Replication Data for: In-House Vs. Outsourced Trolls: How Digital Mercenaries Shape State Influence Strategies
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'When governments run influence operations they may leverage in-house capabilities, outsource to digital mercenaries, or use a combination of these strategies. We theorize that governments outsource because it provides plausible deniability if the operation is uncovered, and offers access to cutting-edge influence tactics beyond those common to established government institutions. Using data from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, we test implications of this theory via two covert online influence campaign case studies, each focused on Syria, executed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (colloquially known as the GRU), and by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a privately owned company. We find that the GRU focused on the creation of front media properties that produced longform journalistic content, an established tactic more amena' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["disinformation","social media"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'When governments run influence operations they may leverage in-house capabilities, outsource to digital mercenaries, or use a combination of these strategies. We theorize that governments outsource because it provides plausible deniability if the operation is uncovered, and offers access to cutting-edge influence tactics beyond those common to established government institutions. Using data from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, we test implications of this theory via two covert online influence campaign case studies, each focused on Syria, executed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (colloquially known as the GRU), and by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a privately owned company. We find that the GRU focused on the creation of front media properties that produced longform journalistic content, an established tactic more amena' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
When governments run influence operations they may leverage in-house capabilities, outsource to digital mercenaries, or use a combination of these strategies. We theorize that governments outsource because it provides plausible deniability if the operation is uncovered, and offers access to cutting-edge influence tactics beyond those common to established government institutions. Using data from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, we test implications of this theory via two covert online influence campaign case studies, each focused on Syria, executed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (colloquially known as the GRU), and by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a privately owned company. We find that the GRU focused on the creation of front media properties that produced longform journalistic content, an established tactic more amena
disinformation; social media