Indiscriminate messaging and chatcontrol: Last chance to protest
<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;oeil&#x2F;popups&#x2F;ficheprocedure.do?reference=2020&#x2F;0259(COD)&amp;l=en" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;oeil&#x2F;popups&#x2F;ficheproc...</a><p>&gt; Use of technologies by number-independent interpersonal communications service providers for the processing of personal and other data for the purpose of combatting [SIC] child sexual abuse online (temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002&#x2F;58&#x2F;EC)<p>Who believes the sincerity behind this? Children&#x27;s rights? Child protection? Do they not see the violation of rights and the potential abuse this law would effectuate, or is it just intentionally designed for it?<p>I cannot believe anyone would be so brazen to give up a core right that is already established as part of 2002&#x2F;58&#x2F;EC, aka &quot;ePrivacy directive&quot;, <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ec.europa.eu&#x2F;digital-single-market&#x2F;en&#x2F;news&#x2F;eprivacy-directive" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ec.europa.eu&#x2F;digital-single-market&#x2F;en&#x2F;news&#x2F;eprivacy-...</a>. So, let&#x27;s look into the proposal more closely, which is available in the top URL.<p>&gt; CONTENT: the proposal aims to introduce a temporary and strictly limited derogation from the applicability of certain obligations of the ePrivacy Directive to enable providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services to continue using specific technologies and continue their current activities to the extent necessary to detect and report child sexual abuse online and remove child sexual abuse material on their services from December 2020, pending the adoption of the announced long-term legislation.<p>In case you are wondering, &quot;number-independent interpersonal communications services&quot;, apparently covers communication technology and services that not explicitly rely on public identifiable numbers. So, any communication service that you can have separate from a personally identified user.<p>&gt; As a reminder, the proposal aims to introduce limited and temporary changes to the rules governing the privacy of electronic communications so that over the top (OTT) communication interpersonal services, such as web messaging, voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), chat and web-based email services, can continue to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse online on a voluntary basis.<p>The language here comes across as particularly dishonest. You cannot introduce &quot;limited&quot; ability to circumvent privacy. In order to monitor <i>something</i>, services will need to be able to monitor <i>everything</i>.<p>It goes on to mention safeguards:<p>&gt; - a mandatory prior data protection impact assessment pursuant and a mandatory consultation procedure, prior to the use of the technology;<p>&gt; - human overview and intervention is ensured for any processing of personal data, and no positive result is sent to law enforcement authorities or organisations acting in the public interest without prior human review<p>&gt; - appropriate procedures and redress mechanisms are in place<p>&gt; - no interference with any communication protected by professional secrecy<p>&gt; - effective remedies provided by the Member States at national level.<p>&gt; When no online child sexual abuse has been detected, all data should be deleted immediately, according to Members. Only in confirmed cases can the strictly relevant data be stored for use by law enforcement for a maximum of three months<p>---<p>It honestly strikes me as one of the worst proposals I&#x27;ve seen in a long time. I cannot imagine that child porn is regularly transmitted through chatting services on a p2p basis. Especially not to the extent that it vindicates an end of E2E encryption. Giving up such a core component of ePrivacy, you would think that a report that documents what the problem currently is, would be in order.<p>The document attached to this proposal, and the article on HN documents the issues quite well. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;doceo&#x2F;document&#x2F;LIBE-AM-661791_EN.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;doceo&#x2F;document&#x2F;LIBE-AM-661791...</a><p>&gt; The proposal does not protect children but exposes law-abiding citizens to major risks (such as AI algorithms falsely flagging legal intimate depictions and conversations of children and adults relating to their health and sexual life) and violates the fundamental rights of millions of children and adults according to relevant jurisprudence. Analysing the content of all private messages is as unacceptable as if the post office opened all letters to check for illegal content. According to EDPS, neither the necessity nor the proportionality of the instrument have been demonstrated<p>---<p>A very important and separate issue to E2E discussion is the violation of privacy for whom this is intended to protect.<p>&gt; Teenagers have the right to discover their sexual identity in a safe and private environment. The rise in reported numbers of online child sexual abuse material is also partially due to the emerging practice of teenagers who, in the development of their sexual identity and experiences, take explicit pictures of videos of themselves and send them to peers, or share such material without a sexual motivation. In addition, the age of sexual consent differs across Member States. If users have reached the age of sexual consent under national law, no reporting on solicitation of children should not be reported to law enforcement authorities<p>&gt; Notwithstanding their legitimate objective, these activities constitute an interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life and protection of personal data of the individuals concerned, namely all users, potential offenders and victims. Any limitation to the fundamental right to respect for private and family life, including the confidentiality of communications, cannot be justified merely on the ground that certain technologies were previously deployed when the services concerned did not, from a legal perspective, constitute electronic communications services.<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;doceo&#x2F;document&#x2F;A-9-2020-0258_EN.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.europarl.europa.eu&#x2F;doceo&#x2F;document&#x2F;A-9-2020-0258_...</a><p>---<p>I must say I am pleasantly surprised as to how transparent this process is, and it shows that the &quot;common sense&quot; objections are voiced and brought up.