A disclaimer: I am not currently a fictionalist, but I find it remarkably interesting to consider.<p>Fictionalists are not making claims about mathematical truth; they are making claims about philosophical truth.  When Colyvan (who I believe is not a fictionalist) describes fictionalism as an error theory of mathematical discourse, he does not mean that mathematicians incorrectly assign the label of mathematical truth to statements that are mathematically false, but rather that it is an error to conflate mathematical truth (&quot;true in the story of mathematics&quot;) with philosophical truth.  In other words, you and the fictionalists are in agreement on your first point.<p>I don&#x27;t quite understand your second point, or its justification.  For example, would you consider the statement &quot;All even primes greater than 2 are divisible by 1001&quot; to be true, false, or meaningless?  I think most people will agree that even primes greater than 2 do not exist.  Fictionalists would assert that this statement is false; with my background in formal logic, I tend to believe that this statement is vacuously true.  I would be interested in seeing an argument for the claim that this statement is meaningless.