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38. On 20 April 2009 the Tambov Regional Prosecutor supervising correctional institutions sent a letter to the applicant’s lawyer, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows: “It was established that on 10 March 2009 at 7.15 a.m., having arrived at the check‑point of [the medical colony] in the Tambov Region and disregarding the orders of an officer on duty... to wait until the beginning of the working day, you entered the restricted area adjacent to the [medical colony]. On arriving at the office building, you did not file a request for a meeting with [the applicant] with the colony administration. The facility administration considered that your actions constituted an administrative offence proscribed by Article 19.3 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences; you were accordingly asked to produce identification documents in order to draw up a report [of an administrative offence], but you categorically refused [to comply with the request] and left the
the Northern Caucasus
74. A decision of 17 November 2003 terminated the criminal proceedings in case no. 34/00/0008-03. It stated, in particular, that pursuant to Presidential Decree no. 1255c of 23 September 1999, the Russian authorities had launched a counter-terrorism operation in
Kavkaz
92. On 1 January 2003 an investigator questioned officer G. of the Karabulak GOVD. G. stated that at 9 a.m. on 29 October 2002 he had been informed that Mr Adam Arsamikov had been abducted from the garage where he lived by officers of the Chechnya FSB. The abductors had used white VAZ-2106 and VAZ-2121 (Niva) vehicles with registration plates covered with mud. Officer G. together with officers G-v and Ts. pursued the abductors. At the checkpoint near the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya they were told that no such vehicles had been that way. Then the officers went to checkpoint no. 20 at the entry point for the Rostov-Baku motorway. Traffic police there confirmed that two white vehicles VAZ-2106 and Niva with registration plates covered with mud had passed by fifteen to twenty minutes previously. They had not stopped them because they had papers on their windscreens authorising unhindered passage. It was usually FSB officers who had such badges. At the “
the Vilnius Region
17. In 2006 the applicant and her husband lodged a claim against the VCA before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They complained that the two hectares of land assigned to them in 1995 had still not been provided, that they had been unable to receive any information from the VCA about the ongoing land reform in
Staropromyslovskiy
48. The applicant’s neighbour in Grozny, “Galina P.”, testified that she had been with the applicant and her sister on 11 January 2000 when they had found their parents’ and uncle’s bodies in the house at Derazhavina Street. The witness submitted that the Chechen fighters (“boyeviki”) had left the district by mid-December, and that before that they had caused no harm to the residents, and had sometimes even helped them. From 25 December 1999 the Russian servicemen started to enter the
the Payidar hills
56. On 23 December 1992 the Palu public prosecutor Nihat Turan examined the documents relating to the preliminary examination and decided that he lacked jurisdiction to investigate the killing “on 9 November 1992 of an unidentified terrorist during the clash between members of the PKK and soldiers on
premises
21. The investigation in case no. 47041 was suspended in August 2005, March 2006, September 2007, November 2009 and on the latest occasion on 4 March 2010. Supervising prosecutors repeatedly set aside those decisions, ordering the investigation to be resumed and pointing to the investigators’ failure to take a number of important steps. For instance, on 26 January 2006, 21 August 2007 and then again, as late as on 23 October 2009, the supervising prosecutors pointed out the investigators’ failure to inspect the premises of the 2nd regiment and verify the allegation of the involvement of its officers in the crime with the participation of the third applicant, in spite of his specific assertions that he had been detained on those
Veljun
12. On 30 March 2006 the Karlovac State Attorney’s Office asked the Slunj police whether the Veljun area had been occupied on 7 August 1995; whether the perpetrator of the killing of G.O. had been identified; and whether G.O. had been a member of the paramilitary forces of Krajina or of the Croatian army. On 6 July 2006 the Karlovac police department replied that
Central Asia
37. On 13 February 2009 the Moscow City Court again found the decision of the General Prosecutor's Office of 11 March 2008 to be valid. The City Court heard the applicant and her lawyer, as well as Ms Ryabinina, who made a statement as an expert on the situation in
Urus-Martan
18. The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicant. According to their submission, “... in connection with the abduction of A.S. Sadulayev which had taken place on 9 December 2002 on the road between Alkhazurovo and Martan-Chu, the
the Oktyabrskiy District
79. On 17 July 2003 the town prosecutor’s office stayed the investigation in case no. 40007 on account of the failure to identify the perpetrators. The decision stated as follows: “... The preliminary investigation established that on 27 December 2002 at about 10.20 a.m. unidentified armed and camouflaged servicemen of the 2nd battalion of military unit no. 3186 had unlawfully entered the Temergeriyevs’ house, searched it and discovered a grenade in the refrigerator... Meanwhile Musa Temergeriyev, born in 1952, returned home. [He] was arrested and brought in an APC to the military unit located on the grounds of the former 15th military base in Gudermesskaya Street in
Urus-Martan
84. On 18 April 2003 the first applicant, acting in her capacity as the head of the NGO “Society of War Victims”, forwarded a list of missing persons who had disappeared following their detention by the “power structures” in the
Urus-Martan
35. On 3 July 2003 the district military commander’s office informed the applicant that they had conducted an inquiry into her allegations about the abduction of her son at the checkpoint and stated the following: “... as of 30 June 2003 the
Shali
84. On 25 January 2006 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigators resume the proceedings, establish which military unit had carried out the special operation on 1 August 2003 and question military servicemen stationed in the
premises
14. The Guardianship Authority then contacted a child upbringing counsellor (“nevelési tanácsadó”) who recommended the assistance of a foundation specialised in facilitating visits. It therefore ordered that the regular visits scheduled for the period between 16 February and 11 May 2002 be held at the foundation’s
İmralı
31. According to the Government, no restrictions were placed on the applicant as regards either the number of visits by his lawyers or their duration. Apart from the first visit, which took place under the supervision of a judge and members of the security forces, the meetings were held subject to the restrictions provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order to ensure their safety, the lawyers were taken to the island of
the Groznenskiy District
6. The applicants are: 1) Ms Nebist Khalitova, born in 1959; 2) Ms Zarema Almurzayeva, born in 1971; 3) Ms Zalina Chapayeva, born in 1982; and 4) Mr Maulat Achkhanov, born in 1929. The first applicant lives in the village of Raduzhnoe. The second, third and fourth applicants live in the village of Pobedinskoe. The two villages are located a short distance one from another in
Europe
16. In the Divisional Court judgment dated 4 April 2001, Lord Justice Kennedy noted that section 3 had a long history and cited the Secretary of State’s reasons, given in the proceedings, for maintaining the current policy: “By committing offences which by themselves or taken with any aggravating circumstances including the offender’s character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence, such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way the country is governed for that period. There is more than one element to punishment than forcible detention. Removal from society means removal from the privileges of society, amongst which is the right to vote for one’s representative.” Examining the state of practice in other jurisdictions, he observed that in
Urus-Martan
130. During questioning on 2 and 3 July 2003 four pilots, Pog., Ab., D. and Sh., who at the material time had been seconded to the Chechen Republic and served in military unit 11731, stated that they had performed a flight in a group of four planes on 19 October 1999 to the southern mountainous area of the Chechen Republic. According to Mr Pog., the planes had been laden with aerial bombs of calibre 250 or 500 kg. The pilots also stated that the results of the bombing had been recorded by means of objective control devices – video recorders and photographic cameras – and after the flight had been given to a commanding officer. The pilots insisted that they had been instructed to launch bombs in an area situated at a distance of no less than three kilometres from any inhabited settlement and that they had never carried out any strikes on
Europe
