940]ing from Cuba.
[2942]6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict
[2943]our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec-
[2944]tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States
[2945]and the Caribbean.
[2947]7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes
[2948]launched against the United States from the Soviet Unidn.
[2950]8. Advanced Soviet submarine.:bases could be established in Cuban ports
[2951]with very little effort.
[2953]9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a furthe
[2954]reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.
[2956]10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin
[2957]American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage
[2958]techniques. |
[2960]ll. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation’:
[2961]image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability
[2963]to meet and defeat the forces of commmism thousands of miles across the ocean
[2964]if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our vexy doorstep.
[2966]A consideration of ali these matters serves to emphasize the gravity
[2967]of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.
[2969]D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion
[2971]The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen
[2972]to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insur-
[2974])
[2975]gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the
[2977]Bocld:324274709 Page 67
[2981]- 33 -
[2983]Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide
[2984]evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently
[2985]immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper
[2986]to the fires of revolt, We can only expect, under present circumstances,
[2987]that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-
[2988]ple in Cuba, wlll wither and shrink. The communization of the younger ele-
[2989]ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant coummist nation.
[2991]The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary
[2992]psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as
[2993]a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free-
[2994]dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces
[2995]standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the
[2996]Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to
[2998]insurgent forces.
[3000]SECRE®
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[3004]"Ts @ . SECRET e
[3006]- 34 -
[3008]VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
[3010]Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public
[3011]debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic
[3012]weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being
[3013]maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The
[3014]matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the
[3015]real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this
[3016]hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.
[3018]The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and
[3019]spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be
[3020]sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible.
[3021]The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may
[3022]be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu-
[3023]tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may
[3024]fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist
[3025]goal of isolating the United States has been attained.
[3027]Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods .
[3028]and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates,
[3029]With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent.
[3030]The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to
[3031]violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuka ae elsewhere it is
[3032]conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world commimism for the
[3033]purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is
[3034]to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them
[3035]with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and
[3037]moral control of subjugated peoples.
[3039]SECRET
[3041]BW O50955 Docld:32474703 Page 69
[3043]7" @ @ SECRET? is
[3045]~ 35 -
[3047]This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved
[3048]_ elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We
[3049]_ must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national
[3050]ho ‘self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western
[3051]Hemisphere,
[3052]The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting
[3053]menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever
[3054]alert and vigilant to all of ite sinister implications. We must exercise
[3055]the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available
[3056]resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that
[3057]unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised.
[3058]The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the
[3059]highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that
[3060]the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be
[3062]eliminated at an early date.
[3064]BW 50955 Docld:32474703 Page 70
[3066]. . Mrs Califano
[3068]: | Co) Corchel\
[3070]March 29, 1963
[3072]MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State
[3074]SUBJECT: Miselle Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report
[3075]to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962
[3077]Purauant to dur telephone conversation, the attached draft
[3078]has been reviewed and the Department of Defense haa no objection
[3079]to it, subject to the following changes:
[3081]1, «=6©Page 3, Line &: Change nudiber "25" te a4,"
[3082]Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy
[3083]records.
[3085]2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to > LG" and "25"
[3086]to "24," Beason: Accuracy.
[3088]3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before
[3089]word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic"
[3090]pefore “missiles, Reasga: Clarity and more accurate detail.
[3092]4, Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert. “by December 6"
[3094]before “ite promise" and "42" before "1L-25," Eliminate
[3095]the sentence “and, by December 6, the US wae informed that
[3096]all bombers (42 in nuraber) had left," and substitute “their
[3097]removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by
[3099]. along-side:obeérvation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships
[3100]carrying them back to the UDSR." Reason: Provide additional
[3101]positive detail, particularly with reference to the 1L.«28 remeval
[3102]being based upon confirmed observation and aot merely upon
[3103]information provided by the USER.
[3105]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 71
[3108]. Page 43, Line 9: Insert “more vigilant and* bafora
[3109]“stronger. Reason: Streagthen prime poine that jacraased
[3110]awerenesa of Communist duplicity and potential threats
[3111]veguited from exisis, particularly im the OAS.
[3113]Joseph A, Califano, Je.
[3114]Special Agaistant to the
[3115]Secretary of the Army
[3117]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 72
[3120]DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[3122]DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3123]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3125]28 March 1963
[3126]UL7,171/P-2 ,
[3128]SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft
[3129]Report to Congress on US’ Participation in the UN
[3130]During 1962
[3132]TO: General Counsel
[3133]Department of Defense
[3135]Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and
[3136]the following comments are submitted:
[3138]1. Page 3,. line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:
[3139]Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.
[3141]2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "2i."
[3143]Reason: Accuracy.
[3145]3, Page. By. Lines 14 and “15: Insert "aor before word
[3147]"November" ai, Lines 1 before "2," and. "ballistic" before
[3149]"missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail,
[3151]4, Page 37, Lines 13 - 15 Insert "by December 6" before
[3152]Nits promise” and. "46" before hoy 28 Eliminate the sentence
[3153]"and, by December A the US was informed that all bombers (42 in
[3154]number) had left, and substitute “their removal being confirmed
[3155]by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on
[3156]the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR."
[3157]Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with
[3158]reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed
[3160]observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.
[3162]5. Page He, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
[3163]"stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
[3164]awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted
[3165]from crisis, particularly in the OAS,
[3167]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 73
[3169]DEPARTMENT .OF DEFENSE
[3170]DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[3171]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3173]28 March 1963
[3175]Report o vConeress on US "partietpation in the UN
[3176]During 1962 _
[3178]LOe General Counsel
[3179]Department of Defense
[3181]Tntelly ence content of subject draft. ait Be reviewed and. _
[3182]owing comments. ave submitted:
[3184]» Be Change: nutiber “25" to "2h," Reason:
[3185]EES Department of the Meny records.
[3187]Bo Pag
[3188]‘November a
[3189]“nissiles.
[3191]insert. "10" ‘before word
[3192]"HO." and "pal co" peffore
[3193]more accuPate: detail.
[3195]Reagon: larity and
[3196]Insert "by Decenber 6" before
[3197]sit el eabrate the Sentence
[3199]ily panblowlerty with
[3200]Pr a Lee - based upon confirmed
[3201]observation and not cerely. ‘upon information previded by the USSR.
[3203]9: Insert “mere vigilant and" before
[3204]trengthen ried eae that ancreased,
[3205]Ete: 1 +t
[3207]from. erisis,. particularly ain the OAS.
[3209]JOSEPH F, CARROLL
[3210]Bieutenant General, USAF
[3211]Director
[3213]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 74
[3215]DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[3216]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
[3217]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[3219]March 27, 1963
[3223]de Se
[3225]MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE Neer
[3226]: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Ww
[3228]_ Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-.
[3229]dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation.in the United
[3230]Nations during. 1962.
[3232]The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
[3233]me for Department’ eof Defense clearance. I. should appreciate it if
[3234]you would read the- report. and return it to me with any comments by
[3235]1200 hours ‘on March 29, 1963.
[3237]ny. A. Califano, Jr,
[3238]Special Assistant to. thé
[3239]Secrétary of the Army
[3241]Attachment
[3242]As Stated
[3246]Mr. Yarmolinsky
[3247]Mr. McGiffert
[3248]‘General Carroll (DIA)
[3250]HY 450955 Docld:32424709 Page 75
[3256]‘ut
[3259]OPTIONAL FORM RO. 10 .
[3262].“ 4JNITED STATES GOVERKNN ENT
[3263]te
[3266]. 7 FO
[3268]we
[3270]- FROM : RPA = William G, Bowdler™ ye
[3272]ve ‘SuBjECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report, -
[3273]. To Congress on US 5 Participation in UN During 1962,
[3277]; UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter... _
[3278]‘on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on |
[3279]US participation in the. UN.
[3281]Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have +
[3283]been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about °
[3285]- this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with ~
[3287]the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through.
[3289]. @CA channels, Could you please arrange for this te be done: as quickly . a
[3290]mo as Possible @ as the report is now overdue? | be 5 ot
[3292]“> ARA/RPA:WGBowdlers 3Jv
[3294]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 76
[3296]March 27, 1963
[3298]MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
[3299]DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[3301]Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-
[3302]dent's Repart to Congress on United States Participation in the United
[3303]Nations during 1962.
[3305]The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
[3306]me fer Department of Defense clearance. 1 should appreciate it if
[3307]you would read the report aad return it to me with any comments by
[3308]1206 hours on March 29, 1963.
[3310]Signed ~
[3311]Joseph A. Califano,Jr.
[3313]deceph A. Califano, Jr.
[3314]Special Agalatant to the
[3315]Secretary of the Army
[3317]Attathmest
[3318]Ag Btated
[3320]Os
[3322]Mr. Yarmelinshy
[3323]Mr. MeCitfere
[3324]General Garrall (DIA)
[3326]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 77
[3328]7 ‘
[3330]Re
[3332]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 7a
[3334]te : oD
[3335]° | . @
[3337]sovisr OFFENSIVE YEAPOIS IN CUBS 4
[3339]DRAFT PRESTDESE'S. REEOR 1.962
[3341]“Soviet Buildup
[3343]on Oetobar 22, President Kennedy announsed to the nation and to the world
[3345]. the *seeret, swift and extraordinary buildup” by the Soviet Ynion of offensive
[3346]missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States wes taking to
[3348]cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the
[3350]J 4 '
[3351]President the previous Tuesday morning (osteber 16} and, during the week that
[3352]followed, serveillance was stepped up, coufiruing avidence evaluated, a course
[3353]of aetion decided upon, friendly goverments notified and eonsulted, the
[3354]members and uachinery of the Organization of American Sta ates (OsAcS. > brought
[3355]7 into the picture, and Ageriean defenses in the Caribbean streng gthened and put
[3356]of the alert.
[3357]"The President revealed that 2 serious threat against the peace and
[3359]seeurit ¥ of the Americas | wag being vocretiy aounted by the Soviet [rion on
[3360].
[3361]7 the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-rangs ballistic HLESILeS
[3362]“(oraus) -eapable of careying a , nuélear warhead i, 600 naubical niles had been
[3363]_ropidly and secretly installed and additional sites not vet connleted Wave
[3364]designed ‘for Inverediateurange ballistic nissiles (IRBHs} gapable of
[3366]travelling twee as far and thus posing a nuglear threat to rout of the Ea jor
[3367]cities of the Western Hemisphere. This ergent transformation of Cuba inte a
[3371]strategie base with muelear striking cepaclty const ed an expiics % threat
[3373]to the peace and security of ‘the Anorkeas in defianse of the
[3374]Treaty yy of Reciprocal hasistance (Rao Back) of 1947, "the traditions of this
[3375]nation and hemigphere, ®° and the CGhasier of the United Hations.
[3377]action con miradieted the repeated agsurances of Soylet spokesmen, both
[3379]{publicly and
[3382]. = e
[3385]e2Z2e2
[3386]publiciy and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain
[3388]its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor ‘the world
[3390]" coummity, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate esception
[3392]and offensive threat represented *y she clandestine Goploymant of strategic
[3393]nuclear HeEapons. .
[3395]fo meat this threat ‘the United States ves taking immediately the
[3396]following s steps: 4) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all
[3397]offensive military. : whpmont under shipment to to Cube was being initiated and,
[3399]should ofgensive military preparations ontimioy "further action will be
[3401]“ gustified;" 2) ‘the Unive States declared that 14 would regard any nuclear
[3403]‘ missile Launched frou gube against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by
[3405]the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
[3407]“Unions 3) Guantanamo was being reinforceds ‘&) the Couneil of the Organization. .
[3409]of fnerican States was being convened to appiy the Rio Treaty in support of.
[3410]hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United ations, the
[3412]United States wes requesting an enuergency meeting of tee Security couneil.
[3414]. Finally, the Pr resident called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate
[3416]this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threay to world peace and to -
[3418]stable relations between our two nations.”
[3420]. U.S. Chjective
[3422]This was a difftevlt and dangerous effort on which the United States
[3424]had set out, the President coneluded, wt the greatest danger of all would
[3425]be to do nothing.” On the military sides, steps ware taken to strengthen
[3427]defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces im a posture to
[3429]eyoly the quarantine. . The pepartuent of pefens se had order ed all tours of
[3430]cuty of We avy and Marine porgonnel extended until further notices the
[3432]/Guantanazo ‘naval
[3434]HY 50955 Docld:324274709 Page 79
[3436]oo _@
[3437]Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in
[3438]the Southeastern portion of the United ‘States; and military deployment put
[3439]- 5.000 marines and 40 uevel vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a
[3441]training ekerclace Follows: cand resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation
[3442]of the Comeil of the Organization of American States (deseribed below) the
[3443]President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Guba as of
[3445]10 Ace on October 2h The Departuent of Defense ordered the interdiction
[3447]. of 25 Soviet nerchan vesaclls known to be headed for Guba ; At 8 AcHe on
[3449]October 25 ‘the first intereeption of a , Soviet shipg the ol tanker Bucharest, -
[3451]” tools place, and. the a was allowsd to proceed. ie of the 25 Soviet vessels
[3452]beading for. Cuba ' tuened around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying . wit
[3454]vereel occurred s durin the ae affair,’
[3456]_ and deception ace”
[3460]was conclusive. the second was to halt gurther shipments and bring about: ee
[3461]rapidly and effectively the ronoval. of the offensive weapons, under Uebe — os
[3463]supervision, before the guarantine could be lifted. The United States was
[3465]prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various ‘formulae but not =
[3466]to abandon this goal. | | - _
[3467]From the start, both the Organization of American states and the United
[3468]"Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were
[3469]used to! underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet
[3470]Union that elimination. of the offensive weapons Was a purpose to which the |
[3471]henigphers was solidly committed. From the start, Loo, & was clear that
[3472]- /the United Nations
[3474]HW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 80
[3476]gg a
[3477]oka ,
[3478]the United Hatdons would have a crucial role. It was the forua in which the ~
[3479]evidence of Soviet godlt could be nost convincingly exposed to a world-wide
[3480]_ audience, world opinion mobiliz ad, ard the world vardict pronounced. It Was,
[3481]| also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communis ations. The |
[3482]Duited Yatdons served as a site whers U.S and Soviet negotiators could
[3483]easily meet. The Secretary-General hineel? supplied an important, Link
[3484]between the parties particularly during the first, days when vension was
[3485]highest. Thirdly, al thougis Cuba prevented their exploynent, the United Nations Z
[3486]. proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable pechanisas for inspection
[3487]| . and vyorifieation of diszantling and renoval of the offensive weupons and for
[3488]safeguards against their reintrodustion. The United Hations was also prepared
[3489]“to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities: “Simul taneously with |
[3490], the President’s speech, therefore, the United States took diplozatic steps to
[3491]“© set in motion the political machinery of the 0.4.8. and the U.N.
[3492]QeAsSe Action
[3493]In Washington the U.S. Representative oa the Council of the Orgeni zation
[3494]of American States. (C.0.AcS-) sent 2 ‘note to the Acting Chairman requesting
[3495]the immediate eonvesation of. the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation
[3496]ynder Article 6 of the Tater-imerican freaty of Reciprocel Assistance (Rio treaty). :
[3497]fais article provides for imediate consultation on measures to be taken for the
[3498]. ¢ goson defenze and for the maintenance of peace and goourity of the Continent
[3499]yhen “the inplolability ef the integrity of the territory ow the sovereignty
[3500]cr political independence of any American states should be affeeted by an
[3501]aggression hich is not en armed attack or by an cxtrasconth zental conflicts
[3502]or hy any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of Azeriea.®
[3503][The O.AS-
[3505]RUE EE PE gop ae Pe ae better od
[3507]nore bs A Boag gs J Pattg s+ ae eR Ge BEES, por Pte.
[3509]50955 Dood: 32424709 ‘Page 81
[3511]. - 3 - | 2 .
[3512]fhe OAS. Couneil met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of state
[3514]Dean Rusk sitting as the D.S. Representative deseribed the nature: of the threat
[3515]to this hemisphere and the coun. .neesures which the United States considered
[3516]At essential for the inter-American systém to teke. He ‘stated thatthe Soviet —
[3517]intervention in this hemisphere with: major offensive weapons challenges as
[3518]never before the determination oF the Azericen Governments to earry, cut
[3519]enispheric commitments solemily assumed in inter-Azerican treaties and
[3521]resolut ons for the defense of the peace and security. of the nations of the
[3523]honiephere ‘heainst ‘extrd-continental aggression or intervention.® He proposed
[3525]: that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ vof Consultation,
[3526]“without delay "eal for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba
[3528]of all missiles ami other weapons of offensive capability and co. recomiond cos
[3530]that the member states of the Organisation of Amcrican States take the
[3532]necessary measures to ensure that Cuba doss uct continus to receive additional
[3533]‘offensive BEAPCNS ove and if necessary to prevent, the offensive capacity already
[3534]acquired by the castro rogixe fron being used to destroy the paace and security
[3536]- of the hezisphere.*
[3538]_ The Se erstary noted ‘that the United stat tes was oinn) tansously asking
[3539]the U.W. Seeurity Council to act in the natter. He observed: “fhe threat °
[3541]is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as
[3543]‘Ye ere now doing, as a hemisphere. Bub the threat originates from cutside
[3545]the henisphere awl it is appropriate that the extra-continental pover which
[3546]challenges our inter-American commitments oo. ba dealt with in the foram in
[3547]wsleh that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the
[3549]SeourLty Council of the United Na ‘dons bs requested to eall upon this menber
[3550][to refrain
[3552]MW 50955 Docld:32494709 Page 682 -
[3554]1 seep ener Te oan cen TD
[3556]mee mene eee me nee Stee wage
[3558]strameemes oo etna nape ee
[3560]emer PTY eerie es
[3564]en tetera rtteom prea pattem en
[3566]“ - e @
[3568]=e Ge
[3569]to refrain fron nis aggressive actions agains st us and seek to emorse upon
[3570]him its decisions. Heanwhile, without avaliting the outeone of the United
[3571]Nations approach, ws must ensure that our hemisphere is sffectively
[3572]quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military
[3573]pousr in owe midst.* . . .
[3575]. Follouing a general discussion of the danger confronting the heaisphere
[3576]the Council votad 19 to 6 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instracticas) to
[3577]“gonst itute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation {Cs OoAeS. 106 Ge ys
[3578]Thon, at the suggestion of the GoSe Representative, the organ of consultation
[3579]adjourned for several hours te permit | a pumber’ of del egations to songult their
[3580]governments and receive instruetions on the draft resolution presented by the:
[3582]tiaited States to deal with the thruat confronting the heal sphere.
[3583]| oe The Organ of Consultation reconvened that saze afternoon. Debate centered
[3584]on 2 the draft resolution. Ag each representative spoke, it becaze evident that
[3585]the nerican republics were solidly united im their determination to resist —
[3586]this’ “gost. ‘dangerous’ threat tothe peace and security of the hexispheres... he few
[3587]delegations wsre not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions
[3588]of the resolution, attributable for the most part to dozestie constitutional .
[3589]- considerations, but when the regolution gs 2 whole was put to a vote, the support
[3590]was unanimous. In ona of tha historic decisions of the inter-Asarican systea
[3591]os the Organ of Consul tation: {1} called for “the immediate dismantling and
[3592]withdraval from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive
[3593]canability,” and (2) recommended that “the mombor states, in accordance with
[3594]Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Resiprosal Asvistence, take
[3595]all meesures, individually and sollectively including the use of araad force;
[3596]. Junieh thoy
[3598]HW 450955 Docld: 32424709 Page 63
[3600]. “ © | . &
[3602]a Fo ; }
[3604]which they may deem nesessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba gannot
[3605]gontinue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related
[3607]3
[3609]supplies which may threaten the peace’and security of the Continent and to
[3611]prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever beconing
[3613]an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution
[3615]sige ae ote e reempeemne men
[3617]also expressed "the. hope that the Security Couneil will, in accordance with
[3619]the Resolution introduced by the United Sietes, dispatch United Nations
[3621]f
[3623]wes observer's to Cuba at the earJiest moment."
[3624]Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American
[3626]States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant te the recommendations contained
[3628]' in the second paragraph of the resolution edopted, President Kennedy issued
[3630]the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons
[3632]andassociated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard
[3633]Time on Oatober 24. The proglamation stated that the Secretary of Defense
[3634]*shali take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of srohitited
[3635]material to Cuba, enploying the Land, sea and air forces of the United States 7
[3636]in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other jmerican
[3637]states." the ‘Secretary of Defense vas authorized to designate prohibited or
[3639]restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that “any vessel, or craft
[3641]which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted ard may be direeted to
[3643]4
[3645]adentify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of cai
[3647]ed
[3649].y to
[3650]stop, to Lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to progeed as divested."
