DOJ: Strong encryption that we don’t have access to is “unreasonable”
If they want to convince me to accept some kind of back door in my encryption, they have to propose a system where it can be shown that it cannot be abused by bad actors within my government, and where there are clearly stated public rules about when it can be used.<p>It <i>is</i> possible to design such a system, where the probability of abuse is arbitrarily low [1], but I have a hard time imagining the current DOJ proposing such a thing.<p>[1] key escrow with access controlled by a multilevel secret sharing system that requires consensus among a diverse international group of shareholders to release the key from escrow. The shareholder group is chosen so that it includes a mix of public and private entities in a variety of jurisdictions, including anonymous shareholders, so that no entity can acquire enough power or influence to force a key to be revealed.