Yes, if you don&#x27;t care about GERS™ knowing which sites you use, when you add accounts to them, when you chance passwords, and all the other sensitive information that can be extracted from metadata.<p>&gt; <i>would it be possible to mitigate this by HMAC&#x27;ing the encrypted password with, for instance, the site name?</i><p>In that case you duplicate the metadata: You keep one datum in plain text for search purposes, and a second for MAC&#x2F;verification purposes. That&#x27;s a somewhat awkward construction, and you can accidentally create new security holes in your application (by using the MAC&#x27;d metadata at point A and the plain metadata at point B – there&#x27;s a bunch of high-profile CVEs created this way).<p>Alternatively, you can MAC the metadata separately from the password. <i>However</i>, (H)MAC involves a secret key that must not be shared in plain text. So you&#x27;d need encryption anyway to be able to verify the MAC key.<p>In either case you still allow a few attacks: Attackers can delete entries (DoS), attackers can selectively replace entries with older versions (DoS or information leakage if the password still works), and probably a few others.<p>Using the password AEAD to encrypt the <i>whole</i> database, not just passwords, not just individual entries, is not just safer, but also reduces complexity.