Electoral Dis-connection: The Limits of Accountability in Weak Institutional Environments
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Conventional academic wisdom holds that the “carrot and stick' of re-election helps voters reign in poorly performing politicians.   Empirical research suggests, however, that achieving electoral accountability is harder in practice than in theory.  Electoral accountability requires what Mayhew (1974) famously called the electoral connection: what links politicians to voters is their desire for reelection and their ability to secure it by performing well in office. Though political parties play a fundamental role in maintaining that connection, ensuring support for incumbents through partisan loyalty and incentivizing good performance, scholars know little about the impact on the electoral connection when party systems collapse.  Through a sub-national study of Peruvian mayoral politics, I show that where par' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["electoral accountability","Latin America","re-election","voting behavior"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Conventional academic wisdom holds that the “carrot and stick' of re-election helps voters reign in poorly performing politicians.   Empirical research suggests, however, that achieving electoral accountability is harder in practice than in theory.  Electoral accountability requires what Mayhew (1974) famously called the electoral connection: what links politicians to voters is their desire for reelection and their ability to secure it by performing well in office. Though political parties play a fundamental role in maintaining that connection, ensuring support for incumbents through partisan loyalty and incentivizing good performance, scholars know little about the impact on the electoral connection when party systems collapse.  Through a sub-national study of Peruvian mayoral politics, I show that where par' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Conventional academic wisdom holds that the “carrot and stick' of re-election helps voters reign in poorly performing politicians.   Empirical research suggests, however, that achieving electoral accountability is harder in practice than in theory.  Electoral accountability requires what Mayhew (1974) famously called the electoral connection: what links politicians to voters is their desire for reelection and their ability to secure it by performing well in office. Though political parties play a fundamental role in maintaining that connection, ensuring support for incumbents through partisan loyalty and incentivizing good performance, scholars know little about the impact on the electoral connection when party systems collapse.  Through a sub-national study of Peruvian mayoral politics, I show that where par
electoral accountability; Latin America; re-election; voting behavior