Replication Data for: Heeding to the Losers: Legislators’ Trade Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Electoral incentives affect legislators’ responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators’ responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll-call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators’ trade policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, ar' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["legislative behavior","political representation","party discipline","constituent demands","trade policy","survey experiments"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Electoral incentives affect legislators’ responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators’ responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll-call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators’ trade policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, ar' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Electoral incentives affect legislators’ responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators’ responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll-call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators’ trade policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, ar
legislative behavior; political representation; party discipline; constituent demands; trade policy; survey experiments