37. The terms of this recommendation are as follows: « The Committee of Ministers, in accordance with Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a closer union among its members, and that this aim may be pursued in particular by adopting joint action in the field of education; Recognising the urgent need to lay new foundations for future educational strategies for Roma / Gypsies in
premises
5. On 8 September 2000 a security officer of the applicant’s former employer, a private company, drew up a report in which he stated that in the course of the applicant’s work on 7 September 2000 she had stolen thirty-five labels, the total value of which was 0.42 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1]. These labels were found in the applicant’s possession when she was leaving the company’s
the Kemi River
11. By virtue of the Tornio Fishing Act, the Ministry issued Decision no. 496/1997 (“the 1997 Decision”), prohibiting all salmon and trout fishing throughout the year and all fishing with stationary gear during the period from 1 May until 5 July. The restrictions extended to the maritime area of
Hasköy Dock
7. On 22 April 2004 the applicants requested a rectification of the decision dated 21 January 2004. Subsequently, on 26 April 2004 the applicants' lawyer also lodged a request with the Military Supreme Administrative Court and requested clarification (tavzih) of the decision dated 21 January 2004. In his request the applicants' lawyer referred to the relevant statements of means provided by the domestic authorities. He further stated that while lodging the case he had submitted the relevant medical records concerning Mr Yusuf Kaba, a report on the asbestos levels at
Pankissi Gorge
7. In the period from March to December 2001 the applicant, as a member of a small group of “volunteers” from Azerbaijan, underwent military training organised by Chechen militants based in Georgia’s
Atlantic
13. On 13 June 2002, at 6 a.m., the French frigate spotted a merchant ship travelling at slow speed through the waters off Cape Verde, several thousand kilometres from France. It was not flying a flag, but was identified as the Winner. The merchant ship suddenly changed course and began to steer a course that was dangerous both for the frigate and for members of the armed forces who had boarded a speedboat. While the Winner refused to answer the attempts of the commander of the frigate to establish radio contact, its crew jettisoned a number of packages into the sea; one of the packages, containing about 100 kilos of cocaine, was recovered by the French seamen. After several warnings and warning shots fired under orders from France’s maritime prefect for the
Schengen Area
43. The Supreme Court further observed that the first applicant lacked a legal basis for residing in Norway and therefore ought to leave the country in any event. What the likely outcome could be of an application for residence permit in the current situation could not enter into the consideration of the case. The disputed decision entailed the consequence for him that he would be expelled from the country for a period of five years and he could not apply for a residence- or work permit during this period. Norway’s participation in the Schengen cooperation meant as a rule that an expulsion from Norway also implied a prohibition to enter the entire
Krásná Ves Districts
11. On the basis of the Land Ownership Act, the applicant entered into restitution agreements with two legal persons (the Hradec Králové State Forest Enterprise and the Líny – Krásná Ves Agricultural Cooperative) on 10 December 1993 and 4 May 1994 respectively. By two decisions of 12 October 1994 the Mladá Boleslav Land Office (pozemkový úřad, “the Land Office”) refused to approve the restitution agreements. Referring to section 32(3) of the Land Ownership Act, it found that some of the plots had been assigned to different owners pursuant to the 1948 Act, and that these owners, being natural persons, had proved their property rights by showing their deeds of assignment. The Land Office based its decisions on the following documents: the decision of the former Mladá Boleslav State Notary (státní notářství) of 26 May 1977 on the applicant’s father’s inheritance, the decision of the former Doksy District National Council of 7 June 1949 on the expropriation of the applicant’s father’s property, the record of the former Líny Local National Council (místní národní výbor) of 7 November 1949 on the proceedings on the applicant’s father’s appeal against the expropriation, the decision of the former Liberec Regional National Council (krajský národní výbor) of 29 November 1949 by which the decision of expropriation had been modified, and an extract (výpis) from the land register (pozemková kniha) relating to the Líny and
Urus-Martan
18. In the morning of 5 February 2003 the applicant and his relatives found numerous footprints on the snow in their yard and around their household in the street. The footprints led in the direction of the village bakery. According to one of the applicant’s daughters-in-law, the servicemen who had raided their house that night had been out of breath and she concluded that they had reached their house on foot from some distance away. Several days later she talked to three other residents of Goyty who had seen two military UAZ vehicles parked near the bakery on the night of the abduction. The first witness had seen the UAZ vehicles close to the bakery in Goyty; the second and third witnesses had seen the vehicles in the western part of the village at about 4 a.m. on 5 February 2003. The vehicles were leaving Goyty and were about to cross the checkpoint of the Russian federal forces in the eastern part of
Vedeno
69. On 3 March 2005 the investigators again questioned the second applicant. She stated that about eight months prior to being questioned, in the summer of 2004, a young man named Mr Ya. Ge., who had been around twenty years old, had arrived at her house and had told her that he had been detained with Magomed Kudayev for eight days. The detention place had reminded him of an abandoned bathhouse and had been located in
the Daugava River
10. By contracts signed in 1994, in respect of donations inter vivos, the applicants became the owners of five plots of land on the island of Kundziņsala. This island, situated close to the mouth of
North Sea
137. The High Court did not share Mr Vilnes’s view that the State had been the actual wrongdoer. The wrongdoers had been those who had conducted the diving activities. In addition, the licence holders had been jointly and severally liable for the damage (section 10-9 of the Petroleum Act). The assertion that diving - especially
the Moscow Region
6. On 10 March 2009 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow remanded the applicant in custody during the investigation. In particular, the court noted as follows: “When deciding whether a preventive measure should be imposed, the court takes into consideration whether [the applicant] has been charged with a serious offence which entails a custodial sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment. [The offence in question] was committed against public peace and public order. Further, the court takes into consideration the fact that, at the time of the arrest, [the applicant] did not reside in Moscow, did not reside at his registered address and, according to him, was staying at his friend’s place in
Evin
17. Subsequently, the applicant was summoned to appear on 2 November 2009 before the Revolutionary Court. He had contacted a friend who, in turn, had obtained the help of a smuggler to enable him to leave the country. The applicant submitted a summons from the Revolutionary Court dated 21 October 2009 stating that he should present himself at
Europe
18. Lastly, the court considered that, in respect of Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the principle of equality, the relevant legislation did not create unreasonable discrimination, given that homosexual unions could not be considered equivalent to marriage. Even Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not require full equality between homosexual unions and marriages between a man and a woman, as this was a matter of Parliamentary discretion to be regulated by national law, as evidenced by the different approaches existing in
Pont-Euxin
18. On 12 September 2005, the first day of the school year, the Romani parents, including the parents, accompanied their children to school. In front of the entrance, several non-Romani parents, most of them of Pontic origin, that is to say from the region of
the Tsentralniy District
29. On 18 August 2003 the first applicant complained to a number of prosecutors’ offices. The relevant parts of her complaint read as follows: “Between 20 December 2002 and 17 June 2003 I have addressed law-enforcement agencies on numerous occasions asking them to search for my son, Kaykharov Gelani Arturovich, who was abducted by unidentified men in masks and camouflage uniforms armed with machine guns ... On 17 June 2003 I again addressed the issue concerning the abduction of my son to the prosecutor of the Oktyabrskiy District, [R.]. After examination of the case file, the prosecutor [R.] told me that my son was alive and was detained in the SIZO of
Kazeli
