PostgreSQL used fsync incorrectly for 20 years
The kernel itself isn't really a transaction manager. If there is an I/O error on a file, then I'd only expect it to percolate up in that immediate "session". When <i>should</i> that error flag be expected to carry over until, filesystem remount? Or even longer, with the talk of storing a flag in the superblock?<p>Specifically it seems like asking for trouble to open() a path a second time, and expect fsync() calls to apply to writes done on the other file descriptor object - there's no guarantee they're even the same file [0]! At the very least, pass the actual file descriptor to the other process. Linux's initial behavior was in violation of what I've said here, but the patch to propagate the error to every fd open at the time of the error should resolve this to satisfaction.<p>I would think about the only reasonable assumption you could make about concurrent cross-fd syncing is that after a successful fsync(fd), any successful read(fd) should return data that was on disk at the time of that fsync(fd) or <i>later</i>. In other words, dirty pages shouldn't be returned by read() and then subsequently fail being flushed out.<p>disclaimer: It's been a while since I've written syscall code and I've had the luxury of never really having to really lean into the spec to obtain every last bit of performance. Given how many guarantees the worse-is-better philosophy forewent, I don't see much point to internalize what few are there.<p>[0] Ya sure, you can assert that the user shouldn't be otherwise playing around with the files, I'm just pointing out that translating path->fd isn't a pure function.