Australians who won't unlock their phones could face ten years in jail
The article buries the lede pretty badly.<p>&gt;The government’s explanatory note says that the Bill could force a manufacturer to ... install government software on it<p>If the bill passes, using a phone purchased in Australia is no longer secure. I know my security threat model excludes manufacturer-installed root kits - is there a reasonable strategy for mitigating this risk? Buying a phone in the US and importing it yourself is one, but that seems very awkward.<p>edit: reading the actual text, there&#x27;s some protection in section 317ZG, which prohibits the law from being used to cause &quot;systematic weakness&quot; or &quot;systematic vulnerability&quot;, but explicitly carves out an exception for targeting specific devices. So for a specific example, the bill would allow the Australian government to compel Apple to secretly push an over-the-air update to backdoor a specific device of interest.<p>&gt;The mere fact that a capability to selectively assist agencies with access to a target device exists will not
necessarily mean that a systemic weakness has been built.<p>Yeah, the bill is definitely designed to allow <i>exactly</i> the scenario I described. They&#x27;re after using the code-signing keys and technical expertise of device manufacturers and communication program developers to target individual devices with encryption backdoors.<p>&gt;Likewise, a notice may require a provider to facilitate access to information prior to or after an encryption
method is employed, as this does not weaken the encryption itself.<p>Definitely planning on backdooring devices and reading the messages pre-encryption and post-decryption.