12. Attached to her observations of 4 September 2002, the applicant produced a certificate of affirmation of ownership of Turkish-occupied immovable properties, issued on 12 August 2002 by the Departments of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, and an affidavit, signed by herself, in which she declared that she owned 8 pieces of land in Lapithos “all on the mountain slope, very suitable for building purposes”. According to the above mentioned certificate of affirmation of ownership, the following properties were owned by Mrs Iordanou Iordani Anthousa, daughter of Mr Polykerpos Panagiotou: Lapithos village – Agia Paraskevi and Agia Anastasia: (a) Land certificate no. 1613 of 22 April 1971, plot no. 199 of sheet/plan XI/22 (Mantres tou
Europe
50. In paragraphs 127‑133 of its 1999 report on Bulgaria, the CPT stated, inter alia: “[H]ealth care in Bulgarian prisons is provided by the Ministry of Justice ... Prison health-care staff are recruited by and administratively subordinated to the Main Prison Directorate, whose Medical Division is responsible for supervising their work. The prison health-care services apply general health guidelines and regulations issued by the Ministry of Health; further, arrangements can be made for hospitalising prisoners in need of urgent treatment in Ministry of Health establishments. However, it emerged that in the Ministry of Health's view, given the division of responsibilities, the issue of health care for prisoners lay outside its remit... A similar situation is found in many other countries in
Iecava
44. In a third set of proceedings, on 22 September 2011, the custodial court examined the suitability of the applicant’s wife and son as his guardians, following a complaint by the applicant. Following a hearing in the applicant’s presence, it was decided that they were not appropriate guardians and the court terminated their guardianship of the applicant. The reasons for this were, among other things, that they had never taken him outside the Īle Centre to stay at their home, to visit his parents’ grave or to church, which had been long-standing requests from him. In addition, they had not ensured that the applicant visited the
West
20. On 16 March 2010 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicant's case as it found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows: ... In its decision of 13 June 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board found ... The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that your client's fear of being forcibly recruited by the LTTE or of being subjected to outrages by the LTTE as a result of having fled from the LTTE does not warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board emphasises that your client's statements about his alleged connection with the LTTE were extended during the asylum proceedings and were diverging in essential areas. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board also refers to the fact that the Sri Lankan military forces defeated the LTTE in May 2009. Moreover, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the background information available to the Board from which it appears that it is hardly likely that former low-ranking members of the LTTE or persons who have previously supported the LTTE will risk reprisals from the LTTE, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009. Regardless of whether your client's information about his previous activities for the LTTE is considered a fact, the Refugee Appeals Board stills find that your client would not risk persecution or being subjected to outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act by the Sri Lankan authorities if returned to Sri Lanka, including in connection with his arrival at Colombo airport. The Refugee Appeals Board emphasizes that from his detention in 1991, where his photo was taken, and until his departure in 1997 your client has not been detained or had his picture or fingerprint taken or in any other way been the object of interest from the Sri Lankan authorities. The authorities have thus not carried out any acts aimed at your client that indicated that he was suspected of being a member of the LTTE. In this connection, the Board also refers to the fact that your client departed lawfully from Sri Lanka with his own Sri Lankan national passport for the purpose of family reunification with his spouse. Similarly, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the background material available to the Board, according to which persons who have previously supported the LTTE on a lower level are generally not of interest to the authorities, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009, and see United Kingdom: Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23-29 August 2009. Against that background the Refugee Appeals Board also finds that the fact that one or more of your client's siblings have been members of or active for the LTTE cannot warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act, according to the background information now available. The fact that as an ethnic Tamil from northern Sri Lanka your client may risk being questioned and investigated by the authorities on entry into the country cannot lead to a revised assessment of the case under asylum law. In this assessment, consideration has been given to the background information available to the Board, according to which the individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka, those without identification or residence in Colombo, and those recently returned from the
Straits
57. In a judgment of 15 December 2000, the Beyoğlu Commercial Court confirmed its earlier judgment and held that the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed on the grounds that the seizure and detention of the vessel had been in compliance with domestic law and the Montreux Convention governing the
premises
12. Melanie Joy was concerned for the safety of Michael Fitzgerald and, although she did not know whether or not he was in the flat, she shouted his name through the letterbox on the front door of the
the Middle East
57. The charges brought against the applicant by the public prosecutor may be summarised as follows. (i) In a speech he had given in Batman on 27 October 2012 in the offices of the Peace and Democracy Party (“the BDP”, a left-wing pro-Kurdish political party), the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK terrorist organisation by urging people to close their shops and not to send their children to school as a protest aimed at securing the release of the PKK leader. (ii) On 13 November 2012 two demonstrations had been held in Nusaybin and Kızıltepe in protest against the conditions of the PKK leader’s detention, and the applicant had made the following comments in Kızıltepe: “They said you couldn’t put up the poster of Öcalan. Those who said it ... Let me speak clearly. We are going to put up a sculpture of President Apo. The Kurdish people have now risen up. With their leader, their party, their elected representatives, their children, their young and old, they are one of the greatest peoples of
the Ramon District of the Voronezh Region
38. On 6 June 2005 the District Court, acting as a first-instance court, upheld the decision of 15 February 2005. The court decided that the investigation had been lawful and sufficiently complete to exclude the criminal responsibility of the police officers in question. The court noted, in particular: “... During the investigation carried out on the [applicant’s] request ... it was established that on 23 August 2004 [the applicant] was arrested and detained in the [local] police station, where he was placed in sobering-up cell, and then an administrative case against him was sent for examination on the merits to the justice of the peace of circuit no. 2 of
Urus-Martan District
71. The investigation of the kidnappings of Apti and Musa Elmurzayev did not establish the identities of the perpetrators. The implication of special units of State agencies and federal forces in those crimes was not proven. Neither was it proven that the perpetrators had been driving APCs and UAZ vehicles. According to the information obtained by the district prosecutor's office from the Department of the FSB of the
the Leninskiy District
22. On 14 June 2006 the head of the Department for supervision of the investigation of crimes by the prosecutor’s office forwarded the first applicant’s complaint about the disappearance of Khamzat Tushayev to the acting prosecutor of
Urus-Martan
120. On 11 March 2001 the applicant’s husband informed the investigator that on 25 December 2000 Akhmed had left home at about 11 a.m. and had not been since since. He further stated that on 27 December 2000 the
premises
14. The applicant's parents appealed against that judgment. On 31 July 2003 the Nantes Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal, on the same grounds as the lower court, finding that the applicant, by behaving as she had done, had overstepped the limits of the right to express and manifest her religious beliefs on the school
Kavkaz
106. In her statement of 15 December 1999 the first applicant asked the Nazran Town Court to certify the fact of her two children's deaths. She submitted that on 29 October 1999 a refugee convoy was attacked by fighter planes on the “
premises
9. The applicant subsequently requested information about his missing son and his lorry from General Na. The commander refused to admit that the 205th brigade had detained Elbek Tashukhadzhiyev and that his lorry had been parked at their
premises
93. On 30 June 2008 the investigators forwarded a number of requests to various law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya, asking them to provide information concerning any possible detention of Magomed Kudayev on their
