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It is a well settled principle that "a State Legislature may not enact laws that are in derogation of the Constitution." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 Md. 326, 328",
"parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037",
"parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"",
"sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)."
} | 4,111,678 | b |
It is a well settled principle that "a State Legislature may not enact laws that are in derogation of the Constitution." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "404 A.2d 1027, 1037",
"parenthetical": "noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a \"license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... \"",
"sentence": "Lamone v. Capozzi 396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546, 873 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2005) (“[T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision ... does not authorize the General Assembly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or amend the Constitution”); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1979) (noting that the constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, by rules, does not authorize a rule which is inconsistent with that provision, as it would be a “license ... to make a substantive change in the Maryland constitution ..., a result we do not think was contemplated by the drafters.... ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 A. 137, 137",
"parenthetical": "\"[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 29 (1968) (“[W]e must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 [of the United States Constitution] gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other [state] constitutional provisions”); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 527, 31 A. 300, 301-02 (1895) (“But whatever may be done, no restrictions can be imposed that will require other or different qualifications for voting, than those prescribed by the first Article of the Constitution of the State)”; Kemp v. Owens, supra, 76 Md. at 239, 24 A. at 607 (Bryan, J., concurring) (“We cannot add anything to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution; neither can we take anything from them”); Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 328, 22 A. 137, 137 (1891) (“[Qualifications [for voting in Maryland], fixed by the organic law, can neither be enlarged nor curtailed by the General Assembly”)."
} | 4,111,678 | a |
In this case, no explanation or reason was given by the trial court as to its justification for the entry of the final judgment for Peco, aside from the formulaic recitation of "no just reason for delay." This failure by the trial court to include a reasoned explanation makes any review by this Court, as to whether there was an abuse of discretion in the entry of the Rule 54(b) judgment, merely speculative. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 F.2d 61, 61",
"parenthetical": "the district court's failure to give a reasoned statement regarding its entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment makes any appellate \"judgment as to the propriety of certification speculative, both as to whether any consideration was given to the order and what factors were considered\"",
"sentence": "See Solomon, 782 F.2d at 61 (the district court’s failure to give a reasoned statement regarding its entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment makes any appellate “judgment as to the propriety of certification speculative, both as to whether any consideration was given to the order and what factors were considered”); see also McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir.2008) (the district court’s failure to provide specific reasons for its Rule 54(b) certification, makes the review by the appellate court “more speculative and less circumscribed than would be the case had the court explained its actions more fully”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 F.3d 924, 928",
"parenthetical": "the district court's failure to provide specific reasons for its Rule 54(b",
"sentence": "See Solomon, 782 F.2d at 61 (the district court’s failure to give a reasoned statement regarding its entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment makes any appellate “judgment as to the propriety of certification speculative, both as to whether any consideration was given to the order and what factors were considered”); see also McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir.2008) (the district court’s failure to provide specific reasons for its Rule 54(b) certification, makes the review by the appellate court “more speculative and less circumscribed than would be the case had the court explained its actions more fully”)."
} | 7,026,372 | a |
Plaintiff's status, however, as either a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner does not affect analysis of his claims. While Plaintiff's claims as a pretrial detainee are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Tenth Circuit has determined the scope of this protection is co-extensive with the Eighth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 490, 495",
"parenthetical": "\"Although the Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee's claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.\"",
"sentence": "See Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.1998) (\"Although the Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.”) (citation omitted); see also Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir.2002) (\"Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, [and courts in this circuit] appl[y] an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to § 1983.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "312 F.3d 1304, 1315",
"parenthetical": "\"Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, [and courts in this circuit] appl[y] an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to SS 1983.\"",
"sentence": "See Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.1998) (\"Although the Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.”) (citation omitted); see also Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir.2002) (\"Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, [and courts in this circuit] appl[y] an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to § 1983.”)."
} | 3,820,068 | a |
We express no opinion on whether products liability claims are preempted only if the manufacturer complied with applicable FDA regulations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "961 F.2d 1334, 1334",
"parenthetical": "scope of preemption under MDA \"is limited to efforts by states to impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations\"",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Zimmer, 830 F.Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (refusing to extend preemptive reach of MDA to negligence claim against manufacturer that allegedly violated FDA requirements); see also Slater, 961 F.2d at 1334 (scope of preemption under MDA “is limited to efforts by states to impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "830 F.Supp. 199, 204",
"parenthetical": "refusing to extend preemptive reach of MDA to negligence claim against manufacturer that allegedly violated FDA requirements",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Zimmer, 830 F.Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (refusing to extend preemptive reach of MDA to negligence claim against manufacturer that allegedly violated FDA requirements); see also Slater, 961 F.2d at 1334 (scope of preemption under MDA “is limited to efforts by states to impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations”)."
