sentence-transformers safetensors nomic_bert sentence-similarity feature-extraction generated_from_trainer dataset_size:10000 loss:TripletLoss custom_code arxiv:1908.10084 arxiv:1703.07737 base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1 base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1 model-index autotrain_compatible text-embeddings-inference endpoints_compatible region:us
---
base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy
- dot_accuracy
- manhattan_accuracy
- euclidean_accuracy
- max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:10000
- loss:TripletLoss
widget:
- source_sentence: value-neutral social science, this kind of negative depiction of
    managers would be deserved if it were empirically valid and based on careful research.
    However, it is not always either valid or carefully based. Some of the anti-manage
    ment bias comes a priori from theories that take as axiomatic that managers are
    prone to act in a bad way (e.g. agency theory). Some other part of the bias seems
    to be simply faculty members accepting popular negative stories about managers,
    which circulate in the community and are carried in the mass media. Again, a negative
    view of managers might be scientifically valid if based on large, representative
    samples. Yet, often the critical view propounded by management school academics
    about managers is based on a handful of cases. These cases are then taken to prove
    generalizations about managers being inherently bad or predisposed to unethical
    conduct. TABLE I Elements of business ethics teaching and their unanticipated
    negative consequences Teaching Business Ethics Causes Negative Consequences 1.
    Misdiagnosis of Causes of Problems True Causes Neglected Problems Solution Failure
    2. Salience of Moral Authority of Academics Unethical Academics Lack Moral Authority
    to Teach Ethics Effectively 3. Ethical Philosophy Inconclusiveness ("No right
    answer") Ethics Scepticism Rationalizing Unethical Behaviour 4. Ethical Dilemmas
    Indecision 5. Free Choice Freedom Delusion Social Science Incompatibility Ethics
    Problems and Problems with Ethics 301 Extreme cases of misconduct that receive
    publicity are treated as being 'the tip of the iceberg', or as being a way to
    see into the true nature of managers. Again, at other
  sentences:
  - 'times, the results of larger scale social science inquiries are taken as proving
    widespread managerial wrongdoing when that conclusion is reached only by a particular
    interpretation of the data. Such interpretation uses one or other of the anti
    management theories, in that way creating an illusion that the anti-management
    theory is valid. In contrast, the empirical findings may better fit a theory that
    has a more positive view of managers. However, the anti-management discourse in
    modern management schools ignores such more pro-management theories. This violates
    the scientific ideal that a range of the ories should be considered in interpreting
    data. Again, it leads to the overlooking of pro-manage ment research, both theoretical
    and empirical. Unanticipated negative consequences of teaching business ethics
    Education in business ethics has five elements that can produce unanticipated
    negative consequences thereby rendering ethics education ineffectual or counter-productive:
    misdiagnosis of causes of prob lems, salience of moral authority of academics,
    ethical philosophy, ethical dilemmas and free choice. Misdiagnosis of causes of
    problems A contemporary way of reasoning is to go from a few cases, to over-generalizations
    of a negative kind about management, and thence to recommendations such as more
    ethics education in management schools. Each of these steps in the chain needs
    to be queried. Many of the prominent cases of managerial wrongdoing are not primarily
    failures of ethics but are poor managerial business judgements that led to corporate
    financial collapse, prompting unethical acts or accompanied by unethical acts.
    This can be seen in'
  - ethics remains the extent to which it is central or peripheral to the curriculum.
    An Analysis of CSR, CI and Ethics Teaching in Business Schools 119 Business values
    driving the academic agenda? There are many views regarding the challenge of transferring
    ethical learning from the classroom into the corporation. Cordiero (2003) asserts
    the devel opment of ethical behaviour in managers ought to be grounded in their
    development as leaders, "ethics is not something a manager 'does'; it is something
    that a manager 'is'". Pfeffer and Fong (2004) argue that most effective and influential
    ethics education is best located within a pedagogic framework more akin to traditional
    professional education. This would incorporate clearly stated professional values
    and responsibilities, consistent with other established professions, a code of
    ethics and responsibilities should be defined with clear guidelines for those
    that violate professional standards, and disciplinary pro cedures to encourage
    non-tolerance of ethical malfeasance. The appropriateness of specific pedagogic
    options is not the only source of difficulty with regards to the effectiveness
    of ethics education in business schools. There is a strongly held view amongst
    some academics that business schools are reluctant to incorporate moral and ethical
    thinking into univer sity curricula (e.g., Scott, 1988; Sims and Sims, 1991).
    Kelly (2005) has observed that a number of US business schools are reducing or
    removing ethics teaching altogether from their curricula, which might be as a
    result of a lack of availability of appropriately qualified staff, over-crowded
    curricula and indiffer ence among staff not involved in ethics teaching. Pfeffer
  - 'the interviews were conducted using ORC''s CATI system. ORC utilizes a random-digit-dial
    sampling procedure that is fully replicated and stratified by region. According
    to ORC: "completed interviews are weighted by four variables: age, sex, geographic
    region, and race, to ensure reliable and accurate representation of the total
    population, 18 years of age and older... The use of replicable sampling, standardized
    inter viewing procedures and representative weighting provides that all CARAVAN
    studies are parallel to one another. Thus, CARAVAN usage is appropriate both for
    point-in-time analysis as well as tracking and trend comparisons" (ORC, CARAVAN
    research report, 2006). For all the details of the sampling procedures and operation
    of ORC, see Appendix A. For the purpose of computing the BEI, we employed the
    weighted sample to minimize demographic fluctuations as a source of sampling error.
    Results Respondent characteristics All five 2006 national probability samples
    comprised 1045 adults (18 years of age or older) living in private households
    in the continental United States. The respondents'' demographic characteristics
    for all five waves are presented in Table 1. EXHIBIT 1A Questions comprising the
    Business Ethics Index Personal/Past 1. Based on your own experiences as a consumer
    in the past year, businesses you dealt with generally behaved: Very unethically
    Somewhat unethically Neither nor Somewhat ethically Very ethically Vicarious/Past
    2. Based on what you heard from others or the media in the past year, businesses
    behaved: Very unethically Somewhat unethically Neither nor Somewhat ethically
    Very ethically Personal/Future 3. Based on your'
- source_sentence: 'solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view
    has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality
    and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the
    act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the
    act-object model for its intelligibility'
  sentences:
  - satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the
    Liar paradox, we consider the maximal
  - of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational
    notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our
    thoughts about existing objects,
  - at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues
    of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework, provided we understand
    intentional objects correctly. I use Crane as a guide here, and build on his work
    on intentional objects. In the end, we can provide a suitable solution to the
    problem of thinking
- source_sentence: 'might be discounted as intellectual laggards; they are also the
    disciplined and reflective professionals in the field. And among these are not
    only the artists and the poets, who might be suspected of carrying their creative
    habits over into their ordinary speech, but also the non-artists, whose interests
    in art are detached 378 MEANING RANGE IN WORK OF ART 379 and factual. These are
    the critics, the museum professionals, some philosophers, and even cultural historians
    and anthropologists. It is by no means characteristic of any of these latter groups
