Replication Data for: Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying? (with Per G. Fredriksson and Gergely Ujhelyi), Public Choice, 133 (1-2), 2007, pp. 231-251
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying?In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to thedemands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel datafrom 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. Wefind that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification,and the effect rises with the degree of corruption' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["agreements","corruption","environmentalism","political economy","ratification"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying?In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to thedemands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel datafrom 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. Wefind that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification,and the effect rises with the degree of corruption' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying?In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to thedemands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel datafrom 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. Wefind that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification,and the effect rises with the degree of corruption
agreements; corruption; environmentalism; political economy; ratification