Replication Data for: Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model where congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances where their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exert' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Congress","Congressional oversight","Presidents","Regulation"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model where congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances where their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exert' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model where congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances where their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exert
Congress; Congressional oversight; Presidents; Regulation