Replication Data for: Time for a Haircut: Political Regimes and Sovereign Debt Restructurings
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to fulldebt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countriestake a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions frominvestors. This article argues that these differences are largely explainedby the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previousresearch examines whether democracies make more crediblecommitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining withforeign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with theirinstitutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, andpublic deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentivesto pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set ofviable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset ofdebt re' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["IPE, Democracy, Debt, Duration analysis/Duration model, International regimes"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to fulldebt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countriestake a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions frominvestors. This article argues that these differences are largely explainedby the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previousresearch examines whether democracies make more crediblecommitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining withforeign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with theirinstitutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, andpublic deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentivesto pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set ofviable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset ofdebt re' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to fulldebt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countriestake a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions frominvestors. This article argues that these differences are largely explainedby the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previousresearch examines whether democracies make more crediblecommitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining withforeign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with theirinstitutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, andpublic deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentivesto pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set ofviable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset ofdebt re
IPE, Democracy, Debt, Duration analysis/Duration model, International regimes