<i>4) The process for accessing the data on a specific device becomes simple - law enforcement needs to be in possession of (A) the device and (B) a court order. Apple will decrypt the key if forced by court order.</i><p>I think, we can assume that up till now, Apple has its private keys protected on some disconnected machine in a HSM, perhaps multiple HSMs, that are only accessible with very restricted access. When there is a gold iOS build, some of the key personal will go through a security procedure to get the build signed.<p>Now suppose that such a procedure is put in place. And you get requests from US courts and Western European courts[1]. Once it&#x27;s there, there will probably be hundreds, perhaps thousands of daily requests. It suddenly becomes undoable to keep the same security procedures. More people need access to the master key to handle all the requests for which there is a court order. Or even worse: there has to be an semi-automated procedure to handle such requests.<p>In any case, any such procedure will weaken the security of iOS devices significantly. Since Apple&#x27;s master key is so extremely valuable, it will be an extremely attractive target for attacks (in the semi-automatic scenario); or it&#x27;s easier to find a corrupt person to leak the keys.<p>Since people store anything from personal photos, access to bank accounts, to business plans on their phones, we should move into the direction of making crypto systems stronger, not intentionally weakening them.<p>[1] Let&#x27;s avoid the slippery slope that this would trigger for not-so-nice regimes for a moment. Although, once such a backdoor is there, it will happen.