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Direct Cloud VM Connections | Adversaries may leverage [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009), such as Azure Serial Console(Citation: Azure Serial Console), AWS EC2 Instance Connect(Citation: EC2 Instance Connect)(Citation: lucr-3: Getting SaaS-y in the cloud), and AWS System Manager.(Citation: AWS System Manager).
Methods of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access.
Adversaries may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure and pivot through an environment.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console) These connections typically provide direct console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/008 external_id: T1021.008 source_name: EC2 Instance Connect description: AWS. (2023, June 2). Connect using EC2 Instance Connect. Retrieved June 2, 2023. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-connect-methods.html source_name: AWS System Manager description: AWS. (2023, June 2). What is AWS System Manager?. Retrieved June 2, 2023. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/what-is-systems-manager.html source_name: lucr-3: Getting SaaS-y in the cloud description: Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: Scattered Spider Getting SaaS-y In The Cloud. Retrieved September 20, 2023. url: https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud source_name: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console description: Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial source_name: Azure Serial Console description: Microsoft. (2022, October 17). Azure Serial Console. Retrieved June 2, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/azure/virtual-machines/serial-console-overview | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
System Binary Proxy Execution | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.
Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218 external_id: T1218 source_name: GTFO split description: GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022. url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/ source_name: LOLBAS Project description: Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022. url: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria source_name: split man page description: Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022. url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Timestomp | Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.
Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006 external_id: T1070.006 source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques description: Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016. url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Reflective Code Loading | Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)).
Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) may be abused to load raw code into the running process.(Citation: Microsoft AssemblyLoad)
Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620 external_id: T1620 source_name: 00sec Droppers description: 0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715 source_name: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool description: Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/ source_name: Mandiant BYOL description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique source_name: S1 Old Rat New Tricks description: Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/ source_name: MDSec Detecting DOTNET description: MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/ source_name: Microsoft AssemblyLoad description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Assembly.Load Method. Retrieved February 9, 2024. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load source_name: Intezer ACBackdoor description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/ source_name: Stuart ELF Memory description: Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html source_name: Introducing Donut description: The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | macOS | enterprise-attack |
Wi-Fi Discovery | Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018), and other discovery or [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.
Adversaries may collect various types of information about Wi-Fi networks from hosts. For example, on Windows names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks a device has previously connected to may be available through `netsh wlan show profiles` to enumerate Wi-Fi names and then `netsh wlan show profile “Wi-Fi name” key=clear` to show a Wi-Fi network’s corresponding password.(Citation: BleepingComputer Agent Tesla steal wifi passwords)(Citation: Malware Bytes New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) Additionally, names and other details of locally reachable Wi-Fi networks can be discovered using calls to `wlanAPI.dll` [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader)
On Linux, names and passwords of all Wi-Fi-networks a device has previously connected to may be available in files under ` /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`.(Citation: Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux) On macOS, the password of a known Wi-Fi may be identified with ` security find-generic-password -wa wifiname` (requires admin username/password).(Citation: Find Wi-Fi Password on Mac)
| source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/002 external_id: T1016.002 source_name: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader description: Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/blog/emotet-evolves-with-new-wi-fi-spreader/ source_name: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022 description: Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022. url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/ source_name: Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux description: Geeks for Geeks. (n.d.). Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/wi-fi-password-connected-networks-windowslinux/ source_name: Malware Bytes New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials description: Hossein Jazi. (2020, April 16). New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials source_name: Find Wi-Fi Password on Mac description: Ruslana Lishchuk. (2021, March 26). How to Find a Saved Wi-Fi Password on a Mac. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://mackeeper.com/blog/find-wi-fi-password-on-mac/ source_name: BleepingComputer Agent Tesla steal wifi passwords description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2020, April 16). Hackers steal WiFi passwords using upgraded Agent Tesla malware. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-wifi-passwords-using-upgraded-agent-tesla-malware/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Ignore Process Interrupts | Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such as when the user of the active session logs off.(Citation: Linux Signal Man) These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts to pause or terminate specified running processes.
Adversaries may invoke processes using `nohup`, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, or similar commands that may be immune to hangups.(Citation: nohup Linux Man)(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell SilentlyContinue) This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.
