What Is Voter Satisfaction Efficiency?
It looks like it&#x27;s a metric constructed to justify Range-ish voting systems, a la Warren Smith&#x27;s Bayesian regret models.<p>It performs the same core sleigh of hand: it takes a very simple view of strategic voting, assuming a fixed share of the electorate vote &quot;strategically&quot; regardless of election method, and making big assumptions about what&#x27;s a good strategy.<p>That is, to put it mildly, not a reasonable assumption. It varies widely how much information about other people&#x27;s preferences you need to &quot;vote strategically&quot;, and the strategies also vary widely in how risky they are. If I have false beliefs about other people&#x27;s preferences, how likely is it that I shoot myself in the foot with &quot;strategic&quot; voting? And how likely is it that we get caught in a bad equilibrium where our false beliefs about the other side&#x27;s preferences reinforce each other?<p>All this makes the sort of modelling attempted here a vain pursuit. You just can&#x27;t model strategy this naively.<p>But some methods come MUCH better out of this hopelessly naive modelling of strategy than others.<p>For instance, Approval voting requires very little information about other people&#x27;s beliefs to vote strategically - you just need to know who the top two contenders are - The strategy is to approve the &quot;least evil&quot; of those two, plus any from the rest of the field you prefer to those two. It degenerates to pretty much the same problem as Plurality voting, with maybe slightly better chance to get out of bad equilibriums in the long run.<p>And Range&#x2F;Score voting is even more extreme: you can vote strategically there even knowing <i>nothing</i> about other people&#x27;s preferences. Just always use extreme values (0 and 100).<p>By comparison, strategic voting in Condorcet systems requires really exact information about the electorate&#x27;s full range of preferences - and even then, you usually need to coordinate your strategic voting without the opposition getting wind of it, otherwise they can counter it. It&#x27;s just not practical.<p>(Likewise, Borda gets a bad rap in these comparisons. It&#x27;s not a good system, but the likelihood that &quot;strategic voting&quot; will backfire horribly means that in all likelihood, voters <i>would not pursue those strategies</i>. )