Strictly, it is not the <i>cryptography</i> being broken in this case. The FBI want to guess a (possibly) six-digit pin. The iPhone might have been configured to erase its data on 10 failed PIN attempts, so the current odds are not good. To this end, the FBI want Apple to produce a version of iOS that bypasses this restriction, and install it on the phone.<p>Assuming I agree that a security system that can be turned off remotely by its vendor is reasonably secure, it is only a specific court order <i>now</i>. If Apple are successfully compelled to produce a version of iOS that bypasses PIN security, it will be much easier for the FBI to request that it be deployed on phones in the future - after all, that version of iOS will already exist then.<p>If Apple do make it, I am certain there will quickly be a slew of court orders regarding other iDevices that the authorities have in their possession, all of which are likely to be harder to defeat than the court order they would just have failed to defeat.<p>However, I don&#x27;t agree that a security system that can be turned off remotely by its vendor is reasonably secure, anyway. There is nothing <i>technically</i> requiring Apple to wait for a court order: the phone will accept their new software whether or not it comes with a court order. Apple <i>could</i> decide to make PIN cracking available to anyone who can prove they own a given iPhone. Given their attitude, they probably won&#x27;t, but the <i>actual security mechanism</i> is reliant on their <i>goodwill</i> for it to remain unbroken. I don&#x27;t consider that reasonable.