Replication Data for: 'Targeting Ordinary Voters or Political Elites?: Why Pork is Distributed Along Partisan Lines in India'
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases when allocating public resources.  While previous studies posit that such biases are driven by politicians' motivations to target benefits directly to certain groups of ordinary voters, this paper develops the argument that national politicians also target pork along partisan lines to win over political incumbents at lower levels of government whose co-operation they need to ensure the successful implementation of development projects. Using a quasi-experimental design, the argument is tested with data on thousands of public works projects sanctioned by MPs in North India. The results show that, even controlling for unobserved differences in voter characteristics, MPs systematically favored the constituencies of co-partisan state legislator' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Distributive politics","Public service provision"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases when allocating public resources.  While previous studies posit that such biases are driven by politicians' motivations to target benefits directly to certain groups of ordinary voters, this paper develops the argument that national politicians also target pork along partisan lines to win over political incumbents at lower levels of government whose co-operation they need to ensure the successful implementation of development projects. Using a quasi-experimental design, the argument is tested with data on thousands of public works projects sanctioned by MPs in North India. The results show that, even controlling for unobserved differences in voter characteristics, MPs systematically favored the constituencies of co-partisan state legislator' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
A key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases when allocating public resources.  While previous studies posit that such biases are driven by politicians' motivations to target benefits directly to certain groups of ordinary voters, this paper develops the argument that national politicians also target pork along partisan lines to win over political incumbents at lower levels of government whose co-operation they need to ensure the successful implementation of development projects. Using a quasi-experimental design, the argument is tested with data on thousands of public works projects sanctioned by MPs in North India. The results show that, even controlling for unobserved differences in voter characteristics, MPs systematically favored the constituencies of co-partisan state legislator
Distributive politics; Public service provision