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crs_R46330 | crs_R46330_0 | You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
Throughout U.S. history, Congress has created advisory commissions to assist in the development of public policy. Among other contexts, commissions have been used following crisis situations, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. In such situations, advisory commissions may potentially provide Congress with a high-visibility forum to assemble expertise that might not exist within the legislative environment; allow for the in-depth examination of complex, cross-cutting policy issues; and lend bipartisan credibility to a set of findings and recommendations.
As Congress considers its range of responses to the coronavirus pandemic, the creation of one or more congressional advisory commissions is an option that could provide a platform for evaluating various pandemic-related policy issues over time. Past congressional advisory commissions have retrospectively evaluated policy responses, brought together diverse groups of experts, and supplemented existing congressional oversight mechanisms. Policymakers may determine that creating an advisory commission is unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize existing congressional oversight structures, such as standing or select committees, or already established oversight entities.
This report provides a comparative analysis of five proposed congressional advisory commissions that would investigate various aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The five proposed commissions are found in H.R. 6429 (the National Commission on COVID-19 Act, sponsored by Representative Stephanie Murphy), H.R. 6431 (the Made in America Emergency Preparedness Act, sponsored by Representative Brian Fitzpatrick), H.R. 6440 (the Pandemic Rapid Response Act, sponsored by Representative Rodney Davis), H.R. 6455 (the COVID-19 Commission Act, sponsored by Representative Bennie Thompson), and H.R. 6548 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States Act, sponsored by Representative Adam Schiff). The overall structures of each of the proposed commissions are similar in many respects, both to each other and to previous independent advisory entities established by Congress. Specifically, the proposed commissions would (1) exist temporarily; (2) serve in an advisory capacity; and (3) report a work product detailing the commission's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. That said, each particular proposed commission has distinctive elements, particularly concerning its membership structure, appointment structure, and time line for reporting its work product to Congress.
This report compares the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of procedure and operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) powers of the commission, (6) staffing issues, and (7) funding for each of the proposed COVID-19 commissions. Table 1 (at the end of this report) provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the five proposals.
Membership Structure
Several matters related to a commission's membership structure might be considered. They include the size of a commission, member qualifications, compensation of commission members, and requirements for partisan balance.
Size of Commission
In general, there is significant variation in the size of congressional advisory commissions. Among 155 identified congressional commissions created between the 101 st Congress and the 115 th Congress, the median size was 12 members, with the smallest commission having 5 members and the largest 33 members.
The membership structure of each of the five proposed commissions is similar to previous independent advisory entities created by Congress. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would each create a 10-member entity. H.R. 6455 would create a 25-member entity.
Qualifications
Past legislation creating congressional commissions has often required or suggested that commission members possess certain substantive qualifications. Such provisions arguably make it more likely that the commission is populated with genuine experts in the policy area, which may improve the commission's final work product.
H.R. 6455 would provide that commissioners "shall be a United States person with significant expertise" in a variety of fields related to public health and public administration. H.R. 6440 , H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide "the sense of Congress" that commission members should be "prominent U.S. citizens" who are nationally recognized experts in a variety of fields relevant to the pandemic and response efforts. In addition, H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 all prohibit the appointment of federal, state, and local government employees and officers. H.R. 6455 would prohibit federal employees from being commission members.
Compensation of Commission Members
Some congressional commissions have compensated their members. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission provided that commission members could be compensated at a daily rate of basic pay. Nearly all have reimbursed members for travel expenses. Those that have provided for commissioner compensation most frequently provided compensation at the daily equivalent of level IV of the Executive Schedule.
Each of the five proposals would provide that commission members be compensated at a rate "not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay" for level IV of the Executive Schedule, "for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of the Commission." Members of three proposed commissions would receive travel expenses, including a per diem.
Partisan Limitations
Each proposal provides a limit on the number of members appointed from the same political party. H.R. 6455 would provide that not more than 13 of its 25 members may be from the same party. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that not more than 5 (of 10) members are from the same party. Most previous advisory entities created by Congress do not impose formal partisan restrictions on the membership structure. It may also be difficult to assess the political affiliation of potential members, who may have no formal affiliation (voter registration, for example) with a political party. Instead, most past advisory commissions usually achieve partisan balance through the appointment structure; for instance, by providing equal (or near-equal) numbers of appointments to congressional leaders of each party.
Appointment Structure
Past congressional commissions have used a wide variety of appointment structures. Considerations regarding appointment structures include partisan balance, filling vacancies, and the time line for making commission appointments.
The statutory scheme may directly designate members of the commission, such as a specific cabinet official or a congressional leader. In other cases, selected congressional leaders, often with balance between the parties, appoint commission members. A third common statutory scheme is to have selected leaders, such as committee chairs and ranking members, recommend candidates for appointment to a commission. These selected leaders may act either in parallel or jointly, and the recommendation may be made either to other congressional leaders, such as the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, or to the President.
Each of the five commission proposals would delegate most or all appointment authority to congressional leaders (including chamber, party, and committee leaders; see Table 1 for details). Additionally, H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 provide for one appointment to be made by the President. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would have the President appoint the commission's chair. H.R. 6455 has its membership appointed by the chairs and ranking members of designated House and Senate committees, and the Joint Economic Committee. H.R. 6455 does not provide any executive branch appointments.
Attention to the proper balance between the number of members appointed by congressional leaders and by other individuals (such as the President), or to the number of Members of Congress required to be among the appointees, or to the qualifications of appointees, can be significant factors in enabling a commission to fulfill its congressional mandate.
In general, a commission's appointment scheme can impact both the commission's ability to fulfill its statutory duties and its final work product. For instance, if the scheme provides only for the appointment of Members of Congress to the commission, it arguably might not have the technical expertise or diversity of knowledge to complete its duties within the time given by statute. Similarly, if the appointment scheme includes qualifying provisos so specific that only a small set of private citizens could serve on the panel, the commission's final work product may arguably only represent a narrow range of viewpoints. None of the proposed COVID-19 commissions specify whether Members of Congress may serve on the commission.
Partisan Balance in Appointment Authority
Most previous congressional advisory commissions have been structured to be bipartisan, with an even (or near-even) split of appointments between leaders of the two major parties. By achieving a nonpartisan or bipartisan character, congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically acceptable to diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can give recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when dealing with divisive public policy issues. Similarly, commission recommendations that are perceived as partisan may have difficulty gaining support in Congress.
In some cases, however, bipartisanship also can arguably impede a commission's ability to complete its mandate. In situations where a commission is tasked with studying divisive or partisan issues, the appointment of an equal number of majority and minority commissioners may serve to promote partisanship within the commission rather than suppress it, raising the possibility of deadlock where neither side can muster a majority to act.
Each of the five proposals employs a structure where leaders in both the majority and minority parties in Congress would make appointments. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide for five majority and five minority appointments, including one for the President. H.R. 6440 would include two each by the Senate majority leader, the Senate minority leader, and the Speaker of the House, with one appointment by the House minority leader and one by the President, and the chair appointed by the Speaker and vice chair appointed by the Senate majority leader. H.R. 6455 would have 12 majority and 12 minority appointments made by the 12 committee chairs and ranking members and one member jointly appointed by the chair and vice chair of the Joint Economic Committee.
Vacancies
All five proposals provide that vacancies on the commission will not affect its powers and would be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
Deadline for Appointments
Three of the bills propose specific deadlines for the appointment of commissioners. H.R. 6429 and H.R. 6548 provide that appointments are made between specific dates in January or February 2021. Further, H.R. 6429 provides that commission members could be appointed in September 2020, if there is no longer a COVID-19 public health emergency in effectâas determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Servicesâas of August 31, 2020. H.R. 6440 would require all appointments be made by December 15, 2020. H.R. 6455 would require appointments to be made within 45 days after enactment. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would start the commission's work in early 2021, as the commission cannot operate without the appointment of members. H.R. 6429 , however would provide that the proposed commission's work would begin no later than October 31, 2020, if members are appointed in September 2020. H.R. 6431 does not specify a deadline for the appointment of members.
Typically, deadlines for appointment can range from several weeks to several months. For example, the deadline for appointments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission was 60 days after the enactment of its establishing act. The deadline for appointment to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was 120 days from the date of enactment. The deadline for appointment to the 9/11 Commission was December 15, 2002, 18 days after enactment of the act.
Rules of Procedure and Operations
While most statutes that authorize congressional advisory commissions do not provide detailed procedures for how the commission should conduct its business, the statutory language may provide a general structure, including a mechanism for selecting a chair and procedures for creating rules. None of the five COVID-19 commission proposals contain language that directs the process for potentially adopting rules of procedure. For a comparison of each proposed commission's specified rules of procedures and operations, see Table 1 .
Chair Selection
Each bill provides for the selection of a chair and/or vice chair of the commission. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would have the chair appointed by the President and the vice chair appointed by congressional leaders of the political party opposite the President. H.R. 6440 would have the chair appointed by the Speaker of the House (in consultation with the Senate majority leader and the House minority leader) and the vice chair appointed by the Senate majority leader (in consultation with the Speaker of the House and the Senate minority leader). H.R. 6455 would have the chair and vice chair chosen from among commission members by a majority vote of the commission, and would require the chair and vice chair to have "significant experience" in areas to be studied by the commission.
Initial Meeting Deadline
As with the timing of commission appointments, some authorizing statutes are prescriptive in when the commission's first meeting should take place. Three of the bills analyzed here provide specific time lines for the commission's first meeting. H.R. 6429 would require the first meeting to be no later than March 15, 2021, unless members are appointed in September 2020 (if no public health emergency exists). H.R. 6455 would require the first meeting within 45 days after the appointment of all commission members, which isâgiven the 45-day deadline for appointmentâeffectively a maximum of 90 days after enactment. H.R. 6548 would direct the commission to hold its initial meeting "as soon as practicable," but not later than March 5, 2021. H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 do not provide for an initial meeting deadline. Instead, they direct the commission to meet "as soon as practicable."
Quorum
Most commission statutes provide that a quorum will consist of a particular number of commissioners, usually a majority, but occasionally a supermajority. All five bills would provide for a quorum requirement. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would define a quorum as 6 (of 10) members. H.R. 6455 would provide that a quorum is 18 of 25 members (72%).
Public Access
All five commission bills would require commission meetings to be open to the public. Each bill would also require that reports be made publicly available.
Formulating Other Rules of Procedure and Operations
Absent statutory guidance (eithe r in general statutes or in individual statutes authorizing commissions), advisory entities vary widely in how they adopt their rules of procedure. In general, three models exist: formal written rules, informal rules, and the reliance on norms. Any individual advisory entity might make use of all three of these models for different types of decisionmaking.
The choice to adopt written rules or rely on informal norms to guide commission procedure may be based on a variety of factors, such as the entity's size, the frequency of meetings, member preferences regarding formality, the level of collegiality among members, and the amount of procedural guidance provided by the entity's authorizing statute. Regardless of how procedural issues are handled, protocol for decisionmaking regarding the following operational issues may be important for the commission to consider at the outset of its existence: eligibility to vote and proxy rules; staff hiring, compensation, and work assignments; hearings, meetings, and field visits; nonstaff expenditures and contracting; reports to Congress; budgeting; and procedures for future modification of rules. None of the five COVID-19 commission proposals specify that the proposed commission must adopt written rules.
FACA Applicability
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) mandates certain structural and operational requirements, including formal reporting and oversight procedures, for certain federal advisory bodies that advise the executive branch. Three proposals ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 ) specifically exempt the proposed commission from FACA. Of the remaining two, FACA would also likely not apply to the commission proposed in H.R. 6455 because it would be appointed entirely by Members of Congress, although it only specifies that its final report is public, not whether it is specifically sent to Congress and/or the President. It is not clear that FACA would apply to the commission proposed in H.R. 6440 . Although it includes a presidential appointment and its report would be sent to both Congress and the President, its establishment clause specifies that the commission "is established in the legislative branch," and a super-majority of its members would be appointed by Congress.
Duties and Reporting Requirements
Most congressional commissions are generally considered policy commissionsâtemporary bodies that study particular policy problems and report their findings to Congress or review a specific event.
General Duties
All five of the proposed commissions would be tasked with duties that are analogous to those of past policy commissions. While the specific mandates differ somewhat, all proposed commissions are tasked with investigating aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic and submitting one or more reports that include the commission's findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislative action. H.R. 6440 would specifically require the commission to avoid unnecessary duplication of work being conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), congressional committees, and executive branch agency and independent commission investigations.
Reports
Each proposed commission would be tasked with issuing a final report detailing its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that the commission "may submit" interim reports to Congress and the President, but do not provide time lines on when those reports might be submitted. In each case, the interim report would need to be agreed to by a majority of commission members. H.R. 6431 would also require the commission to submit a report on actions taken by the states and a report on essential products, materials, ingredients, and equipment required to fight pandemics.
H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 also specify that final reports shall be agreed to by a majority of commission members. H.R. 6455 does not specify a vote threshold for approval of its report.
None of the bills make specific provisions for the inclusion of minority viewpoints. Presumably this would leave each commission with discretion on whether to include or exclude minority viewpoints. Past advisory entities have been proposed or established with a variety of statutory reporting conditions, including the specification of majority or super-majority rules for report adoption and provisions requiring the inclusion of minority viewpoints. In practice, advisory bodies that are not given statutory direction on these matters have tended to work under simple-majority rules for report adoption.
Report Deadlines
H.R. 6429 would require a final report one year after the commission's initial meeting. H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 would require a final report not later than 18 months after enactment. H.R. 6455 would require a final report to be published not later than 18 months after the commission's first meeting.
H.R. 6548 would require a final report by October 15, 2021. This deadline could be extended by 90 days upon a vote of no fewer than 8 (out of 10) commission members. The commission could vote to extend its final report deadline up to three times, and would be required to notify Congress, the President, and the public of any such extension.
While such a deadline would potentially give the commission a defined period of time to complete its work, setting a particular date for report completion could potentially create unintended time constraints. Any delay in the passage of the legislation or in the appointment process would reduce the amount of time the commission has to complete its work, even with the opportunity for the commission to extend its own deadline up to three times.
The length of time a congressional commission has to complete its work is arguably one of the most consequential decisions when designing an advisory entity. If the entity has a short window of time, the quality of its work product may suffer or it may not be able to fulfill its statutory mandate on time.
