The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 97, 2003
U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2925903
See all articles by Ronald J. Allen
Ronald J. Allen
Northwestern University Law School
Michael S. Pardo
We consider and reject the idea that there is an ontological, epistemological, or analytical distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. Rather, we contend that the labels "law" and "fact" refer to the allocation of decision-making authority for pragmatic reasons. This allocation is driven by three factors: (1) the judge-jury relationship, (2) standard conventions concerning the meaning of "law" and "fact," and (3) a distinction between matters of general import and highly specific and localized phenomena.
Keywords: questions of law, questions of fact, punitive damaages, constitutional facts, Seventh Amendment, First Amendment, contracts, torts, patents, appellate review, juries, judicial notice, criminal procedure
Allen, Ronald Jay and Pardo, Michael S., The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction (2003). Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 97, 2003; U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2925903. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925903
Ronald Jay Allen
Northwestern University Law School ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Michael S. Pardo (Contact Author)