Replication Data for: Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue-areas. Using a computational model, we show that the amount of effort that DCA partners expend on defense depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with high levels of transitive 'friend of a friend' relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense n' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["burden sharing","defense cooperation agreements","network-behavior coevolution","network efficiency","policy convergence","social network analysis","stochastic actor-oriented model"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue-areas. Using a computational model, we show that the amount of effort that DCA partners expend on defense depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with high levels of transitive 'friend of a friend' relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense n' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue-areas. Using a computational model, we show that the amount of effort that DCA partners expend on defense depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with high levels of transitive 'friend of a friend' relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense n
burden sharing; defense cooperation agreements; network-behavior coevolution; network efficiency; policy convergence; social network analysis; stochastic actor-oriented model