A corrupt file led to the FAA ground stoppage – also found in backup system
Earlier today another HN user linked to a PDF from a previous 2018 (cira 2014) investigation that pointed to the &quot;dual-channel back up&quot; system being fragile and likely insufficient.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=34338373" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=34338373</a><p>&gt; ERAM’s original design did not include a dedicated backup system. FAA believed that ERAM  did not need one due to the redundancy provided by the system’s dual channel design. This design was intended to prevent outages because it allows for seamless switching between the two channels without impacting air traffic control should a problem occur in the active channel. The Agency believed this redundancy would make it unlikely that a problem in one channel could migrate to the other channel. In addition, to provide additional backup capabilities during ERAM’s implementation, FAA planned to temporarily maintain EBUS, its pre-existing backup system, before phasing it out completely beginning in 2015, to rely solely on ERAM’s dual channels.<p>&gt; However, problems experienced during and since ERAM’s implementation have shown that the system remains susceptible to dual channel failures. As a result, FAA decided to maintain EBUS much longer than intended because air traffic controllers currently rely on EBUS for backup. However, with FAA’s ongoing and planned upgrades to ERAM, which will span the next 7 years, EBUS will soon become incompatible with the new hardware. As such, FAA plans to begin phasing out EBUS in April 2019, leaving ERAM without a backup system to supplement the system’s redundant dual channels.<p>A $2 billion dollar Lockheed Martin system where a memory overflow takes down BOTH the main system and the backup system. Surely that&#x27;s not a signal of fragility.