The result would be a catastrophe (1985)
I&#x27;m not saying NASA didn&#x27;t fuck up by any means. I&#x27;d just like to point out that hindsight bias is a very real effect that can have huge consequences when planning for future events: <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;lesswrong.com&#x2F;lw&#x2F;il&#x2F;hindsight_bias&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;lesswrong.com&#x2F;lw&#x2F;il&#x2F;hindsight_bias&#x2F;</a><p>&gt;Viewing history through the lens of hindsight, we vastly underestimate the cost of effective safety precautions.  In 1986, the Challenger exploded for reasons traced to an O-ring losing flexibility at low temperature.  There were warning signs of a problem with the O-rings.  But preventing the Challenger disaster would have required, not attending to the problem with the O-rings, but attending to every warning sign which seemed as severe as the O-ring problem, without benefit of hindsight.  It could have been done, but it would have required a general policy much more expensive than just fixing the O-Rings.<p>&gt;Shortly after September 11th 2001, I thought to myself, and now someone will turn up minor intelligence warnings of something-or-other, and then the hindsight will begin.  Yes, I&#x27;m sure they had some minor warnings of an al Qaeda plot, but they probably also had minor warnings of mafia activity, nuclear material for sale, and an invasion from Mars.<p>&gt;Because we don&#x27;t see the cost of a general policy, we learn overly specific lessons.  After September 11th, the FAA prohibited box-cutters on airplanes—as if the problem had been the failure to take this particular &quot;obvious&quot; precaution.  We don&#x27;t learn the general lesson: the cost of effective caution is very high because you must attend to problems that are not as obvious now as past problems seem in hindsight.