Replication Data for: Legislative Resources, Corruption, and Incumbency
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Data and code to replicate results reported in 'Legislative Resources, Corruption, and Incumbency.' Abstract: Members of some legislatures enjoy long political careers, whereas elsewhere turnover is rampant. This variation is consequential, since high-incumbency assemblies may facilitate legislative expertise at the expense of social representation. We explore cross-national differences in re-election (incumbency) rates by identifying 'supply' conditions such as legislative resources that benefit incumbents, as well as 'demand' conditions such as political corruption that affect voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents. We hypothesize that legislative perquisites help incumbents win re-election only if there is relatively high public confidence in politics, as reflected in low corruption levels. We test our argument using instrumental' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Corruption","Cross-National Analysis","Incumbency","Legislatures"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Data and code to replicate results reported in 'Legislative Resources, Corruption, and Incumbency.' Abstract: Members of some legislatures enjoy long political careers, whereas elsewhere turnover is rampant. This variation is consequential, since high-incumbency assemblies may facilitate legislative expertise at the expense of social representation. We explore cross-national differences in re-election (incumbency) rates by identifying 'supply' conditions such as legislative resources that benefit incumbents, as well as 'demand' conditions such as political corruption that affect voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents. We hypothesize that legislative perquisites help incumbents win re-election only if there is relatively high public confidence in politics, as reflected in low corruption levels. We test our argument using instrumental' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Data and code to replicate results reported in 'Legislative Resources, Corruption, and Incumbency.' Abstract: Members of some legislatures enjoy long political careers, whereas elsewhere turnover is rampant. This variation is consequential, since high-incumbency assemblies may facilitate legislative expertise at the expense of social representation. We explore cross-national differences in re-election (incumbency) rates by identifying 'supply' conditions such as legislative resources that benefit incumbents, as well as 'demand' conditions such as political corruption that affect voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents. We hypothesize that legislative perquisites help incumbents win re-election only if there is relatively high public confidence in politics, as reflected in low corruption levels. We test our argument using instrumental
Corruption; Cross-National Analysis; Incumbency; Legislatures