} | 10,501,865 | b |
To focus our inquiry, we must first define the relevant forum to which the Unions seek access. As we have thus far assumed, the local government payroll systems (rather than, say, local government property in general) constitute the relevant forum for our analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 800, 800",
"parenthetical": "counseling a \"tailored approach\" to defining the parameters of a government forum",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "460 U.S. 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "considering teachers' mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | 4,069,722 | b |
To focus our inquiry, we must first define the relevant forum to which the Unions seek access. As we have thus far assumed, the local government payroll systems (rather than, say, local government property in general) constitute the relevant forum for our analysis. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counseling a \"tailored approach\" to defining the parameters of a government forum",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "460 U.S. 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "considering teachers' mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | 4,069,722 | b |
To focus our inquiry, we must first define the relevant forum to which the Unions seek access. As we have thus far assumed, the local government payroll systems (rather than, say, local government property in general) constitute the relevant forum for our analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering teachers' mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 800, 800",
"parenthetical": "counseling a \"tailored approach\" to defining the parameters of a government forum",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | 4,069,722 | a |
To focus our inquiry, we must first define the relevant forum to which the Unions seek access. As we have thus far assumed, the local government payroll systems (rather than, say, local government property in general) constitute the relevant forum for our analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering teachers' mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counseling a \"tailored approach\" to defining the parameters of a government forum",
"sentence": "See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948 (considering teachers’ mailboxes, rather than the entire school, to be the relevant forum for purposes of forum analysis); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (counseling a “tailored approach” to defining the parameters of a government forum)."
} | 4,069,722 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1942, 1942-43",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1942, 1942-43",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1942, 1942-43",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 774, 774-75",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 774, 774-75",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 774, 774-75",
"parenthetical": "involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2853, 2853",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2853, 2853",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2853, 2853",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 L.Ed.2d 556, 556",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 L.Ed.2d 556, 556",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 L.Ed.2d 556, 556",
"parenthetical": "concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 437, 437-39",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 437, 437-39",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 437, 437-39",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 1896, 1896-97",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 1896, 1896-97",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 S.Ct. 1896, 1896-97",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 L.Ed.2d 495, 495",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 L.Ed.2d 495, 495",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 L.Ed.2d 495, 495",
"parenthetical": "applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 1210, 1216",
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"this civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "18 F.3d 297, 297-98",
"parenthetical": "predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "18 F.3d 297, 297-98",
"parenthetical": "predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "18 F.3d 297, 297-98",
"parenthetical": "predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "881 S.W.2d 831, 831",
"parenthetical": "involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "950 F.2d 193, 194-95",
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "881 S.W.2d 831, 831",
"parenthetical": "involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | a |
The authorities cited by Solar and Urtado are distinguishable. In each cited case, the State targeted exactly the same offense in both civil and criminal actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.\"",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "881 S.W.2d 831, 831",
"parenthetical": "involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture",
"sentence": "See Kurth Ranch, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d at 774-75 (involving criminal convictions for possession and conspiracy to possess drugs with later civil tax applied to the same possessed drugs); Dixon, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d at 556 (concerning use of contempt proceedings and criminal prosecution for same drug offense); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97, 104 L.Ed.2d at 495 (applying civil and criminal actions to the same sixty-five false claim violations); United States v. $4.05,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.1994) (“this civil forfeiture action and the claimants’ criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws”), amended by 56 F.3d 41 (1995); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 (predicating civil forfeiture proceeding on the same drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 (involving single charge of possession with intent to deliver followed by civil forfeiture); see also United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (“The assessed civil fines addressed the same conduct which was the basis of the subsequent criminal indictments.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992)."
