To follow up: I personally see some extra subtlety here, in that even if a prediction machine did exist, we could <i>still</i> have a meaningful form of free will, because that machine would be governed by Rice&#x27;s theorem (<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Rice&#x27;s_theorem" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Rice&#x27;s_theorem</a>), which says that in general the only way to predict the outcome of a computation is to run the computation. (this is closely related to the halting problem).<p>That is, even if I could capture the relevant aspects of your mind state on a computer, i.e., the no-cloning theorem is not a barrier, it&#x27;s still the case that the only way for me to predict what you will do in two minutes&#x27; time is to actually run your mind inside the computer for two minutes of subjective time. This would constitute a prediction machine in Aaronson&#x27;s sense, assuming the computer could run faster than realtime. But since the computation that occurs is literally following your thought process step by step (Rice&#x27;s theorem says there are no shortcuts), there&#x27;s a real sense in which the decision was not determined until you -- the version inside the computer -- actually made it.<p>Of course this account depends on a functionalist&#x2F;computational theory of mind, which can be quibbled with in all sorts of ways. But it does seem important for the philosophical discussion on free will to at least take into account the things we now know about the nature of computation, the character of physical law, and other scientific&#x2F;mathematical questions, that were not known decades or centuries ago when the philosophical battle lines were being drawn. Yes, scientists can be arrogant and are often just wrong or deeply misinformed on philosophical questions. But that doesn&#x27;t remove the responsibility of philosophers to engage with the frontiers of knowledge on these issues, which means engaging with people like Scott rather than just dismissing them as &quot;confused&quot;. (as if anyone thinking about free will has ever not been confused!)