Hiding from process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike [Trap](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005) this does not establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) since the process will not be re-invoked once actually terminated. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/011 external_id: T1564.011 source_name: Linux Signal Man description: Linux man-pages. (2023, April 3). signal(7). Retrieved August 30, 2023. url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/signal.7.html source_name: nohup Linux Man description: Meyering, J. (n.d.). nohup(1). Retrieved August 30, 2023. url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/nohup source_name: Microsoft PowerShell SilentlyContinue description: Microsoft. (2023, March 2). $DebugPreference. Retrieved August 30, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_preference_variables?view=powershell-7.3#debugpreference | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Escape to Host | Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)
There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as `unshare` and `keyctl` to escalate privileges and steal secrets.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)(Citation: Container Escape)(Citation: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape)(Citation: Keyctl-unmask)
Additionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as `docker.sock`, to break out of the container via a [Container Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609).(Citation: Container Escape) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)
Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611 external_id: T1611 source_name: Container Escape description: 0xn3va. (n.d.). Escaping. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping source_name: Windows Server Containers Are Open description: Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/ source_name: Docker Overview description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/ source_name: Docker Bind Mounts description: Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/ source_name: Trend Micro Privileged Container description: Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html source_name: Intezer Doki July 20 description: Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/ source_name: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape description: Manoj Ahuje. (2022, January 31). CVE-2022-0185: Kubernetes Container Escape Using Linux Kernel Exploit. Retrieved July 6, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2022-0185-kubernetes-container-escape-using-linux-kernel-exploit/ source_name: Keyctl-unmask description: Mark Manning. (2020, July 23). Keyctl-unmask: "Going Florida" on The State Of Containerizing Linux Keyrings. Retrieved July 6, 2022. url: https://www.antitree.com/2020/07/keyctl-unmask-going-florida-on-the-state-of-containerizing-linux-keyrings/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Shortcut Modification | Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.
Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
Shortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176)) to persistently launch malware. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009 external_id: T1547.009 source_name: Shortcut for Persistence description: Elastic. (n.d.). Shortcut File Written or Modified for Persistence. Retrieved June 1, 2022. url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.html#shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020. url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Application Window Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ([Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) to evade.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Adversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) commands and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010 external_id: T1010 source_name: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020 description: ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/ source_name: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021 description: Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022. url: https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | macOS | enterprise-attack |
Email Account | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003 external_id: T1087.003 source_name: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists description: Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019 source_name: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist source_name: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016 description: Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/ source_name: Google Workspace Global Access List description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021. url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Time Based Evasion | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.
Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003 external_id: T1497.003 source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc source_name: Revil Independence Day description: Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021. url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/ source_name: Netskope Nitol description: Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021. url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique source_name: Joe Sec Nymaim description: Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021. url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803 source_name: Joe Sec Trickbot description: Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021. url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473 source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks description: Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux | enterprise-attack |
CMSTP | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003 external_id: T1218.003 source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018 description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009 description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017 description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018. url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018 description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018. url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018 description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
SSH Hijacking | Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001 external_id: T1563.001 source_name: Slideshare Abusing SSH description: Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018. url: https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219 source_name: SSHjack Blackhat description: Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017. url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf source_name: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking description: Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020. url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Disable Windows Event Logging | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping the service using <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>).(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog</code> then restarting the system for the change to take effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
There are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the "Start" value in the key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security</code>, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-System</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application</code> to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002 external_id: T1562.002 source_name: Disable_Win_Event_Logging description: dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021. url: https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging source_name: def_ev_win_event_logging description: Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021. url: https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/ source_name: EventLog_Core_Technologies description: Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021. url: https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/ source_name: Audit_Policy_Microsoft description: Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy source_name: Windows Log Events description: Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020. url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/ source_name: disable_win_evt_logging description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022. url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 source_name: auditpol description: Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol source_name: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter description: Naceri, A. (2021, November 7). Windows Server 2019 file overwrite bug. Retrieved April 7, 2022. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20211107115646/https://twitter.com/klinix5/status/1457316029114327040 source_name: T1562.002_redcanaryco description: redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021. url: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md source_name: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings description: Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings source_name: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC description: STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021. url: https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html source_name: evt_log_tampering description: svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021. url: https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Scheduled Transfer | Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.
