Work on production line of Boeing 737 Max ‘not adequately funded’
I look at this and see surprising parallels to the Wells Fargo scandal ( <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-23/fake-accounts-still-haunt-wells-fargo" rel="nofollow">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-23/fake-a...</a> ).<p>In both cases, management appears to have applied significant pressure to the teams doing the work, pushing them to achieve extremely unrealistic targets. And in both cases, the results of that incentive ended up being extremely detrimental to basically everybody (to the general public in the form of identity fraud / unsafe aircraft, to the companies in the forms of fines / grounding / PR / etc).<p>I doubt anybody in Boeing’s offices woke up and thought “what a nice morning! Time to go to work and build some dangerous airplanes that will kill people, so that I can get slightly richer”. I suspect the execs involved were just amazingly (and potentially even criminally) negligent: in their minds, they were pushing their employees to make the airplane actually similar enough to qualify as a “minor” change, without any of the oversight that would have caught what was actually happening. They turned a blind eye any time somebody told them that the new plane would require larger changes, and the results are unsurprising: their teams declared all the changes “minor”, not because they’d successfully made only minor changes, but because exec pressure mandated that all changes be “minor”.