idx
int64 | project
string | commit_id
string | project_url
string | commit_url
string | commit_message
string | target
int64 | func
string | func_hash
float64 | file_name
string | file_hash
float64 | cwe
sequence | cve
string | cve_desc
string | nvd_url
string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
216,871 | openssl | 23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2 | Fix printing of PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> | 1 | static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
BIO *out, int indent)
{
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
else
BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
return 1;
} | 277,287,998,004,405,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2021-3712 | ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3712 |
507,853 | openssl | 23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2 | Fix printing of PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> | 0 | static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
BIO *out, int indent)
{
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
else
BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %.*s\n", indent, "",
pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
return 1;
} | 291,842,418,864,040,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2021-3712 | ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3712 |
216,874 | openssl | d9d838ddc0ed083fb4c26dd067e71aad7c65ad16 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d9d838ddc0ed083fb4c26dd067e71aad7c65ad16 | Fix a read buffer overrun in X509_aux_print().
The ASN1_STRING_get0_data(3) manual explitely cautions the reader
that the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated, and the function
X509_alias_set1(3) does not sanitize the data passed into it in any
way either, so we must assume the return value from X509_alias_get0(3)
is merely a byte array and not necessarily a string in the sense
of the C language.
I found this bug while writing manual pages for X509_print_ex(3)
and related functions. Theo Buehler <[email protected]> checked my
patch to fix the same bug in LibreSSL, see
http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/t_x509a.c#rev1.9
As an aside, note that the function still produces incomplete and
misleading results when the data contains a NUL byte in the middle
and that error handling is consistently absent throughout, even
though the function provides an "int" return value obviously intended
to be 1 for success and 0 for failure, and even though this function
is called by another function that also wants to return 1 for success
and 0 for failure and even does so in many of its code paths, though
not in others. But let's stay focussed. Many things would be nice
to have in the wide wild world, but a buffer overflow must not be
allowed to remain in our backyard.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16108)
(cherry picked from commit c5dc9ab965f2a69bca964c709e648158f3e4cd67) | 1 | int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent)
{
char oidstr[80], first;
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust, *reject;
const unsigned char *alias, *keyid;
int keyidlen;
int i;
if (X509_trusted(x) == 0)
return 1;
trust = X509_get0_trust_objects(x);
reject = X509_get0_reject_objects(x);
if (trust) {
first = 1;
BIO_printf(out, "%*sTrusted Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) {
if (!first)
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
} else
BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Trusted Uses.\n", indent, "");
if (reject) {
first = 1;
BIO_printf(out, "%*sRejected Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) {
if (!first)
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
} else
BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
alias = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL);
if (alias)
BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %s\n", indent, "", alias);
keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
if (keyid) {
BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
for (i = 0; i < keyidlen; i++)
BIO_printf(out, "%s%02X", i ? ":" : "", keyid[i]);
BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
}
return 1;
} | 252,393,493,912,061,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2021-3712 | ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3712 |
507,868 | openssl | d9d838ddc0ed083fb4c26dd067e71aad7c65ad16 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d9d838ddc0ed083fb4c26dd067e71aad7c65ad16 | Fix a read buffer overrun in X509_aux_print().
The ASN1_STRING_get0_data(3) manual explitely cautions the reader
that the data is not necessarily NUL-terminated, and the function
X509_alias_set1(3) does not sanitize the data passed into it in any
way either, so we must assume the return value from X509_alias_get0(3)
is merely a byte array and not necessarily a string in the sense
of the C language.
I found this bug while writing manual pages for X509_print_ex(3)
and related functions. Theo Buehler <[email protected]> checked my
patch to fix the same bug in LibreSSL, see
http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/lib/libcrypto/asn1/t_x509a.c#rev1.9
As an aside, note that the function still produces incomplete and
misleading results when the data contains a NUL byte in the middle
and that error handling is consistently absent throughout, even
though the function provides an "int" return value obviously intended
to be 1 for success and 0 for failure, and even though this function
is called by another function that also wants to return 1 for success
and 0 for failure and even does so in many of its code paths, though
not in others. But let's stay focussed. Many things would be nice
to have in the wide wild world, but a buffer overflow must not be
allowed to remain in our backyard.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16108)
(cherry picked from commit c5dc9ab965f2a69bca964c709e648158f3e4cd67) | 0 | int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent)
{
char oidstr[80], first;
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust, *reject;
const unsigned char *alias, *keyid;
int keyidlen;
int i;
if (X509_trusted(x) == 0)
return 1;
trust = X509_get0_trust_objects(x);
reject = X509_get0_reject_objects(x);
if (trust) {
first = 1;
BIO_printf(out, "%*sTrusted Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) {
if (!first)
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
} else
BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Trusted Uses.\n", indent, "");
if (reject) {
first = 1;
BIO_printf(out, "%*sRejected Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, "");
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) {
if (!first)
BIO_puts(out, ", ");
else
first = 0;
OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof(oidstr),
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i), 0);
BIO_puts(out, oidstr);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
} else
BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
alias = X509_alias_get0(x, &i);
if (alias)
BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", i, alias);
keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
if (keyid) {
BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
for (i = 0; i < keyidlen; i++)
BIO_printf(out, "%s%02X", i ? ":" : "", keyid[i]);
BIO_write(out, "\n", 1);
}
return 1;
} | 259,335,861,165,031,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2021-3712 | ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3712 |
216,907 | openssl | 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 | Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
Based on patch by David Benjamin <[email protected]>.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | 1 | BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
* algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
* Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
*/
{
BIGNUM *ret = in;
int err = 1;
int r;
BIGNUM *A, *b, *q, *t, *x, *y;
int e, i, j;
if (!BN_is_odd(p) || BN_abs_is_word(p, 1)) {
if (BN_abs_is_word(p, 2)) {
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_bit_set(a, 0))) {
if (ret != in)
BN_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
}
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
return NULL;
}
if (BN_is_zero(a) || BN_is_one(a)) {
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_one(a))) {
if (ret != in)
BN_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (y == NULL)
goto end;
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
/* A = a mod p */
if (!BN_nnmod(A, a, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* now write |p| - 1 as 2^e*q where q is odd */
e = 1;
while (!BN_is_bit_set(p, e))
e++;
/* we'll set q later (if needed) */
if (e == 1) {
/*-
* The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse
* modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed
* directly by modular exponentiation.
* We have
* 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2),
* so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
*/
if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
goto end;
q->neg = 0;
if (!BN_add_word(q, 1))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_exp(ret, A, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
if (e == 2) {
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* Subject: Square Roots and Cognate Matters modulo p=8n+5.
* URL: https://listserv.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=NMBRTHRY&P=4026
* November 1992.)
*/
/* t := 2*a */
if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))
goto end;
/* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8) */
if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 3))
goto end;
q->neg = 0;
if (!BN_mod_exp(b, t, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* y := b^2 */
if (!BN_mod_sqr(y, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* t := (2*a)*b^2 - 1 */
if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, y, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
goto end;
/* x = a*b*t */
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, A, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
/*
* e > 2, so we really have to use the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm. First,
* find some y that is not a square.
*/
if (!BN_copy(q, p))
goto end; /* use 'q' as temp */
q->neg = 0;
i = 2;
do {
/*
* For efficiency, try small numbers first; if this fails, try random
* numbers.
*/
if (i < 22) {
if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
goto end;
} else {
if (!BN_priv_rand(y, BN_num_bits(p), 0, 0))
goto end;
if (BN_ucmp(y, p) >= 0) {
if (!(p->neg ? BN_add : BN_sub) (y, y, p))
goto end;
}
/* now 0 <= y < |p| */
if (BN_is_zero(y))
if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
goto end;
}
r = BN_kronecker(y, q, ctx); /* here 'q' is |p| */
if (r < -1)
goto end;
if (r == 0) {
/* m divides p */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
goto end;
}
}
while (r == 1 && ++i < 82);
if (r != -1) {
/*
* Many rounds and still no non-square -- this is more likely a bug
* than just bad luck. Even if p is not prime, we should have found
* some y such that r == -1.
*/
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
goto end;
}
/* Here's our actual 'q': */
if (!BN_rshift(q, q, e))
goto end;
/*
* Now that we have some non-square, we can find an element of order 2^e
* by computing its q'th power.
*/
if (!BN_mod_exp(y, y, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_one(y)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
goto end;
}
/*-
* Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer
* k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that
*
* a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p).
*
* As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even.
* q+1 is even, too, so there is an element
*
* X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
*
* and it satisfies
*
* X^2 = a^q * a * y^k
* = a,
*
* so it is the square root that we are looking for.
*/
/* t := (q-1)/2 (note that q is odd) */
if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))
goto end;
/* x := a^((q-1)/2) */
if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: p = 2^e + 1 */
if (!BN_nnmod(t, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_zero(t)) {
/* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */
BN_zero(ret);
err = 0;
goto end;
} else if (!BN_one(x))
goto end;
} else {
if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
/* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */
BN_zero(ret);
err = 0;
goto end;
}
}
/* b := a*x^2 (= a^q) */
if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* x := a*x (= a^((q+1)/2)) */
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
while (1) {
/*-
* Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E
* where E refers to the original value of e, which we
* don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
*
* We have a*b = x^2,
* y^2^(e-1) = -1,
* b^2^(e-1) = 1.
*/
if (BN_is_one(b)) {
if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
/* find smallest i such that b^(2^i) = 1 */
i = 1;
if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
i++;
if (i == e) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
goto end;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
}
/* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
if (!BN_copy(t, y))
goto end;
for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx))
goto end;
e = i;
}
vrfy:
if (!err) {
/*
* verify the result -- the input might have been not a square (test
* added in 0.9.8)
*/
if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx))
err = 1;
if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
err = 1;
}
}
end:
if (err) {
if (ret != in)
BN_clear_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
} | 44,827,292,692,614,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-835"
] | CVE-2022-0778 | The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a modular square root, contains a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli. Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form. It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters. Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters. Thus vulnerable situations include: - TLS clients consuming server certificates - TLS servers consuming client certificates - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. In the OpenSSL 1.0.2 version the public key is not parsed during initial parsing of the certificate which makes it slightly harder to trigger the infinite loop. However any operation which requires the public key from the certificate will trigger the infinite loop. In particular the attacker can use a self-signed certificate to trigger the loop during verification of the certificate signature. This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0. It was addressed in the releases of 1.1.1n and 3.0.2 on the 15th March 2022. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.2 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1n (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1m). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2zd (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2zc). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0778 |
509,581 | openssl | 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 | Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
Based on patch by David Benjamin <[email protected]>.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
* algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
* Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
* an incorrect "result" will be returned.
*/
{
BIGNUM *ret = in;
int err = 1;
int r;
BIGNUM *A, *b, *q, *t, *x, *y;
int e, i, j;
if (!BN_is_odd(p) || BN_abs_is_word(p, 1)) {
if (BN_abs_is_word(p, 2)) {
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_bit_set(a, 0))) {
if (ret != in)
BN_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
}
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
return NULL;
}
if (BN_is_zero(a) || BN_is_one(a)) {
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_one(a))) {
if (ret != in)
BN_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (y == NULL)
goto end;
if (ret == NULL)
ret = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto end;
/* A = a mod p */
if (!BN_nnmod(A, a, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* now write |p| - 1 as 2^e*q where q is odd */
e = 1;
while (!BN_is_bit_set(p, e))
e++;
/* we'll set q later (if needed) */
if (e == 1) {
/*-
* The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse
* modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed
* directly by modular exponentiation.
* We have
* 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2),
* so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
*/
if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
goto end;
q->neg = 0;
if (!BN_add_word(q, 1))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_exp(ret, A, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
if (e == 2) {
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* Subject: Square Roots and Cognate Matters modulo p=8n+5.
* URL: https://listserv.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=NMBRTHRY&P=4026
* November 1992.)
*/
/* t := 2*a */
if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))
goto end;
/* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8) */
if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 3))
goto end;
q->neg = 0;
if (!BN_mod_exp(b, t, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* y := b^2 */
if (!BN_mod_sqr(y, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* t := (2*a)*b^2 - 1 */
if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, y, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
goto end;
/* x = a*b*t */
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, A, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
/*
* e > 2, so we really have to use the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm. First,
* find some y that is not a square.
*/
if (!BN_copy(q, p))
goto end; /* use 'q' as temp */
q->neg = 0;
i = 2;
do {
/*
* For efficiency, try small numbers first; if this fails, try random
* numbers.
*/
if (i < 22) {
if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
goto end;
} else {
if (!BN_priv_rand(y, BN_num_bits(p), 0, 0))
goto end;
if (BN_ucmp(y, p) >= 0) {
if (!(p->neg ? BN_add : BN_sub) (y, y, p))
goto end;
}
/* now 0 <= y < |p| */
if (BN_is_zero(y))
if (!BN_set_word(y, i))
goto end;
}
r = BN_kronecker(y, q, ctx); /* here 'q' is |p| */
if (r < -1)
goto end;
if (r == 0) {
/* m divides p */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
goto end;
}
}
while (r == 1 && ++i < 82);
if (r != -1) {
/*
* Many rounds and still no non-square -- this is more likely a bug
* than just bad luck. Even if p is not prime, we should have found
* some y such that r == -1.
*/
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
goto end;
}
/* Here's our actual 'q': */
if (!BN_rshift(q, q, e))
goto end;
/*
* Now that we have some non-square, we can find an element of order 2^e
* by computing its q'th power.
*/
if (!BN_mod_exp(y, y, q, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_one(y)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME);
goto end;
}
/*-
* Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer
* k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that
*
* a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p).
*
* As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even.
* q+1 is even, too, so there is an element
*
* X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
*
* and it satisfies
*
* X^2 = a^q * a * y^k
* = a,
*
* so it is the square root that we are looking for.
*/
/* t := (q-1)/2 (note that q is odd) */
if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))
goto end;
/* x := a^((q-1)/2) */
if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: p = 2^e + 1 */
if (!BN_nnmod(t, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_zero(t)) {
/* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */
BN_zero(ret);
err = 0;
goto end;
} else if (!BN_one(x))
goto end;
} else {
if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
/* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */
BN_zero(ret);
err = 0;
goto end;
}
}
/* b := a*x^2 (= a^q) */
if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
/* x := a*x (= a^((q+1)/2)) */
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx))
goto end;
while (1) {
/*-
* Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E
* where E refers to the original value of e, which we
* don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
*
* We have a*b = x^2,
* y^2^(e-1) = -1,
* b^2^(e-1) = 1.
*/
if (BN_is_one(b)) {
if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
goto end;
err = 0;
goto vrfy;
}
/* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
if (i == 1) {
if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
goto end;
} else {
if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
}
if (BN_is_one(t))
break;
}
/* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
if (i >= e) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
goto end;
}
/* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
if (!BN_copy(t, y))
goto end;
for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
}
if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx))
goto end;
e = i;
}
vrfy:
if (!err) {
/*
* verify the result -- the input might have been not a square (test
* added in 0.9.8)
*/
if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx))
err = 1;
if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
err = 1;
}
}
end:
if (err) {
if (ret != in)
BN_clear_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
bn_check_top(ret);
return ret;
} | 248,690,382,993,613,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-835"
] | CVE-2022-0778 | The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a modular square root, contains a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli. Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form. It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters. Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters. Thus vulnerable situations include: - TLS clients consuming server certificates - TLS servers consuming client certificates - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. In the OpenSSL 1.0.2 version the public key is not parsed during initial parsing of the certificate which makes it slightly harder to trigger the infinite loop. However any operation which requires the public key from the certificate will trigger the infinite loop. In particular the attacker can use a self-signed certificate to trigger the loop during verification of the certificate signature. This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0. It was addressed in the releases of 1.1.1n and 3.0.2 on the 15th March 2022. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.2 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1n (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1m). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2zd (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2zc). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0778 |
216,944 | server | 3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | MDEV-25994: Crash with union of my_decimal type in ORDER BY clause
When single-row subquery fails with "Subquery reutrns more than 1 row"
error, it will raise an error and return NULL.
On the other hand, Item_singlerow_subselect sets item->maybe_null=0
for table-less subqueries like "(SELECT not_null_value)" (*)
This discrepancy (item with maybe_null=0 returning NULL) causes the
code in Type_handler_decimal_result::make_sort_key_part() to crash.
Fixed this by allowing inference (*) only when the subquery is NOT a
UNION. | 1 | bool Item_singlerow_subselect::fix_length_and_dec()
{
if ((max_columns= engine->cols()) == 1)
{
if (engine->fix_length_and_dec(row= &value))
return TRUE;
}
else
{
if (!(row= (Item_cache**) current_thd->alloc(sizeof(Item_cache*) *
max_columns)) ||
engine->fix_length_and_dec(row))
return TRUE;
value= *row;
}
unsigned_flag= value->unsigned_flag;
/*
If there are not tables in subquery then ability to have NULL value
depends on SELECT list (if single row subquery have tables then it
always can be NULL if there are not records fetched).
*/
if (engine->no_tables())
maybe_null= engine->may_be_null();
else
{
for (uint i= 0; i < max_columns; i++)
row[i]->maybe_null= TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
} | 239,302,885,543,348,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-89"
] | CVE-2022-27380 | An issue in the component my_decimal::operator= of MariaDB Server v10.6.3 and below was discovered to allow attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via specially crafted SQL statements. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27380 |
511,887 | server | 3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | MDEV-25994: Crash with union of my_decimal type in ORDER BY clause
When single-row subquery fails with "Subquery reutrns more than 1 row"
error, it will raise an error and return NULL.
On the other hand, Item_singlerow_subselect sets item->maybe_null=0
for table-less subqueries like "(SELECT not_null_value)" (*)
This discrepancy (item with maybe_null=0 returning NULL) causes the
code in Type_handler_decimal_result::make_sort_key_part() to crash.
Fixed this by allowing inference (*) only when the subquery is NOT a
UNION. | 0 | bool Item_singlerow_subselect::fix_length_and_dec()
{
if ((max_columns= engine->cols()) == 1)
{
if (engine->fix_length_and_dec(row= &value))
return TRUE;
}
else
{
if (!(row= (Item_cache**) current_thd->alloc(sizeof(Item_cache*) *
max_columns)) ||
engine->fix_length_and_dec(row))
return TRUE;
value= *row;
}
unsigned_flag= value->unsigned_flag;
/*
If the subquery has no tables (1) and is not a UNION (2), like:
(SELECT subq_value)
then its NULLability is the same as subq_value's NULLability.
(1): A subquery that uses a table will return NULL when the table is empty.
(2): A UNION subquery will return NULL if it produces a "Subquery returns
more than one row" error.
*/
if (engine->no_tables() &&
engine->engine_type() != subselect_engine::UNION_ENGINE)
maybe_null= engine->may_be_null();
else
{
for (uint i= 0; i < max_columns; i++)
row[i]->maybe_null= TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
} | 262,929,527,540,289,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-89"
] | CVE-2022-27380 | An issue in the component my_decimal::operator= of MariaDB Server v10.6.3 and below was discovered to allow attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via specially crafted SQL statements. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27380 |
216,966 | server | af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | MDEV-28098 incorrect key in "dup value" error after long unique
reset errkey after using it, so that it wouldn't affect
the next error message in the next statement | 1 | void handler::print_error(int error, myf errflag)
{
bool fatal_error= 0;
DBUG_ENTER("handler::print_error");
DBUG_PRINT("enter",("error: %d",error));
if (ha_thd()->transaction_rollback_request)
{
/* Ensure this becomes a true error */
errflag&= ~(ME_WARNING | ME_NOTE);
}
int textno= -1; // impossible value
switch (error) {
case EACCES:
textno=ER_OPEN_AS_READONLY;
break;
case EAGAIN:
textno=ER_FILE_USED;
break;
case ENOENT:
case ENOTDIR:
case ELOOP:
textno=ER_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case ENOSPC:
case HA_ERR_DISK_FULL:
textno= ER_DISK_FULL;
SET_FATAL_ERROR; // Ensure error is logged
break;
case HA_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
case HA_ERR_NO_ACTIVE_RECORD:
case HA_ERR_RECORD_DELETED:
case HA_ERR_END_OF_FILE:
/*
This errors is not not normally fatal (for example for reads). However
if you get it during an update or delete, then its fatal.
As the user is calling print_error() (which is not done on read), we
assume something when wrong with the update or delete.
*/
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case HA_ERR_ABORTED_BY_USER:
{
DBUG_ASSERT(ha_thd()->killed);
ha_thd()->send_kill_message();
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_WRONG_MRG_TABLE_DEF:
textno=ER_WRONG_MRG_TABLE;
break;
case HA_ERR_FOUND_DUPP_KEY:
{
if (table)
{
uint key_nr=get_dup_key(error);
if ((int) key_nr >= 0 && key_nr < table->s->keys)
{
print_keydup_error(table, &table->key_info[key_nr], errflag);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
}
textno=ER_DUP_KEY;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY:
{
char rec_buf[MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
String rec(rec_buf, sizeof(rec_buf), system_charset_info);
/* Table is opened and defined at this point */
/*
Just print the subset of fields that are part of the first index,
printing the whole row from there is not easy.
*/
key_unpack(&rec, table, &table->key_info[0]);
char child_table_name[NAME_LEN + 1];
char child_key_name[NAME_LEN + 1];
if (get_foreign_dup_key(child_table_name, sizeof(child_table_name),
child_key_name, sizeof(child_key_name)))
{
my_error(ER_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY_WITH_CHILD_INFO, errflag,
table_share->table_name.str, rec.c_ptr_safe(),
child_table_name, child_key_name);
}
else
{
my_error(ER_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY_WITHOUT_CHILD_INFO, errflag,
table_share->table_name.str, rec.c_ptr_safe());
}
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_NULL_IN_SPATIAL:
my_error(ER_CANT_CREATE_GEOMETRY_OBJECT, errflag);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_FOUND_DUPP_UNIQUE:
textno=ER_DUP_UNIQUE;
break;
case HA_ERR_RECORD_CHANGED:
/*
This is not fatal error when using HANDLER interface
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
*/
textno=ER_CHECKREAD;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_NOT_KEYFILE;
break;
case HA_ERR_WRONG_IN_RECORD:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno= ER_CRASHED_ON_USAGE;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED_ON_USAGE:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_CRASHED_ON_USAGE;
break;
case HA_ERR_NOT_A_TABLE:
textno= error;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED_ON_REPAIR:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_CRASHED_ON_REPAIR;
break;
case HA_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
textno=ER_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
break;
case HA_ERR_WRONG_COMMAND:
my_error(ER_ILLEGAL_HA, MYF(0), table_type(), table_share->db.str,
table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
break;
case HA_ERR_OLD_FILE:
textno=ER_OLD_KEYFILE;
break;
case HA_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
textno=ER_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
break;
case HA_ERR_RECORD_FILE_FULL:
{
textno=ER_RECORD_FILE_FULL;
/* Write the error message to error log */
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_INDEX_FILE_FULL:
{
textno=ER_INDEX_FILE_FULL;
/* Write the error message to error log */
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_LOCK_WAIT_TIMEOUT:
textno=ER_LOCK_WAIT_TIMEOUT;
break;
case HA_ERR_LOCK_TABLE_FULL:
textno=ER_LOCK_TABLE_FULL;
break;
case HA_ERR_LOCK_DEADLOCK:
{
String str, full_err_msg(ER_DEFAULT(ER_LOCK_DEADLOCK), system_charset_info);
get_error_message(error, &str);
full_err_msg.append(str);
my_printf_error(ER_LOCK_DEADLOCK, "%s", errflag, full_err_msg.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_READ_ONLY_TRANSACTION:
textno=ER_READ_ONLY_TRANSACTION;
break;
case HA_ERR_CANNOT_ADD_FOREIGN:
textno=ER_CANNOT_ADD_FOREIGN;
break;
case HA_ERR_ROW_IS_REFERENCED:
{
String str;
get_error_message(error, &str);
my_printf_error(ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED_2,
ER(str.length() ? ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED_2 : ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED),
errflag, str.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_NO_REFERENCED_ROW:
{
String str;
get_error_message(error, &str);
my_printf_error(ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW_2,
ER(str.length() ? ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW_2 : ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW),
errflag, str.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_TABLE_DEF_CHANGED:
textno=ER_TABLE_DEF_CHANGED;
break;
case HA_ERR_NO_SUCH_TABLE:
my_error(ER_NO_SUCH_TABLE_IN_ENGINE, errflag, table_share->db.str,
table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_RBR_LOGGING_FAILED:
textno= ER_BINLOG_ROW_LOGGING_FAILED;
break;
case HA_ERR_DROP_INDEX_FK:
{
const char *ptr= "???";
uint key_nr= get_dup_key(error);
if ((int) key_nr >= 0)
ptr= table->key_info[key_nr].name.str;
my_error(ER_DROP_INDEX_FK, errflag, ptr);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE:
textno= ER_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE;
my_error(ER_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE, errflag,
"TABLE", table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_NO_PARTITION_FOUND:
textno=ER_WRONG_PARTITION_NAME;
break;
case HA_ERR_TABLE_READONLY:
textno= ER_OPEN_AS_READONLY;
break;
case HA_ERR_AUTOINC_READ_FAILED:
textno= ER_AUTOINC_READ_FAILED;
break;
case HA_ERR_AUTOINC_ERANGE:
textno= error;
my_error(textno, errflag, table->next_number_field->field_name.str,
table->in_use->get_stmt_da()->current_row_for_warning());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
break;
case HA_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONCURRENT_TRXS:
textno= ER_TOO_MANY_CONCURRENT_TRXS;
break;
case HA_ERR_INDEX_COL_TOO_LONG:
textno= ER_INDEX_COLUMN_TOO_LONG;
break;
case HA_ERR_NOT_IN_LOCK_PARTITIONS:
textno=ER_ROW_DOES_NOT_MATCH_GIVEN_PARTITION_SET;
break;
case HA_ERR_INDEX_CORRUPT:
textno= ER_INDEX_CORRUPT;
break;
case HA_ERR_UNDO_REC_TOO_BIG:
textno= ER_UNDO_RECORD_TOO_BIG;
break;
case HA_ERR_TABLE_IN_FK_CHECK:
textno= ER_TABLE_IN_FK_CHECK;
break;
case HA_ERR_PARTITION_LIST:
my_error(ER_VERS_NOT_ALLOWED, errflag, table->s->db.str, table->s->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
default:
{
/* The error was "unknown" to this function.