On the other hand, if the commission is given a long period of time to complete its work, it may undermine one of a commission's primary legislative advantages, the timely production of expert advice on a current matter. A short deadline may also affect the process of standing up a new commission. The selection of commissioners, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and other logistical matters may require expedited action if short deadlines need to be met.
Report Submission
Of the five proposed commissions, four ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 ) are directed to submit their reports to both Congress and the President. H.R. 6455 requires that the report is made public.
Most congressional advisory commissions are required to submit their reports to Congress, and sometimes to the President or an executive department or agency head. For example, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing's final report was submitted to both Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Commission Termination
Congressional commissions are usually statutorily mandated to terminate. Termination dates for most commissions are linked to either a fixed period of time after the establishment of the commission, the selection of members, or the date of submission of the commission's final report. Alternatively, some commissions are given fixed calendar termination dates.
All five commission proposals would provide for the commission to terminate within a certain period of time following submission of its final report. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6455 would each direct the commission to terminate 60 days after the submission; H.R. 6548 specifies a time line of 90 days after submission.
Commission Powers
Each of the five proposals would provide the proposed commission with certain powers to carry out its mission (see Table 1 for specifics). One general issue for commissions is who is authorized to execute such powers. In some cases, the commission itself executes its powers, with the commission deciding whether to devise rules and procedures for the general use of such power. In other cases, the legislation specifically authorizes the commission to give discretionary power to subcommittees or individual commission members. Finally, the legislation itself might grant certain powers to individual members of the commission, such as the chair.
Hearings and Evidence
All five bills would provide the proposed commission with the power to hold hearings, take testimony, and receive evidence. All five commissions would also be provided the power to administer oaths to witnesses.
Subpoenas
Four of the bills would provide the commission with subpoena power. H.R. 6440 would not provide subpoena power to the commission. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that subpoenas could only be issued by either (1) agreement of the chair and vice chair, or (2) the affirmative vote of 6 (of 10) commission members. H.R. 6455 would require that a subpoena could only be issued by either agreement of the chair and vice chair or an affirmative vote of 18 (of 25) commission members. All four bills that would provide subpoena power contain substantially similar judicial methods of subpoena enforcement.
Administrative Support
All five of the bills would provide that the commission receive administrative support from the General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA provides administrative support to dozens of federal entities, including congressional advisory commissions. Each of the five bills would provide that GSA be reimbursed for its services by the commission. Each bill also provides that other departments or agencies may provide funds, facilities, staff, and other services to the commission.
Other Powers
Without explicit language authorizing certain activities, commissions often cannot gather information, enter into contracts, use the U.S. mail like an executive branch entity, or accept donations or gifts.
All five bills direct that federal agencies provide information to the commission upon request. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would also provide that the commission could use the U.S. mails in the same manner as any department or agency, enter into contracts, and accept gifts or donations of services or property.
Staffing
The proposed COVID-19 commissions contain staffing provisions commonly found in congressional advisory commission legislation. Congressional advisory commissions are usually authorized to hire staff. Most statutes specify that the commission may hire a lead staffer, often referred to as a "staff director," "executive director," or another similar title, in addition to additional staff as needed. Rather than mandate a specific staff size, many commissions are instead authorized to appoint a staff director and other personnel as necessary, subject to the limitations of available funds.
Most congressional commissions are also authorized to hire consultants, procure intermittent services, and request that federal agencies detail personnel to aid the work of the commission.
Director and Commission Staff
Four of the bills provide that the commission may hire staff without regard to certain laws regarding the competitive service; H.R. 6440 does not specifically exempt the commission from such laws. Four bills ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6455 , and H.R. 6548 ) would authorize, but not require, the commission to hire a staff director and additional staff, as appropriate. Four proposals would limit staff salaries to level V of the executive schedule. Three of the bills would specifically designate staff as federal employees for the purposes of certain laws, such as workman's compensation, retirement, and other benefits.
Detailees
When authorized, some commissions can have federal agency staff detailed to the commission. All five bills would provide that federal employees could be detailed to the commission. Four bills would provide that the detailee would be without reimbursement to his or her home agency. H.R. 6440 would allow detailees on a reimbursable basis.
Experts and Consultants
All five bills would provide the commission with the authority to hire experts and consultants. Four of the bills limit the rate of pay for consultants to level IV of the Executive Schedule. H.R. 6440 does not specify a specific limit.
Security Clearances
Four bills would provide that federal agencies and departments shall cooperate with the commission to provide members and staff appropriate security clearances. H.R. 6440 does not contain a security clearance provision.
Funding and Costs
Commissions generally require funding to help meet their statutory goals. When designing a commission, therefore, policymakers may consider both how the commission will be funded, and how much funding the commission will be authorized to receive. Four of the five proposals specify a funding mechanism for the commission.
How commissions are funded and the amounts that they receive vary considerably. Several factors can contribute to overall commission costs. These factors might include the cost of hiring staff, contracting with outside consultants, and engaging administrative support, among others. Additionally, most commissions reimburse the travel expenditures of commissioners and staff, and some compensate their members. The duration of a commission can also significantly affect its cost; past congressional commissions have been designed to last anywhere from several months to several years.
Costs
It is difficult to estimate or predict the potential overall cost of any commission. Annual budgets for congressional advisory entities range from several hundred thousand dollars to millions of dollars annually. Overall expenses for any individual advisory entity depend on a variety of factors, the most important of which are the number of paid staff and the commission's duration and scope. Some commissions have few full-time staff; others employ large numbers, such as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which had a full-time paid staff of nearly 80. Secondary factors that can affect commission costs include the number of commissioners, how often the commission meets or holds hearings, whether or not the commission travels or holds field hearings, and the publications the commission produces.
Authorized Funding
Three of the bills ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 ) would authorize the appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary" for the commission, to be derived in equal amounts from the contingent fund of the Senate and the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives. H.R. 6429 and H.R. 6548 would provide that funds are available until the commission terminates. H.R. 6455 would authorize the appropriation of $4 million for the commission, to remain available until the commission terminates. H.R. 6431 does not include an authorization of appropriations.
Comparison of Proposals to Create a COVID-19 Commission
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the five proposals. For each bill, the membership structure, appointment structure, rules of procedure and operation, duties and reporting requirements, proposed commission powers, staffing provisions, and funding are compared.
Summary:
| null | 96 | 31,300 | 31,302 | 31,302 | ... [The rest of the report is omitted]
| You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
Throughout U.S. history, Congress has created advisory commissions to assist in the development of public policy. Among other contexts, commissions have been used following crisis situations, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. In such situations, advisory commissions may potentially provide Congress with a high-visibility forum to assemble expertise that might not exist within the legislative environment; allow for the in-depth examination of complex, cross-cutting policy issues; and lend bipartisan credibility to a set of findings and recommendations.
As Congress considers its range of responses to the coronavirus pandemic, the creation of one or more congressional advisory commissions is an option that could provide a platform for evaluating various pandemic-related policy issues over time. Past congressional advisory commissions have retrospectively evaluated policy responses, brought together diverse groups of experts, and supplemented existing congressional oversight mechanisms. Policymakers may determine that creating an advisory commission is unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize existing congressional oversight structures, such as standing or select committees, or already established oversight entities.
This report provides a comparative analysis of five proposed congressional advisory commissions that would investigate various aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The five proposed commissions are found in H.R. 6429 (the National Commission on COVID-19 Act, sponsored by Representative Stephanie Murphy), H.R. 6431 (the Made in America Emergency Preparedness Act, sponsored by Representative Brian Fitzpatrick), H.R. 6440 (the Pandemic Rapid Response Act, sponsored by Representative Rodney Davis), H.R. 6455 (the COVID-19 Commission Act, sponsored by Representative Bennie Thompson), and H.R. 6548 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States Act, sponsored by Representative Adam Schiff). The overall structures of each of the proposed commissions are similar in many respects, both to each other and to previous independent advisory entities established by Congress. Specifically, the proposed commissions would (1) exist temporarily; (2) serve in an advisory capacity; and (3) report a work product detailing the commission's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. That said, each particular proposed commission has distinctive elements, particularly concerning its membership structure, appointment structure, and time line for reporting its work product to Congress.
This report compares the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of procedure and operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) powers of the commission, (6) staffing issues, and (7) funding for each of the proposed COVID-19 commissions. Table 1 (at the end of this report) provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the five proposals.
Membership Structure
Several matters related to a commission's membership structure might be considered. They include the size of a commission, member qualifications, compensation of commission members, and requirements for partisan balance.
Size of Commission
In general, there is significant variation in the size of congressional advisory commissions. Among 155 identified congressional commissions created between the 101 st Congress and the 115 th Congress, the median size was 12 members, with the smallest commission having 5 members and the largest 33 members.
The membership structure of each of the five proposed commissions is similar to previous independent advisory entities created by Congress. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would each create a 10-member entity. H.R. 6455 would create a 25-member entity.
Qualifications
Past legislation creating congressional commissions has often required or suggested that commission members possess certain substantive qualifications. Such provisions arguably make it more likely that the commission is populated with genuine experts in the policy area, which may improve the commission's final work product.
H.R. 6455 would provide that commissioners "shall be a United States person with significant expertise" in a variety of fields related to public health and public administration. H.R. 6440 , H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide "the sense of Congress" that commission members should be "prominent U.S. citizens" who are nationally recognized experts in a variety of fields relevant to the pandemic and response efforts. In addition, H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 all prohibit the appointment of federal, state, and local government employees and officers. H.R. 6455 would prohibit federal employees from being commission members.
Compensation of Commission Members
Some congressional commissions have compensated their members. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission provided that commission members could be compensated at a daily rate of basic pay. Nearly all have reimbursed members for travel expenses. Those that have provided for commissioner compensation most frequently provided compensation at the daily equivalent of level IV of the Executive Schedule.
Each of the five proposals would provide that commission members be compensated at a rate "not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay" for level IV of the Executive Schedule, "for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of the Commission." Members of three proposed commissions would receive travel expenses, including a per diem.
Partisan Limitations
Each proposal provides a limit on the number of members appointed from the same political party. H.R. 6455 would provide that not more than 13 of its 25 members may be from the same party. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that not more than 5 (of 10) members are from the same party. Most previous advisory entities created by Congress do not impose formal partisan restrictions on the membership structure. It may also be difficult to assess the political affiliation of potential members, who may have no formal affiliation (voter registration, for example) with a political party. Instead, most past advisory commissions usually achieve partisan balance through the appointment structure; for instance, by providing equal (or near-equal) numbers of appointments to congressional leaders of each party.
Appointment Structure
Past congressional commissions have used a wide variety of appointment structures. Considerations regarding appointment structures include partisan balance, filling vacancies, and the time line for making commission appointments.
The statutory scheme may directly designate members of the commission, such as a specific cabinet official or a congressional leader. In other cases, selected congressional leaders, often with balance between the parties, appoint commission members. A third common statutory scheme is to have selected leaders, such as committee chairs and ranking members, recommend candidates for appointment to a commission. These selected leaders may act either in parallel or jointly, and the recommendation may be made either to other congressional leaders, such as the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, or to the President.
Each of the five commission proposals would delegate most or all appointment authority to congressional leaders (including chamber, party, and committee leaders; see Table 1 for details). Additionally, H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 provide for one appointment to be made by the President. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would have the President appoint the commission's chair. H.R. 6455 has its membership appointed by the chairs and ranking members of designated House and Senate committees, and the Joint Economic Committee. H.R. 6455 does not provide any executive branch appointments.
Attention to the proper balance between the number of members appointed by congressional leaders and by other individuals (such as the President), or to the number of Members of Congress required to be among the appointees, or to the qualifications of appointees, can be significant factors in enabling a commission to fulfill its congressional mandate.
In general, a commission's appointment scheme can impact both the commission's ability to fulfill its statutory duties and its final work product. For instance, if the scheme provides only for the appointment of Members of Congress to the commission, it arguably might not have the technical expertise or diversity of knowledge to complete its duties within the time given by statute. Similarly, if the appointment scheme includes qualifying provisos so specific that only a small set of private citizens could serve on the panel, the commission's final work product may arguably only represent a narrow range of viewpoints. None of the proposed COVID-19 commissions specify whether Members of Congress may serve on the commission.
Partisan Balance in Appointment Authority
Most previous congressional advisory commissions have been structured to be bipartisan, with an even (or near-even) split of appointments between leaders of the two major parties. By achieving a nonpartisan or bipartisan character, congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically acceptable to diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can give recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when dealing with divisive public policy issues. Similarly, commission recommendations that are perceived as partisan may have difficulty gaining support in Congress.
In some cases, however, bipartisanship also can arguably impede a commission's ability to complete its mandate. In situations where a commission is tasked with studying divisive or partisan issues, the appointment of an equal number of majority and minority commissioners may serve to promote partisanship within the commission rather than suppress it, raising the possibility of deadlock where neither side can muster a majority to act.
Each of the five proposals employs a structure where leaders in both the majority and minority parties in Congress would make appointments. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide for five majority and five minority appointments, including one for the President. H.R. 6440 would include two each by the Senate majority leader, the Senate minority leader, and the Speaker of the House, with one appointment by the House minority leader and one by the President, and the chair appointed by the Speaker and vice chair appointed by the Senate majority leader. H.R. 6455 would have 12 majority and 12 minority appointments made by the 12 committee chairs and ranking members and one member jointly appointed by the chair and vice chair of the Joint Economic Committee.
Vacancies
All five proposals provide that vacancies on the commission will not affect its powers and would be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
Deadline for Appointments
Three of the bills propose specific deadlines for the appointment of commissioners. H.R. 6429 and H.R. 6548 provide that appointments are made between specific dates in January or February 2021. Further, H.R. 6429 provides that commission members could be appointed in September 2020, if there is no longer a COVID-19 public health emergency in effectâas determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Servicesâas of August 31, 2020. H.R. 6440 would require all appointments be made by December 15, 2020. H.R. 6455 would require appointments to be made within 45 days after enactment. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would start the commission's work in early 2021, as the commission cannot operate without the appointment of members. H.R. 6429 , however would provide that the proposed commission's work would begin no later than October 31, 2020, if members are appointed in September 2020. H.R. 6431 does not specify a deadline for the appointment of members.
