<p>How to proceed in the following finite game of imperfect information to solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? The only subgame is the game itself. And by converting the extensive form into a normal form game to arrive at the pure strategy nash equilibrium I am getting (C,q) which somehow doesn't seem to be correct.</p>
<p><a href="https://i.sstatic.net/1nm2g.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/1nm2g.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2023-07-12T12:53:23.030Z
$(C, q)$ is the only pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Amit
CC BY-SA 4.0
2023-07-13T14:46:20.783Z
Why do you think your answer is not correct?
smcc
<game-theory>
Finding Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Information
S.G.
# Finding Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Information

(Asked by: username_0 on 2023-07-12)

How to proceed in the following finite game of imperfect information to solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? The only subgame is the game itself. And by converting the extensive form into a normal form game to arrive at the pure strategy nash equilibrium I am getting (C,q) which somehow doesn't seem to be correct.

[![enter image description here](https://i.sstatic.net/1nm2g.png)](https://i.sstatic.net/1nm2g.png)

**Tags:** game-theory

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: $(C, q)$ is the only pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.  
> **username_2**: Why do you think your answer is not correct?  

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## 0 answers

