NSA Backdoors and Bitcoin (2013)
Pseudorandom parameter selection of NIST P-curves, including secp256r1 has created much controversy within the cypherpunk community in the early 2000s. the theory is that the NSA discovered a class of secret curves with an unknown special weakness, and then bruteforced the random seed that would generate the weak curve. [0] On the other hand, secp256k1&#x27;s parameters were not generated by random seeds. [1]<p>I think the important fact is not whether secp256r1 has a backdoor, but the decision of selecting secp256k1 by Satoshi Nakamoto for the use in Bitcoin. At the time, secp256k1 was the only widely-implemented non-P curve in various crypto libraries, and almost nobody used it at the time. It seems the entire decision of using secp256k1 was made to avoid secp256r1. This is  another piece of evidence that Satoshi Nakamoto must have beee active in the 1990-2000 cypherpunk community, so that he was well-aware of those discussions. This should shed some light on his possible identity.<p>--<p>[0] DJB&#x27;s paper <i>how to manipulate curve standards</i> [2] is DJB&#x27;s attempt of creating the strongest argument for this claim. But even in his analysis, overall it&#x27;s not too plausible, there&#x27;s little evidence that such a class of secret curves exists and it required huge computation (2^80), it&#x27;s on the edge of what was possible, but the pseudorandom parameter selection is certainly technically unfavorable as he demonstrated.<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;safecurves.cr.yp.to&#x2F;rigid.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;safecurves.cr.yp.to&#x2F;rigid.html</a><p>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;eprint.iacr.org&#x2F;2014&#x2F;571.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;eprint.iacr.org&#x2F;2014&#x2F;571.pdf</a>