Replication data for: Size, Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought. Given the validity of arguments for and against small units, one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes. However, the reform trend is uniform: units, often at the local level, are amalgamated to harvest scale effects. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems. Our testing ground is a recent Danish reform. It allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms. The reform was directed by central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities, while 32 municipalities were left untouched. We thus have a quasi-experiment with pre- and post-treatment observations for both an experiment and co' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Administrative costs","Endogeneity","Jurisdictional reform","Optimal size","Quasi experiment","Scale effects"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'The search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought. Given the validity of arguments for and against small units, one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes. However, the reform trend is uniform: units, often at the local level, are amalgamated to harvest scale effects. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems. Our testing ground is a recent Danish reform. It allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms. The reform was directed by central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities, while 32 municipalities were left untouched. We thus have a quasi-experiment with pre- and post-treatment observations for both an experiment and co' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
The search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought. Given the validity of arguments for and against small units, one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes. However, the reform trend is uniform: units, often at the local level, are amalgamated to harvest scale effects. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems. Our testing ground is a recent Danish reform. It allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms. The reform was directed by central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities, while 32 municipalities were left untouched. We thus have a quasi-experiment with pre- and post-treatment observations for both an experiment and co
Administrative costs; Endogeneity; Jurisdictional reform; Optimal size; Quasi experiment; Scale effects