Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion under Autocracy
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'During the most recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined.  In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected.  This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories.  We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. In a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue tha' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["China, Vietnam, Promotion, Factions, Performance, Public Opinion"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'During the most recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined.  In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected.  This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories.  We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. In a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue tha' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
During the most recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined.  In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected.  This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories.  We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. In a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue tha
China, Vietnam, Promotion, Factions, Performance, Public Opinion