That I agree with. That&#x27;s also the government&#x27;s official position per NSA IAD since Orange Book. They said most software was shit, showed it in evaluations, showed how to do better, proved that with evaluations, and the market stayed on shit for profit margins.<p>Anyway, I think we should use their own Common Criteria and INFOSEC statements against them in crypto debates.<p>&quot;Mr. Comey, these NSA documents say a system isn&#x27;t secure until certain rigorous practices are performed from the chips up to the app. This iPhone wasnt designed to that standard due to to backward compatibility and cost concerns. By your own docs, the Fed&#x27;s or NSA at least shoukd be able to shred it along with most COTS systems. So why is FBI contradicting NSA&#x27;s expert testimony?&quot;<p>Lavabit case defense I wrote previously:<p>&quot;Your honor, FBI wants to put a black box in the system that can stealthily compromise all users and even forge evidence.  You asked for an alternative. In our possession is a network tap that is certified for security by NSA-approved labs per NSA-approved standards.  It has a NSA-approved TPM to attest its software hasnt been tampered with. Our administrator of that device has a US security clearance and will testify under oath to its physical integrity. This device can, in audited way, run a specific search on our logs or stored keys to get just the data the court needs. We suggest using it as, per NSA expert testimony, it&#x27;s all they need to get the job done and has no risk of tampering.&quot;<p>What you think, tptacek? Nice way to make the red tape pay off? ;)