Semantics. The effect of the incentive rules quoted in the article is that by taking the higher-paying job, the woman will end up with 20% more money while working twice as hard.<p>I see the same thing in Norway: If you are able to hold a great-paying job (equivalent to 200,000 USD a year, for instance, typical for a hard-working oil industry consultant), the marginal tax greatly reduces the value you get from your extra effort. (Typical numbers here are 35% tax on everything up to 50000 USD, increasing to 55% for everything above 130000 USD). Given that you invariably work your ass off in jobs like these, the prospect doesn't seem very tempting. Why work twice as hard when you only get 50% more money? You can't even work hard one year and slack the next, because it doesn't pay.<p>The problem is that you want as many people as possible to do the best work they can do. The effect of tax/incentive rules such as these is that the government is telling people capable of holding high-paying jobs to start slacking. This is bad on many levels.