Replication Data for: Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ 'voter buying' to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits -- which undermined voter buying -- decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these ef' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Auditing","Clientelism","Elections","Electorate","Fraud","Machine politics","Politics and government","Reelection","Regression discontinuity design","Transfers","Vote buying"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ 'voter buying' to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits -- which undermined voter buying -- decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these ef' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ 'voter buying' to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits -- which undermined voter buying -- decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these ef
Auditing; Clientelism; Elections; Electorate; Fraud; Machine politics; Politics and government; Reelection; Regression discontinuity design; Transfers; Vote buying