When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029 external_id: T1029 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux | enterprise-attack |
SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002 external_id: T1021.002 source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 source_name: TechNet RPC description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014. url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984 source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem source_name: Lateral Movement Payne description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Implant Internal Image | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525 external_id: T1525 source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019 description: Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/ source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019 description: Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
Protocol Tunneling | Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)
[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19)
Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572 external_id: T1572 source_name: SSH Tunneling description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020. url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling source_name: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19 description: Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020. url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/ source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Control Panel | Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.
Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a <code>CPlApplet</code> function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)
Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.
Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002 external_id: T1218.002 source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014 description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013 description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017 description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020 description: Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Network Address Translation Traversal | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)
When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders.
Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001 external_id: T1599.001 source_name: RFC1918 description: IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Network | enterprise-attack |
Upload Tool | Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo, or on Platform-as-a-Service offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)
Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002 external_id: T1608.002 source_name: Dell TG-3390 description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage source_name: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers description: Jérôme Segura. (2019, December 4). There's an app for that: web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku source_name: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole description: Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don’t Align: A New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/ source_name: Intezer App Service Phishing description: Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Security Support Provider | Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.
The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005 external_id: T1547.005 source_name: Graeber 2014 description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Use Alternate Authentication Material | Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)
Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.
| source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550 external_id: T1550 source_name: TechNet Audit Policy description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx source_name: NIST Authentication description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020. url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication source_name: NIST MFA description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020. url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Threat Intel Vendors | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds)
Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001 external_id: T1597.001 source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011 external_id: T1011 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Network Device Configuration Dump | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.
Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002 external_id: T1602.002 source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Network | enterprise-attack |
Gather Victim Identity Information | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589 external_id: T1589 source_name: OPM Leak description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ source_name: GitHub truffleHog description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog source_name: GrimBlog UsernameEnum description: GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021. url: https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ source_name: Register Uber description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ source_name: GitHub Gitrob description: Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob source_name: CNET Leaks description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ source_name: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023 description: Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024. url: https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/ source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 source_name: Register Deloitte description: Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Disable or Modify System Firewall | Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.
Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571)).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)
Adversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) may also indirectly modify firewall rules. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004 external_id: T1562.004 source_name: Huntress BlackCat description: Carvey, H. (2024, February 28). BlackCat Ransomware Affiliate TTPs. Retrieved March 27, 2024. url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware-affiliate-ttps source_name: change_rdp_port_conti description: The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022. url: https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Archive Collected Data | An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560 external_id: T1560 source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Linux | enterprise-attack |
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
* Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003 external_id: T1553.003 source_name: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017 description: Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165 source_name: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017 description: Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017 description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf source_name: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017 description: Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files source_name: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012 description: Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10) source_name: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016 description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11) source_name: Microsoft Authenticode description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx source_name: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx source_name: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008 description: Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Browser Session Hijacking | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185 external_id: T1185 source_name: Wikipedia Man in the Browser description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser source_name: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018. url: https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses source_name: cobaltstrike manual description: Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Remote Services | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain.
Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 external_id: T1021 source_name: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3 description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf source_name: Remote Management MDM macOS description: Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161 source_name: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands description: Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710 source_name: Lockboxx ARD 2019 description: Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021. url: http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html source_name: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop description: Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing description: Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021. url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins source_name: SSH Secure Shell description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020. url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Mail Protocols | Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003 external_id: T1071.003 source_name: FireEye APT28 description: FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Hybrid Identity | Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.
Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):
* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud
* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory
* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD
AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.
By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)
In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007 external_id: T1556.007 source_name: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers description: Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers. Retrieved September 28, 2022. url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/ source_name: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/ source_name: MagicWeb description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24). MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved September 28, 2022. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/ source_name: Azure AD Hybrid Identity description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved September 28, 2022. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn source_name: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors description: Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Vulnerability Scanning | Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002 external_id: T1595.002 source_name: OWASP Vuln Scanning description: OWASP. (n.d.). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://owasp.org/www-project-automated-threats-to-web-applications/assets/oats/EN/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Cloud API | Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules like Azure for PowerShell(Citation: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell), or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).
Cloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies.
With proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001) and [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009 external_id: T1059.009 source_name: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell description: Microsoft. (2014, December 12). Azure/azure-powershell. Retrieved March 24, 2023. url: https://github.com/Azure/azure-powershell | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
Search Open Technical Databases | Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan)
Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596 external_id: T1596 source_name: Circl Passive DNS description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/ source_name: DNS Dumpster description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://dnsdumpster.com/ source_name: Medium SSL Cert description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2 source_name: WHOIS description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.whois.net/ source_name: Shodan description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://shodan.io source_name: SSLShopper Lookup description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html source_name: DigitalShadows CDN description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Electron Applications | Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams.(Citation: Electron 2) Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS.(Citation: Electron 3) The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code.(Citation: Electron 1)
Due to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework.(Citation: Electron 1) For example, the abuse of `teams.exe` and `chrome.exe` may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., `chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher="C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c calc.exe`).(Citation: Electron 6-8)
Adversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) within Electron applications.(Citation: Electron Security) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/015 external_id: T1218.015 source_name: Electron 3 description: Alanna Titterington. (2023, September 14). Security of Electron-based desktop applications. Retrieved March 7, 2024. url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/electron-framework-security-issues/49035/ source_name: Electron Security description: ElectronJS.org. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2024. url: https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/using-native-node-modules source_name: Electron 6-8 description: Kosayev, U. (2023, June 15). One Electron to Rule Them All. Retrieved March 7, 2024. url: https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf source_name: Electron 1 description: TOM ABAI. (2023, August 10). There’s a New Stealer Variant in Town, and It’s Using Electron to Stay Fully Undetected. Retrieved March 7, 2024. url: https://www.mend.io/blog/theres-a-new-stealer-variant-in-town-and-its-using-electron-to-stay-fully-undetected/ source_name: Electron 2 description: Trend Micro. (2023, June 6). Abusing Electronbased applications in targeted attacks. Retrieved March 7, 2024. url: https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2023/FIRSTCON23-TLP-CLEAR-Horejsi-Abusing-Electron-Based-Applications-in-Targeted-Attacks.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | macOS | enterprise-attack |
Disable or Modify Linux Audit System | Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.
Often referred to as `auditd`, this is the name of the daemon used to write events to disk and is governed by the parameters set in the `audit.conf` configuration file. Two primary ways to configure the log generation rules are through the command line `auditctl` utility and the file `/etc/audit/audit.rules`, containing a sequence of `auditctl` commands loaded at boot time.(Citation: Red Hat System Auditing)(Citation: IzyKnows auditd threat detection 2022)
With root privileges, adversaries may be able to ensure their activity is not logged through disabling the Audit system service, editing the configuration/rule files, or by hooking the Audit system library functions. Using the command line, adversaries can disable the Audit system service through killing processes associated with `auditd` daemon or use `systemctl` to stop the Audit service. Adversaries can also hook Audit system functions to disable logging or modify the rules contained in the `/etc/audit/audit.rules` or `audit.conf` files to ignore malicious activity.(Citation: Trustwave Honeypot SkidMap 2023)(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/012 external_id: T1562.012 source_name: IzyKnows auditd threat detection 2022 description: IzySec. (2022, January 26). Linux auditd for Threat Detection. Retrieved September 29, 2023. url: https://izyknows.medium.com/linux-auditd-for-threat-detection-d06c8b941505 source_name: Red Hat System Auditing description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). Red Hat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing source_name: ESET Ebury Feb 2014 description: M.Léveillé, M.. (2014, February 21). An In-depth Analysis of Linux/Ebury. Retrieved April 19, 2019. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/ source_name: Trustwave Honeypot SkidMap 2023 description: Radoslaw Zdonczyk. (2023, July 30). Honeypot Recon: New Variant of SkidMap Targeting Redis. Retrieved September 29, 2023. url: https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/honeypot-recon-new-variant-of-skidmap-targeting-redis/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Rogue Domain Controller | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.
Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)
This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207 external_id: T1207 source_name: DCShadow Blog description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018. url: https://www.dcshadow.com/ source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015. url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821 source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018. url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor source_name: Microsoft DirSync description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018 description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018. url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Code Signing Policy Modification | Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.
Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)
Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code> on Windows and <code>csrutil disable</code> on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying <code>g_CiOptions</code> to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006 external_id: T1553.006 source_name: Apple Disable SIP description: Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection source_name: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 description: F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf source_name: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2 description: Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html source_name: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017 description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test source_name: Microsoft DSE June 2017 description: Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN source_name: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021 description: Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020 description: Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ source_name: GitHub Turla Driver Loader description: TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021. url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Deploy Container | Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611) and access other containers running on the node. (Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)
Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. (Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.(Citation: Kubernetes Workload Management) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610 external_id: T1610 source_name: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020 description: Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024. url: https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216 source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts description: Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host source_name: Docker Containers API description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container source_name: Kubernetes Workload Management description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28, 2024. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/ source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/ source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Containers | enterprise-attack |
Modify Registry | Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.
Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)
The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112 external_id: T1112 source_name: Microsoft Reg description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx source_name: Microsoft Remote description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017 description: Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657 source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017 description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018. url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353 source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006 description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016 description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014 description: Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Launch Daemon | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004 external_id: T1543.004 source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf source_name: launchd Keywords for plists description: Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021. url: https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html source_name: WireLurker description: Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf source_name: OSX Malware Detection description: Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf source_name: LaunchDaemon Hijacking description: Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021. url: https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/ source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019 description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | macOS | enterprise-attack |
Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580 external_id: T1580 source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ source_name: AWS Head Bucket description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html source_name: AWS Get Public Access Block description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html source_name: AWS Describe DB Instances description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html source_name: Amazon Describe Instance description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html source_name: Amazon Describe Instances API description: Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html source_name: Google Compute Instances description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020 description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest source_name: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas description: Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022. url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
Credentials from Web Browsers | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003 external_id: T1555.003 source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html source_name: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata source_name: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018 description: Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019. url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign source_name: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017 description: Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html source_name: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016 description: Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019. url: https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.
Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.
For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)
Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008 external_id: T1574.008 source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 source_name: Windows NT Command Shell description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120 source_name: Microsoft WinExec description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393 source_name: Microsoft Environment Property description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Defacement | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.
| source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491 external_id: T1491 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.
Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.
A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.
An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535 external_id: T1535 source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
DHCP Spoofing | Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).
DHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows:
1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.
2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address.
3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered.
4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.
Adversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.
DHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a <code>INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)</code> message to the <code>All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers</code> multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.
Rather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003 external_id: T1557.003 source_name: rfc2131 description: Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Retrieved March 9, 2022. url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131 source_name: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware description: Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware. Retrieved January 14, 2022. url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/ source_name: rfc3315 description: J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022. url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315 source_name: dhcp_serv_op_events description: Microsoft. (2006, August 31). DHCP Server Operational Events. Retrieved March 7, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11) source_name: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes description: Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved March 7, 2022. url: https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/ source_name: w32.tidserv.g description: Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January 14, 2022. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Remote Service Session Hijacking | Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.
Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563 external_id: T1563 source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017. url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020. url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Binary Padding | Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.
Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001 external_id: T1027.001 source_name: ESET OceanLotus description: Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/ source_name: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017 description: Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019. url: https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/ source_name: VirusTotal FAQ description: VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019. url: https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Web Shell | Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)
In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003 external_id: T1505.003 source_name: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells description: NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021. url: https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW description: Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/ source_name: Lee 2013 description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Group Policy Modification | Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code><GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code><GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf</code>, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001 external_id: T1484.001 source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016 description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016 description: Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach description: Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/ source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: https://wald0.com/?p=179 source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/ source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics description: srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019. url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Browser Information Discovery | Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.(Citation: Kaspersky Autofill)
Browser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser.
Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser information is typically stored in local files and databases (e.g., `%APPDATA%/Google/Chrome`).(Citation: Chrome Roaming Profiles) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217 external_id: T1217 source_name: Chrome Roaming Profiles description: Chrome Enterprise and Education Help. (n.d.). Use Chrome Browser with Roaming User Profiles. Retrieved March 28, 2023. url: https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7349337 source_name: Kaspersky Autofill description: Golubev, S. (n.d.). How malware steals autofill data from browsers. Retrieved March 28, 2023. url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/browser-data-theft/27871/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Private Keys | Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.
Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)
When a device is registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)
On network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)
Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004 external_id: T1552.004 source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ source_name: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys description: Cisco. (2023, February 17). Chapter: Deploying RSA Keys Within a PKI . Retrieved March 27, 2023. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_pki/configuration/xe-17/sec-pki-xe-17-book/sec-deploy-rsa-pki.html#GUID-1CB802D8-9DE3-447F-BECE-CF22F5E11436 source_name: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/ source_name: Kaspersky Careto description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf source_name: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token description: Microsoft. (2022, September 9). What is a Primary Refresh Token?. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-primary-refresh-token source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Server | Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), enabling [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations, or facilitating [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011). Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)(Citation: Freejacked)
Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004 external_id: T1583.004 source_name: Freejacked description: Clark, Michael. (2023, August 14). Google’s Vertex AI Platform Gets Freejacked. Retrieved February 28, 2024. url: https://sysdig.com/blog/googles-vertex-ai-platform-freejacked/ source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020 description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ source_name: NYTStuxnet description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017. url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Windows Remote Management | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 external_id: T1021.006 source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc source_name: Jacobsen 2014 description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 source_name: MSDN WMI description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx source_name: Microsoft WinRM description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Exfiltration Over Bluetooth | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001 external_id: T1011.001 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Default Accounts | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001 external_id: T1078.001 source_name: AWS Root User description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts source_name: Metasploit SSH Module description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: initial-access | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Time Providers | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\`.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003 external_id: T1547.003 source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017 description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018. url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017 description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx source_name: TechNet Autoruns description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Trap | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.
Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005 external_id: T1546.005 source_name: Trap Manual description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019. url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019. url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | macOS | enterprise-attack |
Dynamic Linker Hijacking | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)
On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the <code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code> function, or <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s <code>os.environ</code>.
On Linux, adversaries may set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment variable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code> respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006 external_id: T1574.006 source_name: Man LD.SO description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020. url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020. url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021. url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS description: Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ source_name: Uninformed Needle description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997 description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers description: Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020. url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/ source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020. url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/ source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021. url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Local Account | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a local account. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as <code>username</code>, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001 external_id: T1136.001 source_name: cisco_username_cmd description: Cisco. (2023, March 6). username - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z. Retrieved July 13, 2022. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-t2.html#wp1047035630 source_name: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Service Accounts. Retrieved July 14, 2023. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/ source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event description: Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Communication Through Removable Media | Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092 external_id: T1092 source_name: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014 description: Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017. url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Clear Windows Event Logs | Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:
* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>
* <code>wevtutil cl application</code>
* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>
These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command <code>Remove-EventLog -LogName Security</code> to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
Adversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\`. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001 external_id: T1070.001 source_name: disable_win_evt_logging description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022. url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear description: Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Email Accounts | Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) for follow-on purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)
Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002 external_id: T1585.002 source_name: Trend Micro R980 2016 description: Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/ source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ source_name: Mandiant APT1 description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE | enterprise-attack |
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay | By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR)(Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)
Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords.
In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response.
