<p>Macro regressions, especially annual ones, have in general two flaws:</p>

<ul>
<li>They have small sample problems and</li>
<li>They have no proper identification</li>
</ul>

<p>In order to circumvent problem #1, people often assume that the DGP process behind different countries are the same, increasing observations from perhaps 60 to 600.</p>

<p>In order to attack #2, many people add timing assumptions. However, this is still no clear identification, these are still assumptions.</p>

<p>To see the issue: Imagine high inflation at $t-5$, and low growth at $t$. Using a standard timing assumption, the former caused the latter. However, we like to think about agents as forward looking. Can we be <em>certain</em> that expectations w.r.t. the latter didn't influence the former?</p>

<p>Especially because of #2, this type of regressions have lost popularity. Also, there is not really much more to do. </p>

<p><strong>tl;dr:</strong> No important new results that I know of. </p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-09T23:06:42.983Z
2015-02-09T23:06:42.983Z
FooBar
<p>The strongest story I hear for the benefits of inflation is from undoing the nominal rigidities that make it difficult for some prices to adjust down. The most important of these rigidities is usually thought to be wages. People seem to really hate nominal wage cuts and wages are some of the most important prices in the economy. As such, economists have tried to quantify how large the nominal rigidities in wages are. For example:</p>

<p><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032" rel="nofollow">Inflation, Nominal Wage Rigidity, and the Efficiency of Labor Markets</a> </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>If nominal wages cannot fall, then positive inflation may facilitate
  real wage adjustment. We examine data on individuals' wage changes and
  find only limited evidence of such downward nominal rigidity. The
  shape of the distribution of wage changes is little affected by the
  rate of inflation. About 8 percent of job stayers have zero nominal
  wage change, but we estimate that less than half of that spike
  represents truncation associated with downward nominal rigidity. We
  estimate that reducing inflation from four percent to zero would
  result in an additional 1/2 to 1 3/4 percent of peoplehaving
  constrained wages because of downward nominal rigidity, and our
  estimates of the associated welfare loss center on about
  five-hundredths of a percent of aggregate output.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393205000462" rel="nofollow">Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity</a> </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Nominal wage rigidity has been shown to exist in periods of high
  inflation, while reduction in nominal pay has been hypothesized to
  occur in times of low inflation. Nominal wage rigidity would therefore
  become irrelevant because there is little need to cut nominal pay
  under high inflation, while the necessary cuts would occur under low
  inflation. We test this hypothesis by examining Swiss data in the
  1990s, where wage inflation was low. Nominal wage rigidity proves
  robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a considerable
  obstacle to real wage adjustments. Real wages would indeed respond to
  unemployment without downward nominal rigidity. Moreover, wage
  sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity correlate strongly to
  unemployment, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity fuels
  unemployment.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02094.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&amp;userIsAuthenticated=false" rel="nofollow">Real and Nominal Wage Rigidities and the Rate of Inflation: Evidence from West German Micro Data</a></p>

<blockquote>
  <p>This article examines real and nominal wage rigidities in West
  Germany. Using regionally disaggregated register data for 1975–2001,
  we estimate the extent of both types of wage rigidities from the
  observed distribution of individual wage changes, taking into account
  possible measurement error. The fraction of workers facing wage
  increases that are caused by nominal and particularly real wage
  rigidity is substantial. The extent of real rigidity rises with
  inflation and falls with regional unemployment, whereas the opposite
  holds for nominal rigidity. Overall, the incidence of wage rigidity,
  which accelerates unemployment growth, is most likely minimised in a
  moderate inflation environment.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The empirical distribution of nominal rigidities could form a basis for an optimal inflation. There are other benefits and costs of inflation, but as @FooBar points out, many may be difficult to get good identification upon. </p>

<p>The somewhat confusingly titled paper <a href="http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8883.pdf" rel="nofollow">The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability</a> which actually considers going from 4 percent to 2 percent annual CPI growth. Martin Feldstein lays out four welfare costs and benefits of inflation: </p>

<ol>
<li>Consumption timing - inflation can act as a tax on savings</li>
<li>Housing demand - create incentives to over invest in housing by increasing deduction</li>
<li>Money demand - by raising the cost of holding money, inflation causes people hold too little </li>
<li>Debt service - Lower inflation makes it more expensive to service existing debt</li>
</ol>

