&gt; So the government can&#x27;t force Toyota to push a firmware update to fix faulty electronic throttles?<p>No, of course they can&#x27;t (or, rather, should not be able to).  Nor can they compel the production of such a firmware update in the first place, let alone pushing it.  For the particular case of vehicles, since the government controls licensing of cars on roads, they can deny or withdraw such licensing entirely on safety grounds, and since the manufacturer doesn&#x27;t want any of that to happen they&#x27;ll produce and push firmware updates instead.  That&#x27;s the government saying something you <i>can&#x27;t</i> do again: you can&#x27;t drive an unsafe vehicle on public roads where you could potentially hurt people, which seems perfectly reasonable.<p>&gt; the compromise is that the government can get at nearly any place that might contain evidence, so long as it has a warrant.<p>Encryption and electronic access controls aren&#x27;t a &quot;place&quot;; the analogy does not hold.  If they serve up a warrant, they can take the locked device, and they can have all the encrypted bits they want.  I would argue that attempting to force decryption or backdoors would represent an <i>expansion</i> of warrant powers, or &quot;moving the goal line&quot;; preventing that simply keeps the goal line in place.