Moral Hazard at Sea: How Alliances Actually Increase Low-Level Maritime Provocations between Allies
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict; mainly shows of force or what we call maritime provocations, and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to provoke defending states using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional secu' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Alliances, Security, maritime disputes, International Customary Law"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict; mainly shows of force or what we call maritime provocations, and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to provoke defending states using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional secu' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict; mainly shows of force or what we call maritime provocations, and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to provoke defending states using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional secu
Alliances, Security, maritime disputes, International Customary Law