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tasmācchaktipratiniyamāt kiñcidevāsatkriyate na sarvam | Due to the restriction of potency, only some non-existent [thing] is produced, not everything. |
ata evopādānagrahaṇādityādikriyate hetucatuṣṭayasyānaikāntikatvaṃ | For this very reason, the four reasons [given by Sāṃkhya] such as "the securing of the material cause" etc. are [shown to be] inconclusive. |
tathā hi yadi kāryasattākṛtameva pratiniyatopādānagrahaṇaṃ kvacit siddhaṃ syāt tadaitat syāt | For if the securing of a specific material cause were established anywhere as being due to the pre-existence of the effect, then [their argument] would hold. |
yāvatā kāraṇaśaktiniyamakṛtam api niyatopādānagrahaṇaṃ yujyata eva | Whereas the securing of a specific material cause can indeed be due to the restriction of causal potency. |
kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamādeva ca na sarvasya sarvasmāt sambhavaḥ sarvasya sarvārthakriyākāritvasvabhāvāsambhavāt | And due to the restriction of causal potency alone, everything cannot arise from everything, because it is impossible for everything to have the nature of producing all effects. |
yatpunaruktamakāryātiśayaṃ yattvityādi tadapyabhiprāyāparijñānād uktam | Moreover, what was stated [by the opponent] beginning with "that which has no special effect" etc., was said without understanding [our] intention. |
nahyasmābhirabhāvaḥ kriyata ityabhidhīyate | For we do not say that "non-existence is produced." |
yena vikṛtau satyāṃ tasya svabhāvahāniprasaṅgaḥ syāt | Due to which, if there were modification, there would be the unwanted consequence of loss of its nature. |
kiṃtu vastveva kriyata iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam | Rather, as explained before, it is a real entity that is produced. |
tac ca vastu upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher niṣpannasya ca kāryatvānupapatteḥ prāgutpādād asadity ucyate yasya ca kāraṇasya sannidhānamātreṇa tattathābhūtamudeti tena tatkriyata iti vyapadiśyate natu vyāpārasamāveśāt kenacitkiñcit kriyate nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām | And that entity is said to be non-existent prior to its production because [1] what is perceptible is not perceived [before production] and [2] what is already accomplished cannot be an effect; and it is designated as being produced by that cause in whose mere presence it arises as such—not that anything is produced by anything through the entering of operations, because all phenomena are devoid of activity. |
nāpyasannāma kiñcid asti yadvikriyate na vā vastusvabhāvaḥ pratiṣedhamātralakṣaṇatvād asattvasya / | There is neither anything that can be called "non-existent" which could be modified, nor can non-existence constitute the essence of anything, because non-existence is characterized merely by negation. |
apica yadyakāryātiśayatvād asanna kriyata ityabhidhīyate / sadapi ca svabhāvaniṣpatter akāryātiśatameveti tat kathaṃ kriyate / | Moreover, if it is claimed that "what is non-existent cannot be produced because no peculiarities of the effect could be attributed to it," then how could what is existent be produced either, since its essential nature is already accomplished and no further peculiarities could be attributed to it? |
tasmācchaktasya śakyakāraṇādityeṣonaikāntaḥ / asatkāryavāde ca kāraṇābhāvasya yujyamānatvāt kāraṇabhāvādityayamapyanaikāntikaḥ / yadvā pūrvaṃ sataḥ kāryatvāsambhavasya pratipāditatvāt asatkāryavāda eva copādānagrahaṇādiniyamasya yujyamānatvāt upādānagrahaṇād ityāder hetucatuṣṭayasya viruddhatā sādhyaviparyayasādhanāt // | Therefore, the reasoning that "because what is capable [produces] what it is capable of [producing]" is inconclusive. And since in the theory of asatkāryavāda [the doctrine of non-existent effect] it is possible for things to be causes, the argument "because [the effect] is of the nature of the cause" is also inconclusive. Alternatively, since it has been previously established that what exists cannot be an effect, and since the rule regarding "the securing of material causes" etc. is explicable only under the theory of asatkāryavāda, the four reasons beginning with "the securing of material causes" are contradictory because they prove the opposite of what is to be proved. |
