Replication Data for 'The Limited Value of a Second Opinion'
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission. Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of senders' biases in a sequential, cheap-talk, sender-receiver game. We find that decision makers do no better when a second opinion is available, irrespective of the alignment or competition between advisers, than when they receive a single opinion. Despite the fact that messaging behavior differs across experimental conditions, receivers successfully extract the same amount of information---an amount greater than what is theoretically predicted.  These findings are consistent with senders using a simple strategy of naive  exaggeration, with receivers correctly recognizing this and adjusting their behavior accordingly' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Laboratory experiment","Multiple senders","Sender-receiver games","Strategic information transmission"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission. Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of senders' biases in a sequential, cheap-talk, sender-receiver game. We find that decision makers do no better when a second opinion is available, irrespective of the alignment or competition between advisers, than when they receive a single opinion. Despite the fact that messaging behavior differs across experimental conditions, receivers successfully extract the same amount of information---an amount greater than what is theoretically predicted.  These findings are consistent with senders using a simple strategy of naive  exaggeration, with receivers correctly recognizing this and adjusting their behavior accordingly' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission. Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of senders' biases in a sequential, cheap-talk, sender-receiver game. We find that decision makers do no better when a second opinion is available, irrespective of the alignment or competition between advisers, than when they receive a single opinion. Despite the fact that messaging behavior differs across experimental conditions, receivers successfully extract the same amount of information---an amount greater than what is theoretically predicted.  These findings are consistent with senders using a simple strategy of naive  exaggeration, with receivers correctly recognizing this and adjusting their behavior accordingly
Laboratory experiment; Multiple senders; Sender-receiver games; Strategic information transmission