Replication Data for: To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This paper studies the consequences of digital surveillance in dictatorships. I first develop an informational theory of repression and co-optation. I argue that digital surveillance resolves an information problem all dictators face: they do not know individual citizens' true anti-regime sentiments. By identifying radical opponents, digital surveillance enables dictators to substitute targeted repression for non-exclusive co-optation to forestall coordinated uprisings. My theory implies that as digital surveillance technologies advance, we should observe a rise in targeted repression and a decline in universal redistribution. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits temporal variation in digital surveillance systems among Chinese counties, I find that surveillance increases local governments' public security expenditure an' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Co-optation","Dictatorship","Digital surveillance","Information resources","Repression"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This paper studies the consequences of digital surveillance in dictatorships. I first develop an informational theory of repression and co-optation. I argue that digital surveillance resolves an information problem all dictators face: they do not know individual citizens' true anti-regime sentiments. By identifying radical opponents, digital surveillance enables dictators to substitute targeted repression for non-exclusive co-optation to forestall coordinated uprisings. My theory implies that as digital surveillance technologies advance, we should observe a rise in targeted repression and a decline in universal redistribution. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits temporal variation in digital surveillance systems among Chinese counties, I find that surveillance increases local governments' public security expenditure an' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
This paper studies the consequences of digital surveillance in dictatorships. I first develop an informational theory of repression and co-optation. I argue that digital surveillance resolves an information problem all dictators face: they do not know individual citizens' true anti-regime sentiments. By identifying radical opponents, digital surveillance enables dictators to substitute targeted repression for non-exclusive co-optation to forestall coordinated uprisings. My theory implies that as digital surveillance technologies advance, we should observe a rise in targeted repression and a decline in universal redistribution. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits temporal variation in digital surveillance systems among Chinese counties, I find that surveillance increases local governments' public security expenditure an
Co-optation; Dictatorship; Digital surveillance; Information resources; Repression