Against privacy defeatism: why browsers can still stop fingerprinting
Over the years I've noticed this, privacy defeatism, amongst other excuses used to push back against security and privacy enhancements.<p>Another is security chicken and egg.  "Because A isn't secure, there's no point in securing B.  And because B isn't secure, there's no point in securing A."  I've seen arguments along those lines used against improving the security of, for example, DNS and SNI.  Or just DNS in general.  "There's no point in securing DNS because your ISP can see what IP addresses you connect to."<p>The all-or-nothing argument has been used to argue against HTTPS.  "State actors like China can circumvent HTTPS, since they control trusted CAs!  So why use HTTPS at all?"<p>Then there's the arguments against security because "it makes development harder!"  People have argued against mandatory HTTPS saying that it makes developing websites harder.<p>The list goes on.<p>Luckily it seems that pro-security and pro-privacy succeed in the end, for the most part.  But those that use these pathological arguments have certainly delayed things more than they should have been.