The Linux kernel is not using the true RNG circuitry included with all modern microprocessors (this is not entirely correct - see &#x2F;u&#x2F;matt_wulfeck&#x27;s comment). As far as I know, this is because the kernel devs fear that the RNG circuit can be backdoored, allowing an unwanted entity to control the output of the random bitstream.<p>This is an issue I&#x27;ve been thinking about quite a bit. Is there a way to somehow sign a circuit design on silicon and allow devs to check the circuit&#x27;s integrity?<p>For example, in the case of a TRNG, the developer can add a &quot;verify&quot; instruction to ensure that the TRNG on the user&#x27;s CPU is not compromised before executing the RAND instruction. Of course, that&#x27;s what the dev does, but the signing itself is much more complex.<p>I&#x27;ve been looking through the literature and I haven&#x27;t found much to go on. I know it&#x27;s likely impossible to do given how many layers there are between silicon and machine code, but I&#x27;d like to at least give it a try.