House Oversight Committee Report on Equifax Breach [pdf]
> The attackers transferred this data out of
the Equifax environment, unbeknownst to Equifax. Equifax did not see the data exfiltration
because the device used to monitor ACIS network traffic had been inactive for 19 months due to
an expired security certificate.<p>> Equifax had allowed over 300 security
certificates to expire, including 79 certificates for monitoring business critical domains.<p>(on page 2 of the Executive Summary)<p>I've been following the Equifax breach story but this is the first I'm hearing about the expired certificates. That is shockingly bad.<p>I'm a little disappointed in the final "conclusion" of the report, though. The end of the executive summary basically chalks the breach up to two things: "Equifax's IT management structure was complicated" and "Equifax uses legacy software that is hard to secure". These <i>are</i> valid points, but these are also issues that nearly every single major corporation in the world faces, and yet many of them still manage to prevent (or at least mitigate) major breaches. These aren't good enough reasons to explain why Equifax failed so spectacularly compared to every other bureaucratic company with legacy software.<p>Also, I know this report isn't meant to be a remediation strategy roadmap, but it's also pretty disappointing that the recommendations section is basically just 3 pages of fluffy, vague, "X and Y should work together to increase cybersecurity" bullshit. Such a high profile incident would have been a great time for the federal government to really show some leadership (or at least strong guidance) in this realm, but they really didn't. I mean hell, at least link your recommendations to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework...