Replication Data for: Off-Cycle and Off-Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics, that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees interests and find that local governments that are elected off-cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizen' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["election-timing","interest groups","municipal politics","public employees","representation"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics, that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees interests and find that local governments that are elected off-cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizen' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics, that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees interests and find that local governments that are elected off-cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizen
election-timing; interest groups; municipal politics; public employees; representation