} | 9,999,749 | b |
However, an insured's conduct can vitiate good faith even without subjective dishonesty, actual knowledge of, or complicity in the forgery. If an insured's conduct rises past ordinary negligence to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to "red flags," it breaches the good faith requirement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suggesting that \"extending] credit based on documents that look[ ] suspicious\" would be bad faith",
"sentence": "See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 721 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.1983) (“[M]ere ignorance is not bad faith, but ... if one chooses to remain ignorant ... in fear of what a little knowledge will disclose ... such selective ignorance is bad faith.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Manitowoc II, 485 F.3d at 978 n. 5 (suggesting that “extending] credit based on documents that look[ ] suspicious” would be bad faith); Manitowoc I, 2005 WL 2460719, at *5 (“To the extent an insured’s negligence rose to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to red flags raised about a document or customer, the bond’s good faith requirement would preclude coverage.”); cf. Stix Friedman & Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 563 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo.Ct.App.1978) (approving a jury instruction stating, “ ‘good faith’ means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "563 S.W.2d 517, 521",
"parenthetical": "approving a jury instruction stating, \" 'good faith' means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 721 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.1983) (“[M]ere ignorance is not bad faith, but ... if one chooses to remain ignorant ... in fear of what a little knowledge will disclose ... such selective ignorance is bad faith.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Manitowoc II, 485 F.3d at 978 n. 5 (suggesting that “extending] credit based on documents that look[ ] suspicious” would be bad faith); Manitowoc I, 2005 WL 2460719, at *5 (“To the extent an insured’s negligence rose to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to red flags raised about a document or customer, the bond’s good faith requirement would preclude coverage.”); cf. Stix Friedman & Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 563 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo.Ct.App.1978) (approving a jury instruction stating, “ ‘good faith’ means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,025,768 | a |
However, an insured's conduct can vitiate good faith even without subjective dishonesty, actual knowledge of, or complicity in the forgery. If an insured's conduct rises past ordinary negligence to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to "red flags," it breaches the good faith requirement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "563 S.W.2d 517, 521",
"parenthetical": "approving a jury instruction stating, \" 'good faith' means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 721 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.1983) (“[M]ere ignorance is not bad faith, but ... if one chooses to remain ignorant ... in fear of what a little knowledge will disclose ... such selective ignorance is bad faith.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Manitowoc II, 485 F.3d at 978 n. 5 (suggesting that “extending] credit based on documents that look[ ] suspicious” would be bad faith); Manitowoc I, 2005 WL 2460719, at *5 (“To the extent an insured’s negligence rose to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to red flags raised about a document or customer, the bond’s good faith requirement would preclude coverage.”); cf. Stix Friedman & Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 563 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo.Ct.App.1978) (approving a jury instruction stating, “ ‘good faith’ means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2460719, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"To the extent an insured's negligence rose to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to red flags raised about a document or customer, the bond's good faith requirement would preclude coverage.\"",
"sentence": "See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 721 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.1983) (“[M]ere ignorance is not bad faith, but ... if one chooses to remain ignorant ... in fear of what a little knowledge will disclose ... such selective ignorance is bad faith.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Manitowoc II, 485 F.3d at 978 n. 5 (suggesting that “extending] credit based on documents that look[ ] suspicious” would be bad faith); Manitowoc I, 2005 WL 2460719, at *5 (“To the extent an insured’s negligence rose to the level of gross negligence or knowing indifference to red flags raised about a document or customer, the bond’s good faith requirement would preclude coverage.”); cf. Stix Friedman & Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 563 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Mo.Ct.App.1978) (approving a jury instruction stating, “ ‘good faith’ means freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,025,768 | b |
In the present case, and giving due deference to Detective Comeaux's experience and expertise in the investigation of the illicit methamphetamine trade, the detective had the requisite minimal objective basis for detaining all four occupants of the vehicle who arrived together but took pains not to seem together as they engaged in "smurfing," even discounting his opinion that the exchange of money between Hatcher and defendant constituted some sort of drug transaction (for which the officer could not articulate an objective basis because he did not observe the contemporaneous transfer of an object), and even further discounting the discovery of the box of Sudafed in the bag taken from Deanne Wetzler by his partner. Moreover, once Comeaux initiated the stop, he had the authority to order defendant and the other occupants out of the vehicle for officer safely. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 So.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers' safety",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 408, 413",
"parenthetical": "when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | 7,280,097 | a |
In the present case, and giving due deference to Detective Comeaux's experience and expertise in the investigation of the illicit methamphetamine trade, the detective had the requisite minimal objective basis for detaining all four occupants of the vehicle who arrived together but took pains not to seem together as they engaged in "smurfing," even discounting his opinion that the exchange of money between Hatcher and defendant constituted some sort of drug transaction (for which the officer could not articulate an objective basis because he did not observe the contemporaneous transfer of an object), and even further discounting the discovery of the box of Sudafed in the bag taken from Deanne Wetzler by his partner. Moreover, once Comeaux initiated the stop, he had the authority to order defendant and the other occupants out of the vehicle for officer safely. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "117 S.Ct. 882, 886",
"parenthetical": "when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 So.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers' safety",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | 7,280,097 | b |
In the present case, and giving due deference to Detective Comeaux's experience and expertise in the investigation of the illicit methamphetamine trade, the detective had the requisite minimal objective basis for detaining all four occupants of the vehicle who arrived together but took pains not to seem together as they engaged in "smurfing," even discounting his opinion that the exchange of money between Hatcher and defendant constituted some sort of drug transaction (for which the officer could not articulate an objective basis because he did not observe the contemporaneous transfer of an object), and even further discounting the discovery of the box of Sudafed in the bag taken from Deanne Wetzler by his partner. Moreover, once Comeaux initiated the stop, he had the authority to order defendant and the other occupants out of the vehicle for officer safely. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 So.2d 345, 347",
"parenthetical": "police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers' safety",
"sentence": "See State v. Landry, 588 So.2d 345, 347 (La.1991) (police may order passengers to exit a car in a routine traffic stop for reasons of the officers’ safety); see also Maryland v. 9Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (when a vehicle is stopped, even for a traffic violation, officers may lawfully order its passengers to exit the vehicle)."
