Evidence of regulatory capture of patent examiners
I saw an argument not long ago that the revolving door ensures more rigorous review of the regulated company.
Basically, domain experts are hired out of a regulatory agency if they demonstrate their domain expertise by being a competent regulator.  Would you want to hire someone who didn't do their job well?  Also, the 'toughest' regulators are the ones who the companies don't want in their jobs anymore - they'd rather those people were on the other side of the fence, so they hire them.
The people who are soft (or incompetent) are useful in their role, so are left alone, not hired out.<p>Not sure this is actually true, but the incentive arguments seem like they run in the right direction.<p>This may not apply to patents as much as other regulatory agencies due to the way patents are argued (Not in court)?
Maybe they cover these arguments in the paper...  I just read the abstract and didn't pay to get the whole thing.