nanu yadyasadevotpadyata iti bhavatāṃ mataṃ tat kathaṃ sūtre sadasator utpādaḥpratiṣiddhaḥ / | [The opponent asks:] "If it is your view that what is produced was [previously] non-existent, then how is it that in the sūtra the production of both the existent and the non-existent is denied?" |
yathoktam anutpannā mahāmate sarvadharmāḥ sadasator anutpannatvāt iti atrāha utpāda ityādi / utpādo vastubhāvastu so 'satā na satā tathā / | As it has been said: "O Mahāmati, all dharmas are unproduced because neither the existent nor the non-existent is produced." The answer to this is given [in the verse beginning with] "utpāda" etc. |
tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ / | The particle tu is used in the sense of emphasis. |
vastūnāṃ pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyakṣaṇamātrāvasthāyī svabhāva evotpāda ity ucyate / bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ / | What is called "production" is nothing but the momentary essential nature of things, devoid of both past and future limits, [as becomes clear] when examining its nature alone through the exclusion of other differences. |
natu vaibhāṣikavikalpitā jātiḥ samskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ / | It is not a universal characterized by being conditioned, as imagined by the Vaibhāṣikas. |
tasyāḥ pratiṣetsyamānatvāt / | Because that [universal] will be refuted [later]. |
nāpi vaiśeṣikaparikalpitaḥ sattāsamavāyaḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā tayor api niṣetsyamānatvāt / | Nor is it inherence in existence or inherence in its own cause as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas, because both of these will also be refuted [later]. |
paramatena ca tayor nityatvāt / nityasya ca janmānupapatteḥ / | And because according to the opponent's view [i.e., the Vaiśeṣika] these two [inherences] are eternal, and because what is eternal cannot have origination. |
sattāsvakāraṇāśleṣakaraṇāt kāraṇaṃ kila / | A cause becomes a cause by [virtue of] bringing about the contact with its own effect with existence. |
sā sattā sa ca sambandho nityau kāryamatheha kiṃ // | [Since] that existence and that connection are [both] eternal, what then could be [their] effect here? |
sa evam ātmaka utpādo nāsatā tādātmyena sambadhyate / | This production of such nature cannot be related to what is non-existent through [the relation of] identity. |
sadasator virodhāt / na hy asad bhavati / | Because of [the mutual] contradiction between the existent and non-existent; for indeed the non-existent cannot come into being. |
nāpi satā pūrvabhāvinā sambadhyate / | Nor is [production] related to what is [already] existent [as] pre-existing. |
tasya pūrvamasattvāt / | Because of its non-existence prior [to production]. |
katham idānīm asatkāryavādino yūyam ity āha kalpikayetyādi / | "How then are you [Buddhists] proponents of asatkāryavāda?" - thus [someone] says, [to which the reply begins with] "through conceptual [cognition]." |
kalpikayā dhiyā kartṛbhūtayā karaṇabhūtayā vā kevalamasatā kartrā sambadhyate sambandhamupanīyata ity arthaḥ / | [It means that] through conceptual cognition, which is either in the form of an agent or an instrument, [production] is brought into relation with the purely non-existent agent. |
nahyasannāma kiñcid asti yadutpattimāviśet kiṃ tu kalpaniko 'yaṃ vyavahāro yadasadutpadyata iti yāvat // | For indeed nothing called "non-existent" exists which could enter into production; rather, this conventional usage that "the non-existent is produced" is merely conceptual. |
yadidaṃ vastuno rūpam ekānantaramīkṣyate / | When this form of a thing is perceived immediately after [another thing] |
