Encrypted email is still a pain
Encrypted email is pretty much over in 2017.<p>The emerging consensus among experts is that it&#x27;s not worth the trouble, or, worse, incapable of doing much more than generating a false sense of security. That&#x27;s for a bunch of reasons:<p>* An enormous installed base of clients that won&#x27;t do encryption, meaning that at best you&#x27;re attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted transport.<p>* A protocol that leaks metadata, including some message content, at the envelope layer.<p>* Hundreds of millions of users that primarily access messages through browser clients that can&#x27;t meaningfully implement crypto.<p>* An archive-always UX that ensures that huge amounts of plaintext are scattered around the Internet by both senders and receivers.<p>* An unencrypted installed base that ensures encryption will be opt-in for the foreseeable future, meaning that users will routinely reveal plaintext accidentally by, for instance, quoting messages and forgetting to encrypt.<p>* End user demands for things like search that can only be delivered efficiently at scale by databases of plaintext (most likely at centralized servers).<p>All these problems are probably surmountable (with enormous, concerted effort). But: why bother? Email is just one of dozens of messaging systems available to Internet users. Better to move sensitive conversations to things like Signal, WhatsApp, or Wire --- the double ratchet construction is designed specifically to make IM-like protocols secure even when conversations are sporadic and last months.