Re: WSJ: PG&E's Huge losses... ,
 And comments of other participants to the AB 1890 deal would also be very 
helpful (like Steve Peace and customer groups).  Ought to show why Glynn's 
making comments like "we don't want to overanalyze the old deal."



	Steven J Kean
	Sent by: Steven J Kean
	09/27/2000 11:50 AM
		 
		 To: Elizabeth Linnell/NA/Enron@Enron
		 cc: Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron, James D Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron
		 Subject: WSJ: PG&E's Huge losses...

Eliz -- I need your group to put together a search which captures the 
comments of PG&E and Edison officials in trade press, anlyst reports, and 
speeches which would be inconsistent with the idea that they can now recover 
their shortfall.  In other words, when they were trying to get AB 1890 
passed, when they were fighting Proposition 9, when they floated their "rate 
reduction bonds" and when they talked to analysts and rating agencies I'm 
sure they assumed that they would live under the rate freeze and take the 
risk of stranded cost recovery whithin the statutory deadline.

----- Forwarded by Steven J Kean/NA/Enron on 09/27/2000 11:45 AM -----

	"Dick S George" <dsgeorge@firstworld.net>
	09/27/2000 08:04 AM
		 
		 To: "Dick George" <dsgeorge@firstworld.net>
		 cc: 
		 Subject: WSJ: PG&E's Huge losses...

CC list suppressed...
September 27, 2000
California Utilities' LossesOn Electricity Pose Risk

By REBECCA SMITH

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

California's two biggest utilities are losing so much
money buying electricity in the state's deregulated
market that they have run up deficits equivalent to half
their net worth in just four months.

If the cost of wholesale power continues to exceed the
price these utilities are allowed to bill their
customers, as currently seems likely, they could become
technically insolvent sometime next year. That would put
pressure on regulators to orchestrate a
multibillion-dollar public bailout, similar to the "too
big to fail'' response that in the past pushed
governments to rescue banks.

Such a scenario is quietly being discussed by bond-rating
concerns that recently reduced their credit outlooks for
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., a unit of San Francisco-based
PG&E Corp., and Southern California Edison, a unit of
Edison International of Rosemead, Calif. Bond- rating
concerns say they aren't sure how much additional debt
can be borne by the two affected utilities before they
will have difficulty paying their bills.

Probe of California Power Prices Begins, but New Plants
Aren't Seen as Solution (Sept. 11)

Los Angeles Utility Is Benefitting, Surprisingly, From
Deregulation (Sept. 6)

California Lawmakers Vote to Limit Electricity Costs
(Sept. 1)
"If this is just a seasonal aberration, the utilities can
get through it," says Lori Woodland, analyst for Fitch
IBCA. "If it goes on for six or nine months, it's a very
serious situation." Adds A.J. Sabatelle, senior credit
officer at Moody's Investors Service Inc.: "At some
point, you have a financial crisis."

The utilities say they are having no difficulty meeting
expenses and don't envision problems in servicing their
debts. But they are vigorously lobbying state and federal
regulators to change the rules of the game, hoping
somehow to raise rates to make up for the shortfall. The
California utilities' experience may be a harbinger of
what could happen in other states where wholesale power
prices have surpassed the amount that utilities are
allowed to charge their ratepayers.

For now, utilities are making ends meet by going to the
financial markets to borrow money. PG&E, a giant utility
that serves one out of every 20 Americans, is seeking
approval to increase its debt capacity by $1.4 billion.
It is borrowing $200 million, while Edison is tapping
$250 million from the commercial paper market. "This is
going to be a long, tough road," says Jim Scilacci, chief
financial officer for Southern California Edison.

Today's situation represents a complete turnabout from
what was expected when California deregulated its energy
market on March 31, 1998, which opened electricity
pricing to competition. California tried to give its
utilities a competitive edge nationally by deregulating
faster than other states and by creating a mechanism to
allow investor-owned utilities, such as PG&E and Edison,
to quickly pay down debts incurred to serve customers
under the old regulatory system.

