From what I understand, the discussion is about an update being installed through the low-level bootloader, while the phone being locked is a function of the higher-level operating system (which probably already has the &quot;no updates will install unless the phone is unlocked&quot; rule).<p>The relevant rule would instead be something like &quot;installing any update through the low-level bootloader always wipes the encryption keys and the data partition&quot;. Normal updates wouldn&#x27;t be through the low-level bootloader, so this rule isn&#x27;t too restrictive.<p>Not that it makes any difference. The attackers in this case don&#x27;t have to install the update in any normal way, be it through the normal operating system or the bootloader; they can instead desolder the NAND chips and write the update directly to them.<p>What I believe the attackers actually need is a signature from Apple. If the bootloader chain checks the operating system&#x27;s signature, it won&#x27;t boot unless it&#x27;s signed by Apple.