    today that they eschew the notion of meaning from their discussions of art. Quite
    the opposite. It is at least a nine to one probability that any considerable observation
    or discourse that one comes upon anywhere about art today will make some direct
    or implied reference to the meaning of art. A music critic speaks of the "intellectual
    content" of Beethoven''s symphonies. A literary critic affirms that in poetry
    "the .... aesthetic effect of intellectual cogency is not to be slighted."'' Another
    "disagrees" with some of the political views expressed by a poet in his poetry.
    An interpretation of the French impressionists in painting finds that a central
    aim of this school was to attain "the greatest possible degree of truth" in the
    presentation of its subjects.2 The writer of an introductory essay in a catalogue
    of a recent and notable exhibition of contemporary American painting states it
    directly: "Essentially, the artist is seeking to give visual'
  sentences:
  - the lower right‐hand corner of figure 1. You should answer no to each question,
    which is the view advanced by Daniel Boisvert, who has emphasized, in favor of
    his view, that pejorative terms seem to have precisely this kind of dual content—for
    example, the offensive racial slur ‘n——r’ clearly has a descriptive content, but
    it is also associated with a contemptuous attitude.12 In accordance with a no
    answer to question Q1, the contemptuous attitude it is associated with is the
    same, no matter what sentence it figures in and even when embedded under negations,
    inside conditionals, or in questions. In accordance with a no answer to question
    Q2, it is the same attitude for different speakers—always contempt for a certain
    racial group. In accordance with a no answer to question Q3, the descriptive content
    is the same for every speaker. And in accordance with a no answer to question
    Q4, the contemptuous attitude associated with this word derives from the descriptive
    content of the word, together with the attitudes prevalent in the social background
    in which the word was originally used. So the descriptive content does not depend
    on the associated attitude. So in Sections VIII and IX, I will look at precisely
    which sorts of advantages may possibly accrue to hybrid views in the lower right‐hand
    corner of the figure. I will argue that there are many sorts of advantages which
    cannot accrue to this sort of view but also that this view does allow for certain
    subtle
  - 'form to conceptions of truth."3 These are fair samples of considered statements
    about art which are characteristic of recent and present-day thinking by various
    specialists who concern themselves with it. Any reader of the literature about
    art will know that they can be multiplied practically without limit and from all
    quarters. The fair reader will know also that, although many such statements are
    semantically vague and ambiguous, their general intent is plain enough. There
    is among them common agreement that art conveys ideas which can be meaningfully
    stated. That is, in application to art they disagree with the positivistic thesis
    of meaning. They hold that not only can one think about art (which is not the
    issue), but also that you can think about thinking in art-which is the issue.
    With the disagreement thus set, I want to ask as my main question: Does the positivistic
    analysis of meaning invalidate the ascription of cognitive meaning to works of
    art, or does it not? A simple affirmative answer implies (1) correctness of the
    positivistic analysis of meaning on all points pertinent to its use in rejecting
    meaning claims for art; (2) either logical ignorance or perversity on the part
    of those who persist in speaking of the meaning of art. A simple negative answer
    implies (1) a faulty or incomplete analysis of the concept of cognitive meaning,
    or (2) a misunderstanding on the part of the logical or semantic critic of the
    nature of art with a resulting misapplication of the concept of meaning to'
  - Once this step is taken, it is not difficult to go on and say that any perception
    of a painting is an 'interpretation'. When this is said, the sense of 'interpretation'
    has been stretched, and we have what borders upon an octopus use of the term.
    I wish to show that the acceptance of an octopus use of 'interpretation' does
    not solve any of the standing problems in aesthetics and that it produces additional
    problems. In order to do this, I must first describe the differential use of 'interpretation'
    in the arts. *) 'Conversations with Marin', Corothy Norman, Art News, Dec., 1953,
    p. 59. 2) 'Everyone wants to understand art. Why not try to understand the song
    of a bird? Why does one love the night, flowers, everything around one, without
    trying to under stand them? But in the case of a painting, people have to understand.'
    Artists on Art, Robert Goldwater and Marco Tr?ves (ed.), Pantheon, 1945, p. 421.
    3) 'The vast majority of English folk can not, will not consider a picture as
    a picture apart from any story which it may be supposed to tell.' Ibid, p. 346,7.
    199 CAMPBELL CROCKETT II. THE DIFFERENTIAL USE OF 'INTERPRETATION' IN THE ARTS.
    Problems concerning 'interpretation' often arise in the arts, and we discuss and
    frequently disagree about surrealistic paintings, the novels of Kafka and Camus,
    and modern dance. When we raise questions con cerning the 'interpretation' of
    these and other works of art, often we do not know how to take what we see, hear,
- source_sentence: of the open society, he condemned complacency towards social institutions
    and so, if only tacitly, condemned complacency towards the institutions of science
    ([1944-1945] 1957, [1945] 1962).6 Not only did he fail to criticize scientific
    institutions explicitly, he too held up science-beautified as Socratic seminar-as
    a model for rational conduct in general and in politics in particular. In not
    working out the implications of his critical and democratic ideasfor institutional
    science Popper faltered. His beautification of science as institution was inconsistent
    with his critical philosophy of social institutions.7 What then are the scope
    and limits of republicanism applied to science? Both philosophers provide insights
    and ideas with which to criticize each other and, it is to be hoped, clarify the
    issues. In the body of this paper I condense them into four questions. Two questions
    focus on control. Should science be exempted from the democratic control of the
    wider society as Polanyi maintains (?2)?; or, is critical and democratic reform
    of institutionalized science possible along Popperian lines (?3). The two remaining
    questions focus on the impact of scientific norms and results on the host society.
    Is real existing science a suitable model for society in general along either
    Polanyiite or Popperian lines (?4)?; and, is science just one among the social
    institutions or, as both Polanyi and Popper claim, does its pursuit of truth make
    it exceptional and if so, how (?5)? 5. For the argument that The Logic of Scientific
    Discovery contains a social view of science see my The Republic
  sentences:
  - aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter,
    not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata
    for an aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure
    that satisfies all desiderata
  - of Science (Jarvie 2001). 6. In citing page numbers for these works I shall be
    using the more readily available 1957 book edition of 1944-1945 and the fourth
    (1962) edition of 1945. 7. In some of his later essays and addresses Popper shows
    considerable awareness of the deficiencies of institutionalized science, especially
    its implication in war technology (Popper 1994, chs. 4 and 6). Yet he does not
    look back to and revise his earlier presentation. 547 I. C. JARVIE 2. Democratic
    and Authoritarian Republics. Should science be exempted from the democratic control
    of the wider society? Polanyi's principal argument for exemption relies on his
    special view of scientific authority. Popper, a critic of all authority, offers
    a challenge to Polanyi's argument for exceptionalism. Polanyi wrote much on the
    social relations of science, finding there lessons for democratic society itself
    (1945, 1951, 1958, 1961, 1962). His work combines reliable ethnographic reports
    with controversial social and political analysis. To understand why he tries to
    fuse republicanism with authoritarianism we need to outline salient features of
    his social analysis of science. Polanyi views the working of science as "coordination
    by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives" much like teams working on a
    large jigsaw puzzle. Every puzzler keeps in mind the pieces held and the elements
    of the picture so far assembled, and remains watchfully aware of the progress
