Magstripe skimmers are a solved problem here in Europe; we moved on to chip and pin (EMV technology) nearly a decade ago <i>specifically</i> because of this kind of attack (and, in the case of the UK, because of this: <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/21/phantoms_and_rogues/" rel="nofollow">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/21/phantoms_and_rogues/</a> ).<p>There are concerns over the cryptographic integrity of PIN codes in some chip and pin implementations, but it's a much harder target for ATM skimmers, which is why organized criminals have switched to tampering with retail EPOS terminals instead. And the threshold for <i>that</i> is a lot higher, too. (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/3173161/Credit-card-scam-How-it-works.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/3173...</a>)  Overall, the level of card crime in the UK seems to have diminished significantly since the switchover, although the general rule applies: if you build a better safe, you'll attract a better class of safe-cracker.