the Northern Caucasus
14. On 3 August 2000 the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper ran an article on the Unification Church’s activities in southern Russia which – according to the applicant – described in general terms the grounds subsequently endorsed by the Federal Security Service in favour of his expulsion. It was entitled “Caramels from Moon will drive to debility” («‘Гуцулочки’ от Муна до маразма доведут»): “The prosecutor’s office of the Stavropol Region has banned the activity of social organisations under the protection of which the Korean Moon ... was buying souls for $500 a piece. Once there were two public organisations registered by the Stavropol Department of Justice: the Youth Federation for World Peace (YFWP) and the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU). As it turned out, these so-called public movements preach one of the most dangerous religions of the past century... Outwardly inoffensive ‘pedlars’ who sell or give away the ‘New Families’ newspaper and cheap caramels lure young men and women into Moon’s family ... Young missionaries who were freely permitted to lecture to senior students at Stavropol schools introduced themselves as volunteers from the International Education Fund (IEF), [which is] one of Moon’s many ‘parishes’ ... The self-proclaimed lecturers had no documents authorising them to talk to students. To ‘sweeten’ the lectures, they distributed caramels. Later, a panel of experts from the Stavropol clinic for borderline states gave a negative appraisal of Gutsulka caramels that Moonies distributed to children and adults alike. As it turned out, an outwardly inoffensive caramel destroys the human being’s energy-information profile. Simply speaking, such caramels with little-known inclusions – in some of them small holes are visible – facilitate the conversion of neophytes into zombies. The contents of Moonies’ lectures leave a strong aftertaste of debility. It is sufficient to read the briefing materials [prepared by] the IEF – an outline of the lecture on ‘Preparation of a Secure Marriage’. Citation: ‘The genitals belong to a spouse and they only serve their purpose in a marital relationship ... Until the marriage you are the guardian of your genitals for your future spouse ...’ After some time ... [a certain young man] was introduced to the head Moonie in
A. O.’s
6. According to the applicants, the uncontrolled draining of sand from Batman Stream of Dicle River changed the stream’s ecological balance. Eventually, holes and vortexes which occurred as a result of uncontrolled sand drain allegedly contributed to
Autonomous region of Krajina
6. The applicant, a person of Serbian ethnic origin, lived in the town of Sisak. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about one third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the so-called “Serbian
the Southern Federal Circuit
53. On 27 January 2010 the head of the Chechen investigation department wrote to the Chechen Minister of the Interior stating, amongst other things: “... [within the framework of the investigation of criminal case no. 66094], on 24 December 2009 the Chechen prosecutor organised a meeting on officers from the Leninskiy ROVD in Grozny and servicemen from operational-search unit no. 2 of the Ministry of the Interior in
Europe
61. In an article published in the daily newspaper “Radikal” on 5 December 1996, the journalist İsmet Berkan wrote: “It all dates back to early 1992. At that time the Turkish Chief of Staff's office made radical changes in its strategy in the fight against the outlawed PKK. The military units, which used to take action only after PKK attacks had taken place by engaging in hot pursuit, started to be organised as a guerrilla force. Now they were taking pre‑emptive action. This change soon started to bear fruit. The PKK no longer had the initiative. Now the PKK was on the run with the soldiers at its heels. The PKK gradually withdrew from the centres of population where it had been staging attacks, taking refuge in the mountains. But Turkey's “active fight” against terrorism was continuing. This time, the logistic support for the PKK in the mountains began to diminish through village evacuations. The PKK had been greatly weakened, and seemed to be on the verge of being “finished off”. But the change in the strategy was not limited to a “low-intensity conflict” in the region. It was decided that a “more active” drive was required to dry up other sources of terrorism too. In this way, with a little effort, this job would be “finished off next spring”. This would take the form of a two-pronged effort. Terrorists would be caught – or killed if necessary – before they actually staged attacks. And the persons who provided the terrorists with material or moral support would be equated with the terrorists themselves. This change in strategy was put on the agenda of the National Security Board at the end of 1992. A National Security Board document, which the author of this column was allowed to see, contains the chart of the organisation that was to be created for this purpose, as well as the names of the persons who would take part in it. These names included Abdullah Çatlı. The others taking part in the organisation included policemen belonging to the "special teams", soldiers and some of Çatlı's friends. Initially, the proposed tactics did not meet with the approval of the National Security Board. Turgut Özal, at that time the President of Turkey, and Eşref Bitlis, at that time the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, both opposed the State taking action in co-operation with fugitives <from justice>. I guess this is pure coincidence, but first General Bitlis and then Özal died, the former in an accident and the latter due to a heart attack. Süleyman Demirel became President and Tansu Çiller the Prime Minister. Initially, Çiller was quite mild on the south-east issue. She was talking about the Basque model and, with good intentions, having discussions with the opposition leaders on the issue. But after a short time she underwent a change. She became more hawkish than all of the other hawks, declaring, “This <the PKK> will either be finished or it will be finished”. It was obvious that she was convinced that it would end soon. As there was no one around to raise objections any longer, the issue was again submitted to the National Security Board. And this new technique of struggle was approved in the autumn of 1993. The organisation, call it “Gladio”[2] or "special organisation," was founded by a decision taken by the National Security Board. According to figures released at that time, Turkey was spending more than $8 billion annually on the fight against the PKK. No doubt the PKK was also spending a lot in its fight against Turkey. Calculations made in the higher State echelons indicated that the PKK's war budget was no less than $3 billion. In the autumn of 1993, the year in which Çiller became Prime Minister, the PKK had two main sources of income: 1. money obtained through narcotics and extortion. 2. donations collected in
Kurgan Region
50. On 12 November 2004 the investigator of the Kurgan Region Police Department ruled not to open criminal proceedings against persons unknown. The decision was taken in response to a letter from the applicant’s representative claiming that the applicant’s injuries had been caused in the context of incitement to ethnic hatred. The decision referred to pending criminal investigation no. 96348 and the absence of information on the alleged perpetrators of that crime. It also referred to the fact that no charges had been brought under Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement to ethnic or religious hatred) in the entire
St Barnabas
172. The witness denied the applicant's allegation that he had left the island two days before the killing of Mr Adalı, namely on 4 July 1996. He stressed that he had left the island in the second week of August 1996 subsequent to the end of his term of office. When asked about the allegations made by Mr Adalı, in his column in 23 March 1996 edition of Yenidüzen, in relation to the
Shali
26. On 30 September 2005 the Shali ROVD informed the applicants that they were taking operational-search measures to establish the whereabouts of Abdul Kasumov. The text of the letter included the following: “... [the investigators] have been verifying the theory of the involvement in the abduction of the special forces and power structures stationed in the
North-Western
82. In April 2002 the head and deputy head of the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD testified about the events of January and February 2000. Both stated that they had arrived in the district around 22 January 2000 with the troops, that they were aware of the applicant's case and that it was one of many instances of servicemen killing civilians in the district. The head of the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD stated that he was aware of about 40 similar cases in the district, all committed in the same style – people shot with automatic rifles in courtyards and garages. Both servicemen also spoke of widespread looting committed by servicemen who had been conducting house-to-house searches. The witnesses testified that, according to their information, the crimes against civilians had been committed by servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior, most probably by a consolidated team of special police forces (SOBR) of the
