Replication Data for: The Alliance Formation Puzzle in Contests with Capacity-Constraints: A Test using American Football Reception-Coverage Contest Data
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We utilize a contest-theoretic model to demonstrate a version of the alliance form puzzle that aligns with reception-coverage contests in American football.  Namely, secondary defenders can opt for single-coverage (1 v 1 contest) or form a defensive alliance (double-coverage or 2 v 1 contest with exogenous intra-alliance prize division) when defending a given receiver.  In our theoretical treatment, we find that defenses have a lower equilibrium success rate in preventing the receiver from “getting open” under double-coverage than under single-coverage in the absence of (sufficiently-binding) capacity constraints.  We also find that this success rate paradox is a necessary condition for the alliance formation puzzle (i.e., loss of expected allied party payoffs under alliance).  We then test the theoretical treatment by analyzing 8,508 p' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["alliance formation puzzle","behavioral game theory","economic resource contests,","gridiron football","NFL","professional football","sport data","Tullock contest"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We utilize a contest-theoretic model to demonstrate a version of the alliance form puzzle that aligns with reception-coverage contests in American football.  Namely, secondary defenders can opt for single-coverage (1 v 1 contest) or form a defensive alliance (double-coverage or 2 v 1 contest with exogenous intra-alliance prize division) when defending a given receiver.  In our theoretical treatment, we find that defenses have a lower equilibrium success rate in preventing the receiver from “getting open” under double-coverage than under single-coverage in the absence of (sufficiently-binding) capacity constraints.  We also find that this success rate paradox is a necessary condition for the alliance formation puzzle (i.e., loss of expected allied party payoffs under alliance).  We then test the theoretical treatment by analyzing 8,508 p' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We utilize a contest-theoretic model to demonstrate a version of the alliance form puzzle that aligns with reception-coverage contests in American football.  Namely, secondary defenders can opt for single-coverage (1 v 1 contest) or form a defensive alliance (double-coverage or 2 v 1 contest with exogenous intra-alliance prize division) when defending a given receiver.  In our theoretical treatment, we find that defenses have a lower equilibrium success rate in preventing the receiver from “getting open” under double-coverage than under single-coverage in the absence of (sufficiently-binding) capacity constraints.  We also find that this success rate paradox is a necessary condition for the alliance formation puzzle (i.e., loss of expected allied party payoffs under alliance).  We then test the theoretical treatment by analyzing 8,508 p
alliance formation puzzle; behavioral game theory; economic resource contests,; gridiron football; NFL; professional football; sport data; Tullock contest