&gt; <i>If you want to persist in that assertion, you should easily be able to point to the marketing you are refering to</i><p>This case right here! We&#x27;ve got, by most anybody&#x27;s standards, a legitimate search warrant. There&#x27;s no judicial overreach with regards to scope; process is the only thing they&#x27;re arguing in the legal realm. The FBI could adjust their request for technical documentation on the KDF, create their own hardware, and the forced creation aspect would disappear.<p>The <i>only</i> reason Apple didn&#x27;t quietly unlock the phone was because the FBI publicized the request (against Apple&#x27;s wishes), and Apple wanted to avoid the inevitable press field day undermining their reality distortion field of &quot;privacy&quot;.<p>&gt; <i>LUKS&#x2F;dmcrypt is a small component that cannot provide anywhere near the necessary features to substitute for the iOS security system.</i><p>LOL. And yet a default Debian install would be locked for eternity (barring implementation flaws, which are not under discussion here for either system).<p>You can&#x27;t have it both ways - arguing the properties provided by each system differ, while simultaneously refusing to discuss security models. You&#x27;re attempting to narrow the domain to a single point, so that no objective comparisons can be made.<p>The sheer ridiculousness of this statement leads me to believe I&#x27;m talking to an Apple partisan rather than someone who earnestly analyzes security, so I don&#x27;t see the point of continuing this discussion.