Breaking the Ledger Security Model
I was willing to tolerate Ledger's issues here (I'm a user and I've heavily recommended their products) if they fixed them -- the problems never should have happened, but they are marginally better than Trezor in a lot of other ways.<p>Unfortunately, the Ledger team appear to be asshats, so there's every reason to fear using them in the future, even if they've fixed this specific issue.  If they're going to handle a legit issue like this (downplaying it, etc.), I'm not willing to trust them.<p>I'd love to see three products created:<p>1) Split client/server wallets (so you don't need to trust the  operator or your local machine alone); some work has been done on this.  Also, split PC + SGX or phone + secure element wallets.  This is basically software-only in cost, but at higher security, so it would be suitable for $0+ balance accounts.<p>2) A low end ($20?) wallet with a cheap display and button.  If you retailed them at $100 but sold them to providers at $40 they could probably give them away for a lot of accounts; basically like Yubikeys but with displays.<p>3) Some higher-end hardware wallets; essentially HSMs plus display/input.  HSM technology basically stagnated in 1995; there's a lot of need for something better today.  This could be in the $10-50k per unit range for a lot of high-value keys if actually implemented well and in a way which had no "trust us" demons.  There are hundreds or thousands of potential customers, and more by the day.