The FBI Identified a Tor User
I have second hand knowledge of lawsuits that have been dropped by the FBI during discovery because it would require them revealing zero days they have on Tor. Recently this has started getting increasing levels of press exposure[1] including in CSAM cases.<p>The FBI has also continued to run CSAM websites after takeover to collect intel, and likely run honeypots for other content.<p>If your adversary is a state actor, particularly the U.S., tor alone is not sufficient for anonymity. It's fairly safe to assume they have the ability to deanonymize you. Your only safety net, it seems, is the value of other targets relative to you when it comes to them burning their "golden ticket" zero day. And even then, you're at risk of parallel construction.<p>If you're sitting in front of a computer that you're using for something the U.S. government has significant interest in prosecuting, that device should be considered compromised and adversarial - you should act accordingly.<p><a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/03/feds-rather-drop-child-porn-case-give-exploit/" rel="nofollow">https://www.wired.com/2017/03/feds-rather-drop-child-porn-ca...</a><p>Edit, pulling up from the threads below:<p>Tor is just a layer. You still have to take measures to separate your identity from the device, the behavior, and the location.<p>When tor falls, the next question is "what do they see?" You have control over that.