prāg āsīn neti tadbījaṃ prāgbhūtaṃ tv idamasti na // | The basis [for assuming its non-existence] is [the thought] "it did not exist before," but if it had existed before, this [basis] would not be present. |
yadetadekasya pratiniyataysa kasyacitpadārthasyānantaramadṛṣṭapūrvaṃ vasturūpamupalabhyate tanmadhyāvasthātaḥ prāṅnāsīt upalabdhikṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ / | When this previously unseen form of some particular specific thing is perceived immediately [after another], it did not exist before that middle state, because [if it had existed] it would not have gone unperceived when the conditions for perception were fulfilled. |
tasmād idaṃ prāgasatsamutpadyata ityasyāḥ kalpanāyā bījaṃ / | This is therefore the basis for the conception that "what is produced was non-existent before." |
kasmād ity āha prāgbhūta ityādi / | [One asks] "Why?" [To which he] speaks [beginning with] "if it existed before..." |
madhyavasthātaḥ prāk madhyāvasthātadbhūte vidyamāne sati vasturūpe nāstīdaṃ kalpanānibandhanam utpadyata iti / | If the form of the thing had existed prior to the middle state, in [the form of] that middle state, there would be no basis for the conception that "it is produced." |
tathā hi utpadyata ityanena madhyāvasthabhāvyena pratiniyataṃ svarūpamucyate / | For by this [term] "is produced" is meant the specific nature [of a thing] that appears in the middle state. |
yadica yasya prāgapi bhāvaḥ syāt tadā tasya madhyāvasthabhāvyeveti yadetanniyatam svarūpaṃ tasya hāniḥ syāt / | And if something's existence were there even before, then this specific nature of it - namely that it appears only in the middle state - would be contradicted. |
ākāśavat sarvadāvasthitasya pūrvāparamadhyāvasthābhāvāt / | Because like space, if [something] existed at all times, it could not have prior, subsequent, or middle states. |
tataś ca sarvadā sarvamutpadyata ityevaṃ vyapadiśyeta viśeṣābhāvāt // | And then, due to the absence of any distinction, one would have to say that "everything is produced at all times." |
kṣīrādiṣu ca dadhyādi śaktirūpeṇa yanmataṃ / | And [there is] the view that curd and other [effects exist] in milk and other [causes] in the form of a potency. |
kā śaktis tatra dadhyādi yadi dṛśyeta dugdhavat // | What is this 'potency'? If it [exists] like curd and other [effects], then it should be perceived like milk. |
kāraṇe kāryamastīti yaducyate bhavadbhis tatra ko 'rtho 'bhipretaḥ / kiṃ vyaktirūpeṇa / tan na / | When you [Sāṅkhyas] assert that "the effect subsists in the cause," what meaning do you intend by this? Do [you mean it exists] in manifest form? That cannot be. |
kṣīrādyavasthāyām api dadhyādīnāṃ paścādvadupalabdhiprasaṅgāt / | Because [if that were so], even while in the state of milk, curd and other [effects] would be perceived just as [they are] afterwards. |
atha śaktirūpeṇa / tathāpi yattachaktirūpaṃ dadhyādeḥ kāryarūpādupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptādanyat āhosvit tadeva / yadi tadeva tadā pūrvavadupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ // anyaccetkatham anyasya bhāve 'bhaktyānyaducyate / | Or [do you mean it exists] in the form of potency? Then is this potency-form different from the effect-form of curd etc. which is available for perception, or is it the same? If it is the same, then as before, it would follow that it would be perceived. If it is different, how can the existence of one thing be spoken of as [the existence of] another except metaphorically? |
nahi sattvasya sadbhāvaḥ sadbhāvo duḥkhamohayoḥ // | For indeed, the existence of sattva [cannot be called] the existence of pain and delusion. |
athānyaditi pakṣaḥ tadā kāraṇātmani kāryam astīti pakṣasyakto bhavet / | If [you take] the position that it is different, then [your] thesis that "the effect exists in the nature of the cause" would be abandoned. |
