Replication Data for: Gerrymandering—Vietnamese Style: Escaping the Partial Reform Equilibrium in a Nondemocratic Regime
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required thesimultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome opposition from the concentrated group of early winners and unite a disparate group of potentialbeneficiaries from future reforms into an alternative coalition. In this article, I rigorously test the theory that Vietnamese reformers managed to solve both dilemmas and to escape their unique partial reform trap through thetargeted creation of new provinces in 1996. The tactic provided reformers with ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Vietnam gerrymandering SOEs redistricting economic reform"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required thesimultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome opposition from the concentrated group of early winners and unite a disparate group of potentialbeneficiaries from future reforms into an alternative coalition. In this article, I rigorously test the theory that Vietnamese reformers managed to solve both dilemmas and to escape their unique partial reform trap through thetargeted creation of new provinces in 1996. The tactic provided reformers with ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Hellman’s (1998) depiction of the Partial Reform Equilibrium (PRE) presented a prophecy of despair for many transition economies. Because winners from initial economic reforms could use their newfound power to block further reform initiatives that might undermine their lucrative positions, escaping the PRE trap required thesimultaneous resolution of two conundrums. Policymakers interested in furthering transition needed to both overcome opposition from the concentrated group of early winners and unite a disparate group of potentialbeneficiaries from future reforms into an alternative coalition. In this article, I rigorously test the theory that Vietnamese reformers managed to solve both dilemmas and to escape their unique partial reform trap through thetargeted creation of new provinces in 1996. The tactic provided reformers with 
Vietnam gerrymandering SOEs redistricting economic reform