Replication Data for: War and Default
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Sovereign borrowing often pays for the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war's economic disruptions, strains states' ability to honor debt promises.  Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this manuscript lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war.  In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war.  After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finan' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["Sovereign default","War"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Sovereign borrowing often pays for the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war's economic disruptions, strains states' ability to honor debt promises.  Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this manuscript lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war.  In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war.  After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finan' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Sovereign borrowing often pays for the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war's economic disruptions, strains states' ability to honor debt promises.  Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this manuscript lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war.  In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war.  After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finan
Sovereign default; War