the Moscow Region
349. On 16 February 2006 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the complaint. The District Court established that there were no appropriate penitentiaries in Moscow; furthermore, it was impossible to accommodate all the convicts from Moscow in
San José
5. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Valencia. He has lived in San José, a residential district of Valencia since 1962. Since 1974 Valencia City Council (“the City Council”) has allowed licensed premises, such as bars, pubs and discotheques, to open in the vicinity of his home. In view of the problems caused by the noise, the City Council resolved on 22 December 1983 not to permit any more licensed premises to open in the area. However, the resolution was never implemented and new licences were granted. In 1993, the Polytechnic University of Valencia carried out a study of the levels of night-time noise during the weekend on behalf of the City Council. It was reported that in the
Urus-Martan
91. On 2 July 2007 the investigators again questioned the seventh applicant, who stated that at about 4 p.m. on 6 July 2002 she had seen a UAZ vehicle and a VAZ-2107 car leaving the premises of the district military commander's office. Some time later that day she had been told that unidentified persons had arrived at her house. When the seventh applicant had returned home, her father, the eighth applicant, informed her that unidentified men in similar vehicles had searched their house looking for weapons. The applicant had concluded that the unidentified men had arrived in the vehicles she had seen at the military commander's office. According to the applicant, next to the building of the local administration she had seen the APCs in which the abductors had taken away her brother. The applicant further stated that on 8 July 2002 she had been in
North Caucasus
73. In July 2003 the materials concerning the applicants’ detention at the Khankala military base were separated from case no. 22600008 and transmitted to the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (UGA) in the
Lukiškės
40. From 8 December 2009 to 5 October 2011 and from 4 to 20 July 2012 Mr Traknys was held in the Lukiškės Remand Prison. It can be deduced from the Lithuanian court decisions that during the first period of his detention in
premises
45. On 27 February 2003 the investigators forwarded a number of information requests to various detention centres in the Northern Caucasus. According to their responses, Balavdi Ustarkhanov was not detained on their
Bryansk Region
8. The article read as follows, in so far as relevant: “Maksim Kosenkov and Ruslan Pogulyayev will be on trial in Bryansk. The lads wanted to replicate the deed of the Bryansk thieves from the local administration, but they lacked the power, although they had skills in abundance. They concocted fake decrees from the Bezhitskiy District Administration on the parcelling of land for the construction of individual houses. They ‘certified’ the papers with makeshift stamps and took them to the Bryansk Region Department of the State Register (Росреестр). Here they were issued with [extracts from the State registry of real estate] in respect of nine plots of land. Try to register your property at that department. They will wear you down with requests for piles of papers. However, in this case the credulous clerks easily signed the documents after accepting the fakes. Isn’t that strange? As established by the prosecutor’s office, the swindlers acquired property rights in this way in respect of plots of lands which belonged to the category of indivisible State property. Their market value exceeded 6,400,000 roubles. The lads face up to ten years’ imprisonment for this. Pity the birds. They could be doing good deeds, raising their kids. However, they got carried away by the example of the big Bryansk thieves and failed to take into account that the latter were protected from all sides – by the powers that be, the party, relations, and so on. At least we know now what sentence
Pirin Macedonia
9. The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (“the applicant association” or “Ilinden”) is an association based in south-western Bulgaria (in an area known as the Pirin region or the geographic region of
Inkaya
109. Later, the applicant petitioned Kulp District Gendarme Command, Lice District Gendarme Command and Kulp Chief Public Prosecutor. Approximately one month after the incident, the applicant was in Diyarbakır and he met Esref from the
Europe
96. On 26 June 2007 PACE adopted the following resolution on the “Promotion by Council of Europe member States of an international moratorium on the death penalty”: “1. The Parliamentary Assembly confirms its strong opposition to the death penalty in all circumstances. The death penalty is the ultimate form of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment: it violates the right to life. The Assembly takes pride in its decisive contribution to making the member States of the Council of Europe a de facto death penalty-free zone, and strongly regrets the fact that one European country – Belarus – still carries out executions. 2. The Assembly has also on several occasions taken a strong stand against executions in other parts of the world, and in particular in the Council of Europe observer States which retain the death penalty, namely Japan and the United States of America. 3. It notes with satisfaction that the death penalty is on the decline worldwide, as shown by a 25% decrease in executions and death sentences between 2005 and 2006. 4. It also draws attention to the fact that more than 90% of known executions in 2006 took place in only six countries: China, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, and the United States of America – a Council of Europe observer State. Based on available public records, which may cause the number of executions to be underestimated in countries lacking free media or an accountable government, China alone accounts for more than two thirds of all executions worldwide. Iran’s execution rate nearly doubled from 2005 to 2006. Iraq also witnessed a dramatic increase in executions in 2006, bringing the number up to 65. Saudi Arabia, among the worst offenders in 2005, saw a decrease in 2006 to 39 executions, but witnessed an upsurge in early 2007 (48 executions through to the end of April). 5. The small number of countries that still resort to executions on a significant scale is becoming increasingly isolated in the international community. Between 1977 and 2006, the number of abolitionist countries rose from 16 to 89. This number increases to 129 when including those countries which have not carried out any executions for the past ten years or more and which can therefore be considered as abolitionist in practice. The time is now ripe to give new impetus to the campaign in favour of a death penalty-free world. 6. The Assembly therefore strongly welcomes Italian efforts in the United Nations General Assembly in advocating for a moratorium on the death penalty, as well as the support of the European Union for this initiative, and expects it to be proceeded with in such a manner as to guarantee the best possible success within the United Nations. 7. A moratorium on executions is but one step in the right direction, the ultimate goal remaining the complete abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. 8. In the meantime, a moratorium is an important step as it saves lives immediately and has the potential of demonstrating to the public in retentionist countries that an end to State-sponsored killings does not lead to any increase in violent crime. On the contrary, a moratorium on executions can bring about a change of atmosphere in society fostering greater respect for the sanctity of human life, and thus contribute to reversing the trend towards ever-increasing hate and violence. 9. Finally, a universal moratorium on the death penalty represents a concrete and highly symbolic political act, which could help change an international climate which is all too often characterised by violent actions which take their victims – by no means exclusively in a context of conflict – from among civilian populations. A universal moratorium on the death penalty would also make a significant contribution to the establishment of a shared and operational body of principles and rules leading towards a more effective rule of law at international level. 10. The Assembly calls on all member and observer States of the Council of Europe to actively support the initiative for the abolition of the death penalty in the UN General Assembly and to make the best use of their influence in order to convince countries that are still on the sidelines to join in. In this context, it warmly welcomes the resolution in the same spirit, adopted by the European Parliament on 26 April 2007, on the initiative for a universal moratorium on the death penalty. 11. At the Luxembourg meeting of 18 June 2007, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the European Union unanimously made a formal commitment to tabling – at the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations – a resolution calling for a moratorium on executions all over the world. 12. The Assembly recalls that, whilst 60 States have so far ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989 to promote the universal abolition of the death penalty, 10 Council of Europe member and observer States have not yet done so, namely Albania, Armenia, France, Japan (observer), Latvia, Mexico (observer), Poland (signed but not ratified), the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America (observer). For countries which have de facto and de jure abolished the death penalty (Albania, Armenia, France, Latvia, Mexico (observer), Poland and Ukraine), or which maintain a moratorium (Russian Federation), the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR would be a valuable gesture of political support for abolition, and would contribute to further isolating the remaining retentionist countries. 13. The Council of Europe’s own instruments against the death penalty are also still lacking ratifications. In particular, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty (ETS No. 114) has still not been ratified by the Russian Federation, despite the commitment to do so undertaken upon its accession to the Council of Europe in 1996. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances (ETS No. 187), including in time of war or imminent threat of war, has still not been signed by Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, and has still not been ratified by Armenia, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Spain. For the sake of the strong and unified signal to be sent by the Council of Europe as a whole, the Assembly calls on the countries concerned to sign and ratify these instruments without further delay. 14. The Assembly notes in this context that Italy’s Chamber of Deputies approved on 2 May 2007, in a second reading, the constitutional bill containing amendments to Article 27 of the Constitution concerning the abolition of the death penalty; the bill is presently before the senate for its second reading and final adoption under the current procedure for constitutional revision. The bill aims to delete from Article 27 § 4 the following words: ‘unless in the cases provided for by military laws in case of war’, thus eliminating any reference to the death penalty in the Italian Constitution and making it possible to ratify Protocol No. 13 to the Convention. 15. Also, the Assembly reiterates its view, noted in Recommendation 1760 (2006) on the position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and observer States which have not abolished the death penalty, that the death penalty should be abolished in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Transnistrian Moldavan Republic, and that the sentences of all prisoners currently on death row in these territories should be immediately commuted to terms of imprisonment in order to put an end to the cruel and inhuman treatment of those who have been kept on death row for years in a state of uncertainty as to their ultimate fate. 16. The Assembly fully supports the Conference to establish a European Day against the Death Penalty, to be held in Lisbon on 9 October 2007, and expects all member States of the Council of Europe also to show their unstinting support. Given its pioneering work on the abolition of the death penalty in
premises
10. On 14 November 1995 the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the head of the Energy Department of the Tartu City Government. The proceedings concerned the alleged abuse of his position in contracting a loan with the Ministry of Finance for reconstructing the city's heat supply in an amount higher than approved and guaranteed by the City Council. In the context of these criminal proceedings the Tartu Public Prosecutor (Tartu prokurör) approved a search of the applicant's company's
Europe
29. Some ten hearings were held between 6 October and 10 November 2006 and on 19 January 2007 the Brussels Court of Appeal confirmed the applicant’s guilt and his original sentence of seven years’ imprisonment and a EUR 2,500 fine. (i) Criminal procedure issues ... 34. The defendants further protested against the addition to the case file of interview reports from France and Morocco. They argued that the statements had been obtained using treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, adding that, in respect of the interviews conducted in Morocco, they were unlawful under Moroccan law. Invoking their right to a fair trial, they requested the Court of Appeal to remove them from the criminal case file. ... 36. As to the interviews conducted in Morocco, the Court of Appeal first noted that the defendants had not adduced any concrete evidence giving rise to reasonable doubt as to a possible breach of Moroccan law by the police or judicial authorities of that country in the proceedings from which the interview reports in question had emanated. The court found, in particular, that the interview reports recorded the statements in a detailed manner, mentioning the identity of the police officer by whom they were drawn up, the precise duration of the judicial custody periods and the fact that they had been authorised by the relevant public prosecutor. It further found as follows: “... Moreover, the fact of citing in general terms various reports of human rights organisations – admittedly respectable ones – does not adduce any concrete evidence that would be capable of giving rise in the present case to the above-mentioned reasonable doubt as to the violence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment that was allegedly inflicted on the individuals interviewed in Morocco ... Lastly, it cannot be surmised from those interviews or from the Moroccan court decisions added to the file that ... the above-mentioned persons were questioned or sentenced after an expedited trial for participating in the Casablanca bombings, on the basis of a Moroccan Law of 28 May 2003 on the combating of terrorism that had been applied retroactively in breach both of Article 4 of the Moroccan Criminal Code and of the general principle that criminal legislation cannot have retrospective effect. An examination of the Moroccan court decisions – and more specifically the judgment of the Rabat Assize Court – reveals, on the contrary, that the eight Moroccan defendants had initially been charged with setting up a criminal association for the preparation and commission of acts of terrorism, forgery of passports, and the collection of funds in aid of terrorist actions, on the basis of legislation that was unconnected with the above-mentioned Law of 28 May 2003. It can be seen from the foregoing findings that the interview reports and Moroccan court decisions that were added to the file, with the possibility of being freely challenged by the parties, should not be excluded. In addition, the contradictions allegedly contained in those statements, according to defence counsel’s argument, are not capable of justifying the claim that the individuals who were interviewed and/or tried in Morocco were subjected to any inhuman and degrading treatment or torture. Lastly, the Belgian trial courts are by no means bound by those statements and remain free to decide on their relevance and accuracy.” ... (ii) Examination on the merits 39. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal began by showing that the GICM was a terrorist group within the meaning of Article 139 § 1 of the Criminal Code, explaining that it was an organised association of more than two people, established on a lasting basis, which engaged in concerted action for the purpose of committing terrorist offences covered by Article 137 of the Criminal Code. It observed in particular that the group had set up a coordination committee in Morocco and a number of cells in
Северо‑Кавказского региона
54. On 27 May 2005 the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment in the North Caucasus Region (Военная прокуратура Объединенной группировки войск (сил) по проведению контртеррористических операций на территории
Kadıköy
5. The applicants were born in 1938, 1938 and 1964 respectively and live in Istanbul. The first two applicants are the parents and the third applicant is the wife of Mr Taşkın Usta, who was shot dead by police officers at a flat in the
Europe
6. On 2 August 2005 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of two counts of drug trafficking. The arrest warrant specified that the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences resulted from statements made by one of his co‑suspects, the separately prosecuted A.K. The District Court further found that there was a risk that the applicant, who did not have a permanent residence in Germany and in the past had been travelling between Brazil and
the Terskiy mountain range
12. According to the applicant, the village was shelled by artillery positioned on the Terskiy mountain range, where Russian troops were stationed. In his submission, a total of five to six shells had been fired during the attack. He submitted a sketch map of the scene of the incident indicating the shell craters. According to him, the position of the craters clearly indicated that the shells could only have been fired from
the Yaroslavl Region
149. In December 2008 the district investigation unit asked the head of the investigation committee to order his subordinates to establish the whereabouts of Mr P.Ch. and Mr I.Kh., two former servicemen of military unit no. 3186, who had subsequently been dispatched to
Wólka Kosowska
