Replication Data for: Legibility and External Investment: An Institutional Natural Experiment in Liberia
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We address a debate over the eects of private versus customary property rights on external investment. Despite political economists’ claims that external investors favor private property rights, other experts argue that customary systems enable large-scale “land grabs.” We organize these competing claims, highlighting tradeos due to dierences in legibility versus the ability to displace existing land holders under both systems. We study a natural experiment in Liberia where law codifies parallel private and customary property rights systems. We use this institutional boundary and dierence-in-dierences methods to isolate dierential changes in external investment under the dierent property rights systems following the Global Food Crisis of 2007–8. We find a larger increase in land clearing where private property rights prevailed, with suc' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Customary Institutions","Land Investment","Property Rights"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We address a debate over the eects of private versus customary property rights on external investment. Despite political economists’ claims that external investors favor private property rights, other experts argue that customary systems enable large-scale “land grabs.” We organize these competing claims, highlighting tradeos due to dierences in legibility versus the ability to displace existing land holders under both systems. We study a natural experiment in Liberia where law codifies parallel private and customary property rights systems. We use this institutional boundary and dierence-in-dierences methods to isolate dierential changes in external investment under the dierent property rights systems following the Global Food Crisis of 2007–8. We find a larger increase in land clearing where private property rights prevailed, with suc' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We address a debate over the eects of private versus customary property rights on external investment. Despite political economists’ claims that external investors favor private property rights, other experts argue that customary systems enable large-scale “land grabs.” We organize these competing claims, highlighting tradeos due to dierences in legibility versus the ability to displace existing land holders under both systems. We study a natural experiment in Liberia where law codifies parallel private and customary property rights systems. We use this institutional boundary and dierence-in-dierences methods to isolate dierential changes in external investment under the dierent property rights systems following the Global Food Crisis of 2007–8. We find a larger increase in land clearing where private property rights prevailed, with suc
Customary Institutions; Land Investment; Property Rights