[3651]Any vessel that refused to comply with diveetions wight be taken into
[3653]eustody. In earrying out the order forse was not to.be used except
[3655]an ease of failure or refusal to comply with directions or
[3657]/reguiations
[3659]Lait
[3660]24709
[3662]st"
[3663]Boold: 324
[3665]Page 84
[3667]. .
[3668]t : & o . L
[3670]=” 8 -
[3671]regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communiéste with the
[3673]vessel or craft, or in self-defense.
[3675]In the days imnediately folloving, twalve other American republics offered
[3676]assistance in support of the quarantine ‘opsration: Argentina, Dosinican
[3677]Republic, Venezusia, Costa Rica, Coloxbia, Ecuador’, EL Salvador, Guatezala,
[3679]Raiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval
[3681]units, posing the problema of coordination of foreas. Consequently, on Hovenber 5s -_
[3683]the Co0.A.S2/0.C- recommended that the contributing mamber states take among
[3685]thenselves the technical reasures nacessary to establish an effielent and
[3687]“coordinated action. Pursvant to this recommendation, the governzsnts of Argentinas
[3688]the Dominican Republic and the United States on Noveaber 9 notified the .
[3689]CoboAeSo/OoCe of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine
[3691]Fores into which they. vere integrating their respective naval units and placing
[3693]officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the _
[3695]. Combined: “Quarantine Force. —
[3697]Security Counedl. consideration
[3699]Simul tanepusly with the call for a meeting of the OoA.5- Councit, Ambas Ambassador
[3701]Ad}ad Stevensop in New York raquested the President of the Security Council ==
[3703]that month the Soviet Representative we to eall an urgent meeting of the Coueil
[3705]“te deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused
[3708]wy the secret pstablishnont in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[3710]of! “Launching bases and the ‘Anstallation of long-range ballistic missiles capable
[3712]of carrying thermonuclear ‘yarboads to wost of North and South juortea.® “the
[3714]United statesst he. wrote, mot has incontrovertible evidenes that the 0. S.3.R-
[3715]has been installing in cuba a whole series of facilities for Jeunching offensive
[3717]nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons theasslve3.
[3718][the establishnent
[3723]' .
[3727]The ostablishsent of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, “eonstitutes
[3728]a@ grave threat to the peace aud security of this henlsphere and of the whole
[3729]vorld,* It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he coneluded,
[3730]"to bring about the innediate diswantling and withdrawal of the Soviet
[3731]missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba y under the supervision of United
[3732]Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which 4s being
[3733]pat into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to
[3735]confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to
[3737]7 the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world.®
[3739]_ |. Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution hich ealied for the
[3740]- Amnodiate dismantling and withdrawal fron Cuba, of all missiles and other — |
[3741]offensive weepors, and hich authorized the sending to Guba of & Ucle observer
[3743]Corps, to ; assure. aed report on 2 compliance with the resolutione the resolution
[3745]called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of silitery shipsents to Cuba when
[3747]the above terns ware complied with and recomaanded that the United States |
[3749]and the U.3.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove tho existing threat.”
[3750]fhe Security Council held four mootings on October 235 2h, and 25. BY
[3752]_ the tins ‘the first mooting opened on the afternoon of Oetober 23, the Soviet
[3754]Union and Cuba hed introdueed two parallel letters to the President. of ths -
[3756]. Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Couneil
[3758]in an attexpt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S.
[3759]countermeasures and “aggressive action® against Cubs consti tyted tho real,
[3761]threat +o peace in the Caribbean. Vader Rule 37 of the Comncil’s provisional
[3763]: vples of procedure, the ouben Representative was invited to perticipate in the
[3765]eiseussion of the uatter bsfore the Security Council.
[3766]/dsbassador
[3768]>. . ©
[3770]Ambassador Stevenson’s opening speech put the issue in the porspective
[3771]of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionisu. He traced the “vast plan of
[3772]plesemeal aggression" and “the basic drive to abolish the world of the
[3773]' Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and’ which
[3774]had not been altered by the presont Soviet Government. Contrasting the
[3775]history of Soviet expansionisu and rejection of the priaeiples of the Charter |
[3776]with the United States record of loyal support for the Orgenization and “the
[3777]world of the Charter," Azbassador Stevenson rogretted that sone weabers ,
[3778]“secued to believe that the cold war is a private war petuoen wo. great, supar
[3780]: |. powers." "It is not a private atruggles* he insisted, "it is a : world evil
[3782]"war on a contest betueca the pluralistic world and the monolithic world en
[3784]contest between the world of the, charter’ ar the world of Communist conforaity.*
[3785]the castro rogino,® he pointed, out, thas aided and abatted an invasion of this
[3786]. “peakappore" and "hag given the Soviet Union a staging area in a this neaisphere”
[3788]. by inviting Yan extra-continontel, anti-dezocratic and cxpansionist pover into
[3789]the bosos ‘of the ‘American ‘fanily" ‘and by making itsal? "en accoaplice in the.
[3790]communist enterprise of world domination.” ‘The Soviet Union, he continued,
[3791]had secretly transforasd Cuba into a forsidable missile and strategie atrbasay
[3792]armed with the deadliest, nost Payareaching nmedern nuclear weapons, in an
[3793]attempt to put all the Averieas under a “nuclear gun” and to intensify the
[3794]"Soviet diplasacy of blackzail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded.
[3795] 8Tf the United States and the other nations of ths western Hemispheres should
[3797]accept this Rei phase or aggression, ws would be delinquent in our obligations _
[3799]to world peaces" Be could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded
[3800]dtsal? into sugposing the United States lecked tho nerve and will to use its
[3801]pover, and ke voiced the nope that the Soviets would call en end “to this new.
[3802]. /phase of
[3804]HW 50955. DooTd:32474709° Page 67. _
[3806]rhe.
[3808]asia am se! ae Te step uitey Hake Pred ete Boat
[3809]HY 50955. Doold: 32424709" Page 66 — Tg
[3811]mat . ' : .
[3814]i : o Le :
[3815]phase of aggressicn.” He urged the Council to gall for the issediate withdraual
[3817]of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.
[3819]Asbassador Stevenson then inforaad the Security Council, in in accordance - :
[3821]with Article 54 of the Charters that the Council of the 0.A.S. had adopted a
[3823]. resolution by 19 affirzative votes (as noted above) calling for the disaentling
[3825]and withdrawal of the offensive Weapons recommending that nexber states of the
[3826]Oo A.Ss take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the. .
[3827]continent, and expressing the hopo that the Security Council will “atspateh UcNe
[3829], observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.*
[3831]Aubassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Securliy Couneil
[3832]which defined the theses for the debate during the rest of the wack:
[3833](1) The Soviet astion in sending thousands of military technicians to .
[3835]its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet borbers capable of delivering |
[3837]nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and
[3838]preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing
[3839]these ‘things through deceit and under tho cloak of secrecy, were in defiance
[3841]of the seeurity comsitments of the Organization of American States and in
[3843]. ylolation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a nanifest threat
[3845]- to this hewisphers and to the whole world.
[3847](2) ‘The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in
[3849]gonsonance with the U.N. Caarter and had the unanimous wacking of the
[3851], Organization of American States.
[3853](3) The Seeurkty Council should reuove the threat by calling, as the
[3855]yesolution proposed, for the imnediate dismantling and withdrawal froz Cuba
[3857]ge al), missiles. and alt offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the
[3858]Sosrotary-Goneral to dispatch to Cuba a U.l. observer corps to agsure and
[3859][report in
[3861]Toop ote a ° 7
[3862]eae papi ip HTS fa te gett oof oul its aay a nerds
[3865]yo oO — @
[3867]report in coxspliance with this ‘resolution; calling for termination of the
[3868]‘quarantine upon U.N. certification of such ecmpliance; and urgently wecomending —
[3869]that the United States and ithe Soviet Uaion confer promptly om measures to
[3871]Pe Tp ere renner eet on arenes creat
[3873]remove the existing threat ‘to the security and the peace of the world end
[3874]report therein to the Seeurlty Councils - -
[3875]| Following Asbassador Stevenson's mresentation, the Cuban and Soviet
[3876]Representatives pads their initial Statenents. The Cuban Represoutative,
[3878]» Garcla-Inchaustegui, denounced the ravall "ploskede” ag an “act of war?
[3880]A ae TORS TIO eh v retnteerggyS ee newt
[3882]‘and declared that tho” cuban people bed ansvored the Sarned attack" with
[3883]. general mobilization. He asked the Council to eall for the immediate
[3884]“withdraval of all trocpsy ships and planes deployed on the approaches to
[3886]f
[3887]k
[3888]4
[3890]7
[3891]if
[3893]Cuban: ‘Shores, and for. the cogsation of all “interventionist” measures. TES:
[3894]Cuban, Representative also contended that the United States hed ne right to
[3895]ose for Atonantling and dicarnenent and that “logieally, UeHo observers skould
[3897]i . .
[3899]be sont ta ths U.So bases from which invéders and pirates energe to punish
[3900]and harass a small states? He insisted that Cuba ui) not acsept any kind
[3901]ad ‘observers in metters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction.
[3903]The’ Soviet Representative, Anbassador Zoring declared that the United =
[3904]states charges usre “a ‘glumsy attept to cover up egeressive actions” in Cubase .
[3905]He deseribed the U.S. quarantine es a "new and extrexely dangerces cet of
[3906]aggression” and as Sunda sgniged piracye* During this first encounter, while
[3907]avoiding direct reference to the prosence of Soviet missiles op boxbers in
[3909]Cuba, Asbassedor Zorin declared that accasxticas that the Soviet Union hed
[3910]"sot up offensive armazents in Cuba” vere false, and officially confiraed the
[3911]statement already nade by the Soviet Union in this connection, “that the Soviet
[3912]Coverazent hag not directed and is not directing to Guba any offensive armaments o"
[3914]Ee also recalled the statement of Soviet Hinister for Foreign Affairs
[3915]. _Hearet Grozyko
[3917]HW 50955 DoclId:32424709 Page 89
[3919]“AE, 50955 DocTd: 32424709 “Page. 90.00 6. ee
[3921]. ip
[3923]Audrad arcayto an the General Assezbly jest a month previously (Septenber 21, 1962)
[3924]that “ony sober-minded nau Imovs that Cuba is not ove building up her foress to
[3925]~ gueh a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States coo or cise a.
[3926]throat to any state of the Western Bealsphere.®
[3927]Anhbaseador Zoran gubaitted to the Security Council a statexent published
[3928]by the Soviet covernrent that day uhich addregsed a “serious warming to the .
[3929]Gaited States Goverazeat, to advise it that, im carrying owt the measures
[3930]emnounesd by President Kemnedy, it is Aeakshing on stself a heavy rosponmibility
[3931]: for the fate of the workds® declared that tho Soviet Government wi do
[3932]“everything in its pover to frustrate the aggressive desigas of 3.8.
[3933]imperialistic eircless” and appealed to all governzents and peoples to raise
[3934]their voices in protest against the “aggressive acts” of the Balted States and.
[3935]; strongly to conden such acts. He introduced 2 draft resolution conisening
[3936]the "actions of tho Goverment of the United States designed to violate the
[3937]Charter of the United Metions anc to intensify the threat of war.” Tks Soviet
[3938]resolution insisted that the United States “yepeal its decision on the coatrol, |
[3939]of ships of other states going touards tho ghores of Cuba,* and ealled spon
[3940]‘the United States, Guba, and 0.S.SRo to establish contacts and cuter inte
[3941]negotiations for the. purpose of norasiizing the situation and thareby Feaoving a -
[3942]the threat of war.”
[3943]At the request of the seereutstiv of Ghana the mecting wae adjourned
[3944]to the following morning so that representatives night consult with other
[3945]delegations outside the Council. , OO
[3946]sho Woxt Morning: Qetober 26 me
[3947]The nett nora » the Security Comell heard the nopreventative of
[3948]Yonesucle, Hro Sosa-Rodriguoz, associate the Latin Anerican nations with the.
[3949]action taken by the United States pursuest to the 0.A.Ss posolution, He noted ~
[3952].
[3954]wow Lb a
[3956]that "4% bas sen proved that the Soviet Union has set up iniCuba rocket bases
[3957]that might deliver meleer sissiles to about 1,000 miles distance, ana that,
[3958]anparently, it is at preseat sett ting up others for, roskots with @ range of up.
[3959]to 2,209 miles.” Thig had created on atmosphere of inscearity and concorn in
[3960]tho ecuntries of the American kenisphora vaich felt theaslves directly
[3962]' theostened by such Weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Yenozuclan Representative
[3963]caphasized, vere no longer dofeasive but offensive, and “thoy are of a magnitude
[3965]_ that might be sufficlent to vipe gut any of the sscrioan republics and drog the. |
[3967]. world into the holocaust of fF . ° He deseribed the apprehension felt
[3969]2 cuban subversive activities, including the
[3971]throughout the continent :
[3972]“ introdection of agents, ‘propecenta, and weapons to equip guersilla forces in
[3973]fesriean republics, jubaseedor SosacRodrigusz recalled the yesolution adopted
[3974]by the Organization, oth ioarican States and declared that he vas sposking for the
[3975]- entire contineat in asking the Security Council to take measures to step nuclear
[3976]me oapons ‘from arriving te Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of
[3977]| nuclear ‘Foskets ia cuba ‘@iguantled. -
[3978]Sky Petrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by 20
[3979]stroteh even of the Soviet imnginalioa could a nuclear mis sile with a range of
[3980](2,200 miles in Guba be called defensive, and roealled agsurencss on this point
[3981]by Foreign Minister Geonyno and Prosident Dortieos of Ceba at the Gameral
[3982]Ausexbly the previcus month. hile the Soviet Govermzent vere acting their
[3983]lie,” he stated, “the orders vere being given, plans qaid and preperations
[3984]boing made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who con possitty belicve in
[3985]' tho honesty of the Soviet Goverszent’s intentions in these eirewistances?®
[3986]The United Kingdea, he concluded, considered that the Ualted States acted
[3987]properly by eouing to the Security Council at the first possible mozonte Now
[3988]. the Security Couecll mst take imesdiate and urgent steps to restore confidence
[3989]/in the Western
[3991]HW'50955, DocId:32424709 Page 91
[3993]. oo _ @
[3994]2 15 =
[3996]in the Westers Hesisphere by having these offensive missiles dlssantled and
[3997]withdrawn. The United Kingdoz fully supported the U.S. resolution before tha
[3998]Council. .
[4000]fhe Representative of Rumania, Hre ‘palitea. supported the Soviet position.
[4001]fko Irish Foreign Minister, Hts Aiken, underlined world concern with tho
[4002]geouth of Soviet imtervention in Cubao He appreciated Cuban co aeera ‘with ats
[4003]national security, “out it ig a , Por ery feou that to a military puildep of the
[4004]kind whieh the Cubsn Goverment now eppesre to have exbarked upoa with the
[4005]massive assistarce of the Soviet Uakon.® He. sould not endersten! eywiay the
[4006]Soviet Union should have chosen this noasm to establish mew missile and pozker
[4007]/ bases on tho island of Cubar® the Foreign Minister believed he perceived sane
[4009]Feperrcie igromed in the U.S. statexont to the Security Comeil of October 22 whch |
[4011]declared ToS williagnass %29 confer with the Soviet Union on noeswres to
[4012]: renove the existing ‘threat to eoeurity of the Hsstern Henlsphere,” and in the
[4013]Sovist drat resoli¢ioa wich proposed thet the Yaited States, U.S.SRe and
[4014]Cuba eotablich contacts and enter into negotiations.
[4016]The Security Goanei peeonversd that evening, soze forty-cight hours
[4017]after Presidsat Kemedy°s bistorié specch. The naval quarantine had gone igto
[4019]effest at 10:69 AoMe that mornings deabors kmew that if a Soviet ship attexpted —
[4021]to run the queranting the result would be serious. ghey ziso kmewu that the
[4022] *Brpesident had indicated that tke quarsntine ls an imnodiate step" which
[4024]would be followed by further action? 1f the Soviet missiles were not ronovede
[4026]AY thig nesting ‘the Cowell heard statexouts by those mexkers who had not
[4027]yot spokeme France, China, Chile, United Arsh Republic, and Ghma.o In
[4028]‘ adddtica to expressions of support for the U.S». rosolutios by Franco and China,
[4029]the Bightsgnte of the mesting ware the statexcat of Chile, the United arab
[4033]2 Se RR TT LM RR TEEN HOS APN a
[4035]Sear ee at Sa RA Ta ele a
[4037]= ete a agg enemy eres pen
[4039]/Republic-Ghana
[4041]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709. Page 92
[4043]+ 16 « 1
[4044]nepeblie-dhana "restraint vogolubic smo? and the first forsal imtecveation of
[4045]_ the Secretary-Genaral . Azbassedor Seydour, the Representative of Franco,
[4046]noted that “the eppearanca of foreign guelesyr missiles on Cuban soilo.-cannot
[4047]bo considered as other than a serious initiative ainzed at, eroating & Bey war
[4048]front in a regioa which up to nov has beoa freo from such threats.” He stated
[4049]that ths U.S. had denonstrated olearly that 4% is scoking a poacaful solution
[4050]in accordance, with the Charter of the Taited Nations and that the solution
[4051]_ proposed by the 8.8. ‘wag do trebil ia tho intorest of ‘tho countries coocerned
[4052]and “in order to ‘banish once and for alt the dangara with which world peace
[4053]ss threatened by tho regant dovelopseats in Gxba." Ankassador Lia, for the
[4054]! Republic of Chinas noted ‘that At was particularly disturbing to’ sea Cuba .
[4055]\peans? formed, so a result ‘of Sino-Soviet intervention, imto an arzed base for
[4056], cosminist ponstratioa ag ‘the juries, He declared that the measures initiated |
[4057]by the TUatted States designed to eal an iunodiate halt to the shipzeat of |
[4058]. blitary natorial to Cubs wera jusidtied and supported the U.S- draft :
[4059]resolution as 3 reasonable and peaceful, golutica. _
[4060]- Spesking for Chile, jebacvodar Schuuiteer extoracd the csowlty messares
[4061]ce tie veglonal systes and exprassed sarport for the U.S> arate resolutions
[4062]He weleoned the. gauthorization that the U.S. deaft % resoluticn gevo ta the
[4063]Secrotery-.donaral to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. opafortenately," hs
[4064]said, “the Representative of Cuba yesterday rojeeted this iden. At such a .
[4065]decisive nonont as thie, vo balieve Cuba chould trust, tho methods of the United
[4066]eviews for putting out the flezeg of conflict and for ensuring PE2eS One
[4067]suck mothed could be to GAsure the United Hetions presence im a zone of |
[4068]conflict coos Wo make a fervent and heartfelt apneal, to Cuba to accept sach
[4069]a procedure.? .
[4070]{the United Arab —
[4072]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 93
[4074]' @ . . ae
[4075]at .
[4077]ole) a]
[4079]LAI ORT
[4081]fhe United Arab Repeblic Represaatative, Bre Mahmoud Rind, declared that
[4083]“aneeeantmemem sonia er rte apeneninete zone
[4085]' bis ecuntry gamot coudone the milateral decision of the United States of
[4086]"_pearica to exorcise the quarantine” which ko characterized os costiary to
[4087]internaticasl lauiand Likely to imeresse world tension. He recalled that
[4088]’ Dre Dorticos had told the denaral, Assezbly thet the weapons cuba hed acquired
[4089]. Were "defensive. in natere” and eelled for enormaligation® of rolutions botuson
[4090]"Guba aed the United States, Ab the sano tine he reaffirmed U.ieRe policisg.
