Development or Rent-Seeking? How Political Influence Shapes Public Works Provision in India
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do politicians with influence over public works programs balance their incentives to gain electoral support with their proclivities for rent-seeking? This research argues that government elites in parliamentary systems manage this trade-off by concentrating rent-seeking opportunities in their own hands while facilitating efficient public goods provision in the constituencies of their more junior partisan colleagues. Analyses using fine-grained data on road construction in India based on a variety of causal inference strategies support the argument. While ruling party legislators showed higher levels of road provision in their constituencies regardless of ministerial status, road projects in ministers' constituencies showed higher levels of rent-seeking than those in the constituencies of other ruling party legislators. Moreover, con' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Corruption","India","Public Goods"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do politicians with influence over public works programs balance their incentives to gain electoral support with their proclivities for rent-seeking? This research argues that government elites in parliamentary systems manage this trade-off by concentrating rent-seeking opportunities in their own hands while facilitating efficient public goods provision in the constituencies of their more junior partisan colleagues. Analyses using fine-grained data on road construction in India based on a variety of causal inference strategies support the argument. While ruling party legislators showed higher levels of road provision in their constituencies regardless of ministerial status, road projects in ministers' constituencies showed higher levels of rent-seeking than those in the constituencies of other ruling party legislators. Moreover, con' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How do politicians with influence over public works programs balance their incentives to gain electoral support with their proclivities for rent-seeking? This research argues that government elites in parliamentary systems manage this trade-off by concentrating rent-seeking opportunities in their own hands while facilitating efficient public goods provision in the constituencies of their more junior partisan colleagues. Analyses using fine-grained data on road construction in India based on a variety of causal inference strategies support the argument. While ruling party legislators showed higher levels of road provision in their constituencies regardless of ministerial status, road projects in ministers' constituencies showed higher levels of rent-seeking than those in the constituencies of other ruling party legislators. Moreover, con
Corruption; India; Public Goods