The author is absolutely, totally wrong.<p>The PIN number is entangled with the device&#x27;s 256-bit &quot;UID&quot;, which itself is on-die in the SoC&#x2F;CPU and <i>NOT</i> extractable without either being able to run code on the CPU, or decapping the SoC, reverse engineering its implementation, and extracting the UID, all from the SEM imagery.<p>The PIN number and the UID are fed to key derivation code for strengthening; the result of that process is used to actually perform encryption of the data on the NAND.<p>The weak point here is the PIN number; the FBI would be extremely hard-pressed to brute force the derived AES keys.<p>This is described in the &quot;Tangling&quot; definition on page 59 of the iOS Security Guide: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf</a><p>I flagged the article, as the entire argument is predicated on a factually false premise.