Replication Data for: COUNTERINSURGENCY AS AN INSTITUTION: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put thirteen provinces under emergency rule (1987-2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro- insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) legal-institutional framework of counterinsurg' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Civil war, counterinsurgency, state of emergency, elections, pro-insurgent party"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put thirteen provinces under emergency rule (1987-2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro- insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) legal-institutional framework of counterinsurg' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put thirteen provinces under emergency rule (1987-2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro- insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) legal-institutional framework of counterinsurg
Civil war, counterinsurgency, state of emergency, elections, pro-insurgent party