New York got it wrong on cybersecurity and the right to repair
&gt; Disabling software locks that prevent repair has no bearing on the cybersecurity of covered devices.<p>This is presented without adequate proof.<p>It is plainly not true for <i>hardware</i> locks and physical security. For example, a car with a sealed, inaccessible engine would be hard to repair and maintain, but also harder to tamper with or sabotage, and it would be harder for thieves to steal the catalytic converter. But what if the engine compartment door is controlled by <i>software</i> that only permits access by authorized repair providers? The same argument applies.<p>Similarly, a device or OS that refuses to run unsigned or unauthorized device drivers might interfere with repairs such as replacing component devices with new ones that required new drivers, but would likely interfere with the operation of unauthorized, driver-based malware.<p>There are clear counterexamples disproving the claim that disabling software locks that prevent repair has no bearing on security (&quot;cyber&quot; or otherwise.) On the contrary, software locks that make benevolent repair harder can also make malicious tampering (to hardware and&#x2F;or software) more difficult as well.