Normally it wouldn&#x27;t. But as I understand, in FB&#x27;s case the last hop will be served by a fleet of extremely well connected, high-bandwidth edge nodes. And I would be sorely surprised if they didn&#x27;t have peering agreements in practically all internet exchanges.<p>So under the faster onion routing, when accessing FB.onion your roundtrip is total of 6 hops. Hops 3 and 4 will be made to an edge node network, so the &quot;last hop in&quot; and &quot;first hop out&quot; will be, on average, faster. Even if the circuit was reconfigured midway through the session, the fast innermost hop would still exist.[~]<p>It&#x27;s just another timing attack, with passive traffic analysis. I wonder how much one could do with active attacks.<p>~: I have no knowledge how FB has configured their Tor network connectivity, but I do know that the private key is not held on a single termination point. (The traffic volume is too much for a standalone node.) Hence I am making an educated guess that their onion address is advertised from multiple edge systems.