    of others. Polanyi's jigsaw puzzle metaphor harbors a difficulty. Unlike the picture
    cut up by the jigsaw, the world-picture is not a prior given.
  - to be used as an instrument, science must keep an essential measure of self-identity
    and autonomy. We could conclude this brief confrontation by saying that science
    is and must be both "neutral" and "non-neutral", according to the aspect of it
    we take into consideration. It can and must be neutral as far as it is a system
    of reliable knowledge; it cannot and must not be neutral as far as it is a human
    activity implicated with all the other aspects of the human praxis. All this may
    be rather clear, and is certainly very important to recognize, but new problems
    arise at this point. According to the two one-sided positions considered above,
    a kind of struggle was envisaged between science on the one side and the whole
    of its "external" environment on the other. For the ones the problem was that
    of preserving at all price the integrity of science, its independence and freedom
    towards the outside while for the others the problem was that of eliminating this
    arrogant pretension by reducing science to the dismasked role of being just a
    pawn in the complex game of the socio-political battle. What is common to both
    positions is the antagonistic way they envisage the relationship between science
    and the extra-scientific world. But we must note that this antagonistic way of
    thinking is by no means automatically eliminated once we become aware that science
    is somehow two different things at the same time, i.e. a system of knowledge and
    a human activity. For the problem immediately
- source_sentence: reflective conceptual scheme of the the observer's world. So, even
    though we can differentiate by analysis the conditions of our awareness, there
    is no actual awareness short of conceptual incorporation into a functional and
    rational world. Not only is there no thinking without signs; there is no experience
    short of thirdness. This does not imply that such experiences are whole and complete
    relative to consciousness. That for both Hegel and Peirce never happens short
    of the Absolute ? however different their visions ofthat Absolute may have been.
    What it does mean is that there is no direct access to any reality as it presents
    itself either the Cartesian mental or the Cartesian physical, that can warrant
    any claims for an epistemological direct realism. That thought is always mediated
    by sym bols gives the basis for the "critical" in Peirce's own critical common-sen
    sism, and puts him in line with Santayana and Sellars (perhaps Wilfred as well
    as Roy Wood) for critical realism. While this is the case epistemologically, Peirce
    wanted to maintain that such an account requires ontologically the reality of
    all three pheno menological categories. He chided Hegel for dwelling on thirdness
    to the exclusion of secondness and firstness, treating the triadic form as "a
    mere RECONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION 377 fashion of dress." "Had Hegel, instead
    of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them
    as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might
    have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their
  sentences:
  - truth" (CP5.436). Peirce maintained that they are all three as ontologically required
    as are firsts and seconds required for triadic relations in logic. Reaction and
    feeling are implicit in the continuity of habit, actuality and quality in the
    generality of law, and interpretation presupposes facts with which to come to
    terms. Since Peirce, the neo-posi tivists have tried to reduce thirds to seconds,
    clearly without success. Among the reactions to that pristine scientism have been
    the current waves of neohegelian fervour that attempt to move the other way, by
    absorbing feeling and action into interpretation. Peirce's ontological realism
    is based on logical conditions for phenomenology , and thus resists the reductionis
    ts urges in both directions. These epistemological and ontological realisms are
    grounded in the dynamical object. Peirce understood dynamis much as Aristotle
    understood the material condition of change, as serving a conditional limit and
    as suggesting a teleological fulfillment. Peirce thought it conditional because
    it was interactive with other circumstances of action and experience. The determination
    of it as a limit to action and experience depended upon how it related to other
    conditions in its circumstantial context, and that can be dealt with in thought
    and action only in an actualized and conceptualized form. None the less, the dynamical
    object stands over against thought and action, and it requires coming to terms
    with it to make sense of the world and to act in it. Ultimately, were we to consider
    it as some sort of surd
  - logic of relations; although what the intimate connection is between these studies
    and his metaphysics Peirce leaves the reader to guess at random. 4 This approach
    has many obvious affiliations with the "presuppositionless ' studies of essences
    by Descartes, Husserl, and Santayana, although in the light of Peirce 's devastating
    critique of the Augustinian-Cartesian philosophy in his earliest papers, too much
    can not be made of this similarity. And after the nature of Thirdness has been
    discussed it will be seen how full of presuppositions Peirce 's analysis really
    is. 368 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Let us turn to the categories themselves. The Category
    of Firstness indicates the aspect of freshness, life, freedom, variety, and spontaneity
    in the phaneron. Thus it would seem that Firstness presents the phase of atomicity,
    specificity, or sheer quality in experience. A quality is just what it is, and
    in its sheer immediacy is utterly disconnected with any other quality. On the
    other hand Peirce regards Firstness as a "pure nature" or quality to which embodiment
    and localization are essentially foreign (1.303). A quality is eternal, independent
    of time or of any realization (1.420); it is simply a "may-be," whose nature is
    that it might be a specific moment in a phaneron. Nevertheless Firstness is not
    a general or universal, since to be a universal involves reference to embodiment
    and localization (1.304). It is not easy to reconcile these various characterizations
    of Firstness. Peirce seems to shuttle back and forth between regarding Firstness
  - 'peculiar theory. Royce does not appear to distinguish the mystic''s motive from
    the motive ot speculation in general, the motive which the mystic has in common
    witb the realist, the motive drawn from the defects of that (wonderfully depicted)
    "finite situation that ;sends us all alike looking for true Being ". In so far
    as mystic and realist alike have the intention not alone to find true Being, but
    to define it, both must be equally condemned by Royce''s proof that " Each in
    the end defines Nothing whatever ".1 But what if the difference between mystic
    and realist lay precisely in this point: that the purpose of the mystic is not
    to define anything at all, but to do something which by every device he has tried
    to differentiate from all processes of defirning or of speculating. I believe
    this to be the case; and that, the logic of Royce thus passes over his head. The
    purpose of the mystic lies in the region of the practice of religion; and his
    essential theoretical message is, that there is a practical cognition of the Absolute
    which philosophical knowledge necessarily fails to reach. The point of difference
    between the mystic and all speculators (including the speculative mystics as speculators)
    seems to me to be this:A philosophy does not supply the thinker ipso facto either
    with the incentive to worship or with the power to worship. Thought may perhaps
    persuade us of God''s immediate presence in experience, and yet it leaves us empty
    of the idea of ''approach''; it'
model-index:
- name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
  results:
  - task:
      type: triplet
      name: Triplet
    dataset:
      name: nomic
      type: nomic
    metrics:
    - type: cosine_accuracy
      value: 0.972
      name: Cosine Accuracy
    - type: dot_accuracy
      value: 0.028
      name: Dot Accuracy
    - type: manhattan_accuracy
      value: 0.968
      name: Manhattan Accuracy
    - type: euclidean_accuracy
      value: 0.972
      name: Euclidean Accuracy
    - type: max_accuracy
      value: 0.972
      name: Max Accuracy
    - type: cosine_accuracy
      value: 0.971
      name: Cosine Accuracy
    - type: dot_accuracy
      value: 0.029
      name: Dot Accuracy
    - type: manhattan_accuracy
      value: 0.9695
      name: Manhattan Accuracy
    - type: euclidean_accuracy
      value: 0.971
      name: Euclidean Accuracy
    - type: max_accuracy
      value: 0.971
      name: Max Accuracy
---

# SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

## Model Details

### Model Description
- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
- **Base model:** [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1) <!-- at revision ec7a86b7066613e0a8acf87e1fcaaf23f8733dd6 -->
- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 8192 tokens
- **Output Dimensionality:** 768 tokens
- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
<!-- - **Training Dataset:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **Language:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **License:** Unknown -->

### Model Sources

- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)

### Full Model Architecture

```
SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)
```

## Usage

### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

```bash
pip install -U sentence-transformers
```

Then you can load this model and run inference.
```python
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v3")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'reflective conceptual scheme of the the observer\'s world. So, even though we can differentiate by analysis the conditions of our awareness, there is no actual awareness short of conceptual incorporation into a functional and rational world. Not only is there no thinking without signs; there is no experience short of thirdness. This does not imply that such experiences are whole and complete relative to consciousness. That for both Hegel and Peirce never happens short of the Absolute ? however different their visions ofthat Absolute may have been. What it does mean is that there is no direct access to any reality as it presents itself either the Cartesian mental or the Cartesian physical, that can warrant any claims for an epistemological direct realism. That thought is always mediated by sym bols gives the basis for the "critical" in Peirce\'s own critical common-sen sism, and puts him in line with Santayana and Sellars (perhaps Wilfred as well as Roy Wood) for critical realism. While this is the case epistemologically, Peirce wanted to maintain that such an account requires ontologically the reality of all three pheno menological categories. He chided Hegel for dwelling on thirdness to the exclusion of secondness and firstness, treating the triadic form as "a mere RECONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION 377 fashion of dress." "Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their',
    'truth" (CP5.436). Peirce maintained that they are all three as ontologically required as are firsts and seconds required for triadic relations in logic. Reaction and feeling are implicit in the continuity of habit, actuality and quality in the generality of law, and interpretation presupposes facts with which to come to terms. Since Peirce, the neo-posi tivists have tried to reduce thirds to seconds, clearly without success. Among the reactions to that pristine scientism have been the current waves of neohegelian fervour that attempt to move the other way, by absorbing feeling and action into interpretation. Peirce\'s ontological realism is based on logical conditions for phenomenology , and thus resists the reductionis ts urges in both directions. These epistemological and ontological realisms are grounded in the dynamical object. Peirce understood dynamis much as Aristotle understood the material condition of change, as serving a conditional limit and as suggesting a teleological fulfillment. Peirce thought it conditional because it was interactive with other circumstances of action and experience. The determination of it as a limit to action and experience depended upon how it related to other conditions in its circumstantial context, and that can be dealt with in thought and action only in an actualized and conceptualized form. None the less, the dynamical object stands over against thought and action, and it requires coming to terms with it to make sense of the world and to act in it. Ultimately, were we to consider it as some sort of surd',
    'logic of relations; although what the intimate connection is between these studies and his metaphysics Peirce leaves the reader to guess at random. 4 This approach has many obvious affiliations with the "presuppositionless \' studies of essences by Descartes, Husserl, and Santayana, although in the light of Peirce \'s devastating critique of the Augustinian-Cartesian philosophy in his earliest papers, too much can not be made of this similarity. And after the nature of Thirdness has been discussed it will be seen how full of presuppositions Peirce \'s analysis really is. 368 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Let us turn to the categories themselves. The Category of Firstness indicates the aspect of freshness, life, freedom, variety, and spontaneity in the phaneron. Thus it would seem that Firstness presents the phase of atomicity, specificity, or sheer quality in experience. A quality is just what it is, and in its sheer immediacy is utterly disconnected with any other quality. On the other hand Peirce regards Firstness as a "pure nature" or quality to which embodiment and localization are essentially foreign (1.303). A quality is eternal, independent of time or of any realization (1.420); it is simply a "may-be," whose nature is that it might be a specific moment in a phaneron. Nevertheless Firstness is not a general or universal, since to be a universal involves reference to embodiment and localization (1.304). It is not easy to reconcile these various characterizations of Firstness. Peirce seems to shuttle back and forth between regarding Firstness',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
```

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### Direct Usage (Transformers)

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### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)

You can finetune this model on your own dataset.

<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

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### Out-of-Scope Use

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## Evaluation

### Metrics

#### Triplet
* Dataset: `nomic`
* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

| Metric             | Value     |
|:-------------------|:----------|
| cosine_accuracy    | 0.972     |
| dot_accuracy       | 0.028     |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.968     |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.972     |
| **max_accuracy**   | **0.972** |

#### Triplet
* Dataset: `nomic`
* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

| Metric             | Value     |
|:-------------------|:----------|
| cosine_accuracy    | 0.971     |
| dot_accuracy       | 0.029     |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.9695    |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.971     |
| **max_accuracy**   | **0.971** |

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## Bias, Risks and Limitations