Ask handler if it has got a message for this error */
bool temporary= FALSE;
String str;
temporary= get_error_message(error, &str);
if (!str.is_empty())
{
const char* engine= table_type();
if (temporary)
my_error(ER_GET_TEMPORARY_ERRMSG, errflag, error, str.c_ptr(),
engine);
else
{
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
my_error(ER_GET_ERRMSG, errflag, error, str.c_ptr(), engine);
}
}
else
my_error(ER_GET_ERRNO, errflag, error, table_type());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
}
DBUG_ASSERT(textno > 0);
if (unlikely(fatal_error))
{
/* Ensure this becomes a true error */
errflag&= ~(ME_WARNING | ME_NOTE);
if ((debug_assert_if_crashed_table ||
global_system_variables.log_warnings > 1))
{
/*
Log error to log before we crash or if extended warnings are requested
*/
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
}
}
/* if we got an OS error from a file-based engine, specify a path of error */
if (error < HA_ERR_FIRST && bas_ext()[0])
{
char buff[FN_REFLEN];
strxnmov(buff, sizeof(buff),
table_share->normalized_path.str, bas_ext()[0], NULL);
my_error(textno, errflag, buff, error);
}
else
my_error(textno, errflag, table_share->table_name.str, error);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
} | 176,899,003,449,109,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2022-27457 | MariaDB Server v10.6.3 and below was discovered to contain an use-after-free in the component my_mb_wc_latin1 at /strings/ctype-latin1.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27457 |
514,535 | server | af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | MDEV-28098 incorrect key in "dup value" error after long unique
reset errkey after using it, so that it wouldn't affect
the next error message in the next statement | 0 | void handler::print_error(int error, myf errflag)
{
bool fatal_error= 0;
DBUG_ENTER("handler::print_error");
DBUG_PRINT("enter",("error: %d",error));
if (ha_thd()->transaction_rollback_request)
{
/* Ensure this becomes a true error */
errflag&= ~(ME_WARNING | ME_NOTE);
}
int textno= -1; // impossible value
switch (error) {
case EACCES:
textno=ER_OPEN_AS_READONLY;
break;
case EAGAIN:
textno=ER_FILE_USED;
break;
case ENOENT:
case ENOTDIR:
case ELOOP:
textno=ER_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case ENOSPC:
case HA_ERR_DISK_FULL:
textno= ER_DISK_FULL;
SET_FATAL_ERROR; // Ensure error is logged
break;
case HA_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
case HA_ERR_NO_ACTIVE_RECORD:
case HA_ERR_RECORD_DELETED:
case HA_ERR_END_OF_FILE:
/*
This errors is not not normally fatal (for example for reads). However
if you get it during an update or delete, then its fatal.
As the user is calling print_error() (which is not done on read), we
assume something when wrong with the update or delete.
*/
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
break;
case HA_ERR_ABORTED_BY_USER:
{
DBUG_ASSERT(ha_thd()->killed);
ha_thd()->send_kill_message();
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_WRONG_MRG_TABLE_DEF:
textno=ER_WRONG_MRG_TABLE;
break;
case HA_ERR_FOUND_DUPP_KEY:
{
if (table)
{
uint key_nr=get_dup_key(error);
if ((int) key_nr >= 0 && key_nr < table->s->keys)
{
print_keydup_error(table, &table->key_info[key_nr], errflag);
table->file->errkey= -1;
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
}
textno=ER_DUP_KEY;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY:
{
char rec_buf[MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
String rec(rec_buf, sizeof(rec_buf), system_charset_info);
/* Table is opened and defined at this point */
/*
Just print the subset of fields that are part of the first index,
printing the whole row from there is not easy.
*/
key_unpack(&rec, table, &table->key_info[0]);
char child_table_name[NAME_LEN + 1];
char child_key_name[NAME_LEN + 1];
if (get_foreign_dup_key(child_table_name, sizeof(child_table_name),
child_key_name, sizeof(child_key_name)))
{
my_error(ER_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY_WITH_CHILD_INFO, errflag,
table_share->table_name.str, rec.c_ptr_safe(),
child_table_name, child_key_name);
}
else
{
my_error(ER_FOREIGN_DUPLICATE_KEY_WITHOUT_CHILD_INFO, errflag,
table_share->table_name.str, rec.c_ptr_safe());
}
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_NULL_IN_SPATIAL:
my_error(ER_CANT_CREATE_GEOMETRY_OBJECT, errflag);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_FOUND_DUPP_UNIQUE:
textno=ER_DUP_UNIQUE;
break;
case HA_ERR_RECORD_CHANGED:
/*
This is not fatal error when using HANDLER interface
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
*/
textno=ER_CHECKREAD;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_NOT_KEYFILE;
break;
case HA_ERR_WRONG_IN_RECORD:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno= ER_CRASHED_ON_USAGE;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED_ON_USAGE:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_CRASHED_ON_USAGE;
break;
case HA_ERR_NOT_A_TABLE:
textno= error;
break;
case HA_ERR_CRASHED_ON_REPAIR:
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
textno=ER_CRASHED_ON_REPAIR;
break;
case HA_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
textno=ER_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
break;
case HA_ERR_WRONG_COMMAND:
my_error(ER_ILLEGAL_HA, MYF(0), table_type(), table_share->db.str,
table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
break;
case HA_ERR_OLD_FILE:
textno=ER_OLD_KEYFILE;
break;
case HA_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
textno=ER_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
break;
case HA_ERR_RECORD_FILE_FULL:
{
textno=ER_RECORD_FILE_FULL;
/* Write the error message to error log */
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_INDEX_FILE_FULL:
{
textno=ER_INDEX_FILE_FULL;
/* Write the error message to error log */
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
break;
}
case HA_ERR_LOCK_WAIT_TIMEOUT:
textno=ER_LOCK_WAIT_TIMEOUT;
break;
case HA_ERR_LOCK_TABLE_FULL:
textno=ER_LOCK_TABLE_FULL;
break;
case HA_ERR_LOCK_DEADLOCK:
{
String str, full_err_msg(ER_DEFAULT(ER_LOCK_DEADLOCK), system_charset_info);
get_error_message(error, &str);
full_err_msg.append(str);
my_printf_error(ER_LOCK_DEADLOCK, "%s", errflag, full_err_msg.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_READ_ONLY_TRANSACTION:
textno=ER_READ_ONLY_TRANSACTION;
break;
case HA_ERR_CANNOT_ADD_FOREIGN:
textno=ER_CANNOT_ADD_FOREIGN;
break;
case HA_ERR_ROW_IS_REFERENCED:
{
String str;
get_error_message(error, &str);
my_printf_error(ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED_2,
ER(str.length() ? ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED_2 : ER_ROW_IS_REFERENCED),
errflag, str.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_NO_REFERENCED_ROW:
{
String str;
get_error_message(error, &str);
my_printf_error(ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW_2,
ER(str.length() ? ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW_2 : ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW),
errflag, str.c_ptr_safe());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_TABLE_DEF_CHANGED:
textno=ER_TABLE_DEF_CHANGED;
break;
case HA_ERR_NO_SUCH_TABLE:
my_error(ER_NO_SUCH_TABLE_IN_ENGINE, errflag, table_share->db.str,
table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_RBR_LOGGING_FAILED:
textno= ER_BINLOG_ROW_LOGGING_FAILED;
break;
case HA_ERR_DROP_INDEX_FK:
{
const char *ptr= "???";
uint key_nr= get_dup_key(error);
if ((int) key_nr >= 0)
ptr= table->key_info[key_nr].name.str;
my_error(ER_DROP_INDEX_FK, errflag, ptr);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
case HA_ERR_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE:
textno= ER_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE;
my_error(ER_TABLE_NEEDS_UPGRADE, errflag,
"TABLE", table_share->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
case HA_ERR_NO_PARTITION_FOUND:
textno=ER_WRONG_PARTITION_NAME;
break;
case HA_ERR_TABLE_READONLY:
textno= ER_OPEN_AS_READONLY;
break;
case HA_ERR_AUTOINC_READ_FAILED:
textno= ER_AUTOINC_READ_FAILED;
break;
case HA_ERR_AUTOINC_ERANGE:
textno= error;
my_error(textno, errflag, table->next_number_field->field_name.str,
table->in_use->get_stmt_da()->current_row_for_warning());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
break;
case HA_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONCURRENT_TRXS:
textno= ER_TOO_MANY_CONCURRENT_TRXS;
break;
case HA_ERR_INDEX_COL_TOO_LONG:
textno= ER_INDEX_COLUMN_TOO_LONG;
break;
case HA_ERR_NOT_IN_LOCK_PARTITIONS:
textno=ER_ROW_DOES_NOT_MATCH_GIVEN_PARTITION_SET;
break;
case HA_ERR_INDEX_CORRUPT:
textno= ER_INDEX_CORRUPT;
break;
case HA_ERR_UNDO_REC_TOO_BIG:
textno= ER_UNDO_RECORD_TOO_BIG;
break;
case HA_ERR_TABLE_IN_FK_CHECK:
textno= ER_TABLE_IN_FK_CHECK;
break;
case HA_ERR_PARTITION_LIST:
my_error(ER_VERS_NOT_ALLOWED, errflag, table->s->db.str, table->s->table_name.str);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
default:
{
/* The error was "unknown" to this function.
Ask handler if it has got a message for this error */
bool temporary= FALSE;
String str;
temporary= get_error_message(error, &str);
if (!str.is_empty())
{
const char* engine= table_type();
if (temporary)
my_error(ER_GET_TEMPORARY_ERRMSG, errflag, error, str.c_ptr(),
engine);
else
{
SET_FATAL_ERROR;
my_error(ER_GET_ERRMSG, errflag, error, str.c_ptr(), engine);
}
}
else
my_error(ER_GET_ERRNO, errflag, error, table_type());
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
}
DBUG_ASSERT(textno > 0);
if (unlikely(fatal_error))
{
/* Ensure this becomes a true error */
errflag&= ~(ME_WARNING | ME_NOTE);
if ((debug_assert_if_crashed_table ||
global_system_variables.log_warnings > 1))
{
/*
Log error to log before we crash or if extended warnings are requested
*/
errflag|= ME_ERROR_LOG;
}
}
/* if we got an OS error from a file-based engine, specify a path of error */
if (error < HA_ERR_FIRST && bas_ext()[0])
{
char buff[FN_REFLEN];
strxnmov(buff, sizeof(buff),
table_share->normalized_path.str, bas_ext()[0], NULL);
my_error(textno, errflag, buff, error);
}
else
my_error(textno, errflag, table_share->table_name.str, error);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
} | 166,818,593,904,132,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2022-27457 | MariaDB Server v10.6.3 and below was discovered to contain an use-after-free in the component my_mb_wc_latin1 at /strings/ctype-latin1.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27457 |
216,969 | openssl | 2eda98790c5c2741d76d23cc1e74b0dc4f4b391a | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2eda98790c5c2741d76d23cc1e74b0dc4f4b391a | Fix OCSP_basic_verify signer certificate validation
The function `OCSP_basic_verify` validates the signer certificate on an OCSP
response. The internal function, ocsp_verify_signer, is responsible for this
and is expected to return a 0 value in the event of a failure to verify.
Unfortunately, due to a bug, it actually returns with a postive success
response in this case. In the normal course of events OCSP_basic_verify
will then continue and will fail anyway in the ocsp_check_issuer function
because the supplied "chain" value will be empty in the case that
ocsp_verify_signer failed to verify the chain. This will cause
OCSP_basic_verify to return with a negative result (fatal error). Normally
in the event of a failure to verify it should return with 0.
However, in the case of the OCSP_NOCHECKS flag being used, OCSP_basic_verify
will return with a positvie result. This could lead to callers trusting an
OCSP Basic response when it should not be.
CVE-2022-1343
Fixes #18053
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | 1 | static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
int ret = -1;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto end;
}
if ((vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) == NULL)
goto end;
if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
if (response
&& X509_get_ext_by_NID(signer, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, -1) >= 0)
/*
* Locally disable revocation status checking for OCSP responder cert.
* Done here for CRLs; should be done also for OCSP-based checks.
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR,
"Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
goto end;
}
if (chain != NULL)
*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
} | 135,340,782,496,843,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-1343 | The function `OCSP_basic_verify` verifies the signer certificate on an OCSP response. In the case where the (non-default) flag OCSP_NOCHECKS is used then the response will be positive (meaning a successful verification) even in the case where the response signing certificate fails to verify. It is anticipated that most users of `OCSP_basic_verify` will not use the OCSP_NOCHECKS flag. In this case the `OCSP_basic_verify` function will return a negative value (indicating a fatal error) in the case of a certificate verification failure. The normal expected return value in this case would be 0. This issue also impacts the command line OpenSSL "ocsp" application. When verifying an ocsp response with the "-no_cert_checks" option the command line application will report that the verification is successful even though it has in fact failed. In this case the incorrect successful response will also be accompanied by error messages showing the failure and contradicting the apparently successful result. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.3 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1,3.0.2). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1343 |
514,677 | openssl | 2eda98790c5c2741d76d23cc1e74b0dc4f4b391a | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2eda98790c5c2741d76d23cc1e74b0dc4f4b391a | Fix OCSP_basic_verify signer certificate validation
The function `OCSP_basic_verify` validates the signer certificate on an OCSP
response. The internal function, ocsp_verify_signer, is responsible for this
and is expected to return a 0 value in the event of a failure to verify.
Unfortunately, due to a bug, it actually returns with a postive success
response in this case. In the normal course of events OCSP_basic_verify
will then continue and will fail anyway in the ocsp_check_issuer function
because the supplied "chain" value will be empty in the case that
ocsp_verify_signer failed to verify the chain. This will cause
OCSP_basic_verify to return with a negative result (fatal error). Normally
in the event of a failure to verify it should return with 0.
However, in the case of the OCSP_NOCHECKS flag being used, OCSP_basic_verify
will return with a positvie result. This could lead to callers trusting an
OCSP Basic response when it should not be.
CVE-2022-1343
Fixes #18053
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | 0 | static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
int ret = -1;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto end;
}
if ((vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) == NULL)
goto end;
if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
if (response
&& X509_get_ext_by_NID(signer, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, -1) >= 0)
/*
* Locally disable revocation status checking for OCSP responder cert.
* Done here for CRLs; should be done also for OCSP-based checks.
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
if (ret <= 0) {
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR,
"Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
goto end;
}
if (chain != NULL)
*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
} | 216,092,094,613,497,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-1343 | The function `OCSP_basic_verify` verifies the signer certificate on an OCSP response. In the case where the (non-default) flag OCSP_NOCHECKS is used then the response will be positive (meaning a successful verification) even in the case where the response signing certificate fails to verify. It is anticipated that most users of `OCSP_basic_verify` will not use the OCSP_NOCHECKS flag. In this case the `OCSP_basic_verify` function will return a negative value (indicating a fatal error) in the case of a certificate verification failure. The normal expected return value in this case would be 0. This issue also impacts the command line OpenSSL "ocsp" application. When verifying an ocsp response with the "-no_cert_checks" option the command line application will report that the verification is successful even though it has in fact failed. In this case the incorrect successful response will also be accompanied by error messages showing the failure and contradicting the apparently successful result. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.3 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1,3.0.2). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1343 |
216,972 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 1 | xbstream_open(ds_ctxt_t *ctxt, const char *path, MY_STAT *mystat)
{
ds_file_t *file;
ds_stream_file_t *stream_file;
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
ds_ctxt_t *dest_ctxt;
xb_wstream_t *xbstream;
xb_wstream_file_t *xbstream_file;
xb_ad(ctxt->pipe_ctxt != NULL);
dest_ctxt = ctxt->pipe_ctxt;
stream_ctxt = (ds_stream_ctxt_t *) ctxt->ptr;
pthread_mutex_lock(&stream_ctxt->mutex);
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) {
stream_ctxt->dest_file = ds_open(dest_ctxt, path, mystat);
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&stream_ctxt->mutex);
file = (ds_file_t *) my_malloc(sizeof(ds_file_t) +
sizeof(ds_stream_file_t),
MYF(MY_FAE));
stream_file = (ds_stream_file_t *) (file + 1);
xbstream = stream_ctxt->xbstream;
xbstream_file = xb_stream_write_open(xbstream, path, mystat,
stream_ctxt,
my_xbstream_write_callback);
if (xbstream_file == NULL) {
msg("xb_stream_write_open() failed.");
goto err;
}
stream_file->xbstream_file = xbstream_file;
stream_file->stream_ctxt = stream_ctxt;
file->ptr = stream_file;
file->path = stream_ctxt->dest_file->path;
return file;
err:
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file) {
ds_close(stream_ctxt->dest_file);
stream_ctxt->dest_file = NULL;
}
my_free(file);
return NULL;
} | 133,283,141,336,811,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,715 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_open(ds_ctxt_t *ctxt, const char *path, MY_STAT *mystat)
{
ds_file_t *file;
ds_stream_file_t *stream_file;
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
ds_ctxt_t *dest_ctxt;
xb_wstream_t *xbstream;
xb_wstream_file_t *xbstream_file;
xb_ad(ctxt->pipe_ctxt != NULL);
dest_ctxt = ctxt->pipe_ctxt;
stream_ctxt = (ds_stream_ctxt_t *) ctxt->ptr;
pthread_mutex_lock(&stream_ctxt->mutex);
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) {
stream_ctxt->dest_file = ds_open(dest_ctxt, path, mystat);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&stream_ctxt->mutex);
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
file = (ds_file_t *) my_malloc(sizeof(ds_file_t) +
sizeof(ds_stream_file_t),
MYF(MY_FAE));
if (!file) {
msg("my_malloc() failed.");
goto err;
}
stream_file = (ds_stream_file_t *) (file + 1);
xbstream = stream_ctxt->xbstream;
xbstream_file = xb_stream_write_open(xbstream, path, mystat,
stream_ctxt,
my_xbstream_write_callback);
if (xbstream_file == NULL) {
msg("xb_stream_write_open() failed.");
goto err;
}
stream_file->xbstream_file = xbstream_file;
stream_file->stream_ctxt = stream_ctxt;
file->ptr = stream_file;
file->path = stream_ctxt->dest_file->path;
return file;
err:
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file) {
ds_close(stream_ctxt->dest_file);
stream_ctxt->dest_file = NULL;
}
my_free(file);
return NULL;
} | 109,927,311,295,173,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
216,974 | server | 7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | MDEV-26561 mariabackup release locks
The previous threads locked need to be released too.
This occurs if the initialization of any of the non-first
mutex/conditition variables errors occurs. | 1 | create_worker_threads(uint n)
{
comp_thread_ctxt_t *threads;
uint i;
threads = (comp_thread_ctxt_t *)
my_malloc(sizeof(comp_thread_ctxt_t) * n, MYF(MY_FAE));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd = threads + i;
thd->num = i + 1;
thd->started = FALSE;
thd->cancelled = FALSE;
thd->data_avail = FALSE;
thd->to = (char *) my_malloc(COMPRESS_CHUNK_SIZE +
MY_QLZ_COMPRESS_OVERHEAD,
MYF(MY_FAE));
/* Initialize the control mutex and condition var */
if (pthread_mutex_init(&thd->ctrl_mutex, NULL) ||
pthread_cond_init(&thd->ctrl_cond, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
/* Initialize and data mutex and condition var */
if (pthread_mutex_init(&thd->data_mutex, NULL) ||
pthread_cond_init(&thd->data_cond, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
if (pthread_create(&thd->id, NULL, compress_worker_thread_func,
thd)) {
msg("compress: pthread_create() failed: "
"errno = %d", errno);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
goto err;
}
}
/* Wait for the threads to start */
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd = threads + i;
while (thd->started == FALSE)
pthread_cond_wait(&thd->ctrl_cond, &thd->ctrl_mutex);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
}
return threads;
err:
my_free(threads);
return NULL;
} | 67,434,126,023,970,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31623 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_compress.cc, when an error occurs (i.e., going to the err label) while executing the method create_worker_threads, the held lock thd->ctrl_mutex is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31623 |
514,724 | server | 7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | MDEV-26561 mariabackup release locks
The previous threads locked need to be released too.
This occurs if the initialization of any of the non-first
mutex/conditition variables errors occurs. | 0 | create_worker_threads(uint n)
{
comp_thread_ctxt_t *threads;
uint i;
threads = (comp_thread_ctxt_t *)
my_malloc(sizeof(comp_thread_ctxt_t) * n, MYF(MY_FAE));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd = threads + i;
thd->num = i + 1;
thd->started = FALSE;
thd->cancelled = FALSE;
thd->data_avail = FALSE;
thd->to = (char *) my_malloc(COMPRESS_CHUNK_SIZE +
MY_QLZ_COMPRESS_OVERHEAD,
MYF(MY_FAE));
/* Initialize the control mutex and condition var */
if (pthread_mutex_init(&thd->ctrl_mutex, NULL) ||
pthread_cond_init(&thd->ctrl_cond, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
/* Initialize and data mutex and condition var */
if (pthread_mutex_init(&thd->data_mutex, NULL) ||
pthread_cond_init(&thd->data_cond, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
if (pthread_create(&thd->id, NULL, compress_worker_thread_func,
thd)) {
msg("compress: pthread_create() failed: "
"errno = %d", errno);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
goto err;
}
}
/* Wait for the threads to start */
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd = threads + i;
while (thd->started == FALSE)
pthread_cond_wait(&thd->ctrl_cond, &thd->ctrl_mutex);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
}
return threads;
err:
while (i > 0) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd;
i--;
thd = threads + i;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&thd->ctrl_mutex);
}
my_free(threads);
return NULL;
} | 40,328,221,301,176,333,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31623 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_compress.cc, when an error occurs (i.e., going to the err label) while executing the method create_worker_threads, the held lock thd->ctrl_mutex is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31623 |
216,975 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18626) | 1 | int ossl_rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2(BN_ULONG *res1,
const BN_ULONG *base1,
const BN_ULONG *exp1,
const BN_ULONG *m1,
const BN_ULONG *rr1,
BN_ULONG k0_1,
BN_ULONG *res2,
const BN_ULONG *base2,
const BN_ULONG *exp2,
const BN_ULONG *m2,
const BN_ULONG *rr2,
BN_ULONG k0_2,
int factor_size)
{
typedef void (*AMM)(BN_ULONG *res, const BN_ULONG *a,
const BN_ULONG *b, const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG k0);
int ret = 0;
/*
* Number of word-size (BN_ULONG) digits to store exponent in redundant
* representation.
