NSA encryption plan for ‘internet of things’ rejected by ISO
Does anyone who's been following these IoT encryption standards think that new algorithms are truly needed? Considering that even the most trivial embedded devices these days get powerful microcontrollers and megabytes of RAM -- often running a full operating system! -- is there any <i>perceptible</i> gain with one of these unknown lightweight algorithms compared to using a well-known and standard algorithm like AES?<p>I took a look at the performance tests of AES vs NSA's Simon/Speck done by the CryptoLUX group at the University of Luxembourg[1]. They have so much data comparing different scenarios, processors, and implementation versions that it's difficult to summarize the trade-offs. But my brief look at AES vs Simon/Speck on an 8-bit Atmel AVR processor is that the difference in code size and RAM are in the hundreds of bytes (<i>bytes</i>, not megabytes) and AES performance might be approximately equal (if AES is implemented with large code size and RAM) or up to 10-15 times slower (if implemented with small code size and RAM).<p>Seriously, embedded software these days is so bloated (just like in web development), and processors and RAM are so over-provisioned, and encryption is such a minuscule part of the tasks of a system that I wonder if using a standard algorithm like AES would make a perceptible difference to anybody.<p>[1] <a href="https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS_Block_Ciphers_Detailed_Results#AVR" rel="nofollow">https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS_Block_Ciphers_Det...</a>