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### Recommendations

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## Training Details

### Training Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 10,000 training samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                             | negative                                                                            |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                               | string                                                                              |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 10 tokens</li><li>mean: 255.88 tokens</li><li>max: 655 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 14 tokens</li><li>mean: 255.08 tokens</li><li>max: 490 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 15 tokens</li><li>mean: 270.3 tokens</li><li>max: 562 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  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  |:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------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  | <code>finite equational basis. The extension of this theorem to the quasivariety case by J. Czelakowski, W. Dziobiak [5] and the first author [16] followed. Finally, K. A. Baker and J. Wang proved [2] that a variety V with DPSC and Vsi (Vfsi) strictly elementary has finite equational basis. The new proof of Baker's theorem presented in [2] is based on the above mentioned result of K. A. Baker and J. Wang, and the fact that each finitely generated congruence-distributive variety hats DPSC [2, Theorem 2]. In order to obtain a proof of Pigozzi's theorem one can easily carry over the latter fact to the quasivariety case (Proposition 7) and use our Theorem 2. Pigozzi's theorem was already reproved by W. Dziobiak in [6] and by M. Maróti, R. McKenzie in [12]. But, according to our knowledge, the proof presented here is the shortest one, as is the proof of Baker's theorem given in [2]. However, both these proofs are non-constructive. The results more general than Pigozzi's theorem are known nowadays. The first author of this article proved in [17] that a locally finite relatively congruence-distributive quasivariety Q has a finite quasi-equational basis provided the class Qfsi is strictly elementary. W. Dziobiak, M. Maróti, R. McKenzie and the first author proved [7] that each finitely generated relatively congruence-meet-semidistributive quasivariety has a finite quasiequational basis. It is a quasivariety version of Willard's theorem [20]. Finally, K. Palasinska proved in [18] that a finitely generated</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                         | <code>protoalgebraic filter-distributive strict universal Horn class is finitely axiomatizable. 2. Toolbox We briefly recall basic facts from quasivariety theory we will need. A standard book about quasivarieties is [8] and about universal algebra are [4, 14]. One may also consult the classical position [11]. Definable Relative Principal Subcongruences 111 We assume that all considered algebras are in the same finite language. A quasivariety Q is a class of algebras defined by a set S of quasi-identities (strict universal Horn sentences). The set E is called a quasiequational basis of Q. Recall that a class is strictly elementary, or finitely axiomatizable, if it may be defined by a single sentence. Notice that a quasivariety Q has a finite quasi-equational basis if and only if Q is strictly elementary. The smallest quasivariety Q containing a given class Ç is SPPu(ö), where P denotes the product class operator, Pu denotes the ultraproduct class operator, and S denotes the subalgebra class operator [8, Corollary 2.3.4]. If G is a finite family of finite algebras, then Q = SP(£), and every such Q is called finitely generated. Let Q be a quasivariety. A congruence a on an algebra A is called a Q-congruence provided A/ a G Q. Note that A G Q if and only if the equality relation 0^ on A is a Q-congruence. The set Cong (A) of all Q-congruences of A forms an algebraic lattice which is a meet-subsemilattice of Con(A) [8, Corollary 1.4.11]. We use the symbol V2 for the lattice join in Cong(A). A nontrivial algebra S</code>                                                                                                                                                                                             | <code>CEP. It follows from this result that V(Qmn), (, n) 0 {(0, 0), (1, 0)}, does not have AP. Using Priestley duality we show in Section 3 that the class of finite quasi-Stone algebras has AP. We do not know whether the whole class QSA has AP. This problem was posed by H. P. Sankappanavar in [8]. In Section 5 we explain briefly how to obtain the free quasi-Stone algebra over a set S from the free Q-lattice over S. Priestley Duality for Quasi-Stone Algebras 85 The concepts and results on distributive lattices and universal algebra that are used here are well known and can be found in the books [1] and [3]. We assume that the reader is familiar with Priestley duality for distributive lattice (see [6] and [7]), the theory of Q-distributive lattices ([4] and [5]) and the theory of quasi-Stone algebras ([8]). 2. Duality The results of this section rely on ?2 of [4]. For a distributive lattice L with 0 and 1 we will denote its Priestley space by X. X can be represented as the set of prime filters of L ordered by set inclusion, the topology on X having as a sub-base the sets of the form {P E X: a 0 P} and {P C X: a E P} for each a E L. The map a 9-+ {P C I: a E P} is a lattice isomorphism of L onto the lattice of clopen increasing subsets of X, where join is set union, meet is</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
  | <code>London 2001 . 8 J. Milbank C. Pickstock G. Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy. A New Theology, Routledge, London New York 1999; J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, Blackwell Publishing, Maiden 20062, esp. chapt. 12, pp. 382-442; S. Zižek J. Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ. Paradox or Dialectic?, MIT Press, Cambridge London 2009, pp. 110-233. The most notable figures in this context are: J. Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, trans, by D. Wills, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007; Id., Violence and Metaphysics, in Writing and Difference, trans, by A. Bass, Routledge, London 1978, pp. 79-153; G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans, by P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York 1994, pp. 5-11; G. Deleuze F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans, by B. Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1987; M.C. Taylor, Altarity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1987; m! Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: S0ren Kierkegaard's Ethics of Responsibility, Fordham University Press, New York 2001. This list is provisional and highly selective. The historical-intellectual contours of poststructuralism are drawn by Johannes Willem Bertens in The Idea of the Postmodern. A History, Routledge, London New York 1995. 10 J. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1997. 1 Id., On Religion, p. 119. 614 LEO STAN attack against established Christianity and its underlying critique of classical metaphysics12. Kierkegaard matters to Caputo because he discloses a universal horizon to religiosity, above and beyond the partial (and always contentious)</code> | <code>instantiations of particular religions. (2) Contrary to Caputo's efforts to universalize Kierkegaard's religious thought, a rather particularistic approach has been advanced by the Christian theologian John Milbank, one of the founders of Radical Orthodoxy. In a groundbreaking essay, titled The Sublime in Kierkegaard 13 , Milbank actually agrees with the poststructuralist reception and tries to describe to what extent Kierkegaard anticipates the postmodern image of the self. One of the reasons Milbank invokes in this direction is that the Kierkegaardian model of subjectivity remains somehow devoid of any universal significance14. For him, Kierkegaard's (religious) selfhood is «endlessly liable to fracture and postponement», «simultaneously preconstituted and deconstituted by a repetitious dynamic which permits only an illusory self-mastery»15. As 12 Moreover, Caputo relies on Kierkegaard's opposition to any rational grounding of religious experience with the subsequent privileging of the processual, finite, incommunicable, passionate, jocose, and thus always perspectivai side of the self's interaction with the divine. See Id., Instants, Secrets , and Singularities : Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida , in M. J. Matuštik M. Westphal (eds.), Kierkegaard in Posti Modernity, Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indianapolis 1995, pp. 216-238; Id., Radical Hermeneutics , Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1987, pp. 1 1-35, 92, 262, 292, 294; Id., How to Read Kierkegaard , W.W. Norton & Company, New York London 2008, pp. 3, 16, 55. Ironically enough, Caputo wishes to be part of the postmodernist reception of Kierkegaard, which, as already stated, prefers to insist on the nonand even</code> | <code>B ' 'provides the measure against the recurring idolatric tendencies across the spectrum of culture-spheres' (p. 12) a transcendence which is missed by theorists like Habermas. Kierkegaard is often held up in this collection as a corrective to some twentieth-century excesses or distortions. Thus, Patricia Huntington argues that Heidegger's ontologizing of Kierkegaard 'depletes the latter's thought of its ethical import' (p. 44). C. Stephen Evans contrasts Kierkegaard's Christian therapy with Freud's fatalism and pessimism. Matustik traces the way in which Kierkegaard evades modernity's political categories, whilst Westphal claims that Levinas's ethical philosophy lacks Kierkegaard's hope for an ultimate reconciliation of self and Other. This is no simple hagiography of the Danish master, however. True, the essayists are by and large keen to dispel some images of Kierkegaard, and to stress his relevance to social ethics (Perkins, McBride, Evans, Matustik) and REVIEWS 23I as a partner in dialogue for feminist thinking (Berry, Lorraine). But there are notes of criticism too. Huntington points to Kierkegaard's failure to develop a critique of our inherited symbolic order a failure in which he can be supplemented by a reading of Derrida. Alison Leigh Brown writes of Kierkegaard's evasion of feminine imagery for the divine and a need to resist his logic of sacrifice. Jurgen Habermas's contribution criticizes Michael Theunissen for his Kierkegaardian equation of transcendence with a God relationship. Thus, in various ways, a critique of Kierkegaard's conservatism and other-worldliness is upheld. The interest of the collection lies partly in its tensions tensions between those who</code> |
  | <code>constructed opposition between Spinoza and Hegel. Where Zizek views Hegel's non-dualistic relational epistemology as a substantial improvement over Spinoza's purported dogmatic</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <code>account of a reality which is external to the perceiver, I argue that Hegel inherited such an epistemology from Spinoza. Ultimately, it is Spinoza who provides Hegel with</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <code>makes sense of things. In Section II, the discussion turns to Hegel's notion of a 'form of consciousness'. I argue that Hegel's notion of a 'form of consciousness' is best understood as comprising a worldview. The principal advantage of articulating stances in a Hegelian way is that such an interpretation explicitly details both the theoretical and affective attitudes</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  ```

