Replication Data for: Geographically-Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems use geographically-targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office and if so, how?  Despite its use in twenty eight countries around the world today, little research has addressed this question.  We explain how MMM's combination of electoral rules and unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large and small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both.  Once in government, we explain how parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically-targeted spending to cement it.  We test our propositions using original data from Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016).  In both cases, we find that municipalities in which supporters split their bal' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["electoral systems","geographically-targeted spending","mixed-member systems","preelectoral coordination"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems use geographically-targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office and if so, how?  Despite its use in twenty eight countries around the world today, little research has addressed this question.  We explain how MMM's combination of electoral rules and unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large and small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both.  Once in government, we explain how parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically-targeted spending to cement it.  We test our propositions using original data from Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016).  In both cases, we find that municipalities in which supporters split their bal' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems use geographically-targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office and if so, how?  Despite its use in twenty eight countries around the world today, little research has addressed this question.  We explain how MMM's combination of electoral rules and unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large and small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both.  Once in government, we explain how parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically-targeted spending to cement it.  We test our propositions using original data from Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016).  In both cases, we find that municipalities in which supporters split their bal
electoral systems; geographically-targeted spending; mixed-member systems; preelectoral coordination