Agents of Peace or Enablers of Violence? The Proximal Effects of Mediators in International Disputes
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals' strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an ‘insurance policy’, reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995-2010. We find tha' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Mediation, Negotiation, conflict escalation, insurance effect, bargaining, conflict resolution"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals' strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an ‘insurance policy’, reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995-2010. We find tha' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals' strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an ‘insurance policy’, reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995-2010. We find tha
Mediation, Negotiation, conflict escalation, insurance effect, bargaining, conflict resolution