In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong <i>today</i>.<p>For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is of interest in whatever today's moral panic is (e.g. terrorism after 9/11). Plus perceptual hashing, by its very <i>design</i>, is created to be less precise than traditional cryptographic hashing.<p>A cryptographic hash + file size combo is unlikely to have a false positive within our lifetime (and it has been used successful by multiple companies to combat CP). The interesting thing about a perceptual hash is that the closer the source material is to the banned material in terms of actual content (e.g. nudity), the more likely for a false positive.<p>Therefore, if Apple does mess up via false-positive and manually review your material, it is more likely to be sensitive private materials (involving consenting adult(s), not CP) because that is what the perceptual hashes are looking for similarities to.<p>PS - If you think this concept cannot happen in a Western country, see the UK's internet filters as a textbook example. Originally started to fight CP, and now used to fight a ton of other stuff too with more proposals every year: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_blocking_in_the_United_Kingdom#Planned_programmes" rel="nofollow">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_blocking_in_the_United_Kin...</a>