<p>The address the block reward goes to is in the data that is being hashed. That address is the pool's. If a miner finds a hash that meets the block difficulty, changing the address to the miner's own will cause a different hash, and you don't have control over the distribution of the bits in that second hash. So you don't get a block if you change the address.</p>

<p>Going the other way is the same: if the miner mines using his or her own address, that miner will not be able to send shares to the pool to secure part of next block the pool finds.</p>

<p>A miner can withhold the winning share though, which is detrimental to the pool, but cannot pocket the reward.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2023-09-05T22:16:51.490Z
what about holding the hash hostage with a zero-knowledge proof?
JBaczuk
CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-06-22T08:45:37.420Z
2016-06-22T08:45:37.420Z
user36303
<p>How does a mining pool insure that the miner who will find the valid share for the current block will not use it for his solo mining?</p>

<mining-pools><solo-mining><mining-pool-shares>
Keeping valid shares for it's own when mining in a pool
mhaddad
# Keeping valid shares for it's own when mining in a pool

(Asked by: username_0 on 2016-06-22)

How does a mining pool insure that the miner who will find the valid share for the current block will not use it for his solo mining?

**Tags:** mining-pools, solo-mining, mining-pool-shares


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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2016-06-22. Score: 5 | Accepted answer

The address the block reward goes to is in the data that is being hashed. That address is the pool's. If a miner finds a hash that meets the block difficulty, changing the address to the miner's own will cause a different hash, and you don't have control over the distribution of the bits in that second hash. So you don't get a block if you change the address.

Going the other way is the same: if the miner mines using his or her own address, that miner will not be able to send shares to the pool to secure part of next block the pool finds.

A miner can withhold the winning share though, which is detrimental to the pool, but cannot pocket the reward.

> **Comments:**
> **username_2**: what about holding the hash hostage with a zero-knowledge proof?  

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