kāryavyatiriktasya śakyākhyasya padārthāntarasya bhāvābhyupagamāt / tathā hi yadevāvirbhūtaṃ viśiṣṭarasavīryavipākādiguṇopetaṃ rūpaṃ tadeva dadhyādikaṃ kāryamucyate / | Because [you would be] admitting the existence of another entity called potency distinct from the effect. For what becomes manifested as a form endowed with specific qualities resulting from the development of particular taste and potency - that alone is called an effect like curd etc. |
tac ca kṣīrāvasthāyam upalambhayogyasyānupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayaḥ / | And this [effect] is spoken of as non-existent in the state of milk because what would be capable of being perceived is not perceived. |
yac cānyad asti śaktirūpaṃ tat kāryam eva na bhavati / | And whatever exists as the form of potency, which is different [from the effect], cannot be the effect itself. |
na cānyasya bhāve 'nyadastyatiprasaṅgāt / | And the existence of one thing cannot [mean] the existence of another, as this would lead to an absurd consequence. |
nanu cāyur ghṛtaṃ naḍvalodakaṃ pādaroga ityanyasya sadbhāve 'nyaducyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam evetyāha abhaktyeti / | "But [one might object that] we see [expressions] such as 'ghṛta [is] āyus' and 'naḍvalodaka [is] pādaroga', where one thing is spoken of as another existing thing." |
abhaktyā anupacāreṇetyarthaḥ / | The meaning is "without figurative usage" [abhaktyā]. |
kāraṇe hi kāryopacārād āyurghṛtam ity ucyate / | For [in such cases] 'āyur-ghṛtam' is spoken through attributing the effect to the cause figuratively. |
na mukhyataḥ / | [It is] not [meant] literally. |
yadi tu bhavatāpyupacārāt kāraṇe kāryamastītyucyate tadā na kaścid virodhaḥ / | If you too say that "the effect exists in the cause" only figuratively, then there is no contradiction whatsoever. |
etad eva dṛṣṭāntenopapādayannāha nahītyādi / | [The author] explains this very point through an example, saying "na hi" etc. |
nahi yadeva satvarūpaṃ tadeva duḥkhamohayor bhavadbhir vyavasthāpyate teṣāṃ parasparaṃ bhinnalakṣaṇavyavasthānāt / | For even you [Sāṃkhyas] do not maintain that what has the form of sattva is identical with [the forms of] pain and delusion, since these are established as having mutually distinct characteristics. |
sattvādyanugataṃ vyaktaṃ na siddhaṃ naḥ kathañcana / | The manifest [world] as pervaded by sattva etc. is not established for us in any way. |
āntaratvātsukhādīnāṃ vyaktatvāt tatsvasaṃvidaḥ / | Because pleasure and the rest are internal, [and this is] manifest from their self-awareness. |
śabdādilakṣaṇaṃ vyaktam sukhādirūpaṃ naḥ asmākam asiddhaṃ / | The manifest characterized by sound etc. being of the same form as pleasure etc. is not established for us. |
kasmāt / sukhādīnām āntaratvāt saṃvidrūpatvāt / | Why? Because pleasure and the rest are internal [and] of the nature of consciousness. |
śabdādīnāṃ cācetanatvāt katham ete sukhādyanvitā bhaveyuḥ / | And since sound and the rest are insentient, how could they be connected with pleasure and the rest? |
prayogaḥ ye saṃvidrūparahitāś ca śabdādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | The argument [is as follows]: [There is] non-apprehension of the pervader regarding sound and other [things] which are devoid of the nature of consciousness. |
yathaparaḥ upagtaḥ āchetanaḥ purushaḥ smhidruparahitāsca shabdhadaya itivyapacanupalabdhiḥ | As [in the case of] the puruṣa accepted by others [which is] insentient, and sound and the rest which are devoid of consciousness - [there is] non-apprehension of the pervader. |
syad etat saṃvidrūpatvena sukhādimayatvasya yadā vyāptiḥ siddhā bhavet tadā tannivartamānaṃ śabdādiṣu sukhādimayatvaṃ nivartayedyāvatā saiva na siddhā puruṣasyaiva saṃvidrūpatveneṣṭatvādityata āha vyaktyatvāt tatsvasaṃvidaiti / | [One might object:] "This would be [valid] only when the pervasion of being made of pleasure etc. by having the nature of consciousness is established - then its absence would exclude the being made of pleasure etc. in sound and the rest; but this [pervasion] itself is not established since [your] puruṣa itself is accepted as having the nature of consciousness." To this [the author] says: "because of manifestness through their own consciousness." |