} | 7,280,097 | b |
Statutes that provide rewards for informants or whistleblowers are plainly inapposite to Mr. Hicks and the facts of his ease. Nor is there any basis on which to conclude plaintiff acted as a confidential informant pursuant to any express or implied agreement with the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 1204, 1210",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent privity [of contract] between [plaintiff] and the government, there is no case.\"",
"sentence": "See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Absent privity [of contract] between [plaintiff] and the government, there is no case.”); San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed.Cir.1989) (explaining that “[t]o recover for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must allege ... (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach”); contra Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36 (2014) (finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36",
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement",
"sentence": "See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Absent privity [of contract] between [plaintiff] and the government, there is no case.”); San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed.Cir.1989) (explaining that “[t]o recover for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must allege ... (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach”); contra Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36 (2014) (finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement)."
} | 4,288,211 | a |
Statutes that provide rewards for informants or whistleblowers are plainly inapposite to Mr. Hicks and the facts of his ease. Nor is there any basis on which to conclude plaintiff acted as a confidential informant pursuant to any express or implied agreement with the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 957, 959",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[t]o recover for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must allege ... (1",
"sentence": "See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Absent privity [of contract] between [plaintiff] and the government, there is no case.”); San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed.Cir.1989) (explaining that “[t]o recover for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must allege ... (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach”); contra Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36 (2014) (finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36",
"parenthetical": "finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement",
"sentence": "See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Absent privity [of contract] between [plaintiff] and the government, there is no case.”); San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed.Cir.1989) (explaining that “[t]o recover for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must allege ... (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach”); contra Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. 226, 232-36 (2014) (finding jurisdiction existed over claim for breach of confidential informant agreement)."
} | 4,288,211 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 638, 644-45",
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 A.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 638, 644-45",
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 A.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 638, 644-45",
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 A.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 U.S. 638, 644-45",
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 A.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | a |
While Pennsylvania's scheme will no doubt produce constitutional results in some instances, the practical effect of such a scheme on other occasions is the unconstitutional taxation of out-of-state value and impermissible double taxation. In my judgment, the complete absence of the subsidiaries from the apportionment formula makes it facially apparent that the Pennsylvania statute reaches beyond constitutional limits and taxes value outside its borders. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 A.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania's capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute",
"sentence": "See Norfolk & Western, 390 U.S. at 325, 88 S.Ct. 995 (apportionment formula must be rationally related, both on its face and in its application, to values connected with the taxing state); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (a tax that unfairly apportions income from other states is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce, and discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) (holding manufacturing exception to Pennsylvania’s capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce)."
