TPM provides zero practical security
Unfortunately this sounds like a typical pro-Linux rant with the usual scare words such as &quot;Microsoft&quot;, &quot;UEFI&quot;, &quot;secure boot&quot;, etc. To be clear, I am attacking the piece itself, not the author.<p>The reason there is no explicit threat model defined in the TPM specs is because it defines a general-purpose hardware security module. It is up to integrator to define the threat model (TPM&#x27;s security properties also depend on the rest of the system) and the application.<p>Even if a TPM is not perfect and depends on other pieces of the puzzle to also be secure, it at least opens the possibility of making it secure in the future once those vulnerabilities are discovered &amp; fixed. Furthermore, even in this vulnerable state, it still increases the effort required for a successful attack.<p>Support for TPM-backed full disk encryption means you can now have FDE on by default for everyone with no usability impact at all. Even if it&#x27;s not secure and a dedicated attack will still break it, it means a casual attacker can&#x27;t just pull a drive or reboot the machine and run chntpw or steal sensitive data from discarded drives that haven&#x27;t been properly wiped.<p>I like TPMs. I like the fact that a rogue datacenter employee or intruder can&#x27;t just pull one of my servers&#x27; drives out and get sensitive data. I like not having to worry about having sensitive keys on the filesystem somewhere because every secret is in memory and is ultimately derived from the TPM doing remote attestation at boot and handing ephemeral keys. I like not having to worry about unattended reboots or entering LUKS passphrases remotely.