*/
int exp_digits = number_of_digits(factor_size + 2, DIGIT_SIZE);
int coeff_pow = 4 * (DIGIT_SIZE * exp_digits - factor_size);
/* Number of YMM registers required to store exponent's digits */
int ymm_regs_num = NUMBER_OF_REGISTERS(exp_digits, 256 /* ymm bit size */);
/* Capacity of the register set (in qwords) to store exponent */
int regs_capacity = ymm_regs_num * 4;
BN_ULONG *base1_red, *m1_red, *rr1_red;
BN_ULONG *base2_red, *m2_red, *rr2_red;
BN_ULONG *coeff_red;
BN_ULONG *storage = NULL;
BN_ULONG *storage_aligned = NULL;
int storage_len_bytes = 7 * regs_capacity * sizeof(BN_ULONG)
+ 64 /* alignment */;
const BN_ULONG *exp[2] = {0};
BN_ULONG k0[2] = {0};
/* AMM = Almost Montgomery Multiplication */
AMM amm = NULL;
switch (factor_size) {
case 1024:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x20_x1_ifma256;
break;
case 1536:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x30_x1_ifma256;
break;
case 2048:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x40_x1_ifma256;
break;
default:
goto err;
}
storage = (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc(storage_len_bytes);
if (storage == NULL)
goto err;
storage_aligned = (BN_ULONG *)ALIGN_OF(storage, 64);
/* Memory layout for red(undant) representations */
base1_red = storage_aligned;
base2_red = storage_aligned + 1 * regs_capacity;
m1_red = storage_aligned + 2 * regs_capacity;
m2_red = storage_aligned + 3 * regs_capacity;
rr1_red = storage_aligned + 4 * regs_capacity;
rr2_red = storage_aligned + 5 * regs_capacity;
coeff_red = storage_aligned + 6 * regs_capacity;
/* Convert base_i, m_i, rr_i, from regular to 52-bit radix */
to_words52(base1_red, regs_capacity, base1, factor_size);
to_words52(base2_red, regs_capacity, base2, factor_size);
to_words52(m1_red, regs_capacity, m1, factor_size);
to_words52(m2_red, regs_capacity, m2, factor_size);
to_words52(rr1_red, regs_capacity, rr1, factor_size);
to_words52(rr2_red, regs_capacity, rr2, factor_size);
/*
* Compute target domain Montgomery converters RR' for each modulus
* based on precomputed original domain's RR.
*
* RR -> RR' transformation steps:
* (1) coeff = 2^k
* (2) t = AMM(RR,RR) = RR^2 / R' mod m
* (3) RR' = AMM(t, coeff) = RR^2 * 2^k / R'^2 mod m
* where
* k = 4 * (52 * digits52 - modlen)
* R = 2^(64 * ceil(modlen/64)) mod m
* RR = R^2 mod m
* R' = 2^(52 * ceil(modlen/52)) mod m
*
* EX/ modlen = 1024: k = 64, RR = 2^2048 mod m, RR' = 2^2080 mod m
*/
memset(coeff_red, 0, exp_digits * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
/* (1) in reduced domain representation */
set_bit(coeff_red, 64 * (int)(coeff_pow / 52) + coeff_pow % 52);
amm(rr1_red, rr1_red, rr1_red, m1_red, k0_1); /* (2) for m1 */
amm(rr1_red, rr1_red, coeff_red, m1_red, k0_1); /* (3) for m1 */
amm(rr2_red, rr2_red, rr2_red, m2_red, k0_2); /* (2) for m2 */
amm(rr2_red, rr2_red, coeff_red, m2_red, k0_2); /* (3) for m2 */
exp[0] = exp1;
exp[1] = exp2;
k0[0] = k0_1;
k0[1] = k0_2;
/* Dual (2-exps in parallel) exponentiation */
ret = RSAZ_mod_exp_x2_ifma256(rr1_red, base1_red, exp, m1_red, rr1_red,
k0, factor_size);
if (!ret)
goto err;
/* Convert rr_i back to regular radix */
from_words52(res1, factor_size, rr1_red);
from_words52(res2, factor_size, rr2_red);
bn_reduce_once_in_place(res1, /*carry=*/0, m1, storage, factor_size);
bn_reduce_once_in_place(res2, /*carry=*/0, m2, storage, factor_size);
err:
if (storage != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, storage_len_bytes);
OPENSSL_free(storage);
}
return ret;
} | 13,768,713,307,638,353,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corruption an attacker may be able to trigger a remote code execution on the machine performing the computation. SSL/TLS servers or other servers using 2048 bit RSA private keys running on machines supporting AVX512IFMA instructions of the X86_64 architecture are affected by this issue. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,727 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18626) | 0 | int ossl_rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2(BN_ULONG *res1,
const BN_ULONG *base1,
const BN_ULONG *exp1,
const BN_ULONG *m1,
const BN_ULONG *rr1,
BN_ULONG k0_1,
BN_ULONG *res2,
const BN_ULONG *base2,
const BN_ULONG *exp2,
const BN_ULONG *m2,
const BN_ULONG *rr2,
BN_ULONG k0_2,
int factor_size)
{
typedef void (*AMM)(BN_ULONG *res, const BN_ULONG *a,
const BN_ULONG *b, const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG k0);
int ret = 0;
/*
* Number of word-size (BN_ULONG) digits to store exponent in redundant
* representation.
*/
int exp_digits = number_of_digits(factor_size + 2, DIGIT_SIZE);
int coeff_pow = 4 * (DIGIT_SIZE * exp_digits - factor_size);
/* Number of YMM registers required to store exponent's digits */
int ymm_regs_num = NUMBER_OF_REGISTERS(exp_digits, 256 /* ymm bit size */);
/* Capacity of the register set (in qwords) to store exponent */
int regs_capacity = ymm_regs_num * 4;
BN_ULONG *base1_red, *m1_red, *rr1_red;
BN_ULONG *base2_red, *m2_red, *rr2_red;
BN_ULONG *coeff_red;
BN_ULONG *storage = NULL;
BN_ULONG *storage_aligned = NULL;
int storage_len_bytes = 7 * regs_capacity * sizeof(BN_ULONG)
+ 64 /* alignment */;
const BN_ULONG *exp[2] = {0};
BN_ULONG k0[2] = {0};
/* AMM = Almost Montgomery Multiplication */
AMM amm = NULL;
switch (factor_size) {
case 1024:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x20_x1_ifma256;
break;
case 1536:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x30_x1_ifma256;
break;
case 2048:
amm = ossl_rsaz_amm52x40_x1_ifma256;
break;
default:
goto err;
}
storage = (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc(storage_len_bytes);
if (storage == NULL)
goto err;
storage_aligned = (BN_ULONG *)ALIGN_OF(storage, 64);
/* Memory layout for red(undant) representations */
base1_red = storage_aligned;
base2_red = storage_aligned + 1 * regs_capacity;
m1_red = storage_aligned + 2 * regs_capacity;
m2_red = storage_aligned + 3 * regs_capacity;
rr1_red = storage_aligned + 4 * regs_capacity;
rr2_red = storage_aligned + 5 * regs_capacity;
coeff_red = storage_aligned + 6 * regs_capacity;
/* Convert base_i, m_i, rr_i, from regular to 52-bit radix */
to_words52(base1_red, regs_capacity, base1, factor_size);
to_words52(base2_red, regs_capacity, base2, factor_size);
to_words52(m1_red, regs_capacity, m1, factor_size);
to_words52(m2_red, regs_capacity, m2, factor_size);
to_words52(rr1_red, regs_capacity, rr1, factor_size);
to_words52(rr2_red, regs_capacity, rr2, factor_size);
/*
* Compute target domain Montgomery converters RR' for each modulus
* based on precomputed original domain's RR.
*
* RR -> RR' transformation steps:
* (1) coeff = 2^k
* (2) t = AMM(RR,RR) = RR^2 / R' mod m
* (3) RR' = AMM(t, coeff) = RR^2 * 2^k / R'^2 mod m
* where
* k = 4 * (52 * digits52 - modlen)
* R = 2^(64 * ceil(modlen/64)) mod m
* RR = R^2 mod m
* R' = 2^(52 * ceil(modlen/52)) mod m
*
* EX/ modlen = 1024: k = 64, RR = 2^2048 mod m, RR' = 2^2080 mod m
*/
memset(coeff_red, 0, exp_digits * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
/* (1) in reduced domain representation */
set_bit(coeff_red, 64 * (int)(coeff_pow / 52) + coeff_pow % 52);
amm(rr1_red, rr1_red, rr1_red, m1_red, k0_1); /* (2) for m1 */
amm(rr1_red, rr1_red, coeff_red, m1_red, k0_1); /* (3) for m1 */
amm(rr2_red, rr2_red, rr2_red, m2_red, k0_2); /* (2) for m2 */
amm(rr2_red, rr2_red, coeff_red, m2_red, k0_2); /* (3) for m2 */
exp[0] = exp1;
exp[1] = exp2;
k0[0] = k0_1;
k0[1] = k0_2;
/* Dual (2-exps in parallel) exponentiation */
ret = RSAZ_mod_exp_x2_ifma256(rr1_red, base1_red, exp, m1_red, rr1_red,
k0, factor_size);
if (!ret)
goto err;
/* Convert rr_i back to regular radix */
from_words52(res1, factor_size, rr1_red);
from_words52(res2, factor_size, rr2_red);
/* bn_reduce_once_in_place expects number of BN_ULONG, not bit size */
factor_size /= sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8;
bn_reduce_once_in_place(res1, /*carry=*/0, m1, storage, factor_size);
bn_reduce_once_in_place(res2, /*carry=*/0, m2, storage, factor_size);
err:
if (storage != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, storage_len_bytes);
OPENSSL_free(storage);
}
return ret;
} | 22,144,793,980,359,746,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corruption an attacker may be able to trigger a remote code execution on the machine performing the computation. SSL/TLS servers or other servers using 2048 bit RSA private keys running on machines supporting AVX512IFMA instructions of the X86_64 architecture are affected by this issue. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
217,011 | qemu | 3517fb726741c109cae7995f9ea46f0cab6187d6 | https://github.com/bonzini/qemu | https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/3517fb726741c109cae7995f9ea46f0cab6187d6 | target/loongarch: Clean up tlb when cpu reset
We should make sure that tlb is clean when cpu reset.
Signed-off-by: Song Gao <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> | 1 | static void loongarch_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(dev);
LoongArchCPU *cpu = LOONGARCH_CPU(cs);
LoongArchCPUClass *lacc = LOONGARCH_CPU_GET_CLASS(cpu);
CPULoongArchState *env = &cpu->env;
lacc->parent_reset(dev);
env->fcsr0_mask = FCSR0_M1 | FCSR0_M2 | FCSR0_M3;
env->fcsr0 = 0x0;
int n;
/* Set csr registers value after reset */
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, PLV, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, IE, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DA, 1);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, PG, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DATF, 1);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DATM, 1);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, FPE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, SXE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, ASXE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, BTE, 0);
env->CSR_MISC = 0;
env->CSR_ECFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_ECFG, CSR_ECFG, VS, 0);
env->CSR_ECFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_ECFG, CSR_ECFG, LIE, 0);
env->CSR_ESTAT = env->CSR_ESTAT & (~MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, 2));
env->CSR_RVACFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_RVACFG, CSR_RVACFG, RBITS, 0);
env->CSR_TCFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_TCFG, CSR_TCFG, EN, 0);
env->CSR_LLBCTL = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_LLBCTL, CSR_LLBCTL, KLO, 0);
env->CSR_TLBRERA = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_TLBRERA, CSR_TLBRERA, ISTLBR, 0);
env->CSR_MERRCTL = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_MERRCTL, CSR_MERRCTL, ISMERR, 0);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, TLB_TYPE, 2);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, MTLB_ENTRY, 63);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, STLB_WAYS, 7);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, STLB_SETS, 8);
for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV0, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV1, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV2, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV3, 0);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
env->pc = 0x1c000000;
#endif
restore_fp_status(env);
cs->exception_index = -1;
} | 189,863,556,959,363,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-908"
] | CVE-2022-35414 | softmmu/physmem.c in QEMU through 7.0.0 can perform an uninitialized read on the translate_fail path, leading to an io_readx or io_writex crash. NOTE: a third party states that the Non-virtualization Use Case in the qemu.org reference applies here, i.e., "Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not considered security bugs at this time. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35414 |
515,809 | qemu | 3517fb726741c109cae7995f9ea46f0cab6187d6 | https://github.com/bonzini/qemu | https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/3517fb726741c109cae7995f9ea46f0cab6187d6 | target/loongarch: Clean up tlb when cpu reset
We should make sure that tlb is clean when cpu reset.
Signed-off-by: Song Gao <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> | 0 | static void loongarch_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(dev);
LoongArchCPU *cpu = LOONGARCH_CPU(cs);
LoongArchCPUClass *lacc = LOONGARCH_CPU_GET_CLASS(cpu);
CPULoongArchState *env = &cpu->env;
lacc->parent_reset(dev);
env->fcsr0_mask = FCSR0_M1 | FCSR0_M2 | FCSR0_M3;
env->fcsr0 = 0x0;
int n;
/* Set csr registers value after reset */
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, PLV, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, IE, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DA, 1);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, PG, 0);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DATF, 1);
env->CSR_CRMD = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_CRMD, CSR_CRMD, DATM, 1);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, FPE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, SXE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, ASXE, 0);
env->CSR_EUEN = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_EUEN, CSR_EUEN, BTE, 0);
env->CSR_MISC = 0;
env->CSR_ECFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_ECFG, CSR_ECFG, VS, 0);
env->CSR_ECFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_ECFG, CSR_ECFG, LIE, 0);
env->CSR_ESTAT = env->CSR_ESTAT & (~MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, 2));
env->CSR_RVACFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_RVACFG, CSR_RVACFG, RBITS, 0);
env->CSR_TCFG = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_TCFG, CSR_TCFG, EN, 0);
env->CSR_LLBCTL = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_LLBCTL, CSR_LLBCTL, KLO, 0);
env->CSR_TLBRERA = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_TLBRERA, CSR_TLBRERA, ISTLBR, 0);
env->CSR_MERRCTL = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_MERRCTL, CSR_MERRCTL, ISMERR, 0);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, TLB_TYPE, 2);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, MTLB_ENTRY, 63);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, STLB_WAYS, 7);
env->CSR_PRCFG3 = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_PRCFG3, CSR_PRCFG3, STLB_SETS, 8);
for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV0, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV1, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV2, 0);
env->CSR_DMW[n] = FIELD_DP64(env->CSR_DMW[n], CSR_DMW, PLV3, 0);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
env->pc = 0x1c000000;
memset(env->tlb, 0, sizeof(env->tlb));
#endif
restore_fp_status(env);
cs->exception_index = -1;
} | 336,031,391,612,226,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-908"
] | CVE-2022-35414 | softmmu/physmem.c in QEMU through 7.0.0 can perform an uninitialized read on the translate_fail path, leading to an io_readx or io_writex crash. NOTE: a third party states that the Non-virtualization Use Case in the qemu.org reference applies here, i.e., "Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not considered security bugs at this time. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35414 |
217,013 | html-parser | b9aae1e43eb2c8e989510187cff0ba3e996f9a4c | http://github.com/gisle/html-parser | http://github.com/gisle/html-parser/commit/b9aae1e43eb2c8e989510187cff0ba3e996f9a4c | decode_entities confused by trailing incomplete entity
Mark Martinec reported crashed when running SpamAssassin, given a
particular HTML junk mail to parse. The problem was caused by
HTML::Parsers decode_entities function confusing itself when it
encountered strings with incomplete entities at the end of the string. | 1 | decode_entities(pTHX_ SV* sv, HV* entity2char, bool expand_prefix)
{
STRLEN len;
char *s = SvPV_force(sv, len);
char *t = s;
char *end = s + len;
char *ent_start;
char *repl;
STRLEN repl_len;
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
char buf[UTF8_MAXLEN];
int repl_utf8;
int high_surrogate = 0;
#else
char buf[1];
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(UNICODE_HTML_PARSER)
/* gcc -Wall reports this variable as possibly used uninitialized */
repl_utf8 = 0;
#endif
while (s < end) {
assert(t <= s);
if ((*t++ = *s++) != '&')
continue;
ent_start = s;
repl = 0;
if (*s == '#') {
UV num = 0;
UV prev = 0;
int ok = 0;
s++;
if (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X') {
s++;
while (*s) {
char *tmp = strchr(PL_hexdigit, *s);
if (!tmp)
break;
num = num << 4 | ((tmp - PL_hexdigit) & 15);
if (prev && num <= prev) {
/* overflow */
ok = 0;
break;
}
prev = num;
s++;
ok = 1;
}
}
else {
while (isDIGIT(*s)) {
num = num * 10 + (*s - '0');
if (prev && num < prev) {
/* overflow */
ok = 0;
break;
}
prev = num;
s++;
ok = 1;
}
}
if (ok) {
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
if (!SvUTF8(sv) && num <= 255) {
buf[0] = (char) num;
repl = buf;
repl_len = 1;
repl_utf8 = 0;
}
else {
char *tmp;
if ((num & 0xFFFFFC00) == 0xDC00) { /* low-surrogate */
if (high_surrogate != 0) {
t -= 3; /* Back up past 0xFFFD */
num = ((high_surrogate - 0xD800) << 10) +
(num - 0xDC00) + 0x10000;
high_surrogate = 0;
} else {
num = 0xFFFD;
}
}
else if ((num & 0xFFFFFC00) == 0xD800) { /* high-surrogate */
high_surrogate = num;
num = 0xFFFD;
}
else {
high_surrogate = 0;
/* otherwise invalid? */
if ((num >= 0xFDD0 && num <= 0xFDEF) ||
((num & 0xFFFE) == 0xFFFE) ||
num > 0x10FFFF)
{
num = 0xFFFD;
}
}
tmp = (char*)uvuni_to_utf8((U8*)buf, num);
repl = buf;
repl_len = tmp - buf;
repl_utf8 = 1;
}
#else
if (num <= 255) {
buf[0] = (char) num & 0xFF;
repl = buf;
repl_len = 1;
}
#endif
}
}
else {
char *ent_name = s;
while (isALNUM(*s))
s++;
if (ent_name != s && entity2char) {
SV** svp;
if ( (svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, s - ent_name, 0)) ||
(*s == ';' && (svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, s - ent_name + 1, 0)))
)
{
repl = SvPV(*svp, repl_len);
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
repl_utf8 = SvUTF8(*svp);
#endif
}
else if (expand_prefix) {
char *ss = s - 1;
while (ss > ent_name) {
svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, ss - ent_name, 0);
if (svp) {
repl = SvPV(*svp, repl_len);
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
repl_utf8 = SvUTF8(*svp);
#endif
s = ss;
break;
}
ss--;
}
}
}
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
high_surrogate = 0;
#endif
}
if (repl) {
char *repl_allocated = 0;
if (*s == ';')
s++;
t--; /* '&' already copied, undo it */
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
if (*s != '&') {
high_surrogate = 0;
}
if (!SvUTF8(sv) && repl_utf8) {
/* need to upgrade sv before we continue */
STRLEN before_gap_len = t - SvPVX(sv);
char *before_gap = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)SvPVX(sv), &before_gap_len);
STRLEN after_gap_len = end - s;
char *after_gap = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)s, &after_gap_len);
sv_setpvn(sv, before_gap, before_gap_len);
sv_catpvn(sv, after_gap, after_gap_len);
SvUTF8_on(sv);
Safefree(before_gap);
Safefree(after_gap);
s = t = SvPVX(sv) + before_gap_len;
end = SvPVX(sv) + before_gap_len + after_gap_len;
}
else if (SvUTF8(sv) && !repl_utf8) {
repl = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)repl, &repl_len);
repl_allocated = repl;
}
#endif
if (t + repl_len > s) {
/* need to grow the string */
grow_gap(aTHX_ sv, repl_len - (s - t), &t, &s, &end);
}
/* copy replacement string into string */
while (repl_len--)
*t++ = *repl++;
if (repl_allocated)
Safefree(repl_allocated);
}
else {
while (ent_start < s)
*t++ = *ent_start++;
}
}
*t = '\0';
SvCUR_set(sv, t - SvPVX(sv));
return sv;
} | 55,873,461,094,162,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2009-3627 | The decode_entities function in util.c in HTML-Parser before 3.63 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via an incomplete SGML numeric character reference, which triggers generation of an invalid UTF-8 character. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3627 |
515,837 | html-parser | b9aae1e43eb2c8e989510187cff0ba3e996f9a4c | http://github.com/gisle/html-parser | http://github.com/gisle/html-parser/commit/b9aae1e43eb2c8e989510187cff0ba3e996f9a4c | decode_entities confused by trailing incomplete entity
Mark Martinec reported crashed when running SpamAssassin, given a
particular HTML junk mail to parse. The problem was caused by
HTML::Parsers decode_entities function confusing itself when it
encountered strings with incomplete entities at the end of the string. | 0 | decode_entities(pTHX_ SV* sv, HV* entity2char, bool expand_prefix)
{
STRLEN len;
char *s = SvPV_force(sv, len);
char *t = s;
char *end = s + len;
char *ent_start;
char *repl;
STRLEN repl_len;
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
char buf[UTF8_MAXLEN];
int repl_utf8;
int high_surrogate = 0;
#else
char buf[1];
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(UNICODE_HTML_PARSER)
/* gcc -Wall reports this variable as possibly used uninitialized */
repl_utf8 = 0;
#endif
while (s < end) {
assert(t <= s);
if ((*t++ = *s++) != '&')
continue;
ent_start = s;
repl = 0;
if (s < end && *s == '#') {
UV num = 0;
UV prev = 0;
int ok = 0;
s++;
if (s < end && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
s++;
while (s < end) {
char *tmp = strchr(PL_hexdigit, *s);
if (!tmp)
break;
num = num << 4 | ((tmp - PL_hexdigit) & 15);
if (prev && num <= prev) {
/* overflow */
ok = 0;
break;
}
prev = num;
s++;
ok = 1;
}
}
else {
while (s < end && isDIGIT(*s)) {
num = num * 10 + (*s - '0');
if (prev && num < prev) {
/* overflow */
ok = 0;
break;
}
prev = num;
s++;
ok = 1;
}
}
if (ok) {
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
if (!SvUTF8(sv) && num <= 255) {
buf[0] = (char) num;
repl = buf;
repl_len = 1;
repl_utf8 = 0;
}
else {
char *tmp;
if ((num & 0xFFFFFC00) == 0xDC00) { /* low-surrogate */
if (high_surrogate != 0) {
t -= 3; /* Back up past 0xFFFD */
num = ((high_surrogate - 0xD800) << 10) +
(num - 0xDC00) + 0x10000;
high_surrogate = 0;
} else {
num = 0xFFFD;
}
}
else if ((num & 0xFFFFFC00) == 0xD800) { /* high-surrogate */
high_surrogate = num;
num = 0xFFFD;
}
else {
high_surrogate = 0;
/* otherwise invalid? */
if ((num >= 0xFDD0 && num <= 0xFDEF) ||
((num & 0xFFFE) == 0xFFFE) ||
num > 0x10FFFF)
{
num = 0xFFFD;
}
}
tmp = (char*)uvuni_to_utf8((U8*)buf, num);
repl = buf;
repl_len = tmp - buf;
repl_utf8 = 1;
}
#else
if (num <= 255) {
buf[0] = (char) num & 0xFF;
repl = buf;
repl_len = 1;
}
#endif
}
}
else {
char *ent_name = s;
while (s < end && isALNUM(*s))
s++;
if (ent_name != s && entity2char) {
SV** svp;
if ( (svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, s - ent_name, 0)) ||
(*s == ';' && (svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, s - ent_name + 1, 0)))
)
{
repl = SvPV(*svp, repl_len);
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
repl_utf8 = SvUTF8(*svp);
#endif
}
else if (expand_prefix) {
char *ss = s - 1;
while (ss > ent_name) {
svp = hv_fetch(entity2char, ent_name, ss - ent_name, 0);
if (svp) {
repl = SvPV(*svp, repl_len);
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
repl_utf8 = SvUTF8(*svp);
#endif
s = ss;
break;
}
ss--;
}
}
}
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
high_surrogate = 0;
#endif
}
if (repl) {
char *repl_allocated = 0;
if (s < end && *s == ';')
s++;
t--; /* '&' already copied, undo it */
#ifdef UNICODE_HTML_PARSER
if (*s != '&') {
high_surrogate = 0;
}
if (!SvUTF8(sv) && repl_utf8) {
/* need to upgrade sv before we continue */
STRLEN before_gap_len = t - SvPVX(sv);
char *before_gap = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)SvPVX(sv), &before_gap_len);
STRLEN after_gap_len = end - s;
char *after_gap = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)s, &after_gap_len);
sv_setpvn(sv, before_gap, before_gap_len);
sv_catpvn(sv, after_gap, after_gap_len);
SvUTF8_on(sv);
Safefree(before_gap);
Safefree(after_gap);
s = t = SvPVX(sv) + before_gap_len;
end = SvPVX(sv) + before_gap_len + after_gap_len;
}
else if (SvUTF8(sv) && !repl_utf8) {
repl = (char*)bytes_to_utf8((U8*)repl, &repl_len);
repl_allocated = repl;
}
#endif
if (t + repl_len > s) {
/* need to grow the string */
grow_gap(aTHX_ sv, repl_len - (s - t), &t, &s, &end);
}
/* copy replacement string into string */
while (repl_len--)
*t++ = *repl++;
if (repl_allocated)
Safefree(repl_allocated);
}
else {
while (ent_start < s)
*t++ = *ent_start++;
}
}
*t = '\0';
SvCUR_set(sv, t - SvPVX(sv));
return sv;
} | 324,129,469,800,921,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2009-3627 | The decode_entities function in util.c in HTML-Parser before 3.63 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via an incomplete SGML numeric character reference, which triggers generation of an invalid UTF-8 character. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3627 |
217,024 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 1 | void* leak_malloc(size_t bytes)
{
// allocate enough space infront of the allocation to store the pointer for
// the alloc structure. This will making free'ing the structer really fast!