Typically, deadlines for appointment can range from several weeks to several months. For example, the deadline for appointments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission was 60 days after the enactment of its establishing act. The deadline for appointment to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was 120 days from the date of enactment. The deadline for appointment to the 9/11 Commission was December 15, 2002, 18 days after enactment of the act.
Rules of Procedure and Operations
While most statutes that authorize congressional advisory commissions do not provide detailed procedures for how the commission should conduct its business, the statutory language may provide a general structure, including a mechanism for selecting a chair and procedures for creating rules. None of the five COVID-19 commission proposals contain language that directs the process for potentially adopting rules of procedure. For a comparison of each proposed commission's specified rules of procedures and operations, see Table 1 .
Chair Selection
Each bill provides for the selection of a chair and/or vice chair of the commission. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would have the chair appointed by the President and the vice chair appointed by congressional leaders of the political party opposite the President. H.R. 6440 would have the chair appointed by the Speaker of the House (in consultation with the Senate majority leader and the House minority leader) and the vice chair appointed by the Senate majority leader (in consultation with the Speaker of the House and the Senate minority leader). H.R. 6455 would have the chair and vice chair chosen from among commission members by a majority vote of the commission, and would require the chair and vice chair to have "significant experience" in areas to be studied by the commission.
Initial Meeting Deadline
As with the timing of commission appointments, some authorizing statutes are prescriptive in when the commission's first meeting should take place. Three of the bills analyzed here provide specific time lines for the commission's first meeting. H.R. 6429 would require the first meeting to be no later than March 15, 2021, unless members are appointed in September 2020 (if no public health emergency exists). H.R. 6455 would require the first meeting within 45 days after the appointment of all commission members, which isâgiven the 45-day deadline for appointmentâeffectively a maximum of 90 days after enactment. H.R. 6548 would direct the commission to hold its initial meeting "as soon as practicable," but not later than March 5, 2021. H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 do not provide for an initial meeting deadline. Instead, they direct the commission to meet "as soon as practicable."
Quorum
Most commission statutes provide that a quorum will consist of a particular number of commissioners, usually a majority, but occasionally a supermajority. All five bills would provide for a quorum requirement. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would define a quorum as 6 (of 10) members. H.R. 6455 would provide that a quorum is 18 of 25 members (72%).
Public Access
All five commission bills would require commission meetings to be open to the public. Each bill would also require that reports be made publicly available.
Formulating Other Rules of Procedure and Operations
Absent statutory guidance (eithe r in general statutes or in individual statutes authorizing commissions), advisory entities vary widely in how they adopt their rules of procedure. In general, three models exist: formal written rules, informal rules, and the reliance on norms. Any individual advisory entity might make use of all three of these models for different types of decisionmaking.
The choice to adopt written rules or rely on informal norms to guide commission procedure may be based on a variety of factors, such as the entity's size, the frequency of meetings, member preferences regarding formality, the level of collegiality among members, and the amount of procedural guidance provided by the entity's authorizing statute. Regardless of how procedural issues are handled, protocol for decisionmaking regarding the following operational issues may be important for the commission to consider at the outset of its existence: eligibility to vote and proxy rules; staff hiring, compensation, and work assignments; hearings, meetings, and field visits; nonstaff expenditures and contracting; reports to Congress; budgeting; and procedures for future modification of rules. None of the five COVID-19 commission proposals specify that the proposed commission must adopt written rules.
FACA Applicability
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) mandates certain structural and operational requirements, including formal reporting and oversight procedures, for certain federal advisory bodies that advise the executive branch. Three proposals ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 ) specifically exempt the proposed commission from FACA. Of the remaining two, FACA would also likely not apply to the commission proposed in H.R. 6455 because it would be appointed entirely by Members of Congress, although it only specifies that its final report is public, not whether it is specifically sent to Congress and/or the President. It is not clear that FACA would apply to the commission proposed in H.R. 6440 . Although it includes a presidential appointment and its report would be sent to both Congress and the President, its establishment clause specifies that the commission "is established in the legislative branch," and a super-majority of its members would be appointed by Congress.
Duties and Reporting Requirements
Most congressional commissions are generally considered policy commissionsâtemporary bodies that study particular policy problems and report their findings to Congress or review a specific event.
General Duties
All five of the proposed commissions would be tasked with duties that are analogous to those of past policy commissions. While the specific mandates differ somewhat, all proposed commissions are tasked with investigating aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic and submitting one or more reports that include the commission's findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislative action. H.R. 6440 would specifically require the commission to avoid unnecessary duplication of work being conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), congressional committees, and executive branch agency and independent commission investigations.
Reports
Each proposed commission would be tasked with issuing a final report detailing its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that the commission "may submit" interim reports to Congress and the President, but do not provide time lines on when those reports might be submitted. In each case, the interim report would need to be agreed to by a majority of commission members. H.R. 6431 would also require the commission to submit a report on actions taken by the states and a report on essential products, materials, ingredients, and equipment required to fight pandemics.
H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 also specify that final reports shall be agreed to by a majority of commission members. H.R. 6455 does not specify a vote threshold for approval of its report.
None of the bills make specific provisions for the inclusion of minority viewpoints. Presumably this would leave each commission with discretion on whether to include or exclude minority viewpoints. Past advisory entities have been proposed or established with a variety of statutory reporting conditions, including the specification of majority or super-majority rules for report adoption and provisions requiring the inclusion of minority viewpoints. In practice, advisory bodies that are not given statutory direction on these matters have tended to work under simple-majority rules for report adoption.
Report Deadlines
H.R. 6429 would require a final report one year after the commission's initial meeting. H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 would require a final report not later than 18 months after enactment. H.R. 6455 would require a final report to be published not later than 18 months after the commission's first meeting.
H.R. 6548 would require a final report by October 15, 2021. This deadline could be extended by 90 days upon a vote of no fewer than 8 (out of 10) commission members. The commission could vote to extend its final report deadline up to three times, and would be required to notify Congress, the President, and the public of any such extension.
While such a deadline would potentially give the commission a defined period of time to complete its work, setting a particular date for report completion could potentially create unintended time constraints. Any delay in the passage of the legislation or in the appointment process would reduce the amount of time the commission has to complete its work, even with the opportunity for the commission to extend its own deadline up to three times.
The length of time a congressional commission has to complete its work is arguably one of the most consequential decisions when designing an advisory entity. If the entity has a short window of time, the quality of its work product may suffer or it may not be able to fulfill its statutory mandate on time.
On the other hand, if the commission is given a long period of time to complete its work, it may undermine one of a commission's primary legislative advantages, the timely production of expert advice on a current matter. A short deadline may also affect the process of standing up a new commission. The selection of commissioners, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and other logistical matters may require expedited action if short deadlines need to be met.
Report Submission
Of the five proposed commissions, four ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 ) are directed to submit their reports to both Congress and the President. H.R. 6455 requires that the report is made public.
Most congressional advisory commissions are required to submit their reports to Congress, and sometimes to the President or an executive department or agency head. For example, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing's final report was submitted to both Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Commission Termination
Congressional commissions are usually statutorily mandated to terminate. Termination dates for most commissions are linked to either a fixed period of time after the establishment of the commission, the selection of members, or the date of submission of the commission's final report. Alternatively, some commissions are given fixed calendar termination dates.
All five commission proposals would provide for the commission to terminate within a certain period of time following submission of its final report. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6455 would each direct the commission to terminate 60 days after the submission; H.R. 6548 specifies a time line of 90 days after submission.
Commission Powers
Each of the five proposals would provide the proposed commission with certain powers to carry out its mission (see Table 1 for specifics). One general issue for commissions is who is authorized to execute such powers. In some cases, the commission itself executes its powers, with the commission deciding whether to devise rules and procedures for the general use of such power. In other cases, the legislation specifically authorizes the commission to give discretionary power to subcommittees or individual commission members. Finally, the legislation itself might grant certain powers to individual members of the commission, such as the chair.
Hearings and Evidence
All five bills would provide the proposed commission with the power to hold hearings, take testimony, and receive evidence. All five commissions would also be provided the power to administer oaths to witnesses.
Subpoenas
Four of the bills would provide the commission with subpoena power. H.R. 6440 would not provide subpoena power to the commission. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would provide that subpoenas could only be issued by either (1) agreement of the chair and vice chair, or (2) the affirmative vote of 6 (of 10) commission members. H.R. 6455 would require that a subpoena could only be issued by either agreement of the chair and vice chair or an affirmative vote of 18 (of 25) commission members. All four bills that would provide subpoena power contain substantially similar judicial methods of subpoena enforcement.
Administrative Support
All five of the bills would provide that the commission receive administrative support from the General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA provides administrative support to dozens of federal entities, including congressional advisory commissions. Each of the five bills would provide that GSA be reimbursed for its services by the commission. Each bill also provides that other departments or agencies may provide funds, facilities, staff, and other services to the commission.
Other Powers
Without explicit language authorizing certain activities, commissions often cannot gather information, enter into contracts, use the U.S. mail like an executive branch entity, or accept donations or gifts.
All five bills direct that federal agencies provide information to the commission upon request. H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , and H.R. 6548 would also provide that the commission could use the U.S. mails in the same manner as any department or agency, enter into contracts, and accept gifts or donations of services or property.
Staffing
The proposed COVID-19 commissions contain staffing provisions commonly found in congressional advisory commission legislation. Congressional advisory commissions are usually authorized to hire staff. Most statutes specify that the commission may hire a lead staffer, often referred to as a "staff director," "executive director," or another similar title, in addition to additional staff as needed. Rather than mandate a specific staff size, many commissions are instead authorized to appoint a staff director and other personnel as necessary, subject to the limitations of available funds.
Most congressional commissions are also authorized to hire consultants, procure intermittent services, and request that federal agencies detail personnel to aid the work of the commission.
Director and Commission Staff
Four of the bills provide that the commission may hire staff without regard to certain laws regarding the competitive service; H.R. 6440 does not specifically exempt the commission from such laws. Four bills ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6431 , H.R. 6455 , and H.R. 6548 ) would authorize, but not require, the commission to hire a staff director and additional staff, as appropriate. Four proposals would limit staff salaries to level V of the executive schedule. Three of the bills would specifically designate staff as federal employees for the purposes of certain laws, such as workman's compensation, retirement, and other benefits.
Detailees
When authorized, some commissions can have federal agency staff detailed to the commission. All five bills would provide that federal employees could be detailed to the commission. Four bills would provide that the detailee would be without reimbursement to his or her home agency. H.R. 6440 would allow detailees on a reimbursable basis.
Experts and Consultants
All five bills would provide the commission with the authority to hire experts and consultants. Four of the bills limit the rate of pay for consultants to level IV of the Executive Schedule. H.R. 6440 does not specify a specific limit.
Security Clearances
Four bills would provide that federal agencies and departments shall cooperate with the commission to provide members and staff appropriate security clearances. H.R. 6440 does not contain a security clearance provision.
Funding and Costs
Commissions generally require funding to help meet their statutory goals. When designing a commission, therefore, policymakers may consider both how the commission will be funded, and how much funding the commission will be authorized to receive. Four of the five proposals specify a funding mechanism for the commission.
How commissions are funded and the amounts that they receive vary considerably. Several factors can contribute to overall commission costs. These factors might include the cost of hiring staff, contracting with outside consultants, and engaging administrative support, among others. Additionally, most commissions reimburse the travel expenditures of commissioners and staff, and some compensate their members. The duration of a commission can also significantly affect its cost; past congressional commissions have been designed to last anywhere from several months to several years.
Costs
It is difficult to estimate or predict the potential overall cost of any commission. Annual budgets for congressional advisory entities range from several hundred thousand dollars to millions of dollars annually. Overall expenses for any individual advisory entity depend on a variety of factors, the most important of which are the number of paid staff and the commission's duration and scope. Some commissions have few full-time staff; others employ large numbers, such as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which had a full-time paid staff of nearly 80. Secondary factors that can affect commission costs include the number of commissioners, how often the commission meets or holds hearings, whether or not the commission travels or holds field hearings, and the publications the commission produces.
Authorized Funding
Three of the bills ( H.R. 6429 , H.R. 6440 , and H.R. 6548 ) would authorize the appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary" for the commission, to be derived in equal amounts from the contingent fund of the Senate and the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives. H.R. 6429 and H.R. 6548 would provide that funds are available until the commission terminates. H.R. 6455 would authorize the appropriation of $4 million for the commission, to remain available until the commission terminates. H.R. 6431 does not include an authorization of appropriations.
Comparison of Proposals to Create a COVID-19 Commission
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the five proposals. For each bill, the membership structure, appointment structure, rules of procedure and operation, duties and reporting requirements, proposed commission powers, staffing provisions, and funding are compared. | Summary: | gov_report | 1,024 | null | 0 |
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crs_R46255 | crs_R46255_0 | You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
The U.S. government administers multiple international food assistance programs that aim to alleviate hunger and improve food security in other countries. Some of these programs provide emergency assistance to people affected by conflict or natural disaster. Other programs provide nonemergency assistance to address chronic poverty and hunger, such as by providing food to people during a seasonal food shortage or training communities on issues related to nutrition.
U.S. international food assistance programs originated in 1954 with the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), also referred to as P.L. 480 . Historically, the United States has provided international food assistance primarily through in-kind aid , whereby U.S. commodities are shipped to countries in need. Congress typically funds in-kind food aid programs through the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Actâknown as the Agriculture appropriations bill. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service.
In 2010, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) began providing market-based assistance to supplement in-kind aid in emergency and nonemergency situations. Market-based assistance provides cash transfers, vouchers, or local and regional procurement (LRP)âfood purchased in the country or region where it is to be distributed rather than purchased in the United States. Congress funds most market-based assistance through the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bill. The SFOPS appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and other non-defense foreign policy agencies.
For FY2020, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided approximately $4.091 billion for U.S. international food assistance programs. This was an 11% decrease from the $4.581 billion provided in FY2019. Division B of P.L. 116-94 provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs in Agriculture appropriations, including $1.725 billion for the Food for Peace (FFP) Title II program and $220 million for the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. Division G of P.L. 116-94 provided an estimated $2.146 billion for international food assistance programs in SFOPS appropriations. This included an estimated $2.066 billion for the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and $80 million for the Community Development Fund (CDF).
This report provides an overview of accounts in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that fund international food assistance programs. It summarizes the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request for international food assistance. The report then details the international food assistance provisions in the FY2020 enacted Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations billsâDivision B and Division G of P.L. 116-94 , respectively.
