Replication Data for: Politicised Enforcement in China: Evidence from the Enforcement of Land Laws and Regulations
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Politically-motivated interference by politicians, or 'politicised enforcement', is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this paper develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron-client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote econo' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["China","land governance","law and regulatory enforcement","politicised enforcement"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Politically-motivated interference by politicians, or 'politicised enforcement', is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this paper develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron-client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote econo' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Politically-motivated interference by politicians, or 'politicised enforcement', is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this paper develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron-client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote econo
China; land governance; law and regulatory enforcement; politicised enforcement