Replication Data for: Political Competition and Authoritarian Repression: Evidence from Pinochet's Chile
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes' security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, creating a challenge for regimes that wish to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 military coup in Chile, a period with civilian collaboration with repression, this paper presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. Using pre-coup democratic elections to measure pol' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Repression","political violence","authoritarianism","military coup","elections","Latin America"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes' security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, creating a challenge for regimes that wish to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 military coup in Chile, a period with civilian collaboration with repression, this paper presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. Using pre-coup democratic elections to measure pol' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes' security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, creating a challenge for regimes that wish to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 military coup in Chile, a period with civilian collaboration with repression, this paper presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. Using pre-coup democratic elections to measure pol
Repression; political violence; authoritarianism; military coup; elections; Latin America