9. On 14 May 2008 the mayor gave a decision in which she banned the demonstration on the grounds that it might entail a danger to life or limb, or a major danger to property (section 8(2) of the Assemblies Act). The reasons for the mayor’s decision were as follows: “Nadrzeczna Street is the main road in Wólka Kosowska and provides access to Krakowska street for residents and many businesses located on [that street], their deliveries and employees. It should be underlined that there is increased traffic on that street, particularly during the morning (and in the evenings), which impacts on traffic on Krakowska street. Nadrzeczna Street is used by public transport minibuses and by the school bus. Therefore organising a demonstration on that street between 7 and 10 a.m. would block the entire length of the street and also limit or even make impossible any journey by car to Krakowska street and in the farther direction of Grojec. In the event of a traffic accident, the intervention of the police, the fire service or the ambulance service would be difficult, if not impossible. Similarly, access to a doctor by the residents of
the Fergana Valley
103. In its report of 29 March 2004, “Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan”, Human Rights Watch remarked: “For the past decade, with increasing intensity, the government of Uzbekistan has persecuted independent Muslims. This campaign of religious persecution has resulted in the arrest, torture, public degradation, and incarceration in grossly inhumane conditions of an estimated 7,000 people. The campaign targets nonviolent believers who preach or study Islam outside the official institutions and guidelines. They include independent imams and their followers, so-called Wahhabis - a term used incorrectly by the government to defame people as “fundamentalists.” The most numerous targets were adherents of the nonviolent group Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), whose teachings in favor of an Islamic state the government finds seditious ... International human rights law guarantees individuals the right to have and to express religion or beliefs. The Uzbek government’s policy and practices directly contravene these standards, as they punish certain religious believers for the content of their belief, for expressing their beliefs, exchanging information with others, or engaging in nonviolent association. In their treatment of independent Muslims, the Uzbek authorities’ systematic torture, ill-treatment, public degradation, and denial of due process also violate the country’s obligations under international law. This report documents these violations. It explains how the state criminalized legitimate religious practice and belief and how it casts individuals’ exercise of their rights to freedom of conscience, expression, and association as attempts to overthrow the government. It details the ordeal independent Muslims have endured from their arrest through to their incarceration, in some cases serving up to twenty years. Most of the people whose stories are documented in this report remain incarcerated. They were tortured and suffered other forms of mistreatment by police trying to obtain confessions. They endured incommunicado detention, denial of defense counsel, denial of a fair trial, and convictions based on fabricated evidence. They continue to suffer torture and ill-treatment as they serve their sentences in Uzbek prisons. We also document the arrest, harassment, and intimidation of their families, including Soviet-style public denunciations that local officials stage against perceived Islamic “fundamentalists.” ... Finally, the report describes the obstacles independent Muslims face in seeking redress through state agencies, including the courts, the ombudsperson’s office, and the procuracy. It also recounts the harassment they sometimes face in retribution for appealing to international organizations ... ... Since 2000, arrests and convictions of independent Muslims - members of Hizb ut-Tahrir mostly, but also people accused of “Wahhabism” - have continued apace and have outstripped the number of people returned to liberty following implementation of presidential amnesty decrees in 2001 and 2002. As of September 25, 2003, Human Rights Watch had analyzed and entered the cases of 1,229 independent Muslims into its database of religious prisoners in Uzbekistan. The cases of about 150 additional individuals convicted on charges related to religious activity, belief, or affiliation remained to be examined and entered into the database. Researchers from the Russian rights group Memorial have documented the cases of 1,967 independent Muslims. While the campaign was carried out by law enforcement agents nationwide, it appeared that the arrests of independent Muslims occurred on a most massive scale in the capital city Tashkent and certain cities in
Western Europe
13. On 3 March 2012 the Nyírbátor District Court again prolonged the applicants’ detention, holding that there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would hinder or delay the implementation of the expulsion order. Having heard the applicants, the court held as follows: “The expulsion order cannot be considered unenforceable on the ground that the asylum procedure has not been concluded. Under section 51(2) of the Immigration Act, a first asylum application has suspensive effect on the enforcement of the expulsion order, although this does not mean that the expulsion order is not enforceable. Unenforceability refers to a permanent state and not to a temporary period such as the term of the asylum procedure. ... Under section 54(6) of the Immigration Act (Act no. II of 2007), detention ordered under the immigration laws shall be terminated if (a) the expulsion or transfer has become viable; (b) when it becomes evident that the expulsion or transfer cannot be executed; or (c) the detention has exceeded six ... months. None of the reasons for the termination [of the detention] listed in the above-cited paragraph exists. The expulsion or transfer is [actually] not viable because of the pending asylum application; furthermore, there will be [at last] no reason preventing the execution of the expulsion or transfer if the foreign national [eventually] receives no protection in the asylum procedure, since the procedure has failed to prove that Serbia is no safe third country, [and Serbia], according to the information provided by the immigration authority, is ready to re-admit the foreign national pursuant to the Agreement between Serbia and the European Union. Lastly, the time that has elapsed since the beginning of the detention is less than six or twelve months ... On the basis of the information available to the court, the foreign national, according to his statement made during the first interview, intended to travel to
Peloponnese
5. The applicants, Bangladeshi migrants living in Greece without a work permit, were recruited on different dates between October 2012 and February 2013 in Athens and other places, to work on the region’s biggest strawberry farm, at Manolada, a village of two thousand inhabitants in the regional district of Elis, in the western part of the
premises
68. The applicant submitted three bailiff's reports on the eviction of the police units dated 30 July 2001 (see paragraph 43 above). The reports were drawn up in respect of the applicant's house, his brother's house and the industrial equipment and
Caucasus
54. It went on to state that “by publishing and disseminating the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter [the applicant had] wilfully acted with a view to stirring up enmity and conflict, including armed conflict, on national, racial and religious grounds between citizens living in the European and Asian parts of the country and people living in the
premises
47. The Government further submitted a report of 16 September 2003 by the same officer, who informed that on the same day the applicants had dismissed his offer to drive them to their former place of residence. The documents also contained a copy of a universal power of attorney dated 16 September 2003 and certified by a notary public in her
the Staropromyslovskiy district
8. In December 2000 the city of Grozny was under curfew. The applicants and Mayrudin Khantiyev lived in the same five-storey block of flats at no. 269 Ugolnaya Street in Grozny (“house no. 269”). The flat of Mayrudin Khantiyev's family was on the ground floor; his parents' flat was on the first floor. Two guard posts of the Russian military forces were stationed on the roof of house no. 269 on a permanent basis, the soldiers having constructed a shelter there. The building was situated about fifty metres from the military commander's office of
Dniester
19. In 1991-92 a number of 14th Army military units joined the Transdniestrian separatists. In the Ilaşcu judgment the Court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that Transdniestrian separatists were able, with the assistance of 14th Army personnel, to arm themselves with weapons taken from the stores of the 14th Army stationed in Transdniestria. In addition, large numbers of Russian nationals from outside the region, particularly Cossacks, went to Transdniestria to fight with the separatists against the Moldovan forces. Given the support provided to the separatists by the troops of the 14th Army and the massive transfer to them of arms and ammunition from the 14th Army’s stores, the Moldovan army was in a position of inferiority that prevented it from regaining control of Transdniestria. On 1 April 1992 the President of the Russian Federation, Mr Boris Yeltsin, officially transferred the 14th Army to Russian command, and it thereafter became the “Russian Operational Group in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova” or “ROG”. On 2 April 1992 General Netkachev, the new Commander of the ROG ordered the Moldovan forces which had encircled the town of Tighina (Bender), held by the separatists, to withdraw immediately, failing which the Russian army would take counter-measures. In May the ROG launched attacks against the Moldovan forces, driving them out of some villages from the left bank of the