} | 11,365,275 | b |
Plaintiffs argue the opposite: that it is inconceivable that Suttles, who led BP's media response effort after the oil spill, would not have known of "BP's very oum, estimates of the flow rate." (Doc. No. 186, at 36.) Plaintiffs' argument is more persuasive here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 F.3d 351, 351-54",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a securities fraud complaint may survive where plaintiffs have alleged facts demonstrating that defendants failed to review or check information that they had a duty to monitor",
"sentence": "See, e.g., see also ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 351-54 (explaining that a securities fraud complaint may survive where plaintiffs have alleged facts demonstrating that defendants failed to review or check information that they had a duty to monitor); see also In re Washington Mut, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d at 1209-1210 (finding a strong inference of scienter pleaded as to statement about risk management where defendant was responsible for overseeing risk management)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "694 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1209-1210",
"parenthetical": "finding a strong inference of scienter pleaded as to statement about risk management where defendant was responsible for overseeing risk management",
"sentence": "See, e.g., see also ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 351-54 (explaining that a securities fraud complaint may survive where plaintiffs have alleged facts demonstrating that defendants failed to review or check information that they had a duty to monitor); see also In re Washington Mut, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d at 1209-1210 (finding a strong inference of scienter pleaded as to statement about risk management where defendant was responsible for overseeing risk management)."
} | 3,776,071 | a |
As we have related, prior to the introduction of the 2012 legislation, Attorney General Gansler and senior members of his office had opined on no less than four separate occasions that CCI's machines, and the way that they were operated, violated then-current Maryland law. Further, even if CCI's machines were legal under the 2008 law, the prohibition against special laws does not restrict the General Assembly's authority to prohibit what was previously permitted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 Md.App. 276, 276",
"parenthetical": "that legislation immediately affects only one entity \"is not sufficient to render it a special law\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "101 U.S. 814, 818",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | 3,902,085 | a |
As we have related, prior to the introduction of the 2012 legislation, Attorney General Gansler and senior members of his office had opined on no less than four separate occasions that CCI's machines, and the way that they were operated, violated then-current Maryland law. Further, even if CCI's machines were legal under the 2008 law, the prohibition against special laws does not restrict the General Assembly's authority to prohibit what was previously permitted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 Md.App. 276, 276",
"parenthetical": "that legislation immediately affects only one entity \"is not sufficient to render it a special law\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | 3,902,085 | a |
As we have related, prior to the introduction of the 2012 legislation, Attorney General Gansler and senior members of his office had opined on no less than four separate occasions that CCI's machines, and the way that they were operated, violated then-current Maryland law. Further, even if CCI's machines were legal under the 2008 law, the prohibition against special laws does not restrict the General Assembly's authority to prohibit what was previously permitted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "101 U.S. 814, 818",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "that legislation immediately affects only one entity \"is not sufficient to render it a special law\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | 3,902,085 | b |
As we have related, prior to the introduction of the 2012 legislation, Attorney General Gansler and senior members of his office had opined on no less than four separate occasions that CCI's machines, and the way that they were operated, violated then-current Maryland law. Further, even if CCI's machines were legal under the 2008 law, the prohibition against special laws does not restrict the General Assembly's authority to prohibit what was previously permitted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "that legislation immediately affects only one entity \"is not sufficient to render it a special law\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.\"",
"sentence": "See Days Cove, 200 Md.App. at 276, 27 A.3d 565 (that legislation immediately affects only one entity “is not sufficient to render it a special law”); cf. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879) (“[N]o legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of [the] police power.”)"
} | 3,902,085 | a |
Count 3 charged the Defendant with dealing in stolen property, "to wit: JEWELRY.... " The jury found the Defendant guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. As , both charges relate to the same jewelry and to one scheme or course of conduct, the Defendant's conviction for grand theft of the jewelry violates double jeopardy. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the defendant's grand theft conviction where he was charged with grand theft of two television sets, and trafficking in one of the stolen television sets four days later",
"sentence": "Stallworth v. State, 538 So.2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (reversing the defendant’s grand theft conviction where he was charged with grand theft of two television sets, and trafficking in one of the stolen television sets four days later); see Jones v. State, 453 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (rejecting the state’s attempt to limit the grand theft count to a stolen car, and the dealing in stolen property count to a stereo system)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the state's attempt to limit the grand theft count to a stolen car, and the dealing in stolen property count to a stereo system",
"sentence": "Stallworth v. State, 538 So.2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (reversing the defendant’s grand theft conviction where he was charged with grand theft of two television sets, and trafficking in one of the stolen television sets four days later); see Jones v. State, 453 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (rejecting the state’s attempt to limit the grand theft count to a stolen car, and the dealing in stolen property count to a stereo system)."
} | 9,002,907 | a |
In other words, only Oklahoma law governed the case. And Oklahoma does not permit a claim for gross negligence as an exemption to. the Workers' Compensation Act; thus, a gross-negligence claim necessarily < could not have supported Ms. Phillips's action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 P.3d 553, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong's equivalent.\"",
"sentence": "See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 P.3d 575, 575-76",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and \"willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm\" and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers' Compensation Act",
"sentence": "See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable."
