Replication Data for: Compliance and Truthfulness: Leveraging Peer Information with Competitive Audit Mechanisms
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How to design audit mechanisms that harness the benefits of self-reporting forachieving compliance with regulatory targets while limiting misreporting is a pressingquestion in many regulatory contexts, from climate policies to public health. Contrastingrandom audit and competitive audit mechanisms, this paper theoretically andexperimentally studies their performance in regulating socially undesirable emissionswhen peer information about others’ emissions is present or absent. Our focus is onthe compliance of emission levels with regulatory targets, going beyond existing resultson truthfulness of reporting. Confirming theoretical predictions, the experiment showsthat in contrast to the random audit mechanism, the competitive audit mechanism canleverage peer information for compliance: emission levels are closer to the socialopt' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Regulation","compliance","tournament theory","online experiment"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How to design audit mechanisms that harness the benefits of self-reporting forachieving compliance with regulatory targets while limiting misreporting is a pressingquestion in many regulatory contexts, from climate policies to public health. Contrastingrandom audit and competitive audit mechanisms, this paper theoretically andexperimentally studies their performance in regulating socially undesirable emissionswhen peer information about others’ emissions is present or absent. Our focus is onthe compliance of emission levels with regulatory targets, going beyond existing resultson truthfulness of reporting. Confirming theoretical predictions, the experiment showsthat in contrast to the random audit mechanism, the competitive audit mechanism canleverage peer information for compliance: emission levels are closer to the socialopt' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How to design audit mechanisms that harness the benefits of self-reporting forachieving compliance with regulatory targets while limiting misreporting is a pressingquestion in many regulatory contexts, from climate policies to public health. Contrastingrandom audit and competitive audit mechanisms, this paper theoretically andexperimentally studies their performance in regulating socially undesirable emissionswhen peer information about others’ emissions is present or absent. Our focus is onthe compliance of emission levels with regulatory targets, going beyond existing resultson truthfulness of reporting. Confirming theoretical predictions, the experiment showsthat in contrast to the random audit mechanism, the competitive audit mechanism canleverage peer information for compliance: emission levels are closer to the socialopt
Regulation; compliance; tournament theory; online experiment