Replication data for: What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'What makes African voters “up for grabs”? Existing approaches to the “swing voter” have several liabilities. This paper introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count-model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana’s critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the success of clientelism as a strategy to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collect' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Clientelism","Elections","Swing voters","Voting"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'What makes African voters “up for grabs”? Existing approaches to the “swing voter” have several liabilities. This paper introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count-model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana’s critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the success of clientelism as a strategy to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collect' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
What makes African voters “up for grabs”? Existing approaches to the “swing voter” have several liabilities. This paper introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count-model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana’s critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the success of clientelism as a strategy to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collect
Clientelism; Elections; Swing voters; Voting