<p>Actually, nobody else can create a valid signature for your transaction inputs, as they do not possess the private keys to do so.</p>

<p>When a transaction is malleated by a third party, it is not re-signed, merely it's signature is changed. <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki" rel="nofollow noreferrer">ECDSA signatures are malleable, in that taking the negative of number <code>S</code> (modulo the curve order) does not invalidate them.</a> As the TXID is created by hashing the complete transaction data, this will result in a new valid transaction with identical payload except for a new TXID.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-04-05T23:19:42.813Z
I did (think/) understand that but was un-confident of my reasoning totally! Thank you so much for validation! signing would need private keys this instead looks like it's string manipulation
Ben Muircroft
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-04-05T22:10:18.833Z
2017-04-06T08:29:43.787Z
2017-04-06T08:29:43.787Z
Murch
<p>It would be really great if there was a way to loop through all the txids in a new block and be able to check if you <em>(can)</em> sign your original transaction the same way it was re-signed - that it matches the new txid</p>

<p>but i guess it would require that you also hold the private key of whom ever resigned your tx :/</p>

<p><strong>Question(s)</strong>:</p>

<p>if I somehow had the public key of whom ever re-signed my tx what could i observe from the new malleat-ed txid?</p>

<p>would i be able to run a test on the new txid to see if it is somehow related to my tx and/or my original txid?</p>

<p>If so how would I go about accessing the public key that relates to the private key that re-signed the txid in a new block?</p>

<p><strong>Assumption(s)</strong>:</p>

<p>the public key is named public because i could possibly/somehow have access to it easily...(??)</p>

<p>If the pub key is not readily accessible (massive assumption) peers on the bitcoin network should supply the public key part of their keys (to other peers) that is the pair to the private key they use to malform/re-sign transactions...(!!?)</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-04-05T05:29:42.710Z
I don't understand the premise of your question.  As I understand it, malleability means creating a different transaction with the identical payload, having a valid (but different) signature by the original key.  It doesn't involve signing the transaction with a new key.  And you can't learn anything at all about a transaction from its txid alone - the txid is a one-way hash of the transaction.
Nate Eldredge
<public-key><signature><transaction-verification><transaction-malleability><transaction-id>
tx-malleability who re-signed the tx?
Ben Muircroft
# tx-malleability who re-signed the tx?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2017-04-04)

It would be really great if there was a way to loop through all the txids in a new block and be able to check if you *(can)* sign your original transaction the same way it was re-signed - that it matches the new txid

but i guess it would require that you also hold the private key of whom ever resigned your tx :/

**Question(s)**:

if I somehow had the public key of whom ever re-signed my tx what could i observe from the new malleat-ed txid?

would i be able to run a test on the new txid to see if it is somehow related to my tx and/or my original txid?

If so how would I go about accessing the public key that relates to the private key that re-signed the txid in a new block?

**Assumption(s)**:

the public key is named public because i could possibly/somehow have access to it easily...(??)

If the pub key is not readily accessible (massive assumption) peers on the bitcoin network should supply the public key part of their keys (to other peers) that is the pair to the private key they use to malform/re-sign transactions...(!!?)

**Tags:** public-key, signature, transaction-verification, transaction-malleability, transaction-id

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: I don't understand the premise of your question.  As I understand it, malleability means creating a different transaction with the identical payload, having a valid (but different) signature by the original key.  It doesn't involve signing the transaction with a new key.  And you can't learn anything at all about a transaction from its txid alone - the txid is a one-way hash of the transaction.  

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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2017-04-05. Score: 2

Actually, nobody else can create a valid signature for your transaction inputs, as they do not possess the private keys to do so.

When a transaction is malleated by a third party, it is not re-signed, merely it's signature is changed. [ECDSA signatures are malleable, in that taking the negative of number `S` (modulo the curve order) does not invalidate them.](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki) As the TXID is created by hashing the complete transaction data, this will result in a new valid transaction with identical payload except for a new TXID.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: I did (think/) understand that but was un-confident of my reasoning totally! Thank you so much for validation! signing would need private keys this instead looks like it's string manipulation  

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