[4092]“against. the spread of ruclear wsapons. He wged ali parties to refrain from
[4094]lam peraggeageneenines qeepipanateringemnean ernie: teewnne mp emigteneie me RT AT
[4096]veasionaoggrevating action and called for gwegotiaticas. Tho Ghaxian
[4097]Representative, Re. Quaison-Saskey, took a sizilar position, stating that ke
[4098]. hed ao "incontrovertible: PROOF 0» 928 to the offensive charceter of milltery |
[4100]- developzents in Guba? and therefore could mot comdons the quarantine. He alse
[4102]eatded for yogotiations to resolve the crisis om the basis of “mateal respect
[4104]7 for soveretga Pights.®. Phe U.ARe«Ghans joint draft resolution requested the”
[4105]seeretary-Cencral Big promptly confer with the pertics directly concerned om
[4107]- “tmieaiate steps te bo taken to roxove the existing threat to world peace, and
[4108]to moxgelize the sit uption im the Caribheans" ead ealled on the parties
[4109]_ concernsd to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance
[4110]to the Seerotary-Gemeral, and “to refrain moanuhile fren any action vhich may A
[4111]directly or oe indivestly further aggrave’ ate the siteation.® ho: forma proposed Jb
[4112]was thus Lintted toa general appeal for mediation by the SeorotaryGenarale (s.
[4114]: toe Baoblo invelvezant in inspsotion asd verification.
[4116]OS sank Ppopogal of Qatcbor ok
[4118]ht the close of the Ba-tiNZo the SeccotaryConeral revealed thet he had
[4119]. fi just addresset’
[4121]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 94 : : - , j
[4122]i:
[4128]wo 18 «@ . . 1
[4130]yer eps
[4132]i
[4134]crc arm
[4136]just eddzcascd an argent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairasn Khrushchev
[4137]which proposed eho voluntary suspemoioz of all amas shipments to Cuba, and
[4138]also ths volumtary suspension of the qaawantine measures involving the searching
[4139]of shins borad for Cuba." Ghent believed that euch voluntary suspension for a
[4140]poried of tuo te thres weeks wowld groctly esse the altestion and give tine to |
[4141]the parties to “nest and discuss.® We offered te Snake uysclf available to
[4142]all parties for whatever services I may be able te perforn.”
[4144]In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Presiler Kurushchov,
[4145]the § Seeretaryefensral took tho ‘ceeasion of the Security Cowell meeting to
[4147]“ aavess an urgent spposl to tho President ont ester of Guba, dsclaring that
[4149]‘3%; ould also contribute grostly te the saze cad if the constructica and
[4150]devalopsent of wajor silitery facilities end installations in Gebe would be
[4151] sespended during the poried of zegotiations.” He then appealed to “the parties
[4152]) coxserncd” to eater into negotiations imedistely, Seven this night," |
[4153]irrespective of other prosedures, vith the firet subject to be discassed being ©
[4154]the °acdalities" to achieve his suggestions, Signifieast im U Tkant°s intervention
[4155]wore his offer to rake hineal? available to U.S- and Soviet negotiatars “for
[4156]vhatover services” he might perform ami the concrete suggestion for Sguspension®
[4157]of Soviet ares ghignents ami of the construction and cavelopscat of wajor
[4158]military iuotaliaticns in enchange for tho suspension of the ‘qearantine.
[4159]the maxt day, President Kennedy*s reply reninded the preyerrmareh
[4160]that the threat °uas created by the sserot intredusti.oy of offensive weapons.
[4161]tate Cuba, aud the answor Lies in the remeval <«f such HELPORSf fhe Prosident
[4162]4 that tho Seerotary.Coperel hedtesds certain suggestions ates invited
[4163]sci ierlm ioimery talks te dstersine whether satisfactory arrengerente cen be
[4165]—— aed ieadated that Cambassador Stevanson is ready 46 discuss proaptly
[4168]o@ 19%
[4170]these arrangenents with you." Proeniee Earushehev*s reply wellconed yu fhant’s |
[4172]initiative and characterized ‘the situation "as highly dangerous and calling ©
[4173]for the immediate intervention by the United Bations.”
[4175]When the Security Coaacii cocanvaned Shuveday afterncon for what proved
[4176]to bs the last formal mestiag on the Gubsn crisis, ‘hebassador Stevenson
[4177]weleezed both the course adopted oy the. Soviet Union the provicus day to
[4178]avoid dirset confrontations fia the 2020 of quarantine and the report that
[4180]Ere Knrachehor Rad agrecd to the proposals esvenced by the seezotarytonoral .
[4181],Hovarthaless, the situntion remained serious and ‘Asbassador Stevensom set the
[4182]“hone im hie opening voasrk by inv! iting the Council to address itself to the
[4184]7 realities of the situatica posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power
[4187]ja Cuba.®
[4189]Anbaseador Stevenson cautioned the Counsil not to forget that “us are
[4190]boro today’s efor one single reason: beeaase the Soviet Unien seeratly
[4192]introduced this mmacing offensive militery buildup into the island of Cuba .
[4194]while assuring the world that nothiag was further from its thougats.%
[4196]Already the Comamists hed attempted te dletort tho record by arguing that
[4198]£% was mot the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly —
[4200]installing these weapons in Cuba, “but thet it wes the United States which
[4202]' eronted this wisis by discovering and ruporting these installations. This
[4204]ag the Pirst vine, I sonfess,* the U.S. Representative contimeed, “thet I
[4205]| “Rave ever heard 4% said that the crieg is mot the burglary. ut the discovery
[4207]of the barglas ‘ 27 He note 2 that sono vepresentatives bao the Gomell say. Yat
[4209]they do mot imo whether the Soviet Usior has in fact ‘puilt ig Cuba
[4211]Sustallatdonas capable of firing maclear missiles ovar ranges fraa 1,000
[4213]2,600 wiles. if further dewbt remaized on this secre the United States would -
[4215]Ieeay
[4217]fiw prengenai enn one re rs
[4219]egg ee DE TLE TBE RL PEE IE PRE LAE I OE ATTY
[4221]|
[4222]E
[4225]neumeerner
[4228]| &
[4229]2 2) o ; , oo?
[4230]| gladly exhibit photographie evidence to prove the truth of the charges.
[4231]- Oxe by one Aubassador Stevenson dexolished the arguments that Amzessador |
[4232]; Zovin had presented at the first Security Comeil meoting. As for the
[4233]“thirtyefive bases in foreign countries” waich the Soviet Represcatative had
[4234]mentioned, the fact was that there ware such missiles with the forces of
[4235]. only three of our allies << the Quited Kingdos, Italy, and Turkey: <= and that
[4236]. these were established by tha devisioa of Reads of Coverrmont in Deceabar 1957
[4237]Svhich vas s compelled to suthorize such arrangements by virtue of a priory
[4238]‘ Soviet decision to introduce its ov mlesiles eapeble of destroying the .
[4239]coantries of Western Europe.” why was it necessary for the Western Healsphore
[4240]nations to act with such apeed? The “speed and stealth” of the Sovict
[4241]offensive buildup in Cub desonstiated the preneditated attempt by the Sovict
[4242]| Union sto confvont this hemisphere with a fait aggamlie® If the United States
[4243]_ had not acted” prospthy and pad delayed’its comteraction, “the meclearization
[4244]© of Guba would have been quickly completed.” Ho stroosed that the United 7
[4245]7 : states had acted promptly to pet inte peouess “tho political machinery which
[4246]‘we pray will achieve a salution to this grave orisis.® ‘The one action in (| -
[4247]| the ‘Last feu days veich had strengthened the peace waa ‘the Goternination to
[4248]stop this further spread of weapons in this hesispheros qhe United States
[4249]was now ia ¢he security Counsil, Aebaseador Stevenson noted, because 1k
[4250]wished the machinery of the United Nations “to tae over to reduce those .
[4251]tensions and to interpose ite? to eliminate this aggressive threat to
[4252]peace and to ensure the renoval ‘frou this hemisphere of offensive nuclear
[4253]| wesvons and the corresponding lifting of the querantine.*
[4254]‘When Zorin again attempted to delude the Counell ebout the facts of
[4255]the Soviet offensive buildaip, a drazatic encounter occurred betucen
[4256]ST _ Stevenson and
[4258]HW 50955 Doold: 324274709 Page 937
[4260]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 396
[4263]» 2 « a
[4265]“Stevenson and Zorin,g which exposed the trath beyond doubt.
[4266]STEVEESOW: | Wall, let me gay something to you, Hr. Axbassedors we do
[4267]| have the evidence. We have it, end it is clear and incontrovertible. And
[4268]let mo say somsthing elses Those wapons must be taken out of Cabs. |
[4269]| Next, let me say to you that, if I umderstood you, you said = with a
[4270]_ trespass on eredulity that exeels your best ~- that ou position had changed
[4271]since I spoke here the other day because af tho pressures ‘of world opinica
[4272]gad a najority of the United Bations.. Well, let no aay to Fou» sir: Toa
[4273]; are wrong agains “We have had 20 pressure from anyone whatsoever. ve Cane
[4274]: here today to indicate our willingness to cisouss U Thant’s proposals - ao BE
[4275]; . that is the only change that bas taken plase.
[4276]i But let He also say to you, sir, that there has been a changa. You, |
[4277], the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union,
[4279]pave ‘upset ‘the balanog of ‘power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have:
[4281]a ereated this, new! danger - ee not the United States...
[4283]Finally, Mr. torin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny
[4284]: the existence af these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly |
[4285]become defensive weapons. Bat today oe» again, if I heard you correctly a
[4287]"you ‘say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist om and
[4289]- you say this with ansther fine flood of rhetorical seora. rel vighty sir,
[4291]let me ask you one sinple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that
[4292]the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and internediate-range
[4293]missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do mot wait for the interpretation.
[4295]Yes or no?
[4297]' ZORINs I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not
[4299]wish to answer a question that is put to me an the fashion in which a.
[4301]prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply. - .
[4305]ae preemie ae ne AC MON, 8S tar tere emer
[4308]See : : : .
[4309]aed . oO be :
[4310]" . . | a |
[4311]: Lo .
[4313]. 7 ee : , ‘ : .
[4314]"STEVENSON: You are in the courtrooa of world opinion right now, and
[4315]_ you can answer nyas” of "no®, You have dented that they exist -- ard I
[4316]want to know whether I have understood you correctly.
[4317]— ZORIN: Will you please continue your statenont, sir? You will have
[4319]your answer in due course.
[4321]se cece eres evened areneeine nena A) Me Speen Te menos gee
[4323]Inasmuch ag Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present
[4324]conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.
[4326]This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and paps
[4328]pinpointing the details and Location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aireraft and of
[4329]Soviet. misgile basas, complete with launching sites and supporting equiprent,
[4331]tay short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible
[4333]woapons." When Zorin’s reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet
[4335]“ae cn canes nee amen ena npate Regn pen
[4337]Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the
[4339]Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he
[4341]had identified in order to authenticate the evidence. 7
[4342]{he proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana,
[4343]%Q postpone further work ‘of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was
[4344]adopted without ob jection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the
[4345]B,5.SoRe to consult with the Secretary-Gensral on his suggestions of the "
[4347]previous day. - The Security Couneil thus adjourned but remained “seized"
[4349]of the probley while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the
[4350]fymal chauber of the Security | Counsil to the informal chanbers of the .
[4352]Sgorotary General.
[4354][Weekend Negotiations:
[4356]tb oneaelg Ade te
[4358]30404780" “Page ‘99 :
[4360]Pon hin weenie
[4361]“he su5% 7
[4364]a o¢ i
[4365]2 23 =
[4366]Weekend liogetiati ons Tae Kennady-Knrushchev tet lers
[4367]That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters
[4369]between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba
[4370]erisis. 0a Oetober 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to Preeident Rennedy.
[4372]making certain proposals on the ramoval of offensive weapons from Cuba.
[4373]“On Cetcber 27, another isttisr from Khrushchev, which was broadcast befors
[4374]- delivery, algo expressed willingness te withdraw the weapons but proposed
[4376]to 1ink the queation of Soviet offensive weapong ta Cuba te the unrelated .
[4378]: {veue of strategic weapons iz Turkey. the USSR would ragras te remove.
[4380]fron Cuba those. weane which ‘you regard & ap offensive msans We agree
[4382]to carry thia gut. and made a pledge da the United Nations. Your repre-
[4383]"sentative will nade a. declaration bed ‘the effect that the United States .
[4384]3 America, “On ptr part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the
[4385]fo Soviet State, wl remove ita gimilar meang from Turkey...After that
[4386]oe persons “sntrasted by the United Nations: Security Councit may check on
[4387]‘the « epot tho ‘fulfilment of the pledga made by either wide.” Of courze, » oe
[4388]he added, Bene suthorisation of tae Governmsate of Guba and of Turkey
[4389]. weuld be necensary for Gis eabry Late ‘those countries of thene agente. o
[4390]_ In addition, Karuehchey proposed that the United States and the USSR
[4391]give pledges against invasion of Uuba and turkey respectively: and eodem .
[4392]_ pramises to reyapect the sovereignty and ths inviolabi lity of the frontiers
[4393]of these countries.
[4394]- This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejacted. by the
[4395]tiited States. A statement issued by the kiite Howse that dey noted
[4396]that eoveral inconsistent and conflicting prepogale had been made by
[4398]the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.
[4400]2 fhe proposal
[4402]HW 50955- Docld:32424709: Page 100
[4404]‘ cf .
[4406]~ 2 we
[4407], 4
[4409]“the propoxal involved the security of * nations ou wtedde the Western
[4410]“Hemisphers and.it-wag the Western Hemigphere nations alee that were
[4411]the subject of the threat which produced the crigis. ‘The position of
[4412]the United States, the statenent read, was that “ag an urgent ‘preliminary
[4413]* to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban baa ses mast Zbop3
[4414]offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further ehipment of |
[4415]offensive weapons to Cuba must cease ~- ali under effective international
[4416]= verificatica," As to propodals concerning the security of nations cabelas a
[4417]this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and itg allie
[4418]had long taken the lead in seeking properly Inspected ars limitation,
[4419]Moy on both sides, These efforts cowld continue as soon ag the present seviét- .
[4420]- created threat was ended.
[4421]Te President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev ef the same day
[4422]v4 (ooteber 27) replied to Khrushehev's letter of Getober 26.
[4423]. mae r read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of
[4424]your proposale which seem generally acceptable as I underatand them are .
[4425]as follows: ;
[4426]#2, “You would agrea to remove these weapons systems fron Cuba
[4427]_ under appropriate U. N. obs ervation and auperviedons’ and undertake,
[4428]with suitable safeguardd, to halt the further introduction of such
[4429]weapons systans dito Cuba. |
[4430]WZ, We, on our part; ‘would agree <= upon establishment of adequate
[4431]arraygeusnte through the United Nations to ensure the carrying oyt
[4432]and pontinuation of these comituents -- (a) to renave promptly
[4433]the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b} to give ageurance
[4434]against an invasion of Cuba, and I am ‘eoufident ‘thes other nations
[4435]of tbe Wester Hemtophore & ial be prepared ¢ to do iikewdea.
[4438]oF wi ma Spe
[4440]HW 50955. DocTa: 32424709. Page| ‘101
[4448]2 25 =
[4450]Agsuning work cvaned on offensive missile bageg in Cuba and all weapons
[4452]systema in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered incpsrable, under.
[4454]| effective UN arvangemants, the President vas prepared to have representatives
[4455]in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Se cretary-General
[4456]for a permanent solution akong the Lines suggested in Chairman Khrashchev’s
[4457]- 7 letter of October 26. *. . by .
[4458](On Sunday, October 28 == Chairman, Khruchchev broadcast the text of
[4459]. his reply in addition te earlier ineeructiong: vo dlecontinus: further. wrk
[4461]- on woapeng coustraction sites be the Soviet Goverament "has given .
[4463]8 new “order te alsnantle the arms vhieh you described ag offensive, and
[4464]- ro crate and return. them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:
[4465]ae regard with respect, and truet the statement you mada in yeur
[4466]_ _ Jradeage of October 27, 1962, that there would bea no attack, no invasion -
[4467]do te of Ouba, and not only on the part of the Usited States, bet also on » the :
[4469]part. of other nationy of the: Western - Hemisphere, as. you gaid in your pang —
[4471]ae ‘then the motives which induced sas to vender sselstance of such
[4472]‘a kind te Cuba disappear. ; :
[4473]"Zt is for thi reason that we instrocted our officers <= thess means
[4474]ae I had alraady informed yeu earlier are in the hands. of the Soviet oe
[4475]a officers =~ to take appropriate measures to discontinue sonetruction of
[4476]. the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle then, and to raturn them to
[4477]the Soviet Union. As I had infermsd you an the letter of Octebar 27,
[4478]we are prepared to reach agreenont to enable Tnited Nations Representatives
[4479]te verify the dismantling of these means.
[4480]“Thus ia view of the ageurances you have given and eur instructions on
[4482]diemantling, there is every eoudition fey eliminating the present conflict."
[4484]/Chairnan
[4486]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 102,
[4488]fe,
[4490]Ae
[4492]zs 50953
[4494]we ve
[4497]Cx
[4498]t
[4500]. 4d
[4501]Chairman Khrugheney sent a copy of this message te U Thant "to enable
[4503]you to familiarize yourself with cur positica, which ve regard as exhaustive -
[4504]and which “whl help you to discharge your noble. funetiong.” At the sama
[4506]time, he informed the Thited States and the United Nations, that in connection
[4507]with the negotiations U0 Thant was conducting with representatives ef the USSR,
[4508]‘the United States, and ‘Cuba, the Soviet Government vas sunding First Deputy
[4509]Foreign Minister ¥. ¥. ‘Kuznetsov te Bow York to help U Thant in his noble
[4510]‘efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerevs ci¢uation.® |
[4512]President Kennedy replied at once to the breadcest maseage of October 28 7
[4514]even before the official text reached him, and weleemed it as "an important
[4516]ah pees: eet
[4518]. , contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:
[4520]“The distinguished efferte of Acting Secretary-General, 0 Tnant
[4521]. have greatly facilitated both our tavks. I conzider my letter to
[4522]_you of Ostober 27 and your reply ‘of today ae firm undertakings on
[4523]the part of both our governments which should be prenptly earriod
[4524]out. IX hege that the necessary measures can at. once be taken through
[4525]the United Nations as your masage gays, so that the United States
[4526]in % burn can. Texove the quarantine msagures now in affect. I have
[4527]. already nade arrangements to report all these matters te the
[4528]Organization of Ansricaa States, wiove mombera share a deep interest,
[4529]ina genuine peace in the Caribbean urea.“ 4 .
[4530]"Y agree with you,? the President cencluded, "hat we must devote :
[4531]urgent attention to the probiem of disarmament. oJ think we should
[4532]give priority te questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear 7
[4534]weapons, on earth and in cuter space,and to the great effort for a
[4536]. fnuglear test ban.
[4539]Docld: 324247 3 Pag
[4543]i,
[4544]nuclear test baz. Bat we ghould also work hard to see £f wider
[4546]meauures of disarmament éan be agreed and put inte operation at an
[4547]. early dats, the United States Govermasnt will be propered to discuss 7
[4548]these questions urgently, gad in a constructive spirit, at Geneva
[4549]er elsewhere."
[4550]A. U.S. statement iesued the sans day welcomed the Khrashchéy responge
[4552]and stated: We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United .
[4554]| Natdons | with respect 4 to reciprocal measures to assure tha yoace: a the
[4556]“Caribbean area."
[4558]7 Weokend Fopotiati ons i Hew Yor
[4559]ee Meanthile steps contiaued in 3 New York to reach agreement on practical
[4561]means of avoiding confhict at ga and on arrangements to carry out the
[4563]Seoretary-Cenoral?s suggsation for stopping work on the offensive bases and -
[4565]prong further abipmenty ag conditions. of suspending ‘he quarantine.
[4566]The. initial, sm of the Sesvetary-Ceneral was to" avaid an incident: at
[4568]“pea. What concerned hiu most, he had written on Oeteber 25 to Chairmen |
[4570]. Khrushchev, waz that a confrontation at gon betwoen Soviet ships and Gn}ted:
[4572]States vessels rypuld destroy any possibility of the discusatons r have 4
[4574]suggested as a prelude toe negotiations on a peaceful 6e etlement.* He
[4576]therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be inetructed
[4578]_ te stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order tte
[4579]“permit digeuesions of the modalities of a possible agreement.” fhe next
[4580]: day (October 26), the Secretary-Cenoral addressed a parallel Setter to
[4581]Progident Kennedy, ‘informing him of his approach te Chairman Khrushchev
[4582]and requesting that ninetrustd ont may be issued the United States’ vessels
[4584]ia the Caribbean $0. de overything posedbie to" avoid direct confrontation with
[4586]NW 50955 DocId:32424709" Page 104 : Cota {Soviet ships
[4588]TET NE Ne TENT OE ETE,
[4591]. @
[4592]= 2B |
[4595]Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the ‘rigk of an
[4596]outward incident.” He expressed the further hope that such eouperation
[4597]. could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of...
