Replication Data for: Famine Mortality and Rational Political Inactivity (with Thomas Plümper), World Development, 37 (1), 2009, pp. 50-61
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|> You are a research archivist expert in dataset metadata. Answer the question truthfully.  <|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|> Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of faminemortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquitaet al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., &Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders.British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003).The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press].We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat.We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover,a larger share of people being ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|> {"Answer" : ["autocracy","democracy","developing countries","famine","food aid","mortality"]} <|eot_id|>
 Here is the Description of a dataset. Description:'Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of faminemortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquitaet al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., &Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders.British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003).The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press].We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat.We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover,a larger share of people being ' . Please return only a json list of at most 3 Keywords corresponding to the Description:.
Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of faminemortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquitaet al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., &Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders.British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003).The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press].We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat.We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover,a larger share of people being 
autocracy; democracy; developing countries; famine; food aid; mortality