Replication Data for: The Long-Run Consequences of The Opium Concessions for Out-Group Animosity on Java
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Looking at the Dutch East Indies, I examine the consequences of the opium concession system---an arrangement in which the Dutch would auction the monopolistic right to sell opium in a locality to the highest bidder. The winners of these auctions were invariably ethnic Chinese. The poverty of the indigenous population of Java, combined with the addictive properties of opium, meant that many fell into destitution at the hands of ethnic Chinese vendors. I argue that this institution put in motion a self-reinforcing arrangement that enriched one group and embittered the other, with present-day consequences. Consistent with this theory, I find that individuals in villages where the opium concession system was operative during the nineteenth century---compared to individuals in nearby unexposed counterfactual villages---report higher levels o' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Opium, Ethnic conflict, Indonesia, Historical Political Economy"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Looking at the Dutch East Indies, I examine the consequences of the opium concession system---an arrangement in which the Dutch would auction the monopolistic right to sell opium in a locality to the highest bidder. The winners of these auctions were invariably ethnic Chinese. The poverty of the indigenous population of Java, combined with the addictive properties of opium, meant that many fell into destitution at the hands of ethnic Chinese vendors. I argue that this institution put in motion a self-reinforcing arrangement that enriched one group and embittered the other, with present-day consequences. Consistent with this theory, I find that individuals in villages where the opium concession system was operative during the nineteenth century---compared to individuals in nearby unexposed counterfactual villages---report higher levels o' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Looking at the Dutch East Indies, I examine the consequences of the opium concession system---an arrangement in which the Dutch would auction the monopolistic right to sell opium in a locality to the highest bidder. The winners of these auctions were invariably ethnic Chinese. The poverty of the indigenous population of Java, combined with the addictive properties of opium, meant that many fell into destitution at the hands of ethnic Chinese vendors. I argue that this institution put in motion a self-reinforcing arrangement that enriched one group and embittered the other, with present-day consequences. Consistent with this theory, I find that individuals in villages where the opium concession system was operative during the nineteenth century---compared to individuals in nearby unexposed counterfactual villages---report higher levels o
Opium, Ethnic conflict, Indonesia, Historical Political Economy