[4598]uhich the quarantine msasures could be called off as goon as possible. |
[4599]Premier Nharughchey accepted the proposel and "ordered the magters of
[4600]Soviet voessls bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception ' area, ag
[4601]you recommand.” President Kennedy weleoned u Thant °s efforts for a.
[4603]eaticfactery golutiea and stated that i? the Soviet. Qovermicnt acceptg
[4605]and abides by nie request that Soviet ahipe ‘already on thotr ey te Cuba
[4606]stay out of the. interception area ‘during the peried of prelininary discussions
[4607], o yon may be: ‘desured that this Goveranent will accept and abide by your |
[4608]" request thet our veszels in the Caribbean Yo everything possible to avoid
[4609]: “¢arect confrontation, saith Sovket chips in the next few days in- order to
[4610]3 -pinintig tho risk of any antoward incidents * at the gana time the Frevident
[4612]“underlined . that, this.we an matter of great urgency in view of the fect
[4614]that certain Soviet chips were. ‘otal proceeding touard Cuba and the |
[4615]interception area, .
[4617]- Sergening Shipments,
[4619]. Ags the Yhite House’ statement on October 2? made clear, the urgent
[4620]preliminary to the concideration of any proposals for a solution wae that
[4622]; wori on the Cuban baces stop, the offene! ive weapons be rendered inogarable, -
[4623]and further shigwent of veapene to Cuba mest ceage-<all under effective ; o
[4624]international verification, After that means must be found to get the .
[4625]missiles and other offensive weepens removed and their removal verified and
[4626]to inatitute adequate safocuards against their reilntraduction.
[4628] fTha immediate
[4630]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 105
[4632]at . 29 . —
[4633]7
[4634]“the tmodiate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the .
[4636]‘initial phase,’ Wee to work out a gyeten for incoming Shiprente to ensure
[4637]that no further affonsive weapons. were being introduced. The tN asked
[4639]the Intermational Comaittes of the Red Croae { (z0R6) to § gerve as its agent
[4640]in inepecting incoming vessels to make eure that ne more 5 Soviet weapons
[4641]were coming in to Cuba. Tho operation would be expected to continue for ;
[4643]. ‘about one month and would be entrusted te come thirty inspectors wnieh
[4645]| the ICRC vould undertake to recruit, Hr. Poul Ruegeer, former proaident
[4646]co of the TORC, arrived in Hew York early in Hovenber. tediseuss with the UN
[4647]whether and under what elreumstances the ICRC could widertake this task.
[4649]| in releases iseued in Geneva on Novexber 5 and November 13, the TCRC
[4650]‘pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with
[4652]. the formal agreenent of “the three parties concermed." The stateneat -
[4654]ro _ issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "evantual action by the
[4655]. TCRC- would be based on previowe congent being given by the three states.
[4657]: concemed* and the nethods of contre) ‘would have to be clarified in future .
[4658]discusalene. Premier Castro refused to give his eongent to the proposed
[4659]schexe, Before final arrangements eculd be made it WBS, in any event,
[4661] pealiged that the system envigaged would no leager be required and that
[4663]' the Taited States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely
[4664]on other meang, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments
[4665]of offensive weapons. | . . :
[4667]“Havana talks
[4669]The pain obatacle’ to pregregs on establishing the conditions for a.
[4671]eottlenent wag the attitude of the Cuban government. - On October 26 U Thant
[4673]_farote Prime wintetor
[4675]OLN eae getty He
[4678]| HW 50955 DocTd: 3342
[4680]IT Ae feet oe ccey
[4683]Se _ ry
[4684]: oo i ,
[4685]wrote Prime Minister Cagtro renewing bic appeal that he (Castre} direct that
[4686]_ ™the construction and development of major military facilities and
[4687]installations la Guba end especially installations desl gned ¢ $a launch
[4689]medium-range aad intermediate-range ballistic missiles, te suspended
[4691]sree, Creat inom capmnene ne oe PREG MINE ERE NER LEN ERE
[4693]during the poricd ef nagetietions which are now endervay.”
[4695]‘Dr. Castro's reply cane the next day and proved to be a hedged accept-
[4697]ance. He rejected "the preswytion of the thited States to determine what
[4699]action we are entitled ta take within our P country, what kind of arms we.
[4701]consider appropriate tor our datende,* Cuba wes prepared to accopt ‘tthe
[4703]. compromises that “you, request as afforte in favor of peace 3 provided that — c
[4704]1 Bt the sama tn, enile negotiations ave in progress, the United States
[4706]coveranent desiats from threats and ageresaive actions against Cuba,
[4708]sg renee
[4710]_ including naval vleckade of the country." Read Literally, De, Cagtre wag -
[4711]| saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending :
[4713]the quarantine. At the same time » bis letter contained another note:
[4715]nadqmeg neon err errr a
[4717]8, Should you consider At weofel to the cause of peace, our government
[4718]“would be glad te receive Fou in our country ag Sesretary-General of the - rn:
[4719]United Nations, with a: view to direet digcussions on the present. erisia." _ . - of
[4721]u Thant réplied eho next day noting that Castro was | prepared to accept.
[4723]the suggestion he nad made provided the Uaited states Government “desints :
[4725]rom threats. against Cuba including the naval Blockade" while negotiations ~
[4727]wore in progress. ‘Ho accepted the invitation to wieit Cuba carly in the
[4729]coming week ==. ond to "oving a fow. aides vith Re to leave some of them behind . _ |
[4730]to continue our - eonmen etfert to ards 2 scetud solution of the problen.” |
[4731]Po focititate his task ‘the United Staves had agreed to ‘guspand its naval
[4733]quarantine and ‘eoriel survei lence during. ‘the Seoretary-Censvall'e visit to. oS
[4735]_fBavana.
[4737]HW 50955 DocId:32494709 Page 107
[4739]~ Fle
[4741]et vue : ,
[4743]Havana, At thts point » the United Rationg was working on tHe ascumption :
[4745]that the vieit to Cuba would be concerned vith yorking out molalities of
[4747]Uo. ebcervation and inspection and "reciprocal measures + aseure the
[4749]pozce in the Caribbean."
[4751]fhe issue was further clouded by Castro’s netatensnt ‘of conditions"
[4753]- §esusd in Havana on Octeber 28. "The guarantecs of waich President Komedy
[4755]gpsaks against the. invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elinination | ,
[4757]also of the naval blockade ;" he declared, "and adoption; - auong others, of
[4761]1.
[4765]End of the economic blockade and mall measures of commercial
[4767]and economic pressure" exercised by the Uaited States against
[4769]Cuba
[4771]End of wall subversive activities and the organization or support
[4772]of imvasionss
[4774]End of npdrate attacks" frou bases in the United States and
[4775]Puerte Rico; |
[4777]End of "violationa of air and naval specs by the ‘United States;
[4778]United States withdrawal from the naval bage at Guantanamo and its |
[4780]return to Cuba.
[4782]Thie statenent of conditions wag ¢learly unacceptable and adunbrated
[4784]. 4tg intrans}gent . position that the Cuban authorities would take during the .
[4786]Ravana talks. JU Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier Ganeral
[4788]Rilkhye and a email mili¢ary staff, flew to Havana on Oeteber 30 and held
[4790]“telke with Guban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N.
[4792]; eupervicion of removal of the offensive weapons and to digguss the other
[4794]acdalities for: carrying out the Kenmedy-Rurushclov agreement of October. 27-28.
[4796]/artiroiign store a
[4798]HW S095S” Docta:3249e%09 . Page Tbs? (OP 0 Povo eee ot pe
[4800]pee te sna RE TEI IE TT I TA CE
[4802]; 2326, -
[4803]Although general agreensnt was reached that the United Nations showld
[4804]participate in cottlemont of the Cuban crisis and the talks vere characterized
[4805]. ag "fruitful," the Cuban awthorities balked at all preposals for U.N.
[4807]inepeetion of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction.
[4809]a snliea mtemeesepmie on raion ome nL SRR Epa ias Ae sete mtn wut
[4811]“Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28
[4812]gtatement. These demands were ebviouely beyond ‘the scope of the,
[4813]Sacretary-General’s purpove ih negotiating with the Cubang, and no agreeuent
[4814]was reached. . |
[4815]es The Secretarg-Ceneral and his party retumed te © Hew York “tng next day,
[4816]uhere, it was understeod; alka betwson the Secretery-Gsneral and Cuban
[4817](Peproventatives + would contines, Premier Castre, hovever, did state that he
[4818]would not interfere with. the Soviet removal of the migelles. The missiles
[4819]8re. Snot ours, he gad in a radie spsech om Novexber 1 in which he
[4820]: 7 “reported on his talks with J Jhant, but he rajected any form of intéraational
[4821]dnepecticn on the withdraval ef Soviet waapone. He specifically turned
[4822]down a proposal that ‘the: Intemations? Committees of the Red Croas ¢ rere)
[4823]‘carry out the inapestion task, He also rejected other forms: of tN tnepect.gn.
[4824]On Friday, Noveaber 2, Soviet Firet Deputy Premier Anastal I, Mikoyan
[4825]arrived in New York ca his way to Havana and issued a . statement cupporting
[4826]Premier Castro's demands ard warmly endorsing the Cuban regina,
[4827] Survyolllance and Dismantling Continued . .
[4828]| When U Thant lef Hevana without a mutually satisfactory formula,
[4829]| President .Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to.
[4830]Cuba and authorized reg gwaption of cloge serial surveillance of ‘the iglend
[4831]to dstermine unether diamantling of Sovict ndseile basses was proceeding
[4833]ag reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of Nevember 2, the
[4835]/President reported
[4837]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 109
[4839]asa ii ana
[4841]AWW 50955 Docld:32424709 | Page 110
[4843]eo 33
[4845]President. reported in a short gelevision and radio breedcast that the
[4846]"Soviet missile bages ars being disnantled, the missil ag are being
[4848]‘ erated and the fixed installations at the sites are peing destroyed." The
[4849]Preeident said the information was based on acriel photographs and added .
[4851]that the Urited States intended to follow closely the completion of this ,
[4853]work through various means, fueluding aerial surveillance, until Ran equally
[4854]satisfactory international meang of verification is effected." ‘He also
[4855]gaid that while the quarantine remained in effect, hs was ‘hopeful that
[4856]adequate procedures could be developed for: international inspection of
[4858]Cuba~bound ‘eargess.. Fhe Taternationsl Gommittce of the Red Cross could be
[4860]i "en appropriate agent" for carrying out tls inspection.
[4862]mony Hew Yorke Nogotiabions: Yord fication end T2685
[4864]“Weanuanile 2 talke proceeded in New York between Anbassador Stevenson
[4865]and Be, John J. MeCloy for the Taited States and Deruty Foreign Minister _
[4866]‘Rusnoteoy, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working owt the details of”
[4867]“the schoms for ORC. inspection of laceming shi puents (deseribed above) hace
[4869]negotiators gpent the next three weeks in considering suo main iseves.
[4871]: Until November 12 the contral concern ef the negotiators wag to make sure.
[4873]| thet the offensive missile gystem had left Cuba and te work out a satige
[4874]factory aysten for verification that diemandling and renoval had in fact -
[4875]taken place. Associated with thie was ths problea of longer-term safe~
[4876]guards ageinst the reintroduction er offensive WOSPSES Fron Rovember’ w
[4877]to Hove mber 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problen of removal
[4878]of the Sevist TL-26 bombers from Cuba. .
[4879]| On vorificatioa, ae vag clear that what the President had terusd .
[4881]Pan equally satiefactory international usens of verification" required an
[4883]adequate | Gi ‘eye stom ‘of ‘fnepsction to make sure: that: the offensive wsapOns - a
[4885]t
[4887]fnad in fact
[4890]‘ Lo
[4891]- | a
[4893]had in fact. been renoved, te guard against hiding, and to > provertt
[4894]reintroduction of sus h weapons. Various Schenss were ‘considered -
[4895]and the USSR made clear its willingness 3 teh have oY verification take place.
[4896]Castro ademantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the
[4898]UN or under ite auspices for removel of the weapons. US negotiators
[4900]peer ne renee a Oe ET MIRAE A a RBar ep mmEE
[4902]contimied te maka 1t clear to the Soviet negotlaters thet US aerial
[4903]surveillance vould continue so loug as there was no adequate UH syaten of
[4904]inspection, When it became elear that Castro would not give nis consent
[4906]te UN ingpection or verification of shipments frem his ports, the negotiators
[4908]tumed to ‘devising a systen for GS inspection < at sea of outgoing ships
[4910]carrying the diexantled miseiles. The 05 ‘pavel vessels would coma “alongeide"
[4911]departing Seviet vess els wnieh wowld be loaded in such a way as te enable .
[4912]“the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid
[4913]prognges was mede in dismantling 2 and toading the rissiles and by November
[4914]' the US had counted 2 departing missiles by this procedure, Falling UW .
[4915]verification and safeguards, the BS continusd its oun “system of surveillance - Ss
[4916]under the” existing OAS vegolution to meke sure that offensive weapons a
[4917]were nob reintroduced. . - 7
[4918]On Hovenber 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators
[4919]--teok up again the question of the venoval of: TL-283 and made it clear
[4920]that the United States could not consider Lifting the quarantine anti
[4921]the bembera wera withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their
[4922]part of the bergein by dismantling and removing the nisalige and were
[4923]sging for Lifting of. the quarantine and a U.S. non~irivagion pledge, -
[4924]. Tre oS posi Lea was that the bombers ware defined ag offensive
[4926]weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of. Octeber r 23 and that they, Cee Bad wee
[4928]pore included 20
[4933]_ were included. ag. such im the Kennedy-Khrue noker exchange of Octover 2728.
[4935]The United States made it clear that 1t could uct consider lifting the
[4937]quarantine wmtil the Sovists agreed to remove the Ti-28s within a short time.
[4939]Partisl Settlement: Nowexber 20 :
[4940]on November’ 20, Br. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wtehed
[4941]to remove the beubors he would not object. That day an agreenent was reached
[4943]betwoen Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the Th-28e would oe withdraw, .
[4945]a, & U Thant was notified the game day by anbacoader Stevenven . ead Deputy Foreign
[4947]Minister. Kueneteovs ‘Soviet agreement we renove the panbers payed the way
[4951]‘for the Lifting of the: quarontiti. The partial s settlement had | taken just .
[4953]At nis pres 5 conference that evening, President Kennedy snnounced
[4955]‘shat he hed that day been informed by Chairman Karushcher that all of the
[4957]| meet bombers in Guba, would be withdrawn in shirty days 3, and that these
[4958]38 Co a. erved and counted aa they departed. “iesmuch ag this
[4959]goes a tong way sowerds reducing the ‘danger wWiieh faced tht hemisphere .
[4960]four weeks ago," the Fresidsnt announced , af have this afterncon instructed
[4961]the Secretary ef Defense to Lift our naval quarentine." The Presidant |
[4962]then recalled the egresnont he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev
[4963]October Z7-26, “ineluding the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had
[4964]complied with all his pledges > Hea woud remove our naval quarenvine. and —
[4965]give assurance against invagion of Cuba." Bridence to date indicated that
[4966]‘ali known offencive missile sites had beon diswantled, he stated, and sea
[4967]inspection by the navy had confirmed thet the missiles had teen withdrawn.
[4968]Bui, ke warned, Hiepor riant part 2" of the agrsemont "remain to be carried
[4970]out. The Cuban Government has net yet permitted the United Nations to
[4972]\ frerify whether all Ys Bene
[4974]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 112
[4976]peek a SRD PPR es CRA auth ise ts pote A a in Sa
[4978]a * , | e
[4979]. | @
[4981]ag
[4985]verify whether all offeneive weapons have been remered, and no lasting
[4987]Le appear gee oe mre Ma he eee EN
[4988]aires re
[4990]safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of
[4992]offensive weapons back inte Cuba.* the United States, therefore, had no
[4993]choice but to pursue ite owa means of checking on military activities in
[4994]Cuba. ‘fhe United Stetes, he gaid, will continues ite efforts to achieve . |
[4995]tadequate international arrangemate for the task of ingpection and . or
[4996]verification ‘of Cube." Later, in reply tc a question, he defined adequate ; (
[4998]safeguards a3 "an inspection which would provide Us with agsarances that
[5000]there are not in the igland weapong capabis of offensive action ‘againet
[5002]United States or neighboring countries and that they wil not be reintroduced, "
[5004]Regarding guarantess against invasion, the President gtated that these ;
[5005]were contingent on adequate verification and vafeguards for the future. oa
[5007]a “AS for our part, 4f all effensive weapons are removed from
[5009]Cuba and hope out of the Hemigphers in the future, wider |
[5010]adequate verification and safeguards, and if. ‘Cuba is not used _
[5012]for the export of aggressive Commins. 2% gurposea, ¢here will be
[5013]peace in” the Caribbean. And, as r agta in ‘Septexber, We shell -
[5015]noither fnttiat 2. Ror permit aggression in tds hemisphere."
[5017]The United Seat vee he stressed, would not abandon the political,
[5019]economic,’ aga other efforts to hald subversion from Guba nor its purpoge |
[5021]and hogs | Rae & the Cuba people shell soma day be fulldy | free. That thesg |
[5023]policies
[5025]sig very different from any Intent to Jauneh a military invasion
[5026]of? the ieland.”
[5028]Tater-Amorican quarentins Porce fomnine ated: Gpstatione
[5032]Following the. Lifting of the quarentire, the three governments whose.
[5034]- foaval units hed
[5036]set Pe Ray eye wee nateita tags Nowe eetin? fof tee ae boa
[5037]ria 50955 ‘Page. ne en Cn ace poe de oe
[5040]oe
[5043]naval unite tad paréiedpated in tho intersAmsricsn coabined quarantine
[5044]force w= i.e. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United Statas --
[5045]notified the €.0.A.5./0.C. on Wovenbor 30 that the operetions of the
[5046]quarantine force had been termineted. Uurley thie pseried, it had not been
[5047]necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and
[5048]other types of assistance made by ether henigpherie determinatien and
[5049]solidarity,
[5051]Ag the negotiations botween the United States and the Soviet Trion
[5052]in New York progressed, the United States kept the o.0.8.8./0.0. fully a
[5053]informed of devélopients.. “the C.0.8.8./0.C. in the meantime withheld
[5054]aking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks werg
[5056]‘complet ed.
[5058]Continued. Negotistions —
[5060]The Soviet Government carried oub it3 promize to withdraw the rin28
[5062]poubors, and, by December &, the tated States wae informed that all benbers
[5064](he ‘dn ‘nunber) hed left. No progress, hoijever, wad made duping the rest
[5065]of the month in achieving the radsquate ingemational arrangersnts fer the
[5067]tack of ingpection and. werification in Cuba" that the President had
[5069]- mantigned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding.
[5071]Dsputy Promisr Mikeyan''s three-hour conversations with ths Pregident on
[5072]Novenber 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did act advance
[5073]the final golution. The question was turned over again to the delegations
[5074]in Hew York. |
[5076]By mid-December several important loose ends still remained, . No,
[5078]fadequate,
[5080]HY 30955 Docld: 32424709 Page 114
[5082]a gteeticrmecnre n mereretanee a ry
[5084]2
[5086]§ Ther near etre ener nene gem
[5088]to ptt a ene anne pe I en Fem ecm tet
[5090]Ba
[5092]Ae
[5094]ry oo h a £ :
[5095]adequate, U.N,-superviesd arrangements fer verification of removal of
[5097]7
[5098]|
[5099]f
[5101]offensive weapons and safeguards ageins} their reintroduction had been . ‘|
[5102]achieved, the U. S$. agsurance against invasion or suppor eting an inwasion of
[5103]t
[5104]k
[5105]Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons “were hot i
[5107]present or reintroduced into Cute and thet Cuba refrained from aggressive’ i
[5108]j
[5109]i
[5111]acts against the Weetern Hemlephers.
[5113]Soviet Troops _ . — , - ; ; :
[5114]The withdrawal, of Soriet personnel from Cuba vag algo a natter of
[5116]deep concern to ths United States, As the President stated at his
[5118]press conference ef November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet
[5120]combat unite and other Sovies mits wore assoclated with the protection
[5123]ef effensive weapons systems and would alee be withdrawn in dus course.
