Replication Data for: 'Judicial Federalism and Representation.' Jonathan P. Kastellec
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:' I examine the relationship between judicial federalism and state-level representation. I develop a framework in which federal courts establish a ``federal floor' in a policy area, thus creating an asymmetry---states with lower levels of policy must shift policy to the floor, whereas states higher levels of policy above the floor are unaffected. I use the framework to recast the ``counter-majoritarian difficulty'' as an issue of federalism. To illustrate the framework, I present a quantitative analysis of the legalization of same-sex marriage in all 50 states, using data on public opinion, federal and state judicial decisions, and state-level policy' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Courts, Federalism, Judicial Review, Gay Marriage"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:' I examine the relationship between judicial federalism and state-level representation. I develop a framework in which federal courts establish a ``federal floor' in a policy area, thus creating an asymmetry---states with lower levels of policy must shift policy to the floor, whereas states higher levels of policy above the floor are unaffected. I use the framework to recast the ``counter-majoritarian difficulty'' as an issue of federalism. To illustrate the framework, I present a quantitative analysis of the legalization of same-sex marriage in all 50 states, using data on public opinion, federal and state judicial decisions, and state-level policy' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
 I examine the relationship between judicial federalism and state-level representation. I develop a framework in which federal courts establish a ``federal floor' in a policy area, thus creating an asymmetry---states with lower levels of policy must shift policy to the floor, whereas states higher levels of policy above the floor are unaffected. I use the framework to recast the ``counter-majoritarian difficulty'' as an issue of federalism. To illustrate the framework, I present a quantitative analysis of the legalization of same-sex marriage in all 50 states, using data on public opinion, federal and state judicial decisions, and state-level policy
Courts, Federalism, Judicial Review, Gay Marriage