Anatolia
29. The articles also emphasized that the Government’s public declarations, which appeared to allow displaced villagers to return to their villages, were unreliable. Whenever villagers had attempted to do so, they were physically denied access to their villages. (d) The report of 14 January 1998 of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Commission of Inquiry on the measures to be taken in order to address the problems of the persons displaced following the evacuation of settlement units in east and south-east
Kentron
7. On 10 October 2002, as compensation for the applicant’s kiosk, the Mayor of Yerevan adopted decision no. 1785-A, granting her the right to lease a plot of public land of 5 sq. m. at a specified address in the
the Urus-Martan District
19. The relatives of the two abducted men chased the UAZ vehicles in a car. At some point Mr S., a serviceman of the military commander's office, managed to stop their car and told them not to follow the vehicles because they might be shot. Mr S. added that the UAZ vehicles belonged to the department of the interior of
Achkhoy-Martan
44. On 1 May 2004 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 was instructed to verify the following information: whether federal troops had carried out a special operation in Assinovskaya on 19 January 2004; whether they had arrested Luiza Mutayeva, and whether the military units stationed in the
the Balkan States
40. According to the applicants in the present case, Russia accounted for 18% of the “MRT”‘s exports and 43.7% of its imports, primarily energy. The “MRT” paid for less than 5% of the gas it had consumed. For example, in 2011 Transdniestria consumed USD 505 million worth of gas, but paid for only 4% (USD 20 million). The Russian Government explained that since the “MRT” was not recognised as a separate entity under international law, it could not have its own sovereign debts and Russia did not effect separate gas supplies for Moldova and Transdniestria. The bill for supplying gas to Transdniestria was, therefore, attributed to Moldova. The supply of gas to the region was organised through the Russian public corporation Gazprom and the joint stock company Moldovagaz, which was owned jointly by Moldova and the “MRT”. The debt owed by Moldovagaz to Russia exceeded USD 1.8 billion, of which USD 1.5 billion related to gas consumed in Transdniestria. Gazprom could not simply refuse to supply gas to the region, since it needed pipelines through Moldova to supply
Zangelan
59. In 1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted the following four Resolutions relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Resolution 822 (1993), 30 April 1993, S/RES/822 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, ... 1. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan, ...” Resolution 853 (1993), 29 July 1993, S/RES/853 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Expressing its serious concern at the deterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic and at the tensions between them, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic, ... 3. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces involved from the district of Agdam and other recently occupied districts of the Azerbaijani Republic; ... 9. Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with its resolution 822 (1993) and the present resolution, and the acceptance by this party of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the [OSCE]; ...” Resolution 874 (1993), 14 October 1993, S/RES/874 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region, ... 5. Calls for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps provided for in the [OSCE] Minsk Group’s ‘Adjusted timetable’, including the withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removal of all obstacles to communication and transportation; ...” Resolution 884 (1993), 12 November 1993, S/RES/884 (1993) “The Security Council, ... Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as [a] consequence of the violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those violations, in particular the occupation of the
Urus-Martan
17. According to the applicant’s brother-in-law and his wife, the men who raided their house were members of the federal forces, since they spoke Russian without an accent and had military vehicles at their disposal. The applicant also submitted an eye-witness statement by a neighbour of her brother-in-law, who had confirmed that he had seen Russian servicemen in a “Ural” military vehicle not far from the house of the Bersunkayev family on the night of the incident, and that he had subsequently mentioned this fact during his interview at the
Okusha
20. In 1997 the local forest authority brought an action for rei vindicatio against the applicants, claiming that they had unlawfully entered into possession of State forest land. The claim concerned plots covering 25.6 ha, including the plots of 14 ha in the
Dundas
12. On 6 August 2001 the applicants and other Greenpeace activists arrived off the coast of the Dundas peninsula by a vessel called the M/V Arctic Sunrise. Some of the activists went ashore at the beach of
Central Sudan
18. On 27 August 2012 the applicant’s representative asked the FOM for access to the transcript of the Lingua analysis. By letter of 3 September 2012 it informed the representative that the applicant could listen to the interview conducted by the expert at its offices, but that the transcript contained some confidential information so could not be provided in full. The following details could be disclosed. The expert who had carried out the analysis originated from
South America
5. The applicant claimed to be the owner of four tenements in Malta. Before the Court he produced a statement made on 19 July 2006 by a notary public, which reads as follows: “I the undersigned Dr. Paul Pullicino, Notary Public, do hereby certify that in virtue of a secret will made on the 4th day of October, 1966, by Charles Edwards, and published by me on the 9th November, 1996, Major Joseph John Edwards [the applicant] was nominated and appointed by his father, the late Mr Charles Edwards as his sole universal heir and Testamentary Executor of his estate to whom he bequeathed 21/25ths undivided parts of tenements situated at numbers 96 to 100 Tonna Street, Sliema, - of which 2/25ths had been inherited by his wife from her late brother Sir Augustus Bartolo and the further 16/25ths purchased by him from her brother's family in the mid 1950's – all of which were owned in common with the remaining 4/25ths undivided and equal parts owned by four further members of the Bartolo family residing somewhere in
premises
16. By a decision of 6 July 2007, filed with the court registry on 9 July 2007, the Bologna Youth Court refused the application for return. It noted that divorce and custody proceedings were still pending in Romania; that M. had claimed that she and the child had lived in Italy since 2006; and that since June 2006 A. had been known to the Infant Neuropsychiatric Services (“NPI”) of the Parma Local Health Agency (“AUSL”). Moreover, it noted that M. had claimed to have had the required permission from her husband to keep the child in Italy in accordance with a notarial deed of 2005 and that the applicant had contested this on the basis that he had only given permission for A. to travel to Italy for tourist purposes, and that, albeit he had moved to Qatar in 2006, he wanted the child to be with him. In that light, the court considered that there were no grounds for returning A. and that, in view of the relevant international law, it could not be held that the mother had arbitrarily taken A. away from his father as legitimate custodian of the child. The Bologna Youth Court noted that the Romanian authorities had not yet taken a decision on custody, thus the parents had joint custody, and therefore the applicant did not have exclusive custody rights. Moreover, the applicant had consented to A.’s transfer to Italy and had eventually moved to Qatar. Furthermore, the Bologna Youth Court observed that the child had been in Italy for more than a year and was integrated into Italian society, albeit with some problems. In this light, the court considered that psychological harm would ensue as a result of his return. Thus it was not obliged, according to Article 13 of the Hague Convention, to order his return. Indeed, from the social services report ordered by the court, it appeared that A. had arrived at the NPI’s
the Vilnius Region
12. On 25 September 2000 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) approved the land allocation plan (žemės reformos žemėtvarkos projektas) for the Buivydiškės cadastral area (this area comprised several villages in
Europe
12. In application no. 41463/12, the European Union for Progressive Judaism is a religious association with its registered office in London. It acts as an umbrella organisation for progressive Jewish congregations in