[5125]the U.S. position was that removal of the offengive weepons systems made the
[5126]! pesaenee ef Seriet traops to defend euch + pons ne longer necessary. | ie
[5127]7 “Efforts be secure their removal continued inte 1963,
[5128]Security. Council Consideration Coneluded
[5129]fhe formula for tenninating Security Council consideration of the
[5131]Cuban crisis vas finally agreed between the governments of the United
[5133]States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. Tt represented a standstill
[5134]‘yather than a final settlement. The tuo governments agreed to send a
[5135]joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to
[5136]the Security Council for information of its members, The text of the .
[5137]letter read:
[5138]| "On behalf’ of the covernmente ef tha United States and the
[5139]Soviet Union, we desira te express to you our appreciation for
[5141]_ your efforts in assisting our governments te avert the serious
[5142]threat te the peace uhich recently arose in the Caribbean area.
[5144]pprrneeeenee gre tmecene: yong meme remaster, gears neengemeentp nn saeco ly ete
[5146]"yhile at has not bsen possible for cur governments to
[5148]/resolve all the -
[5150]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 115
[5152]— .* ]
[5155]resolve al} the problems that have arigen in eonnection with this
[5156]affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding»
[5157]reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the
[5158]extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it
[5159]is not receagary for this item to occupy further the attenticn A
[5160]of the Security Council at this tine,
[5162]one manera pone nerccemea ate aime eR,
[5164]"The Govermments of the Urited States of America and of the
[5165]Soviet Union express the hope thet the actions taken to avert the ae
[5166]_¢breat of war in commection with this erisis will lead toward the i
[5167]adjustment of other differences between them end the general :
[5168]- easing of tengions that could cause a further threat of war. ® ,
[5170]The sama day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative ef Cuba,
[5171]Carlos M.. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he
[5172]requested ba ¢rarionitied to Uaited Nations mambors, sxpreesing 2 dissenting
[5174]view on the conclusion of the affair, Cuba, the letver declared, "does
[5176]_ snob consider as effgetive any agreenont other then one which would include’
[5178]consideration of five points or measures, wich ag minimum guarantees to
[5180]peace in the Caribbean, our Prim Hinieter Fidel Castro stresses in his
[5181]‘declaration of 26 Ogteber, 1962...00 .
[5182]As the Security Council concluded ite consideration of the Cuban
[5183]iten, the situation remained as follewss
[5185]4. ‘The Soviet Union had withdram ite offensive missiles,
[5187]ena en ME Ee Merete Men gees cape amma pamenrongentecmtetin, to certs at
[5189]°° 4¢8 bombers, and soms of its military personnel. ‘The United
[5191]States and participating American Republics had lifted the
[5192]-querentina, ~ | . , ;
[5194]2, The Cubans had refused to accept eu site inepection and
[5196]post-removal verification or te agree on a system of sentinuing ~~ [
[5197]safeguards against relntroduction of offensive weapons under _
[5199]United Nations auapices.
[5200]3, In the abgence of adequate insyection and safeguards, the . ood
[5201]United States continued other metheds of surveillance of military ..
[5203]. oo factivities in _
[5204]HY 50955 Docld:32434709 Page 116
[5206]ee 7 ot 4, @ : i
[5208]oe KO »
[5210]estivitdes in Cuba in the intereste af hemispheric security.
[5212]hk, The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in
[5214]Cuba constituted an unacceptable interventisn of foreign
[5216]military power in the Western Hemisphers. Efforts contdnuad
[5218]with the USSR to chtain their removal og agread,
[5220]5S. The United States continued tc be sericusly conserned about
[5221]‘Guban subversive efferts directed against other American Republics.
[5223]6. The United States position with regard te assurance against
[5225]Aneasiion Fomained that stated by the Pres ident on ‘November 20, as J 4
[5227]duthined above, | _ i:
[5229]Vo With he contlusion of the Now York telke and the Joint GS-TS5R :
[5231]-Istter teminating Security Council congideration of the matter,
[5232]responsibility: of further action remained with the OAS Organ of
[5234]' - Consultation in its hemispheric context,
[5236]| Con: Lemente ne of Bila
[5238]“Gonehusion: ary Role
[5240]aberal, Rap pnais and UN Diplomac
[5244]the Cuban affair denorstrated the utility and possibilities for inte
[5246]action of the varicue dipleratic and military inetrumente available to the
[5248]' United States in a cris vi. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional,
[5250]arrangements, and the United Natione syatem marked the handling of the
[5252]erisis throughout. Im particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique
[5254]demonstration of coordination hetween a regional system and the world
[5256]organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the 0,A.5. and the
[5258]Usited Nations, deyending on the task to be perfermed and the governments
[5260]ai
[5262]directly involved, The 0.4.5. systen successfully met the test of
[5264]a am ae a
[5266] fworkability by
[5268]oe ene eee mere
[5270]HW 50955 Docla:32424709 Page 117
[5272]workability. by denonstrating comiusively, the solidarity and determination
[5273]of the American Republics when their gecurity is endangered. The rapid,
[5274]dscisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty
[5275]etrengthened the hand of the Usited States in making ats sass before world
[5276]opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in
[5278]nogetiating with the Soviets.
[5280]4
[5281]'
[5283]“The United Nations played a thres-feld role: as a forum for exposing _
[5284]Soviet duplicity and for anlisting diplomatic suppert of the United Staten
[5285]position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for
[5286]negotiations and, ag an institution willing and abla, on shert notice,
[5287]to provide inepection and verification servi cag.
[5289](2) The United States provided an waparalleled forum for presenting
[5290]the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to repregentatives of
[5292]109 nations and through communications media directly to world public
[5294]opinion. Ambaeaador Stevenscn’s gpaeches of Octcber 23 and 25 in the
[5295]Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations vO
[5296]delegations both inside and eutsida the chamber, prevented incontrevertibie °
[5297]evidence in a dramatic and effeetive manner and thus helped in convincing
[5299]the world of ths facte. Yn addition, the Waited Nations provided a
[5301]forum in ehich the American Republics cowld impress on the world and
[5303]on the Secretary-Gensrel their solidarity on thig issue.
[5305](2) the Secretary-Gensval provided an effective point ef contact,
[5306]notably in the tease days at the outast ef the erisis and valuable
[5307]suggestions for avoiding cirsct eonfrontation, The Secretery-General’s .—
[5308]intervention on the cecond day of Security Couneil debate, in which i
[5309]he called for suspension of arn shipments and of construction and
[5310]development of military inetallationg im exchange for suspension of
[5312]i
[5314]sd 5O98S Saw TA 90424909 Page ALG 4 oyu wk ea tee ya yee, cee A EHO, QUATANEINE snip oncners,
[5317]a
[5319]bq we, & a, = &
[5321]the quarantine led te the formula under whieh Seviet ships! stayed away
[5322]- fren the interseption area and on that condition the United States agreed |
[5323]_ to do everything poasibls to avoid diract confrontation. Khrushchev gave
[5324]unprecedented agreement te tha idea of U.N. inspection and verification |
[5326]of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was
[5328]4
[5329]1
[5331]ready and capable of organiaing a corps of observers and a eystem of
[5332]inspection in rapid order. -
[5333]"Both the United Katiens and. the Organization ef American States proved
[5335]their utility. and vigor <= and anerged atxonger from the erdgal,
[5337]as
[5339]‘HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 119
[5341]‘SECRET - wap WITH srAceyeTS
[5343]OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[5344]WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
[5346]a iia
[5348]March 6, 1963
[5350]MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH
[5352]SUBJECT: ‘Cuba
[5354]Ae & follow-up to my rnemorandum to you on February 15,
[5355]£963, lam attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in.
[5356]tactimeny given by the Degartmuent of Defense te congressional
[5357]committees. They continue from the latast dete of each coransitice |
[5358]excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed
[5360]” Services Gommittee trauseYipts.
[5362]Not ali testimeany has heen eercencd for Cuba references
[5363]inasmuch ae all trangerigte are got available. ‘Thus the House
[5364]Armed Services Gommmittee has been covered up to Fabruary 21,
[5365]the DOD Subcommittee of the Neuse Appropriations Committee to.
[5366]®ebruarcy 13, and the Senate Armed Services Commities to
[5367]February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Genate Appropriations
[5368]Gommittee hag not yet begun ite heavings.
[5370]| . Aa transezipis become available, I will send the raquested
[5371]items to you.
[5373]“SIGNED
[5375]"David HE. MeGiffert
[5376]. Agvlatant to the Sacretary
[5377](Legialative Affaira)
[5379]U Attachments
[5380]HASC Transcript excerpte
[5381]; Dad So, HApgone Transcripts excerote
[5382]4 £A6C Tranocript excerpts
[5384]SERY » | SECR FT WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS
[5386]ce:(S/Attachments included) -
[5387]Mr. McNaughton, GC Myr. Lennartson, PA
[5388]Mg. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst. “Mg. Califano, OSA <————““«
[5389]Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
[5391]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 1270
[5393]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 121
[5395]STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[5396]‘y ROBERT S.°.McNAMARA‘TO.THE PERMANENT
[5397]SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
[5398]COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS - 13 March 1963
[5399]U. S, SENATE
[5401]Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted
[5402]my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my
[5403]views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of
[5404]General Dynamics Corporation aS prime contractor for this versatile new
[5405]addition to our Defense arsenal.
[5407]My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the
[5408]Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based
[5409]on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air-
[5410]plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend-
[5411]able both in training missions and in actual combat.
[5413]The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in
[5415]aay judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the
[5416]Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of. obtaining a
[5417]single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:
[5418]- The least expensive, time-consuming research and
[5419]development effort before production.
[5420]- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
[5421]- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
[5423]- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type
[5425]aircraft.
[5427]HW 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 122
[5429]ily i)
[5431]- The greatest use of proven design techniques and
[5433]methods.
[5435]° - The most understanding of the requirements and
[5436]difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and
[5437]producing a fighter~type aircraft.
[5439]When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first
[5440]identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 --
[5441]1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by
[5442]six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable
[5443]without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to
[5444]whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or
[5445]whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be
[5446]continued in order to meet the military requirements.
[5448]Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall
[5449]of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by
[5450]the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:
[5452]"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
[5453]design and produce this weapon system.
[5455]"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
[5456]design configurations to the using Agencies involved ~- TAC and the
[5457]Navy.
[5459]'(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
[5461]and changes can be expected during the development period.
[5463]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 123
[5465]HY 50955
[5469]'(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
[5470]will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in
[5471]carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
[5473](5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed,
[5474]and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will
[5475]markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability. "'
[5477]The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal,
[5479]and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both
[5481]‘proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to
[5483]meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation
[5484]with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing pro-
[5485]posal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single
[5486]design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the
[5487]differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied
[5488]amore realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to
[5489]select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded
[5490]that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could
[5491]be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military
[5492]requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera-
[5493]tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part
[5494]of the record,
[5496]When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed
[5498]me to:
[5500]Docld: 324274709 Page 124
[5504]1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military
[5505]requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.
[5507]2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible
[5508]cost.
[5509]Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in
[5511]both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear
[5512]forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory
[5513]forces:and to. increase théir flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those
[5514]weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of
[5515]nuclear surprise attack.
[5517]At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-
[5518]nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the
[5519]many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure
[5520]that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro-
[5521]curement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly in-
[5522]creased, °
[5524]Concur rently with these increases in.our fighting strength we have
[5525]attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of
[5526]the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy
[5527]period of development, their tremendous combat power and their
[5528]enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon
[5529]systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key
[5531]decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.
[5533]4
[5535]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 125
[5539]In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com-
[5540]monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when
[5541]the program started, and in some instances more, Some of the reasons
[5542]for such overruns have been:
[5544]1, We have insisted that weapon systems meet pefform-
[5545]ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.
[5547]2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost
[5548]estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied
[5549]many times during the program.
[5551]3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what
[5552]it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered
[5553]that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in
[5554]what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract
[5555]is awarded,
[5557]4, We have too often employed inadequate and
[5558]unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in-
[5559]sufficient weight on. .seagoned.experience in:theidesign and :prodiiction
[5560]of similar weapons. .
[5562]5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and
[5563]other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce
[5565]cost.
[5567]f
[5568]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 126
[5571]Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to
[5572]attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been.
[5573]launched, which should produce savings of at least $3. billion per year by the
[5574]end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount
[5575]to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed
[5576]price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program
[5577]definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-péofit organiza-
[5578]. tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.
[5579]At my request the problem of how we select. contractors. has been under
[5580]_ study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense
[5581]Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's
[5583]business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our
[5585]current source selection procedures can be improved.
[5587]One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that
[5588]weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where
[5589]this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements.
[5590]The advantages of one weapon ‘system over two are obvious. They result in
[5591]substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but
[5592]throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic! support, ‘midinterrance,
[5593]training programs, and operations,
[5595]The. disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be
[5597]observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a
[5599]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page i237
[5601]e ®
[5602]rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high.
[5603]The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive
[5604]spare parts ‘inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change,
[5605]the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already
[5606]obsolete and practically worthless.
[5608]When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was
[5609]developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105,
[5610]At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the
[5611]F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common
[5612]missions and require many similar operational capabilities, After consultation
[5614]with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con-
[5615]vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the
[5616]Navy and Air Force requirements, Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force
[5617]reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common
[5618]tactical fighter.
[5620]The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new.
[5621]I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority
[5623]of experts in the Nawy and Air Force said it couldn't be done, As late
[5625]HY 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 126
[5627]as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air ‘Force had been
[5628]working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both
[5629]Services that development of a single TX aireratt to fulfill stated
[5630]requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.
[5632]While this attitude, based ori years of going separate ways,
[5633]was understandable, ‘Idid not consider it was a realistic approach,
[5634]considering the versatility and. capabilities that could be built into a
[5635]modern aircraft because of-advances in technology. ‘Iwas also
[5636]convinced that, if we could achieve’ a single tactical fighter, we would
[5637]save at least one billion ‘dollars, . in development, production, maintenance
[5638]and operating costa. In short, after study and review, I believed: that .
[5639]the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both
[5640]Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and
[5641]economically desirable, I directed that we continue to work toward
[5642]this objective. “Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept
[5644]myself fully advised of the development of the (FX as it progressed
[5646]over the succeeding 14 months.
[5648]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 129
[5650]Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of
[5651]the. matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you
[5652]in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision.
[5653]On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop ~
[5654]a single aircratt for. both the Air For ce. tactical mission and the .
[5655]Navy fleet air defense mission. ; From the outset; the emphasis :
[5656]was on development ofa weapons system that provided minimum .
[5657]divergence between the Navy-and.Air Force versions. My specific
[5658]guideline in this regard was! "Changes ‘to the air Force tactical a
[5660]' version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall |
[5661]be held to a minimum, " ‘This is a recurring theme throughout thei: -
[5662]procurement actions which followed. ee
[5664]Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were |.
[5666]issued in October, 1961, and proposals ‘were submitted by six-firms a
[5668]two months thereafter. © — . |
[5670]A Source Selection Board was organized with members
[5671]appointed by the. Navy-and the Air Force, ‘and they’ we re instructed
[5672]to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting
[5674]chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Ae ronautical
[5676]Systems Division.
[5678]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 130.
[5680]To assist the Source $élection Board, an Evaluation Group was -
[5681]established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force
[5682]officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the
[5683]detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the: areas
[5684]of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management a
[5685]strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft
[5686]carriers. | |
[5688]The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the ‘Source
[5689]Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by
[5690]appropriate commands within the: Navy'and the Air Force, ‘as well as ;
[5691]by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief a
[5692]of Naval Operations >» and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and ;
[5693]Air Force who made their recommendations to me. o ue
[5695]Of the six proposals conside red in December and January, those of
[5696]Boeing Company and Gene val Dynamics Corporation were determined by
[5697]the Evaluation Group to-be significantly bette r. : But it was recognized
[5698]that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it.
[5699]would be acceptable. | Although the Boeing design was given. the higher
[5700]rating in ope rational capability, ‘and General Dynamics was | given the.
[5701]higher rating in the technical area,. the Evaluat jon Group recom-
[5702]mended that study contracts -be awarded to both Boeing-and General
[5704]Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military
[5706]requirements. For éxample, Boeing's proposal had offered the General
[5707]10
[5709]HW 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 131
[5711]Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable, The senior
[5712]Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs
[5713]was acceptable without very substantial change.
[5715]A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board
[5716]which recornmended that further work to achieve a satisfactory
[5717]design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that
[5718]substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine
[5719]was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the
[5720]radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting
[5721]capsules for ejection seats had to be explored, The Source Selection
[5722]Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the
[5723]limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be
[5724]acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommenda-
[5725]tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force
[5726]Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force
[5727]Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi-
[5728]bility for development of the aircraft, | recommended against the selection
[5729]of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and
[5731]General Dynamics, as suggedted by the Evaluation Group.
[5735]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 132
[5737]The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for
[5738]Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence
[5739]of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua-
[5740]tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to-both companies
[5741]for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized
[5742]that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, 7
[5743]would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by
[5744]extending the compatition for an additional period “time and dollars are thereby
[5745]more apt to be saved than lost in the long run. " It considered that competition
[5746]should produce realistic cost estimates, further ‘as surance of the validity |
[5747]of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design. .
[5749]Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the
[5750]Navy and Air Force recommended to ‘me that study eoatracts be. awarded.
[5751]to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that: :
[5753]a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly
[5754]superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up
[5755]to stated Service requirements. | | |
[5756]b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General
[5758]Electric engine (on which ‘the Boeing design had been-based) because of
[5759]the low probability of its development in the time required, ‘since not
[5761]even a prototype existed at the time.
[5763]12
[5765]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 133
[5767]c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs
[5768]and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design
[5769]standpoints.
[5771]I approved the recommendations of the-Secretaries of the Navy and
[5772]Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost
[5773]estimates :
[5775]The two. companies submitted new proposals on April 2,, 1962,. and
[5776]the second evaluation was conducted in April and\May. The Evaluation
[5777]_Group.concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correct-
[5778]ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy > .
[5779]from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability
[5780]to remain on station for adequate: periods of time.
[5782]-The diffe rence of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged
[5783]more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overt:
[5784]shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since
[5785]the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor
[5786]the General.Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse-
[5787]ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and. by him to-the
[5788]Secretary of the Navy, recommended in. effect abandonment of the effort to
[5789]-achieve a. joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air:Force members of the
[5791]Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing: submission. The qualified,
[5793]13
[5795]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 134
[5797]os 8
[5798]concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the
[5799]over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson
[5800]stated in writing that he had ''no indication that Navy requirements can
[5801]indeed be met.'' Therefore, he. was of the opinion that it was premature
[5802]to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally
[5803]selected,"
[5805]The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in
[5806]view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by
[5807]the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and
[5808]wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine
[5809]courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the
[5810]Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting
[5811]divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,
[5812]resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.
[5813]Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-
[5814]ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by
[5815]reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent
[5816]ina joint program. |
[5818]At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals
[5819]which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy
[5820]member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of
[5822]the new proposals met the Navy's requirements, The Board also noted that
[5824]14
[5826]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 135
[5828]the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions
[5829]that would be. necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been
[5830]determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom-
[5831]mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
[5832]the Chief of Naval Ope rations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing,
[5833]should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design .
[5834]definition" phase. The expressed neéd for the continuation of the
[5835]definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the
[5836]third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.
[5838]Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it
[5839]appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require -
[5840]ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under-
[5841]stood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to.
[5842]develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the ‘needs of both the Navy.
[5843]and the Air Force.
[5845]Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air
[5846]Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from _
[5847]which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective
[5848]versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and .
[5849]the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the
[5850]contractors’ cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled.
[5852]' Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce. cost by maximizing similarities
[5853]15
[5855]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 136
[5857]in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use.of common equipments
[5858]and structures,
[5860]To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary
[5861]of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining
[5862]fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in
[5863]accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962,.
[5864]explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any
[5865]contract would be awarded. These. were: | |
[5867]"l, Satisfaction of both Navy and Air:-Force that a significant
[5868]improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the
[5869]winning design,
[5871]"2. Minimum dive rgence from a common design compatible
[5872]with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the
[5873]inherent savings of a joint program.
[5875]"3, Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for
[5876]development and procurement of the complete: TFX ‘weapon ‘system,,.which
[5877]costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military
[5878]strength by the weapon system," |
[5880]These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used
[5881]in judging and weighing the two proposals | -- Boeing and General Dynamics.
