Show HN: We built an end-to-end encrypted alternative to Google Photos
Congratulations, this looks neat. A couple questions around this venture:<p>1. Does ente.io intend to remain bootstrapped or seek funding (tiny-vc, crowd, crypto, public)?<p>2. Is the founding team in it for long term; serious about sustaining this business in face of capable incumbents (some upcoming ones <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=27338008" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=27338008</a>, some established ones like nextcloud.com, getkeepsafe.com) and competent competition (EteSync)?<p>---<p>A couple around the app:<p>1. What are the guarantees around backups &#x2F; data loss across updates, device changes, account turnovers due to password-loss etc<p>2. If the founding team is thinking ahead, do they plan to build other such alt-apps too?<p>3. What&#x27;s the server-side object store, if okay revealing that: StackPath? Scaleway? Wasabi?<p>4. How does ente.io handle file versioning, race conditions (file created and deleted with same names across different devices, as one example)?<p>5. How does ente.io handle abuse? Using ente.io for nefarious purposes such as CSAM, as one example.<p>---<p>A couple around cryptography (since you emphasize e2ee I took a glance at the architecture doc):<p>1. To my untrained eye, a lot of crypto cited in the architecture document reads like it was hand-rolled. There exists RFCs that cover recovery for usecases involving public-key crypto (PGP is hard for a reason), but yours is &quot;cross-encrypt master-key with recovery-key and vice versa...&quot; which does not inspire any sort of confidence in me. Besides, the wrapped keys stored on servers are sent to clients without any checks and hence subject to brute-force attacks. Are you sure of what you have designed isn&#x27;t weak? ente.io sets out to be <i>tarsnap</i> but looks far from it.<p>2. Another thing that sticks out is the custom &quot;encrypted authentication flow&quot;...<p>3. How do I rotate the master key, collection keys, file keys etc in case my password is compromised? Sounds like a lot of work given the current architecture?<p>I see that the doc has been &quot;peer reviewed&quot; by 5+ engs, but any cryptographers in there?<p>---<p>A couple around ToS:<p>1. ToS states that ente.io may store documents even post-deletion by the customer. Why not delete it right away? That&#x27;s a security risk?<p>2. If you suspend access to an account (since ente.io retains the right to do so), what policies govern data-takeout?<p>Thanks. All the best.