Replication Data for: Shallow Commitments May Bite Deep: Domestic Politics and Flexibility in International Cooperation
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Scholars generally view flexibility in international institutions as a tradeoff - flexible agreements attract more signatories at the cost of limitingthe institution's ability to change behavior, because flexibility allowsstates to make shallow commitments that require little, if any, deviationfrom current behavior. This paper argues that this trade-off is lesssevere than previous research suggests, because initially shallowcommitments can deepen over time as domestic groups mobilize topress governments to widen the scope of their formal commitments.Such mobilization is most likely to arise in democratic societies, wherecitizens enjoy greater freedom to communicate, express their views, anddirect political pressure toward elites. By contrast, in nondemocracies,influxes of information and assistance from international' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["International cooperation, Flexibility, Reservations, Human rights"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Scholars generally view flexibility in international institutions as a tradeoff - flexible agreements attract more signatories at the cost of limitingthe institution's ability to change behavior, because flexibility allowsstates to make shallow commitments that require little, if any, deviationfrom current behavior. This paper argues that this trade-off is lesssevere than previous research suggests, because initially shallowcommitments can deepen over time as domestic groups mobilize topress governments to widen the scope of their formal commitments.Such mobilization is most likely to arise in democratic societies, wherecitizens enjoy greater freedom to communicate, express their views, anddirect political pressure toward elites. By contrast, in nondemocracies,influxes of information and assistance from international' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Scholars generally view flexibility in international institutions as a tradeoff - flexible agreements attract more signatories at the cost of limitingthe institution's ability to change behavior, because flexibility allowsstates to make shallow commitments that require little, if any, deviationfrom current behavior. This paper argues that this trade-off is lesssevere than previous research suggests, because initially shallowcommitments can deepen over time as domestic groups mobilize topress governments to widen the scope of their formal commitments.Such mobilization is most likely to arise in democratic societies, wherecitizens enjoy greater freedom to communicate, express their views, anddirect political pressure toward elites. By contrast, in nondemocracies,influxes of information and assistance from international
International cooperation, Flexibility, Reservations, Human rights