Replication Data for: The Countervailing Effects of Competition on Public Goods Provision: When Bargaining Inefficiencies Lead to Bad Outcomes
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provisionthrough its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that politicalcompetition additionally mediates public goods provision by increasing the inefficiencyof legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effectin places with weak parties and low transparency – typical of many young democracies.We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between competition andlocal public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate ourinterpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. Toexplore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data andshow that political competition leads to better (worse) public' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Africa","democratic accountability","electoral competition","public goods provision"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provisionthrough its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that politicalcompetition additionally mediates public goods provision by increasing the inefficiencyof legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effectin places with weak parties and low transparency – typical of many young democracies.We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between competition andlocal public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate ourinterpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. Toexplore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data andshow that political competition leads to better (worse) public' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provisionthrough its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that politicalcompetition additionally mediates public goods provision by increasing the inefficiencyof legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effectin places with weak parties and low transparency – typical of many young democracies.We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between competition andlocal public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate ourinterpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. Toexplore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data andshow that political competition leads to better (worse) public
Africa; democratic accountability; electoral competition; public goods provision