### Evaluation Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 500 evaluation samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                             | negative                                                                             |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                               | string                                                                               |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 23 tokens</li><li>mean: 257.39 tokens</li><li>max: 530 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 23 tokens</li><li>mean: 256.21 tokens</li><li>max: 530 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 19 tokens</li><li>mean: 265.53 tokens</li><li>max: 814 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
  |:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | <code>cause harm.6 The authors identify the line between reckless and negligent conduct as the line between awareness and unawareness of the risk one is creating.7 In their view, there is no morally significant difference between punishing someone who himself lacked awareness of a risk even if a reasonable person would have been aware ofthat risk and strict liability. They argue that in either case the actor may be punished without proof that she herself consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk,8 and that there is no principled way of identifying the universe of risks to which one ought to advert.9 And because they assume that negligent behavior lacks the element of choice and therefore falls below the threshold for culpability, they deem it improperly consequentialist to consider whether punishing negligence would promote the penal goal of communicating and enforcing norms for future conduct.10 II. THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST NEGLIGENCE What sort of argument are the authors making against negligence liability? 'Negligence' might simply be the evaluative label the authors place on the category of conduct that they consider morally non-culpable. The argument might run that criminal culpability requires a guilty mind, a guilty mind requires con6 Id. at p. 79. 7 Id. at p. 69. 8 Id. atDD. 81-82. 9 Id. at η. 76. 10 Id. at p. 78. 436 SUSAN Α. BANDES scious choice, negligence is by definition a lack of conscious choice, and hence negligence is non-culpable. Negligence might simply connote a lack of mens rea in</code>                        | <code>its most general sense: an absence of blameworthiness.11 Alternatively, it might connote a lack of mens rea in its more specific, elemental, sense: the absence of a conscious or subjective state of mind. In either formulation, the term 'negligence' makes no real contribution. It is essentially a legal conclusion serving the same purpose as the term 'non-culpable,' rather than a term identifying a type of conduct. This is the sort of argument that merges the descriptive task of identifying the mental state with the normative task of determining whether the mental state should be punishable.12 This does not strike me as a fair or plausible reading of the authors' argument. Rather, there is ample support for the conclusion that the authors are making a descriptive argument about the negligent state of mind as a fact in the world.13 The argument is that negligent actors do not make a conscious choice to risk or cause harm. Their actions are beyond their control.14 Moreover, 'character traits are not under actors' direct control, nor can we change our characters at will, at least not at any given moment in time'.15 This argument about the nature of negligence rests on two basic descriptive assumptions. First, it assumes that the negligent actor is unaware of the risk she is taking. Second, it assumes that at the time she undertakes 11 See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law (5th ed. 2009), pp. 118-119 (distinguishing broad 'culpability' meaning of mens rea from narrow 'elemental' meaning of the term). 12</code>                             | <code>intention, focusing instead on corpo rate irresponsibility and negligence. He argues that corporate intention to do harm will not gen erally be identifiable. What could be more easily identifiable is a lack of awareness of risk, a lack of concern, perhaps a degree of irresponsibility. These "dispositions" can be readily absorbed by the culture of an organisation or part of an organisation, and can be extremely difficult for individuals to resist. In such a context the organ isation might be seen as having a moral equiva lent of civil liability, where we would not be looking for intention in order to hold the mis creant liable, but rather a lack of care leading to harmful consequences. Gibson does not argue that the concept of intention is erroneous, simply that the concept of negligence is more produc tive. However, shifting focus to corporate negli gence does not in fact remove the problem of corporate intention. A negligent corporation is one that can be held responsible for its failure to act prudently and with thought to the conse quences of its actions. To be held responsible for its negligent actions or inaction it must be capable of acting otherwise in this context, of acting prudently and far-sightedly. And prudent, far-sighted action involves intention, even if it is only the negative intention of avoiding certain outcomes. So a culpably negligent corporation must be capable of such intentional action. The problem of intention simply returns by another route, despite Gibson's efforts. A more fundamental rethinking of the issues is undertaken by Ouyang and</code> |
  | <code>clear the air and set the stage. Consider a green spot. Call F the fact of its being green. It is as "simple" a fact as I can think of. Yet, being a fact, F, like any other fact, has constituents which are things. In this sense no fact is "simple." (The familiar difference thus revealed between the uses of 'simple' as applied to facts and to things, respectively, will play a role in the last part.) Which thing or things are the constituents of F? Some answer that they are two, namely, an individual (the spot) and a character (the spot's color). The answer seems obvious; to me it is obvious. But, then, it has not been and still is not obvious to many. Up to a point, of course, everyone agrees that in being presented with F he is presented with the color. Beyond that point, though, some try to make distinctions. They might claim, for instance, that the individual and the character are not presented in quite the same way, only the former but not the latter being "wholly presented." Objections against calling the character a thing, as well as against calling an expression directly referring to it a name, as either unusual or confusing, may be a linguistic symptom of this attempt to distinguish. An extreme and explicit variant of it is to insist that F has only one constituent (which is a thing) and that this constituent is neither the spot nor its color but,</code>                                                                                                                                                                                      | <code>rather, the "colored spot." We have come upon the root of the realismnominalism controversy, a disagreement so fundamental that one might expect it to be relevant to almost any question a philosopher is likely to raise. I shall take it for granted that F has two constituents which are things and which are presented to us 20 INEFFABILITT