International Food Assistance Programs
Congress funds most U.S. international food assistance programs through two annual appropriations billsâthe Agriculture appropriations bill and the SFOPS appropriations bill. The following sections detail each account in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that funds international food assistance and the programs funded through these accounts. Table 1 lists each international food assistance account along with the respective appropriations bill, funded programs, primary delivery method, and implementing agency. Figure 1 depicts each U.S. international food assistance program by authorizing and appropriations committee jurisdiction and implementing agency.
Agriculture-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts
Some international food assistance programs under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture appropriations committees receive discretionary funding, while other programs receive mandatory funding. Congress authorizes discretionary funding levels in authorizing legislation. A program's receipt of any of the authorized funding then awaits congressional discretion in annual appropriations. With mandatory funding, Congress authorizes and provides funding in authorizing legislation. Thus, programs with mandatory funding do not require a separate appropriation.
The Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480) is the primary authorizing legislation for international food assistance programs funded through agriculture appropriations. Congress reauthorizes discretionary and mandatory funding levels for these programs in periodic farm bills, most recently the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334 ). Congress provides discretionary funding for international food assistance programs through three accounts in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title of the Agriculture appropriations bill: the Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account, the Food for Peace Title II Grants account, and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants account. Congress has periodically provided additional discretionary funding for international food assistance in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture appropriations bill.
Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program Account
The Food for Peace (FFP) Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account provides administrative expenses for the FFP Title I and Food for Progress programs. FFP Title I provides concessional sales âsales on credit terms below market rates (loans)âof U.S. commodities to governments of developing countries and private entities. USDA administers FFP Title I. Congress has not appropriated funds for new FFP Title I sales since FY2006 but continues to appropriate funds to administer the FFP Title I loans provided before FY2006.
Food for Progress donates U.S. agricultural commodities to governments or organizations to be monetized âsold on local markets in recipient countries to generate proceeds for economic development projects. Congress has authorized Food for Progress to receive both mandatory and discretionary funding. This account receives annual appropriations to cover administrative expenses. Congress primarily funds programmatic activities through mandatory funding.
Food for Peace Title II Grants Account
The Food for Peace Title II Grants account funds the FFP Title II program. FFP Title II donates U.S. agricultural commodities to recipients in foreign countries. FFP Title II provides both emergency and nonemergency aid. Typically, the majority of FFP Title II funds support emergency aid. USAID administers FFP Title II. Congress appropriates FFP Title II funds to USDA, which then transfers the funds to USAID. Since the mid-1980s, FFP Title II has received the majority of funds appropriated to international food assistance in the Agriculture appropriations bill. FFP Title II also receives some funding for nonemergency assistance from the Community Development Fund in the SFOPS appropriations bill (see " SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts ").
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants Account
This account funds the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. McGovern-Dole donates U.S. agricultural commodities to school feeding programs and pregnant or nursing mothers in qualifying countries. USDA administers McGovern-Dole. Since FY2016, Congress has set aside a portion of McGovern-Dole funds for LRP. The 2018 farm bill authorized USDA to use up to 10% of annual McGovern-Dole funds for LRP.
The Farmer-to-Farmer Program Set-Aside
Congress funds the Farmer-to-Farmer Program, also known as FFP Title V, through a set-aside of the total appropriation for Food for Peace Act programs. This program finances short-term placements for U.S. volunteers to provide technical assistance to farmers in developing countries. USAID administers the Farmer-to-Farmer Program. Statute sets minimum program funding as the greater of $10 million or 0.5% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs and maximum program funding as the greater of $15 million or 0.6% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs.
Programs with Mandatory Funding
Congress has authorized certain U.S. international food aid programs to receive mandatory funding. Food for Progress relies primarily on mandatory funding financed through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Food for Progress does not typically receive discretionary funding beyond funding for administrative expenses provided by the FFP Title I account. However, in FY2019, Congress provided discretionary funding for Food for Progress in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture Appropriations Act.
The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is a reserve of funds held by the CCC. USDA can use BEHT funds to supplement FFP Title II activities, especially when FFP Title II funds alone cannot meet emergency international food needs. If USDA provides aid through BEHT, Congress may appropriate funds to the CCC in a subsequent fiscal year to reimburse the CCC for the value of the released funds. USDA did not release funds from BEHT in FY2019, and Congress did not appropriate any BEHT reimbursement funds to the CCC in FY2020.
SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts
Congress funds international food assistance programs through two funding accounts in the SFOPS appropriation using discretionary funds.
International Disaster Assistance
The International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding account provides for EFSP, which USAID first employed in FY2010 to supplement its emergency FFP Title II in-kind aid. Congress permanently authorized the program in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-195 ). Congress does not specify the exact funding level for EFSP in its annual appropriation; rather, USAID determines the allocation of IDA funds in response to humanitarian need in any given year. Between FY2015 and FY2019, EFSP represented an average of 47% of the whole IDA appropriation.
Development Assistance
Congress designates funding within the Development Assistance (DA) account for CDF. CDF funds complement FFP Title II nonemergency programs. USAID first used CDF in FY2010 to reduce its reliance on monetization âthe practice of implementing partners selling U.S. commodities on local markets and using the proceeds to fund programs. As with EFSP, CDF offers USAID the flexibility to pursue market-based interventions including cash transfers, food vouchers, and LRP. Today, CDF continues to complement FFP Title II nonemergency programming but is no longer needed to offset monetization, as the practice is no longer a legislative requirement.
Congress designates the level of CDF in its reports accompanying annual appropriations (often referred to as a "soft earmark"). For more information on CDF, see CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs , by Emily M. Morgenstern.
The Administration's FY2020 Budget Request
For the third year in a row, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposed eliminating McGovern-Dole and FFP Title II. However, unlike in the FY2018 and FY2019 requestsâin which the President proposed shifting all funding for international food assistance to the IDA account within the SFOPS appropriations billâthe President's FY2020 request proposed creating a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. The proposed IHA account would have consolidated four humanitarian assistance accountsâthe IDA, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts that are funded in SFOPS appropriations, along with FFP Title II within Agriculture appropriationsâinto a single account within the SFOPS appropriations bill. The FY2020 budget request also repeated past proposals to eliminate Food for Progress and merge the DA account with the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Democracy Fund (DF), and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) accounts to create a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) within SFOPS appropriations.
Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, or Food for Progress or create the new combined IHA and ESDF accounts. The following section summarizes the Administration's FY2020 budget requests for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills.
FY2020 Agriculture Funding Request
For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested discretionary funding for one international food assistance program account. The Administration requested $135,000 for the FFP Title I account to carry out existing FFP Title I loans and Food for Progress projects. This amount would have been $14,000 less than the FY2019 enacted amount for the FFP Title I account. The Administration's FY2020 budget request stated that the workload to administer FFP Title I was "significantly less than previously estimated" and that "funds were redirected to meet higher priorities."
The FY2020 request also repeated the FY2018 and FY2019 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, and McGovern-Dole and the FY2019 proposal to eliminate Food for Progress. Regarding FFP Title II, the Administration stated "To replace the inefficient food aid provided through Title II, the 2020 request includes funding for emergency food needs within the new, more efficient International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account." Eliminating FFP Title II would fund all emergency food assistance through the SFOPS appropriations rather than jointly between the SFOPS and Agriculture appropriations bills.
Regarding the proposed elimination of McGovern-Dole, the Administration's FY2020 request stated, "In kind food aid is associated with high transportation and other costs and is inefficient compared to other types of development assistance. In addition, the McGovern Dole program has unaddressed oversight and performance monitoring challenges."
Food for Progress primarily receives mandatory funding. The FY2020 request proposes to eliminate mandatory funding authority, estimating that this would result in $1.7 billion in savings over 10 years.
FY2020 SFOPS Funding Request
The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal included a combined IHA account that would have consolidated the four humanitarian assistance accounts. According to budget documents, the IHA account would have supported "all aspects of humanitarian assistance, including shelter, protection, emergency health and nutrition, the provision of safe drinking water, livelihoods supports, emergency food interventions, rehabilitation, disaster risk reduction, and transition to development assistance programs," among other activities. The account would have been managed by the newly consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Bureau at USAID but with a "senior dual-hat leader" under the policy authority of the Secretary of State reporting to both the Secretary of State and the USAID administrator. The Administration proposed $5.97 billion for the IHA account, a 37% decrease from the combined FY2019 appropriations for IDA, FFP Title II, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance.
The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal also included a combined ESDF account that would have merged the DA, ESF, DF, and AEECA accounts. The FY2020 proposal included $5.23 billion for ESDF, a 32% decrease from the FY2019 appropriations for the four accounts combined.
Potential Implications of the FY2020 Funding Request
Moving funding from FFP Title II to a new IHA could have changed how the United States delivers food assistance to recipient countries. Statute requires that nearly all assistance distributed under FFP Title II be in-kind aid. By contrast, EFSP, which Congress currently funds through the IDA account but which the Administration proposed to fund through the new IHA, does not have a statutory requirement to provide a portion of assistance as in-kind aid. EFSP can provide in-kind aid or market-based assistance. Therefore, under current statutes, shifting international food assistance funding from FFP Title II to IHA would have meant this funding would not have needed to adhere to the FFP Title II requirement to provide in-kind aid. This could have increased the portion of food assistance provided as market-based assistance rather than in-kind aid and would have shifted implementation from USDA to USAID.
Proposals to shift U.S. international food assistance funding from in-kind food aid to market-based food assistance are not new. Both the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations proposed increasing the portion of U.S. international food assistance delivered as market-based assistance. Some proponents of increasing the use of market-based assistance argue that it could improve program efficiency. However, some interested parties assert that the Trump Administration's proposed decrease in overall funding for international food assistance could offset potential efficiency gains, resulting in fewer people receiving assistance. Some opponents of increasing the share of food assistance that is market-based rather than in-kind maintain that in-kind aid ensures that the United States provides high-quality food to recipients. Certain stakeholders, such as some agricultural commodity groups, may also oppose such changes due to their implications for U.S. government purchase of U.S. commodities.
In addition to the implications above, there are a number of international food assistance issues in which Members of Congress have expressed interest. These include the share of in-kind and market-based food assistance, cargo preference requirements, and congressional jurisdiction, among others. For more information on the broad range of international food assistance-related issues, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview , by Alyssa R. Casey.
Congressional Appropriations
The FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act provided funding for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V). This included funding for FFP Title II and McGovern-Dole. The act also provided funding for administrative expenses to manage existing FFP Title I loans that originated while the FFP Title I program was active. Unlike in FY2019, Congress did not provide discretionary funding in FY2020 for the Food for Progress program.
The FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations Act provided funding for international food assistance programs in Bilateral Assistance (Title III). Figure 2 shows funding trends for international food assistance programs for FY2015-FY2020. Table 2 details appropriations for international food assistance programs for FY2018-FY2020, including proposed funding levels in the FY2020 Administration's request and House and Senate Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills.
FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations
The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 , Div. B) provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs, roughly level with the FY2019 enacted amount of $1.942 billion. The FY2020 enacted amount was less than the $2.085 billion in the House-passed Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3055 ) but more than the $1.926 billion in the Senate-passed bill ( H.R. 3055 ). Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposal to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, and Food for Progress.
The FY2020 act provided $1.725 billion for FFP Title II, a 0.5% increase from the $1.716 billion provided in FY2019. In FY2020, Congress provided all FFP Title II funding in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V) of the Agriculture appropriations bill. This was a change from FY2019, when Congress provided the majority of FFP Title II funding ($1.5 billion) in the Foreign Assistance title but provided additional funding for FFP Title II ($216 million) in the bill's General Provisions title (Title VII).
The FY2020 act provided $220 million for McGovern-Dole, a 5% increase from the FY2019 enacted amount of $210. Congress directed a minimum of $20 million of McGovern-Dole funding and a maximum of 10% of total program funding ($22 million) be set aside for LRP. This was an increase from the $15 million set-aside in FY2019. The FY2020 act also provided $142,000 for FFP Title I and Food for Progress administrative expenses, equal to the FY2019 enacted amount.
Unlike in FY2019, the FY2020 act did not provide discretionary appropriations for Food for Progress. Congress typically funds this program through mandatory funding. The 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 , §3302) authorized new pilot agreements within the Food for Progress program to directly fund economic development projects rather than funding the projects through monetizing commodities. The 2018 farm bill authorized $10 million per year for FY2019-FY2023 for pilot agreements, subject to annual appropriations. Congress did not appropriate funding for Food for Progress pilot agreements in FY2019 or FY2020.
FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations
Division G of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided funds for international food assistance programs appropriated under the SFOPS measure. The enacted IDA appropriation level grew by 0.2%, from $4.385 billion in FY2019 to $4.395 billion in FY2020. As in prior fiscal years, the measure did not determine a specific level for EFSP. IDA funds are designated to "carry out the provisions of section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for international disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance." Because the account is meant to respond to international emergencies, Congress tends to appropriate funds in a lump sum instead of directing funds toward specific countries or crises.
As in previous fiscal years, the final FY2020 act included $80 million for CDF under DA.
Policy-Related Provisions
In addition to providing funding, the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills may contain policy-related provisions that direct the executive branch how to spend certain funds. Provisions included in appropriations act text have the force of law but generally only for the duration of the fiscal year for which the act provides appropriations. Policy-related provisions generally do not amend the U.S. Code . Table 3 compares select policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs (Title V) and General Provisions (Title VII) titles of the FY2019 and FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Acts. There was no language from the SFOPS bills for a similar table.
The explanatory statement that accompanies the appropriations act, as well as the committee reports that accompany the House and Senate committee-reported bills, can provide statements of support for certain programs or directions to federal agencies on how to spend certain funding provided in the appropriations bill. While these documents generally do not have the force of law, they can express congressional intent. The committee reports and explanatory statement may need to be read together to capture all of the congressional intent for a given fiscal year.
Table 4 compares selected policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act. Table 5 compares one selected policy-related provision pertaining to U.S. international food assistance programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 SFOPS appropriation.
Summary:
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| You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
The U.S. government administers multiple international food assistance programs that aim to alleviate hunger and improve food security in other countries. Some of these programs provide emergency assistance to people affected by conflict or natural disaster. Other programs provide nonemergency assistance to address chronic poverty and hunger, such as by providing food to people during a seasonal food shortage or training communities on issues related to nutrition.
