&gt; don&#x27;t have the resources to vet every line in every piece of software they run<p>For the same reason I do not independently vet every line of source code <i>I</i> run, but still reasonably trust my system <i>magnitudes</i> more than anyone could - and I argue, nobody <i>can</i> - trust proprietary systems. And that is because while I personally may not take initiative to inspect my sources, I know many other people will, and that if I were suspicious of anything I <i>could</i> investigate.<p>Bugs like Heartbleed just demonstrated... well, several things:<p>1. Software written in C is often incredibly unsafe and dangerous, even when you think you know what you are doing.
2. Implementing hard problems is not the whole story, because you also need people who comprehend said problems, the sources implementing them, and have reason to do so in the first place.<p>Which I guess relates back to C in many ways.<p>I look forward to Crypto implemented in Rust and other memory &#x2F; concurrency &#x2F; resource safe languages. There is always a surface vector of a mistake being made that can compromise any level of security - if you move the complexity into the programming language the burden falls on your compiler. But in the same way you can only trust auditable in production heavily used sources, nothing is going to be more heavily used and scrutinized, at least by those interested, than languages themselves.