tat saṃvidrūpatvaṃ sudkhādīnāṃ siddhaṃ kasmāt / sukhādīnāṃ svasaṃvida svasaṃvedanasya vyaktatvāt / | That [fact of] pleasure etc. having the nature of consciousness is established - how? Because of the manifestness of their self-awareness through their own consciousness. |
atispaṣṭeyaṃ sukhaprītitāpādirūpeṇa satyasati vā śabdādiviṣayasannidhāne prakāśāntaranirapekṣā svayamprakāśātmalakṣaṇā svasaṃvittiḥ / | This self-awareness, which takes the form of pleasure, satisfaction, suffering and the rest, [occurring] when objects like sound are present or absent, is very clear, independent of any other illumination [and] characterized by self-luminosity. |
yadeva hi prakāśāntaranirapekṣaṃ sātādirūpataḥ svayaṃ siddhaṃ taccaitanyaṃ sukhaṃ saṃvedanaṃ jñānamityādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ kathyate / | For that which is independent of other illumination [and] self-established in the form of satisfaction etc. is expressed by synonyms such as 'consciousness', 'pleasure', 'awareness', 'cognition'. |
yadi ca sukhādīnām anyena saṃvedanenānubhavād anubhavakhyātiḥ syāt tadā teṣāṃ saṃvedanamasātādirūpaṃ syāt svayam atadātmakatvāt / | And if the awareness of experiences of pleasure etc. were due to some other awareness, then their awareness would not be of the nature of satisfaction etc., because it would not itself be of that nature. |
yathā yogino 'numātuś ca parakīyaṃ sukhādi samvedayataḥ / | As [in the case of] a yogin or an inferrer who cognizes pleasure etc. belonging to others. |
anyathā te 'pi yogyādayaḥ sākṣāt sukhādyanubhāvina ivāturādayaḥ syuḥ / | Otherwise, those yogins etc. too would be direct experiencers of pleasure etc., like those who are afflicted. |
yogyādivadvānyeṣām apyanugrahopaghātau na syātāmaviśeṣāt / | Or like yogins etc., others too would not experience benefit and harm, since [there would be] no difference. |
saṃvedanasya ca sātādirūpatve 'bhyupagamyamāne siddhaṃ sukhādeḥ saṃviddhrūpatvaṃ / | And when awareness is admitted to be of the nature of satisfaction etc., pleasure etc. being of the nature of consciousness is established. |
idam eva hi naḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca yatsātamasātaṃ ca saṃvedanaṃ / | For this indeed is our pleasure and pain: that which is awareness of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. |
tasmānnānaikāntikatā hetor nāpyasiddhatā / | Therefore the reason [in the text] is neither inconclusive nor inadmissible. |
bāhyārthavādināṃ sarveṣām eva śabdādiṣu saṃvidrūparahitatvasya siddhatvāt / | Since it is established by all proponents of external reality that sound and other [external objects] are devoid of the nature of consciousness. |
anyathā vijñānavādimatamevāṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt / | Otherwise, [they] would have to accept only the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins. |
tacceṣṭam eva / | And that [would be] exactly what is desired. |
nāpi viruddhatā hetoḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt // | Nor is the reason contradictory, since it exists in similar instances [where the probandum is present]. |
syād etat yathā bahiravasthitanīlādisannidhānād anīlādirūpam api saṃvedanaṃ nīlādirūpanirbhāsaṃ bhavati tathā bāhyasukhādyupadhānavaśād asātādirūpam api sātādirūpamiva lakṣyate tena saṃvedanasya sātādirūpatve 'pi na sukhādīnāṃ saṃvidrūpatvaṃ sidhyatyato naikāntikatā maulasya hetor ityāśaṅkyāha ekatretyādi / | [One might object:] "Just as consciousness, though itself devoid of blue and other forms, appears to have the form of blue due to the proximity of external blue objects, similarly [consciousness], though devoid of the nature of pleasure and other [feelings], appears as if having their nature due to the imposition of external pleasure and so forth. Therefore, even if consciousness has the nature of pleasure etc., the nature of consciousness is not established for pleasure and other [feelings]. Hence the primary reason is not conclusive." [To this he] responds with [the verse beginning with] "ekatra." |