<p>Feldstein shows that total effects depend on parameters: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Table 3.1 summarizes all of the welfare changes that are discussed in
  the remaining sections of the paper. The specific assumptions and
  parameters values will be discussed there. With the parameter values
  that seem most likely, the overall total effect of reducing inflation
  from 2% to zero, shown in the lower right corner of the table, is to
  reduce the annual deadweight loss by between 0.63 and 1.01% of GDP.</p>
</blockquote>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-10T02:46:54.397Z
Thanks! Nominal rigidities explain why small positive inflation (2-4%) is desirable. It'd be interesting to find out more about *negative* effects of 5–15% inflation because central banks sacrifice short-term growth when they cut rates to bring this inflation down. They must have models that show that this inflation needs immediate actions. Well, apart from political pressure.
Anton Tarasenko
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-10T00:23:12.357Z
2015-02-10T10:33:15.330Z
2015-02-10T10:33:15.330Z
BKay
<p>Noticeable works about the impact of inflation on economic growth are dated back to the 90s.</p>

<p>For example, <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/96/05/9605rb2.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Barro (1995)</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>the impact effects from an increase in average inflation by 10 percentage points per year are a reduction of the growth rate of real per capita GDP by 0.2-0.3 percentage points per year and a decrease in the ratio of investment to GDP by 0.4-0.6 percentage points.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>He also shows outliers there:</p>

<p><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/dI8FK.png" alt="enter image description here"></p>

<p><a href="https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/18_easterly_bruno_inflationcrisesandlongrungrowth_prp.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Bruno and Easterly, “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth”</a> (1998), reiterate that extreme situations matter for growth:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>growth falls sharply during discrete high inflation crises, then recovers rapidly and strongly after inflation falls.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Since after these papers, no highly cited paper on topic appeared. Though there's Acemoglu et al., “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms” (2003), which is relevant in another sense.</p>

<p>In a <a href="http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Documents/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb29.pdf" rel="noreferrer">recent survey</a> (2012), the Bank of England mentions without a reference that</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The consensus seems to be that
  above a threshold of around 3%–4%, inflation imposes welfare
  costs, while the plausible gains from reducing inflation below
  about 2% are unlikely to outweigh the advantages of a positive
  inflation target.
  There is even less guidance in the literature on the optimal
  level of inflation in developing and emerging countries,
  though Balassa-Samuelson effects imply that optimal
  inflation in these countries should be a little higher than in
  industrialised countries.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Apart from cross-country evidences, rare country studies are available. The <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14222.pdf" rel="noreferrer">IMF on India (2014)</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Our findings suggest that, on average, there is a negative long-run relationship between
  inflation and economic growth in India. We also find statistically-significant inflation-growth threshold effects in the case of states with persistently-elevated inflation rates of above 5.5 percent. </p>
</blockquote>

<p>Does the current academic consensus remain with Barro's 1995 paper? Are there any new estimates of the impact of inflation, threshold levels of inflation, and changes in inflation on long-term economic growth?</p>

<macroeconomics><inflation><academic-graduate><economic-growth>
Inflation and economic growth
Anton Tarasenko
# Inflation and economic growth

(Asked by: username_0 on 2015-02-09)

Noticeable works about the impact of inflation on economic growth are dated back to the 90s.

For example, [Barro (1995)](http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/96/05/9605rb2.pdf):

> the impact effects from an increase in average inflation by 10 percentage points per year are a reduction of the growth rate of real per capita GDP by 0.2-0.3 percentage points per year and a decrease in the ratio of investment to GDP by 0.4-0.6 percentage points.

He also shows outliers there:

![enter image description here](https://i.sstatic.net/dI8FK.png)

[Bruno and Easterly, “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth”](https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/18_easterly_bruno_inflationcrisesandlongrungrowth_prp.pdf) (1998), reiterate that extreme situations matter for growth:

> growth falls sharply during discrete high inflation crises, then recovers rapidly and strongly after inflation falls.

Since after these papers, no highly cited paper on topic appeared. Though there's Acemoglu et al., “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms” (2003), which is relevant in another sense.

In a [recent survey](http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Documents/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb29.pdf) (2012), the Bank of England mentions without a reference that

> The consensus seems to be that
> above a threshold of around 3%–4%, inflation imposes welfare
> costs, while the plausible gains from reducing inflation below
> about 2% are unlikely to outweigh the advantages of a positive
> inflation target.
> There is even less guidance in the literature on the optimal
> level of inflation in developing and emerging countries,
> though Balassa-Samuelson effects imply that optimal
> inflation in these countries should be a little higher than in
> industrialised countries.

Apart from cross-country evidences, rare country studies are available. The [IMF on India (2014)](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14222.pdf):

> Our findings suggest that, on average, there is a negative long-run relationship between
> inflation and economic growth in India. We also find statistically-significant inflation-growth threshold effects in the case of states with persistently-elevated inflation rates of above 5.5 percent.

Does the current academic consensus remain with Barro's 1995 paper? Are there any new estimates of the impact of inflation, threshold levels of inflation, and changes in inflation on long-term economic growth?

