Boeing 737 MAX crash and the rejection of ridiculous data
It should be noted in the doomed Air France 447 flight, the plane activated the stall warning because of a high angle of attack that was leading to stall. (thanks pdx for the corrected info)<p>At some point the system rejected the data and stopped the stall warning because the angle of attack was so severe that it considered the data erroneous. This is speculated to have caused the co-pilot to keep pulling back on the stick and to maintain the stall because everytime he let the nose of the plane come down the stall warning activated again as the AoA was decreasing into the range that the airplane considered a real signal. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vanityfair.com&#x2F;news&#x2F;business&#x2F;2014&#x2F;10&#x2F;air-france-flight-447-crash" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vanityfair.com&#x2F;news&#x2F;business&#x2F;2014&#x2F;10&#x2F;air-france-...</a><p>A plane&#x27;s instruments, the actions software takes, and it&#x27;s interactions with the humans that fly the plane isn&#x27;t as simple as an if statement.<p>If anything, fewer and simpler controls or automated systems are easier to debug and work around than a plane that has an internal calculus of what is valid data.<p>Air France 447 crashed because of a stall caused by a severe AoA that MCAS might have prevented (if MCAS simple pushes the nose down at high AoA it might. I am unsure of the exact implementation). MCAS obviously had a different impact on the Lion and Ethiopian Air Flights.<p>Basically, it&#x27;s complicated.