I do not agree with this line of reasoning, and personally find it ridiculous that the court can compel companies to subvert their own novel systems for government use (e.g. require access to suspects&#x27; OnStar), but:<p>This seems, to me, to be similar to CALEA[1] requirements that compel telco companies to implement infrastructure that allows wiretapping.  I do not have firsthand experience, but on the face of it telcos are specifically forbidden under CALEA to implement devices or technology in their infrastructure that could prevent &quot;lawful intercept&quot; from occurring. This particular instance does not seem to have a CALEA justification, but that may be a temporary problem.<p>I think that they are setting themselves up for a win&#x2F;win scenario and may not be concerned with the legal footing being ironclad.  If they win, great.  Otherwise, fighting for and losing this case is the stepping stone to going to congress to get a CALEA analog for US companies making communications devices.<p>[1]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Communications_Assistance_for_...</a>