Replication Data for 'Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits  in Latin America, 1984–2015
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Since the late 20th century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to expand term limits, often successfully. This paper discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in expanding term limits.  Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, I make three arguments.  First, the preferences of actors are fairly predictable based on office-holding:  presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance.  Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in congress.  Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties (and the courts), but only when the latter are sufficiently independent' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Term Limits, Re-Election, Approval Ratings, Presidential Powers, government-opposition relations"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Since the late 20th century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to expand term limits, often successfully. This paper discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in expanding term limits.  Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, I make three arguments.  First, the preferences of actors are fairly predictable based on office-holding:  presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance.  Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in congress.  Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties (and the courts), but only when the latter are sufficiently independent' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Since the late 20th century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to expand term limits, often successfully. This paper discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in expanding term limits.  Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, I make three arguments.  First, the preferences of actors are fairly predictable based on office-holding:  presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance.  Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in congress.  Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties (and the courts), but only when the latter are sufficiently independent
Term Limits, Re-Election, Approval Ratings, Presidential Powers, government-opposition relations