&gt; Not for the encryption. That&#x27;s done in software. A seized linux laptop with an encrypted partition using a strong key is effectively snoop proof by the definition we&#x27;re using here.<p>You can&#x27;t run the software without hardware, so it has to be trusted.  Don&#x27;t misunderstand me, this is obviously considerably more far fetched than the Apple attacking their own software&#x2F;hardware combo.  However, assuming (a big assumption) that we trust what Apple are telling us at the moment, a seized iphone with a strong password would currently be just as snoop proof.   In fact, this includes the phone that has spawned this conversion.<p>They can be compelled to defeat their own security if you&#x27;re accepting continued updates to your phone.  Under the security architecture I&#x27;ve (loosely) described they can&#x27;t attack it without the user accepting an update.  Of course, you&#x27;re totally correct in practice because you&#x27;re most likely just going to have to trust Apple updates as they come out.