Replication Data for: What Do We Learn About Voter Preferences from Conjoint Experiments?
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political scientists frequently interpret the results of conjoint experiments as reflective of majority preferences. In this paper we show that the target estimand of conjoint experiments, the AMCE, is not well-defined in these terms. Even with individually rational experimental subjects, the AMCE can indicate the opposite of the true preference of the majority. To show this, we characterize the preference aggregation rule implied by the AMCE and demonstrate its several undesirable properties. With this result we provide a method for placing bounds on the proportion of experimental subjects who prefer a given candidate-feature. We describe conditions under which the AMCE corresponds in sign with the majority preference. Finally, we offer a structural interpretation of the AMCE and highlight that the problem we describe persists even whe' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Conjoint experiments","Electoral politics","Preference aggregation","Social choice theory","Survey methodology"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political scientists frequently interpret the results of conjoint experiments as reflective of majority preferences. In this paper we show that the target estimand of conjoint experiments, the AMCE, is not well-defined in these terms. Even with individually rational experimental subjects, the AMCE can indicate the opposite of the true preference of the majority. To show this, we characterize the preference aggregation rule implied by the AMCE and demonstrate its several undesirable properties. With this result we provide a method for placing bounds on the proportion of experimental subjects who prefer a given candidate-feature. We describe conditions under which the AMCE corresponds in sign with the majority preference. Finally, we offer a structural interpretation of the AMCE and highlight that the problem we describe persists even whe' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Political scientists frequently interpret the results of conjoint experiments as reflective of majority preferences. In this paper we show that the target estimand of conjoint experiments, the AMCE, is not well-defined in these terms. Even with individually rational experimental subjects, the AMCE can indicate the opposite of the true preference of the majority. To show this, we characterize the preference aggregation rule implied by the AMCE and demonstrate its several undesirable properties. With this result we provide a method for placing bounds on the proportion of experimental subjects who prefer a given candidate-feature. We describe conditions under which the AMCE corresponds in sign with the majority preference. Finally, we offer a structural interpretation of the AMCE and highlight that the problem we describe persists even whe
Conjoint experiments; Electoral politics; Preference aggregation; Social choice theory; Survey methodology