AND ONTOLOGY whenever F is presented, namely, the individual and the character. But I shall also argue that F has three further constituents which in some sense are presented to us whenever F is. The accent in this paper is on these additional three-this excess, as it were, over either one or two constituents. This is the peculiar way in which, fundamental as it is, the difference between one and two, if I may so express myself, does not matter for my purpose. When I know that this is a green spot, I know also that (i) the spot is an individual, (2) the color is a character, and (3) the former exemplifies the latter (and not, perhaps, the latter the former). How could I know all this if it were not, in some sense, presented to me? To grasp the idea more firmly, consider for a moment a visual field containing two spots, one red, one green. When this field is presented to me, I also know which spot exemplifies which color and, for that matter, also that no spot or color exemplifies the other spot or color. How, to repeat,</code>                                                                                                                                                                                           | <code>cannot be opposed to, for they are part of Reality. Their true logical opposite is not Reality but the Absolute, and to it they are opposed as the finite to the Infinite, the relation being, if viewed from the side of appearances, on,e of total dependence; if viewed from the side of the Absolute, one of absoluteness, independence or irrelativity. (2) Whatever appears to be is.-By saying that a content is real, we mean in the first instance, that it is a logical function of the real system with which we come in contact in perceptive experience. Now this real system (the real world of common-sense) is itself an intellectual construction, and it owes its reality to its being a logical function of the absolute and all-inclusive system. If these positions are granted, it will follow that every appearance is real if every appearance in its integral and proper nature is a function of the absolute system. Since it is in the content of error and illusion, if anywhere, that we must look for unreal appearance, I propose to undertake an analysis which I hope will serve the double object of at once justifying this test of reality and of showing that every appearance satisfies it. Consider such cases as the following: the variations of colour which an object presents in different lights and at different distances; the blueness, for example, of the hills on the horizon, which we refuse to refer to them as their real colour, or the ghostlike appearance of a scarecrow at night to a belated wanderer,</code>                                                                                    |
  | <code>their end and in their fate,... willingly or not, everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology, kit and caboodle, will follow the path of the signifier. (Lacan 1988, pp. 43-44) 2 For convenience, Lacan's works shall be cited henceforth in the text with date and page number, for example (1948, p. 17); other citations shall be by name, date, and page number (unless the author is indicated in the immediately preceding text, in which case only date and page number will be cited). 3 This is Lacan's word, from the opening quotation above. 4 Human infants are, obviously, gendered, and thus usually referred to with pronouns such as "he or she" and "him or herself." However, since I will constantly be making pronominal reference to infants in my discussion of Lacan's account of the mirror stage, gendered but gender-neutral pronouns would become extremely awkward, making an already-complicated exposition even more muddled. (For example, the next sentence would read as follows: "The infant anticipates a not-yet-experienced coherence and unity of self as he or she recognizes him or herself in the unified body seen in the mirror.") Hence, when making pronominal reference to infants in this paper, I shall use "it" and "itself." This is not meant to dehumanize infants in any way (on the contrary), but rather to facilitate communication of complex ideas. & Springer The Alienating Mirror 21 1 Lacan the event in which a consciousness becomes a self-consciousness. Recognizing an as-yet unrealized unity in the body-image in a mirror and</code> | <code>recognizing this image as its own, the infant becomes aware of itself as a unity, and thus gains selfconsciousness. But Lacan's account diverges markedly here from Hegel's classic account of the acquisition of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness cannot occur, as it does in Lacan's account, without reference to another consciousness.5 If self-consciousness or ego formation is only possible on the presupposition of certain kinds of social interaction, then the mirror stage is not the initial moment of ego-formation, as Lacan suggests, but rather the culmination or conclusion of an extended social process. In order to substantiate this objection, I will first have to present Lacan's account of the mirror stage and ego-formation in some detail. I will then be able to show why the infant's self-recognition in the mirror seems to be prefaced upon some sort of prior mutual-recognition with another subject. In conclusion, I will be able to identify some potential implications of this critique for Lacan's account of the subject and point toward several other promising directions for research. Lacan's account of ego-formation in the infant can be presented very briefly. The two papers in which Lacan himself presents his view are each a mere seven pages in length.6 The key idea, as we have already sketched, is that at a certain stage in an infant's development, when the infant first recognizes its image in a mirror, reacting with jubilation to the recognized image,</code> | <code>wholeness, marks his dynamics with 3 Hypatia Otherness throughout his psychic development. It is this simultaneous desire and fear, simultaneous dependence and disavowal, that shapes him into a split, violent subject warring always against the Otherness of his own embodiment. THE STUFF OF NIGHTMARES . . I want to look more carefully at these boundaries-boundaries between self and Other; and the projection of this internal, psychic Otherness onto boundaries between physical selves and others. I want to look more carefully at these boundaries and projections, at our cultural obsession with them, and at the violences that these produce. It is perhaps too easy in the telling of this story to turn one more time to Rene Descartes (1986) and lay this all at his doorstep-Descartes, the dualistic madman who forever severed our bodies from our minds, and consequently our selves from other selves. That story is perhaps too easy and too worn to illuminate these dynamics. In a more contemporary telling of the Cartesian dualism, Lacan portrays for us in the mirror stage the formation of a subject as an effect of the idealization of a body-in-control. To become a body-incontrol-or at least to pursue this as an ideal, which is necessary to become a legible and meaningful subject in western symbolics-the subject must clearly identify the rigid boundaries between itself and others, including that Other reflected back to it in the image of the mirror. The warring against his Otherness that marks this subject as forever split demands that he separate</code>                                   |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  ```

