Replication Data for: Mimica, N., & Navia, P. (2022). Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018. Revista De Ciencia Política. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Party affiliationand individualincentives: committee assignmentsinthechamberof dePutiesin chile, 1990-2018Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107 NICOLÁS MIMICA Universidad Diego Portales, ChilePATRICIO NAVIA Universidad Diego Portales, Chile & New York University, United StatesABSTRACTIn presidential democracies with strong party systems, the congress shares legis-lative  powers  with  the  executive,  and  parties  strongly  influence  the  behavior  of  legislators.  The  law-making  process  should  reflect  that  balance  of  power,  as  the  reactive legislative powers of Congress should make committee membership less valuable than in systems where the legislature enjoys proactive p' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Cartel party theory","Chile","Distributional theory","Informational theory","Issue ownership theory","Legislative committee assignments"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Party affiliationand individualincentives: committee assignmentsinthechamberof dePutiesin chile, 1990-2018Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107 NICOLÁS MIMICA Universidad Diego Portales, ChilePATRICIO NAVIA Universidad Diego Portales, Chile & New York University, United StatesABSTRACTIn presidential democracies with strong party systems, the congress shares legis-lative  powers  with  the  executive,  and  parties  strongly  influence  the  behavior  of  legislators.  The  law-making  process  should  reflect  that  balance  of  power,  as  the  reactive legislative powers of Congress should make committee membership less valuable than in systems where the legislature enjoys proactive p' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Party affiliationand individualincentives: committee assignmentsinthechamberof dePutiesin chile, 1990-2018Militancia partidista e incentivos individuales: la membresía en comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 1990-2018https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2022005000107 NICOLÁS MIMICA Universidad Diego Portales, ChilePATRICIO NAVIA Universidad Diego Portales, Chile & New York University, United StatesABSTRACTIn presidential democracies with strong party systems, the congress shares legis-lative  powers  with  the  executive,  and  parties  strongly  influence  the  behavior  of  legislators.  The  law-making  process  should  reflect  that  balance  of  power,  as  the  reactive legislative powers of Congress should make committee membership less valuable than in systems where the legislature enjoys proactive p
Cartel party theory; Chile; Distributional theory; Informational theory; Issue ownership theory; Legislative committee assignments