// 1. allocate enough memory and include our header
// 2. set the base pointer to be right after our header
void* base = dlmalloc(bytes + sizeof(AllocationEntry));
if (base != NULL) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&gAllocationsMutex);
intptr_t backtrace[BACKTRACE_SIZE];
size_t numEntries = get_backtrace(backtrace, BACKTRACE_SIZE);
AllocationEntry* header = (AllocationEntry*)base;
header->entry = record_backtrace(backtrace, numEntries, bytes);
header->guard = GUARD;
// now increment base to point to after our header.
// this should just work since our header is 8 bytes.
base = (AllocationEntry*)base + 1;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gAllocationsMutex);
}
return base;
} | 230,226,643,357,187,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
515,997 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 0 | void* leak_malloc(size_t bytes)
{
// allocate enough space infront of the allocation to store the pointer for
// the alloc structure. This will making free'ing the structer really fast!
// 1. allocate enough memory and include our header
// 2. set the base pointer to be right after our header
size_t size = bytes + sizeof(AllocationEntry);
if (size < bytes) { // Overflow.
return NULL;
}
void* base = dlmalloc(size);
if (base != NULL) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&gAllocationsMutex);
intptr_t backtrace[BACKTRACE_SIZE];
size_t numEntries = get_backtrace(backtrace, BACKTRACE_SIZE);
AllocationEntry* header = (AllocationEntry*)base;
header->entry = record_backtrace(backtrace, numEntries, bytes);
header->guard = GUARD;
// now increment base to point to after our header.
// this should just work since our header is 8 bytes.
base = (AllocationEntry*)base + 1;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gAllocationsMutex);
}
return base;
} | 331,569,411,028,560,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
217,025 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 1 | void* chk_malloc(size_t bytes)
{
char* buffer = (char*)dlmalloc(bytes + CHK_OVERHEAD_SIZE);
if (buffer) {
memset(buffer, CHK_SENTINEL_VALUE, bytes + CHK_OVERHEAD_SIZE);
size_t offset = dlmalloc_usable_size(buffer) - sizeof(size_t);
*(size_t *)(buffer + offset) = bytes;
buffer += CHK_SENTINEL_HEAD_SIZE;
}
return buffer;
} | 207,891,667,812,877,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
515,993 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 0 | void* chk_malloc(size_t bytes)
{
size_t size = bytes + CHK_OVERHEAD_SIZE;
if (size < bytes) { // Overflow.
return NULL;
}
uint8_t* buffer = (uint8_t*) dlmalloc(size);
if (buffer) {
memset(buffer, CHK_SENTINEL_VALUE, bytes + CHK_OVERHEAD_SIZE);
size_t offset = dlmalloc_usable_size(buffer) - sizeof(size_t);
*(size_t *)(buffer + offset) = bytes;
buffer += CHK_SENTINEL_HEAD_SIZE;
}
return buffer;
} | 337,156,802,310,075,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
217,026 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 1 | void* leak_memalign(size_t alignment, size_t bytes)
{
// we can just use malloc
if (alignment <= MALLOC_ALIGNMENT)
return leak_malloc(bytes);
// need to make sure it's a power of two
if (alignment & (alignment-1))
alignment = 1L << (31 - __builtin_clz(alignment));
// here, aligment is at least MALLOC_ALIGNMENT<<1 bytes
// we will align by at least MALLOC_ALIGNMENT bytes
// and at most alignment-MALLOC_ALIGNMENT bytes
size_t size = (alignment-MALLOC_ALIGNMENT) + bytes;
void* base = leak_malloc(size);
if (base != NULL) {
intptr_t ptr = (intptr_t)base;
if ((ptr % alignment) == 0)
return base;
// align the pointer
ptr += ((-ptr) % alignment);
// there is always enough space for the base pointer and the guard
((void**)ptr)[-1] = MEMALIGN_GUARD;
((void**)ptr)[-2] = base;
return (void*)ptr;
}
return base;
} | 113,652,545,145,346,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
516,002 | platform_bionic | 7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic | https://github.com/android/platform_bionic/commit/7f5aa4f35e23fd37425b3a5041737cdf58f87385 | bionic: fix integer overflows in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
The allocation size in chk_malloc(), leak_malloc(), and leak_memalign()
functions may be rounded up to a small value, leading to buffer overflows.
The code only runs in debugging mode.
This patch complements commit 6f04a0f4 (CVE-2009-0607).
Change-Id: Id899bcd2bcd2ea2205e5753c433390710032dc83
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]> | 0 | void* leak_memalign(size_t alignment, size_t bytes)
{
// we can just use malloc
if (alignment <= MALLOC_ALIGNMENT)
return leak_malloc(bytes);
// need to make sure it's a power of two
if (alignment & (alignment-1))
alignment = 1L << (31 - __builtin_clz(alignment));
// here, aligment is at least MALLOC_ALIGNMENT<<1 bytes
// we will align by at least MALLOC_ALIGNMENT bytes
// and at most alignment-MALLOC_ALIGNMENT bytes
size_t size = (alignment-MALLOC_ALIGNMENT) + bytes;
if (size < bytes) { // Overflow.
return NULL;
}
void* base = leak_malloc(size);
if (base != NULL) {
intptr_t ptr = (intptr_t)base;
if ((ptr % alignment) == 0)
return base;
// align the pointer
ptr += ((-ptr) % alignment);
// there is always enough space for the base pointer and the guard
((void**)ptr)[-1] = MEMALIGN_GUARD;
((void**)ptr)[-2] = base;
return (void*)ptr;
}
return base;
} | 146,050,602,257,073,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2674 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) chk_malloc, (2) leak_malloc, and (3) leak_memalign functions in libc/bionic/malloc_debug_leak.c in Bionic (libc) for Android, when libc.debug.malloc is set, make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2674 |
217,027 | nedmalloc | 2965eca30c408c13473c4146a9d47d547d288db1 | https://github.com/ned14/nedmalloc | https://github.com/ned14/nedmalloc/commit/2965eca30c408c13473c4146a9d47d547d288db1 | Avoid overflowing allocation size in calloc() | 1 | NEDMALLOCNOALIASATTR NEDMALLOCPTRATTR void * nedpcalloc(nedpool *p, size_t no, size_t size) THROWSPEC
{
unsigned flags=NEDMALLOC_FORCERESERVE(p, 0, no*size);
return nedpmalloc2(p, size*no, 0, M2_ZERO_MEMORY|flags);
}
| 276,074,049,330,858,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2675 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) CallMalloc (malloc) and (2) nedpcalloc (calloc) functions in nedmalloc (nedmalloc.c) before 1.10 beta2 make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2675 |
516,019 | nedmalloc | 2965eca30c408c13473c4146a9d47d547d288db1 | https://github.com/ned14/nedmalloc | https://github.com/ned14/nedmalloc/commit/2965eca30c408c13473c4146a9d47d547d288db1 | Avoid overflowing allocation size in calloc() | 0 | NEDMALLOCNOALIASATTR NEDMALLOCPTRATTR void * nedpmalloc(nedpool *p, size_t size) THROWSPEC
{
unsigned flags=NEDMALLOC_FORCERESERVE(p, 0, size);
return nedpmalloc2(p, size, 0, flags);
}
| 18,285,440,970,008,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2675 | Multiple integer overflows in the (1) CallMalloc (malloc) and (2) nedpcalloc (calloc) functions in nedmalloc (nedmalloc.c) before 1.10 beta2 make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2675 |
217,028 | squidclamav | 80f74451f628264d1d9a1f1c0bbcebc932ba5e00 | https://github.com/darold/squidclamav | https://github.com/darold/squidclamav/commit/80f74451f628264d1d9a1f1c0bbcebc932ba5e00 | Add a workaround for a squidGuard bug that unescape the URL and send it back unescaped. This could conduct in wrong result and ssquidclamav crash especially with URL containing the %0D or %0A character. John Xue | 1 | int squidclamav_check_preview_handler(char *preview_data, int preview_data_len, ci_request_t * req)
{
ci_headers_list_t *req_header;
struct http_info httpinf;
av_req_data_t *data = ci_service_data(req);
char *clientip;
struct hostent *clientname;
unsigned long ip;
char *username;
char *content_type;
ci_off_t content_length;
char *chain_ret = NULL;
char *ret = NULL;
int chkipdone = 0;
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: processing preview header.\n");
if (preview_data_len)
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: preview data size is %d\n", preview_data_len);
/* Extract the HTTP header from the request */
if ((req_header = ci_http_request_headers(req)) == NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(0, "ERROR squidclamav_check_preview_handler: bad http header, aborting.\n");
return CI_ERROR;
}
/* Get the Authenticated user */
if ((username = ci_headers_value(req->request_header, "X-Authenticated-User")) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: X-Authenticated-User: %s\n", username);
/* if a TRUSTUSER match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (simple_pattern_compare(username, TRUSTUSER) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTUSER match) for user: %s\n", username);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
} else {
/* set null client to - */
username = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*2);
strcpy(username, "-");
}
/* Check client Ip against SquidClamav trustclient */
if ((clientip = ci_headers_value(req->request_header, "X-Client-IP")) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: X-Client-IP: %s\n", clientip);
ip = inet_addr(clientip);
chkipdone = 0;
if (dnslookup == 1) {
if ( (clientname = gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip, sizeof(ip), AF_INET)) != NULL) {
if (clientname->h_name != NULL) {
/* if a TRUSTCLIENT match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (client_pattern_compare(clientip, clientname->h_name) > 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTCLIENT match) for client: %s(%s)\n", clientname->h_name, clientip);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
chkipdone = 1;
}
}
}
if (chkipdone == 0) {
/* if a TRUSTCLIENT match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (client_pattern_compare(clientip, NULL) > 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTCLIENT match) for client: %s\n", clientip);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
}
} else {
/* set null client to - */
clientip = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*2);
strcpy(clientip, "-");
}
/* Get the requested URL */
if (!extract_http_info(req, req_header, &httpinf)) {
/* Something wrong in the header or unknow method */
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: bad http header, aborting.\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: URL requested: %s\n", httpinf.url);
/* Check the URL against SquidClamav Whitelist */
if (simple_pattern_compare(httpinf.url, WHITELIST) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (WHITELIST match) for url: %s\n", httpinf.url);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Check URL header against squidGuard */
if (usepipe == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Sending request to chained program: %s\n", squidguard);
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Request: %s %s %s %s\n", httpinf.url,clientip,username,httpinf.method);
fprintf(sgfpw,"%s %s %s %s\n",httpinf.url,clientip,username,httpinf.method);
fflush(sgfpw);
/* the chained redirector must return empty line if ok or the redirection url */
chain_ret = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*MAX_URL_SIZE);
if (chain_ret != NULL) {
ret = fgets(chain_ret,MAX_URL_SIZE,sgfpr);
if ((ret != NULL) && (strlen(chain_ret) > 1)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Chained program redirection received: %s\n", chain_ret);
if (logredir)
ci_debug_printf(0, "INFO Chained program redirection received: %s\n", chain_ret);
/* Create the redirection url to squid */
data->blocked = 1;
generate_redirect_page(strtok(chain_ret, " "), req, data);
xfree(chain_ret);
chain_ret = NULL;
return CI_MOD_CONTINUE;
}
xfree(chain_ret);
chain_ret = NULL;
}
}
/* CONNECT method (https) can not be scanned so abort */
if (strcmp(httpinf.method, "CONNECT") == 0) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: method %s can't be scanned.\n", httpinf.method);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Check the URL against SquidClamav abort */
if (simple_pattern_compare(httpinf.url, ABORT) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check (ABORT match) for url: %s\n", httpinf.url);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Get the content length header */
content_length = ci_http_content_length(req);
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Content-Length: %d\n", (int)content_length);
if ((content_length > 0) && (maxsize > 0) && (content_length >= maxsize)) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check, content-length upper than maxsize (%d > %d)\n", content_length, (int)maxsize);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Get the content type header */
if ((content_type = http_content_type(req)) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Content-Type: %s\n", content_type);
/* Check the Content-Type against SquidClamav abortcontent */
if (simple_pattern_compare(content_type, ABORTCONTENT)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check (ABORTCONTENT match) for content-type: %s\n", content_type);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
}
/* No data, so nothing to scan */
if (!data || !ci_req_hasbody(req)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No body data, allow 204\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
if (preview_data_len == 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: can not begin to scan url: No preview data.\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
data->url = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(httpinf.url)+1);
strcpy(data->url, httpinf.url);
if (username != NULL) {
data->user = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(username)+1);
strcpy(data->user, username);
} else {
data->user = NULL;
}
if (clientip != NULL) {
data->clientip = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(clientip)+1);
strcpy(data->clientip, clientip);
} else {
ci_debug_printf(0, "ERROR squidclamav_check_preview_handler: clientip is null, you must set 'icap_send_client_ip on' into squid.conf\n");
data->clientip = NULL;
}
data->body = ci_simple_file_new(0);
if ((SEND_PERCENT_BYTES >= 0) && (START_SEND_AFTER == 0)) {
ci_req_unlock_data(req);
ci_simple_file_lock_all(data->body);
}
if (!data->body)
return CI_ERROR;
if (preview_data_len) {
if (ci_simple_file_write(data->body, preview_data, preview_data_len, ci_req_hasalldata(req)) == CI_ERROR)
return CI_ERROR;
}
return CI_MOD_CONTINUE;
} | 113,201,592,654,248,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-3501 | The squidclamav_check_preview_handler function in squidclamav.c in SquidClamav 5.x before 5.8 and 6.x before 6.7 passes an unescaped URL to a system command call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a URL with certain characters, as demonstrated using %0D or %0A. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3501 |
516,090 | squidclamav | 80f74451f628264d1d9a1f1c0bbcebc932ba5e00 | https://github.com/darold/squidclamav | https://github.com/darold/squidclamav/commit/80f74451f628264d1d9a1f1c0bbcebc932ba5e00 | Add a workaround for a squidGuard bug that unescape the URL and send it back unescaped. This could conduct in wrong result and ssquidclamav crash especially with URL containing the %0D or %0A character. John Xue | 0 | int squidclamav_check_preview_handler(char *preview_data, int preview_data_len, ci_request_t * req)
{
ci_headers_list_t *req_header;
struct http_info httpinf;
av_req_data_t *data = ci_service_data(req);
char *clientip;
struct hostent *clientname;
unsigned long ip;
char *username;
char *content_type;
ci_off_t content_length;
char *chain_ret = NULL;
char *ret = NULL;
int chkipdone = 0;
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: processing preview header.\n");
if (preview_data_len)
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: preview data size is %d\n", preview_data_len);
/* Extract the HTTP header from the request */
if ((req_header = ci_http_request_headers(req)) == NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(0, "ERROR squidclamav_check_preview_handler: bad http header, aborting.\n");
return CI_ERROR;
}
/* Get the Authenticated user */
if ((username = ci_headers_value(req->request_header, "X-Authenticated-User")) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: X-Authenticated-User: %s\n", username);
/* if a TRUSTUSER match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (simple_pattern_compare(username, TRUSTUSER) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTUSER match) for user: %s\n", username);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
} else {
/* set null client to - */
username = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*2);
strcpy(username, "-");
}
/* Check client Ip against SquidClamav trustclient */
if ((clientip = ci_headers_value(req->request_header, "X-Client-IP")) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: X-Client-IP: %s\n", clientip);
ip = inet_addr(clientip);
chkipdone = 0;
if (dnslookup == 1) {
if ( (clientname = gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip, sizeof(ip), AF_INET)) != NULL) {
if (clientname->h_name != NULL) {
/* if a TRUSTCLIENT match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (client_pattern_compare(clientip, clientname->h_name) > 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTCLIENT match) for client: %s(%s)\n", clientname->h_name, clientip);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
chkipdone = 1;
}
}
}
if (chkipdone == 0) {
/* if a TRUSTCLIENT match => no squidguard and no virus scan */
if (client_pattern_compare(clientip, NULL) > 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (TRUSTCLIENT match) for client: %s\n", clientip);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
}
} else {
/* set null client to - */
clientip = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*2);
strcpy(clientip, "-");
}
/* Get the requested URL */
if (!extract_http_info(req, req_header, &httpinf)) {
/* Something wrong in the header or unknow method */
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: bad http header, aborting.\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: URL requested: %s\n", httpinf.url);
/* Check the URL against SquidClamav Whitelist */
if (simple_pattern_compare(httpinf.url, WHITELIST) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No squidguard and antivir check (WHITELIST match) for url: %s\n", httpinf.url);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Check URL header against squidGuard */
if (usepipe == 1) {
char *rbuff = NULL;
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Sending request to chained program: %s\n", squidguard);
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Request: %s %s %s %s\n", httpinf.url,clientip,username,httpinf.method);
/* escaping escaped character to prevent unescaping by squidguard */
rbuff = replace(httpinf.url, "%", "%25");
fprintf(sgfpw,"%s %s %s %s\n",rbuff,clientip,username,httpinf.method);
fflush(sgfpw);
xfree(rbuff);
/* the chained redirector must return empty line if ok or the redirection url */
chain_ret = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*MAX_URL_SIZE);
if (chain_ret != NULL) {
ret = fgets(chain_ret,MAX_URL_SIZE,sgfpr);
if ((ret != NULL) && (strlen(chain_ret) > 1)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Chained program redirection received: %s\n", chain_ret);
if (logredir)
ci_debug_printf(0, "INFO Chained program redirection received: %s\n", chain_ret);
/* Create the redirection url to squid */
data->blocked = 1;
generate_redirect_page(strtok(chain_ret, " "), req, data);
xfree(chain_ret);
chain_ret = NULL;
return CI_MOD_CONTINUE;
}
xfree(chain_ret);
chain_ret = NULL;
}
}
/* CONNECT method (https) can not be scanned so abort */
if (strcmp(httpinf.method, "CONNECT") == 0) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: method %s can't be scanned.\n", httpinf.method);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Check the URL against SquidClamav abort */
if (simple_pattern_compare(httpinf.url, ABORT) == 1) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check (ABORT match) for url: %s\n", httpinf.url);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Get the content length header */
content_length = ci_http_content_length(req);
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Content-Length: %d\n", (int)content_length);
if ((content_length > 0) && (maxsize > 0) && (content_length >= maxsize)) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check, content-length upper than maxsize (%d > %d)\n", content_length, (int)maxsize);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
/* Get the content type header */
if ((content_type = http_content_type(req)) != NULL) {
ci_debug_printf(2, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Content-Type: %s\n", content_type);
/* Check the Content-Type against SquidClamav abortcontent */
if (simple_pattern_compare(content_type, ABORTCONTENT)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No antivir check (ABORTCONTENT match) for content-type: %s\n", content_type);
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
}
/* No data, so nothing to scan */
if (!data || !ci_req_hasbody(req)) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: No body data, allow 204\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
if (preview_data_len == 0) {
ci_debug_printf(1, "DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: can not begin to scan url: No preview data.\n");
return CI_MOD_ALLOW204;
}
data->url = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(httpinf.url)+1);
strcpy(data->url, httpinf.url);
if (username != NULL) {
data->user = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(username)+1);
strcpy(data->user, username);
} else {
data->user = NULL;
}
if (clientip != NULL) {
data->clientip = ci_buffer_alloc(strlen(clientip)+1);
strcpy(data->clientip, clientip);
} else {
ci_debug_printf(0, "ERROR squidclamav_check_preview_handler: clientip is null, you must set 'icap_send_client_ip on' into squid.conf\n");
data->clientip = NULL;
}
data->body = ci_simple_file_new(0);
if ((SEND_PERCENT_BYTES >= 0) && (START_SEND_AFTER == 0)) {
ci_req_unlock_data(req);
ci_simple_file_lock_all(data->body);
}
if (!data->body)
return CI_ERROR;
if (preview_data_len) {
if (ci_simple_file_write(data->body, preview_data, preview_data_len, ci_req_hasalldata(req)) == CI_ERROR)
return CI_ERROR;
}
return CI_MOD_CONTINUE;
} | 275,224,704,382,283,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-3501 | The squidclamav_check_preview_handler function in squidclamav.c in SquidClamav 5.x before 5.8 and 6.x before 6.7 passes an unescaped URL to a system command call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a URL with certain characters, as demonstrated using %0D or %0A. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3501 |
217,130 | illumos-gate | 1d276e0b382cf066dae93640746d8b4c54d15452 | https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate | https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/commit/1d276e0b382cf066dae93640746d8b4c54d15452 | 13242 parse_user_name in PAM is sloppy
Reviewed by: Alex Wilson <[email protected]>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]> | 1 | parse_user_name(char *user_input, char **ret_username)
{
register char *ptr;
register int index = 0;
char username[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE];
/* Set the default value for *ret_username */
*ret_username = NULL;
/*
* Set the initial value for username - this is a buffer holds
* the user name.
