Replication Data for: Capital Meets Democracy: The Impact of Franchise Extension on Sovereign Bond Markets
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'By giving political rights to poor voters, do democratic political institutions pose a risk to financial capital? This paper draws lessons from the reaction of sovereign bond markets to franchise extensions between 1800 and 1920. If franchise extension transferred political power from economic and financial elites to workers, as redistributive theories of democratization suggest, then this should have resulted in a fall in the market price (increase in the yield) of a country’s bonds. Exploiting the asynchronous timing of franchise reforms across countries, we provide evidence that franchise extension contributed to large increases in the premium demanded by investors to hold sovereign debt, reflecting an increased risk of default. However, bond markets became less sensitive to franchise extensions over time, a pattern potentially due t' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Bond markets","Democratization","Franchise","Sovereign debt"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'By giving political rights to poor voters, do democratic political institutions pose a risk to financial capital? This paper draws lessons from the reaction of sovereign bond markets to franchise extensions between 1800 and 1920. If franchise extension transferred political power from economic and financial elites to workers, as redistributive theories of democratization suggest, then this should have resulted in a fall in the market price (increase in the yield) of a country’s bonds. Exploiting the asynchronous timing of franchise reforms across countries, we provide evidence that franchise extension contributed to large increases in the premium demanded by investors to hold sovereign debt, reflecting an increased risk of default. However, bond markets became less sensitive to franchise extensions over time, a pattern potentially due t' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
By giving political rights to poor voters, do democratic political institutions pose a risk to financial capital? This paper draws lessons from the reaction of sovereign bond markets to franchise extensions between 1800 and 1920. If franchise extension transferred political power from economic and financial elites to workers, as redistributive theories of democratization suggest, then this should have resulted in a fall in the market price (increase in the yield) of a country’s bonds. Exploiting the asynchronous timing of franchise reforms across countries, we provide evidence that franchise extension contributed to large increases in the premium demanded by investors to hold sovereign debt, reflecting an increased risk of default. However, bond markets became less sensitive to franchise extensions over time, a pattern potentially due t
Bond markets; Democratization; Franchise; Sovereign debt