Replication Data for: Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention (with Phil Keefer and Thomas Plümper), World Development, 39 (9), 2011, pp. 1530-1541
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We exam-ine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to invest-ments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality iscorrespondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when gov-ernments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corruptcountries' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["democracy","disaster","mortality","political economy","public goods","risk"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We exam-ine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to invest-ments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality iscorrespondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when gov-ernments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corruptcountries' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We exam-ine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to invest-ments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality iscorrespondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when gov-ernments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corruptcountries
democracy; disaster; mortality; political economy; public goods; risk