U.S. international food assistance programs originated in 1954 with the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), also referred to as P.L. 480 . Historically, the United States has provided international food assistance primarily through in-kind aid , whereby U.S. commodities are shipped to countries in need. Congress typically funds in-kind food aid programs through the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Actâknown as the Agriculture appropriations bill. The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service.
In 2010, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) began providing market-based assistance to supplement in-kind aid in emergency and nonemergency situations. Market-based assistance provides cash transfers, vouchers, or local and regional procurement (LRP)âfood purchased in the country or region where it is to be distributed rather than purchased in the United States. Congress funds most market-based assistance through the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bill. The SFOPS appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and other non-defense foreign policy agencies.
For FY2020, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided approximately $4.091 billion for U.S. international food assistance programs. This was an 11% decrease from the $4.581 billion provided in FY2019. Division B of P.L. 116-94 provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs in Agriculture appropriations, including $1.725 billion for the Food for Peace (FFP) Title II program and $220 million for the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. Division G of P.L. 116-94 provided an estimated $2.146 billion for international food assistance programs in SFOPS appropriations. This included an estimated $2.066 billion for the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and $80 million for the Community Development Fund (CDF).
This report provides an overview of accounts in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that fund international food assistance programs. It summarizes the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request for international food assistance. The report then details the international food assistance provisions in the FY2020 enacted Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations billsâDivision B and Division G of P.L. 116-94 , respectively.
International Food Assistance Programs
Congress funds most U.S. international food assistance programs through two annual appropriations billsâthe Agriculture appropriations bill and the SFOPS appropriations bill. The following sections detail each account in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills that funds international food assistance and the programs funded through these accounts. Table 1 lists each international food assistance account along with the respective appropriations bill, funded programs, primary delivery method, and implementing agency. Figure 1 depicts each U.S. international food assistance program by authorizing and appropriations committee jurisdiction and implementing agency.
Agriculture-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts
Some international food assistance programs under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture appropriations committees receive discretionary funding, while other programs receive mandatory funding. Congress authorizes discretionary funding levels in authorizing legislation. A program's receipt of any of the authorized funding then awaits congressional discretion in annual appropriations. With mandatory funding, Congress authorizes and provides funding in authorizing legislation. Thus, programs with mandatory funding do not require a separate appropriation.
The Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480) is the primary authorizing legislation for international food assistance programs funded through agriculture appropriations. Congress reauthorizes discretionary and mandatory funding levels for these programs in periodic farm bills, most recently the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334 ). Congress provides discretionary funding for international food assistance programs through three accounts in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title of the Agriculture appropriations bill: the Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account, the Food for Peace Title II Grants account, and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants account. Congress has periodically provided additional discretionary funding for international food assistance in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture appropriations bill.
Food for Peace Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program Account
The Food for Peace (FFP) Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program account provides administrative expenses for the FFP Title I and Food for Progress programs. FFP Title I provides concessional sales âsales on credit terms below market rates (loans)âof U.S. commodities to governments of developing countries and private entities. USDA administers FFP Title I. Congress has not appropriated funds for new FFP Title I sales since FY2006 but continues to appropriate funds to administer the FFP Title I loans provided before FY2006.
Food for Progress donates U.S. agricultural commodities to governments or organizations to be monetized âsold on local markets in recipient countries to generate proceeds for economic development projects. Congress has authorized Food for Progress to receive both mandatory and discretionary funding. This account receives annual appropriations to cover administrative expenses. Congress primarily funds programmatic activities through mandatory funding.
Food for Peace Title II Grants Account
The Food for Peace Title II Grants account funds the FFP Title II program. FFP Title II donates U.S. agricultural commodities to recipients in foreign countries. FFP Title II provides both emergency and nonemergency aid. Typically, the majority of FFP Title II funds support emergency aid. USAID administers FFP Title II. Congress appropriates FFP Title II funds to USDA, which then transfers the funds to USAID. Since the mid-1980s, FFP Title II has received the majority of funds appropriated to international food assistance in the Agriculture appropriations bill. FFP Title II also receives some funding for nonemergency assistance from the Community Development Fund in the SFOPS appropriations bill (see " SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts ").
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants Account
This account funds the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. McGovern-Dole donates U.S. agricultural commodities to school feeding programs and pregnant or nursing mothers in qualifying countries. USDA administers McGovern-Dole. Since FY2016, Congress has set aside a portion of McGovern-Dole funds for LRP. The 2018 farm bill authorized USDA to use up to 10% of annual McGovern-Dole funds for LRP.
The Farmer-to-Farmer Program Set-Aside
Congress funds the Farmer-to-Farmer Program, also known as FFP Title V, through a set-aside of the total appropriation for Food for Peace Act programs. This program finances short-term placements for U.S. volunteers to provide technical assistance to farmers in developing countries. USAID administers the Farmer-to-Farmer Program. Statute sets minimum program funding as the greater of $10 million or 0.5% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs and maximum program funding as the greater of $15 million or 0.6% of annual funds for Food for Peace Act programs.
Programs with Mandatory Funding
Congress has authorized certain U.S. international food aid programs to receive mandatory funding. Food for Progress relies primarily on mandatory funding financed through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Food for Progress does not typically receive discretionary funding beyond funding for administrative expenses provided by the FFP Title I account. However, in FY2019, Congress provided discretionary funding for Food for Progress in the General Provisions title of the Agriculture Appropriations Act.
The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) is a reserve of funds held by the CCC. USDA can use BEHT funds to supplement FFP Title II activities, especially when FFP Title II funds alone cannot meet emergency international food needs. If USDA provides aid through BEHT, Congress may appropriate funds to the CCC in a subsequent fiscal year to reimburse the CCC for the value of the released funds. USDA did not release funds from BEHT in FY2019, and Congress did not appropriate any BEHT reimbursement funds to the CCC in FY2020.
SFOPS-Funded International Food Assistance Accounts
Congress funds international food assistance programs through two funding accounts in the SFOPS appropriation using discretionary funds.
International Disaster Assistance
The International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funding account provides for EFSP, which USAID first employed in FY2010 to supplement its emergency FFP Title II in-kind aid. Congress permanently authorized the program in the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-195 ). Congress does not specify the exact funding level for EFSP in its annual appropriation; rather, USAID determines the allocation of IDA funds in response to humanitarian need in any given year. Between FY2015 and FY2019, EFSP represented an average of 47% of the whole IDA appropriation.
Development Assistance
Congress designates funding within the Development Assistance (DA) account for CDF. CDF funds complement FFP Title II nonemergency programs. USAID first used CDF in FY2010 to reduce its reliance on monetization âthe practice of implementing partners selling U.S. commodities on local markets and using the proceeds to fund programs. As with EFSP, CDF offers USAID the flexibility to pursue market-based interventions including cash transfers, food vouchers, and LRP. Today, CDF continues to complement FFP Title II nonemergency programming but is no longer needed to offset monetization, as the practice is no longer a legislative requirement.
Congress designates the level of CDF in its reports accompanying annual appropriations (often referred to as a "soft earmark"). For more information on CDF, see CRS Report R45879, International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs , by Emily M. Morgenstern.
The Administration's FY2020 Budget Request
For the third year in a row, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposed eliminating McGovern-Dole and FFP Title II. However, unlike in the FY2018 and FY2019 requestsâin which the President proposed shifting all funding for international food assistance to the IDA account within the SFOPS appropriations billâthe President's FY2020 request proposed creating a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. The proposed IHA account would have consolidated four humanitarian assistance accountsâthe IDA, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts that are funded in SFOPS appropriations, along with FFP Title II within Agriculture appropriationsâinto a single account within the SFOPS appropriations bill. The FY2020 budget request also repeated past proposals to eliminate Food for Progress and merge the DA account with the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Democracy Fund (DF), and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) accounts to create a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) within SFOPS appropriations.
Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, or Food for Progress or create the new combined IHA and ESDF accounts. The following section summarizes the Administration's FY2020 budget requests for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills.
FY2020 Agriculture Funding Request
For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested discretionary funding for one international food assistance program account. The Administration requested $135,000 for the FFP Title I account to carry out existing FFP Title I loans and Food for Progress projects. This amount would have been $14,000 less than the FY2019 enacted amount for the FFP Title I account. The Administration's FY2020 budget request stated that the workload to administer FFP Title I was "significantly less than previously estimated" and that "funds were redirected to meet higher priorities."
The FY2020 request also repeated the FY2018 and FY2019 proposals to eliminate FFP Title II, and McGovern-Dole and the FY2019 proposal to eliminate Food for Progress. Regarding FFP Title II, the Administration stated "To replace the inefficient food aid provided through Title II, the 2020 request includes funding for emergency food needs within the new, more efficient International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account." Eliminating FFP Title II would fund all emergency food assistance through the SFOPS appropriations rather than jointly between the SFOPS and Agriculture appropriations bills.
Regarding the proposed elimination of McGovern-Dole, the Administration's FY2020 request stated, "In kind food aid is associated with high transportation and other costs and is inefficient compared to other types of development assistance. In addition, the McGovern Dole program has unaddressed oversight and performance monitoring challenges."
Food for Progress primarily receives mandatory funding. The FY2020 request proposes to eliminate mandatory funding authority, estimating that this would result in $1.7 billion in savings over 10 years.
FY2020 SFOPS Funding Request
The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal included a combined IHA account that would have consolidated the four humanitarian assistance accounts. According to budget documents, the IHA account would have supported "all aspects of humanitarian assistance, including shelter, protection, emergency health and nutrition, the provision of safe drinking water, livelihoods supports, emergency food interventions, rehabilitation, disaster risk reduction, and transition to development assistance programs," among other activities. The account would have been managed by the newly consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Bureau at USAID but with a "senior dual-hat leader" under the policy authority of the Secretary of State reporting to both the Secretary of State and the USAID administrator. The Administration proposed $5.97 billion for the IHA account, a 37% decrease from the combined FY2019 appropriations for IDA, FFP Title II, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance.
The FY2020 SFOPS budget proposal also included a combined ESDF account that would have merged the DA, ESF, DF, and AEECA accounts. The FY2020 proposal included $5.23 billion for ESDF, a 32% decrease from the FY2019 appropriations for the four accounts combined.
Potential Implications of the FY2020 Funding Request
Moving funding from FFP Title II to a new IHA could have changed how the United States delivers food assistance to recipient countries. Statute requires that nearly all assistance distributed under FFP Title II be in-kind aid. By contrast, EFSP, which Congress currently funds through the IDA account but which the Administration proposed to fund through the new IHA, does not have a statutory requirement to provide a portion of assistance as in-kind aid. EFSP can provide in-kind aid or market-based assistance. Therefore, under current statutes, shifting international food assistance funding from FFP Title II to IHA would have meant this funding would not have needed to adhere to the FFP Title II requirement to provide in-kind aid. This could have increased the portion of food assistance provided as market-based assistance rather than in-kind aid and would have shifted implementation from USDA to USAID.
Proposals to shift U.S. international food assistance funding from in-kind food aid to market-based food assistance are not new. Both the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations proposed increasing the portion of U.S. international food assistance delivered as market-based assistance. Some proponents of increasing the use of market-based assistance argue that it could improve program efficiency. However, some interested parties assert that the Trump Administration's proposed decrease in overall funding for international food assistance could offset potential efficiency gains, resulting in fewer people receiving assistance. Some opponents of increasing the share of food assistance that is market-based rather than in-kind maintain that in-kind aid ensures that the United States provides high-quality food to recipients. Certain stakeholders, such as some agricultural commodity groups, may also oppose such changes due to their implications for U.S. government purchase of U.S. commodities.
In addition to the implications above, there are a number of international food assistance issues in which Members of Congress have expressed interest. These include the share of in-kind and market-based food assistance, cargo preference requirements, and congressional jurisdiction, among others. For more information on the broad range of international food assistance-related issues, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview , by Alyssa R. Casey.
Congressional Appropriations
The FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act provided funding for U.S. international food assistance programs in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V). This included funding for FFP Title II and McGovern-Dole. The act also provided funding for administrative expenses to manage existing FFP Title I loans that originated while the FFP Title I program was active. Unlike in FY2019, Congress did not provide discretionary funding in FY2020 for the Food for Progress program.
The FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations Act provided funding for international food assistance programs in Bilateral Assistance (Title III). Figure 2 shows funding trends for international food assistance programs for FY2015-FY2020. Table 2 details appropriations for international food assistance programs for FY2018-FY2020, including proposed funding levels in the FY2020 Administration's request and House and Senate Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills.
FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations
The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 , Div. B) provided $1.945 billion for international food assistance programs, roughly level with the FY2019 enacted amount of $1.942 billion. The FY2020 enacted amount was less than the $2.085 billion in the House-passed Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3055 ) but more than the $1.926 billion in the Senate-passed bill ( H.R. 3055 ). Congress did not adopt the Administration's FY2020 proposal to eliminate FFP Title II, McGovern-Dole, and Food for Progress.
The FY2020 act provided $1.725 billion for FFP Title II, a 0.5% increase from the $1.716 billion provided in FY2019. In FY2020, Congress provided all FFP Title II funding in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs title (Title V) of the Agriculture appropriations bill. This was a change from FY2019, when Congress provided the majority of FFP Title II funding ($1.5 billion) in the Foreign Assistance title but provided additional funding for FFP Title II ($216 million) in the bill's General Provisions title (Title VII).
The FY2020 act provided $220 million for McGovern-Dole, a 5% increase from the FY2019 enacted amount of $210. Congress directed a minimum of $20 million of McGovern-Dole funding and a maximum of 10% of total program funding ($22 million) be set aside for LRP. This was an increase from the $15 million set-aside in FY2019. The FY2020 act also provided $142,000 for FFP Title I and Food for Progress administrative expenses, equal to the FY2019 enacted amount.
Unlike in FY2019, the FY2020 act did not provide discretionary appropriations for Food for Progress. Congress typically funds this program through mandatory funding. The 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 , §3302) authorized new pilot agreements within the Food for Progress program to directly fund economic development projects rather than funding the projects through monetizing commodities. The 2018 farm bill authorized $10 million per year for FY2019-FY2023 for pilot agreements, subject to annual appropriations. Congress did not appropriate funding for Food for Progress pilot agreements in FY2019 or FY2020.