**Tags:** macroeconomics, inflation, academic-graduate, economic-growth


---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2015-02-09. Score: 6

Macro regressions, especially annual ones, have in general two flaws:

* They have small sample problems and
* They have no proper identification

In order to circumvent problem #1, people often assume that the DGP process behind different countries are the same, increasing observations from perhaps 60 to 600.

In order to attack #2, many people add timing assumptions. However, this is still no clear identification, these are still assumptions.

To see the issue: Imagine high inflation at $t-5$, and low growth at $t$. Using a standard timing assumption, the former caused the latter. However, we like to think about agents as forward looking. Can we be *certain* that expectations w.r.t. the latter didn't influence the former?

Especially because of #2, this type of regressions have lost popularity. Also, there is not really much more to do.

**tl;dr:** No important new results that I know of.


---

### Answer by username_2 on 2015-02-10. Score: 4

The strongest story I hear for the benefits of inflation is from undoing the nominal rigidities that make it difficult for some prices to adjust down. The most important of these rigidities is usually thought to be wages. People seem to really hate nominal wage cuts and wages are some of the most important prices in the economy. As such, economists have tried to quantify how large the nominal rigidities in wages are. For example:

[Inflation, Nominal Wage Rigidity, and the Efficiency of Labor Markets](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032)

> If nominal wages cannot fall, then positive inflation may facilitate
> real wage adjustment. We examine data on individuals' wage changes and
> find only limited evidence of such downward nominal rigidity. The
> shape of the distribution of wage changes is little affected by the
> rate of inflation. About 8 percent of job stayers have zero nominal
> wage change, but we estimate that less than half of that spike
> represents truncation associated with downward nominal rigidity. We
> estimate that reducing inflation from four percent to zero would
> result in an additional 1/2 to 1 3/4 percent of peoplehaving
> constrained wages because of downward nominal rigidity, and our
> estimates of the associated welfare loss center on about
> five-hundredths of a percent of aggregate output.

[Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393205000462)

> Nominal wage rigidity has been shown to exist in periods of high
> inflation, while reduction in nominal pay has been hypothesized to
> occur in times of low inflation. Nominal wage rigidity would therefore
> become irrelevant because there is little need to cut nominal pay
> under high inflation, while the necessary cuts would occur under low
> inflation. We test this hypothesis by examining Swiss data in the
> 1990s, where wage inflation was low. Nominal wage rigidity proves
> robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a considerable
> obstacle to real wage adjustments. Real wages would indeed respond to
> unemployment without downward nominal rigidity. Moreover, wage
> sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity correlate strongly to
> unemployment, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity fuels
> unemployment.

[Real and Nominal Wage Rigidities and the Rate of Inflation: Evidence from West German Micro Data](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02094.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)

> This article examines real and nominal wage rigidities in West
> Germany. Using regionally disaggregated register data for 1975–2001,
> we estimate the extent of both types of wage rigidities from the
> observed distribution of individual wage changes, taking into account
> possible measurement error. The fraction of workers facing wage
> increases that are caused by nominal and particularly real wage
> rigidity is substantial. The extent of real rigidity rises with
> inflation and falls with regional unemployment, whereas the opposite
> holds for nominal rigidity. Overall, the incidence of wage rigidity,
> which accelerates unemployment growth, is most likely minimised in a
> moderate inflation environment.

The empirical distribution of nominal rigidities could form a basis for an optimal inflation. There are other benefits and costs of inflation, but as @username_1 points out, many may be difficult to get good identification upon.

The somewhat confusingly titled paper [The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability](http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8883.pdf) which actually considers going from 4 percent to 2 percent annual CPI growth. Martin Feldstein lays out four welfare costs and benefits of inflation:

1. Consumption timing - inflation can act as a tax on savings
2. Housing demand - create incentives to over invest in housing by increasing deduction
3. Money demand - by raising the cost of holding money, inflation causes people hold too little
4. Debt service - Lower inflation makes it more expensive to service existing debt

Feldstein shows that total effects depend on parameters:

> Table 3.1 summarizes all of the welfare changes that are discussed in
> the remaining sections of the paper. The specific assumptions and
> parameters values will be discussed there. With the parameter values
> that seem most likely, the overall total effect of reducing inflation
> from 2% to zero, shown in the lower right corner of the table, is to
> reduce the annual deadweight loss by between 0.63 and 1.01% of GDP.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Thanks! Nominal rigidities explain why small positive inflation (2-4%) is desirable. It'd be interesting to find out more about *negative* effects of 5–15% inflation because central banks sacrifice short-term growth when they cut rates to bring this inflation down. They must have models that show that this inflation needs immediate actions. Well, apart from political pressure.  

---