### Training Hyperparameters
#### Non-Default Hyperparameters

- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.01
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates

#### All Hyperparameters
<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
- `do_predict`: False
- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `prediction_loss_only`: True
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.01
- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
- `num_train_epochs`: 3
- `max_steps`: -1
- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `warmup_steps`: 0
- `log_level`: passive
- `log_level_replica`: warning
- `log_on_each_node`: True
- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
- `save_safetensors`: True
- `save_on_each_node`: False
- `save_only_model`: False
- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
- `no_cuda`: False
- `use_cpu`: False
- `use_mps_device`: False
- `seed`: 42
- `data_seed`: None
- `jit_mode_eval`: False
- `use_ipex`: False
- `bf16`: False
- `fp16`: False
- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
- `half_precision_backend`: auto
- `bf16_full_eval`: False
- `fp16_full_eval`: False
- `tf32`: None
- `local_rank`: 0
- `ddp_backend`: None
- `tpu_num_cores`: None
- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
- `debug`: []
- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
- `past_index`: -1
- `disable_tqdm`: False
- `remove_unused_columns`: True
- `label_names`: None
- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
- `ignore_data_skip`: False
- `fsdp`: []
- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
- `deepspeed`: None
- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
- `optim`: adamw_torch
- `optim_args`: None
- `adafactor`: False
- `group_by_length`: False
- `length_column_name`: length
- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
- `push_to_hub`: False
- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
- `hub_model_id`: None
- `hub_strategy`: every_save
- `hub_private_repo`: False
- `hub_always_push`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
- `fp16_backend`: auto
- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
- `mp_parameters`: 
- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
- `full_determinism`: False
- `torchdynamo`: None
- `ray_scope`: last
- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
- `torch_compile`: False
- `torch_compile_backend`: None
- `torch_compile_mode`: None
- `dispatch_batches`: None
- `split_batches`: None
- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
- `optim_target_modules`: None
- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
- `eval_on_start`: False
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional

</details>

### Training Logs
| Epoch  | Step | Training Loss | loss   | nomic_max_accuracy |
|:------:|:----:|:-------------:|:------:|:------------------:|
| 0      | 0    | -             | -      | 0.932              |
| 0.04   | 100  | 0.0092        | 0.0087 | 0.934              |
| 0.08   | 200  | 0.0073        | 0.0078 | 0.95               |
| 0.12   | 300  | 0.0063        | 0.0069 | 0.952              |
| 0.16   | 400  | 0.0073        | 0.0060 | 0.956              |
| 0.2    | 500  | 0.0066        | 0.0056 | 0.958              |
| 0.24   | 600  | 0.0056        | 0.0060 | 0.958              |
| 0.28   | 700  | 0.0056        | 0.0059 | 0.954              |
| 0.32   | 800  | 0.006         | 0.0050 | 0.968              |
| 0.36   | 900  | 0.003         | 0.0045 | 0.968              |
| 0.4    | 1000 | 0.0035        | 0.0045 | 0.964              |
| 0.44   | 1100 | 0.0047        | 0.0041 | 0.968              |
| 0.48   | 1200 | 0.0039        | 0.0051 | 0.956              |
| 0.52   | 1300 | 0.0036        | 0.0043 | 0.964              |
| 0.56   | 1400 | 0.0042        | 0.0051 | 0.956              |
| 0.6    | 1500 | 0.0045        | 0.0041 | 0.97               |
| 0.64   | 1600 | 0.0026        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 0.68   | 1700 | 0.0044        | 0.0037 | 0.968              |
| 0.72   | 1800 | 0.004         | 0.0043 | 0.97               |
| 0.76   | 1900 | 0.0039        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 0.8    | 2000 | 0.0046        | 0.0043 | 0.97               |
| 0.84   | 2100 | 0.0042        | 0.0040 | 0.968              |
| 0.88   | 2200 | 0.0032        | 0.0040 | 0.972              |
| 0.92   | 2300 | 0.0047        | 0.0040 | 0.97               |
| 0.96   | 2400 | 0.004         | 0.0036 | 0.974              |
| 1.0    | 2500 | 0.0026        | 0.0035 | 0.978              |
| 1.04   | 2600 | 0.0024        | 0.0040 | 0.968              |
| 1.08   | 2700 | 0.001         | 0.0040 | 0.97               |
| 1.12   | 2800 | 0.0016        | 0.0039 | 0.972              |
| 1.16   | 2900 | 0.0011        | 0.0030 | 0.976              |
| 1.2    | 3000 | 0.0012        | 0.0034 | 0.976              |
| 1.24   | 3100 | 0.0009        | 0.0035 | 0.972              |
| 1.28   | 3200 | 0.0009        | 0.0037 | 0.97               |
| 1.32   | 3300 | 0.0004        | 0.0035 | 0.972              |
| 1.3600 | 3400 | 0.0003        | 0.0037 | 0.97               |
| 1.4    | 3500 | 0.0006        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 1.44   | 3600 | 0.0008        | 0.0036 | 0.968              |
| 1.48   | 3700 | 0.0002        | 0.0036 | 0.968              |
| 1.52   | 3800 | 0.0002        | 0.0037 | 0.968              |
| 1.56   | 3900 | 0.0002        | 0.0038 | 0.968              |
| 1.6    | 4000 | 0.0003        | 0.0038 | 0.968              |
| 1.6400 | 4100 | 0.0003        | 0.0038 | 0.968              |
| 1.6800 | 4200 | 0.0003        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 1.72   | 4300 | 0.0002        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 1.76   | 4400 | 0.0005        | 0.0035 | 0.97               |
| 1.8    | 4500 | 0.0005        | 0.0034 | 0.974              |
| 1.8400 | 4600 | 0.0005        | 0.0039 | 0.964              |
| 1.88   | 4700 | 0.0002        | 0.0040 | 0.964              |
| 1.92   | 4800 | 0.0003        | 0.0040 | 0.964              |
| 1.96   | 4900 | 0.0002        | 0.0039 | 0.968              |
| 2.0    | 5000 | 0.0003        | 0.0038 | 0.968              |
| 2.04   | 5100 | 0.0001        | 0.0038 | 0.97               |
| 2.08   | 5200 | 0.0001        | 0.0037 | 0.97               |
| 2.12   | 5300 | 0.0001        | 0.0037 | 0.968              |
| 2.16   | 5400 | 0.0001        | 0.0036 | 0.972              |
| 2.2    | 5500 | 0.0002        | -      | 0.971              |


### Framework Versions
- Python: 3.10.12
- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
- Transformers: 4.42.4
- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
- Accelerate: 0.32.1
- Datasets: 2.21.0
- Tokenizers: 0.19.1

## Citation

### BibTeX

#### Sentence Transformers
```bibtex
@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}
```

#### TripletLoss
```bibtex
@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}
```

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