FY2020 SFOPS Appropriations
Division G of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) provided funds for international food assistance programs appropriated under the SFOPS measure. The enacted IDA appropriation level grew by 0.2%, from $4.385 billion in FY2019 to $4.395 billion in FY2020. As in prior fiscal years, the measure did not determine a specific level for EFSP. IDA funds are designated to "carry out the provisions of section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for international disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance." Because the account is meant to respond to international emergencies, Congress tends to appropriate funds in a lump sum instead of directing funds toward specific countries or crises.
As in previous fiscal years, the final FY2020 act included $80 million for CDF under DA.
Policy-Related Provisions
In addition to providing funding, the Agriculture and SFOPS appropriations bills may contain policy-related provisions that direct the executive branch how to spend certain funds. Provisions included in appropriations act text have the force of law but generally only for the duration of the fiscal year for which the act provides appropriations. Policy-related provisions generally do not amend the U.S. Code . Table 3 compares select policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs (Title V) and General Provisions (Title VII) titles of the FY2019 and FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Acts. There was no language from the SFOPS bills for a similar table.
The explanatory statement that accompanies the appropriations act, as well as the committee reports that accompany the House and Senate committee-reported bills, can provide statements of support for certain programs or directions to federal agencies on how to spend certain funding provided in the appropriations bill. While these documents generally do not have the force of law, they can express congressional intent. The committee reports and explanatory statement may need to be read together to capture all of the congressional intent for a given fiscal year.
Table 4 compares selected policy-related provisions pertaining to U.S. international food aid programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations Act. Table 5 compares one selected policy-related provision pertaining to U.S. international food assistance programs from the FY2019 and FY2020 House and Senate committee reports and explanatory statement for the FY2020 SFOPS appropriation. | Summary: | gov_report | 1,024 | null | 1 |
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crs_R45933 | crs_R45933_0 | You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
On August 1, 2018 , the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a new Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC, about a week after having declared the end of a separate outbreak in the west of the country. As of September 24, 2019, the WHO had reported 3,175 cases in the current outbreak, including 2,119 deaths. About 58% of all cases have been women and 28% children. The current outbreak is the 10 th on record in DRC, the largest to have occurred in the country, and the second largest ever, after the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Cases have been concentrated in North Kivu and Ituri provinces ( Figure 1 ), where long-running conflicts had already caused a protracted humanitarian crisis and are complicating Ebola control efforts. The number of new Ebola cases identified per week has fluctuated since the start of the outbreak ( Figure 2 ), but has generally trended downward slowly since peaking in April 2019.
The current outbreak has coincided with a fraught political transition process in DRC. A new president, parliament, provincial-level assemblies, and governors were elected between late 2018 and mid-2019, after years of delays, gridlock, political violence, and repression of opposition voices. Election delays in the Ebola-affected areas, an opposition stronghold, heightened tensions and spurred conspiracy theories, arguably hindering Ebola response. President Felix Tshisekedi, inaugurated in January 2019, was previously an opposition figure, but the coalition of his predecessor Joseph Kabila won supermajorities in parliament and at the provincial level. Observers questioned the legitimacy of the election results, and tense negotiations between the two political blocs (Tshisekedi's and Kabila's) delayed the naming of a new cabinet until late August 2019, while complicating relations between the national and provincial/local officials.
Several factors have foiled outbreak control efforts, including low Ebola awareness (early symptoms are similar to other common ailments like malaria), community distrust of health interventions, belated visits to health facilities (at which point survival prospects decline rapidly), and infection prevention control lapses in health facilities. Attacks by militia and criminal groups, political protests, health worker strikes, and security force abuses have also disrupted and impeded the response. In mid-September, for example, violent attacks in a new hotspot (Lwemba, Ituri Province) after the death of a local healthcare worker from Ebola prompted the indefinite suspension of Ebola control activities in the area. As a result, new cases continue to stem from unknown chains of transmission, and deaths continue to occur outside Ebola treatment centers.
U.S. officials and other health experts have repeatedly raised concerns about broader challenges in DRC related to its health care system, political tensions, local grievances, and instability. USAID Administrator Mark Green testified to Congress in April 2019 that in DRC, "You have a failed democracy in many, many waysâ¦. It will take more than simply a medical approach. It will take a development approach to try to tackle this terrible disease and to contain its outbreak." After traveling to DRC in August 2019, Administrator Green wrote, "Decades of corrupt, authoritarian rule during which communities were denied any meaningful voice in their government have undermined the Congolese people's trust in institutions."
Health experts have been troubled by reports of Ebola cases in major DRC cities (including the capital of North Kivu, Goma) and outside of DRC. Between June and August 2019, a total of four cross-border cases were detected in Uganda. Observers expressed optimism about the rapid detection and containment of these cases, but new concerns have arisen about subsequent suspected cases in Tanzania. In mid-September, WHO was informed by unofficial sources of a number of suspected Ebola cases in that country, including in the capital city of Dar es Salaam, while Tanzanian authorities asserted that there were no confirmed or suspected Ebola cases in the country. WHO has reportedly since sent personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccination supplies to Tanzania, and recommended that the sickened patients (one of whom reportedly died) receive secondary confirmation testing at a WHO facility. As of September 21, none of the cases had received secondary confirmation. Ebola control in other neighboring countries such as South Sudan, Burundi, or Central Africa Republic, which have minimal state capacity and are affected by protracted conflicts and political crises, could be highly challenging if required.
The International Response
Outbreak control, treatment, and disease surveillance activities are being carried out primarily by DRC government employees (including health workers and frontline workers, who provide routine and essential services), as well as by international nongovernmental organizations, with U.N. agencies (including the WHO), other multilateral entities (including the World Bank), and foreign governments providing funding, expertise, coordination, and logistical assistance.
Classic Ebola outbreak control protocol entails
infection prevention control (IPC) in health care facilities; management and isolation of patients in Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs); fever surveillance with rapid diagnosis; tracing of Ebola cases and their contacts; and community awareness and adherence to IPC protocols, safe patient and body transport, safe burials, and household and environmental decontamination.
The extraordinary conditions on the ground in affected areas of eastern DRC have limited the effectiveness of conventional control measures, however, and are requiring ever-evolving strategies for containment, including aggressive vaccination campaigns (see text box below). Since the WHO declared the outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in July 2019, it has sought to garner additional donor funds, as well as international support for addressing the political and security issues affecting Ebola control.
In July 2019, the WHO and the DRC Ministry of Health (MoH) released a fourth strategic response plan to "definitively defeat" the Ebola epidemic ( Table 1 ). The strategic plan is expected to cost over $462 million, including about $288 million for the public health response portion ( Table 1 ). In July 2019, the World Bank announced that it would provide $300 million toward the plan, about half of which would support the public health response, on top of prior funding commitments (discussed below).
The public health portion of the strategic plan, covering July 1 through December 31, 2019, purportedly takes into account lessons learned from the third strategic response plan (February through July 2019). This portion of the plan is based on
strengthening political commitment, security, and operational support to improve acceptance of the response and access to insecure areas; deepening support for addressing the varied needs of communities affected by Ebola (beyond a single-minded focus on containment efforts), as a means toward fostering community ownership and involvement in Ebola responses; improving financial planning, monitoring and reporting; and bolstering preparedness of neighboring provinces and countries.
The World Bank has urged other countries to provide additional support, and the WHO Director-General has urged donors to address disbursement delays. As of September 11, 2019, the WHO had received less than $60 million of the $288 million it sought for the current phase of the public health response. The United States is the top country donor for the public health response and has provided almost $158 million for the Ebola humanitarian response, largely supporting activities by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as discussed below.
DRC Government Role
DRC government employees and other Congolese nationals are the primary responders to the Ebola epidemic on the ground. As WHO Executive Director for Health Emergencies Dr. Michael Ryan noted in June 2019, "If you go into the treatment facilities now it is Congolese doctors and nurses in the front line. There may be NGO or WHO badges on the tents but the doctors and nurses are Congolese; surveillance officers are Congolese; 80% of the vaccinators in this response are Congolese." The DRC government has provided health workers and administrative personnel, hired local frontline workers, organized volunteers, and conducted information awareness campaigns. The government has also offered certain health services free of charge in selected government health facilities, with donor support (discussed below).
From the start of the current outbreak, the DRC government's health responses were coordinated by the MoH, as in past Ebola outbreaks in DRC. In July 2019, however, President Tshisekedi transferred coordination responsibilities to an expert committee headed by the director of DRC's biomedical research institute, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe, who reports directly to the president. Dr. Muyembe is a recognized expert on Ebola who helped investigate the first known outbreak of the disease, in DRC in 1976. Then-Health Minister Dr. Oly Ilunga resigned following Dr. Muyembe's appointment, citing a dilution of his authority as well as confusion about the coordination of DRC government Ebola responses, an insufficient focus on the health system, and opposition to utilizing the Johnson & Johnson experimental vaccine (see text box above). Ilunga was subsequently the target of scathing criticism in the leaked report of a DRC government investigative commission, which indicated, among other things, that Ilunga and his team had displayed an "aggressive and ostentatious attitude" when visiting the outbreak area and had squandered Ebola response funds on fancy cars and hotel rooms. These developments have suggested an internal power struggle over policy and control of funds for Ebola response.
U.N. and Other Multilateral Organizations
Humanitarian experts, including U.S. officials, have repeatedly asserted that broader humanitarian access and security issues have stymied outbreak control efforts, and that international response efforts require increased coordination and transparency. In response to such concerns, in May 2019 U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres appointed MONUSCO Deputy Special Representative David Gressly, a U.S. citizen, to serve as a new U.N. Emergency Ebola Response Coordinator charged with establishing a "strengthened coordination and support mechanism" for Ebola response. While the WHO is to continue to lead "all health operations and technical support activities to the government," Gressly is leading a broader U.N.-wide effort to strengthen political engagement, financial tracking, humanitarian coordination, and "preparedness and readiness planning" for Goma and surrounding countries. Gressly, who continues to report to the head of MONUSCO, portrayed his new role as a reflection of the need for "more than just a public health response."
The WHO has deployed some 700 personnel to DRC since the current outbreak began. These personnel are coordinating the public health response and providing operational and technical support to DRC government personnel and other actors. Particular areas of focus include detection and rapid isolation of Ebola cases, intensification of rapid multidisciplinary public health actions for Ebola cases, community engagement, and health system strengthening. In addition, the WHO is coordinating regional readiness exercises and assessments in adjacent areas of DRC and neighboring countries. Vaccination and disease surveillance efforts have been bolstered in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.
The World Bank has stepped up its role in supporting the Ebola response effort since mid-2019. On July 24, the World Bank Group announced it was mobilizing up to $300 millionâto be financed through the Bank's International Development Association and its Crisis Response Windowâon top of $100 million disbursed previously through the International Development Association and the Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). The PEF announced a further $30 million disbursement for DRC on August 23, 2019. World Bank resources have financed free health care and essential medicines in clinics in all affected areas, hazard pay for frontline health workers, handwashing stations, mobile laboratories, decontamination teams, psychosocial support teams, community engagement campaigns, and vaccination efforts. The injection of new resources aims to build on existing World Bank support to strengthen the DRC health system.
The African Union (AU) Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has supported international response efforts by deploying members of its voluntary response corps to DRC and neighboring countries. Africa CDC voluntary responders include epidemiologists and anthropologists, as well as communication, laboratory, and logistics experts from various African countries who are "on standby for emergency deployment." To date, these responders have trained local health workers and community volunteers, set up laboratories, supplied personal protective equipment, and trained people in port-of-entry screening.
The U.S. Government Response
USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed staff to DRC and the region when the outbreak was first detected in August 2018. The United States is also the top country donor to the Ebola response effort, as noted above. As of September 10, USAID had announced more than $148 million for direct support to the Ebola response within DRC and another $9.8 million to support preparedness and prevention activities in neighboring countries. Those funds were drawn primarily ($156.1 million) from unobligated FY2015 International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds that Congress appropriated on an emergency basis for Ebola response during the West Africa outbreak ( P.L. 113-235 ). According to USAID, the available balance of FY2015 emergency IDA Ebola funds stood at $105.5 million as of September 9.
More broadly, the United States is the top bilateral humanitarian donor to DRC and the top financial contributor to MONUSCO, which is providing logistical and security support to Ebola response efforts. USAID Administrator Green testified before Congress in April 2019 that "there is sufficient money for fighting Ebola in DRC," asserting that nonfinancial challenges posed the primary constraint to containment efforts. U.S. funding commitments have continued to grow since then, however, as the outbreak has persisted and broadened.
U.S. personnel are providing technical support from Kinshasa, Goma, and neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, while implementing partners (U.N. agencies and NGOs) are administering Ebola response efforts within the outbreak zone with U.S. resources. The Administration has placed strict constraints on the movement of U.S. personnel to and within affected areas, due to security threats. In September 2018, USAID and CDC withdrew personnel from the immediate outbreak zone due to security concerns, despite CDC's stated preference to maintain staff in the field.
U.S. support for outbreak control has included the following:
USAID has provided grant funding to NGOs and U.N. entities carrying out Ebola response and preparedness activities, drawing primarily on IDA funds (as noted above). In October 2018, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to coordinate the U.S. response in support of the DRC government, the WHO, and other partners. USAID Ebola response funds have supported disease surveillance, infection prevention and control, safe and dignified burials, water and sanitation aid, prepositioning of medical supplies, humanitarian coordination, and logistics. U.S. bilateral economic and health aid funding for DRC has also supported programs that may ease humanitarian access or otherwise complement Ebola response activities.
CDC personnel have provided direct technical support to the DRC government, the WHO, and USAID's DART for disease surveillance, contact tracing, data management, infection protection and control, risk communication and community engagement, laboratory strengthening, emergency management, and surveillance at points of entry. CDC staff also have supported Ebola preparedness efforts in neighboring countries.
The Department of Defense has supplied laboratory training to Ugandan researchers and has partnered with them to conduct clinical Ebola vaccine trials.
