When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it is shown that the presence of strong network effects makes unionisation the Pareto-efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms. The issue of entry is also investigated' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Competitive labour market","Efficient bargaining","Market entry and entry deterrence","Unionised oligopoly"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it is shown that the presence of strong network effects makes unionisation the Pareto-efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms. The issue of entry is also investigated' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it is shown that the presence of strong network effects makes unionisation the Pareto-efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms. The issue of entry is also investigated
Competitive labour market; Efficient bargaining; Market entry and entry deterrence; Unionised oligopoly