Replication Data for: Certainty and War
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This dissertation explains why a leader's certainty about adversary attributes sometimes causes peace (as conventional wisdom suggests) and sometimes causes war. Certainty facilitates bargaining and peace when the available information is sufficient to justify that certainty, as in standard rationalist accounts. However, leaders are frequently more certain than the available information warrants. These errors of overprecision can increase bargaining demands and consequently the probability of conflict. Whether leaders make overprecision errors depends on the information they solicit from senior advisers, particularly whether they collect information from those advisers with a substantive focus on adversary political, as opposed to military, attributes. I test and find support for the theory using a new measure of foreign policy elites' ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["bargaining","war"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'This dissertation explains why a leader's certainty about adversary attributes sometimes causes peace (as conventional wisdom suggests) and sometimes causes war. Certainty facilitates bargaining and peace when the available information is sufficient to justify that certainty, as in standard rationalist accounts. However, leaders are frequently more certain than the available information warrants. These errors of overprecision can increase bargaining demands and consequently the probability of conflict. Whether leaders make overprecision errors depends on the information they solicit from senior advisers, particularly whether they collect information from those advisers with a substantive focus on adversary political, as opposed to military, attributes. I test and find support for the theory using a new measure of foreign policy elites' ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
This dissertation explains why a leader's certainty about adversary attributes sometimes causes peace (as conventional wisdom suggests) and sometimes causes war. Certainty facilitates bargaining and peace when the available information is sufficient to justify that certainty, as in standard rationalist accounts. However, leaders are frequently more certain than the available information warrants. These errors of overprecision can increase bargaining demands and consequently the probability of conflict. Whether leaders make overprecision errors depends on the information they solicit from senior advisers, particularly whether they collect information from those advisers with a substantive focus on adversary political, as opposed to military, attributes. I test and find support for the theory using a new measure of foreign policy elites' 
bargaining; war