Challenges
Security Threats and Political Tensions
Security threats have periodically forced the temporary cessation of Ebola case management in some areas, interrupted contact tracing, and frustrated surveillance efforts in high-transmission areas. Dozens of armed groups are active in the areas most affected by the outbreak. These include an array of local militias, along with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a relatively large and opaque group implicated in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, local military forces, and civilians. Road travel is often dangerous, with frequent reports of militia attacks, armed robbery, and kidnappings. In April 2019, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on local soldiers previously attributed to the ADF, the latest in a series of signs of emerging ties between the two. State security force personnel reportedly maintain ties with armed groups and have been implicated in atrocities, including civilian massacres in Beni territory since 2014.
Local mistrust of government officials and outsiders (including Congolese who are not from the immediate area)âsometimes rooted in conflict dynamics, ethnic tensions, and political frictionâhas prompted some community resistance to Ebola control efforts and led to attacks on health workers and facilities, including Ebola treatment centers. Some communities in Beni and Butembo have long opposed DRC's central government and complained of neglect and persecution. WHO officials have urged broader international support for "political mediation, engagement with opposition, and negotiated solutions," asserting that "[j]ust purely focusing on community engagement and participation will not fix what are deep seated political issues that need to be addressed at a higher level."
Perceptions that outsiders are profiting financially from the outbreak, or that international intervention is driven more by fear of contagion than concern for locals' wellbeing, appear to have fueled conspiracy theories and community resistance. At a July 15 donors event on Ebola response in Geneva, WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghabreyesusi said that Congolese in the outbreak zone had asked him, "Are you here to help us, or to prevent this thing from coming to you? Are you doing this for us, or for yourself?" He added, "It embarrasses me.⦠We should not appear to be seen as if we are parachuting in and out because of Ebola." DRC's then-Health Minister argued in the same meeting that local perceptions that the response was bringing cash into the region had fueled threats to health workers, including kidnappings.
Health System Constraints
Local perceptions that donors are more concerned with preventing the spread of Ebola to their countries than with helping Congolese communities are rooted, in part, in enduring health challenges. Maternal and infant deaths, for example, have for years regularly exceeded the current count of Ebola deaths but have received comparatively little attention. Authorities have redirected health resources in some areas for Ebola control, deepening local frustrations. Vaccination campaigns have also been interrupted in some Ebola hotspots. In Ituri province, for example, inadequate supply of measles vaccine has limited containment of a measles outbreak that began in January and has infected over 161,000 people, claiming over 3,000 lives. Health workers also are fighting a cholera outbreak that has infected over 15,000 people and killed at least 287.
The WHO has reported that Ebola transmission is likely occurring in ill-equipped and understaffed health facilities. Inconsistent adherence to infection prevention and control, periodic disruptions in supply chain systems, and limited access to water for handwashing in some health facilities have complicated Ebola control efforts. In addition, some health workers have refused to wear personal protective equipment in health facilities or perform rudimentary infection prevention and control measures due to threats of violence by some members of the community. As of August 27, 2019, 156 health workers had contracted Ebola, at least 34 of whom had died. The MoH, WHO, and other partners have identified health facilities of concern and are addressing lapses in triage, case detection, and infection prevention and control.
Reported Progress
Community Engagement. The WHO and implementing partners have worked to deepen local engagement, with some reported positive results. Local Ebola committees in Butembo and Katwa (at the center of the outbreak zone in North Kivu), for example, are chaired and managed by community members who plan Ebola awareness and sensitization campaigns. Improved community engagement has reportedly contributed to increased participation in vaccine campaigns and safe and dignified burial practices. For example, the WHO reported in July 2019 that a high-risk contact in Katwa had sought vaccination and offered to bring other contacts. In an effort to reduce the risk of transmission and broaden access to Ebola treatment and case finding, the WHO also plans to establish smaller patient transit centers closer to communities. Replicating engagement activities in emergent hot spots remains a challenge, however.
Ebola Therapeutics Advance. In August 2019, a clinical trial of four investigational Ebola treatments in DRC identified two "strong performers," leading the WHO to state that "these are the only drugs that future patients will be treated with." The trial, launched in late 2018, was co-sponsored by DRC's national biomedical research institute and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and was carried out by an international research consortium coordinated by the WHO.
Issues for Congress
U.S. Funding for DRC Ebola Response
In FY2015, in the context of the West Africa outbreak, Congress appropriated $5.1 billion for Ebola response and preparedness on an emergency basis, including $1.436 billion in multiyear International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds (Title IX of Division J, P.L. 113-235 ). U.S. funding for responding to the current outbreak has drawn primarily on the unobligated balance of these IDA funds. According to USAID, $105.5 million of these funds remained available for expenditure as of September 9, 2019. Should the outbreak continue or expand in new ways, Congress may consider what funding mechanisms, if any, the United States might use to support Ebola control. At the same time, the United States remains the lead country donor to the current Ebola response effort. Members may examine the U.S. role, vis-Ã -vis other actors (including other countries, multilateral entities, and private sources), in financing Ebola response activities, and may debate strategies for securing additional contributions from other donors.
U.S. Aid Restrictions Related to Trafficking in Persons
DRC is ranked as "Tier III" (worst) under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, P.L. 106-386 , as amended), which triggers prohibitions on certain types of U.S. aid absent a full or partial presidential waiver. In FY2019, in a departure from previous practice, President Trump did not partially waive the restrictions for DRC. Thus, pursuant to the TVPA, no "nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related" assistance may be provided "to the government" of DRC.
IDA funds, the core source of funding for U.S. Ebola response support to date, are exempt from the TVPA restrictions (22 U.S.C. §7102[10]). The TVPA further exempts economic and development assistance "in support of programs of nongovernmental organizations." In practice, the Administration has interpreted the TVPA restrictions to apply broadly to various programs funded through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts, including some that would be implemented by NGOs, though it has not publicly provided a full account of affected activities. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that some U.S. assistance that could help promote humanitarian access in Ebola-affected areas has been held up as a result. Testifying before the Senate in July 2019, a senior USAID official affirmed that some FY2018 aid resources that could help with Ebola control remained restricted in connection with the TVPA, but he and other Administration witnesses did not provide further details.
Two bills introduced in the 116 th Congress ( S. 1340 , the Ebola Eradication Act of 2019, and H.R. 3085 , a House companion bill) would authorize assistance for a range of activities that could help lower community resistance or otherwise support Ebola control efforts in DRC and neighboring states, "notwithstanding" the TVPA restrictions. S. 1340 passed the Senate on September 23, 2019. Similar language was included in a draft FY2020 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations bill circulated by the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 18, 2019. That bill would also broadly provide at least $298.3 million in U.S. bilateral assistance for "stabilization, global health, and bilateral economic assistance" to DRCâslightly higher than the U.S. allocation for DRC in recent years, not counting food aidâ"including in areas affected by, and at risk from, the Ebola virus disease."
Global Health Security
The current Ebola outbreak has prompted resumption of discussions about strengthening health systems worldwide, particularly with regard to pandemic preparedness. In 2014, during the Obama Administration, the United States and the WHO co-launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to improve countries' ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. The United States, the largest donor to this multilateral effort, pledged to support it with $1 billion from FY2015 through FY2019. The Trump Administration has built on these efforts. In May 2019, the White House released the United States Government Global Health Security Strategy , which outlined the U.S. role in extending the Global Health Security Agenda and improving global health security worldwide. Although the Trump Administration, through the strategy and public statements, has supported extending the GHSA through 2024, officials have not provided comprehensive information on what that support would entail.
Members of Congress may continue to debate what role, if any, the United States should play in supporting global health system strengthening efforts to bolster global health security, and whether to adjust funding levels to meet ongoing and future infectious disease threats. Through regular appropriations, disease outbreak prevention and global health security efforts are funded through USAID pandemic influenza and CDC global health protection line items ( Table 2 ).
On September 19, 2019, the House passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Health Extenders Act of 2019 ( H.R. 4378 ), which would authorize the transfer to the CDC of up to $20 million for Ebola preparedness and response activities from the Infectious Disease Rapid Response Reserve Fund. Other relevant bills introduced in the 116 th Congress include H.R. 2166 , which would codify U.S. engagement in the GHSA as specified in an executive order issued by the Obama Administration, and H.R. 826 , which seeks to facilitate research and treatment of neglected tropical diseases, including Ebola.
Summary:
| null | 96 | 28,169 | 28,171 | 28,171 | ... [The rest of the report is omitted]
| You are given a report by a government agency. Write a one-page summary of the report.
Report:
Introduction
On August 1, 2018 , the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a new Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC, about a week after having declared the end of a separate outbreak in the west of the country. As of September 24, 2019, the WHO had reported 3,175 cases in the current outbreak, including 2,119 deaths. About 58% of all cases have been women and 28% children. The current outbreak is the 10 th on record in DRC, the largest to have occurred in the country, and the second largest ever, after the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Cases have been concentrated in North Kivu and Ituri provinces ( Figure 1 ), where long-running conflicts had already caused a protracted humanitarian crisis and are complicating Ebola control efforts. The number of new Ebola cases identified per week has fluctuated since the start of the outbreak ( Figure 2 ), but has generally trended downward slowly since peaking in April 2019.
The current outbreak has coincided with a fraught political transition process in DRC. A new president, parliament, provincial-level assemblies, and governors were elected between late 2018 and mid-2019, after years of delays, gridlock, political violence, and repression of opposition voices. Election delays in the Ebola-affected areas, an opposition stronghold, heightened tensions and spurred conspiracy theories, arguably hindering Ebola response. President Felix Tshisekedi, inaugurated in January 2019, was previously an opposition figure, but the coalition of his predecessor Joseph Kabila won supermajorities in parliament and at the provincial level. Observers questioned the legitimacy of the election results, and tense negotiations between the two political blocs (Tshisekedi's and Kabila's) delayed the naming of a new cabinet until late August 2019, while complicating relations between the national and provincial/local officials.
Several factors have foiled outbreak control efforts, including low Ebola awareness (early symptoms are similar to other common ailments like malaria), community distrust of health interventions, belated visits to health facilities (at which point survival prospects decline rapidly), and infection prevention control lapses in health facilities. Attacks by militia and criminal groups, political protests, health worker strikes, and security force abuses have also disrupted and impeded the response. In mid-September, for example, violent attacks in a new hotspot (Lwemba, Ituri Province) after the death of a local healthcare worker from Ebola prompted the indefinite suspension of Ebola control activities in the area. As a result, new cases continue to stem from unknown chains of transmission, and deaths continue to occur outside Ebola treatment centers.
U.S. officials and other health experts have repeatedly raised concerns about broader challenges in DRC related to its health care system, political tensions, local grievances, and instability. USAID Administrator Mark Green testified to Congress in April 2019 that in DRC, "You have a failed democracy in many, many waysâ¦. It will take more than simply a medical approach. It will take a development approach to try to tackle this terrible disease and to contain its outbreak." After traveling to DRC in August 2019, Administrator Green wrote, "Decades of corrupt, authoritarian rule during which communities were denied any meaningful voice in their government have undermined the Congolese people's trust in institutions."
Health experts have been troubled by reports of Ebola cases in major DRC cities (including the capital of North Kivu, Goma) and outside of DRC. Between June and August 2019, a total of four cross-border cases were detected in Uganda. Observers expressed optimism about the rapid detection and containment of these cases, but new concerns have arisen about subsequent suspected cases in Tanzania. In mid-September, WHO was informed by unofficial sources of a number of suspected Ebola cases in that country, including in the capital city of Dar es Salaam, while Tanzanian authorities asserted that there were no confirmed or suspected Ebola cases in the country. WHO has reportedly since sent personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccination supplies to Tanzania, and recommended that the sickened patients (one of whom reportedly died) receive secondary confirmation testing at a WHO facility. As of September 21, none of the cases had received secondary confirmation. Ebola control in other neighboring countries such as South Sudan, Burundi, or Central Africa Republic, which have minimal state capacity and are affected by protracted conflicts and political crises, could be highly challenging if required.
The International Response
Outbreak control, treatment, and disease surveillance activities are being carried out primarily by DRC government employees (including health workers and frontline workers, who provide routine and essential services), as well as by international nongovernmental organizations, with U.N. agencies (including the WHO), other multilateral entities (including the World Bank), and foreign governments providing funding, expertise, coordination, and logistical assistance.
Classic Ebola outbreak control protocol entails
infection prevention control (IPC) in health care facilities; management and isolation of patients in Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs); fever surveillance with rapid diagnosis; tracing of Ebola cases and their contacts; and community awareness and adherence to IPC protocols, safe patient and body transport, safe burials, and household and environmental decontamination.
The extraordinary conditions on the ground in affected areas of eastern DRC have limited the effectiveness of conventional control measures, however, and are requiring ever-evolving strategies for containment, including aggressive vaccination campaigns (see text box below). Since the WHO declared the outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in July 2019, it has sought to garner additional donor funds, as well as international support for addressing the political and security issues affecting Ebola control.
In July 2019, the WHO and the DRC Ministry of Health (MoH) released a fourth strategic response plan to "definitively defeat" the Ebola epidemic ( Table 1 ). The strategic plan is expected to cost over $462 million, including about $288 million for the public health response portion ( Table 1 ). In July 2019, the World Bank announced that it would provide $300 million toward the plan, about half of which would support the public health response, on top of prior funding commitments (discussed below).
The public health portion of the strategic plan, covering July 1 through December 31, 2019, purportedly takes into account lessons learned from the third strategic response plan (February through July 2019). This portion of the plan is based on
strengthening political commitment, security, and operational support to improve acceptance of the response and access to insecure areas; deepening support for addressing the varied needs of communities affected by Ebola (beyond a single-minded focus on containment efforts), as a means toward fostering community ownership and involvement in Ebola responses; improving financial planning, monitoring and reporting; and bolstering preparedness of neighboring provinces and countries.
The World Bank has urged other countries to provide additional support, and the WHO Director-General has urged donors to address disbursement delays. As of September 11, 2019, the WHO had received less than $60 million of the $288 million it sought for the current phase of the public health response. The United States is the top country donor for the public health response and has provided almost $158 million for the Ebola humanitarian response, largely supporting activities by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as discussed below.
DRC Government Role
DRC government employees and other Congolese nationals are the primary responders to the Ebola epidemic on the ground. As WHO Executive Director for Health Emergencies Dr. Michael Ryan noted in June 2019, "If you go into the treatment facilities now it is Congolese doctors and nurses in the front line. There may be NGO or WHO badges on the tents but the doctors and nurses are Congolese; surveillance officers are Congolese; 80% of the vaccinators in this response are Congolese." The DRC government has provided health workers and administrative personnel, hired local frontline workers, organized volunteers, and conducted information awareness campaigns. The government has also offered certain health services free of charge in selected government health facilities, with donor support (discussed below).
