Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
Author isn't very clever about crypto attacks.<p>Sending device grabs all of the recipients public keys (as well as all of their own keys for other devices, which allows the conversation to be replicated on all of their own devices as well) hosted by Apple. Sending device <i>has no way to verify those keys belong to the intended recipient</i>. User has no way to verify which, or how many devices they are sending to. User doesn't even know if the recipient is mysteriously using a different key that has never been seen before. Sending device does not display any information about how many keys it grabs.<p>Apple wants to read your messages? They drop one of their public keys in the list. Apple gets a warrant? They drop the FBI's key in the list. You'll never know that you're CCing the FBI device keys on all of your messages.<p>What's more, is these keys are provided by Apple over TLS without certificate pinning. So now anyone who can mint certificates from a CA trusted by the device can just assume Apple's position. You don't need to hack or legally compel Apple in order to eavesdrop.<p>If your iDevice is managed by your company IT department, it can be silently fed a certificate without compromising a CA.[1]<p>Finally, if you did not apply the goto fail update a few days ago, it's trivial to break that TLS channel and also "misconfigure" those keys. That hole has been there since September 19, 2012, by the way.<p>Basically, iMessage has been securing you against someone who knows how to run wireshark or tcpdump, but not much else.<p>[1] <a href="http://blog.quarkslab.com/imessage-privacy.html" rel="nofollow">http://blog.quarkslab.com/imessage-privacy.html</a>