Making unphishable 2FA phishable
It would be great if OAuth could include some form of cryptographic attestation—similar to what is already present in WebAuthn—to ensure that only trusted devices can get authorization tokens.<p>In the case of CLI app authorization (where you are proving that the refresh + access tokens are being retrieved on the same device that issued the request), the CLI could generate a local key, store it in the TPM/keychain, and then in the browser you could prove that you have access to that same key.<p>For devices, direct attestation could authenticate the device making the request (e.g. as a legitimate MacBook Pro, or something).<p>Of course, this depends on services choosing to implement such flows, and when you introduce a requirement for a TPM or similar, plus multiple cryptographic steps, implementors are likely to get lazy and just do something that works but is insecure (or they implement the flows badly with home-rolled crypto).