Replication Data for: Strategic Reporting: A Formal Model of Biases in Conflict Data
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'During violent conflict, governments may acknowledge their use of illegitimate violence (e.g., noncombatant casualties) even though such violence can depress civilian support. Why would they do so? We model the strategic incentives affecting government disclosures of illegitimate violence in the face of potential NGO investigations, where disclosures, investigations, and support are endogenous. We highlight implications for the analysis of conflict data generated from government and NGO reports, and for the emergence of government transparency. Under-reporting bias in government disclosures positively correlates with under-reporting bias in NGO reports. Furthermore, governments exhibit greater under-reporting bias relative to NGOs when NGOs face higher investigative costs. We also illustrate why it is difficult to estimate negative effe' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["formal theory, violent conflict, NGO, conflict events, bias"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'During violent conflict, governments may acknowledge their use of illegitimate violence (e.g., noncombatant casualties) even though such violence can depress civilian support. Why would they do so? We model the strategic incentives affecting government disclosures of illegitimate violence in the face of potential NGO investigations, where disclosures, investigations, and support are endogenous. We highlight implications for the analysis of conflict data generated from government and NGO reports, and for the emergence of government transparency. Under-reporting bias in government disclosures positively correlates with under-reporting bias in NGO reports. Furthermore, governments exhibit greater under-reporting bias relative to NGOs when NGOs face higher investigative costs. We also illustrate why it is difficult to estimate negative effe' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
During violent conflict, governments may acknowledge their use of illegitimate violence (e.g., noncombatant casualties) even though such violence can depress civilian support. Why would they do so? We model the strategic incentives affecting government disclosures of illegitimate violence in the face of potential NGO investigations, where disclosures, investigations, and support are endogenous. We highlight implications for the analysis of conflict data generated from government and NGO reports, and for the emergence of government transparency. Under-reporting bias in government disclosures positively correlates with under-reporting bias in NGO reports. Furthermore, governments exhibit greater under-reporting bias relative to NGOs when NGOs face higher investigative costs. We also illustrate why it is difficult to estimate negative effe
formal theory, violent conflict, NGO, conflict events, bias