Several tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174).(Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof)(Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer)(Citation: GitHub Responder) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001 external_id: T1557.001 source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response source_name: GitHub Responder description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019. url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html source_name: TechNet NetBIOS description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof source_name: GitHub Conveigh description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019. url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS description: Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Windows | enterprise-attack |
File and Directory Permissions Modification | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
Adversaries may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.(Citation: new_rust_based_ransomware)(Citation: bad_luck_blackcat)(Citation: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack)(Citation: blackmatter_blackcat)(Citation: fsutil_behavior) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222 external_id: T1222 source_name: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack description: Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, March 23). Falcon OverWatch Threat Hunting Contributes to Seamless Protection Against Novel BlackCat Attack. Retrieved May 5, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-contributes-to-blackcat-protection/ source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018. url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018. url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 source_name: bad_luck_blackcat description: Kaspersky Global Research & Analysis Team (GReAT). (2022). A Bad Luck BlackCat. Retrieved May 5, 2022. url: https://go.kaspersky.com/rs/802-IJN-240/images/TR_BlackCat_Report.pdf source_name: fsutil_behavior description: Microsoft. (2021, September 27). fsutil behavior. Retrieved January 14, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014 description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018. url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/ source_name: blackmatter_blackcat description: Pereira, T. Huey, C. (2022, March 17). From BlackMatter to BlackCat: Analyzing two attacks from one affiliate. Retrieved May 5, 2022. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/from-blackmatter-to-blackcat-analyzing.html source_name: new_rust_based_ransomware description: Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, December 16). Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022. url: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
LSASS Memory | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>
* <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>
Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:
* <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
Similar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
| source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001 external_id: T1003.001 source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea source_name: Deep Instinct LSASS description: Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier than Ever Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023. url: https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2 source_name: Graeber 2014 description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html source_name: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 description: Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ source_name: Powersploit description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit source_name: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector description: Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021. url: https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Active Scanning | Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595 external_id: T1595 source_name: Botnet Scan description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf source_name: OWASP Fingerprinting description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)(Citation: sudo man page 2018) An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548 external_id: T1548 source_name: TechNet How UAC Works description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works source_name: OSX Keydnap malware description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ source_name: Fortinet Fareit description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware source_name: sudo man page 2018 description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018. url: https://www.sudo.ws/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Create Process with Token | Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or created via [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) before being used to create a process.
While this technique is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001), the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002 external_id: T1134.002 source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing source_name: Microsoft RunAs description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11) | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Setuid and Setgid | An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> and <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used.
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.
Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search for such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <code>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001 external_id: T1548.001 source_name: GTFOBins Suid description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January 28, 2022. url: https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid source_name: OSX Keydnap malware description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ source_name: setuid man page description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018. url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Winlogon Helper DLL | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
* Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
* Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
* Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004 external_id: T1547.004 source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 description: Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order source_name: TechNet Autoruns description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Distributed Component Object Model | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)
Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003 external_id: T1021.003 source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019 description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html source_name: Microsoft COM description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx source_name: Microsoft COM ACL description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1 source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx source_name: MSDN WMI description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017 description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/ source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017 description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/ source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017 description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/ source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017 description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/ source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017 description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017. url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Password Spraying | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003 external_id: T1110.003 source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying description: Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019. url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017. url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645 source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows | enterprise-attack |
External Proxy | Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002 external_id: T1090.002 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools description: Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015. url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Web Portal Capture | Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.
This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003 external_id: T1056.003 source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging description: Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Email Addresses | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002 external_id: T1589.002 source_name: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/ source_name: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration description: gremwell. (2020, March 24). Office 365 User Enumeration. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://github.com/gremwell/o365enum source_name: GrimBlog UsernameEnum description: GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021. url: https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ source_name: HackersArise Email description: Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego source_name: CNET Leaks description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Spearphishing Voice | Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or "vishing"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.(Citation: BOA Telephone Scams)
Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number ("callback phishing") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)
Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/004 external_id: T1598.004 source_name: Avertium callback phishing description: Avertium. (n.d.). EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CALLBACK PHISHING. Retrieved February 2, 2023. url: https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing source_name: BOA Telephone Scams description: Bank of America. (n.d.). How to avoid telephone scams. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://business.bofa.com/en-us/content/what-is-vishing.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Cached Domain Credentials | Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds)
On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache)
On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to obtain the plaintext password.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)
With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)
Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005 external_id: T1003.005 source_name: PassLib mscache description: Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020. url: https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html source_name: ired mscache description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020. url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials source_name: Microsoft - Cached Creds description: Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11) source_name: Powersploit description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021. url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows | enterprise-attack |
SSH Authorized Keys | Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code><user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.
Adversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.
Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user.
SSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh pubkey-chain` [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004 external_id: T1098.004 source_name: Venafi SSH Key Abuse description: Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020. url: https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities source_name: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation description: Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/ source_name: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd description: Cisco. (2021, August 23). ip ssh pubkey-chain. Retrieved July 13, 2022. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/d1/sec-d1-cr-book/sec-cr-i3.html#wp1254331478 source_name: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020. url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability source_name: Google Cloud Add Metadata description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata source_name: Azure Update Virtual Machines description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update source_name: SSH Authorized Keys description: ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020. url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Network Security Appliances | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006 external_id: T1590.006 source_name: Nmap Firewalls NIDS description: Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Image File Execution Options Injection | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<executable></code> where <code><executable></code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012 external_id: T1546.012 source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017. url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ source_name: Tilbury 2014 description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017 description: Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process source_name: FSecure Hupigon description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017. url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017. url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Odbcconf | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}</code>). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
| source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008 external_id: T1218.008 source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019. url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017 description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017 description: Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Search Engines | Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002 external_id: T1593.002 source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020. url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Business Relationships | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002 external_id: T1591.002 source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own.
Just-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in Time Access 2023)
Account impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange)
Many cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)
While users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003), which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005 external_id: T1548.005 source_name: AWS PassRole description: AWS. (n.d.). Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS service. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html source_name: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022 description: CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/ source_name: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023 description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Manage just-in-time privileged access to projects. Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Roles for service account authentication. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions source_name: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange description: Microsoft. (2022, September 13). Impersonation and EWS in Exchange. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange source_name: Azure Just in Time Access 2023 description: Microsoft. (2023, August 29). Configure and approve just-in-time access for Azure Managed Applications. Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ source_name: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/ source_name: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023 description: Yonatan Khanashvilli. (2023, November 28). DeleFriend: Severe design flaw in Domain Wide Delegation could leave Google Workspace vulnerable for takeover. Retrieved January 16, 2024. url: https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023 description: Zohar Zigdon. (2023, November 30). Exploring a Critical Risk in Google Workspace's Domain-Wide Delegation Feature. Retrieved January 16, 2024. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
Video Capture | An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.
In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125 external_id: T1125 source_name: objective-see 2017 review description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018. url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Process Doppelgänging | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013 external_id: T1055.013 source_name: Microsoft TxF description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017 description: Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017 description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/ source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows | enterprise-attack |
System Network Configuration Discovery | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. <code>show ip route</code>, <code>show ip interface</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )
Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016 external_id: T1016 source_name: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion description: Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Delete Cloud Instance | An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003 external_id: T1578.003 source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020 description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020. url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/ source_name: Azure Activity Logs description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs source_name: Cloud Audit Logs description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS | enterprise-attack |
Code Repositories | Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
Adversaries may search various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public code repositories can often be a source of various general information about victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data, including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys.(Citation: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003), which focuses on [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009) from private and internally hosted code repositories. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003 external_id: T1593.003 source_name: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials description: Runa A. Sandvik. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved August 9, 2022. url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE | enterprise-attack |
Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005 external_id: T1574.005 source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012 description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017. url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/ source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable description: Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Accessibility Features | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012) debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)
* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
* Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
* Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
* Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
* App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code> | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008 external_id: T1546.008 source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020. url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit description: Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom source_name: Tilbury 2014 description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Account Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.
For examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists.(Citation: AWS List Users)(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) On hosts, adversaries can use default [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087 external_id: T1087 source_name: AWS List Users description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL description: Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020. url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows | enterprise-attack |
Proxy | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic. | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090 external_id: T1090 source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools description: Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015. url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Command and Scripting Interpreter | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).
Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python) | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 external_id: T1059 source_name: Remote Shell Execution in Python description: Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021. url: https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 source_name: Powershell Remote Commands description: Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Linux | enterprise-attack |
Indicator Blocking | An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).
For example, adversaries may modify the `File` value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\Security</code> to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) <code>Set-EtwTraceProvider</code> cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.
In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.
In Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors (Citation: LemonDuck). | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006 external_id: T1562.006 source_name: disable_win_evt_logging description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022. url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 source_name: LemonDuck description: Manoj Ahuje. (2022, April 21). LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining Operations. Retrieved June 30, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/lemonduck-botnet-targets-docker-for-cryptomining-operations/ source_name: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017 description: Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A source_name: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events source_name: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018 description: Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019. url: https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows | enterprise-attack |