Replication Data for: Punish or Tolerate? State Capacity, Military Oversight and Wartime Sexual Violence
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government' s capacity to carry out punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain ' strategically ignorant' of the military' s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of state capacity, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the emp' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Conflict, Security, Human rights"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government' s capacity to carry out punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain ' strategically ignorant' of the military' s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of state capacity, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the emp' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government' s capacity to carry out punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain ' strategically ignorant' of the military' s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of state capacity, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the emp
Conflict, Security, Human rights