} | 4,314,839 | b |
In other words, only Oklahoma law governed the case. And Oklahoma does not permit a claim for gross negligence as an exemption to. the Workers' Compensation Act; thus, a gross-negligence claim necessarily < could not have supported Ms. Phillips's action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "847 P.2d 342, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"While 'ordinary' and 'gross' negligence differ in degree, 'negligence' and 'willful and wanton' misconduct' differ in kind.\"",
"sentence": "See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 P.3d 575, 575-76",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and \"willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm\" and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers' Compensation Act",
"sentence": "See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable."
} | 4,314,839 | b |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 377, 391",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 487, 487-89",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | b |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 487, 487-89",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | a |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 487, 487-89",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | b |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "505 U.S. 377, 391",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2201, 2201",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | b |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2201, 2201",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | a |
Minnesota is not unique in using "because of' in its formulation of bias assault; other courts have interpreted the same words in similar statutes to require the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailant's perception of the group to which the victim belongs. By requiring a causal link, the statutes exclude offenses committed by a person who entertains racial or other bias but whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323",
"parenthetical": "finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2201, 2201",
"parenthetical": "racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment",
"sentence": "Id., 42 Cal.Rptr.2d at 367-68, 896 P.2d at 1377; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89, 113 S.Ct. at 2201 (racist speech may be introduced to prove motive for conduct unprotected by First Amendment); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2547, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 323 (1992) (finding ordinance aimed exclusively at speech to be impermissible, content-based discrimination)."
} | 10,694,324 | b |
Mr. Bozeman and General Motors were not joint tortfeasors. Setoffs generally are available only with respect to joint tortfeasors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "763 So.2d 276, 279",
"parenthetical": "\"Joint and several liability is also appropriate when the tortious acts of multiple tortfeasors combine to produce a single, indivisible injury.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gross v. Lyons, 763 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla.2000) (\"Joint and several liability is also appropriate when the tortious acts of multiple tortfeasors combine to produce a single, indivisible injury.”); Maser v. Fioretti, 498 So.2d 568, 569-70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "654 So.2d 643, 645",
"parenthetical": "holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were \"separate and distinct,\" i.e., \"involving different elements of damages\"",
"sentence": "Rosenberg, D.D.S., P.A., 654 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were \"separate and distinct,” i.e., \"involving different elements of damages”). If damages were indivisible, these defendants might nonetheless be treated as joint tortfeasors."
} | 9,373,422 | b |
Significantly, the agreement sent to Ms. DeFontes, who is no longer a plaintiff in this case, contained additional language advising her of the method of rejection. The introductory provision of the terms and conditions agreement that defendants sent to her stated, "[i]f for any reason Customer is not satisfied with a Dell-branded hardware system, Customer may return the system under the terms and conditions of Dell's Total Satisfaction Return Policy * * In doing so, defendants explicitly contrasted acceptance of the terms with rejection of the goods, albeit while retaining some ambiguity whether rejection of defendants' proposed terms could reasonably be construed as dissatisfaction with "Dell-branded hardware." Many of the cases upholding shrinkwrap agreements cite explicit disclaimers advising consumers of their right to reject the terms. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "998 P.2d 308, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY RETURN * * * TO THE PLACE OF PURCHASE AND YOUR PURCHASE PRICE WILL BE REFUNDED\"",
"sentence": "Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 308 (“IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY RETURN * * * TO THE PLACE OF PURCHASE AND YOUR PURCHASE PRICE WILL BE REFUNDED”). Such explicit language is also present in some of the foreign cases in which defendants have prevailed."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2006 WL 2109436, at *1",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajgreement informs the consumer that by returning the product or refusing delivery in accordance with Dell's return policy, he can reject the terms and conditions\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Sherr, 2006 WL 2109436, at *1 (“[ajgreement informs the consumer that by returning the product or refusing delivery in accordance with Dell’s return policy, he can reject the terms and conditions”)."
