Intertemporal Choice and Income Regularity: Non-Fungibility in the Timing of Income Among Kenyan Farmers
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The optimal design of informal contracts in agricultural value chains depends on when farmers prefer to be paid for their output. While the evidence from the timepreference experiments suggests a preference for early payments, ﬁeld studies often indicate that farmers will defer regular payments if given the opportunity. In this study, we explicitly test whether farmers are more patient regarding regular, earned income than regarding experimental windfall payments. We asked farmers in a dairy cooperative in Kenya to allocate both their milk income and a one-time gift between an early and a deferred payment date. We ﬁnd that a large majority of participants deferred their milk payments, while rarely choosing to defer the gift. Participants’ survey responses suggest that we observe this diﬀerence because of mental accounting: participants' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["AFRICA","AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA","dairy","EAST AFRICA","field experimentation","income","KENYA","marketing","markets","supply chain","value chains"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The optimal design of informal contracts in agricultural value chains depends on when farmers prefer to be paid for their output. While the evidence from the timepreference experiments suggests a preference for early payments, ﬁeld studies often indicate that farmers will defer regular payments if given the opportunity. In this study, we explicitly test whether farmers are more patient regarding regular, earned income than regarding experimental windfall payments. We asked farmers in a dairy cooperative in Kenya to allocate both their milk income and a one-time gift between an early and a deferred payment date. We ﬁnd that a large majority of participants deferred their milk payments, while rarely choosing to defer the gift. Participants’ survey responses suggest that we observe this diﬀerence because of mental accounting: participants' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The optimal design of informal contracts in agricultural value chains depends on when farmers prefer to be paid for their output. While the evidence from the timepreference experiments suggests a preference for early payments, ﬁeld studies often indicate that farmers will defer regular payments if given the opportunity. In this study, we explicitly test whether farmers are more patient regarding regular, earned income than regarding experimental windfall payments. We asked farmers in a dairy cooperative in Kenya to allocate both their milk income and a one-time gift between an early and a deferred payment date. We ﬁnd that a large majority of participants deferred their milk payments, while rarely choosing to defer the gift. Participants’ survey responses suggest that we observe this diﬀerence because of mental accounting: participants
AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; dairy; EAST AFRICA; field experimentation; income; KENYA; marketing; markets; supply chain; value chains