Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on-the-job experience. In theirappointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducinginformation asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning),improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisorypositions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), andplace a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflictbetween the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logicobtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S.federal government' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Agent traits","Bureaucratic leadership","Decision making","Federal government","Information counterbalancing","Organizational learning","Presidential appointments","Presidential effectiveness","Principal-agent theory","Separation of powers"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on-the-job experience. In theirappointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducinginformation asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning),improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisorypositions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), andplace a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflictbetween the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logicobtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S.federal government' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on-the-job experience. In theirappointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducinginformation asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning),improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisorypositions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), andplace a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflictbetween the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logicobtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S.federal government
Agent traits; Bureaucratic leadership; Decision making; Federal government; Information counterbalancing; Organizational learning; Presidential appointments; Presidential effectiveness; Principal-agent theory; Separation of powers