Replication Data for: Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter-Driven Accountability in Senegal
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and---upon receiving information---voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter-level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and non-electoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contac' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Benchmarking","Field experiments","Information","Political accountability","Voting behavior"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and---upon receiving information---voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter-level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and non-electoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contac' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and---upon receiving information---voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter-level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and non-electoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contac
Benchmarking; Field experiments; Information; Political accountability; Voting behavior