ETS protocol does not provide per-session forward secrecy
The real story here is not about security, it&#x27;s about markets and profit (as always). Currently, there&#x27;s a huge market in DPI boxes for inspecting TLS traffic, which are often poorly implemented, tied to expensive support contracts and super flakey.<p>These boxes can only work with a single static secret, which is shared between the DPI boxes and the actual servers. If the servers are using a forward secret mode, this is no longer enough, you have to share a secret for every session.<p>This <i>necessitates</i> some kind of software running on each endpoint to transmit these secrets. But wait, the moment you <i>have to have</i> software running on every endpoint, why do you need a special box? Why not do it all in software?<p>This represents a huge threat to the DPI market. No box means no lock in, no mandatory upgrades, no support contracts. Sure, software can have these things too, but it&#x27;s inherently a more open, competitive market where you are vulnerable to open source invasion. Solutions like eTLS are just a last ditch gnashing of teeth from DPI box sellers, trying to prevent a lucrative market from disappearing.<p>Once you move everything to software: a) competition in general gets better and b) open source starts to take over, c) security will improve.