<p>There is also no NE which sustains coopration for more or less the same reason as in the SPNE case.</p>
<p>Consider, a PD played twice. A strategy contains five actions, one for each decision node: one in the beginning (empty history) and one for each of the four period-2 histories (CC,CD,DC,DD). I claim that any strategy other than (D;D;D;D;D) is dominated.</p>
<p>Consider any strategy in which you play C in period 2, say (C,D,C,C,D). A deviation to (C,D,D,D,D) is profitable because defection cannot be punished after period 2 as the game ends. Behavior in period 1 cannot be conditioned on the future. Given that any equilibrium candidate has the structure (_,D,D,D,D) cooperation in period 1 is also dominated.
If you are not convinced, you can write down the game with all its strategies in a big normal form matrix.</p>
<p>You can iterate the argument for any (commonly known) finite number of periods.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-11-12T19:56:21.943Z
Thanks, I am just reading this now. When you say 'dominated', do you mean 'strictly dominated'?
afreelunch
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-11-12T19:57:29.147Z
I am seeing weak dominance, not strict dominance. But that is not enough to prove uniqueness of NE.
afreelunch
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2020-11-12T20:47:22.553Z
True, there are multiple NE, but in none of them there is cooperation on-path. A NE would be both players playing D in period 1 and D after (D,D) and anything after the other three histories. The off-path play in period 2 has no impact. However, if there was C onpath in the last period, a deviation to D is profitable. So on-path there is always DD in the end. Iterate this argument and ONPATH there are only Ds. I thought you meant C on path with "sustain cooperation."
Bayesian
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2020-11-13T08:36:34.873Z
Right, that is what I thought -- thanks for clarifying
afreelunch
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-11-12T18:38:29.533Z
2020-11-12T18:38:29.533Z
Bayesian
<p>Suppose that two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma (PD) a finite number of times; and assume that they both discount the future at a constant rate. Can cooperation be sustained by a Nash equilibrium? Notice that I am <strong>not</strong> restricting attention to sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (obviously, there are no SPNE which sustain cooperation).</p>

<game-theory><repeated-games>
Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without sub-game perfection
afreelunch
# Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without sub-game perfection

(Asked by: username_0 on 2020-11-12)

Suppose that two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma (PD) a finite number of times; and assume that they both discount the future at a constant rate. Can cooperation be sustained by a Nash equilibrium? Notice that I am **not** restricting attention to sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (obviously, there are no SPNE which sustain cooperation).

**Tags:** game-theory, repeated-games


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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2020-11-12. Score: 6 | Accepted answer

There is also no NE which sustains coopration for more or less the same reason as in the SPNE case.

Consider, a PD played twice. A strategy contains five actions, one for each decision node: one in the beginning (empty history) and one for each of the four period-2 histories (CC,CD,DC,DD). I claim that any strategy other than (D;D;D;D;D) is dominated.

Consider any strategy in which you play C in period 2, say (C,D,C,C,D). A deviation to (C,D,D,D,D) is profitable because defection cannot be punished after period 2 as the game ends. Behavior in period 1 cannot be conditioned on the future. Given that any equilibrium candidate has the structure (\_,D,D,D,D) cooperation in period 1 is also dominated.
If you are not convinced, you can write down the game with all its strategies in a big normal form matrix.

You can iterate the argument for any (commonly known) finite number of periods.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Thanks, I am just reading this now. When you say 'dominated', do you mean 'strictly dominated'?  
> **username_0**: I am seeing weak dominance, not strict dominance. But that is not enough to prove uniqueness of NE.  
> **username_1**: True, there are multiple NE, but in none of them there is cooperation on-path. A NE would be both players playing D in period 1 and D after (D,D) and anything after the other three histories. The off-path play in period 2 has no impact. However, if there was C onpath in the last period, a deviation to D is profitable. So on-path there is always DD in the end. Iterate this argument and ONPATH there are only Ds. I thought you meant C on path with "sustain cooperation."  
> **username_0**: Right, that is what I thought -- thanks for clarifying  

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