Inequality in nature and society
(This is a slightly modified but highly relevant excerpt from a piece I wrote last year: Confusing Math with Morality[1].)<p>In What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources[2], Ronald Dworkin makes a distinction between <i>justified inequality of resources</i> and <i>unjustified inequality of resources</i>. Dworkin borrows from Rawls, but the gist of his sentiment is summarized by SEP[3]: “Unequal distribution of resources is considered fair only when it results from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned.” Conversely, provisions, gifts, bribes, and pure luck are conducive to an unfair (or unjust) inequality of resources.<p>For example, a state lottery is unequal — and creates an unjust inequality of resources — because it’s random. It’s trivial to come up with a social policy that always converges wealth to a uniform distribution[4], but the problem is that unless this convergence is driven by what Dworkin calls ‘ambition-sensitive’ forces, this social policy is profoundly unfair — even though it might <i>seem</i> to be fair.<p>[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;dvt.name&#x2F;2017&#x2F;07&#x2F;10&#x2F;confusing-math-with-morality&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;dvt.name&#x2F;2017&#x2F;07&#x2F;10&#x2F;confusing-math-with-morality&#x2F;</a><p>[2] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;homepage.univie.ac.at&#x2F;herbert.preiss&#x2F;files&#x2F;Dworkin_What is Equality_Part2_Equality of Resources.pdf" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;homepage.univie.ac.at&#x2F;herbert.preiss&#x2F;files&#x2F;Dworkin_Wh...</a><p>[3] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;plato.stanford.edu&#x2F;entries&#x2F;equality&#x2F;#EquofRes" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;plato.stanford.edu&#x2F;entries&#x2F;equality&#x2F;#EquofRes</a><p>[4] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.gaussianwaves.com&#x2F;gaussianwaves&#x2F;wp-content&#x2F;uploads&#x2F;2012&#x2F;09&#x2F;Histogram-of-Uniform-Distribution.jpg" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.gaussianwaves.com&#x2F;gaussianwaves&#x2F;wp-content&#x2F;uploa...</a>