Replication Data for: Presidential Investment in the Administrative State
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Given the U.S. president’s authority over the administrative state, one may expect that the chief executive invests great effort to build capacity within agencies to implement the tasks Congress and the president have assigned to them. The empirical data shows that this not the case. In this paper we explain how presidents strategically invest in administrative capacity, noting that presidents have few incentives to invest effort in capacity building in most agencies. We test our account with two analyses using new observational and survey data. First, we examine the time it took for the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations to nominate individuals to appointed positions. We find that presidents prioritize appointments to policy positions over management positions and that nominations occur sooner in agencies that implement pres' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["bureaucracy","organizational capacity","president"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Given the U.S. president’s authority over the administrative state, one may expect that the chief executive invests great effort to build capacity within agencies to implement the tasks Congress and the president have assigned to them. The empirical data shows that this not the case. In this paper we explain how presidents strategically invest in administrative capacity, noting that presidents have few incentives to invest effort in capacity building in most agencies. We test our account with two analyses using new observational and survey data. First, we examine the time it took for the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations to nominate individuals to appointed positions. We find that presidents prioritize appointments to policy positions over management positions and that nominations occur sooner in agencies that implement pres' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Given the U.S. president’s authority over the administrative state, one may expect that the chief executive invests great effort to build capacity within agencies to implement the tasks Congress and the president have assigned to them. The empirical data shows that this not the case. In this paper we explain how presidents strategically invest in administrative capacity, noting that presidents have few incentives to invest effort in capacity building in most agencies. We test our account with two analyses using new observational and survey data. First, we examine the time it took for the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations to nominate individuals to appointed positions. We find that presidents prioritize appointments to policy positions over management positions and that nominations occur sooner in agencies that implement pres
bureaucracy; organizational capacity; president