Arrow's Theorem (2014)
Like a car swerving side to side as 2 drivers wrestle for control of the wheel, the 2 party system is an erratic vehicle.<p>But I have good news: we can steer a more stable course with score voting.<p>Score voting doesn&#x27;t violate Arrow&#x27;s Theorem (because it&#x27;s not a ranked-choice system).<p>Here&#x27;s how it works:<p>* Each voter gives candidates a score from 0 to 1.<p>* The highest average score wins. (The average can be weighted to account for abstentions.)<p>The upshot:<p>* No political parties are needed.<p>* It resists gerrymandering because it&#x27;s non-partisan.<p>* If there&#x27;s a bias in the system, it&#x27;s towards the center.<p>* Simulations indicate score voting  is socially optimal.<p>* Arrow, himself, expressed preference for approval voting (a variant of score voting)<p>Further reading:<p>electology.org<p>en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Range_voting