ekatraiva ca śabdādau bhāvanājātibhedataḥ / | [This occurs] in one and the same sound etc., due to the difference of habit and inherent nature. |
bhāvanājātibhedata iti / | [The phrase] "due to the difference of habit and inherent nature" [means the following]: |
bhāvanāḥ abhyāsāḥ jātis tu nijā prakṛtiḥ tayor bhedo viśeṣaḥ / | "Bhāvanās" means practices; "jāti" means one's own nature; [and what is meant is] the distinction between these two. |
saṅgādaya iti / | [The phrase] "saṅga and others" [means the following]: |
saṅgo 'bhilāṣaḥ ādiśabdena prītyādayo dveṣodvegādayo dainyāvaraṇādayaś catraiguṇyakāryagaṇā gṛhyante / | By the word "ādi" [and the rest] are included attachment [and] desire, [feelings] such as love etc., hatred and agitation etc., and dejection and delusion etc. — [all these] groups of effects of the three guṇas. |
niyatā iti caikākārāḥ / | [These are] restricted, that is to say, of one form. |
tathā hi bhāvanāviśeṣān madyāṅganādiṣu bhāvitaśubhāśubhādinimittānāṃ kāmukādīnāṃ jātiviśeṣāc ca kuraṅgakarabhādīnāṃ keṣāñcideva pratiniyatāḥ prītyādayaḥ sambhavanti / | For instance, due to their particular dispositions, lovers and others experience specific feelings towards wine, women, and other [things], according to whether [these things] have been found to be causes of good or evil; and similarly, due to their specific natures, certain feelings arise in some [creatures] like deer, young camels and others. |
na sarveṣāṃ etac ca śabdādīnāṃ sukhādirūpatve sati na yuktaṃ // | And [these feelings do] not [arise] in all [beings]; and this would not be logical if sound and other [objects] were of the nature of pleasure and so forth. |
kasmād ity āha ekavastvanupātitva ityādi / | [Someone asks] "Why?" [The author] states [the answer] beginning with "being in keeping with one object." |
ekavastvanupātitve citrā saṃvitprasajyata / | If [feelings] were in keeping with one and the same object, consciousness would necessarily be variegated. |
adṛṣṭādivaśānnno cen na syād vastvanuyāyinī // | If [one objects] "not so, due to the influence of the unseen [merit] and other [factors]," [then consciousness] would not be in accordance with the object at all. |
sarveṣām eva hi teṣām abhinnavastuviṣayatvānnīlādiviṣayasaṃvedanavatpratyekaṃ citrā saṃvitprasajyeta / | For since all these [feelings] would have the same undivided object, each person's consciousness would necessarily be variegated, just like the cognition of blue and other [colors]. |
syād etadyadyapi tryātmakaṃ vastu tathāpy adṛṣṭāder dharmādilakṣaṇasya sahakāriṇo vaśena kasyacit kiñcid eva rūpaṃ pratibhāsate na sarvaṃ sarvasyeti / | One might object thus: "Although an object is threefold in nature, nevertheless, due to the influence of auxiliary causes like the unseen [merit] and so forth, characterized by dharma and other [factors], only some aspect appears to someone, [and] not everything to everyone." |
ādiśabdena bhāvanājātibhedajighṛkṣādīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ / | By the word "ādi" [and so forth] is meant the inclusion of habit, species-difference, desire to grasp, and other [factors]. |
sattvarajastamasāṃ rūpaṃ | The form [of the object] consists of sattva, rajas and tamas. |
yadyevaṃ na syād vastvanuyāyinī vastālambanā sā saṃvin na prāpnoti tadākāraśūnyatvād iti bhāvaḥ | If this were not so, then consciousness would not conform to the object [and] would not have the object as its basis, since it would be devoid of the object's form. |
tryākāraṃ vastuno rūpam ekākārāś ca tadvidaḥ | The form of the object is three-formed, while the cognitions of it are one-formed. |
tāḥ kathaṃ tatra yujyante bhāvinyastadvilakṣaṇāḥ | How can these [cognitions], being different in character from it, be truly possible with regard to that [object]? |
ekākārāś ca tadvida iti | The cognitions of it are one-formed. |
Subsets and Splits