<p>The most distinguishing feature of a LN channel-opening transaction would be an <code>OP_OR</code> in the <code>scriptPubKey</code> of the channel-funding UTXO, where one side of the <code>OP_OR</code> requires two signatures, and the other side a single signature with an <code>OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY</code>.</p>

<p>A closing transaction can be recognized simply based on the fact that it spends a channel-funding UTXO.  If miners were attempting to detect lightning channels, they would need to detect funding transactions.  Once detected, they could either choose to block the funding transaction, itself, or transactions that attempt to spend the funding transactions and close the channel.</p>

<p>Remember, however, that lightning channels will not be the only smart contract that will use UTXOs like described above.  Miners would have to boycott all kinds of smart contracts in order to keep lightning channels off the blockchain.  Also, <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Pay_to_script_hash" rel="noreferrer">P2SH</a> would be used, so that miners would not know what the <code>scriptPubKey</code> contains until after the closing transaction is published.  This means they would lose the ability to prevent opening a channel.  In addition, <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0114.mediawiki" rel="noreferrer">MAST</a> could be used to hide the complexity of a smart contract, even after the contract is fully executed.  This would prevent miners from being able to stop a channel from closing as well.</p>

<p>On the whole, lightning channels would be difficult for miners to discriminate against.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-01-03T15:34:13.313Z
2017-01-03T15:42:59.527Z
2017-01-03T15:42:59.527Z
Jestin
<p>What do transactions creating LN payment channels and resolving them look like? Are Lightning Network transactions distinguishable from other multisignature transactions? Would it be possible for miners to discriminate against LN transactions?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-01-03T17:00:25.720Z
the majority (by hashpower) *always* can do *anything* (soft/hard fork or simply treat some kind of transactions non-standard)
amaclin
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-01-03T18:45:14.373Z
A majority of hashpower cannot do a hard fork without cooperation from the rest of the network. Their blocks would be ignored.
Pieter Wuille
<lightning-network><multi-signature><privacy><ln-closing-channels><censorship-resistance>
Would it be possible for miners to discriminate Lightning Network transactions?
Murch
# Would it be possible for miners to discriminate Lightning Network transactions?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2017-01-03)

What do transactions creating LN payment channels and resolving them look like? Are Lightning Network transactions distinguishable from other multisignature transactions? Would it be possible for miners to discriminate against LN transactions?

**Tags:** lightning-network, multi-signature, privacy, ln-closing-channels, censorship-resistance

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: the majority (by hashpower) *always* can do *anything* (soft/hard fork or simply treat some kind of transactions non-standard)  
> **username_2**: A majority of hashpower cannot do a hard fork without cooperation from the rest of the network. Their blocks would be ignored.  

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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_3 on 2017-01-03. Score: 5 | Accepted answer

The most distinguishing feature of a LN channel-opening transaction would be an `OP_OR` in the `scriptPubKey` of the channel-funding UTXO, where one side of the `OP_OR` requires two signatures, and the other side a single signature with an `OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY`.

A closing transaction can be recognized simply based on the fact that it spends a channel-funding UTXO. If miners were attempting to detect lightning channels, they would need to detect funding transactions. Once detected, they could either choose to block the funding transaction, itself, or transactions that attempt to spend the funding transactions and close the channel.

Remember, however, that lightning channels will not be the only smart contract that will use UTXOs like described above. Miners would have to boycott all kinds of smart contracts in order to keep lightning channels off the blockchain. Also, [P2SH](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Pay_to_script_hash) would be used, so that miners would not know what the `scriptPubKey` contains until after the closing transaction is published. This means they would lose the ability to prevent opening a channel. In addition, [MAST](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0114.mediawiki) could be used to hide the complexity of a smart contract, even after the contract is fully executed. This would prevent miners from being able to stop a channel from closing as well.

On the whole, lightning channels would be difficult for miners to discriminate against.


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