Replication Data for: Sleeping with the Enemy: Effective Representation Under Dynamic Electoral Competition
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties---among other unconventional electoral strategies---may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics.  However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations.  We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short-term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future.  This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections.  We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995-2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Dynamic electoral competition","Electoral coalitions","Entrenched incumbency","Regression discontinuity design","Structural estimation"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties---among other unconventional electoral strategies---may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics.  However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations.  We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short-term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future.  This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections.  We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995-2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties---among other unconventional electoral strategies---may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics.  However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations.  We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short-term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future.  This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections.  We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995-2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have
Dynamic electoral competition; Electoral coalitions; Entrenched incumbency; Regression discontinuity design; Structural estimation