FBI Wants It to Be Impractical to Deploy Strong Encryption Without Key Escrow
Comey&#x27;s argument makes sense at first.  Why not have a trusted escrow provider keep keys safe, and also respond to court orders when necessary. It feels almost like a checks and balances kind of argument, the kind that Americans find persuasive with our three-branch government.<p>The problem is that <i>we now know that the government has the goal of unlawful surveillance without oversight from courts, the legislature, or the public</i>.  There is essentially an ongoing &quot;by any means necessary&quot; attack on civil liberties.<p>Why should we think that the government is not planning to infiltrate the escrow services and preemptively capture all keys?<p>There has been a profound breach of trust (revealed by Snowden) and we must insist upon the rule of law and basic democratic transparency before we consent to any further risks.<p>I try not to be cynical but I am thinking that the trend we are on is leading to strong crypto being largely criminalized. I am hoping that our decentralized systems adapt to this threat and offer solutions that cannot be shut down (like Bitcoin and Ethereum).<p>Incidentally, if Apple seems likely to lose the battle over a back door, it ought to offer an Ethereum smart contract that will unlock one phone every day, require a key provided by each member of congress (with 100% consent required to unlock a device), and publish all unlock key requests on the Ethereum blockchain after a 30 day delay in case an investigation is in progress.<p>This protects against mass surveillance, but offers a very small back door with full transparency and no potential for large scale use (or abuse).