} | 7,294,034 | a |
In that context, plaintiffs who purchased securities are permitted to demonstrate that they were damaged simply because defendant engaged in behavior otherwise prohibited and there was a change in price. See ibid. The theory therefore presumes reliance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 356, 359-62",
"parenthetical": "limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 F.2d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | 3,154,468 | b |
In that context, plaintiffs who purchased securities are permitted to demonstrate that they were damaged simply because defendant engaged in behavior otherwise prohibited and there was a change in price. See ibid. The theory therefore presumes reliance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 F.2d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | 3,154,468 | a |
In that context, plaintiffs who purchased securities are permitted to demonstrate that they were damaged simply because defendant engaged in behavior otherwise prohibited and there was a change in price. See ibid. The theory therefore presumes reliance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 F.2d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | 3,154,468 | a |
In that context, plaintiffs who purchased securities are permitted to demonstrate that they were damaged simply because defendant engaged in behavior otherwise prohibited and there was a change in price. See ibid. The theory therefore presumes reliance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 F.2d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation",
"sentence": "See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, (1988); Blackie, supra, 524 F.2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory in securities fraud litigation); see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-62 (5th Cir.1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of securities fraud claims), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988)."
} | 3,154,468 | b |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's discretionary rulings when \"the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | a |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's discretionary rulings when \"the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | a |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "\"To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | b |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 P.3d 1137, 1139",
"parenthetical": "\"To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | b |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 140, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's discretionary rulings when \"the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | a |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 140, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appellate court not bound by trial court's discretionary rulings when \"the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | a |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 140, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "\"To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | a |
P 13 Because the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions' motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 P.3d 1137, 1139",
"parenthetical": "\"To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 140, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.\"",
"sentence": "See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”)."
} | 3,423,715 | b |
Such rank speculation about a judge's possibly improper motives is clearly insufficient to implicate Murchison's prophylactic rule. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 F.2d 912, 919",
"parenthetical": "\"we think the mere fact that a judge entertains a motion for new trial in a case over which he presided initially does not reasonably call'into question his impartiality ... it may be advantageous ... because of [the original judge's] familiarity with earlier proceedings\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1964) (holding that consistent with Due Process a judge presiding over a reconstruction hearing may use his own recollection of the initial plea in reaching his decision if there has been no showing of bias); cf. United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir.1980) (“we think the mere fact that a judge entertains a motion for new trial in a case over which he presided initially does not reasonably call'into question his impartiality ... it may be advantageous ... because of [the original judge’s] familiarity with earlier proceedings”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "337 F.2d 49, 51",
"parenthetical": "holding that consistent with Due Process a judge presiding over a reconstruction hearing may use his own recollection of the initial plea in reaching his decision if there has been no showing of bias",
"sentence": "United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1964) (holding that consistent with Due Process a judge presiding over a reconstruction hearing may use his own recollection of the initial plea in reaching his decision if there has been no showing of bias); cf. United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir.1980) (“we think the mere fact that a judge entertains a motion for new trial in a case over which he presided initially does not reasonably call'into question his impartiality ... it may be advantageous ... because of [the original judge’s] familiarity with earlier proceedings”)."
} | 11,077,506 | b |
There can be no dispute that a request for waiver of indebtedness is related to VA benefits. The indebtedness in this case arose from an overpayment of benefits, and Mrs. Edwards had a right to seek waiver of any amount owed. Because the duty to sympathetically read pro se pleadings applies, at a minimum, to pleadings related to the provision of VA benefits, and Mrs. Edwards' May 2000 submissions were related to the provision of VA benefits, we need not decide if the duty to assist applies to a request for waiver or if the duty to sympathetically read pleadings applies to any and all pro se submissions to the Secretary, as opposed to those submissions that are related to VA benefits. Inasmuch as it is clear that the Board did not sympathetically read Mrs. Edwards' May 2003 submissions related to her $2,366 indebtedness, this matter will be remanded for the Board to do so in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 394, 405",
"parenthetical": "holding that whether a sympathetic reading of a veteran's filings raises a claim is a factual inquiry",
"sentence": "See Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005) (holding that whether a sympathetic reading of a veteran’s filings raises a claim is a factual inquiry); Richardson v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 64, 72 (2006) (remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits); see also Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2004) (holding that the interpretation of a veteran’s filings is a factual inquiry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1306, 1310",
"parenthetical": "holding that the interpretation of a veteran's filings is a factual inquiry",
"sentence": "See Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005) (holding that whether a sympathetic reading of a veteran’s filings raises a claim is a factual inquiry); Richardson v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 64, 72 (2006) (remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits); see also Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2004) (holding that the interpretation of a veteran’s filings is a factual inquiry)."