*/
bzero((void *)username, PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
/*
* The user_input is guaranteed to be terminated by a null character.
*/
ptr = user_input;
/* Skip all the leading whitespaces if there are any. */
while ((*ptr == ' ') || (*ptr == '\t'))
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0') {
/*
* We should never get here since the user_input we got
* in pam_get_user() is not all whitespaces nor just "\0".
*/
return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
}
/*
* username will be the first string we get from user_input
* - we skip leading whitespaces and ignore trailing whitespaces
*/
while (*ptr != '\0') {
if ((*ptr == ' ') || (*ptr == '\t'))
break;
else {
username[index] = *ptr;
index++;
ptr++;
}
}
/* ret_username will be freed in pam_get_user(). */
if ((*ret_username = malloc(index + 1)) == NULL)
return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
(void) strcpy(*ret_username, username);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
} | 91,358,304,056,509,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-27678 | An issue was discovered in illumos before 2020-10-22, as used in OmniOS before r151030by, r151032ay, and r151034y and SmartOS before 20201022. There is a buffer overflow in parse_user_name in lib/libpam/pam_framework.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27678 |
516,902 | illumos-gate | 1d276e0b382cf066dae93640746d8b4c54d15452 | https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate | https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/commit/1d276e0b382cf066dae93640746d8b4c54d15452 | 13242 parse_user_name in PAM is sloppy
Reviewed by: Alex Wilson <[email protected]>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <[email protected]> | 0 | parse_user_name(char *user_input, char **ret_username)
{
register char *ptr;
register int index = 0;
char username[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE];
/* Set the default value for *ret_username */
*ret_username = NULL;
/*
* Set the initial value for username - this is a buffer holds
* the user name.
*/
bzero((void *)username, PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
/*
* The user_input is guaranteed to be terminated by a null character.
*/
ptr = user_input;
/* Skip all the leading whitespaces if there are any. */
while ((*ptr == ' ') || (*ptr == '\t'))
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '\0') {
/*
* We should never get here since the user_input we got
* in pam_get_user() is not all whitespaces nor just "\0".
*/
return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
}
/*
* username will be the first string we get from user_input
* - we skip leading whitespaces and ignore trailing whitespaces
*/
while (*ptr != '\0') {
if ((*ptr == ' ') || (*ptr == '\t') ||
(index >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)) {
break;
} else {
username[index] = *ptr;
index++;
ptr++;
}
}
/* ret_username will be freed in pam_get_user(). */
if (index >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE ||
(*ret_username = strdup(username)) == NULL)
return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
} | 73,177,564,007,800,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-27678 | An issue was discovered in illumos before 2020-10-22, as used in OmniOS before r151030by, r151032ay, and r151034y and SmartOS before 20201022. There is a buffer overflow in parse_user_name in lib/libpam/pam_framework.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27678 |
217,132 | xdelta-devel | ef93ff74203e030073b898c05e8b4860b5d09ef2 | https://github.com/jmacd/xdelta-devel | https://github.com/jmacd/xdelta-devel/commit/ef93ff74203e030073b898c05e8b4860b5d09ef2 | Add appheader tests; fix buffer overflow in main_get_appheader | 1 | main_get_appheader (xd3_stream *stream, main_file *ifile,
main_file *output, main_file *sfile)
{
uint8_t *apphead;
usize_t appheadsz;
int ret;
/* The user may disable the application header. Once the appheader
* is set, this disables setting it again. */
if (! option_use_appheader) { return; }
ret = xd3_get_appheader (stream, & apphead, & appheadsz);
/* Ignore failure, it only means we haven't received a header yet. */
if (ret != 0) { return; }
if (appheadsz > 0)
{
char *start = (char*)apphead;
char *slash;
int place = 0;
char *parsed[4];
memset (parsed, 0, sizeof (parsed));
while ((slash = strchr (start, '/')) != NULL)
{
*slash = 0;
parsed[place++] = start;
start = slash + 1;
}
parsed[place++] = start;
/* First take the output parameters. */
if (place == 2 || place == 4)
{
main_get_appheader_params (output, parsed, 1, "output", ifile);
}
/* Then take the source parameters. */
if (place == 4)
{
main_get_appheader_params (sfile, parsed+2, 0, "source", ifile);
}
}
option_use_appheader = 0;
return;
} | 281,373,746,731,901,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2014-9765 | Buffer overflow in the main_get_appheader function in xdelta3-main.h in xdelta3 before 3.0.9 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted input file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9765 |
517,037 | xdelta-devel | ef93ff74203e030073b898c05e8b4860b5d09ef2 | https://github.com/jmacd/xdelta-devel | https://github.com/jmacd/xdelta-devel/commit/ef93ff74203e030073b898c05e8b4860b5d09ef2 | Add appheader tests; fix buffer overflow in main_get_appheader | 0 | main_get_appheader (xd3_stream *stream, main_file *ifile,
main_file *output, main_file *sfile)
{
uint8_t *apphead;
usize_t appheadsz;
int ret;
/* The user may disable the application header. Once the appheader
* is set, this disables setting it again. */
if (! option_use_appheader) { return; }
ret = xd3_get_appheader (stream, & apphead, & appheadsz);
/* Ignore failure, it only means we haven't received a header yet. */
if (ret != 0) { return; }
if (appheadsz > 0)
{
const int kMaxArgs = 4;
char *start = (char*)apphead;
char *slash;
int place = 0;
char *parsed[kMaxArgs];
memset (parsed, 0, sizeof (parsed));
while ((slash = strchr (start, '/')) != NULL && place < (kMaxArgs-1))
{
*slash = 0;
parsed[place++] = start;
start = slash + 1;
}
parsed[place++] = start;
/* First take the output parameters. */
if (place == 2 || place == 4)
{
main_get_appheader_params (output, parsed, 1, "output", ifile);
}
/* Then take the source parameters. */
if (place == 4)
{
main_get_appheader_params (sfile, parsed+2, 0, "source", ifile);
}
}
option_use_appheader = 0;
return;
} | 174,889,360,678,033,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2014-9765 | Buffer overflow in the main_get_appheader function in xdelta3-main.h in xdelta3 before 3.0.9 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted input file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9765 |
217,161 | pam_radius | 01173ec2426627dbb1e0d96c06c3ffa0b14d36d0 | https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/pam_radius | https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/pam_radius/commit/01173ec2426627dbb1e0d96c06c3ffa0b14d36d0 | Use "length", which has been limited in size | 1 | static void add_password(AUTH_HDR *request, unsigned char type, CONST char *password, char *secret)
{
MD5_CTX md5_secret, my_md5;
unsigned char misc[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
int i;
int length = strlen(password);
unsigned char hashed[256 + AUTH_PASS_LEN]; /* can't be longer than this */
unsigned char *vector;
attribute_t *attr;
if (length > MAXPASS) { /* shorten the password for now */
length = MAXPASS;
}
if (length == 0) {
length = AUTH_PASS_LEN; /* 0 maps to 16 */
} if ((length & (AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1)) != 0) {
length += (AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1); /* round it up */
length &= ~(AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1); /* chop it off */
} /* 16*N maps to itself */
memset(hashed, 0, length);
memcpy(hashed, password, strlen(password));
attr = find_attribute(request, PW_PASSWORD);
if (type == PW_PASSWORD) {
vector = request->vector;
} else {
vector = attr->data; /* attr CANNOT be NULL here. */
}
/* ************************************************************ */
/* encrypt the password */
/* password : e[0] = p[0] ^ MD5(secret + vector) */
MD5Init(&md5_secret);
MD5Update(&md5_secret, (unsigned char *) secret, strlen(secret));
my_md5 = md5_secret; /* so we won't re-do the hash later */
MD5Update(&my_md5, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
MD5Final(misc, &my_md5); /* set the final vector */
xor(hashed, misc, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
/* For each step through, e[i] = p[i] ^ MD5(secret + e[i-1]) */
for (i = 1; i < (length >> 4); i++) {
my_md5 = md5_secret; /* grab old value of the hash */
MD5Update(&my_md5, &hashed[(i-1) * AUTH_PASS_LEN], AUTH_PASS_LEN);
MD5Final(misc, &my_md5); /* set the final vector */
xor(&hashed[i * AUTH_PASS_LEN], misc, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
if (type == PW_OLD_PASSWORD) {
attr = find_attribute(request, PW_OLD_PASSWORD);
}
if (!attr) {
add_attribute(request, type, hashed, length);
} else {
memcpy(attr->data, hashed, length); /* overwrite the packet */
}
} | 33,288,235,879,950,576,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2015-9542 | add_password in pam_radius_auth.c in pam_radius 1.4.0 does not correctly check the length of the input password, and is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow during memcpy(). An attacker could send a crafted password to an application (loading the pam_radius library) and crash it. Arbitrary code execution might be possible, depending on the application, C library, compiler, and other factors. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9542 |
517,189 | pam_radius | 01173ec2426627dbb1e0d96c06c3ffa0b14d36d0 | https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/pam_radius | https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/pam_radius/commit/01173ec2426627dbb1e0d96c06c3ffa0b14d36d0 | Use "length", which has been limited in size | 0 | static void add_password(AUTH_HDR *request, unsigned char type, CONST char *password, char *secret)
{
MD5_CTX md5_secret, my_md5;
unsigned char misc[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
int i;
int length = strlen(password);
unsigned char hashed[256 + AUTH_PASS_LEN]; /* can't be longer than this */
unsigned char *vector;
attribute_t *attr;
if (length > MAXPASS) { /* shorten the password for now */
length = MAXPASS;
}
if (length == 0) {
length = AUTH_PASS_LEN; /* 0 maps to 16 */
} if ((length & (AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1)) != 0) {
length += (AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1); /* round it up */
length &= ~(AUTH_PASS_LEN - 1); /* chop it off */
} /* 16*N maps to itself */
memset(hashed, 0, length);
memcpy(hashed, password, length);
attr = find_attribute(request, PW_PASSWORD);
if (type == PW_PASSWORD) {
vector = request->vector;
} else {
vector = attr->data; /* attr CANNOT be NULL here. */
}
/* ************************************************************ */
/* encrypt the password */
/* password : e[0] = p[0] ^ MD5(secret + vector) */
MD5Init(&md5_secret);
MD5Update(&md5_secret, (unsigned char *) secret, strlen(secret));
my_md5 = md5_secret; /* so we won't re-do the hash later */
MD5Update(&my_md5, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
MD5Final(misc, &my_md5); /* set the final vector */
xor(hashed, misc, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
/* For each step through, e[i] = p[i] ^ MD5(secret + e[i-1]) */
for (i = 1; i < (length >> 4); i++) {
my_md5 = md5_secret; /* grab old value of the hash */
MD5Update(&my_md5, &hashed[(i-1) * AUTH_PASS_LEN], AUTH_PASS_LEN);
MD5Final(misc, &my_md5); /* set the final vector */
xor(&hashed[i * AUTH_PASS_LEN], misc, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
if (type == PW_OLD_PASSWORD) {
attr = find_attribute(request, PW_OLD_PASSWORD);
}
if (!attr) {
add_attribute(request, type, hashed, length);
} else {
memcpy(attr->data, hashed, length); /* overwrite the packet */
}
} | 53,245,594,408,979,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2015-9542 | add_password in pam_radius_auth.c in pam_radius 1.4.0 does not correctly check the length of the input password, and is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow during memcpy(). An attacker could send a crafted password to an application (loading the pam_radius library) and crash it. Arbitrary code execution might be possible, depending on the application, C library, compiler, and other factors. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9542 |
217,162 | neovim | 4fad66fbe637818b6b3d6bc5d21923ba72795040 | https://github.com/neovim/neovim | https://github.com/neovim/neovim/commit/4fad66fbe637818b6b3d6bc5d21923ba72795040 | vim-patch:8.0.0056
Problem: When setting 'filetype' there is no check for a valid name.
Solution: Only allow valid characters in 'filetype', 'syntax' and 'keymap'.
https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/d0b5138ba4bccff8a744c99836041ef6322ed39a | 1 | did_set_string_option (
int opt_idx, /* index in options[] table */
char_u **varp, /* pointer to the option variable */
int new_value_alloced, /* new value was allocated */
char_u *oldval, /* previous value of the option */
char_u *errbuf, /* buffer for errors, or NULL */
int opt_flags /* OPT_LOCAL and/or OPT_GLOBAL */
)
{
char_u *errmsg = NULL;
char_u *s, *p;
int did_chartab = FALSE;
char_u **gvarp;
bool free_oldval = (options[opt_idx].flags & P_ALLOCED);
/* Get the global option to compare with, otherwise we would have to check
* two values for all local options. */
gvarp = (char_u **)get_varp_scope(&(options[opt_idx]), OPT_GLOBAL);
/* Disallow changing some options from secure mode */
if ((secure || sandbox != 0)
&& (options[opt_idx].flags & P_SECURE)) {
errmsg = e_secure;
}
/* Check for a "normal" file name in some options. Disallow a path
* separator (slash and/or backslash), wildcards and characters that are
* often illegal in a file name. */
else if ((options[opt_idx].flags & P_NFNAME)
&& vim_strpbrk(*varp, (char_u *)"/\\*?[|<>") != NULL) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'backupcopy' */
else if (gvarp == &p_bkc) {
char_u *bkc = p_bkc;
unsigned int *flags = &bkc_flags;
if (opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) {
bkc = curbuf->b_p_bkc;
flags = &curbuf->b_bkc_flags;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && *bkc == NUL) {
// make the local value empty: use the global value
*flags = 0;
} else {
if (opt_strings_flags(bkc, p_bkc_values, flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
if (((*flags & BKC_AUTO) != 0)
+ ((*flags & BKC_YES) != 0)
+ ((*flags & BKC_NO) != 0) != 1) {
// Must have exactly one of "auto", "yes" and "no".
(void)opt_strings_flags(oldval, p_bkc_values, flags, true);
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
}
/* 'backupext' and 'patchmode' */
else if (varp == &p_bex || varp == &p_pm) {
if (STRCMP(*p_bex == '.' ? p_bex + 1 : p_bex,
*p_pm == '.' ? p_pm + 1 : p_pm) == 0)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E589: 'backupext' and 'patchmode' are equal");
}
/* 'breakindentopt' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_briopt) {
if (briopt_check(curwin) == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_isi
|| varp == &(curbuf->b_p_isk)
|| varp == &p_isp
|| varp == &p_isf) {
// 'isident', 'iskeyword', 'isprint or 'isfname' option: refill g_chartab[]
// If the new option is invalid, use old value. 'lisp' option: refill
// g_chartab[] for '-' char
if (init_chartab() == FAIL) {
did_chartab = TRUE; /* need to restore it below */
errmsg = e_invarg; /* error in value */
}
}
/* 'helpfile' */
else if (varp == &p_hf) {
/* May compute new values for $VIM and $VIMRUNTIME */
if (didset_vim) {
vim_setenv("VIM", "");
didset_vim = FALSE;
}
if (didset_vimruntime) {
vim_setenv("VIMRUNTIME", "");
didset_vimruntime = FALSE;
}
}
/* 'colorcolumn' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_cc)
errmsg = check_colorcolumn(curwin);
/* 'helplang' */
else if (varp == &p_hlg) {
/* Check for "", "ab", "ab,cd", etc. */
for (s = p_hlg; *s != NUL; s += 3) {
if (s[1] == NUL || ((s[2] != ',' || s[3] == NUL) && s[2] != NUL)) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (s[2] == NUL)
break;
}
}
/* 'highlight' */
else if (varp == &p_hl) {
if (highlight_changed() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg; /* invalid flags */
}
/* 'nrformats' */
else if (gvarp == &p_nf) {
if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_nf_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_ssop) { // 'sessionoptions'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_ssop, p_ssop_values, &ssop_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
if ((ssop_flags & SSOP_CURDIR) && (ssop_flags & SSOP_SESDIR)) {
/* Don't allow both "sesdir" and "curdir". */
(void)opt_strings_flags(oldval, p_ssop_values, &ssop_flags, true);
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &p_vop) { // 'viewoptions'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_vop, p_ssop_values, &vop_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'scrollopt' */
else if (varp == &p_sbo) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_sbo, p_scbopt_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_ambw || (int *)varp == &p_emoji) {
// 'ambiwidth'
if (check_opt_strings(p_ambw, p_ambw_values, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (set_chars_option(&p_lcs) != NULL) {
errmsg = (char_u *)_("E834: Conflicts with value of 'listchars'");
} else if (set_chars_option(&p_fcs) != NULL) {
errmsg = (char_u *)_("E835: Conflicts with value of 'fillchars'");
}
}
/* 'background' */
else if (varp == &p_bg) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_bg, p_bg_values, FALSE) == OK) {
int dark = (*p_bg == 'd');
init_highlight(FALSE, FALSE);
if (dark != (*p_bg == 'd')
&& get_var_value((char_u *)"g:colors_name") != NULL) {
/* The color scheme must have set 'background' back to another
* value, that's not what we want here. Disable the color
* scheme and set the colors again. */
do_unlet((char_u *)"g:colors_name", TRUE);
free_string_option(p_bg);
p_bg = vim_strsave((char_u *)(dark ? "dark" : "light"));
check_string_option(&p_bg);
init_highlight(FALSE, FALSE);
}
} else
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'wildmode' */
else if (varp == &p_wim) {
if (check_opt_wim() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'wildoptions' */
else if (varp == &p_wop) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_wop, p_wop_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'winaltkeys' */
else if (varp == &p_wak) {
if (*p_wak == NUL
|| check_opt_strings(p_wak, p_wak_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'eventignore' */
else if (varp == &p_ei) {
if (check_ei() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
/* 'encoding' and 'fileencoding' */
} else if (varp == &p_enc || gvarp == &p_fenc) {
if (gvarp == &p_fenc) {
if (!MODIFIABLE(curbuf) && opt_flags != OPT_GLOBAL) {
errmsg = e_modifiable;
} else if (vim_strchr(*varp, ',') != NULL) {
// No comma allowed in 'fileencoding'; catches confusing it
// with 'fileencodings'.
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
// May show a "+" in the title now.
redraw_titles();
// Add 'fileencoding' to the swap file.
ml_setflags(curbuf);
}
}
if (errmsg == NULL) {
/* canonize the value, so that STRCMP() can be used on it */
p = enc_canonize(*varp);
xfree(*varp);
*varp = p;
if (varp == &p_enc) {
// only encoding=utf-8 allowed
if (STRCMP(p_enc, "utf-8") != 0) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
}
} else if (varp == &p_penc) {
/* Canonize printencoding if VIM standard one */
p = enc_canonize(p_penc);
xfree(p_penc);
p_penc = p;
} else if (varp == &curbuf->b_p_keymap) {
/* load or unload key mapping tables */
errmsg = keymap_init();
if (errmsg == NULL) {
if (*curbuf->b_p_keymap != NUL) {
/* Installed a new keymap, switch on using it. */
curbuf->b_p_iminsert = B_IMODE_LMAP;
if (curbuf->b_p_imsearch != B_IMODE_USE_INSERT)
curbuf->b_p_imsearch = B_IMODE_LMAP;
} else {
/* Cleared the keymap, may reset 'iminsert' and 'imsearch'. */
if (curbuf->b_p_iminsert == B_IMODE_LMAP)
curbuf->b_p_iminsert = B_IMODE_NONE;
if (curbuf->b_p_imsearch == B_IMODE_LMAP)
curbuf->b_p_imsearch = B_IMODE_USE_INSERT;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) == 0) {
set_iminsert_global();
set_imsearch_global();
}
status_redraw_curbuf();
}
}
/* 'fileformat' */
else if (gvarp == &p_ff) {
if (!MODIFIABLE(curbuf) && !(opt_flags & OPT_GLOBAL))
errmsg = e_modifiable;
else if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_ff_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
redraw_titles();
/* update flag in swap file */
ml_setflags(curbuf);
/* Redraw needed when switching to/from "mac": a CR in the text
* will be displayed differently. */
if (get_fileformat(curbuf) == EOL_MAC || *oldval == 'm')
redraw_curbuf_later(NOT_VALID);
}
}
/* 'fileformats' */
else if (varp == &p_ffs) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_ffs, p_ff_values, TRUE) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
/* 'matchpairs' */
else if (gvarp == &p_mps) {
if (has_mbyte) {
for (p = *varp; *p != NUL; ++p) {
int x2 = -1;
int x3 = -1;
if (*p != NUL)
p += mb_ptr2len(p);
if (*p != NUL)
x2 = *p++;
if (*p != NUL) {
x3 = mb_ptr2char(p);
p += mb_ptr2len(p);
}
if (x2 != ':' || x3 == -1 || (*p != NUL && *p != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (*p == NUL)
break;
}
} else {
/* Check for "x:y,x:y" */
for (p = *varp; *p != NUL; p += 4) {
if (p[1] != ':' || p[2] == NUL || (p[3] != NUL && p[3] != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (p[3] == NUL)
break;
}
}
}
/* 'comments' */
else if (gvarp == &p_com) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ) {
while (*s && *s != ':') {
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)COM_ALL, *s) == NULL
&& !ascii_isdigit(*s) && *s != '-') {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
++s;
}
if (*s++ == NUL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E524: Missing colon");
else if (*s == ',' || *s == NUL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E525: Zero length string");
if (errmsg != NULL)
break;
while (*s && *s != ',') {
if (*s == '\\' && s[1] != NUL)
++s;
++s;
}
s = skip_to_option_part(s);
}
}
/* 'listchars' */
else if (varp == &p_lcs) {
errmsg = set_chars_option(varp);
}
/* 'fillchars' */
else if (varp == &p_fcs) {
errmsg = set_chars_option(varp);
}
/* 'cedit' */
else if (varp == &p_cedit) {
errmsg = check_cedit();
}
/* 'verbosefile' */
else if (varp == &p_vfile) {
verbose_stop();
if (*p_vfile != NUL && verbose_open() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
/* 'shada' */
} else if (varp == &p_shada) {
// TODO(ZyX-I): Remove this code in the future, alongside with &viminfo
// option.
opt_idx = ((options[opt_idx].fullname[0] == 'v')
? (shada_idx == -1
? ((shada_idx = findoption((char_u *) "shada")))
: shada_idx)
: opt_idx);
for (s = p_shada; *s; ) {
/* Check it's a valid character */
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)"!\"%'/:<@cfhnrs", *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
if (*s == 'n') { /* name is always last one */
break;
} else if (*s == 'r') { /* skip until next ',' */
while (*++s && *s != ',')
;
} else if (*s == '%') {
/* optional number */
while (ascii_isdigit(*++s))
;
} else if (*s == '!' || *s == 'h' || *s == 'c')
++s; /* no extra chars */
else { /* must have a number */
while (ascii_isdigit(*++s))
;
if (!ascii_isdigit(*(s - 1))) {
if (errbuf != NULL) {
sprintf((char *)errbuf,
_("E526: Missing number after <%s>"),
transchar_byte(*(s - 1)));
errmsg = errbuf;
} else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
if (*s == ',')
++s;
else if (*s) {
if (errbuf != NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E527: Missing comma");
else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
if (*p_shada && errmsg == NULL && get_shada_parameter('\'') < 0)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E528: Must specify a ' value");
}
/* 'showbreak' */
else if (varp == &p_sbr) {
for (s = p_sbr; *s; ) {
if (ptr2cells(s) != 1)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E595: contains unprintable or wide character");
mb_ptr_adv(s);
}
}
/* 'guicursor' */
else if (varp == &p_guicursor)
errmsg = parse_shape_opt(SHAPE_CURSOR);
else if (varp == &p_popt)
errmsg = parse_printoptions();
else if (varp == &p_pmfn)
errmsg = parse_printmbfont();
/* 'langmap' */
else if (varp == &p_langmap)
langmap_set();
/* 'breakat' */
else if (varp == &p_breakat)
fill_breakat_flags();
/* 'titlestring' and 'iconstring' */
else if (varp == &p_titlestring || varp == &p_iconstring) {
int flagval = (varp == &p_titlestring) ? STL_IN_TITLE : STL_IN_ICON;
/* NULL => statusline syntax */
if (vim_strchr(*varp, '%') && check_stl_option(*varp) == NULL)
stl_syntax |= flagval;
else
stl_syntax &= ~flagval;
did_set_title(varp == &p_iconstring);
}
/* 'selection' */
else if (varp == &p_sel) {
if (*p_sel == NUL
|| check_opt_strings(p_sel, p_sel_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'selectmode' */
else if (varp == &p_slm) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_slm, p_slm_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'keymodel' */
else if (varp == &p_km) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_km, p_km_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
km_stopsel = (vim_strchr(p_km, 'o') != NULL);
km_startsel = (vim_strchr(p_km, 'a') != NULL);
}
}
/* 'mousemodel' */
else if (varp == &p_mousem) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_mousem, p_mousem_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_swb) { // 'switchbuf'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_swb, p_swb_values, &swb_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'debug' */
else if (varp == &p_debug) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_debug, p_debug_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_dy) { // 'display'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_dy, p_dy_values, &dy_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else
(void)init_chartab();
}
/* 'eadirection' */
else if (varp == &p_ead) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_ead, p_ead_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_cb) { // 'clipboard'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_cb, p_cb_values, &cb_flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spl) // 'spell'
|| varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spf)) {
// When 'spelllang' or 'spellfile' is set and there is a window for this
// buffer in which 'spell' is set load the wordlists.
