An underrated idea: the priority view
&gt;<i>There is also a catch in the hypothetical - let’s assume that the utility gain for the gifted son from living in the suburbs would be larger than the utility gain for the disabled son from living in the city. A pure utilitarian, then, must choose the suburbs. Nagel’s view is this: if you say that you would live in the city for the sake of your disabled son, despite it being the case that moving to the city creates more utility in total, you are not a utilitarian (at least in all circumstances), but rather an egalitarian. You value the equality of the boys more than you do maximising the overall levels of well-being.</i><p>The very idea that there is some measusable &quot;utility&quot; to compare in the two cases, independent from your moral values and sentiments, is inane.<p>&gt;<i>Let’s introduce another scenario: Imagine that the gifted boy has a total utility of 80, and the disabled boy has a total utility of 40.</i><p>What that &quot;utility&quot; unit would measure?<p>Money they can make for you? Their pontential on their own? Their future contribution to society (in what terms? monetary? intellectual?)? Any other of 500 factors (perhaps combined)?<p>What if you don&#x27;t want to help build a society that neglects the needs of disabled people because of their lesser contribution, and thus your utility function - ie. your desired goal maximization includes helping the disabled son?<p>In the examples, it is assumed that ulility == favoring gifted son, which means the utility function you&#x27;ll use is taken for granted (and the whole thing is presented as only a matter of whether you value utility or not).