Some of these extra costs could not have been prevented or foreseen. No one could have anticipated China&#x27;s thirst for steel back in 2001, let alone 1995&#x2F;6; or the fact that, prior to the GFC, investment in major&#x2F;mega  public&#x2F;private infrastructure projects worldwide was snowballing due to burgeoning western economies, putting a significant increase on demand for that (relatively cheaper) steel too, as well as the engineering services and human capital to drive it.<p>One thing I see time and again, in projects I&#x27;ve either been involved with directly, or indirectly, is a failure to do any substantive geo-technical assessment in the early planning phases. Not understanding your environmental invariants properly (when they are usually diverse due to the physical scale of these projects) always comes back to bite you later on. It&#x27;s usually (eventually) a critical path item on any schedule since the structural design is so dependent on them.<p><i>&quot;In April 2006, a consortium involving American Bridge and Fluor won the tower contract. It was built in China to save money—a decision that carried its own costs when inspectors later found poor welding and busted bolts at key points that required fixing. Frick says the current $6.5 billion total is a rough estimate, and that it doesn’t include interest or financing costs.&quot;</i><p>A mistake most larger EPCM&#x27;s made in those days. The horror stories regarding the quality of Chinese steel and fabrication back then are very real. It is unthinkable now to let any fabrication of that nature happen there without adequate on-the-floor supervision and oversight.