Deanonymizing Tor Circuits
First: it seems like the author has come up with a number of useful custom modifications to the Tor daemon to mitigate common attacks against onion operators. Why not work with the Tor Project to upstream some of the more useful ones, as well as the additional debugging information? Reading past Hacker Factor posts, is it just me, or is there a tone of slight disdain towards the Tor project?<p>Second:<p>>However, there's a second attack. The attacker can run one or more hostile guard nodes. If he can knock me off enough guards, my tor daemon will eventually choose one of his guards. Then he can identify my actual network address and directly attack my server. (This happened to me once.)<p>A guard node is going to get a lot of traffic from both onion services and normal Tor users. How can an evil guard node tell which IP belongs to the author's server?<p>Overall, this is startling to read. History suggests that it is only a matter of time before an onion service gets unmasked by the latest attack on the Tor network.