Attack of the week: FREAK (or 'factoring the NSA for fun and profit')
I can't believe how bad some of the findings were.<p>From smacktls.com - "JSSE clients allow the peer to skip all messages related to key exchange and authentication. In particular, a network attacker can send the certificate of any arbitrary website, and skip the rest of the protocol messages. A vulnerable JSSE client is then willing to accept the certificate and start exchanging unencrypted application data. In other words, the JSSE implementation of TLS has been providing virtually no security guarantee (no authentication, no integrity, no confidentiality) for the past several years."<p>To reiterate - The JSSE implementation of TLS has been providing virtually no security guarantee for the past _several years_.<p>JSSE - the Java implementation of TLS shipped with the JDK.<p>I guess the silver lining in all of this is now we have a decent way to fuzz the TLS state machine which will hopefully prevent things like this in the future.