Replication Data for: Money Can’t Buy You Love: Partisan Responses to Vote-Buying Offers in Modern Democracy
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Current theory on vote buying treats benefits instrumentally as income replacements that always increase utility for the machine. But many recipients react negatively. I argue that responses to selective benefits spring from partisan bias, with opponents motivated to reject a machine that attempts to buy their vote. This new partisan response model helps explain why machines target many supporters, why many opponents remain unpersuaded by selective benefits, and why the electoral return from vote buying is often lower than assumed. Tests using conjoint survey experiments in Mexico shows that initial opponents are nearly 9 percentage points less likely to vote for the machine, whereas initial supporters are almost 15 percentage points more likely to vote for it, holding benefits constant. Mediation analysis reveals that initial supporter' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Clientelism","Elections","Vote buying","Voting behavior"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Current theory on vote buying treats benefits instrumentally as income replacements that always increase utility for the machine. But many recipients react negatively. I argue that responses to selective benefits spring from partisan bias, with opponents motivated to reject a machine that attempts to buy their vote. This new partisan response model helps explain why machines target many supporters, why many opponents remain unpersuaded by selective benefits, and why the electoral return from vote buying is often lower than assumed. Tests using conjoint survey experiments in Mexico shows that initial opponents are nearly 9 percentage points less likely to vote for the machine, whereas initial supporters are almost 15 percentage points more likely to vote for it, holding benefits constant. Mediation analysis reveals that initial supporter' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Current theory on vote buying treats benefits instrumentally as income replacements that always increase utility for the machine. But many recipients react negatively. I argue that responses to selective benefits spring from partisan bias, with opponents motivated to reject a machine that attempts to buy their vote. This new partisan response model helps explain why machines target many supporters, why many opponents remain unpersuaded by selective benefits, and why the electoral return from vote buying is often lower than assumed. Tests using conjoint survey experiments in Mexico shows that initial opponents are nearly 9 percentage points less likely to vote for the machine, whereas initial supporters are almost 15 percentage points more likely to vote for it, holding benefits constant. Mediation analysis reveals that initial supporter
Clientelism; Elections; Vote buying; Voting behavior