Replication Data for: Just in time: Political policy cycles of land reform
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Abstract: While the political budget cycle literature focuses on the manipulation of existing policies, an analysis of the impact of the passage of redistributive policies themselves remains absent. I contend that policy passage is a strategically timed signal to voters used before elections to benefit the incumbent. Using aggregate data on land reforms in India from 1957 to 1992, I find that reforms are indeed timed before elections. Second, using historical survey data, I show that land issues remain a strong signal to Indian voters over time, even in states that have already enacted reforms. These findings provide evidence for political policy cycles' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["India, land reform, political cycles"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Abstract: While the political budget cycle literature focuses on the manipulation of existing policies, an analysis of the impact of the passage of redistributive policies themselves remains absent. I contend that policy passage is a strategically timed signal to voters used before elections to benefit the incumbent. Using aggregate data on land reforms in India from 1957 to 1992, I find that reforms are indeed timed before elections. Second, using historical survey data, I show that land issues remain a strong signal to Indian voters over time, even in states that have already enacted reforms. These findings provide evidence for political policy cycles' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Abstract: While the political budget cycle literature focuses on the manipulation of existing policies, an analysis of the impact of the passage of redistributive policies themselves remains absent. I contend that policy passage is a strategically timed signal to voters used before elections to benefit the incumbent. Using aggregate data on land reforms in India from 1957 to 1992, I find that reforms are indeed timed before elections. Second, using historical survey data, I show that land issues remain a strong signal to Indian voters over time, even in states that have already enacted reforms. These findings provide evidence for political policy cycles
India, land reform, political cycles