Dominant party rule, elections, and cabinet instability in African autocracies
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'I draw on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability ofautocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffleministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also producedistinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leadersface fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Militaryleaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to whichleaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["cabinet, dictatorship, party, regime, Africa"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'I draw on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability ofautocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffleministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also producedistinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leadersface fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Militaryleaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to whichleaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
I draw on the authoritarian institutions literature to explain the role of dominant parties in constraining the ability ofautocrats to reshuffle cabinet ministers. Dominant party leaders are constrained in their ability to frequently reshuffleministers by the need to maintain credible power-sharing commitments with party elites. These constraints also producedistinct temporal patterns of instability where large reshuffles occur following elections. Conversely, personalist leadersface fewer power-sharing constraints and engage in more extensive cabinet reshuffles at more arbitrary intervals. Militaryleaders face complex constraints that depend on whether officers or civilians occupy cabinet posts and the extent to whichleaders are dependent upon civilian ministers for regime performance and popular support. Empirical analyses
cabinet, dictatorship, party, regime, Africa