Replication Data for: The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Damage (with Thomas Plümper and Fabian Barthel), Global Environmental Change, 24, 2014, pp. 8-19
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Economic damage from natural hazards can sometimes be prevented and always mitigated. However,private individuals tend to underinvest in such measures due to problems of collective action,information asymmetry and myopic behavior. Governments, which can in principle correct these marketfailures, themselves face incentives to underinvest in costly disaster prevention policies and damagemitigation regulations. Yet, disaster damage varies greatly across countries. We argue that rationalactors will invest more in trying to prevent and mitigate damage the larger a country’s propensity toexperience frequent and strong natural hazards. Accordingly, economic loss from an actually occurringdisaster will be smaller the larger a country’s disaster propensity – holding everything else equal, such ashazard magnitude, the country’s to' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["economic damage","natural disasters","natural hazards","political economy"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Economic damage from natural hazards can sometimes be prevented and always mitigated. However,private individuals tend to underinvest in such measures due to problems of collective action,information asymmetry and myopic behavior. Governments, which can in principle correct these marketfailures, themselves face incentives to underinvest in costly disaster prevention policies and damagemitigation regulations. Yet, disaster damage varies greatly across countries. We argue that rationalactors will invest more in trying to prevent and mitigate damage the larger a country’s propensity toexperience frequent and strong natural hazards. Accordingly, economic loss from an actually occurringdisaster will be smaller the larger a country’s disaster propensity – holding everything else equal, such ashazard magnitude, the country’s to' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Economic damage from natural hazards can sometimes be prevented and always mitigated. However,private individuals tend to underinvest in such measures due to problems of collective action,information asymmetry and myopic behavior. Governments, which can in principle correct these marketfailures, themselves face incentives to underinvest in costly disaster prevention policies and damagemitigation regulations. Yet, disaster damage varies greatly across countries. We argue that rationalactors will invest more in trying to prevent and mitigate damage the larger a country’s propensity toexperience frequent and strong natural hazards. Accordingly, economic loss from an actually occurringdisaster will be smaller the larger a country’s disaster propensity – holding everything else equal, such ashazard magnitude, the country’s to
economic damage; natural disasters; natural hazards; political economy