When the U.S. air force discovered the flaw of averages
This was a very interesting article. And I can’t speak to the statistical methodology described. But I think it paints too broad a brush in terms of why the Air Force fatality rate (or “Class A Mishap Rate” as it’s called) decreased over the decades. Quick side-note – I’m a former USAF pilot and studied USAF history a bit.<p>The short version is – technical details like adjustable cockpits certainly played a part. But the bigger driver was the ever-increasing culture of safety, mishap prevention and leadership accountability.<p>Safety: things that were common place “back in the day” have been banned for many decades in today’s Air Force. These include traveling without appropriate weather checks, acrobatics maneuvers at low altitudes and unauthorized airspaces, and flying without enough sleep.<p>Mishap Prevention: incredible resources are poured into scientific investigations on what exactly happened in each incident so that A) we can learn from it and B) all pilots can be briefed on the mistakes made so that they can save their own lives.<p>Leadership Accountability: if you are a senior leader at an Air Force base with a fatality, you have a large issue on your hands that needs to be handled with extreme attention to detail. Lapses in safety are not looked favorably upon at any level. I wasn’t in the USAF back in the day. But it’s fairly obvious that there was less punishment meted out when mishaps occurred compared to when they happen now. Different times – yes. But overall fatalities were just accepted as “something that happens.”<p>The safety culture is all-pervasive and common in today’s military. But there were different attitudes back in the ‘40s. So while many of today’s pilots gripe about the excesses of safety culture - and I was one of them – most pilots know deep down that it’s a good thing. I wouldn’t want to return to the old school days where crashes were just the cost of doing business.