Replication Data for: Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies.  Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations.  This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities.  Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’  ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only?  I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition fromCongress—extend to the president’s ability to initiate covert operations.   By examining the trade-off betw' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["covert operations, us foreign policy, Congress, elite constraints, military force"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies.  Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations.  This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities.  Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’  ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only?  I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition fromCongress—extend to the president’s ability to initiate covert operations.   By examining the trade-off betw' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies.  Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations.  This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities.  Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’  ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only?  I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition fromCongress—extend to the president’s ability to initiate covert operations.   By examining the trade-off betw
covert operations, us foreign policy, Congress, elite constraints, military force