Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix
The previous flight had exactly the same issue. This is what that pilot wrote in the logs;<p><i>After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem on the Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML).<p>The PIC also reported the flight condition through the electronic reporting system of the company A-SHOR. The event was reported as follows:<p>Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, </i>STS also running to the wrong direction<i>, suspected because of speed difference, identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at FL280, landed safely runway 25L.</i><p>STS is the speed trim system. The pilot didn’t explicitly note that they set STAB TRIM to CUT OUT to correct the problem, perhaps because he thought it was obvious?<p>But then reading the log of the previous flight;<p><i>After three automatic AND trim occurrences, the SIC commented that the control column was too heavy to hold back.<p>At 14:25:46 UTC, the PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach controller due to instrument failure and requested to maintain runway heading.<p>At 14:28:28 UTC, the PIC moved the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT. The PIC re-engaged the STAB TRIM switches to NORMAL, but almost immediately the problem re-appeared. The PIC then moved the STAB TRIM switches back to CUT OUT and continued with manual trim without auto-pilot until the end of the flight.</i><p>This implies it took almost three minutes for the previous crew to figure out the STAB TRIM needed to be CUT OUT after finding the trim is so wrong that they can’t hold the stick back.<p>Clearly this is not a <i>memory item</i> for these pilots.<p>[1] - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;reports.aviation-safety.net&#x2F;2018&#x2F;20181029-0_B38M_PK-LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;reports.aviation-safety.net&#x2F;2018&#x2F;20181029-0_B38M_PK-...</a>