Connections as Liabilities: The Cost of the Politics--Business Revolving Door in China
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This paper theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in the early years of a major corruption crackdown in China. I show that firm-level returns on revolving-door recruitment become negative during this period. In contrast to conventional corporate governance explanations, the mechanism proposed in this paper emphasizes the external perceptions and financing of firms. Text analyses of over 1 million equity reports and bank loan record data show that poli' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Anticorruption Campaign","China","Firm Performance","Political Risk","Politics-Business Revolving Door"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This paper theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in the early years of a major corruption crackdown in China. I show that firm-level returns on revolving-door recruitment become negative during this period. In contrast to conventional corporate governance explanations, the mechanism proposed in this paper emphasizes the external perceptions and financing of firms. Text analyses of over 1 million equity reports and bank loan record data show that poli' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This paper theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in the early years of a major corruption crackdown in China. I show that firm-level returns on revolving-door recruitment become negative during this period. In contrast to conventional corporate governance explanations, the mechanism proposed in this paper emphasizes the external perceptions and financing of firms. Text analyses of over 1 million equity reports and bank loan record data show that poli
Anticorruption Campaign; China; Firm Performance; Political Risk; Politics-Business Revolving Door