“Security problems are primarily just bugs”
&gt; Also, since most security people aren&#x27;t developers, they are also a bit clueless how things actually work. Bounds-checking, which they define as purely a security feature to stop buffer-overflows is actually overwhelmingly a debugging feature. Developers know this, security &quot;experts&quot; tend not to. These kernel changes were made by security people who failed to understand this, who failed to realize that their changes would uncover lots of bugs in existing code, and that killing buggy code was hugely inappropriate.<p>Sorry, but I completely disagree here. Many of us that care about security are developers that have to clean up the mess of such ideas.<p>And to once more paraphrase Hoare&#x27;s Turing award speech.<p>&quot;Many years later we asked our customers whether they wished us to provide an option to switch off these checks in the interests of efficiency on production runs. Unanimously, they urged us not to--they already knew how frequently subscript errors occur on production runs where failure to detect them could be disastrous. I note with fear and horror that even in 1980, language designers and users have not learned this lesson. In any respectable branch of engineering, failure to observe such elementary precautions would have long been against the law.&quot;