Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO
This change makes me sad, not because it isn&#x27;t brilliant work - it is - but because this kind of brilliant work is unlikely to move the needle in the real-world. I can&#x27;t use this RNG because it isn&#x27;t FIPS validated. I can&#x27;t sponsor getting it FIPS validated because the cryptography it uses isn&#x27;t even FIPS compatible. It wouldn&#x27;t make it past the cursory skim of a reviewer. That says more about FIPS than it does this work, but it still means that it&#x27;s a non-starter for many libraries and applications that end up having US Federal Government users ... which is to say that basically everything important gets pushed away from benefiting from work like this.<p>Seperately, I&#x27;m also a little sad that there are no distinct RNGs for secret and non-secret output. It is an indispensable layer of defense to have separately seeded RNGs for these use-cases. That way if there is an implementation flaw or bug in the RNG that leads to re-use or predictability, it is vastly harder for that flaw to be abused. s2n, BouncyCastle, OpenSSL, and more user-space libraries use separately seeded RNGs for this reason and I don&#x27;t think I could justify removing that protection.