Replication Data for: Reforming Global Governance: Power, Alliance, and Institutional Performance
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, we consider this question also in more 'business-as-usual' periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. We argue that allies of IOs' leading stakeholders benefit more than non-aligned countries; however, we also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to non-allied members. We theorize that while IO officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to non-allies during periods of poor IO performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Pairing statistical analysis using an original dataset of reforms at the World Bank between 1944-2018 with qualitative evidence, we fin' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["global governance","international institutions","power","reform","World Bank"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, we consider this question also in more 'business-as-usual' periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. We argue that allies of IOs' leading stakeholders benefit more than non-aligned countries; however, we also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to non-allied members. We theorize that while IO officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to non-allies during periods of poor IO performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Pairing statistical analysis using an original dataset of reforms at the World Bank between 1944-2018 with qualitative evidence, we fin' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
A large literature analyzes the determinants of change in international institutions, focusing on the role of systemic political and economic shocks. However, we consider this question also in more 'business-as-usual' periods, asking when institutions of global governance reform and which states benefit from these changes. We argue that allies of IOs' leading stakeholders benefit more than non-aligned countries; however, we also document that reforms sometimes contain concessions to non-allied members. We theorize that while IO officials reward major stakeholders' allies in normal times, they provide concessions to non-allies during periods of poor IO performance to prevent these states from disengaging. Pairing statistical analysis using an original dataset of reforms at the World Bank between 1944-2018 with qualitative evidence, we fin
global governance; international institutions; power; reform; World Bank