<p>Let the set of alternatives be $A = \left\{a_1,a_2,...,a_k\right\}$. Let the number of players be $n$. Let the set of preference orderings over $A$ be $\mathcal{P}$. Then the set of preference profiles is the Cartesian product 
$$
\mathcal{P}^n = \times_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{P}.
$$
Let us denote the preference ordering
$$
a_1 \succ a_2 \succ ... \succ a_k 
$$
by $p^*$. Define the Social Choice Function $F$ by
$$
\forall p \in \mathcal{P}^n: F(p) = p^*.
$$
This SCF $F$ clearly has universal domain, is not a dictatorship, and is also independent of irrelevant alternatives. (Or any alternatives for that matter.)</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T01:07:47.957Z
Hey, thanks. But I am unable to understand the functioning of this social choice rule. How is it not a dictatorship and how does it not meet Pareto criteria?
LUCIFER
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T07:28:49.357Z
@LUCIFER Could you please define what you think a dictatorship SCF is? And can you please also define the Pareto property for SCFs?
Giskard
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:00:21.537Z
Dictatorship is when there is an individual such that if he prefers x over y, then so does the society irrespective of what the society feels.
LUCIFER
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:01:04.507Z
And Pareto property is that if all individuals prefer x over y, then so should the society. It is about how society preserves total agreement.
LUCIFER
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:16:30.953Z
@LUCIFER If you understand these then surely you see how my SCF fulfills neither condition. I will improve notation a bit.
Giskard
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:35:51.140Z
I am actually unable to understand the SCR. It will be helpful if you just explain how individual preferences are transformed into social preferences (in words). I will understand the applicability of the conditions myself.
LUCIFER
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:44:36.387Z
Sorry but that (how individual preferences are transformed into social preferences) is not the question I wanted to answer. I did answer the question you posted.
Giskard
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T21:45:35.210Z
It failed to meet the purpose but. Thanks anyway. I'll take from here.
LUCIFER
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-10T00:07:46.483Z
2017-12-10T21:48:28.717Z
2017-12-10T21:48:28.717Z
Giskard
<p>The Pareto criterion has two effects: It guarantees that every ranking can occur as a social ranking and it connects social rankings to individual rankings. If one drops the Pareto criterion but keeps the assumption that every social ranking is possible, one obtains a generalization in which every SCG corresponds to a dictatorship or an anti-dictatorship in which the social ranking is exactly opposite to the ranking of a specific individual, an anti-dictator. This is known as Wilson's theorem, originally from:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Wilson, Robert. "Social choice theory without the Pareto principle."
  <em><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053172900518?via%3Dihub" rel="noreferrer">Journal of Economic Theory</a></em> 5.3 (1972): 478-486.</p>
</blockquote>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-11T14:03:13.050Z
"keeps the assumption that every social ranking is possible" That is not an assumption in this question though.
Giskard
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-11T13:12:13.937Z
2017-12-11T13:12:13.937Z
Michael Greinecker
<p>In social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem stating that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)</p>

<p>So, I'm looking for an example where the preferences satisfy unrestricted domain, non dictatorship, IIA and is an ordering, but not meet the Pareto criteria.</p>

<social-choice>
Arrow's impossibility theorem
LUCIFER
# Arrow's impossibility theorem

(Asked by: username_0 on 2017-12-09)

In social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem, the general possibility theorem or Arrow's paradox is an impossibility theorem stating that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)

So, I'm looking for an example where the preferences satisfy unrestricted domain, non dictatorship, IIA and is an ordering, but not meet the Pareto criteria.

**Tags:** social-choice


---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2017-12-10. Score: 6

Let the set of alternatives be $A = \left\{a\_1,a\_2,...,a\_k\right\}$. Let the number of players be $n$. Let the set of preference orderings over $A$ be $\mathcal{P}$. Then the set of preference profiles is the Cartesian product
$$
\mathcal{P}^n = \times\_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{P}.
$$
Let us denote the preference ordering
$$
a\_1 \succ a\_2 \succ ... \succ a\_k
$$
by $p^\*$. Define the Social Choice Function $F$ by
$$
\forall p \in \mathcal{P}^n: F(p) = p^\*.
$$
This SCF $F$ clearly has universal domain, is not a dictatorship, and is also independent of irrelevant alternatives. (Or any alternatives for that matter.)

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Hey, thanks. But I am unable to understand the functioning of this social choice rule. How is it not a dictatorship and how does it not meet Pareto criteria?  
> **username_1**: @username_0 Could you please define what you think a dictatorship SCF is? And can you please also define the Pareto property for SCFs?  
> **username_0**: Dictatorship is when there is an individual such that if he prefers x over y, then so does the society irrespective of what the society feels.  
> **username_0**: And Pareto property is that if all individuals prefer x over y, then so should the society. It is about how society preserves total agreement.  
> **username_1**: @username_0 If you understand these then surely you see how my SCF fulfills neither condition. I will improve notation a bit.  
> **username_0**: I am actually unable to understand the SCR. It will be helpful if you just explain how individual preferences are transformed into social preferences (in words). I will understand the applicability of the conditions myself.  
> **username_1**: Sorry but that (how individual preferences are transformed into social preferences) is not the question I wanted to answer. I did answer the question you posted.  
> **username_0**: It failed to meet the purpose but. Thanks anyway. I'll take from here.  

---

### Answer by username_2 on 2017-12-11. Score: 5

The Pareto criterion has two effects: It guarantees that every ranking can occur as a social ranking and it connects social rankings to individual rankings. If one drops the Pareto criterion but keeps the assumption that every social ranking is possible, one obtains a generalization in which every SCG corresponds to a dictatorship or an anti-dictatorship in which the social ranking is exactly opposite to the ranking of a specific individual, an anti-dictator. This is known as Wilson's theorem, originally from:

> Wilson, Robert. "Social choice theory without the Pareto principle."
> *[Journal of Economic Theory](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053172900518?via%3Dihub)* 5.3 (1972): 478-486.

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: "keeps the assumption that every social ranking is possible" That is not an assumption in this question though.  

---

