First of all, it sets a precedent that companies can be forced to create software that willfully compromises their security mechanisms. This is very much different from your typical data dump ordered by a judge. It&#x27;s quite likely that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies would use such a precedent in many future cases.<p>Second, it&#x27;s unclear how easy it would be to create firmware that only works on a specific device. What if there&#x27;s a bug, or what if someone finds a way to spoof the device ID that would probably be checked? It could very well end up being a backdoor for all iPhones after all (or, at least, for all iPhones without a Secure Enclave).<p>This EFF article has a couple more points[1].<p>[1]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.eff.org&#x2F;deeplinks&#x2F;2016&#x2F;02&#x2F;technical-perspective-apple-iphone-case" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.eff.org&#x2F;deeplinks&#x2F;2016&#x2F;02&#x2F;technical-perspective-...</a>