} | 5,636,786 | a |
There can be no dispute that a request for waiver of indebtedness is related to VA benefits. The indebtedness in this case arose from an overpayment of benefits, and Mrs. Edwards had a right to seek waiver of any amount owed. Because the duty to sympathetically read pro se pleadings applies, at a minimum, to pleadings related to the provision of VA benefits, and Mrs. Edwards' May 2000 submissions were related to the provision of VA benefits, we need not decide if the duty to assist applies to a request for waiver or if the duty to sympathetically read pleadings applies to any and all pro se submissions to the Secretary, as opposed to those submissions that are related to VA benefits. Inasmuch as it is clear that the Board did not sympathetically read Mrs. Edwards' May 2003 submissions related to her $2,366 indebtedness, this matter will be remanded for the Board to do so in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 64, 72",
"parenthetical": "remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits",
"sentence": "See Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005) (holding that whether a sympathetic reading of a veteran’s filings raises a claim is a factual inquiry); Richardson v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 64, 72 (2006) (remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits); see also Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2004) (holding that the interpretation of a veteran’s filings is a factual inquiry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 1306, 1310",
"parenthetical": "holding that the interpretation of a veteran's filings is a factual inquiry",
"sentence": "See Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005) (holding that whether a sympathetic reading of a veteran’s filings raises a claim is a factual inquiry); Richardson v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 64, 72 (2006) (remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits); see also Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2004) (holding that the interpretation of a veteran’s filings is a factual inquiry)."
} | 5,636,786 | a |
The opposing view finds environmental clean-up costs can fall within the scope of the term "damages." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 S.E.2d 459, 459",
"parenthetical": "finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co., 594 S.E.2d at 459 (finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington); see also Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1997) (ordinary meaning of “damages” includes equitable relief encompassing response costs incurred pursuant to state and federal statute); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn.1990) (finding “damages” in policy to include reimbursement for clean-up costs undertaken at the direction of the state)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordinary meaning of \"damages\" includes equitable relief encompassing response costs incurred pursuant to state and federal statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co., 594 S.E.2d at 459 (finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington); see also Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1997) (ordinary meaning of “damages” includes equitable relief encompassing response costs incurred pursuant to state and federal statute); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn.1990) (finding “damages” in policy to include reimbursement for clean-up costs undertaken at the direction of the state)."
} | 1,499,330 | a |
The opposing view finds environmental clean-up costs can fall within the scope of the term "damages." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding \"damages\" in policy to include reimbursement for clean-up costs undertaken at the direction of the state",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co., 594 S.E.2d at 459 (finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington); see also Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1997) (ordinary meaning of “damages” includes equitable relief encompassing response costs incurred pursuant to state and federal statute); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn.1990) (finding “damages” in policy to include reimbursement for clean-up costs undertaken at the direction of the state)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 S.E.2d 459, 459",
"parenthetical": "finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co., 594 S.E.2d at 459 (finding such coverage and citing cases from Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Washington); see also Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1997) (ordinary meaning of “damages” includes equitable relief encompassing response costs incurred pursuant to state and federal statute); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn.1990) (finding “damages” in policy to include reimbursement for clean-up costs undertaken at the direction of the state)."
} | 1,499,330 | b |
The "issue" the trial court ruled on was not whether a Wade hearing was necessary -- and this is natural enough, in light of defendant's failure to ask for one when invited to -- but simply whether the identification was admissible at all. The Wade-hearing issue was not preserved, and defendant does not contend that it was plain error not to hold a Wade hearing. Accordingly, we decline to address whether a Wade hearing was necessary under these circumstances. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "172 Vt. 493, 499",
"parenthetical": "declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error",
"sentence": "State v. White, 172 Vt. 493, 499, 782 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001) (declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error); see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 341, 349",
"parenthetical": "holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases",
"sentence": "State v. White, 172 Vt. 493, 499, 782 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001) (declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error); see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases)."
} | 3,694,028 | a |
The "issue" the trial court ruled on was not whether a Wade hearing was necessary -- and this is natural enough, in light of defendant's failure to ask for one when invited to -- but simply whether the identification was admissible at all. The Wade-hearing issue was not preserved, and defendant does not contend that it was plain error not to hold a Wade hearing. Accordingly, we decline to address whether a Wade hearing was necessary under these circumstances. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 341, 349",
"parenthetical": "holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases",
"sentence": "State v. White, 172 Vt. 493, 499, 782 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001) (declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error); see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "782 A.2d 1187, 1192",
"parenthetical": "declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error",
"sentence": "State v. White, 172 Vt. 493, 499, 782 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001) (declining to address claim raised for the first time on appeal where party failed to assert plain error); see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (holding that, although Wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances, it is not mandated in all cases)."
} | 3,694,028 | b |