The Google plasma globe affair of 2012
It seems pretty scandalous to me that most operating systems still haven't implemented any mitigation for pretend-to-be-a-USB-keyboard attacks.<p>Fixing it isn't trivial, but it's hardly insurmountable. The solution is fairly simple: Whenever a new keyboard is plugged in or types its first keystroke, lock the screen, and don't accept key input to places other than the login form from a new keyboard until that keyboard has typed the user's login password. (You also need to build a way to authorize legit-fake-keyboard devices like barcode scanners that type the barcodes they scan, but that's not to difficult.)<p>Given the high prevalence of USB devices with infectable firmwares, and the large number of USB cables of questionable provenance that no one pays much attention to, it doesn't seem okay to leave this vulnerability open.