Replication Data for: Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Riders to appropriations bills have long been a favorite Congressional instrument for forcing presidents to accept unwanted policies.  To resist unwanted riders, presidents have increasingly resorted to veto threats.  Are such threats credible and do they influence legislation? To answer these questions we analyze the legislative histories of hundreds of threatened and unthreatened riders from 1985 through 2008.  We find that threats are effective in bringing the final legislation closer to the president’s preferences. Threats achieve their success, in large part, by interrupting the textbook legislative process in the Senate – spawning filibusters, prompting leaders to punt bills to conference, and encouraging the use of other “unorthodox” procedures. Unlike conventional models that regard veto threats as minimally effective, the findi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Appropriations","Legislative riders","Rhetoric","Veto"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Riders to appropriations bills have long been a favorite Congressional instrument for forcing presidents to accept unwanted policies.  To resist unwanted riders, presidents have increasingly resorted to veto threats.  Are such threats credible and do they influence legislation? To answer these questions we analyze the legislative histories of hundreds of threatened and unthreatened riders from 1985 through 2008.  We find that threats are effective in bringing the final legislation closer to the president’s preferences. Threats achieve their success, in large part, by interrupting the textbook legislative process in the Senate – spawning filibusters, prompting leaders to punt bills to conference, and encouraging the use of other “unorthodox” procedures. Unlike conventional models that regard veto threats as minimally effective, the findi' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Riders to appropriations bills have long been a favorite Congressional instrument for forcing presidents to accept unwanted policies.  To resist unwanted riders, presidents have increasingly resorted to veto threats.  Are such threats credible and do they influence legislation? To answer these questions we analyze the legislative histories of hundreds of threatened and unthreatened riders from 1985 through 2008.  We find that threats are effective in bringing the final legislation closer to the president’s preferences. Threats achieve their success, in large part, by interrupting the textbook legislative process in the Senate – spawning filibusters, prompting leaders to punt bills to conference, and encouraging the use of other “unorthodox” procedures. Unlike conventional models that regard veto threats as minimally effective, the findi
Appropriations; Legislative riders; Rhetoric; Veto