Practically yes. But as cryptosystem security is based on teasing out differences with respect to various oracles, bounding the security of every piece of cryptographic software to the kernel PRNG algorithm gives me the willies. The only saving grace is that the specific algorithm can be changed out with no worries of backwards incompatibility.<p>I agree the current implementation makes this distinction worthless, but it doesn&#x27;t <i>have</i> to be. The biggest hurdle is that true entropy is scarce, and thus must be strictly partitioned between users.<p>A hardware RNG would solve this, but RDRAND not so much. I feel that if consumer hardware <i>is</i> being subverted by TLAs, the RNG would be the most likely avenue of attack. We may even eventually see partitioning of secure systems into deterministic&#x2F;functional and non-deterministic parts, with the non-deterministic tape being saved for auditing.