Replication Data for: Public Awareness and the Behavior of Unpopular Courts
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Scholars have long debated the positive and negative consequences of an aware public for the quality of governance in modern liberal democracies. This paper extends this debate to the context of constitutional review by exploring how public awareness can limit the effective exercise of review by courts lacking strong public support. Incorporating aspects of both the legitimacy and separation of powers theories on judicial power, I argue that public awareness weakens the efficacy of such unpopular courts by creating an electoral incentive for governments to defy adverse rulings, even when doing so may lead to punishment from other institutional stakeholders. In this article, I develop a simple formal model that identifies how and under what conditions public awareness can influence an unpopular court’s decision making. An analysis of rul' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Comparative judicial politics","Court of Justice of the European Union"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Scholars have long debated the positive and negative consequences of an aware public for the quality of governance in modern liberal democracies. This paper extends this debate to the context of constitutional review by exploring how public awareness can limit the effective exercise of review by courts lacking strong public support. Incorporating aspects of both the legitimacy and separation of powers theories on judicial power, I argue that public awareness weakens the efficacy of such unpopular courts by creating an electoral incentive for governments to defy adverse rulings, even when doing so may lead to punishment from other institutional stakeholders. In this article, I develop a simple formal model that identifies how and under what conditions public awareness can influence an unpopular court’s decision making. An analysis of rul' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Scholars have long debated the positive and negative consequences of an aware public for the quality of governance in modern liberal democracies. This paper extends this debate to the context of constitutional review by exploring how public awareness can limit the effective exercise of review by courts lacking strong public support. Incorporating aspects of both the legitimacy and separation of powers theories on judicial power, I argue that public awareness weakens the efficacy of such unpopular courts by creating an electoral incentive for governments to defy adverse rulings, even when doing so may lead to punishment from other institutional stakeholders. In this article, I develop a simple formal model that identifies how and under what conditions public awareness can influence an unpopular court’s decision making. An analysis of rul
Comparative judicial politics; Court of Justice of the European Union