errmsg = did_set_spell_option(varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spf));
}
/* When 'spellcapcheck' is set compile the regexp program. */
else if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spc)) {
errmsg = compile_cap_prog(curwin->w_s);
}
/* 'spellsuggest' */
else if (varp == &p_sps) {
if (spell_check_sps() != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'mkspellmem' */
else if (varp == &p_msm) {
if (spell_check_msm() != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* When 'bufhidden' is set, check for valid value. */
else if (gvarp == &p_bh) {
if (check_opt_strings(curbuf->b_p_bh, p_bufhidden_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* When 'buftype' is set, check for valid value. */
else if (gvarp == &p_bt) {
if ((curbuf->terminal && curbuf->b_p_bt[0] != 't')
|| (!curbuf->terminal && curbuf->b_p_bt[0] == 't')
|| check_opt_strings(curbuf->b_p_bt, p_buftype_values, FALSE) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
if (curwin->w_status_height) {
curwin->w_redr_status = TRUE;
redraw_later(VALID);
}
curbuf->b_help = (curbuf->b_p_bt[0] == 'h');
redraw_titles();
}
}
/* 'statusline' or 'rulerformat' */
else if (gvarp == &p_stl || varp == &p_ruf) {
int wid;
if (varp == &p_ruf) /* reset ru_wid first */
ru_wid = 0;
s = *varp;
if (varp == &p_ruf && *s == '%') {
/* set ru_wid if 'ruf' starts with "%99(" */
if (*++s == '-') /* ignore a '-' */
s++;
wid = getdigits_int(&s);
if (wid && *s == '(' && (errmsg = check_stl_option(p_ruf)) == NULL)
ru_wid = wid;
else
errmsg = check_stl_option(p_ruf);
}
/* check 'statusline' only if it doesn't start with "%!" */
else if (varp == &p_ruf || s[0] != '%' || s[1] != '!')
errmsg = check_stl_option(s);
if (varp == &p_ruf && errmsg == NULL)
comp_col();
}
/* check if it is a valid value for 'complete' -- Acevedo */
else if (gvarp == &p_cpt) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ) {
while (*s == ',' || *s == ' ')
s++;
if (!*s)
break;
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)".wbuksid]tU", *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
if (*++s != NUL && *s != ',' && *s != ' ') {
if (s[-1] == 'k' || s[-1] == 's') {
/* skip optional filename after 'k' and 's' */
while (*s && *s != ',' && *s != ' ') {
if (*s == '\\')
++s;
++s;
}
} else {
if (errbuf != NULL) {
sprintf((char *)errbuf,
_("E535: Illegal character after <%c>"),
*--s);
errmsg = errbuf;
} else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
}
}
/* 'completeopt' */
else if (varp == &p_cot) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_cot, p_cot_values, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
completeopt_was_set();
}
}
/* 'pastetoggle': translate key codes like in a mapping */
else if (varp == &p_pt) {
if (*p_pt) {
(void)replace_termcodes(p_pt, STRLEN(p_pt), &p, true, true, false,
CPO_TO_CPO_FLAGS);
if (p != NULL) {
if (new_value_alloced)
free_string_option(p_pt);
p_pt = p;
new_value_alloced = TRUE;
}
}
}
/* 'backspace' */
else if (varp == &p_bs) {
if (ascii_isdigit(*p_bs)) {
if (*p_bs >'2' || p_bs[1] != NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (check_opt_strings(p_bs, p_bs_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_bo) {
if (opt_strings_flags(p_bo, p_bo_values, &bo_flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (gvarp == &p_tc) { // 'tagcase'
unsigned int *flags;
if (opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) {
p = curbuf->b_p_tc;
flags = &curbuf->b_tc_flags;
} else {
p = p_tc;
flags = &tc_flags;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && *p == NUL) {
// make the local value empty: use the global value
*flags = 0;
} else if (*p == NUL
|| opt_strings_flags(p, p_tc_values, flags, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &p_cmp) { // 'casemap'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_cmp, p_cmp_values, &cmp_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'diffopt' */
else if (varp == &p_dip) {
if (diffopt_changed() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldmethod' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fdm) {
if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_fdm_values, FALSE) != OK
|| *curwin->w_p_fdm == NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
if (foldmethodIsDiff(curwin))
newFoldLevel();
}
}
/* 'foldexpr' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_fde) {
if (foldmethodIsExpr(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
}
/* 'foldmarker' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fmr) {
p = vim_strchr(*varp, ',');
if (p == NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E536: comma required");
else if (p == *varp || p[1] == NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else if (foldmethodIsMarker(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
}
/* 'commentstring' */
else if (gvarp == &p_cms) {
if (**varp != NUL && strstr((char *)*varp, "%s") == NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_(
"E537: 'commentstring' must be empty or contain %s");
} else if (varp == &p_fdo) { // 'foldopen'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_fdo, p_fdo_values, &fdo_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldclose' */
else if (varp == &p_fcl) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_fcl, p_fcl_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldignore' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fdi) {
if (foldmethodIsIndent(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
} else if (varp == &p_ve) { // 'virtualedit'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_ve, p_ve_values, &ve_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else if (STRCMP(p_ve, oldval) != 0) {
/* Recompute cursor position in case the new 've' setting
* changes something. */
validate_virtcol();
coladvance(curwin->w_virtcol);
}
} else if (varp == &p_csqf) {
if (p_csqf != NULL) {
p = p_csqf;
while (*p != NUL) {
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)CSQF_CMDS, *p) == NULL
|| p[1] == NUL
|| vim_strchr((char_u *)CSQF_FLAGS, p[1]) == NULL
|| (p[2] != NUL && p[2] != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
} else if (p[2] == NUL)
break;
else
p += 3;
}
}
}
/* 'cinoptions' */
else if (gvarp == &p_cino) {
/* TODO: recognize errors */
parse_cino(curbuf);
// inccommand
} else if (varp == &p_icm) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_icm, p_icm_values, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
// Options that are a list of flags.
} else {
p = NULL;
if (varp == &p_ww)
p = (char_u *)WW_ALL;
if (varp == &p_shm)
p = (char_u *)SHM_ALL;
else if (varp == &(p_cpo))
p = (char_u *)CPO_VI;
else if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_fo))
p = (char_u *)FO_ALL;
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_cocu)
p = (char_u *)COCU_ALL;
else if (varp == &p_mouse) {
p = (char_u *)MOUSE_ALL;
}
if (p != NULL) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ++s)
if (vim_strchr(p, *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* If error detected, restore the previous value.
*/
if (errmsg != NULL) {
if (new_value_alloced)
free_string_option(*varp);
*varp = oldval;
/*
* When resetting some values, need to act on it.
*/
if (did_chartab)
(void)init_chartab();
if (varp == &p_hl)
(void)highlight_changed();
} else {
/* Remember where the option was set. */
set_option_scriptID_idx(opt_idx, opt_flags, current_SID);
/*
* Free string options that are in allocated memory.
* Use "free_oldval", because recursiveness may change the flags under
* our fingers (esp. init_highlight()).
*/
if (free_oldval)
free_string_option(oldval);
if (new_value_alloced)
options[opt_idx].flags |= P_ALLOCED;
else
options[opt_idx].flags &= ~P_ALLOCED;
if ((opt_flags & (OPT_LOCAL | OPT_GLOBAL)) == 0
&& ((int)options[opt_idx].indir & PV_BOTH)) {
/* global option with local value set to use global value; free
* the local value and make it empty */
p = get_varp_scope(&(options[opt_idx]), OPT_LOCAL);
free_string_option(*(char_u **)p);
*(char_u **)p = empty_option;
}
/* May set global value for local option. */
else if (!(opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && opt_flags != OPT_GLOBAL)
set_string_option_global(opt_idx, varp);
/*
* Trigger the autocommand only after setting the flags.
*/
/* When 'syntax' is set, load the syntax of that name */
if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_syn)) {
apply_autocmds(EVENT_SYNTAX, curbuf->b_p_syn,
curbuf->b_fname, TRUE, curbuf);
} else if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_ft)) {
/* 'filetype' is set, trigger the FileType autocommand */
did_filetype = TRUE;
apply_autocmds(EVENT_FILETYPE, curbuf->b_p_ft,
curbuf->b_fname, TRUE, curbuf);
}
if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spl)) {
char_u fname[200];
char_u *q = curwin->w_s->b_p_spl;
/* Skip the first name if it is "cjk". */
if (STRNCMP(q, "cjk,", 4) == 0)
q += 4;
/*
* Source the spell/LANG.vim in 'runtimepath'.
* They could set 'spellcapcheck' depending on the language.
* Use the first name in 'spelllang' up to '_region' or
* '.encoding'.
*/
for (p = q; *p != NUL; ++p)
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)"_.,", *p) != NULL)
break;
vim_snprintf((char *)fname, sizeof(fname), "spell/%.*s.vim",
(int)(p - q), q);
source_runtime(fname, DIP_ALL);
}
}
if (varp == &p_mouse) {
if (*p_mouse == NUL) {
ui_mouse_off();
} else {
setmouse(); // in case 'mouse' changed
}
}
if (curwin->w_curswant != MAXCOL
&& (options[opt_idx].flags & (P_CURSWANT | P_RALL)) != 0)
curwin->w_set_curswant = TRUE;
check_redraw(options[opt_idx].flags);
return errmsg;
} | 5,057,343,703,970,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-1248 | vim before patch 8.0.0056 does not properly validate values for the 'filetype', 'syntax' and 'keymap' options, which may result in the execution of arbitrary code if a file with a specially crafted modeline is opened. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1248 |
517,286 | neovim | 4fad66fbe637818b6b3d6bc5d21923ba72795040 | https://github.com/neovim/neovim | https://github.com/neovim/neovim/commit/4fad66fbe637818b6b3d6bc5d21923ba72795040 | vim-patch:8.0.0056
Problem: When setting 'filetype' there is no check for a valid name.
Solution: Only allow valid characters in 'filetype', 'syntax' and 'keymap'.
https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/d0b5138ba4bccff8a744c99836041ef6322ed39a | 0 | did_set_string_option (
int opt_idx, /* index in options[] table */
char_u **varp, /* pointer to the option variable */
int new_value_alloced, /* new value was allocated */
char_u *oldval, /* previous value of the option */
char_u *errbuf, /* buffer for errors, or NULL */
int opt_flags /* OPT_LOCAL and/or OPT_GLOBAL */
)
{
char_u *errmsg = NULL;
char_u *s, *p;
int did_chartab = FALSE;
char_u **gvarp;
bool free_oldval = (options[opt_idx].flags & P_ALLOCED);
/* Get the global option to compare with, otherwise we would have to check
* two values for all local options. */
gvarp = (char_u **)get_varp_scope(&(options[opt_idx]), OPT_GLOBAL);
/* Disallow changing some options from secure mode */
if ((secure || sandbox != 0)
&& (options[opt_idx].flags & P_SECURE)) {
errmsg = e_secure;
}
/* Check for a "normal" file name in some options. Disallow a path
* separator (slash and/or backslash), wildcards and characters that are
* often illegal in a file name. */
else if ((options[opt_idx].flags & P_NFNAME)
&& vim_strpbrk(*varp, (char_u *)"/\\*?[|<>") != NULL) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'backupcopy' */
else if (gvarp == &p_bkc) {
char_u *bkc = p_bkc;
unsigned int *flags = &bkc_flags;
if (opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) {
bkc = curbuf->b_p_bkc;
flags = &curbuf->b_bkc_flags;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && *bkc == NUL) {
// make the local value empty: use the global value
*flags = 0;
} else {
if (opt_strings_flags(bkc, p_bkc_values, flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
if (((*flags & BKC_AUTO) != 0)
+ ((*flags & BKC_YES) != 0)
+ ((*flags & BKC_NO) != 0) != 1) {
// Must have exactly one of "auto", "yes" and "no".
(void)opt_strings_flags(oldval, p_bkc_values, flags, true);
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
}
/* 'backupext' and 'patchmode' */
else if (varp == &p_bex || varp == &p_pm) {
if (STRCMP(*p_bex == '.' ? p_bex + 1 : p_bex,
*p_pm == '.' ? p_pm + 1 : p_pm) == 0)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E589: 'backupext' and 'patchmode' are equal");
}
/* 'breakindentopt' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_briopt) {
if (briopt_check(curwin) == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_isi
|| varp == &(curbuf->b_p_isk)
|| varp == &p_isp
|| varp == &p_isf) {
// 'isident', 'iskeyword', 'isprint or 'isfname' option: refill g_chartab[]
// If the new option is invalid, use old value. 'lisp' option: refill
// g_chartab[] for '-' char
if (init_chartab() == FAIL) {
did_chartab = TRUE; /* need to restore it below */
errmsg = e_invarg; /* error in value */
}
}
/* 'helpfile' */
else if (varp == &p_hf) {
/* May compute new values for $VIM and $VIMRUNTIME */
if (didset_vim) {
vim_setenv("VIM", "");
didset_vim = FALSE;
}
if (didset_vimruntime) {
vim_setenv("VIMRUNTIME", "");
didset_vimruntime = FALSE;
}
}
/* 'colorcolumn' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_cc)
errmsg = check_colorcolumn(curwin);
/* 'helplang' */
else if (varp == &p_hlg) {
/* Check for "", "ab", "ab,cd", etc. */
for (s = p_hlg; *s != NUL; s += 3) {
if (s[1] == NUL || ((s[2] != ',' || s[3] == NUL) && s[2] != NUL)) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (s[2] == NUL)
break;
}
}
/* 'highlight' */
else if (varp == &p_hl) {
if (highlight_changed() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg; /* invalid flags */
}
/* 'nrformats' */
else if (gvarp == &p_nf) {
if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_nf_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_ssop) { // 'sessionoptions'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_ssop, p_ssop_values, &ssop_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
if ((ssop_flags & SSOP_CURDIR) && (ssop_flags & SSOP_SESDIR)) {
/* Don't allow both "sesdir" and "curdir". */
(void)opt_strings_flags(oldval, p_ssop_values, &ssop_flags, true);
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &p_vop) { // 'viewoptions'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_vop, p_ssop_values, &vop_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'scrollopt' */
else if (varp == &p_sbo) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_sbo, p_scbopt_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_ambw || (int *)varp == &p_emoji) {
// 'ambiwidth'
if (check_opt_strings(p_ambw, p_ambw_values, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (set_chars_option(&p_lcs) != NULL) {
errmsg = (char_u *)_("E834: Conflicts with value of 'listchars'");
} else if (set_chars_option(&p_fcs) != NULL) {
errmsg = (char_u *)_("E835: Conflicts with value of 'fillchars'");
}
}
/* 'background' */
else if (varp == &p_bg) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_bg, p_bg_values, FALSE) == OK) {
int dark = (*p_bg == 'd');
init_highlight(FALSE, FALSE);
if (dark != (*p_bg == 'd')
&& get_var_value((char_u *)"g:colors_name") != NULL) {
/* The color scheme must have set 'background' back to another
* value, that's not what we want here. Disable the color
* scheme and set the colors again. */
do_unlet((char_u *)"g:colors_name", TRUE);
free_string_option(p_bg);
p_bg = vim_strsave((char_u *)(dark ? "dark" : "light"));
check_string_option(&p_bg);
init_highlight(FALSE, FALSE);
}
} else
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'wildmode' */
else if (varp == &p_wim) {
if (check_opt_wim() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'wildoptions' */
else if (varp == &p_wop) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_wop, p_wop_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'winaltkeys' */
else if (varp == &p_wak) {
if (*p_wak == NUL
|| check_opt_strings(p_wak, p_wak_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'eventignore' */
else if (varp == &p_ei) {
if (check_ei() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
/* 'encoding' and 'fileencoding' */
} else if (varp == &p_enc || gvarp == &p_fenc) {
if (gvarp == &p_fenc) {
if (!MODIFIABLE(curbuf) && opt_flags != OPT_GLOBAL) {
errmsg = e_modifiable;
} else if (vim_strchr(*varp, ',') != NULL) {
// No comma allowed in 'fileencoding'; catches confusing it
// with 'fileencodings'.
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
// May show a "+" in the title now.
redraw_titles();
// Add 'fileencoding' to the swap file.
ml_setflags(curbuf);
}
}
if (errmsg == NULL) {
/* canonize the value, so that STRCMP() can be used on it */
p = enc_canonize(*varp);
xfree(*varp);
*varp = p;
if (varp == &p_enc) {
// only encoding=utf-8 allowed
if (STRCMP(p_enc, "utf-8") != 0) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
}
} else if (varp == &p_penc) {
/* Canonize printencoding if VIM standard one */
p = enc_canonize(p_penc);
xfree(p_penc);
p_penc = p;
} else if (varp == &curbuf->b_p_keymap) {
if (!valid_filetype(*varp)) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
// load or unload key mapping tables
errmsg = keymap_init();
}
if (errmsg == NULL) {
if (*curbuf->b_p_keymap != NUL) {
/* Installed a new keymap, switch on using it. */
curbuf->b_p_iminsert = B_IMODE_LMAP;
if (curbuf->b_p_imsearch != B_IMODE_USE_INSERT)
curbuf->b_p_imsearch = B_IMODE_LMAP;
} else {
/* Cleared the keymap, may reset 'iminsert' and 'imsearch'. */
if (curbuf->b_p_iminsert == B_IMODE_LMAP)
curbuf->b_p_iminsert = B_IMODE_NONE;
if (curbuf->b_p_imsearch == B_IMODE_LMAP)
curbuf->b_p_imsearch = B_IMODE_USE_INSERT;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) == 0) {
set_iminsert_global();
set_imsearch_global();
}
status_redraw_curbuf();
}
}
/* 'fileformat' */
else if (gvarp == &p_ff) {
if (!MODIFIABLE(curbuf) && !(opt_flags & OPT_GLOBAL))
errmsg = e_modifiable;
else if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_ff_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
redraw_titles();
/* update flag in swap file */
ml_setflags(curbuf);
/* Redraw needed when switching to/from "mac": a CR in the text
* will be displayed differently. */
if (get_fileformat(curbuf) == EOL_MAC || *oldval == 'm')
redraw_curbuf_later(NOT_VALID);
}
}
/* 'fileformats' */
else if (varp == &p_ffs) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_ffs, p_ff_values, TRUE) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
}
/* 'matchpairs' */
else if (gvarp == &p_mps) {
if (has_mbyte) {
for (p = *varp; *p != NUL; ++p) {
int x2 = -1;
int x3 = -1;
if (*p != NUL)
p += mb_ptr2len(p);
if (*p != NUL)
x2 = *p++;
if (*p != NUL) {
x3 = mb_ptr2char(p);
p += mb_ptr2len(p);
}
if (x2 != ':' || x3 == -1 || (*p != NUL && *p != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (*p == NUL)
break;
}
} else {
/* Check for "x:y,x:y" */
for (p = *varp; *p != NUL; p += 4) {
if (p[1] != ':' || p[2] == NUL || (p[3] != NUL && p[3] != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
}
if (p[3] == NUL)
break;
}
}
}
/* 'comments' */
else if (gvarp == &p_com) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ) {
while (*s && *s != ':') {
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)COM_ALL, *s) == NULL
&& !ascii_isdigit(*s) && *s != '-') {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
++s;
}
if (*s++ == NUL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E524: Missing colon");
else if (*s == ',' || *s == NUL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E525: Zero length string");
if (errmsg != NULL)
break;
while (*s && *s != ',') {
if (*s == '\\' && s[1] != NUL)
++s;
++s;
}
s = skip_to_option_part(s);
}
}
/* 'listchars' */
else if (varp == &p_lcs) {
errmsg = set_chars_option(varp);
}
/* 'fillchars' */
else if (varp == &p_fcs) {
errmsg = set_chars_option(varp);
}
/* 'cedit' */
else if (varp == &p_cedit) {
errmsg = check_cedit();
}
/* 'verbosefile' */
else if (varp == &p_vfile) {
verbose_stop();
if (*p_vfile != NUL && verbose_open() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
/* 'shada' */
} else if (varp == &p_shada) {
// TODO(ZyX-I): Remove this code in the future, alongside with &viminfo
// option.
opt_idx = ((options[opt_idx].fullname[0] == 'v')
? (shada_idx == -1
? ((shada_idx = findoption((char_u *) "shada")))
: shada_idx)
: opt_idx);
for (s = p_shada; *s; ) {
/* Check it's a valid character */
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)"!\"%'/:<@cfhnrs", *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
if (*s == 'n') { /* name is always last one */
break;
} else if (*s == 'r') { /* skip until next ',' */
while (*++s && *s != ',')
;
} else if (*s == '%') {
/* optional number */
while (ascii_isdigit(*++s))
;
} else if (*s == '!' || *s == 'h' || *s == 'c')
++s; /* no extra chars */
else { /* must have a number */
while (ascii_isdigit(*++s))
;
if (!ascii_isdigit(*(s - 1))) {
if (errbuf != NULL) {
sprintf((char *)errbuf,
_("E526: Missing number after <%s>"),
transchar_byte(*(s - 1)));
errmsg = errbuf;
} else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
if (*s == ',')
++s;
else if (*s) {
if (errbuf != NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E527: Missing comma");
else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
if (*p_shada && errmsg == NULL && get_shada_parameter('\'') < 0)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E528: Must specify a ' value");
}
/* 'showbreak' */
else if (varp == &p_sbr) {
for (s = p_sbr; *s; ) {
if (ptr2cells(s) != 1)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E595: contains unprintable or wide character");
mb_ptr_adv(s);
}
}
/* 'guicursor' */
else if (varp == &p_guicursor)
errmsg = parse_shape_opt(SHAPE_CURSOR);
else if (varp == &p_popt)
errmsg = parse_printoptions();
else if (varp == &p_pmfn)
errmsg = parse_printmbfont();
/* 'langmap' */
else if (varp == &p_langmap)
langmap_set();
/* 'breakat' */
else if (varp == &p_breakat)
fill_breakat_flags();
/* 'titlestring' and 'iconstring' */
else if (varp == &p_titlestring || varp == &p_iconstring) {
int flagval = (varp == &p_titlestring) ? STL_IN_TITLE : STL_IN_ICON;
/* NULL => statusline syntax */
if (vim_strchr(*varp, '%') && check_stl_option(*varp) == NULL)
stl_syntax |= flagval;
else
stl_syntax &= ~flagval;
did_set_title(varp == &p_iconstring);
}
/* 'selection' */
else if (varp == &p_sel) {
if (*p_sel == NUL
|| check_opt_strings(p_sel, p_sel_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'selectmode' */
else if (varp == &p_slm) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_slm, p_slm_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'keymodel' */
else if (varp == &p_km) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_km, p_km_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
km_stopsel = (vim_strchr(p_km, 'o') != NULL);
km_startsel = (vim_strchr(p_km, 'a') != NULL);
}
}
/* 'mousemodel' */
else if (varp == &p_mousem) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_mousem, p_mousem_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_swb) { // 'switchbuf'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_swb, p_swb_values, &swb_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'debug' */
else if (varp == &p_debug) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_debug, p_debug_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_dy) { // 'display'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_dy, p_dy_values, &dy_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else
(void)init_chartab();
}
/* 'eadirection' */
else if (varp == &p_ead) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_ead, p_ead_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_cb) { // 'clipboard'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_cb, p_cb_values, &cb_flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spl) // 'spell'
|| varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spf)) {
// When 'spelllang' or 'spellfile' is set and there is a window for this
// buffer in which 'spell' is set load the wordlists.