[5882]They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation
[5883]Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its
[5884]comments and conclusions.
[5886]16
[5888]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page i137
[5890]i | @
[5892]The two companies submitted their new proposals in September
[5893]1962, These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the
[5894]Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.
[5896]At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general
[5897]conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by
[5898]theAir Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson,. Chief of
[5899]Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
[5901]"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
[5902]design and produce this weapon system,
[5904]'(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
[5905]design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.
[5907]"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
[5908]and changes can be expected during the development period.
[5910]“(ay When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
[5911]will markedly improve the. capability of the Tactical Air Command in
[5912]carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
[5914]"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and -
[5915]-when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will. markedly
[5916]improve existing fleet air defense capability.'' ‘
[5918]The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors.
[5919]When I reviewed the report, I could see. why. The question was a very close one.
[5921]': In. the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design
[5922]as having ''a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge
[5924]in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel
[5926]17
[5927]HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 138
[5931]Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics
[5932]design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera-~
[5933]bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated
[5935]penetration aids system, For deceleration,. it uses dive brakes in ‘the
[5937]air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited
[5938]deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in fe rry capability,
[5939]conventional-weapon carriagé;. loiter capability, and in landing perform-
[5940]ance, It has the advantage in low-altitude -maneuve ring capability. For
[5941]deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent
[5942]deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."
[5944]In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher
[5945]score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable
[5946]from the users' viewpoint.
[5948]In the "Production, Management and Cost'! area, General Dynamics
[5949]was rated higher than Boeing. ‘In ngcheduling, 4 General Dynamics ‘presented
[5950]the better program. It was ‘somewhat more detailed and better time phased,
[5952]In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of
[5953]maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal
[5954]received a slightly higher rating over-all. |
[5956]It was clear that beth designs met the first condition prescribed in
[5957]Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air
[5958]‘Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their
[5959]tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the ‘degree to which
[5960]‘the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. - You-
[5962]will recall that those two conditions were; (1) minimum divergence from a
[5964]18
[5966]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 139
[5969]common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.
[5970]It should be emphasized that the se two conditions would understandably loom
[5971]less important in the eyes of the Source Sele ction Board than operational
[5972]capability. These are conditions more properly the conce rn of those
[5973]charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are
[5974]equally a part of my.determination of what is in the national ‘inte rest.
[5975]~ When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint
[5976]of minimum dive rgence from a common de sign, Twas immediately struck
[5977]by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. | The Report
[5979]found. that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very
[5981]high degree of identical structure for’ the Navy and Air Force versions. .
[5982]On the other hand, the. Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less
[5983]than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were
[5984]the same. In fact the. Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, .
[5985]proposing two diffe rent airplanes froma structures point of view. | ‘The
[5986]same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of
[5987]identical parts in the General Dynamics design. --a particularly crucial
[5988]point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development
[5989]process to retain identity ‘of parts, while, on the other hand, small
[5990]divergences in the early stages tend to grow.as development proceeds.
[5992]In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of
[5993]minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral
[5995]technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.
[5999]HY 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 140
[6001]S a
[6003]It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role
[6004]as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made
[6005]about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that
[6006]the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could
[6007]be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur-
[6008]pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two, Two airplanes increase
[6009]costs at every stage beginning with development itself.
[6011]As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by
[6012]Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter,
[6013]and fatigue. analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs;
[6014]and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions,"
[6016]Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required
[6017]earlier in the production process, Supply and logistics problems become compli-
[6018]cated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the
[6019]logistics drea.
[6021]These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving
[6022]as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates,
[6023]common technical manuals, and the. like.
[6025]If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects
[6026]of saving one billion dollar s would have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-.
[6028]gence is fundamental. ‘The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.
[6030]19
[6032]HW 50955 Docld:32474709 Page 141
[6035]lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point
[6036]were clear and consistent.
[6038]Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed
[6039]the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk,
[6040]who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Direc-
[6041]tor of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, dis-
[6042]cussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging
[6043]development and production programs, it became clear to me that the
[6044]General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach
[6045]than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully “acceptable,
[6046]There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated
[6047]the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in
[6048]my mind.
[6050]The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers
[6051]for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing
[6052]touch down. ‘Te date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight
[6053]on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on super-
[6054]sonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commer-
[6055]cial jet transports and cargottype aircraft in which the engines are mounted on
[6056]outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter
[6057]aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made.
[6059]This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline
[6061]20
[6063]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page 142
[6065]a ®
[6066]and aft of the tail surfaces, The Boeing design uses two engines nestled
[6067]in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directiy alongside
[6068]the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. ‘The full effect of this hot
[6069]gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability
[6070]was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in
[6071]addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight
[6072]testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design
[6073]would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early opera-
[6074]tional date for the TFX,
[6076]In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evalua-
[6077]tion Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the
[6078]development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this
[6079]problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate
[6080]in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust
[6081]reverser design and development.
[6083]Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically
[6084]proven and. offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated
[6085]military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the
[6086]military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must
[6088]be weighed against their possible advantages, I want to point out that in
[6090]selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply
[6092]21
[6094]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 143
[6096]@ 8
[6097]thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility: to under-
[6098]take this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall
[6099]program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.
[6101]The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce
[6102]more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant-instii-
[6104]_ lation with top~mounted inlets, The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that
[6105]| Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the
[6106]Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air
[6107]flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during
[6108]high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this
[6109]distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately,
[6110]and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under
[6111]the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.
[6113]In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through"
[6114]installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a
[6115]good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best
[6116]trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems.
[6118]The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object
[6119]damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that
[6120]the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not
[6122]be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.
[6124]22
[6126]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 144
[6130]The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater
[6131]development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-
[6132]through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium
[6133]in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat’: ous
[6134]resistant applications and where high streés levels in thick plates are not
[6135]involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the
[6136]fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use
[6137]in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises
[6138]the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report
[6139]further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details,
[6140]especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be
[6141]quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded
[6142]the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel
[6143]Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing
[6144]companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems
[6145]Division, it was net advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject
[6146]to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating
[6147]to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and
[6148]heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that
[6149]not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but
[6150]additional costs would be incurred. : |
[6152]In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing
[6154]leading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra
[6155]wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing
[6156]relatively unusual applications.of an exotic metal.
[6158]23
[6160]HY 50955 Docla: 324274709 Page 145
[6162]These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the
[6164]everall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that
[6165]this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the
[6166]cempetition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen
[6168]more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational
[6169]features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This
[6171]approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped
[6173]General Electric engine for its initial submission.
[6175]‘Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed
[6176]insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems
[6177]associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in super-
[6179]_ sonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all
[6180]susceptible of solution. But my judgment, ‘reinforced by the Fourth
[6181]Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact,
[6182]complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly
[6183]greater development effort te be expanded by Boeing in their solution.
[6185]But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than
[6186]that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater
[6187]complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between
[6188]the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser
[6189]experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter
[6190]aircraft. hia anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the
[6192]Boeing proposal.
[6194]24
[6196]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 146
[6198]I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic. cost estimates in the
[6199]Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was
[6200]overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously
[6201]low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and
[6202]production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate
[6204]the complexities.of developing the TFX,. This is understandable because
[6206]a
[6208]Boeing's paSt experience in aircraft development and preduction has been
[6209]with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable
[6211]to TFX estimating.
[6212]I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- .
[6214]demonstrably credible understanding of costs ~- Boeing's proposal was
[6215]deficient. |
[6216]The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They
[6217]. attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in
[6218]their judgment was more accurate, They also made adjustments for the
[6219]General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but
[6221]not nearly so much so as Boeing's.
[6223]The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical
[6224]factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The
[6225]application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally
[6227]low proposal, Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a. lack
[6229]25
[6231]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 147
[6233]of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are
[6234]subject to substantial errors,
[6236]Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group
[6237]‘could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing
[6238]and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or
[6239]less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation
[6240]of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which
[6241]is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by
[6242]the application of statistical factors.
[6244]The question has been raised as to why costs are important when
[6245]both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts, There
[6246]are several reasons,
[6248]In a development. contract for a complex new weapon system like the
[6250]TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of
[6252]change orders.is borne by the government. Consequently, when two pro-
[6253]posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General
[6255]Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with
[6256]consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred,
[6258]Aside from the maiter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of
[6259]change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be
[6261]carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.
[6263]26
[6265]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 148
[6267]| It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of .
[6268]the contractor and not the government, Nonetheless, if after several years
[6269]of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to. be far in excess
[6270]of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would
[6271]be.in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take
[6272]every possible cost saving alternative, These alternatives could have a
[6273]serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.
[6275]In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force
[6277]efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expendi-
[6279]‘ture is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that
[6281]we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way
[6283]we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has
[6284]not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of
[6285]the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well
[6286]as the contractor. —
[6288]Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and
[6290]development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production
[6292]27
[6294]HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 149
[6296]@ a
[6297]program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this pro-
[6298]duction program, In the event of very large over-runs on the research
[6299]and development contracts,. the price of uthe production program, which
[6300]for all practical purposes would be committed to the development con-
[6301]“ttactor, would probably be affected.
[6302]When we talk about the TEX program, we are talking National Defense.
[6303]This aircraft is to be an. important element in our militar y force; it must
[6304]: be'ope rational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled, The more
[6305]straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well
[6306]versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters,
[6307]and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designe Y, developer, and pro-
[6308]ducer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer
[6309]to our needs,
[6310]Ihave detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment
[6311]‘that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of ob-
[6312]taining a satisfactory aircraft.on the desired time schedule and within
[6313]the dollars programmed,
[6314]Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy
[6318]Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in
[6320]28
[6322]HW 50955 Docld:324274709 Page 150
[6324]@ 6
[6325]November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently,
[6326]coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:
[6328]First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid
[6329]concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of
[6330]the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided.to move ahead with the
[6331]development of the TFX aircraft.
[6333]Second, our best judgment of the many facters involved let us to
[6334]the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award.
[6335]Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad
[6336]bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts
[6338]again before we arrived at a final decision,
[6339]¢Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we.decided to
[6340]award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.
[6341]There remains one more important aspect of this case which I
[6342]believe should be thoroughly understood, Fundamentally, we are
[6343]dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific
[6345]technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment
[6347]is what is at issue.
[6348]In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are
[6349]pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing
[6351]29
[6353]HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 151
[6356]contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost
[6357]within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation
[6358]Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or
[6359]. would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board,
[6360]using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared
[6361]to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational
[6362]areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of.
[6363]costs, This recommendation, understandably; was seconded by the Navy
[6364]-and Air Staffs, since these.officers are most vitally interested in obtaining
[6365]the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion,
[6366]this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons
[6367]systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it
[6368]has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.
[6370]There is only one way I know to. minimize the compounding of error
[6371]that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply
[6372]the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation,
[6373]but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the
[6374]best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises
[6375]held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of
[6376]military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.
[6378]That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition
[6380]- is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue
[6382]30
[6384]HY 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 152
[6386]@ e
[6387]through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach
[6388]great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements
[6389]is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program |
[6390]definition phase until I was satisfied that the. military requirements -of
[6391]both the Navy and Air Force had been met, That I attach great importance
[6392]to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,
[6393]I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the
[6394]contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations
[6395].on the task to be achieved..-
[6396]-I do not feel that this is a case which presents a-civilian--military
[6397]conflict but rather one of placing emphasis ‘where it must be placed.
[6398]In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I
[6399]considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian
[6400]‘advisors as well as-other available evidence, but I had the final
[6401]respon sibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my
[6402]decision were:
[6403]- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs
[6404]met stated military requirements and. would provide
[6405]significant improvements in combat capabilities of
[6406]_the Navy and the Air Force.
[6407]- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in
[6408]minimum divergence from a common design
[6409]compatible with the separate mission of the Navy
[6411]and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings
[6412]Sr
[6414]HY 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 153
[6416]6 g
[6417]and increased dependability inherent in.a joint
[6418]‘program.
[6419]_- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more
[6420]realistic undérstanding of costs.
[6422]As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the
[6424]decision was mine.
[6426]32
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202-10001-10187.pdf | [1][202-10001-10187| | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | -
[3]le wae Date : 08/28/98
[4]Page : 1.
[5]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[6]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[7]AGENCY INFORMATION |
[8]AGENCY : Jcs
[9]RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10187
[10]- RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
[11]AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188
[12]| DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[13]ORIGINATOR : OSD.
[15]a TO x
[16]TITLE ; MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON. MONGOOSE 6
[17]| SEP 62
[18]- DATE : 09/06/62
[19]PAGES : 5
[21]SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE
[23]DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
[24]CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[25]RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1¢
[26]CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[27]| DATE OOP LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
[28]OPENING CRITERIA =:
[29]COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.
[31]NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION
[32]CoO ee Sr CATION
[34]AW 50955 DocId: 32424918 Page 1
[37]a”
[39]other hand, that particularly because of
[41]WW O95 I : Docld: 32424918 Page 2
[43]overn. ght.
[45]‘bad | The Group then turned to a discussion of dumber 32 ‘Gare
[49]£. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
[50]Cuban exile groups (number 48) 1s impractical, The word was changed
[51]to selected.
[53]e
[55]&. ‘Mr. Martin cautioned that results of n ber 50 (actions to
[57]be undertaken by other Heulephere governments) would aot. be. expected
[59]., Several Carger urged that, in gommetticn vien [number 22 L
[61]in working up other -dé aption men. ||!
[63]Re possible Cuban counter-
[65]measures which had. been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look.
[67]at other possibilities in some detail.
[69]a. General Carter fele that a determination should ‘be made as
[70]to. how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic hartassing actions. a8
[71]He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 .
[73]will not in themselves be especially effective in: yrecking che ‘Cuban
[75]‘rs, Pest Dhow
[77]wabotage). General Carter emphasized the extrene sensitivity o¢ any
[78]Such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-—
[79]thing aoing wrong, particularly if there were obvious actribution ‘to
[81]the U.S. He wenc on to say, however, that it would be possitle ro
[83]accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
[87]the paper. He mencioned specifically the possibility ofproducin
[90]«ho
[93][failures /by the introduction of biological agents which would appear
[95]LS they could be completely covered up. fe aim citi
[97]oS 4 wey ‘A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
[98]Poop. cee - :
[99]= _ could be distributed to Cubans should be infilgrated. General Carter
[101]explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
[103]to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
[104]“ :
[106]lt was suggested that the matter of attacking and harragsing of
[107]et personnel within Cuba should be considered, Hi
[111]7, The Atcorney General and Mr. Bundy said “that no reprisals against
[113]exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
[115]8. It was Suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke: ~
[117]into further.
[119]9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
[121]much Llatitwde would be allowed the operating elements of the government
[123]within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that ic would not be:
[125]a@ simple matter ro delegate résponsibilities of this kind to any great :
[127]degree.
[129]10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
[130]oo. ee teseanet eh mw A. weet wa med
[132]day eh | REREAD ess en
[134]HW 30955. Doeld:32424918 Page 3
[136]zo bel of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about |
[137]any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result L.
[138]of local Cuban disaffection or of natural disaster, but. chat we suse |
[140]avoid external activities such astrelease of chemicals, etc., unles¢ coe
[142]f ee
[144], be-easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat:
[149]f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
[150]Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
[151]to selected.
[155]Be Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to
[157]Ps
[159]be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected
[161]over: Ce : a [> ; 4 |
[163]General Carter urged that, in connection with
[165]whd be given” more laticude
[167]MN) General Lansdale sh
[169]in working up other déeption possibilities « Bundy felt, on the
[171]other hand, that particularly because of eiie’ possible Cuban counter~
[172]measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look
[173]at other possibilities in some detail.
[175]i. General Carter fele that a determination should be made as
[176]to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions,
[177]He emphasized chat sabotage operations such as those under number 27
[179]i
[181]will net in themselves be especially effective in grecking the Cuban
[183]economy. Pedr h % qh AK\ . | =
[185]“4./ The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32
[187]General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of. any
[189]such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
[190]thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to
[192]the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to
[194]8 enti
[196]accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
[200]the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility og
[207]Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
[209]any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
[211]at .
[212]aor of local Cuban disaffection or o but that we must
[214]. @vold external activities such a
[216]a ‘a :
[218]Se
[222](0 -~-3. A suggestion was made that suiall explosives or incendiaries which
[223]reed ~
[224]L Ve could be distributed te Cubang should be infiltrated. General Carter
[226]explained that the problem is not ome of such supplies, since they can
[227], be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatic
[229]to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
[232]i
[233]i C oe t was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
[236]\y"! 6 ét personnel within Cuba should be considered ||
[240]7, The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against
[242]exiles whe undertake active operations on their own are contemplaced.
[244]8, Tt was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked
[246]into further.
[248]9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
[249]much Latitude would be allowed che operating elesients of the government,
[250]within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
[251]a simple mamter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
[253]degree.
[255]10. Mr. Bumidy them raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
[257]AE Pe wm cern oo gerne
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202-10001-10203.pdf | [1](202-10001-10203 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992,
[3]AGENCY
[5]RECORD NUMBER
[6]RECORDS SERIES
[7]AGENCY FILE. NUMBER
[9]ORIGINATOR
[10]FROM
[12]TO
[14]TITLE
[16]DATE
[18]PAGES
[19]SUBJECTS
[21]DOCUMENT TYPE
[22]CLASSIFICATION
[23]RESTRICTIONS
[24]CURRENT STATUS
[26]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[27]OPENING CRITERIA
[28]COMMENTS
[30]Date : 08/04/98
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]JCS
[39]202-10001-10203
[40]FOIA SERIES
[41]DOC 204
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[45]OSD
[47]: THE CUBA PROJECT
[49]01/24/62
[50]6
[51]MONGOOSE
[53]: MEMORANDUM
[55]TOP SECRET
[57]1B, 1C
[59]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[60]07/30/98
[62]Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.
[64]NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
[65]TODECLASSIFICATION
[66]REQUIFY ENOE
[68]HW 50955 DocId: 32424934 Page i
[70]([R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[73]i. ane wo
[74]‘ | S-E-C-R-E-T _ 24Y,
[75], EYES ONLY
[76]é. . TAR A:
[77]SUBIECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program
[79]Review
[81]A. TASKS
[82]Part Vv. pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of
[83]the Cuba Project, dated 16 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks
[84]to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned
[85]ta CLA solely or jointly, The tasks have been reviewed by this
[86]Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting
[88]and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and”
[90]ptol State r this document
[91]Se alae of portion(s) of #
[93]without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The
[95]following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's
[98]; P
[101]l. Task l, p.5, The intelligence community is hard at
[103]Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-626)
[105]Reviewed on 6/30
[107]work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of
[108]? February. As was agreed ina conversation of 23 January 1962
[109]with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.
[111]2. Task 2,.p.3. The Cpa-Lorcka Interrogation Center in
[113]Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date,
[115]3.-Task 3. p.5 The survey is in progress and will be
[117]completed on the stipulated date On the basis of the information
[119]CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 10 OSht WO OBIE ee Doc tt 24
[120]DECLASSIFI IFICATION AND/OR 2o sen ‘ 8
[121]RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT = ; 7 ew cnet
[122]AS SANITIZE 7 S.5-.C-R-E-T
[124]° jon & c/e3/3 SLES ONLY
[126]9
[128]HW 50955 DocId: ra: aba2dess wa) 2 i DISA(DFOISR)_ . sy ls (CG
[130]ORE
[132]OO
[135]S-E-C-R-E-T
[136]EYES ONLY
[138]obtained the possibility of establishiag additional interrogation
[139]points will be determined.
[141]4. Task 4, p.5. An operational assessment of the stay-
[142]behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline
[143]of iS > Pepruary: Because communication with singleton agents is
[144]by sw, . not w/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed
[146]by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be
[148]necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work
[150]before that dat An intensive program aimed at the acquisition
[152]of third country’ assets through the cooperation of diaigan.
[154]is also under way, particularly in Spain: Belgium of vance,
[156]Uruguay, and Costa Rica.) /A progress report on the status of
[158]this program will be uidde’by 15 February, although this Agency
[159]cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will
[160]have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the follow.
[161]ing additional steps in respect to Task 4.
[163]a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added
[164]impetus to the search for assets and the development of both
[165]unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been
[166]required by | March.
