Well, maybe? If the purpose re-keying is to recover from a transient compromise, then a single bit isn&#x27;t really sufficient, is it? If the attacker has completely recovered the old seed, they can recover the entire rng stream up to the point where the reseeding happens. The attacker would notice the new output doesn&#x27;t match, and at that point can&#x27;t the attacker simply (brute force) try mixing in a 0 or 1 bit to see which one matches the new output of the rng? Even a few bits wouldn&#x27;t protect against a brute force simulation of the reseeding. It seems like re-seeding a few bits at a time is in fact worse than storing up, say, 128 bits of new entropy then reseeding all 128 bits at the same time. With small incremental reseeding, the attacker can brute force each small reseeding if they can observe the rng outputs.<p>Or is there something I&#x27;m not seeing about how reseeding works?