Replication Data for: Combining Bottom-Up Monitoring and Top-Down Accountability: A Field Experiment on Managing Corruption in Uganda
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Citizen monitoring of government performance is not often effective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially-certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects to high-level bureaucrats charged with overseeing the projects improved delivery. We do not find evidence that this treatment improved the delivery of public projects. Follow-up interviews found that the targeted officials seemed to avoid knowledge of the monitoring, perhaps to avoid taking on the responsibility that would come from such knowledge. However, the treatment also provided informatio' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["accountability","corruption","field experiment","monitoring","Uganda"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Citizen monitoring of government performance is not often effective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially-certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects to high-level bureaucrats charged with overseeing the projects improved delivery. We do not find evidence that this treatment improved the delivery of public projects. Follow-up interviews found that the targeted officials seemed to avoid knowledge of the monitoring, perhaps to avoid taking on the responsibility that would come from such knowledge. However, the treatment also provided informatio' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Citizen monitoring of government performance is not often effective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially-certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects to high-level bureaucrats charged with overseeing the projects improved delivery. We do not find evidence that this treatment improved the delivery of public projects. Follow-up interviews found that the targeted officials seemed to avoid knowledge of the monitoring, perhaps to avoid taking on the responsibility that would come from such knowledge. However, the treatment also provided informatio
accountability; corruption; field experiment; monitoring; Uganda