Replication Data for: Roadblocks: How Property Rights Undermine Development in Colombia
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political economy models view property rights as the lynchpin to economic development.  But strong property rights-defined as rules that provide greater compensation to a larger set of claimants-encourage opportunistic behaviors that undermine infrastructure investments.  Strong rights lead to (1) holdout problems among existing property owners, (2) infrastructure trolls who occupy needed land, and (3) scope expansions in which communities demand unrelated local public goods.  I draw on original qualitative research around highway projects in Colombia to illustrate how communities leverage their property rights to secure greater compensation and collective goods.  A survey experiment supports the microfoundations of the theory: making salient strong property rights increases compensation demands and legal claims.  State audit reports re' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Infrastructure","Property rights"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political economy models view property rights as the lynchpin to economic development.  But strong property rights-defined as rules that provide greater compensation to a larger set of claimants-encourage opportunistic behaviors that undermine infrastructure investments.  Strong rights lead to (1) holdout problems among existing property owners, (2) infrastructure trolls who occupy needed land, and (3) scope expansions in which communities demand unrelated local public goods.  I draw on original qualitative research around highway projects in Colombia to illustrate how communities leverage their property rights to secure greater compensation and collective goods.  A survey experiment supports the microfoundations of the theory: making salient strong property rights increases compensation demands and legal claims.  State audit reports re' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Political economy models view property rights as the lynchpin to economic development.  But strong property rights-defined as rules that provide greater compensation to a larger set of claimants-encourage opportunistic behaviors that undermine infrastructure investments.  Strong rights lead to (1) holdout problems among existing property owners, (2) infrastructure trolls who occupy needed land, and (3) scope expansions in which communities demand unrelated local public goods.  I draw on original qualitative research around highway projects in Colombia to illustrate how communities leverage their property rights to secure greater compensation and collective goods.  A survey experiment supports the microfoundations of the theory: making salient strong property rights increases compensation demands and legal claims.  State audit reports re
Infrastructure; Property rights