text: Triablogue: Infinite loss, infinite comeuppance
  donsands10/07/2011 8:44 AMDeep subject. Some good thoughts. It's such a terrifying thought for people I know. They can't embrace infinite hell for others. Understandable.Have a great weekend, and especially Lord's day, in our Savior's care and love.ReplyDeleteMarc10/07/2011 11:10 AMSteve:Interesting thought experiments, but I wonder if they prove too much. If the punishment we assign to the perpetrator is based upon what the victim is prevented from experiencing, then it seems possible to justify assigning infinite punishment for exceedingly minor offenses. That is, if the duration of the punishment should be directly proportional to the duration of the "good" the victim was prevented from experiencing, then it would appear that seemingly minor offenses should deserve infinite punishment. But that seems highly implausible, so perhaps there's a problem with the manner in which we're assigning punishment in these cases.For example, suppose you're about to help an elderly lady cross the street while carrying her groceries for her -- a morally good act. But before you can begin assisting the lady, I throw a water balloon at your head, the explosion of which causes you to be drenched. Distracted, you temporarily forget about helping the lady, and she struggles to cross the street on her own before your realize it. Now, had you helped the lady, you could've gone to heaven and enjoyed the everlasting (or infinite) memory of having done a morally good deed. Instead, however, you were deprived of experiencing this infinite good. But does this entail that I deserve infinite punishment?Also, I wonder if the principle you're attempting to resist is (or should be) formulated differently. Perhaps the principle isn't: a finite offense can't possibly deserve infinite punishment simpliciter. This appears to suggest that virtually any punishment will be prohibited as long as it's everlasting -- such as everlasting incarceration. Rather, perhaps the principle is something like: a finite offense can't possibly deserve infinite punishment in hell. This formulation might have the benefit of allowing one to accept your counterexamples (to the first principle) without also accepting the conclusion that the (second) principle is falsified. Indeed, the second formulation seems to be a weaker version of the principle, but maybe that increases its plausibility (as well as its relevance to the debate about the nature of hell).ReplyDeleteJacob10/07/2011 10:21 PMThere are a number of flaws in these hypotheticals, particularly #2.ReplyDeleteJim Pemberton10/07/2011 11:15 PMI think these thought experiments are about as good you can get. They are certainly more thoughtful than the argument they are answering.Can you unpack the equivocal, or have you done it in the past? My take:Hell is punishment, but I'm not certain that the Bible supports it as punishment for discreet, or "finite", misdeeds. Rather, we're identified with Christ under His atonement by the life-giving work of the Holy Spirit...or we're not.The punishment is punishment we all deserve by being identified as the progeny of fallen Adam, and sharing in that fallen nature, not from discreet acts that come as a result of that fallen nature. What we are given as Christians is eternal life from what would be otherwise be eternal death.ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 8:10 AMi) Marc, I’m simply responding to the standard formulation a standard annihilationist objection to hell. Its primary appeal lies in its prima facie simplicity: the alleged disparity between the finitude of the offence and the infinitude of the punishment, along with the stipulated principle that an infinite punishment for a finite crime is unjust.If, however, some finite crimes entail infinite harm, then the relevant point of comparison is not between the finitude of the deed and the infinitude of the punishment, but between the infinitude of the result and the infinitude of the punishment. The effect and the punishment are symmetrical. ii) You can, of course, try to improve on the standard formulation. Tack on various qualifications. But that doesn’t invalidate my response to the standard formulation. Rather, you’re introducing a different objection. iii) Moreover, if you present a more sophisticated formulation, that comes at a cost. For you lose the simplistic appeal of the original formulation. In addition, if you can refine the objection, I can refine the counterexamples.iv) Apropos (iii), my hypothetical counterexamples didn’t merely involve the infliction of infinite harm, but criminal intent. A malevolent perpetrator.v) Now perhaps you’d say the perpetrator must intend infinite harm to merit infinite punishment. If so, I think that’s excessive. Is it not sufficient to say the perpetrator is both malevolent and indifferent to the degree of harm? He doesn’t care whether or not the harm he inflicts on the victim is finite or infinite. And his very indifference (as well as malevolence) would be culpable. Perhaps you’d dispute that, but we’re now skin-diving in very murky waters. The objection has lost its intuitive clarity. No longer a straightforward contrast between what’s finite and what’s infinite, but more subtle distinctions.ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 8:14 AMEd,Your copy/paste objections are irrelevant to my argument. I confined my analysis to the alleged asymmetry between the finitude of the crime and the infinitude of the punishment. Your extraneous objections are beside the point.ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 8:15 AMJacob,That's not a counterargument.ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 9:15 AMMARC SAID:"Rather, perhaps the principle is something like: a finite offense can't possibly deserve infinite punishment in hell."But in that case the principle isn't based on the alleged asymmetry between finite crime and infinite punishment, but on the nature of hell.ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 10:25 AMMARC SAID:"Interesting thought experiments, but I wonder if they prove too much. If the punishment we assign to the perpetrator is based upon what the victim is prevented from experiencing, then it seems possible to justify assigning infinite punishment for exceedingly minor offenses. That is, if the duration of the punishment should be directly proportional to the duration of the 'good' the victim was prevented from experiencing, then it would appear that seemingly minor offenses should deserve infinite punishment. But that seems highly implausible, so perhaps there's a problem with the manner in which we're assigning punishment in these cases."i) But does that mean my argument is implausible, or does that expose the implausibility of the annihilationist principle (i.e. principle of proportionality)?The consequences of my argument flow from the annihilationist principle, which I grant for the sake of argument, then carry to a logical conclusion. ii) I could add a caveat to distinguish trivial infinite loss/harm from serious infinite loss/harm. iii) However, your objection ultimately targets the equivocal nature of the finite/infinite contrast. But that's not a problem for me. That's a problem for a popular objection to hell.ReplyDeleteBen10/08/2011 12:57 PMDo you suppose, Steve, that finite beings can genuinely conceive of what they have done in having deprived someone of an everlasting good? Can you punish a child for something beyond their moral conception?ReplyDeletesteve10/08/2011 2:32 PMI've given some examples which are easily conceivable.ReplyDeleteAdd commentLoad more...
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