Replication Data for: Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest 2017 “Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes.”
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear. We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collective action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest. Using count models of protest activity, we ﬁnd strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our ﬁndings with qualitative evidence from the case of Zimbabw' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["dissent","economic sanctions","foreign policy","Protest"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear. We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collective action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest. Using count models of protest activity, we ﬁnd strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our ﬁndings with qualitative evidence from the case of Zimbabw' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear. We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collective action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest. Using count models of protest activity, we ﬁnd strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our ﬁndings with qualitative evidence from the case of Zimbabw
dissent; economic sanctions; foreign policy; Protest