A Yubico FAQ about passkeys
I am very bearish about the current push to passkeys.<p>To start with, why throw out the password? We have literally spend a decade getting people to use 2FA - and rightfully so. Why would we suddenly voluntarily compromise security and go back to 1FA? Sure, people suck at passwords, but even a poor password combined with an authenticator would be better than solely an authenticator. I am quite worried that websites will adopt this form of 1FA as the &quot;new normal&quot;, compromising the security of anyone who still wishes to use secure passwords.<p>Second, it looks like a blatant attempt to vendor-lock to me. The ability to sync passkeys across multiple devices is touted as a core feature, but meanwhile vendors only allow syncing between their own devices. This makes a multi-vendor environment extremely challenging to use, not to mention that switching to another vendor risks losing access to a lot of websites. And that&#x27;s even ignoring the possibility of a vendor getting mad at you and deciding to nuke your account - and all the passkeys with it. Until there is a proper (open!) standard for exporting and importing passkeys, this is an unacceptable risk to me.<p>Some of this could be mitigated by a universal pluggable passkeys backend, but I am not really seeing any substantial movement in this direction. To me, it looks like Google&#x2F;Apple are trying to replace &quot;Log in with Google&#x2F;Apple&quot; with &quot;Log in with Passkeys&quot; to make it <i>seem</i> like it is an open platform, while still locking it down as tightly as possible. Despite being an open standard, the implementations are anything but.<p>Meanwhile, syncing provides a security risk. Every synced device has access to all websites all of the time. If you lose sight of a device, an attacker also has access to those websites - and they might even clone the passkeys. This opens you up to attacks which are extremely hard to detect, and due to the passkey being shared between all devices also relatively difficult to stop.<p>I am also seeing a lot of misleading statements surrounding its security. For example, the claims that the keys are stored in a TPM&#x2F;Secure Enclave. Meanwhile, in practice the TPM is only used for the <i>local</i> encryption of <i>a copy</i> of your passkeys. They also happily live on the cloud because they are being synced, and the vendors seem to be offering ways to recover them without access to a <i>single</i> device. They seem to be intentionally reusing language traditionally reserved for security implementations where the private key is stored solely in a HSM with no way to export it, but that is not at all what is happening here. Security-wise, it&#x27;s nothing more than a rebranded cloud-synced password vault.<p>Meanwhile, hardware token vendors like Yubikey point this out, but they do not see it as a threat as they are selling this synced implementation as not suitable for high-security environments - and rightly so. Luckily, the protocol has a built-in way to bypass this: the passkey backend can be asked for attestation, which in essence is an immutable certificate embedded in the hardware key, signed by the hardware vendor. If you want people to use a high-security passkey implementation, simply require attestation from a small list of well-known vendors - ideally only Yubikey of course. By hopping on the Passkeys bandwagon, they are able to erect significant barriers to entry for any potential competitors.<p>Finally, Passkeys provide a privacy risk. With traditional Webauthn the user provides a username to the server, and the server responds with a set of opaque blobs which the user&#x27;s tokens use for further bidirectional authorization. With Passkeys, the server asks the token for their set of domain-relevant passkeys, which <i>include the username</i>. This is required for the intended single-click usernameless login, but the flip side is that an attacker would be able to discover all of your accounts by probing the token. Alternatively, the server would be able to discover an association between multiple accounts of the same person, destroying attempts to retain an anonymous alt account.<p>All in all, to me Passkeys looks like a thinly-veiled attempt to lock users into certain ecosystems, using convenience as a carrot-on-a-stick. Meanwhile, it adds significant security and privacy risks while <i>claiming</i> to be more secure. Seeing this being touted as a &quot;more secure password replacement&quot; by such major players makes me weep for the future.