Replication Data for: Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision-making during war.  Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents.  I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat.  These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war.  These propositions are tested on an original dataset identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Civil war","Leaders","Termination of war"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision-making during war.  Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents.  I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat.  These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war.  These propositions are tested on an original dataset identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision-making during war.  Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents.  I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat.  These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war.  These propositions are tested on an original dataset identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civi
Civil war; Leaders; Termination of war