Linux RNG flaws
The flaws only applied for keys generated during early boot.  Jann and I looked, but we didn't find a way that this could be turned into a practical exploit, which is why we considered, but decided against, doing any kind of coordinated disclosure.   The potential weakness applies before you see crng_init=2 message, and in practice on many machines this happens well before a minute --- on my laptop, in under 10 seconds.<p>The main problem with the fix is that there are some userspace applications which assumed they could get cryptographic randomness super-early during system startup, and with a patched kernel, those userspace applications would block --- and in some cases, block the boot altogether.    With no activity, there is no entropy to harness, and the boot scripts essentially deadlock waiting for the random pool to be initialized.<p>So for some hardware, and some distributions, we're getting some boot hangs that we now need to try to workaround or fix somehow.   In general, the best thing to do is not to rely on cryptographic strength random number generation during early boot.   Key generation should be done lazily, and deferred for as long as possible.