To do this, the state legislature set retail rates at
high levels, which, at first, generated fat surpluses for
the utilities. As the money piled up, utilities used it
to pay down debts for generation facilities that were
otherwise unprofitable in the new deregulated world. By
the end of this June, PG&E and Edison together had
collected more than $12 billion and were on track to
finish paying down debts well ahead of the March 31,
2002, deadline set by the legislature. At that point,
rate freezes were to end and retail prices were to
fluctuate with the market.

But all that went out the window in June, when wholesale
power prices surged, topping the rates the utilities were
allowed to charge retail customers. Average prices at
state-sanctioned energy markets were four to five times
the prices of a year earlier, and three to four times the
level utilities could charge customers.

The accumulated shortfall has been so enormous at PG&E,
that analysts expect its deficit to exceed $3 billion by
Oct. 31, more than half its shareholder equity of $5.7
billion, which is defined as assets minus liabilities.
Southern California Edison finished August with a deficit
of $2 billion, equivalent to almost two-thirds its net
worth of $3.2 billion. The utilities, though they have
been accumulating deficits, aren't required to report
these as losses on their earnings statements.

That leaves utilities in a bind. They want to end the
rate freeze to be able to pass on the real cost of
electricity to consumers. But should the freeze end
before the statutory deadline of 2002, they get
clobbered. That is because they will immediately have to
book a loss on their power-purchase deficits. What's
more, they can't use the proceeds from planned
power-plant sales to cover those losses; instead, should
the freeze end, they will be obliged to refund some of
the proceeds to ratepayers. In PG&E's case, the refunds
could total $500 million, while in Edison's case, the
amount is $254 million.

Publicly at least, utility executives insist a mechanism
will be found to let them recoup the money spent on
electricity.

Consumer advocates are gearing up for the fight. Nettie
Hoge, executive director for San Francisco consumer group
Utility Reform Network, says ratepayers shouldn't end up
footing the bill for a deal cut by utilities that
benefited them before prices shot up.

Utility executives are now distancing themselves from the
legislation that got them into such a mess, which was
drafted with their assistance. PG&E Chairman Robert Glynn
says it is best not to "overanalyze" the "old deal."
Instead, he says, regulators and legislators should sit
down with utilities and construct a new agreement, since
"it's in the broad interests of the state not to have
critical energy infrastructure look like a leper."

Mr. Glynn says the current deal offers "mutually assured
destruction" to both utilities and ratepayers. Something
must be done, he says, or consumers throughout most of
the state will experience "a San Diego-style rate shock."
The utility serving that city, San Diego Gas & Electric
Co., ended its freeze a year ago and began passing
wholesale power costs directly through to ratepayers.
Legislators intervened this summer, however, and
temporarily capped retail rates when monthly power bills
nearly tripled. The utility, a unit of Sempra Energy, is
also accumulating a deficit as a result.

So long as banks and bond markets believe the utilities
will be repaid, they will be able to borrow, analysts
say. "Until we hear politicians of consequence state
otherwise, our position is that we believe the utilities
will be made whole," says Richard Cortright, a director
at Standard & Poor's corporate ratings group.

But that opinion could change if it looks like the
utilities will have to swallow a big loss. The result:
lower credit ratings that would raise borrowing costs and
could trigger a downward spiral. "You're talking about
top-rated companies, though," said Ms. Woodland of Fitch
IBCA. "To get to insolvency, a lot would have to happen."

In the meantime, utilities are doing all they can to
control the hemorrhaging. They have gotten authority from
regulators to buy more power under long-term contracts at
fixed prices, reducing their vulnerability to spot-market
volatility. And they have petitioned federal regulators
to declare California's market so badly flawed that
generators should be denied market pricing and, even,
ordered to pay refunds.

Nevertheless, several forces are working against them.
Although they can sign bilateral contracts, prices remain
high for those as well. What's more, they can't buy less
power than their customers need. If they don't buy
enough, the California Independent System Operator, the
organization responsible for reliability, will step in
and make purchases for them and send them the bill.

Perhaps the biggest problem facing PG&E and Edison,
though, is one of timing. The California legislature is
out of session until December, and regulators haven't
even really started to address the issue formally. In the
meantime, the utilities' deficit is growing by tens of
millions of dollars daily.

Write to Rebecca Smith at rebecca.smith@wsj.com
skean@enron.com