The Iraq Inquiry: Statement by Sir John Chilcot [pdf]
<p><pre><code>  On 28 July, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush with an
  assurance that he would be with him “whatever”
  [...]
  At the end of January, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable
  for military action by mid-March.
  [...]
  As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the
  Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that Iraq
  possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to
  deliver them and the capacity to produce them.
</code></pre>
Seems to me the lesson here is: If you decide to invade first, then later you invite your intelligence agencies to &quot;get with the program, jump on the team and come on in for the big win&quot; when it&#x27;s clear what you want them to tell you, they&#x27;ll tell you that.<p>Trying to shift blame to them after things went badly seems like scapegoating to me.<p>I mean, that&#x27;s like going to a car dealership and asking the salesman if his cars are reliable. There&#x27;s no point in even asking, because you already know he&#x27;ll say yes regardless of the truth.