Diverse Double Compiling is a proven solution to the On Trusting Trust problem [0]. So, if a package maintainer signs a package and posts that signature on an https page, I can have a high level of confidence that the software I compile and run on my machine is identical.<p>Here is some advice from Schneier on running secure software against a state-level adversary [1][2]. However, even that is not immune from a black bag job [3].<p>[0] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.dwheeler.com&#x2F;trusting-trust&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.dwheeler.com&#x2F;trusting-trust&#x2F;</a>
[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2013&#x2F;10&#x2F;air_gaps.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2013&#x2F;10&#x2F;air_gaps.html</a>
[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2014&#x2F;04&#x2F;tails.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.schneier.com&#x2F;blog&#x2F;archives&#x2F;2014&#x2F;04&#x2F;tails.html</a>
[3] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Black_bag_operation" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Black_bag_operation</a>