Replication Data for: Strategic Rebels: A spatial econometric approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebelorganizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebelorganizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the coretheoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach toexplicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. Weargue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized untilthe end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil,power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategiccomplements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts.Based on a network game theoretic model, we derive a spatialeconometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategicinterdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence ispositive, bu' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Civil war, Duration analysis/Duration model, Network analysis"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebelorganizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebelorganizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the coretheoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach toexplicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. Weargue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized untilthe end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil,power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategiccomplements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts.Based on a network game theoretic model, we derive a spatialeconometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategicinterdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence ispositive, bu' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebelorganizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebelorganizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the coretheoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach toexplicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. Weargue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized untilthe end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil,power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategiccomplements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts.Based on a network game theoretic model, we derive a spatialeconometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategicinterdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence ispositive, bu
Civil war, Duration analysis/Duration model, Network analysis