errmsg = did_set_spell_option(varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spf));
}
/* When 'spellcapcheck' is set compile the regexp program. */
else if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spc)) {
errmsg = compile_cap_prog(curwin->w_s);
}
/* 'spellsuggest' */
else if (varp == &p_sps) {
if (spell_check_sps() != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'mkspellmem' */
else if (varp == &p_msm) {
if (spell_check_msm() != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* When 'bufhidden' is set, check for valid value. */
else if (gvarp == &p_bh) {
if (check_opt_strings(curbuf->b_p_bh, p_bufhidden_values, FALSE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* When 'buftype' is set, check for valid value. */
else if (gvarp == &p_bt) {
if ((curbuf->terminal && curbuf->b_p_bt[0] != 't')
|| (!curbuf->terminal && curbuf->b_p_bt[0] == 't')
|| check_opt_strings(curbuf->b_p_bt, p_buftype_values, FALSE) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
if (curwin->w_status_height) {
curwin->w_redr_status = TRUE;
redraw_later(VALID);
}
curbuf->b_help = (curbuf->b_p_bt[0] == 'h');
redraw_titles();
}
}
/* 'statusline' or 'rulerformat' */
else if (gvarp == &p_stl || varp == &p_ruf) {
int wid;
if (varp == &p_ruf) /* reset ru_wid first */
ru_wid = 0;
s = *varp;
if (varp == &p_ruf && *s == '%') {
/* set ru_wid if 'ruf' starts with "%99(" */
if (*++s == '-') /* ignore a '-' */
s++;
wid = getdigits_int(&s);
if (wid && *s == '(' && (errmsg = check_stl_option(p_ruf)) == NULL)
ru_wid = wid;
else
errmsg = check_stl_option(p_ruf);
}
/* check 'statusline' only if it doesn't start with "%!" */
else if (varp == &p_ruf || s[0] != '%' || s[1] != '!')
errmsg = check_stl_option(s);
if (varp == &p_ruf && errmsg == NULL)
comp_col();
}
/* check if it is a valid value for 'complete' -- Acevedo */
else if (gvarp == &p_cpt) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ) {
while (*s == ',' || *s == ' ')
s++;
if (!*s)
break;
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)".wbuksid]tU", *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
if (*++s != NUL && *s != ',' && *s != ' ') {
if (s[-1] == 'k' || s[-1] == 's') {
/* skip optional filename after 'k' and 's' */
while (*s && *s != ',' && *s != ' ') {
if (*s == '\\')
++s;
++s;
}
} else {
if (errbuf != NULL) {
sprintf((char *)errbuf,
_("E535: Illegal character after <%c>"),
*--s);
errmsg = errbuf;
} else
errmsg = (char_u *)"";
break;
}
}
}
}
/* 'completeopt' */
else if (varp == &p_cot) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_cot, p_cot_values, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else {
completeopt_was_set();
}
}
/* 'pastetoggle': translate key codes like in a mapping */
else if (varp == &p_pt) {
if (*p_pt) {
(void)replace_termcodes(p_pt, STRLEN(p_pt), &p, true, true, false,
CPO_TO_CPO_FLAGS);
if (p != NULL) {
if (new_value_alloced)
free_string_option(p_pt);
p_pt = p;
new_value_alloced = TRUE;
}
}
}
/* 'backspace' */
else if (varp == &p_bs) {
if (ascii_isdigit(*p_bs)) {
if (*p_bs >'2' || p_bs[1] != NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (check_opt_strings(p_bs, p_bs_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
} else if (varp == &p_bo) {
if (opt_strings_flags(p_bo, p_bo_values, &bo_flags, true) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (gvarp == &p_tc) { // 'tagcase'
unsigned int *flags;
if (opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) {
p = curbuf->b_p_tc;
flags = &curbuf->b_tc_flags;
} else {
p = p_tc;
flags = &tc_flags;
}
if ((opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && *p == NUL) {
// make the local value empty: use the global value
*flags = 0;
} else if (*p == NUL
|| opt_strings_flags(p, p_tc_values, flags, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (varp == &p_cmp) { // 'casemap'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_cmp, p_cmp_values, &cmp_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'diffopt' */
else if (varp == &p_dip) {
if (diffopt_changed() == FAIL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldmethod' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fdm) {
if (check_opt_strings(*varp, p_fdm_values, FALSE) != OK
|| *curwin->w_p_fdm == NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else {
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
if (foldmethodIsDiff(curwin))
newFoldLevel();
}
}
/* 'foldexpr' */
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_fde) {
if (foldmethodIsExpr(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
}
/* 'foldmarker' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fmr) {
p = vim_strchr(*varp, ',');
if (p == NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_("E536: comma required");
else if (p == *varp || p[1] == NUL)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else if (foldmethodIsMarker(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
}
/* 'commentstring' */
else if (gvarp == &p_cms) {
if (**varp != NUL && strstr((char *)*varp, "%s") == NULL)
errmsg = (char_u *)N_(
"E537: 'commentstring' must be empty or contain %s");
} else if (varp == &p_fdo) { // 'foldopen'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_fdo, p_fdo_values, &fdo_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldclose' */
else if (varp == &p_fcl) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_fcl, p_fcl_values, TRUE) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
/* 'foldignore' */
else if (gvarp == &curwin->w_allbuf_opt.wo_fdi) {
if (foldmethodIsIndent(curwin))
foldUpdateAll(curwin);
} else if (varp == &p_ve) { // 'virtualedit'
if (opt_strings_flags(p_ve, p_ve_values, &ve_flags, true) != OK)
errmsg = e_invarg;
else if (STRCMP(p_ve, oldval) != 0) {
/* Recompute cursor position in case the new 've' setting
* changes something. */
validate_virtcol();
coladvance(curwin->w_virtcol);
}
} else if (varp == &p_csqf) {
if (p_csqf != NULL) {
p = p_csqf;
while (*p != NUL) {
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)CSQF_CMDS, *p) == NULL
|| p[1] == NUL
|| vim_strchr((char_u *)CSQF_FLAGS, p[1]) == NULL
|| (p[2] != NUL && p[2] != ',')) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
break;
} else if (p[2] == NUL)
break;
else
p += 3;
}
}
}
/* 'cinoptions' */
else if (gvarp == &p_cino) {
/* TODO: recognize errors */
parse_cino(curbuf);
// inccommand
} else if (varp == &p_icm) {
if (check_opt_strings(p_icm, p_icm_values, false) != OK) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (gvarp == &p_ft) {
if (!valid_filetype(*varp)) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else if (gvarp == &p_syn) {
if (!valid_filetype(*varp)) {
errmsg = e_invarg;
}
} else {
// Options that are a list of flags.
p = NULL;
if (varp == &p_ww)
p = (char_u *)WW_ALL;
if (varp == &p_shm)
p = (char_u *)SHM_ALL;
else if (varp == &(p_cpo))
p = (char_u *)CPO_VI;
else if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_fo))
p = (char_u *)FO_ALL;
else if (varp == &curwin->w_p_cocu)
p = (char_u *)COCU_ALL;
else if (varp == &p_mouse) {
p = (char_u *)MOUSE_ALL;
}
if (p != NULL) {
for (s = *varp; *s; ++s)
if (vim_strchr(p, *s) == NULL) {
errmsg = illegal_char(errbuf, *s);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* If error detected, restore the previous value.
*/
if (errmsg != NULL) {
if (new_value_alloced)
free_string_option(*varp);
*varp = oldval;
/*
* When resetting some values, need to act on it.
*/
if (did_chartab)
(void)init_chartab();
if (varp == &p_hl)
(void)highlight_changed();
} else {
/* Remember where the option was set. */
set_option_scriptID_idx(opt_idx, opt_flags, current_SID);
/*
* Free string options that are in allocated memory.
* Use "free_oldval", because recursiveness may change the flags under
* our fingers (esp. init_highlight()).
*/
if (free_oldval)
free_string_option(oldval);
if (new_value_alloced)
options[opt_idx].flags |= P_ALLOCED;
else
options[opt_idx].flags &= ~P_ALLOCED;
if ((opt_flags & (OPT_LOCAL | OPT_GLOBAL)) == 0
&& ((int)options[opt_idx].indir & PV_BOTH)) {
/* global option with local value set to use global value; free
* the local value and make it empty */
p = get_varp_scope(&(options[opt_idx]), OPT_LOCAL);
free_string_option(*(char_u **)p);
*(char_u **)p = empty_option;
}
/* May set global value for local option. */
else if (!(opt_flags & OPT_LOCAL) && opt_flags != OPT_GLOBAL)
set_string_option_global(opt_idx, varp);
/*
* Trigger the autocommand only after setting the flags.
*/
/* When 'syntax' is set, load the syntax of that name */
if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_syn)) {
apply_autocmds(EVENT_SYNTAX, curbuf->b_p_syn,
curbuf->b_fname, TRUE, curbuf);
} else if (varp == &(curbuf->b_p_ft)) {
/* 'filetype' is set, trigger the FileType autocommand */
did_filetype = TRUE;
apply_autocmds(EVENT_FILETYPE, curbuf->b_p_ft,
curbuf->b_fname, TRUE, curbuf);
}
if (varp == &(curwin->w_s->b_p_spl)) {
char_u fname[200];
char_u *q = curwin->w_s->b_p_spl;
/* Skip the first name if it is "cjk". */
if (STRNCMP(q, "cjk,", 4) == 0)
q += 4;
/*
* Source the spell/LANG.vim in 'runtimepath'.
* They could set 'spellcapcheck' depending on the language.
* Use the first name in 'spelllang' up to '_region' or
* '.encoding'.
*/
for (p = q; *p != NUL; ++p)
if (vim_strchr((char_u *)"_.,", *p) != NULL)
break;
vim_snprintf((char *)fname, sizeof(fname), "spell/%.*s.vim",
(int)(p - q), q);
source_runtime(fname, DIP_ALL);
}
}
if (varp == &p_mouse) {
if (*p_mouse == NUL) {
ui_mouse_off();
} else {
setmouse(); // in case 'mouse' changed
}
}
if (curwin->w_curswant != MAXCOL
&& (options[opt_idx].flags & (P_CURSWANT | P_RALL)) != 0)
curwin->w_set_curswant = TRUE;
check_redraw(options[opt_idx].flags);
return errmsg;
} | 209,905,660,793,532,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2016-1248 | vim before patch 8.0.0056 does not properly validate values for the 'filetype', 'syntax' and 'keymap' options, which may result in the execution of arbitrary code if a file with a specially crafted modeline is opened. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1248 |
217,177 | monit | f12d0cdb42d4e74dffe1525d4062c815c48ac57a | https://bitbucket.org/tildeslash/monit | https://bitbucket.org/tildeslash/monit/commits/f12d0cdb42d4e74dffe1525d4062c815c48ac57a | Fixed: Buffer overrun vulnerability in URL decoding. Thanks to Zack Flack for report. | 1 | static char x2c(char *hex) {
register char digit;
digit = ((hex[0] >= 'A') ? ((hex[0] & 0xdf) - 'A')+10 : (hex[0] - '0'));
digit *= 16;
digit += (hex[1] >= 'A' ? ((hex[1] & 0xdf) - 'A')+10 : (hex[1] - '0'));
return(digit);
} | 156,938,523,355,548,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2019-11455 | A buffer over-read in Util_urlDecode in util.c in Tildeslash Monit before 5.25.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker to retrieve the contents of adjacent memory via manipulation of GET or POST parameters. The attacker can also cause a denial of service (application outage). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11455 |
517,462 | monit | f12d0cdb42d4e74dffe1525d4062c815c48ac57a | https://bitbucket.org/tildeslash/monit | https://bitbucket.org/tildeslash/monit/commits/f12d0cdb42d4e74dffe1525d4062c815c48ac57a | Fixed: Buffer overrun vulnerability in URL decoding. Thanks to Zack Flack for report. | 0 | static char _x2c(char *hex) {
register char digit;
digit = ((hex[0] >= 'A') ? ((hex[0] & 0xdf) - 'A')+10 : (hex[0] - '0'));
digit *= 16;
digit += (hex[1] >= 'A' ? ((hex[1] & 0xdf) - 'A')+10 : (hex[1] - '0'));
return(digit);
} | 204,361,104,051,965,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2019-11455 | A buffer over-read in Util_urlDecode in util.c in Tildeslash Monit before 5.25.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker to retrieve the contents of adjacent memory via manipulation of GET or POST parameters. The attacker can also cause a denial of service (application outage). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11455 |
217,178 | ChakraCore | 402f3d967c0a905ec5b9ca9c240783d3f2c15724 | https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore | https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore/commit/402f3d967c0a905ec5b9ca9c240783d3f2c15724 | [CVE-2017-0028] Fix binding of 'async' identifier in the presence of async arrow function. | 1 | ParseNodePtr Parser::ParseTerm(BOOL fAllowCall,
LPCOLESTR pNameHint,
uint32 *pHintLength,
uint32 *pShortNameOffset,
_Inout_opt_ IdentToken* pToken /*= nullptr*/,
bool fUnaryOrParen /*= false*/,
_Out_opt_ BOOL* pfCanAssign /*= nullptr*/,
_Inout_opt_ BOOL* pfLikelyPattern /*= nullptr*/,
_Out_opt_ bool* pfIsDotOrIndex /*= nullptr*/,
_Inout_opt_ charcount_t *plastRParen /*= nullptr*/)
{
ParseNodePtr pnode = nullptr;
charcount_t ichMin = 0;
size_t iecpMin = 0;
size_t iuMin;
IdentToken term;
BOOL fInNew = FALSE;
BOOL fCanAssign = TRUE;
bool isAsyncExpr = false;
bool isLambdaExpr = false;
Assert(pToken == nullptr || pToken->tk == tkNone); // Must be empty initially
if (this->IsBackgroundParser())
{
PROBE_STACK_NO_DISPOSE(m_scriptContext, Js::Constants::MinStackParseOneTerm);
}
else
{
PROBE_STACK(m_scriptContext, Js::Constants::MinStackParseOneTerm);
}
switch (m_token.tk)
{
case tkID:
{
PidRefStack *ref = nullptr;
IdentPtr pid = m_token.GetIdentifier(m_phtbl);
charcount_t ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
size_t iecpLim = m_pscan->IecpLimTok();
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
iecpMin = m_pscan->IecpMinTok();
if (pid == wellKnownPropertyPids.async &&
m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES7AsyncAndAwaitEnabled())
{
isAsyncExpr = true;
}
bool previousAwaitIsKeyword = m_pscan->SetAwaitIsKeyword(isAsyncExpr);
m_pscan->Scan();
m_pscan->SetAwaitIsKeyword(previousAwaitIsKeyword);
// We search for an Async expression (a function declaration or an async lambda expression)
if (isAsyncExpr && !m_pscan->FHadNewLine())
{
if (m_token.tk == tkFUNCTION)
{
goto LFunction;
}
else if (m_token.tk == tkID || m_token.tk == tkAWAIT)
{
isLambdaExpr = true;
goto LFunction;
}
}
// Don't push a reference if this is a single lambda parameter, because we'll reparse with
// a correct function ID.
if (m_token.tk != tkDArrow)
{
ref = this->PushPidRef(pid);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNameNode(pid);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = ichLim;
pnode->sxPid.SetSymRef(ref);
}
else
{
// Remember the identifier start and end in case it turns out to be a statement label.
term.tk = tkID;
term.pid = pid; // Record the identifier for detection of eval
term.ichMin = static_cast<charcount_t>(iecpMin);
term.ichLim = static_cast<charcount_t>(iecpLim);
}
CheckArgumentsUse(pid, GetCurrentFunctionNode());
break;
}
case tkTHIS:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopThis>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkLParen:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
iuMin = m_pscan->IecpMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
if (m_token.tk == tkRParen)
{
// Empty parens can only be legal as an empty parameter list to a lambda declaration.
// We're in a lambda if the next token is =>.
fAllowCall = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
// If the token after the right paren is not => or if there was a newline between () and => this is a syntax error
if (!m_doingFastScan && (m_token.tk != tkDArrow || m_pscan->FHadNewLine()))
{
Error(ERRsyntax);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopEmpty>();
}
break;
}
// Advance the block ID here in case this parenthetical expression turns out to be a lambda parameter list.
// That way the pid ref stacks will be created in their correct final form, and we can simply fix
// up function ID's.
uint saveNextBlockId = m_nextBlockId;
uint saveCurrBlockId = GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId;
GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId = m_nextBlockId++;
this->m_parenDepth++;
pnode = ParseExpr<buildAST>(koplNo, &fCanAssign, TRUE, FALSE, nullptr, nullptr /*nameLength*/, nullptr /*pShortNameOffset*/, &term, true, nullptr, plastRParen);
this->m_parenDepth--;
if (buildAST && plastRParen)
{
*plastRParen = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
ChkCurTok(tkRParen, ERRnoRparen);
GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId = saveCurrBlockId;
if (m_token.tk == tkDArrow)
{
// We're going to rewind and reinterpret the expression as a parameter list.
// Put back the original next-block-ID so the existing pid ref stacks will be correct.
m_nextBlockId = saveNextBlockId;
}
// Emit a deferred ... error if one was parsed.
if (m_deferEllipsisError && m_token.tk != tkDArrow)
{
m_pscan->SeekTo(m_EllipsisErrLoc);
Error(ERRInvalidSpreadUse);
}
else
{
m_deferEllipsisError = false;
}
break;
}
case tkIntCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateIntNodeWithScanner(m_token.GetLong());
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkFltCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopFlt>();
pnode->sxFlt.dbl = m_token.GetDouble();
pnode->sxFlt.maybeInt = m_token.GetDoubleMayBeInt();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkStrCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateStrNodeWithScanner(m_token.GetStr());
}
else
{
// Subtract the string literal length from the total char count for the purpose
// of deciding whether to defer parsing and byte code generation.
this->ReduceDeferredScriptLength(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - m_pscan->IchMinTok());
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkTRUE:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopTrue>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkFALSE:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopFalse>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkNULL:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopNull>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkDiv:
case tkAsgDiv:
pnode = ParseRegExp<buildAST>();
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkNEW:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
if (m_token.tk == tkDot && m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseMetaProperty<buildAST>(tkNEW, ichMin, &fCanAssign);
m_pscan->Scan();
}
else
{
ParseNodePtr pnodeExpr = ParseTerm<buildAST>(FALSE, pNameHint, pHintLength, pShortNameOffset);
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateCallNode(knopNew, pnodeExpr, nullptr);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
}
fInNew = TRUE;
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
break;
}
case tkLBrack:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
pnode = ParseArrayLiteral<buildAST>();
if (buildAST)
{
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
if (this->m_arrayDepth == 0)
{
Assert(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - ichMin > m_funcInArray);
this->ReduceDeferredScriptLength(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - ichMin - this->m_funcInArray);
this->m_funcInArray = 0;
this->m_funcInArrayDepth = 0;
}
ChkCurTok(tkRBrack, ERRnoRbrack);
if (!IsES6DestructuringEnabled())
{
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
else if (pfLikelyPattern != nullptr && !IsPostFixOperators())
{
*pfLikelyPattern = TRUE;
}
break;
}
case tkLCurly:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->ScanForcingPid();
ParseNodePtr pnodeMemberList = ParseMemberList<buildAST>(pNameHint, pHintLength);
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateUniNode(knopObject, pnodeMemberList);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
ChkCurTok(tkRCurly, ERRnoRcurly);
if (!IsES6DestructuringEnabled())
{
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
else if (pfLikelyPattern != nullptr && !IsPostFixOperators())
{
*pfLikelyPattern = TRUE;
}
break;
}
case tkFUNCTION:
{
LFunction :
if (m_grfscr & fscrDeferredFncExpression)
{
// The top-level deferred function body was defined by a function expression whose parsing was deferred. We are now
// parsing it, so unset the flag so that any nested functions are parsed normally. This flag is only applicable the
// first time we see it.
//
// Normally, deferred functions will be parsed in ParseStatement upon encountering the 'function' token. The first
// token of the source code of the function may not a 'function' token though, so we still need to reset this flag
// for the first function we parse. This can happen in compat modes, for instance, for a function expression enclosed
// in parentheses, where the legacy behavior was to include the parentheses in the function's source code.
m_grfscr &= ~fscrDeferredFncExpression;
}
ushort flags = fFncNoFlgs;
if (isLambdaExpr)
{
flags |= fFncLambda;
}
if (isAsyncExpr)
{
flags |= fFncAsync;
}
pnode = ParseFncDecl<buildAST>(flags, pNameHint, false, true, fUnaryOrParen);
if (isAsyncExpr)
{
pnode->sxFnc.cbMin = iecpMin;
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
}
case tkCLASS:
if (m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseClassDecl<buildAST>(FALSE, pNameHint, pHintLength, pShortNameOffset);
}
else
{
goto LUnknown;
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
case tkStrTmplBasic:
case tkStrTmplBegin:
pnode = ParseStringTemplateDecl<buildAST>(nullptr);
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
case tkSUPER:
if (m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseSuper<buildAST>(pnode, !!fAllowCall);
}
else
{
goto LUnknown;
}
break;
case tkCASE:
{
if (!m_doingFastScan)
{
goto LUnknown;
}
ParseNodePtr pnodeUnused;
pnode = ParseCase<buildAST>(&pnodeUnused);
break;
}
case tkELSE:
if (!m_doingFastScan)
{
goto LUnknown;
}
m_pscan->Scan();
ParseStatement<buildAST>();
break;
default:
LUnknown :
Error(ERRsyntax);
break;
}
pnode = ParsePostfixOperators<buildAST>(pnode, fAllowCall, fInNew, isAsyncExpr, &fCanAssign, &term, pfIsDotOrIndex);
// Pass back identifier if requested
if (pToken && term.tk == tkID)
{
*pToken = term;
}
if (pfCanAssign)
{
*pfCanAssign = fCanAssign;
}
return pnode;
} | 274,209,213,099,014,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-0028 | A remote code execution vulnerability exists when Microsoft scripting engine improperly accesses objects in memory. The vulnerability could corrupt memory in a way that enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user, aka "Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability." | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0028 |
517,605 | ChakraCore | 402f3d967c0a905ec5b9ca9c240783d3f2c15724 | https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore | https://github.com/Microsoft/ChakraCore/commit/402f3d967c0a905ec5b9ca9c240783d3f2c15724 | [CVE-2017-0028] Fix binding of 'async' identifier in the presence of async arrow function. | 0 | ParseNodePtr Parser::ParseTerm(BOOL fAllowCall,
LPCOLESTR pNameHint,
uint32 *pHintLength,
uint32 *pShortNameOffset,
_Inout_opt_ IdentToken* pToken /*= nullptr*/,
bool fUnaryOrParen /*= false*/,
_Out_opt_ BOOL* pfCanAssign /*= nullptr*/,
_Inout_opt_ BOOL* pfLikelyPattern /*= nullptr*/,
_Out_opt_ bool* pfIsDotOrIndex /*= nullptr*/,
_Inout_opt_ charcount_t *plastRParen /*= nullptr*/)
{
ParseNodePtr pnode = nullptr;
PidRefStack *savedTopAsyncRef = nullptr;
charcount_t ichMin = 0;
size_t iecpMin = 0;
size_t iuMin;
IdentToken term;
BOOL fInNew = FALSE;
BOOL fCanAssign = TRUE;
bool isAsyncExpr = false;
bool isLambdaExpr = false;
Assert(pToken == nullptr || pToken->tk == tkNone); // Must be empty initially
if (this->IsBackgroundParser())
{
PROBE_STACK_NO_DISPOSE(m_scriptContext, Js::Constants::MinStackParseOneTerm);
}
else
{
PROBE_STACK(m_scriptContext, Js::Constants::MinStackParseOneTerm);
}
switch (m_token.tk)
{
case tkID:
{
PidRefStack *ref = nullptr;
IdentPtr pid = m_token.GetIdentifier(m_phtbl);
charcount_t ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
size_t iecpLim = m_pscan->IecpLimTok();
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
iecpMin = m_pscan->IecpMinTok();
if (pid == wellKnownPropertyPids.async &&
m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES7AsyncAndAwaitEnabled())
{
isAsyncExpr = true;
}
bool previousAwaitIsKeyword = m_pscan->SetAwaitIsKeyword(isAsyncExpr);
m_pscan->Scan();
m_pscan->SetAwaitIsKeyword(previousAwaitIsKeyword);
// We search for an Async expression (a function declaration or an async lambda expression)
if (isAsyncExpr && !m_pscan->FHadNewLine())
{
if (m_token.tk == tkFUNCTION)
{
goto LFunction;
}
else if (m_token.tk == tkID || m_token.tk == tkAWAIT)
{
isLambdaExpr = true;
goto LFunction;
}
else if (m_token.tk == tkLParen)
{
// This is potentially an async arrow function. Save the state of the async references
// in case it needs to be restored. (Note that the case of a single parameter with no ()'s
// is detected upstream and need not be handled here.)
savedTopAsyncRef = pid->GetTopRef();
}
}
// Don't push a reference if this is a single lambda parameter, because we'll reparse with
// a correct function ID.
if (m_token.tk != tkDArrow)
{
ref = this->PushPidRef(pid);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNameNode(pid);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = ichLim;
pnode->sxPid.SetSymRef(ref);
}
else
{
// Remember the identifier start and end in case it turns out to be a statement label.
term.tk = tkID;
term.pid = pid; // Record the identifier for detection of eval
term.ichMin = static_cast<charcount_t>(iecpMin);
term.ichLim = static_cast<charcount_t>(iecpLim);
}
CheckArgumentsUse(pid, GetCurrentFunctionNode());
break;
}
case tkTHIS:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopThis>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkLParen:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
iuMin = m_pscan->IecpMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
if (m_token.tk == tkRParen)
{
// Empty parens can only be legal as an empty parameter list to a lambda declaration.
