<p>This could work in most situations, as long as the pool is trustworthy. However, the whole notion of "relatively safe" 0-confirmation transactions can still be risky if there are any miners that want to be malicious. For example, if one was to accept such transactions, and someone wanting to exploit their trust by double spending and trying to mine their own block with only the second transaction. Even if 99% of the pools would confirm the transaction, the one that wouldn't could cause a lot of problems if exploited by malicious party. Combating such a rogue pool would also be hard if one wants to avoid forks in the blockchain (for example, by rejecting blocks without a given transactions).</p>

<p>In short, this approach offers slightly more security, if widely adopted it can work as intended, but it is not 100% attack-proof.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-02-02T05:55:47.673Z
It's not meant to be 100% attack proof ... it's meant as a way for situations where the risk of fraud exists, but is not huge, because there isn't a lot of money involved.
ripper234
CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-02-02T05:29:36.737Z
2012-02-02T05:29:36.737Z
ThePiachu
<p>I don't think it helps much. The biggest real threat is the Finney attack, and the Finney attack is just as big a threat even with such a promise.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-02-02T10:13:06.620Z
2012-02-02T10:13:06.620Z
David Schwartz
<p><a href="https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=62137.0">This thread</a> proposes a method for miners to promise "that their next block/s will contain a specific transaction", and/or that "they won't mine a conflicting transaction".</p>

<p>If adopted by a large percentage of miners, this method is supposed to enable "relatively safe" 0-confirmation transactions (well, safer than today at least).</p>

<p>If wildly adopted, could this work?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-02-02T09:28:02.037Z
I don't like it. Just my 2c.
o0'.
<transactions><mining-pools><confirmations>
Is the proposed "Miner Promise" method of accepting 0-confirmation transactions safe?
ripper234
# Is the proposed "Miner Promise" method of accepting 0-confirmation transactions safe?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2012-02-02)

[This thread](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=62137.0) proposes a method for miners to promise "that their next block/s will contain a specific transaction", and/or that "they won't mine a conflicting transaction".

If adopted by a large percentage of miners, this method is supposed to enable "relatively safe" 0-confirmation transactions (well, safer than today at least).

If wildly adopted, could this work?

**Tags:** transactions, mining-pools, confirmations

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: I don't like it. Just my 2c.  

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## 2 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2012-02-02. Score: 3 | Accepted answer

This could work in most situations, as long as the pool is trustworthy. However, the whole notion of "relatively safe" 0-confirmation transactions can still be risky if there are any miners that want to be malicious. For example, if one was to accept such transactions, and someone wanting to exploit their trust by double spending and trying to mine their own block with only the second transaction. Even if 99% of the pools would confirm the transaction, the one that wouldn't could cause a lot of problems if exploited by malicious party. Combating such a rogue pool would also be hard if one wants to avoid forks in the blockchain (for example, by rejecting blocks without a given transactions).

In short, this approach offers slightly more security, if widely adopted it can work as intended, but it is not 100% attack-proof.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: It's not meant to be 100% attack proof ... it's meant as a way for situations where the risk of fraud exists, but is not huge, because there isn't a lot of money involved.  

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### Answer by username_3 on 2012-02-02. Score: 6

I don't think it helps much. The biggest real threat is the Finney attack, and the Finney attack is just as big a threat even with such a promise.


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