&gt;Apple will need to hire more staff to handle such requests, come up with a procedure for doing it securely, etc. None of this is without risk, and it is much more risky than not doing it at all.<p>This still seems like a general argument for never complying with warrants. After all, then the government will get more warrants, we&#x27;ll need to hire people to comply with the warrants, and that&#x27;s a security risk!<p>Every large company has people employed solely to respond to requests from law enforcement.<p>&gt;We do not want to internationally set a precedent that it is okay to install backdoors on phones or computers.<p>Then pass a law that bans backdoors like the one Apple has on all its devices, if you think backdoors are not ok. As is, Apple has a backdoor, and the FBI is effectively asking for the key.<p>&gt;There are bad actors, foreign entities, who would love a copy of the software that the DOJ is asking Apple to produce. They will try their hardest to get their hands on it.<p>Remember, the only piece that&#x27;s difficult to get is Apple&#x27;s key. Once you have that, the software is easy to create. That&#x27;s something that <i>already</i> exists, and making the software doesn&#x27;t make it any easier for someone to steal the key.