Replication Data for: Investor Rights versus Human Rights:  Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to foreign investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we explain that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypoth' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Bilateral Investment Treaties","Democracy","Human Rights"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to foreign investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we explain that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypoth' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to foreign investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we explain that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypoth
Bilateral Investment Treaties ; Democracy; Human Rights