text
stringlengths 4
429
|
---|
repeated against a changing
|
target space till enough
|
computers are compromised.
|
Attachment types used
|
Half of all the attachments
|
analyzed used an extension that
|
would run directly when double
|
clicked. This old method is still
|
the most common scheme used.
|
Of all attachments analyzed,
|
38 percent were .exe and 12
|
percent were .src files. In total
|
only 6 percent used double
|
extensions like .pdf.exe to fool
|
the user. It should also be noted Figure 4: Average number of mail accounts targeted per company
|
that 23 percent were Microsoft
|
Word documents using some exploit to execute custom code on the computer.
|
There were also some more exotic
|
extensions used like AutoIt scripts
|
(.au3) and ZX-Edit files (.zed), but
|
these are the exception rather
|
than the rule. It might be that the
|
attackers tried to bypass some email
|
filtering software by experimenting
|
with different attachment types.
|
Sometimes even older exploits like
|
the Microsoft DirectX DirectShow
|
Length Record Remote Code
|
Execution Vulnerability (CVE-
|
2009-1539) in .mp4 files are still
|
occasionally used. This indicates
|
that either not all attackers have
|
the knowhow to use newer exploits
|
that are publicly available or they
|
speculate that the target has not
|
patched all computers. Some of
|
the attackers do not seem to be too
|
sophisticated. For example they used
|
www.[COMPANY-NAME].com.exe
|
an attachment name, clearly missing
|
that the
|
.com
|
at the end would be
|
sufficient to run it and the additional
|
.exe
|
was not needed.
|
Figure 5: Extensions used in targeted attack emails
|
Page 23
|
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
|
B. Visualization with TRIAGE
|
To identify a series of targeted attacks that are likely performed by the same individuals, we have used a novel attack
|
attribution methodology named TRIAGE.
|
Developed by Symantec Research Labs,
|
TRIAGE is data mining software that
|
relies on
|
multi-criteria decision analysis and intelligent data fusion algorithms to reliably link different attacks to the
|
same source. This framework has been
|
developed in order
|
to automate cyberintelligence tasks and reduce the time
|
needed to get insights into organized cybercrime activities. By enabling rapid analysis of large security data sets,
|
Symantec analysts can then quickly and more efficiently attribute various waves of cyberattacks to a specific attack
|
campaign likely run by the same individuals.
|
Figure 6: Graph view of attack wave against company targeted in the New Year
|
s campaign
|
The TRIAGE framework was recently enhanced with novel visualizations
|
thanks to VIS-SENSE, a European research
|
project aiming at developing visual analytics technologies for network security applications.
|
Page 24
|
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
|
Figure 7: Visualization graph of the Greek oil campaign
|
Since its original conception,
|
TRIAGE has been
|
successfully used to analyze the behavior of
|
cybercriminals involved in various types of Internet
|
attack activities, such as rogue antivirus websites [1],
|
spam botnets operations [2], scam campaigns [3] and
|
targeted attacks performed via spear phishing emails
|
[4,5].
|
C. Phases of targeted attacks
|
As with any other targeted attacks, attacks against
|
the energy sector often follow the same pattern. It
|
can be broken down in different phases of attack. It
|
should be noted that we have seen attackers modify
|
their behavior and exceptions from the norm and this
|
is possible especially if the target company has special
|
circumstances or security measures in place.
|
Figure 8: Typical phases of targeted attacks
|
Page 25
|
Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector
|
Reconnaissance phase
|
During this phase the attacker tries to learn as much as possible about the targeted organization.
|
Information sources often include social networks, job posting sites and press releases. This enables the attacker
|
to learn the contact details of possible target individuals as well as context that can be used in social engineering
|
scenarios. The attacker will often create a list of implemented security software used at the targeted company
|
from whatever information is available. These investigations often start completely passively without any direct
|
contact with the company, since there are many data sources publicly available. Subsequently the attacker can use
|
more interaction if needed. Some attackers go through all the effort of creating a fake social media account and
|
befriending key employees. After a period of small talk, to create a false sense of security, such a connection can
|
then be used to pass on an infected document or find out about some key information. Depending on the targeted
|
location, physical reconnaissance and eavesdropping may also be used.
|
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