[168]bo A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of
[170]MW. 50955 Docld: 32424994 Page 3
[173]BW 50955. DoclId:324274934 Page 4
[175]S-E-C-R-E-T
[176]EYES ONLY
[179]operational access to it is under way! Target date: end of
[181]February. —
[183]c. An assessment of more than one hundred Persons to
[185]determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agent¢in
[187]the guise of student alse being conducted. Target date:
[189]end of February.
[191]5. Task 5, p.5. The l February deadline will be met, and
[192]by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable inter-
[193]™Mediaries, Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official
[194]of the Cuban regime whose Personal characteristics indicate he
[195]would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although
[196]some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba,
[197]will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by
[199]intermediaries selected from the ranks offjournalists, foreign
[201]officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime
[203]syndicates, internatiorial detectives and foreign police officials.
[204]Additimally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials
[206]abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access
[208]abroad is under way’)
[210]6. Task 6, p.5. By the assigned date we shall complete
[212]and submit a coordinated Plan. We shall also have begun action on
[214]most planning
[218]EYES ONLY
[221]cover and deception Operations by that data.
[223]7. Task 7, p.5.- Byl February CIA will submit an opera.
[224](| tional schedule for the initiation of an Organized resistance move.
[225]-/\ ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities Selected
[227]and the assessment of Some candidates. _ A fall aSsessment will
[229]Saal
[231]be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in Para. 4,
[232]above, in conformance with Task 4, ff should be noted, | however,
[233]that this operational schedule (like the schedules éalled for in
[234]Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject
[236]to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases _
[238]and as the flow of intelligence is augmented, - Moreover, the
[240]8. Task 10, p.5. CLA has on hand both Propaganda and
[241]political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in
[242]Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support
[243]the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and |
[244]official opinion against Castro outside Cuba, The Opérational
[246]Schedule will be submitted On the stated date,
[248]a se
[249]9. Task 18, p. 6) Discussions with the @pPropriate AFL-CIO.
[250]Sortie “
[252]WM 50955 Docld:32424934 ‘Page 5
[255]S-E-C-R-E-T
[256]EYES ONLY
[257]cat
[259]officials have been donducted and a feport of developments me)
[261]submitted by 15 February.
[263]aw 10. Task 2l, p. 7./ Plans for inducing the failure of crops
[265]will be submitted by 15 February. These plang will envisage both
[266]the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated
[267]and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance,
[268]so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to:
[270]| be directed against crops, particularly rice.
[272]method er disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could,
[274]if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open
[275]attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the
[276]Same purpose, (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward
[278]this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources
[280]of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has n :
[281]proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions.
[282]The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking action
[284](2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking
[286](4) upon the completion of specialized trainin All studies,
[288]oman
[290]including a plan for using overt or covert“Mheans to prevent re-
[292]pore ; institution of thé’ Canad n'supply to the USSR, will be submitted CLK
[294]| by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to
[296]HW 50955 DocId:32424934 Page 6 — EYES ONLY _
[299]; oe, S-E-C-R-E-T
[300]EYES ONLY
[303]" asSigning to the economic action group, ch#ired by the Department
[305]of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny»Cay
[307]| nickel to the USSR.
[309]aa 12, Task 26, p.7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26
[311]we constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation.
[312]/ ; These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit
[313]. by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.
[315]13. Task 27, p.7. See preceding paragraph.
[317]; sont lf. Task 28, p.7. See paragraph 12,
[319]15. Task 30, p.7. By 15 February CIA will submit an opera-
[321]“etscneteeconnnnnsonninininntnncitin,
[322]tional schedule dedling witf/the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban 2
[324]waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications
[326]facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facili-
[328]1 see at ais 28 NS
[330]ties for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food
[331]aupplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel
[332]The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police ‘
[334]communi eons and harassment of military and police training and
[336]{ pérsonnel. inten erento
[338]a 16 Task 31, p.8. This deadline will be met.
[340]S. ADDITIONAL UNDERTARINGS
[341]The following commients are keyed to Sections D throush ™,
[343]Part 1V (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.
[344]2b.
[345]Sn-C-R-2-'
[347]od 7
[348]HW 50955 Bocld:3242749394- Page 7 EYES ONL’.
[351]ly.
[353]Section D, p.3.
[355]Six men,
[357]to form the initial nucleus,
[359]have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates
[361]inside and outside Cuba is
[363]in Progress,
[365]and it is expected that ten
[367]vA
[370]RN
[372]of these will be recruited by,
[374]ebruary,
[376]18. Section E, p.3
[378]Selected as suitable can
[380]Of resistance because
[382]o date fifteen locations have been
[384]Peon
[386]of (1) the Presence
[388]there of Broups among which there is Patent or incipient unrest,
[390](2) the Presence of Strategic and tactical targets for use or deacti.
[392]vation,
[394]In order of Priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Cam
[396]Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas,
[398]Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cubs
[400]’ Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon
[402]19 Section F, p.3.
[404]and (3) Proximity to Potential unconventional Warfare areas.
[406]aguey,
[408]Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the
[410]Ciego de Avila,
[413]“ X
[415]T
[417]r
[422]conducted propa
[424]In support of si? e's efforts CIA has
[426]& Operations,
[428]demonstratio
[430]Costa Rica, eu
[432]G
[434]ador, Guaternala, Mexico,
[438]and Venezuela,
[440]eon
[442]_
[444]ection H. op
[446]n Argentina, Bolivia,
[448]One TV intrusi
[450]including a number of mass
[452]Brazil, Chile, Colombia
[454]Panama,
[456]on operation has been i
[458]| conducted,
[460]on 16 January. Plans for an
[462]|
[464]| Parade and demonstration
[466]al
[468]HW 50955 BDocld: 32424934 Page 6
[470]intrusion during
[476]in Havana are bein
[478]-C.
[479]EYES
[483]§ formulated
[487]be
[489]Nace es inn crane
[493]~-R-E-T
[494]ONLY
[497]fe
[499]S-E-€-R-E-T
[500]Ege ONLY
[504]roups with which CLA has exploi
[506]él. Section K, Pp.
[508]table
[510]aCCES8 Or entree includ o
[512]n, labor, students, teachers,
[513]A
[515]a7 : jurists,
[516]on a .
[517]+ |.) with labor orga’
[519]and other professional classes... International contacts
[521]ations and members of the Catholic
[523], also be utilized.
[527]fe
[529]-8.
[531]HY 50955 Docld: 32424934 Page 9 | [2]
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[534] |
202-10001-10219.pdf | [1]202-10001-10219 _. [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
[3]AGENCY
[5]RECORD NUMBER
[6]RECORDS SERIES
[7]AGENCY FILE NUMBER
[9]ORIGINATOR
[10]FROM
[12]TO
[14]TITLE
[16]DATE
[18]PAGES
[19]SUBJECTS
[21]DOCUMENT ‘TYPE
[22]CLASSIFICATION
[23]RESTRICTIONS
[24]CURRENT STATUS
[25]DATE.OF LAST REVIEW
[27]OPENING CRITERIA :
[31]Page : 1
[33]JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
[34]IDENTIFICATION FORM
[36]AGENCY INFORMATION
[38]JCS
[39]202-10001-10219
[40]FOTA SERIES
[41]pac 220
[43]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[45]OPERATION MONGOOSE PROGRESS
[47]05/31/62
[48]3
[50]: MONGOOSE
[52]MEMORANDUM
[54]TOP SECRET
[56]1B
[58]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[59]07/20/98
[61]COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.
[63]NOUOINT STAFF UBueGTION
[64]TO DECLASSIFIGATION
[65]REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
[67]NW 50955 Docld: 32424950 Page i
[72]y,
[74]OF te OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE . “ a
[75]WASHINGTON 28,0. ¢, {33 4
[79]se
[81]31 te ay 1962
[83]a
[85]3, From: Urig. Cen. Lancdale Sa
[87]Subject: Operation Monsoose Peogreas
[89]. [intetticence niellisence build-up by CIA incluces efforts to recruit a
[90]Guten gloat ineplace and ean ofilelal inan airlines cifice in
[91]HavanZ J She CLA teams nigced ip Pinar cel fio Frovinee leet
[92]March’wes eucceselully re-eupplied by toaritie cocans on
[93]2b stay. The Navy and CLA have worked out a evaperstive effort
[94]@ elrencthen the U.S. security and intellicence prorram at
[95]Cusnizaamne,
[97]|
[99]|
[101]|
[103]; |
[104]L EMORANLUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (auc SL UONTLEp
[105]|
[107]|
[109]|
[111]|
[113]|
[115]|
[117]The CAC continues to provide word froca insice Cuta cover-~
[118]ing local security reves and sopular unrest (unrest Tevortedly
[119]increasin:). A subétantial recuctien in oil relinine and suenue
[120]facture of tires ono tubes le reported fram CAC sources.
[122]G
[124]ocument in ful
[126]the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records
[130]2 (PLIO2- 526),
[132]Eeona:nic pressure ugon the Communist recsime nay be
[133]increased by a Lepartment of Commerce move denying bunxerina
[134]facilitica at U.S. porte to vessela uncer Sino-Soviet bloc charter 4
[135]carrying carpe to Cuba. State Lepartment reports haviar solicited ‘SI
[136]views of our Arnbassador to Javan resarcing pagsible antroacnes St
[137]fo the Javanese asking tuem te cease eucor purchases frou. Culy
[139]Collection Act of 199
[141]t
[142]The Department of State nas no objection tothe
[144]I
[146]i
[148]release or declagsificalion of this d
[150]under
[152]os Mromavanca effortea of USIA ané CLA continue te ¢only eressure
[154]Bee upon tie Cusan rerime Ly focusine wisn abuses of power and failure -
[155]oi hey programe such a8 sxedical and iosd. ‘Sae VOA use of colucees
[156]ia interviews especially underlined thia theme. La lookine into a rosy
[157]USIA proposal tnat we counter Cavemunist Cuba moves to dccress .
[158]Latin America by partieluation in the ataletic North Central Aserican .
[159]ang Caribbean Cavrea set for August ll-2: in Nineston, Jawaica: a
[160]“free Cula” team otght be effective, with geod publicity supvert.
[162]GIABAS NO OBJECTION TO
[164]DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
[166]RS SWTED aes MeV FA nebGEXCLUDED FROM GDS
[168]ZOO, OSA! AREASE HS ; mee 7
[170]og epee ? poe Takes
[171]“areas Tae 2 GSN
[172]woes er « eg
[173]. ‘ f me ‘ . J = Sec eyes a ee ce
[174]Per Lb. aa (|: ot This Gece: nt centninn
[179]HW 50955 DocId:32424950 Page 2 “
[182]Incicent at Guantanamo occurred 26 jay ween @ light Guban
[183]eiversit lancee there. Ghree Gubans hoc fercee the pilot, at
[184]pistol point, to land then at our Naval Ease. ith State’a con-
[185]currence, Defense actce: the Gusan pilot flew home, tue 3 Cuban
[187]apece stayed on tie TASG.
[189]racturine. the Rertine 206 been piven priority attention by
[190]CIAL ‘A eenior caee Giuicer hae been assicned full-ticne to unis
[191]epecific actiga, and nes preferential use of CLA ascets. LA es
[192]cesirable cglection targcts, CIA tas founc several woo seem
[193]vulaeeatld Gnstueing the o‘inister of datiunal Leenamny, Leon cal]
[197]e
[199]Iricrity Qoerntions Hcheccle of 21‘ ay, seening some positive
[200]actiong in vecalf{ of cur project wuring Lic mest gewe ral ween, Os
[201]brouant a very healthy response from CLA anc USIA. The CIA
[202]determination to meet the challenco kas surfaced four palicy-tyoe
[203]questlogg which I note for you on bebalf of CLA:
[204]E> (4)
[206]edatc 7, “Voice of Free Cuba," is alraust immediately
[207]feasicic, if the Creup will asprove CIA arrancingd Sith
[208]Navy for usc of & subtparinc CIA has flew: plans for
[209]worrying the Communist réfime tiroush . hroacccale
[210]which would appear ta cane from locaagissicent groups
[211]actively planning to harass the rezime.
[213]2), Task 1%, ClA is prepared to cis eminate leaflete on Castro's
[214]failure to the Guuan ropulasionf a ballosniwita a view of
[215]increasing instability of the Ce weeunist A:acuine, Fae
[216]technique is tested and ‘1A pag plans t2 onerate iron a
[218]surface chip im international waters, Ant Croup is
[219]agked tu approve the icea, including Mavy supoort. Yaig
[220]coulu be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary
[221]ot Castro's altace upon govern ant forces ut Santiasa de
[222]Cuba in 133, for “the revolution ‘he has now betrayes.
[224]3), Task 1%, CLA believes it can reerult some 2o-an Leamns
[225]‘for poscilule use in beeting up registance proups wituin Guba.
[226]Croup approval is asacd for I cfense Bu omert imoirsinisy
[227]holding, lonistics. ‘ine ‘noice level hasard is motea, but
[228]this gpecial project evuld be alnoct unnwiices il th sec wiks
[229]sproposed U.o. cnilllary enlist went of Gucans.
[231]HW 30955. DocId: 32424950 Page 3 ~ -
[234]est we et \ le
[236]4)F Tact 23, Counterfeit Currency to increase Gvban econo-nie
[237]problume is consicerey icasivle within 330g. GAYS Unon a
[238]iivalted basis anc in Consiceracle ecale within Six montag,
[239]CTA asks the Group approval before proceecing with thig
[240]action, oe
[242]Other Taska,
[246]. Tavte here that CIA coca not feel it hae
[248]operational means’
[249]tals tivoe, cure
[250]Would roeuire
[252]to undertake Jas No. 22; black-market activities
[253]taser thet Task No. UL, Tite Magacine dissemination,
[254]operational facilities far now uvallaule. I accepr inte finite Celerra of
[255]Task No. 22 and scrubbing ef Task Ne. lon tis bagis.
[257]The Levartment of State reaction, ta my effort to pet the U.S. |
[258]inte priority actions towards our project's geale, has been Cisarpesintins
[259]so me thua far. Avparently, "sy Cenécule of tarsets for GSeciul eixorte
[260]ig accepted only as it smay fit into jong -ranze, eulgiing urosramsne already
[261]uncer way. Uf thie is tre theory of our project, I believe iat the praject
[262]then becomes only a special reporting device end not & 6oecial U.S.
[263]effort to wia tie roal of nelping the Cusane wecapture t
[264]from a canp of Coraniunists,
[266]we Country
[268]“Eyes Cnly" copies to:
[270]1. Cener Taylor . s. ifr. Kennedy
[271]2. hig. Johnson 6. Ceneral teimnitser ~——
[272]3.0 Mr. Cilsatric 7. Chief of Operations
[273]4. or. MeCone
[275].
[276]° fee eee care
[277]ee CAS
[278]ee te Coe eS
[280]NY 50955 Docld:324274950 Page 4 . | [2]
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[28]
[29]Date : 08/04/98 —
[30]
[32]
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[37]
[42]
[44]OsD
[46]
[49]
[51]
[53]
[55]
[57]
[60]
[62]
[66]
[68]
[69]
[70]é
[71]
[73]
[76]
[77]—
[78]
[80]
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[86]
[88]
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[175]¥
[176]
[177]ny ey Cony Us ‘ ot +}
[178]
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[194]
[195]«
[196]
[198]
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[243]
[244]erence ee
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[283] |
202-10002-10124.pdf | [1]202-10002-10124 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
[3]AGENCY
[4]RECORD NUMBER
[5]“RECORDS SERIES
[7]ORIGINATOR
[8]FROM
[10]TO
[12]TITOOE
[14]DATE
[16]PAGES
[17]SUBJECTS
[19]DOCUMENT TYPE
[21]CLASSIFICATION :
[23]RESTRICTIONS
[24]CURRENT STATUS
[26]DATE OF LAST REVIEW
[28]OPENING CRITERIA
[29]COMMENTS
[33]Page : 1
[35]JPR ASSASSINATION. SYSTEM
[36]EDENTIPICATION FORM
[38]AGENCY INFORMATION
[40]JCS
[41]202-10002-L0124
[43]: JCS CENTRAL FILES
[44]AGENCY PILE NUMBER :
[46]DOCUMENT INFORMATION
[48]OSD
[49]CYRUS R. VANCE
[51]: MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
[53]CUBAN AFFAIRS IN-THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[54]06/26/65
[56]27
[58]ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION
[60]PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA
[62]SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS
[64]POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT
[66]PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
[67]CONFIDENTIAL
[69]LA, LC
[71]RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
[72]05/15/98
[74]gcS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to
[75]SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban
[76]Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. TCCCA report on
[78]Possible Retallatory Actions by the Castro Government.
[83]OSA
[85]a) Y
[87]a : x oe 31 December 1963 SON
[88]_— cia HIS an oN oe
[89]| pes of Ws 8 nowt
[91]| oi
[93]. MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
[95]OFFICE.OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL , DA
[96]Subject: Payehological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba
[98]1. Ap informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee 7
[99](Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i
[101]Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
[103]agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced, Present from VA
[104]State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and. Montenegro; COA
[105]from CIA, Tilton and| Holloway from USIA, Murphy; and the Ca
[106]undersigned. er,
[108]@. The following topics were discussed:
[110]MPa Montencere.” State Labor advisor for Latin tmerice;
[112]described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
[114]of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and commnists who
[115]will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes
[116]that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
[118]_ sto wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
[119]‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
[121]- discussed:
[123](1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ..
[124]\ “aseertain the degree to which local. (mot national):
[125]. governmental elements will support disruptive and
[126]“harassing actions before and during the meeting.
[128]mae (2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
[129]with the suggestion that local influences be brought
[131]to bear in order to discourage country delegates
[132]from attending the meeting. _
[134]ae (3 USIA to consider VOA broadcasts. to Latin
[135]America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban,
[136]East German, and Chinese. Communist Labor conditions. _
[138]oe (4) CIA.to continue black propaganda operations
[139]we Ad[presit nich suggest | postponement of the: meeting. — COI
[140]a NY
[142]Sp
[144]“DOWNGRADED AD 7 YEAR INTERVALS;
[146]| ma ig years. | fo
[147]1 A8 ¢ dm. mig br 200.20 ee “a
[148]|
[151]Septernber 21, 1963
[153]. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JORN HH, CRIMMINS
[154]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
[155]Department of State
[157]- Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro
[159]Reference: - Memorandom. from the Coordinator of Cuban Affaire
[161]a
[163]In response. to reference mernorandum, outlined below is the
[164]status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed’
[165]upon at our meeting of Septamber 12, 1963, The numbering of the para.
[167]_ §taphe below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
[168]_ §8eference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
[169]eee | Defense apeéific or related military contingency plane exist,
[173]“WAL Actions Against Ue S. Targets in Guba
[174]Be Harassment of Guantaname
[176]fa) outing off of the water supply"
[178]Boe Hie ia made ee
[180]cae which would require
[182]: of e en day. g and which would be implemented on order
[183]» of CINCLANTFLT,/ In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel
[184]in 24 hours or ledS can be accomplished if directed.
[186]"(b). Closing access to the base by Cuban workerg
[187]who > commute”
[189]ia Tes O2dy
[191]_ STE REVIEWED
[192]Cony” cere ~=3 a ai
[194]ao i Pay
[195]POWRGRADED AT 12 YEAR FNTERVALS
[196]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
[200]BW 50955 .DocId:324275002 Page 3
[202]SUBJECT: ny Interdepartmental Coordinating Conirmittee of Cuban © . _ € : < ie
[204]Government (U) i ee
[206]Dept. ae State, subject as 8 above, 13 Sep 630 7
[208](hot /bore Saela (a9 ver 8) 001 B/E 01 b
[213]Big em, ;
[214]oe ae
[216]7 oe
[217]| Piwtpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. - pO Raia
[218]fighter airerafe to veach the scene. fuch overflights may be author cee
[220]lized only by specifically designated commandera,
[222]“5S. ditteck on staping areas employed by exiles in the
[225]con Actions Against Targets im the US : _—
[227]“1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings'*
[229]COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actiona contemplated within
[230]the context of the poser ia not coneidered to exceed the capabilities of
[231]law enforcement agencies to control, There are military contingency
[232]plans to protect ageinst this tye of activity at a much higher level of ©
[233]Intensity. oe - So,
[234]ae . -
[236]“é. dexaming of US padio stations*
[238]oe COMMENT: There are tianding operating procedures ta overcome
[239]_daterference and jaramiag methods employed against military communi
[240]ations, OL
[242]tollitary plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up te and include adall —
[243]Seale military invasten of Guba, me ue
[245]re itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 mecting of -
[246]ee ‘he Gonmnittes that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are
[247]_ ' thowe which would not provoke United Stites retaliation seriously and
[249]a immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely
[250]that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin
[252]8 ge
[255]“NW 50955 Daecid: 32425002 Page 4
[257]: The sumesries of actions at forth above are essentially defensive a
[258] Peactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related ~ = [
[261]fo ce
[262]bey
[263]“sages”
[265]REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY |
[266]ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
[268]1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
[270]_ to the numbering of those actions for which specific or
[271]Pelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
[272]of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.
