Replication Data for: 'Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline' by David Fortunato and Matt W. Loftis
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences.  We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we sho' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["cabinet duration","fiscal discipline","political budget cycles"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences.  We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we sho' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Government durability is critically important, yet the supply of research devoted to its causes far exceeds the supply of research devoted to its consequences.  We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that 1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and 2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we sho
cabinet duration; fiscal discipline; political budget cycles