The precedent you reference doesn&#x27;t really apply because, as you say, the FBI isn&#x27;t actually asking for the signing keys.<p>The big difference between what&#x27;s being asked and the signing keys is that Apple already have the signing keys. There is certainly plenty of precedent for a court to ask Apple to produce something they already have, but less precedent for a court to ask Apple to make something that doesn&#x27;t exist yet.<p>In the analogy, the FBI doesn&#x27;t have a warrant to &quot;search the safe&quot;. What is protected by the signing keys is the ability to distribute iOS updates, but the court wants the data on the phone, which is protected by a different key Apple don&#x27;t have.<p>A more correct non-IT analogy is to imagine that the safe has two locks: one pickable, the other unpickable. Apple don&#x27;t have a matching key for either, but knows how to cut a key for the unpickable one. The FBI has asked Apple to set up a key-cutting facility, <i>definitely only for use on this one occasion</i>, so they can make a key for the unpickable lock.