[274]"As Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba
[276]"4, Harassment of Guantanamo
[278]RM 1d i
[279]implemented rde INCLANTPLT
[281]OF non-essential personnel in 24 hou vr iless if -
[282]~ directed and consistent with national poliey.
[284]"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who ©
[287]COMMENT Provision is made for the introductio
[288]“Callored Naval Construction Battalion unit
[289]ntaining necessary skills, the requisite labor
[290]force, and the possibie stationing of a repair
[291]ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel
[292]{with appropriate skills. Critical personnel
[293]jwould be transported by , to arrive within
[294]48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. ———
[298]n offa
[300]"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" —
[302]COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
[303]degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb-
[305]nee, ranging ‘from no.action. UCh measures! —- f.
[306]ee th Pipe . e a
[307]Db se,
[309]e of fire hoses
[310]nea be te a
[312]"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury
[313]or death"
[315]COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
[317]DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
[318]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
[320]Enclosure
[322]OO 50955. Docld: 32425002 Page 3
[326]| pease
[327]Ngee”
[329]circumstance and situation ranging from no action,
[330]through action taken in self de nse by a wounded
[331]Sentry or those assisting hin, (through increased
[333](defense conditions, placing pex onnel in positions
[335]\protected from fire, and n of fire if appro-
[336]| e and red as. d by the Commander
[338]priate ane
[339]\Naval Base
[341]cise nature of .
[343]GUC)
[345]"Ce) Sabotaging of base facilities™ -
[347]COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
[348]prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S,
[349]Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
[350]taken would depend upon the nature of the
[351]Sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
[352]functioning of the Base.
[354]"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping
[356]"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,
[357]Florida Straits, Windward Passage"
[359]COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
[360]approved by the highest national authority
[361]provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
[362]arca may take immediate protective measures
[364]ie i but not into, Cuban air.
[366]Commanders are
[368]oo BOS Lae iberately a -
[370]Tsuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized
[372]to attack unless either they or the ship they
[374]are defending is endangered by Cuban attack.
[375]in the event Cuban aircraft limit their action ._
[376]| to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making
[377]their presence known by flying close aboard the
[378]Cuban plane.
[380]"CG. Actions Against Cuban Exiles:
[382]"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
[383]registry.
[385]"2, Hot pursuit of or attack on ralding planes over
[386]the high seas or another country's territory. toe
[388]Wie ML . 2 Enclosure
[390]RW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 6
[395]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
[396]high seas or another country's territorial’ waters
[398]th, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
[399]high seas or in another country's territorial waters
[401]COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
[402]policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
[403]U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
[404]aircraft 1s discovered to be under Cuban attack
[405]it may be diffieult to identify it as a "pirate!
[406]"raider", "mother ship" or ‘exile raider", even
[407]though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
[408]Situations, set forth above, are covered, at
[409]least in part, by the rules of engagement which
[410]have been approved by the highest national
[411]authority. However, the action summarized below
[412]is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
[413]aircraft and those not clea. ide .
[414]perng of foreign registry. Commanders are not,
[415]Suthorized to organize deliberately a pursuing
[416]force, however fips or sires rt oodercd to che a
[417]area of the attack r diate protective.
[419]; but not into,
[421]hey are defending
[422]In the event Cuban.
[423]; rt limit: action to harassment, U.S.
[424]BO ay : are limited to making their
[425]GYY) _ presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban
[426]: <a plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft —
[427]ahh S$ authorized only ih those instances where it.
[428]has been established that Cuban attack is being»
[429]made ona U.S. ship or aircraft and then only
[430]for the purpose of substantially reducing the —
[431]time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft
[432]to reach the scene. . Such overflights may be
[433]\Eieeandere only by specifically designated ©
[435]wee
[437]commanders.
[439]"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in
[440]the Caribbean
[442]COMMENT|With regard to Castro att
[443]America, plans exist fo milit. :
[444]espond. to requests for stance.by Latin,
[445]erican governments subject rrangenent for tq]
[447]the
[449]acks on areas se eta) |
[450]» U. coe ,
[452]military:
[454]“\approval. There is also an arrangement for
[456]3 Enclosure
[458]HW 50955. Docid: 32425002 Page 7
[460]va
[463]HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 8
[465]interchange of information between the U.S,
[466]Coast Guard and British naval forces wity
[467]regard to possible Staging areas which m-y be
[469]ed by exiles in the Bahamas,:
[471]"Ee Actions Against Targets in the US
[473]"1. Sabotage or terroristie bombings"
[475]COMMENT The level of intensit
[476]; within the context of +
[478]agencies to control, There are mi
[480]Plans to protect against this type of activity
[481]at a much higher level of intensity.
[483]"2, Jamming of US tadio stations"
[485]COMMENT There are standing Operating procedures to
[486]overcome interference and jamming methods
[487]employed against military communications,
[489]2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
[490]or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
[491]_ dikely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
[492]‘ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
[493]requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
[494]actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
[495]intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most
[496]Likely category." It is inferred that what the committee
[497]Radin mina by the most likely "level of intensity"
[498]provoke the United States
[499]into taking extensive counterteasures whie
[500]endanger the Castro regime. The summaries
[502]There are, however, existing
[503]plans, retaliatory in nature, which
[505]qopee up to and include a full seale military invasion of
[508]3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the
[509]Cuban government are those which would not provoke United
[510]States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering —
[511]the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro mieht
[512]intensify his Support of subversive forces in Latin America
[514]u Enclosure
[517]HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 9
[519]. ae
[520]to 31 December 1963 wg yo DEST oR
[521]. rae . Cia MES SIRICATION yg utHEN
[522]s .
[524]MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
[525]. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA
[527]Subjects Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba
[529]1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee —
[530](Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i
[531]Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
[532]agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from , @
[533]State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; CO
[535]from CIA, Tilton an “from USTA, Murphy; and the GCA)
[537]undersigned.
[539]2, The following topics were discussed:
[541]a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)
[542]meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 2 = 28 Jamary 1964. -
[544]Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,
[545]described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
[546]of left-wing Labor leaders, socialists, and communists who
[547]will attempt to resolve their differences, State believes
[548]that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
[550]-to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
[551]‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
[552]discussed:
[554](L) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to.
[555]~ ascertain the degree to which local {not national)
[556]~ governmental elements will support disruptive and
[558]‘harassing actions before and during the meeting.
[559](2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
[560].. with the suggestion that local influences be brought
[561]. oto bear in order to discourage country delegates
[562]' from attending the meeting.
[564]7 (3). USTA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin
[565]America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, ;
[566]East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.
[568]en CIA .to continue black propaganda operations Va) |
[569]a4 : nich suggest postponement of the meeting. cy) |
[570]mS 2 . |
[572]we uf
[574]DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; |
[576]Aes Ag cade, * : . S Ss weet Ths ra YEARS
[577]O84, ASS Covtral 1k ooy-—~ PEERS aD DR 8200.10
[581]September 21, 1963 9 SO
[583]nb MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS Cel ge
[584]Coordinator of Cuban Affairs a |
[585]Department of State vo
[587]-. SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban | ge Bae
[588]: aa . Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro, veg EES
[589]. Government (u) ; mars 2
[591]- Reference! — Mernorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs —
[592]ae Dept of State, subject ag above, 13 Sep 63... _
[594]. In response to reference mernorandum, outlined below la the
[595]- gtatas of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed
[596]- upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963, The numbering of the paras _
[597]graphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
[598]: reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
[599]-. of Defense specific or related military contingency plans. exiat. :
[601]3
[603]* ‘"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Guba
[604]“4 Harassment of Guantanars
[605]“{a) Cutting off of the water supply"
[608]in addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel —
[609]GUrs OF loos can be accomplished if directed.
[611]"(bp Closing access to the base by Cuban workers
[612]who commute!
[614]phot bogt CislaloowerD ori Clee k
[616]a &S OR RS) top
[617]SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED * owing AT 12 YEAR ENS
[618]‘ i
[620]A Nees rls | ear AR 289--c5stes CONFIDE! I
[622]NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASS! tHE
[624]“poo DIR $200.10
[626]OCOFSA 7 21/684
[628]HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 ‘Page 10 : : : ee pedis |
[631]COMMENT: Provision is made for the intreduction of aa |
[635]| Mie} Staging demonstration and rote at the gates”
[637]COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, king, F |
[639]aed exact. location of the disturbance, ranging from no action| Z Soe
[640]- . eee a ee. cal
[641]“(d} Sniping at base sentvies resulting in injury or
[643]death"
[645]COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances
[646]_ 8nd situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self. defense .
[647]CMY) . by a wounded sentry or those assisting hive, Voce,
[653]"{e) Sabotacging of base facilities"
[655]j/ COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken te prevent guch
[656]i Sabotage by the Comrnander U, 8, Naval Base, Guantanamc, The nature —
[657]of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be
[658]designed t@ aasure the continued functioning of the Base.
[660]"D, Actions <gaingt WU. S, Alrerate and Shisolng
[662]"1, Havassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel,
[663]Plorida Straits, Windward Passage"
[665]COMMENT: . The rules of engagen nent; whieh have heen approved by
[666]the highest national authority pvovide that ships or aincrait ordered te
[668]Fre
[669]a
[671]|
[672]|
[673]|
[675]|
[676]|
[678]HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 11
[681]pote “ BORFIDENTIAE
[682]take imme. eotective mondure: ee oe
[683]. .. Actions Agzinst Guban Exiles €-
[685]a om a2, Hot pursuit of or attack om raiding planes over the
[686]BORG OF Bnother country's territory.
[688]of another country's territerial waters,
[690]ao _ "4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high
[691]: - Of in another country's territerial waters."
[693]“ _ SOMMENT: itis acted that it is contrary to national policy to permit _
[694]Die waide on Cube originating from U. S, territery, however, at the time
[695]athip er aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be diffie
[696]cult ta identify it ag a “pirate,” “raider,” "mother ship" of “exile raiders"
[697]even though thig, in fect, may be the case. All the situations, set forth
[698]above, ave covered, atleast in part, by the rules of engagement which
[699]have been approved by the hishest naticanl guthority. However, the a¢ton —
[701]“1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US reglatey.
[703]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding beats on the high seas
[704]x
[706]fumimarized below ig authorized only in the case of U.S. shies and aire ee
[708]bigh _
[709]“
[711]Stag
[713]- Seatt and those not cleasly identified as being of foreign registry.
[715]HW. 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page iz
[718]"8. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the
[721]om
[723]COMMENT: (
[725]“WE, Actions Against Targets in the US
[727]“i. Sabotage or terreristic bombings"
[729]the context of the poper ig not coneideved to exceed the capabilities af
[730]law enforcement agencies to control. There ave militasy contingency
[731]plane to protect against this tyne of activity at a much higher level af -
[732]intensity. . es
[733]a
[735]"&. Jeroming of US waddle stations"
[737]SOMMENT: There are blanding operating procedures te overcome
[738]anaes reicenieanianerseenntey . *. .
[739]interference and jamming methods employed egalast military commuuni«
[740]cations, : re
[742]écale milltary invasion of Cuba,
[744]4 tee itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 rneeting of
[746]- the Committee that the rocet Mkely actions of the Cuban goverament are
[747]a“ _ those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and_
[748]immediately endangering the Castro regime, It appease more ikely
[749]that Castro might intensify his support of aubversive forcea in Latin
[751]# Abn
[754]HY 30955 . Docld: 32425002 Page 13
[756]COMMENT: . The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within —
[758]The summuvies of actions sét forth above are essentially defensive — = |
[759]reactions to Cuban initiatives, Thore are, of course, existing and related —
[760]military plans, retallatory in mature, which Tange up to and include afull
[763]REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
[764]ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
[766]le The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
[767]te the numbering of those actions for which specific or
[768]~Yelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
[769]of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. ~
[770]"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cubs .
[771]"4, Harassment of Guantanamo .
[773]"Ca) Cutting off of the water supply" -
[775]: Mouation.
[776]ag “OSSeitlal personne. in 2 no less if
[777]directed and consistent with national policy.
[779]COMMENT
[781]"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who
[782]commute!
[784]COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction offs .
[788]ie)
[794]"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"!
[796]COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
[797]degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb~_
[799]DCB Vane ye? Pee : a
[801]"Cd) Sniping at base Sentries resulting in injury
[802]or death"
[804]COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
[806]art DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
[807]AL NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
[809]Enclosure
[811]I $0955 DoclId:324275002 Page i4
[814]ecireumstance and situation ranging from no action, —
[815]through action taken in self defense b a wounded _
[816]sentry or those assisting hin, '
[818]Cle)
[820]“"Ce) Sabotagine of base facilities": -
[822]COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
[823]prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. —
[824]Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
[825]taken would depend upon the nature of the
[827]sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
[828]functioning of the Base,
[830]"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping
[832]"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel ,
[833]Florida Straits, Windward Passage"
[835]COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
[836]approved by the highest national authority _
[837]provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
[839]_ area may take immediate srotective measures
[841]60NL) a
[845]"Cc, Actions Against Cuban Exiles:
[847]"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
[848]registry.
[850]"2. Hot pursuit of or attaek on raiding planes over
[851]the high seas or another country's territory. 7
[853]HAS 2 Enclosure
[856]- GBNFIBENHAL |
[857]"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
[858]high seas or another country's territorial’ waters
[860]"4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
[861]high seas or in another country's territorial waters
[863]COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
[864]policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
[865]U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
[866]aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack —
[867]it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate!!
[868]"raider", “mother ship" or "exile raider", even
[869]though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
[870]situations, set forth above, are covered, at..
[871]least in part, by the rules of engagement which
[872]have been approved by the highest national
[873]authority, However, the action summarized below.
[874]is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
[875]alreraft and those not cleatly identified a5
[877]being of foreign registry... |
[879]a
[881]"5, Attack on:staging areas employed by exiles in
[882]the Caribbean a
[884]So
[886]COMMENT)
[888]oC)
[890]3 Enclosure
[892]iW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 16
[895]BocId: 32425002 Page 17
[897]Sereciill
[899]"E. Actions Against Targets in the Us
[900]"1. Sabotage or terroristic bonbings"
[902]COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions ec atemplated
[903]within the context of the paper is not considered
[904]to exceed the capabllities of law enforcement
[905]agencies to control, There are military contingency
[906]plans to protect against this type of activity
[907]at a much higher level of intensity. —
[909]"2. Jamming of US tadio stations"
[910]COMMENT There are Standing operating procedures to
[912]overcome interference and Jamming methods
[913]employed against military communications,
[915]2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
[916]Of related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
[917]likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
[918]tent in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
[919]requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
[920]actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
[921]intensity which the committee agreed to be in the rost
[922]likely category." It is inferred that what the cormittes
[923]had in ming by the most likely "level of intensity"
[924]was that level which would not provoke the United States
[925]into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously
[926]endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions,
[927]set forth above, which might be taken under existing
[928]military contingency plans are essentially defensive
[929]reactions to Cuban initiatives, There are, however, existing
[930]and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which
[932]aange up to and include a full seale military invasion of
[934]Enelosure
[937]NW.50955 Docld:32425002 Page 16
[939]than risk direct confrontation with the United States, In
[941]the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult
[943]to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke
[944]“immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such
[945]actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara~
[946]tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration
[948]for the “inevitable” Latin American revolution. Whereas an
[949]inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a
[951]few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the
[953]training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas
[955]than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably
[956]would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees
[957]to Latin American countries, their establishment of @vuerrilla
[958]training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and
[959]engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately
[960]provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo.
[961]Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who
[962]commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange.
[963]While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out
[964]of Guantanamo," or ‘ithe harassment of US aircraft operating in
[965]the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be Added to the list,
[966]it is considered that Specifie provocative actions are less
[967]likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support
[968]to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only
[970]is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support
[971]"national liberation movements of Oppressed peoples" but may
[973]be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military
[974]countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus,
[975]they are considered as of that level of intensity which places
[976]them in the most likely category as well as being in the
[977]category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the
[978]United States.
[980]iat —— 5. Enclosure | [2]
[6]
[9]
[11]
[13]
[15]
[18]
[20]
[22]
[25]
[27]
[30]
[31]ae Date : 09/14/98
[32]
[34]
[37]
[39]
[42]
[45]
[47]
[50]
[52]
[55]
[57]
[59]
[61]
[63]
[65]
[68]
[70]
[73]
[77]
[79]
[80]
[81]wes
[82]
[84]
[86]
[90]
[92]
[94]
[97]
[100]
[102]
[107]
[109]
[111]
[113]
[117]
[120]
[122]
[127]
[130]
[133]
[137]
[141]
[143]
[145]
[149]
[150]
[152]
[156]
[158]
[160]
[162]
[166]
[170]
[171]£
[172]
[175]
[177]
[179]
[181]
[185]
[188]
[190]
[193]
[197]
[198]poo piR $200.10
[199]
[201]
[203]
[205]
[207]
[209]
[210]cosa 21/634
[211]
[212]
[215]
[219]
[221]
[223]Garlbbean'! —
[224]
[226]
[228]
[235]
[237]
[241]
[244]
[248]
[251]
[253]’
[254]
[256]
[259]
[260]
[264]
[267]
[269]
[273]
[275]
[277]
[280]
[283]
[285]eonmmute!
[286]
[295]
[296]ssa
[297]
[299]
[301]
[304]
[308]
[311]
[314]
[316]
[319]
[321]
[323]
[324]
[325]&
[328]
[332]
[334]
[337]
[340]
[342]
[344]
[346]
[353]
[355]
[358]
[363]
[365]
[367]
[369]
[371]
[373]
[379]
[381]
[384]
[387]
[389]
[391]
[392]
[393]ERRFTDENAL ”
[394]
[397]
[400]
[418]
[420]
[434]
[436]
[438]
[441]
[446]
[448]
[451]
[453]
[455]
[457]
[459]
[461]
[462]
[464]
[468]
[470]
[472]
[474]
[477]
[479]
[482]
[484]
[488]
[501]
[504]
[506]ba * ~
[507]
[513]
[515]
[516]
[518]
[523]
[526]
[528]
[534]
[536]
[538]
[540]
[543]
[549]
[553]
[557]
[563]
[567]
[571]
[573]
[575]
[578]ect eect ts nsec to sists cecimasmemnnese
[579]
[580]
[582]
[586]
[590]
[593]
[600]
[602]
[606]__ COMMENT:
[607]
[610]
[613]
[615]
[619]
[621]
[623]
[625]
[627]
[629]
[630]
[632]
[633]wae
[634]
[636]
[638]
[642]
[644]
[648]
[649]aa
[650]
[651]ome
[652]
[654]
[659]
[661]
[664]
[667]
[670]
[674]/
[677]
[679]
[680]
[684]
[687]
[689]
[692]
[700]
[702]
[705]
[707]
[710]
[712]
[714]
[716]
[717]
[719]Garibbean"
[720]
[722]
[724]
[726]
[728]
[734]
[736]
[741]
[743]
[745]
[750]
[752]‘
[753]
[755]
[757]
[761]
[762]
[765]
[772]
[774]
[778]
[780]
[783]
[785]
[786]ee
[787]
[789]
[790]cence
[791]
[792]: enone
[793]
[795]
[798]
[800]
[803]
[805]
[808]
[810]
[812]
[813]
[817]
[819]
[821]
[826]
[829]
[831]
[834]
[838]
[840]
[842]
[843]eee
[844]
[846]
[849]
[852]
[854]
[855]
[859]
[862]
[876]
[878]
[880]
[883]
[885]
[887]
[889]
[891]
[893]
[894]
[896]
[898]
[901]
[908]
[911]
[914]
[931]
[933]
[935]
[936]
[938]
[940]
[942]
[947]
[950]
[952]
[954]
[969]
[972]
[979]
[981]
[982]
[983] |
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