Replication Data for: Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country-specific audience cost parameters without replying on proxy variables, e.g., democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium, because the costs serve as a commitment device during the subsequent crisis, incentivizing the country to stand firm and coercing its opponent to back down. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that larger audience costs would result in more peace worldwide, as they also discourage potential opponents from initiating disputes. Beyond regime type, we find that a free press, provisions for executive appointmen' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Audience costs","Constrained maximum likelihood","Crisis escalation","Structural modeling"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country-specific audience cost parameters without replying on proxy variables, e.g., democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium, because the costs serve as a commitment device during the subsequent crisis, incentivizing the country to stand firm and coercing its opponent to back down. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that larger audience costs would result in more peace worldwide, as they also discourage potential opponents from initiating disputes. Beyond regime type, we find that a free press, provisions for executive appointmen' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country-specific audience cost parameters without replying on proxy variables, e.g., democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium, because the costs serve as a commitment device during the subsequent crisis, incentivizing the country to stand firm and coercing its opponent to back down. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that larger audience costs would result in more peace worldwide, as they also discourage potential opponents from initiating disputes. Beyond regime type, we find that a free press, provisions for executive appointmen
Audience costs; Constrained maximum likelihood; Crisis escalation; Structural modeling