No, parent&#x27;s understanding is correct. You&#x27;re thinking of a different (and also valid) attack. Both attacks rely on the fact that the chroot system call remaps the chroot&#x27;s parent directory to itself (so you can&#x27;t &quot;cd &#x2F;; cd ..&quot;), but if you are anywhere else, whether inside <i>or outside</i>, no such remapping is performed.<p>Parent&#x27;s attack requires the attacker to have root inside the chroot. It&#x27;s a &quot;double-chroot&quot; attack: you call chroot a second time as root, so a new directory starts getting remapped. Then the old one no longer does, and you can &quot;cd ..&quot; out of it and eventually &quot;chroot .&quot; when you get to the top. The only mitigation is not to give an attacker root inside a chroot.<p>Your attack <i>does not</i> require the attacker to have root. Instead, the process who was setting up the chroot (which does have root) forgets to cd into the chroot, and leaves the working directory outside it. The attacker cannot chroot again, but they can continue to cd anywhere on your filesystem.