Replication Data for: State Intervention, External Spoilers, and the Durability of Peace Agreements
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement s' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Civil war, Peace agreement, Negotiated settlement, State intervention, Duration analysis/Duration model, External spoilers"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement s' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement s
Civil war, Peace agreement, Negotiated settlement, State intervention, Duration analysis/Duration model, External spoilers