Replication Data for: Campaign Messages, Polling, and Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do politicians' track records and campaign messaging interact and affect voters' welfare? We analyze this question, theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical model, which we implement in the experiment, politicians choose how much of an economy's resources to allocate to the citizenry - keeping the remainder for themselves - then face re-election against a challenger. Both incumbents and challengers have private information about their own quality which determines the economy's level of resources. We vary whether candidates can send campaign messages, and the level of variability in candidates' quality. We observe that both higher quality variability and allowing campaigning benefit citizens by allowing them to better select and hold accountable higher-quality officials. Also, when incumbents have performed poorly or when' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Campaigning","Cheap talk","Elections","Experiments","Negative campaigns","Political economy"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How do politicians' track records and campaign messaging interact and affect voters' welfare? We analyze this question, theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical model, which we implement in the experiment, politicians choose how much of an economy's resources to allocate to the citizenry - keeping the remainder for themselves - then face re-election against a challenger. Both incumbents and challengers have private information about their own quality which determines the economy's level of resources. We vary whether candidates can send campaign messages, and the level of variability in candidates' quality. We observe that both higher quality variability and allowing campaigning benefit citizens by allowing them to better select and hold accountable higher-quality officials. Also, when incumbents have performed poorly or when' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How do politicians' track records and campaign messaging interact and affect voters' welfare? We analyze this question, theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical model, which we implement in the experiment, politicians choose how much of an economy's resources to allocate to the citizenry - keeping the remainder for themselves - then face re-election against a challenger. Both incumbents and challengers have private information about their own quality which determines the economy's level of resources. We vary whether candidates can send campaign messages, and the level of variability in candidates' quality. We observe that both higher quality variability and allowing campaigning benefit citizens by allowing them to better select and hold accountable higher-quality officials. Also, when incumbents have performed poorly or when
Campaigning; Cheap talk; Elections; Experiments; Negative campaigns; Political economy