From the start of the current outbreak, the DRC government's health responses were coordinated by the MoH, as in past Ebola outbreaks in DRC. In July 2019, however, President Tshisekedi transferred coordination responsibilities to an expert committee headed by the director of DRC's biomedical research institute, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe, who reports directly to the president. Dr. Muyembe is a recognized expert on Ebola who helped investigate the first known outbreak of the disease, in DRC in 1976. Then-Health Minister Dr. Oly Ilunga resigned following Dr. Muyembe's appointment, citing a dilution of his authority as well as confusion about the coordination of DRC government Ebola responses, an insufficient focus on the health system, and opposition to utilizing the Johnson & Johnson experimental vaccine (see text box above). Ilunga was subsequently the target of scathing criticism in the leaked report of a DRC government investigative commission, which indicated, among other things, that Ilunga and his team had displayed an "aggressive and ostentatious attitude" when visiting the outbreak area and had squandered Ebola response funds on fancy cars and hotel rooms. These developments have suggested an internal power struggle over policy and control of funds for Ebola response.
U.N. and Other Multilateral Organizations
Humanitarian experts, including U.S. officials, have repeatedly asserted that broader humanitarian access and security issues have stymied outbreak control efforts, and that international response efforts require increased coordination and transparency. In response to such concerns, in May 2019 U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres appointed MONUSCO Deputy Special Representative David Gressly, a U.S. citizen, to serve as a new U.N. Emergency Ebola Response Coordinator charged with establishing a "strengthened coordination and support mechanism" for Ebola response. While the WHO is to continue to lead "all health operations and technical support activities to the government," Gressly is leading a broader U.N.-wide effort to strengthen political engagement, financial tracking, humanitarian coordination, and "preparedness and readiness planning" for Goma and surrounding countries. Gressly, who continues to report to the head of MONUSCO, portrayed his new role as a reflection of the need for "more than just a public health response."
The WHO has deployed some 700 personnel to DRC since the current outbreak began. These personnel are coordinating the public health response and providing operational and technical support to DRC government personnel and other actors. Particular areas of focus include detection and rapid isolation of Ebola cases, intensification of rapid multidisciplinary public health actions for Ebola cases, community engagement, and health system strengthening. In addition, the WHO is coordinating regional readiness exercises and assessments in adjacent areas of DRC and neighboring countries. Vaccination and disease surveillance efforts have been bolstered in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.
The World Bank has stepped up its role in supporting the Ebola response effort since mid-2019. On July 24, the World Bank Group announced it was mobilizing up to $300 millionâto be financed through the Bank's International Development Association and its Crisis Response Windowâon top of $100 million disbursed previously through the International Development Association and the Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). The PEF announced a further $30 million disbursement for DRC on August 23, 2019. World Bank resources have financed free health care and essential medicines in clinics in all affected areas, hazard pay for frontline health workers, handwashing stations, mobile laboratories, decontamination teams, psychosocial support teams, community engagement campaigns, and vaccination efforts. The injection of new resources aims to build on existing World Bank support to strengthen the DRC health system.
The African Union (AU) Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has supported international response efforts by deploying members of its voluntary response corps to DRC and neighboring countries. Africa CDC voluntary responders include epidemiologists and anthropologists, as well as communication, laboratory, and logistics experts from various African countries who are "on standby for emergency deployment." To date, these responders have trained local health workers and community volunteers, set up laboratories, supplied personal protective equipment, and trained people in port-of-entry screening.
The U.S. Government Response
USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed staff to DRC and the region when the outbreak was first detected in August 2018. The United States is also the top country donor to the Ebola response effort, as noted above. As of September 10, USAID had announced more than $148 million for direct support to the Ebola response within DRC and another $9.8 million to support preparedness and prevention activities in neighboring countries. Those funds were drawn primarily ($156.1 million) from unobligated FY2015 International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds that Congress appropriated on an emergency basis for Ebola response during the West Africa outbreak ( P.L. 113-235 ). According to USAID, the available balance of FY2015 emergency IDA Ebola funds stood at $105.5 million as of September 9.
More broadly, the United States is the top bilateral humanitarian donor to DRC and the top financial contributor to MONUSCO, which is providing logistical and security support to Ebola response efforts. USAID Administrator Green testified before Congress in April 2019 that "there is sufficient money for fighting Ebola in DRC," asserting that nonfinancial challenges posed the primary constraint to containment efforts. U.S. funding commitments have continued to grow since then, however, as the outbreak has persisted and broadened.
U.S. personnel are providing technical support from Kinshasa, Goma, and neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, while implementing partners (U.N. agencies and NGOs) are administering Ebola response efforts within the outbreak zone with U.S. resources. The Administration has placed strict constraints on the movement of U.S. personnel to and within affected areas, due to security threats. In September 2018, USAID and CDC withdrew personnel from the immediate outbreak zone due to security concerns, despite CDC's stated preference to maintain staff in the field.
U.S. support for outbreak control has included the following:
USAID has provided grant funding to NGOs and U.N. entities carrying out Ebola response and preparedness activities, drawing primarily on IDA funds (as noted above). In October 2018, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to coordinate the U.S. response in support of the DRC government, the WHO, and other partners. USAID Ebola response funds have supported disease surveillance, infection prevention and control, safe and dignified burials, water and sanitation aid, prepositioning of medical supplies, humanitarian coordination, and logistics. U.S. bilateral economic and health aid funding for DRC has also supported programs that may ease humanitarian access or otherwise complement Ebola response activities.
CDC personnel have provided direct technical support to the DRC government, the WHO, and USAID's DART for disease surveillance, contact tracing, data management, infection protection and control, risk communication and community engagement, laboratory strengthening, emergency management, and surveillance at points of entry. CDC staff also have supported Ebola preparedness efforts in neighboring countries.
The Department of Defense has supplied laboratory training to Ugandan researchers and has partnered with them to conduct clinical Ebola vaccine trials.
Challenges
Security Threats and Political Tensions
Security threats have periodically forced the temporary cessation of Ebola case management in some areas, interrupted contact tracing, and frustrated surveillance efforts in high-transmission areas. Dozens of armed groups are active in the areas most affected by the outbreak. These include an array of local militias, along with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a relatively large and opaque group implicated in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, local military forces, and civilians. Road travel is often dangerous, with frequent reports of militia attacks, armed robbery, and kidnappings. In April 2019, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on local soldiers previously attributed to the ADF, the latest in a series of signs of emerging ties between the two. State security force personnel reportedly maintain ties with armed groups and have been implicated in atrocities, including civilian massacres in Beni territory since 2014.
Local mistrust of government officials and outsiders (including Congolese who are not from the immediate area)âsometimes rooted in conflict dynamics, ethnic tensions, and political frictionâhas prompted some community resistance to Ebola control efforts and led to attacks on health workers and facilities, including Ebola treatment centers. Some communities in Beni and Butembo have long opposed DRC's central government and complained of neglect and persecution. WHO officials have urged broader international support for "political mediation, engagement with opposition, and negotiated solutions," asserting that "[j]ust purely focusing on community engagement and participation will not fix what are deep seated political issues that need to be addressed at a higher level."
Perceptions that outsiders are profiting financially from the outbreak, or that international intervention is driven more by fear of contagion than concern for locals' wellbeing, appear to have fueled conspiracy theories and community resistance. At a July 15 donors event on Ebola response in Geneva, WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghabreyesusi said that Congolese in the outbreak zone had asked him, "Are you here to help us, or to prevent this thing from coming to you? Are you doing this for us, or for yourself?" He added, "It embarrasses me.⦠We should not appear to be seen as if we are parachuting in and out because of Ebola." DRC's then-Health Minister argued in the same meeting that local perceptions that the response was bringing cash into the region had fueled threats to health workers, including kidnappings.
Health System Constraints
Local perceptions that donors are more concerned with preventing the spread of Ebola to their countries than with helping Congolese communities are rooted, in part, in enduring health challenges. Maternal and infant deaths, for example, have for years regularly exceeded the current count of Ebola deaths but have received comparatively little attention. Authorities have redirected health resources in some areas for Ebola control, deepening local frustrations. Vaccination campaigns have also been interrupted in some Ebola hotspots. In Ituri province, for example, inadequate supply of measles vaccine has limited containment of a measles outbreak that began in January and has infected over 161,000 people, claiming over 3,000 lives. Health workers also are fighting a cholera outbreak that has infected over 15,000 people and killed at least 287.
The WHO has reported that Ebola transmission is likely occurring in ill-equipped and understaffed health facilities. Inconsistent adherence to infection prevention and control, periodic disruptions in supply chain systems, and limited access to water for handwashing in some health facilities have complicated Ebola control efforts. In addition, some health workers have refused to wear personal protective equipment in health facilities or perform rudimentary infection prevention and control measures due to threats of violence by some members of the community. As of August 27, 2019, 156 health workers had contracted Ebola, at least 34 of whom had died. The MoH, WHO, and other partners have identified health facilities of concern and are addressing lapses in triage, case detection, and infection prevention and control.
Reported Progress
Community Engagement. The WHO and implementing partners have worked to deepen local engagement, with some reported positive results. Local Ebola committees in Butembo and Katwa (at the center of the outbreak zone in North Kivu), for example, are chaired and managed by community members who plan Ebola awareness and sensitization campaigns. Improved community engagement has reportedly contributed to increased participation in vaccine campaigns and safe and dignified burial practices. For example, the WHO reported in July 2019 that a high-risk contact in Katwa had sought vaccination and offered to bring other contacts. In an effort to reduce the risk of transmission and broaden access to Ebola treatment and case finding, the WHO also plans to establish smaller patient transit centers closer to communities. Replicating engagement activities in emergent hot spots remains a challenge, however.
Ebola Therapeutics Advance. In August 2019, a clinical trial of four investigational Ebola treatments in DRC identified two "strong performers," leading the WHO to state that "these are the only drugs that future patients will be treated with." The trial, launched in late 2018, was co-sponsored by DRC's national biomedical research institute and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and was carried out by an international research consortium coordinated by the WHO.
Issues for Congress
U.S. Funding for DRC Ebola Response
In FY2015, in the context of the West Africa outbreak, Congress appropriated $5.1 billion for Ebola response and preparedness on an emergency basis, including $1.436 billion in multiyear International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds (Title IX of Division J, P.L. 113-235 ). U.S. funding for responding to the current outbreak has drawn primarily on the unobligated balance of these IDA funds. According to USAID, $105.5 million of these funds remained available for expenditure as of September 9, 2019. Should the outbreak continue or expand in new ways, Congress may consider what funding mechanisms, if any, the United States might use to support Ebola control. At the same time, the United States remains the lead country donor to the current Ebola response effort. Members may examine the U.S. role, vis-Ã -vis other actors (including other countries, multilateral entities, and private sources), in financing Ebola response activities, and may debate strategies for securing additional contributions from other donors.
U.S. Aid Restrictions Related to Trafficking in Persons
DRC is ranked as "Tier III" (worst) under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, P.L. 106-386 , as amended), which triggers prohibitions on certain types of U.S. aid absent a full or partial presidential waiver. In FY2019, in a departure from previous practice, President Trump did not partially waive the restrictions for DRC. Thus, pursuant to the TVPA, no "nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related" assistance may be provided "to the government" of DRC.
IDA funds, the core source of funding for U.S. Ebola response support to date, are exempt from the TVPA restrictions (22 U.S.C. §7102[10]). The TVPA further exempts economic and development assistance "in support of programs of nongovernmental organizations." In practice, the Administration has interpreted the TVPA restrictions to apply broadly to various programs funded through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts, including some that would be implemented by NGOs, though it has not publicly provided a full account of affected activities. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that some U.S. assistance that could help promote humanitarian access in Ebola-affected areas has been held up as a result. Testifying before the Senate in July 2019, a senior USAID official affirmed that some FY2018 aid resources that could help with Ebola control remained restricted in connection with the TVPA, but he and other Administration witnesses did not provide further details.
Two bills introduced in the 116 th Congress ( S. 1340 , the Ebola Eradication Act of 2019, and H.R. 3085 , a House companion bill) would authorize assistance for a range of activities that could help lower community resistance or otherwise support Ebola control efforts in DRC and neighboring states, "notwithstanding" the TVPA restrictions. S. 1340 passed the Senate on September 23, 2019. Similar language was included in a draft FY2020 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations bill circulated by the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 18, 2019. That bill would also broadly provide at least $298.3 million in U.S. bilateral assistance for "stabilization, global health, and bilateral economic assistance" to DRCâslightly higher than the U.S. allocation for DRC in recent years, not counting food aidâ"including in areas affected by, and at risk from, the Ebola virus disease."
Global Health Security
The current Ebola outbreak has prompted resumption of discussions about strengthening health systems worldwide, particularly with regard to pandemic preparedness. In 2014, during the Obama Administration, the United States and the WHO co-launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to improve countries' ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. The United States, the largest donor to this multilateral effort, pledged to support it with $1 billion from FY2015 through FY2019. The Trump Administration has built on these efforts. In May 2019, the White House released the United States Government Global Health Security Strategy , which outlined the U.S. role in extending the Global Health Security Agenda and improving global health security worldwide. Although the Trump Administration, through the strategy and public statements, has supported extending the GHSA through 2024, officials have not provided comprehensive information on what that support would entail.
Members of Congress may continue to debate what role, if any, the United States should play in supporting global health system strengthening efforts to bolster global health security, and whether to adjust funding levels to meet ongoing and future infectious disease threats. Through regular appropriations, disease outbreak prevention and global health security efforts are funded through USAID pandemic influenza and CDC global health protection line items ( Table 2 ).
On September 19, 2019, the House passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Health Extenders Act of 2019 ( H.R. 4378 ), which would authorize the transfer to the CDC of up to $20 million for Ebola preparedness and response activities from the Infectious Disease Rapid Response Reserve Fund. Other relevant bills introduced in the 116 th Congress include H.R. 2166 , which would codify U.S. engagement in the GHSA as specified in an executive order issued by the Obama Administration, and H.R. 826 , which seeks to facilitate research and treatment of neglected tropical diseases, including Ebola. | Summary: | gov_report | 1,024 | null | 2 |
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