Replication Data for: Good Times and Bad Apples: Rebel Recruitment in Crackdown and Truce
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Even in long-running civil conflicts, governments may permit rebels to recruit and gather resources freely during years-long truce periods. Scholars and policymakers assume that these periods of forbearance allow rebel organizations to gather strength unchecked. Instead, with innovative evidence from five conflict zones in Northeast India, I show how leniency can actually undermine rebel organizations in the long run. Despite rebel leaders' best efforts, safety and comfort attract selfish opportunists who may later desert in battle, defect to the enemy, or abuse civilians. First, I show experimentally that the benefits of leniency disproportionately attract low-commitment recruits. By sampling in local recruitment hotspots, I gathered nearly 400 likely rebel recruits, testing their motivations with attitudinal questions and a conjoint s' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Armistices","Civil conflict","Experiments","Rebel organizations","Rebel recruitment"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Even in long-running civil conflicts, governments may permit rebels to recruit and gather resources freely during years-long truce periods. Scholars and policymakers assume that these periods of forbearance allow rebel organizations to gather strength unchecked. Instead, with innovative evidence from five conflict zones in Northeast India, I show how leniency can actually undermine rebel organizations in the long run. Despite rebel leaders' best efforts, safety and comfort attract selfish opportunists who may later desert in battle, defect to the enemy, or abuse civilians. First, I show experimentally that the benefits of leniency disproportionately attract low-commitment recruits. By sampling in local recruitment hotspots, I gathered nearly 400 likely rebel recruits, testing their motivations with attitudinal questions and a conjoint s' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Even in long-running civil conflicts, governments may permit rebels to recruit and gather resources freely during years-long truce periods. Scholars and policymakers assume that these periods of forbearance allow rebel organizations to gather strength unchecked. Instead, with innovative evidence from five conflict zones in Northeast India, I show how leniency can actually undermine rebel organizations in the long run. Despite rebel leaders' best efforts, safety and comfort attract selfish opportunists who may later desert in battle, defect to the enemy, or abuse civilians. First, I show experimentally that the benefits of leniency disproportionately attract low-commitment recruits. By sampling in local recruitment hotspots, I gathered nearly 400 likely rebel recruits, testing their motivations with attitudinal questions and a conjoint s
Armistices; Civil conflict; Experiments; Rebel organizations; Rebel recruitment