// We're in a lambda if the next token is =>.
fAllowCall = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
// If the token after the right paren is not => or if there was a newline between () and => this is a syntax error
if (!m_doingFastScan && (m_token.tk != tkDArrow || m_pscan->FHadNewLine()))
{
Error(ERRsyntax);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopEmpty>();
}
break;
}
// Advance the block ID here in case this parenthetical expression turns out to be a lambda parameter list.
// That way the pid ref stacks will be created in their correct final form, and we can simply fix
// up function ID's.
uint saveNextBlockId = m_nextBlockId;
uint saveCurrBlockId = GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId;
GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId = m_nextBlockId++;
this->m_parenDepth++;
pnode = ParseExpr<buildAST>(koplNo, &fCanAssign, TRUE, FALSE, nullptr, nullptr /*nameLength*/, nullptr /*pShortNameOffset*/, &term, true, nullptr, plastRParen);
this->m_parenDepth--;
if (buildAST && plastRParen)
{
*plastRParen = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
ChkCurTok(tkRParen, ERRnoRparen);
GetCurrentBlock()->sxBlock.blockId = saveCurrBlockId;
if (m_token.tk == tkDArrow)
{
// We're going to rewind and reinterpret the expression as a parameter list.
// Put back the original next-block-ID so the existing pid ref stacks will be correct.
m_nextBlockId = saveNextBlockId;
}
// Emit a deferred ... error if one was parsed.
if (m_deferEllipsisError && m_token.tk != tkDArrow)
{
m_pscan->SeekTo(m_EllipsisErrLoc);
Error(ERRInvalidSpreadUse);
}
else
{
m_deferEllipsisError = false;
}
break;
}
case tkIntCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateIntNodeWithScanner(m_token.GetLong());
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkFltCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopFlt>();
pnode->sxFlt.dbl = m_token.GetDouble();
pnode->sxFlt.maybeInt = m_token.GetDoubleMayBeInt();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkStrCon:
if (IsStrictMode() && m_pscan->IsOctOrLeadingZeroOnLastTKNumber())
{
Error(ERRES5NoOctal);
}
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateStrNodeWithScanner(m_token.GetStr());
}
else
{
// Subtract the string literal length from the total char count for the purpose
// of deciding whether to defer parsing and byte code generation.
this->ReduceDeferredScriptLength(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - m_pscan->IchMinTok());
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkTRUE:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopTrue>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkFALSE:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopFalse>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkNULL:
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateNodeWithScanner<knopNull>();
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkDiv:
case tkAsgDiv:
pnode = ParseRegExp<buildAST>();
fCanAssign = FALSE;
m_pscan->Scan();
break;
case tkNEW:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
if (m_token.tk == tkDot && m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseMetaProperty<buildAST>(tkNEW, ichMin, &fCanAssign);
m_pscan->Scan();
}
else
{
ParseNodePtr pnodeExpr = ParseTerm<buildAST>(FALSE, pNameHint, pHintLength, pShortNameOffset);
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateCallNode(knopNew, pnodeExpr, nullptr);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
}
fInNew = TRUE;
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
break;
}
case tkLBrack:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->Scan();
pnode = ParseArrayLiteral<buildAST>();
if (buildAST)
{
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
if (this->m_arrayDepth == 0)
{
Assert(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - ichMin > m_funcInArray);
this->ReduceDeferredScriptLength(m_pscan->IchLimTok() - ichMin - this->m_funcInArray);
this->m_funcInArray = 0;
this->m_funcInArrayDepth = 0;
}
ChkCurTok(tkRBrack, ERRnoRbrack);
if (!IsES6DestructuringEnabled())
{
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
else if (pfLikelyPattern != nullptr && !IsPostFixOperators())
{
*pfLikelyPattern = TRUE;
}
break;
}
case tkLCurly:
{
ichMin = m_pscan->IchMinTok();
m_pscan->ScanForcingPid();
ParseNodePtr pnodeMemberList = ParseMemberList<buildAST>(pNameHint, pHintLength);
if (buildAST)
{
pnode = CreateUniNode(knopObject, pnodeMemberList);
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
pnode->ichLim = m_pscan->IchLimTok();
}
ChkCurTok(tkRCurly, ERRnoRcurly);
if (!IsES6DestructuringEnabled())
{
fCanAssign = FALSE;
}
else if (pfLikelyPattern != nullptr && !IsPostFixOperators())
{
*pfLikelyPattern = TRUE;
}
break;
}
case tkFUNCTION:
{
LFunction :
if (m_grfscr & fscrDeferredFncExpression)
{
// The top-level deferred function body was defined by a function expression whose parsing was deferred. We are now
// parsing it, so unset the flag so that any nested functions are parsed normally. This flag is only applicable the
// first time we see it.
//
// Normally, deferred functions will be parsed in ParseStatement upon encountering the 'function' token. The first
// token of the source code of the function may not a 'function' token though, so we still need to reset this flag
// for the first function we parse. This can happen in compat modes, for instance, for a function expression enclosed
// in parentheses, where the legacy behavior was to include the parentheses in the function's source code.
m_grfscr &= ~fscrDeferredFncExpression;
}
ushort flags = fFncNoFlgs;
if (isLambdaExpr)
{
flags |= fFncLambda;
}
if (isAsyncExpr)
{
flags |= fFncAsync;
}
pnode = ParseFncDecl<buildAST>(flags, pNameHint, false, true, fUnaryOrParen);
if (isAsyncExpr)
{
pnode->sxFnc.cbMin = iecpMin;
pnode->ichMin = ichMin;
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
}
case tkCLASS:
if (m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseClassDecl<buildAST>(FALSE, pNameHint, pHintLength, pShortNameOffset);
}
else
{
goto LUnknown;
}
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
case tkStrTmplBasic:
case tkStrTmplBegin:
pnode = ParseStringTemplateDecl<buildAST>(nullptr);
fCanAssign = FALSE;
break;
case tkSUPER:
if (m_scriptContext->GetConfig()->IsES6ClassAndExtendsEnabled())
{
pnode = ParseSuper<buildAST>(pnode, !!fAllowCall);
}
else
{
goto LUnknown;
}
break;
case tkCASE:
{
if (!m_doingFastScan)
{
goto LUnknown;
}
ParseNodePtr pnodeUnused;
pnode = ParseCase<buildAST>(&pnodeUnused);
break;
}
case tkELSE:
if (!m_doingFastScan)
{
goto LUnknown;
}
m_pscan->Scan();
ParseStatement<buildAST>();
break;
default:
LUnknown :
Error(ERRsyntax);
break;
}
pnode = ParsePostfixOperators<buildAST>(pnode, fAllowCall, fInNew, isAsyncExpr, &fCanAssign, &term, pfIsDotOrIndex);
if (savedTopAsyncRef != nullptr &&
this->m_token.tk == tkDArrow)
{
// This is an async arrow function; we're going to back up and reparse it.
// Make sure we don't leave behind a bogus reference to the 'async' identifier.
for (IdentPtr pid = wellKnownPropertyPids.async; pid->GetTopRef() != savedTopAsyncRef;)
{
Assert(pid->GetTopRef() != nullptr);
pid->RemovePrevPidRef(nullptr);
}
}
// Pass back identifier if requested
if (pToken && term.tk == tkID)
{
*pToken = term;
}
if (pfCanAssign)
{
*pfCanAssign = fCanAssign;
}
return pnode;
} | 313,369,564,772,743,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-0028 | A remote code execution vulnerability exists when Microsoft scripting engine improperly accesses objects in memory. The vulnerability could corrupt memory in a way that enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user, aka "Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability." | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0028 |
217,184 | JPEGsnoop | b4e458612d4294e0cfe01dbf1c0b09a07a8133a4 | https://github.com/ImpulseAdventure/JPEGsnoop | https://github.com/ImpulseAdventure/JPEGsnoop/commit/b4e458612d4294e0cfe01dbf1c0b09a07a8133a4#diff-cf9182aecc9d630e8db2e0e35f1eec65 | Fixed div0 vulnerability in SampFact | 1 | unsigned CjfifDecode::DecodeMarker()
{
TCHAR acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER];
CString strTmp;
CString strFull; // Used for concatenation
unsigned nLength; // General purpose
unsigned nTmpVal;
unsigned nCode;
unsigned long nPosEnd;
unsigned long nPosSaved; // General-purpose saved position in file
unsigned long nPosExifStart;
unsigned nRet; // General purpose return value
bool bRet;
unsigned long nPosMarkerStart; // Offset for current marker
unsigned nColTransform = 0; // Color Transform from APP14 marker
// For DQT
CString strDqtPrecision = _T("");
CString strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("");
if (Buf(m_nPos) != 0xFF) {
if (m_nPos == 0) {
// Don't give error message if we've already alerted them of AVI / PSD
if ((!m_bAvi) && (!m_bPsd)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("NOTE: File did not start with JPEG marker. Consider using [Tools->Img Search Fwd] to locate embedded JPEG."));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
}
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Expected marker 0xFF, got 0x%02X @ offset 0x%08X. Consider using [Tools->Img Search Fwd/Rev]."),Buf(m_nPos),m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
}
m_nPos++;
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
m_nPos++;
// Read the current marker code
nCode = Buf(m_nPos++);
// Handle Marker Padding
//
// According to Section B.1.1.2:
// "Any marker may optionally be preceded by any number of fill bytes, which are bytes assigned code XFF."
//
unsigned nSkipMarkerPad = 0;
while (nCode == 0xFF) {
// Count the pad
nSkipMarkerPad++;
// Read another byte
nCode = Buf(m_nPos++);
}
// Report out any padding
if (nSkipMarkerPad>0) {
strTmp.Format(_T("*** Skipped %u marker pad bytes ***"),nSkipMarkerPad);
m_pLog->AddLineHdr(strTmp);
}
// Save the current marker offset
nPosMarkerStart = m_nPos;
AddHeader(nCode);
switch (nCode)
{
case JFIF_SOI: // SOI
m_bStateSoi = true;
break;
case JFIF_APP12:
// Photoshop DUCKY (Save For Web)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Ducky")) != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not Photoshop DUCKY. Skipping remainder."));
}
else // Photoshop
{
// Please see reference on http://cpan.uwinnipeg.ca/htdocs/Image-ExifTool/Image/ExifTool/APP12.pm.html
// A direct indexed approach should be safe
m_nImgQualPhotoshopSfw = Buf(m_nPos+6);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Photoshop Save For Web Quality = [%d]"),m_nImgQualPhotoshopSfw);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP14:
// JPEG Adobe tag
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
// Some files had very short segment (eg. nLength=2)
if (nLength < 2+12) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Segment too short for Identifier. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
}
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
// TODO: Confirm Adobe flag
m_nPos += 5;
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+0)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" DCTEncodeVersion = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+2)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+3);
strTmp.Format(_T(" APP14Flags0 = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+4)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+5);
strTmp.Format(_T(" APP14Flags1 = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nColTransform = Buf(m_nPos+6);
switch (nColTransform) {
case APP14_COLXFM_UNK_RGB:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [Unknown (RGB or CMYK)]"),nColTransform);
break;
case APP14_COLXFM_YCC:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [YCbCr]"),nColTransform);
break;
case APP14_COLXFM_YCCK:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [YCCK]"),nColTransform);
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [???]"),nColTransform);
break;
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nApp14ColTransform = (nColTransform & 0xFF);
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP13:
// Photoshop (Save As)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
// Some files had very short segment (eg. nLength=2)
if (nLength < 2+20) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Segment too short for Identifier. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
}
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Photoshop 3.0")) != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not Photoshop. Skipping remainder."));
}
else // Photoshop
{
DecodeApp13Ps();
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP1:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier);
if (!_tcsnccmp(acIdentifier,_T("http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/\x00"),29) != 0) {
// XMP
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" XMP = "));
m_nPos++;
unsigned nPosMarkerEnd = nPosSaved+nLength-1;
unsigned sXmpLen = nPosMarkerEnd-m_nPos;
char cXmpChar;
bool bNonSpace;
CString strLine;
// Reset state
strLine = _T(" |");
bNonSpace = false;
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<sXmpLen;nInd++) {
// Get the next char
cXmpChar = (char)m_pWBuf->Buf(m_nPos+nInd);
// Detect a non-space in line
if ((cXmpChar != 0x20) && (cXmpChar != 0x0A)) {
bNonSpace = true;
}
// Detect Linefeed, print out line
if (cXmpChar == 0x0A) {
// Only print line if some non-space elements!
if (bNonSpace) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strLine);
}
// Reset state
strLine = _T(" |");
bNonSpace = false;
} else {
// Add the char
strLine.AppendChar(cXmpChar);
}
}
}
else if (!_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Exif")) != 0)
{
// Only decode it further if it is EXIF format
m_nPos += 2; // Skip two 00 bytes
nPosExifStart = m_nPos; // Save m_nPos @ start of EXIF used for all IFD offsets
// =========== EXIF TIFF Header (Start) ===========
// - Defined in Exif 2.2 Standard (JEITA CP-3451) section 4.5.2
// - Contents (8 bytes total)
// - Byte order (2 bytes)
// - 0x002A (2 bytes)
// - Offset of 0th IFD (4 bytes)
unsigned char acIdentifierTiff[9];
strFull = _T("");
strTmp = _T("");
strFull = _T(" Identifier TIFF = ");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<8;i++) {
acIdentifierTiff[i] = (unsigned char)Buf(m_nPos++);
}
strTmp = PrintAsHexUC(acIdentifierTiff,8);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
switch (acIdentifierTiff[0]*256+acIdentifierTiff[1])
{
case 0x4949: // "II"
// Intel alignment
m_nImgExifEndian = 0;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Endian = Intel (little)"));
break;
case 0x4D4D: // "MM"
// Motorola alignment
m_nImgExifEndian = 1;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Endian = Motorola (big)"));
break;
}
// We expect the TAG mark of 0x002A (depending on endian mode)
unsigned test_002a;
test_002a = ByteSwap2(acIdentifierTiff[2],acIdentifierTiff[3]);
strTmp.Format(_T(" TAG Mark x002A = 0x%04X"),test_002a);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nIfdCount; // Current IFD #
unsigned nOffsetIfd1;
// Mark pointer to EXIF Sub IFD as 0 so that we can
// detect if the tag never showed up.
m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifMakerPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr = 0;
bool exif_done = FALSE;
nOffsetIfd1 = ByteSwap4(acIdentifierTiff[4],acIdentifierTiff[5],
acIdentifierTiff[6],acIdentifierTiff[7]);
// =========== EXIF TIFF Header (End) ===========
// =========== EXIF IFD 0 ===========
// Do we start the 0th IFD for the "Primary Image Data"?
// Even though the nOffsetIfd1 pointer should indicate to
// us where the IFD should start (0x0008 if immediately after
// EXIF TIFF Header), I have observed JPEG files that
// do not contain the IFD. Therefore, we must check for this
// condition by comparing against the APP marker length.
// Example file: http://img9.imageshack.us/img9/194/90114543.jpg
if ((nPosSaved + nLength) <= (nPosExifStart+nOffsetIfd1)) {
// We've run out of space for any IFD, so cancel now
exif_done = true;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" NOTE: No IFD entries"));
}
nIfdCount = 0;
while (!exif_done) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
strTmp.Format(_T("IFD%u"),nIfdCount);
// Process the IFD
nRet = DecodeExifIfd(strTmp,nPosExifStart,nOffsetIfd1);
// Now that we have gone through all entries in the IFD directory,
// we read the offset to the next IFD
nOffsetIfd1 = ByteSwap4(Buf(m_nPos+0),Buf(m_nPos+1),Buf(m_nPos+2),Buf(m_nPos+3));
m_nPos += 4;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Offset to Next IFD = 0x%08X"),nOffsetIfd1);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (nRet != 0) {
// Error condition (DecodeExifIfd returned error)
nOffsetIfd1 = 0x00000000;
}
if (nOffsetIfd1 == 0x00000000) {
// Either error condition or truly end of IFDs
exif_done = TRUE;
} else {
nIfdCount++;
}
} // while ! exif_done
// If EXIF SubIFD was defined, then handle it now
if (m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("SubIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifMakerPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("MakerIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifMakerPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("GPSIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("InteropIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr);
}
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("Identifier [%s] not supported. Skipping remainder."),(LPCTSTR)acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
//////////
// Dump out Makernote area
// TODO: Disabled for now
#if 0
unsigned ptr_base;
if (m_bVerbose)
{
if (m_nImgExifMakerPtr != 0)
{
// FIXME: Seems that nPosExifStart is not initialized in VERBOSE mode
ptr_base = nPosExifStart+m_nImgExifMakerPtr;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T("Exif Maker IFD DUMP"));
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset @ 0x%08X"),ptr_base);
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
#endif
// End of dump out makernote area
// Restore file position
m_nPos = nPosSaved;
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP2:
// Typically used for Flashpix and possibly ICC profiles
// Photoshop (Save As)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("FPXR")) == 0) {
// Photoshop
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" FlashPix:"));
DecodeApp2Flashpix();
} else if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("ICC_PROFILE")) == 0) {
// ICC Profile
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" ICC Profile:"));
DecodeApp2IccProfile(nLength);
} else {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not supported. Skipping remainder."));
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP3:
case JFIF_APP4:
case JFIF_APP5:
case JFIF_APP6:
case JFIF_APP7:
case JFIF_APP8:
case JFIF_APP9:
case JFIF_APP10:
case JFIF_APP11:
//case JFIF_APP12: // Handled separately
//case JFIF_APP13: // Handled separately
//case JFIF_APP14: // Handled separately
case JFIF_APP15:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (m_bVerbose)
{
strFull = _T("");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<nLength;i++)
{
// Start a new line for every 16 codes
if ((i % 16) == 0) {
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset [%04X]: "),i);
} else if ((i % 8) == 0) {
strFull += _T(" ");
}
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+i);
strTmp.Format(_T("%02X "),nTmpVal);
strFull += strTmp;
if ((i%16) == 15) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<nLength;i++)
{
// Start a new line for every 16 codes
if ((i % 32) == 0) {
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset [%04X]: "),i);
} else if ((i % 8) == 0) {
strFull += _T(" ");
}
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+i);
if (_istprint(nTmpVal)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%c"),nTmpVal);
strFull += strTmp;
} else {
strFull += _T(".");
}
if ((i%32)==31) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
} // nVerbose
m_nPos += nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP0: // APP0
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
_tcscpy_s(m_acApp0Identifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
m_acApp0Identifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),m_acApp0Identifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!_tcscmp(m_acApp0Identifier,_T("JFIF")))
{
// Only process remainder if it is JFIF. This marker
// is also used for application-specific functions.
m_nPos += (unsigned)(_tcslen(m_acApp0Identifier)+1);
m_nImgVersionMajor = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgVersionMinor = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" version = [%u.%u]"),m_nImgVersionMajor,m_nImgVersionMinor);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nImgUnits = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgDensityX = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//m_nImgDensityX = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
m_nImgDensityY = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//m_nImgDensityY = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" density = %u x %u "),m_nImgDensityX,m_nImgDensityY);
strFull = strTmp;
switch (m_nImgUnits)
{
case 0:
strFull += _T("(aspect ratio)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case 1:
strFull += _T("DPI (dots per inch)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case 2:
strFull += _T("DPcm (dots per cm)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Unknown ImgUnits parameter [%u]"),m_nImgUnits);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strFull);
//return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
}
m_nImgThumbSizeX = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgThumbSizeY = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" thumbnail = %u x %u"),m_nImgThumbSizeX,m_nImgThumbSizeY);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Unpack the thumbnail:
unsigned thumbnail_r,thumbnail_g,thumbnail_b;
if (m_nImgThumbSizeX && m_nImgThumbSizeY) {
for (unsigned y=0;y<m_nImgThumbSizeY;y++) {
strFull.Format(_T(" Thumb[%03u] = "),y);
for (unsigned x=0;x<m_nImgThumbSizeX;x++) {
thumbnail_r = Buf(m_nPos++);
thumbnail_g = Buf(m_nPos++);
thumbnail_b = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T("(0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X) "),thumbnail_r,thumbnail_g,thumbnail_b);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
}
// TODO:
// - In JPEG-B mode (GeoRaster), we will need to fake out
// the DHT & DQT tables here. Unfortunately, we'll have to
// rely on the user to put us into this mode as there is nothing
// in the file that specifies this mode.
/*
// TODO: Need to ensure that Faked DHT is correct table
AddHeader(JFIF_DHT_FAKE);
DecodeDHT(true);
// Need to mark DHT tables as OK
m_bStateDht = true;
m_bStateDhtFake = true;
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
// ... same for DQT
*/
} else if (!_tcsnccmp(m_acApp0Identifier,_T("AVI1"),4))
{
// AVI MJPEG type
// Need to fill in predefined DHT table from spec:
// OpenDML file format for AVI, section "Proposed Data Chunk Format"
// Described in MMREG.H
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Detected MotionJPEG"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Importing standard Huffman table..."));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
AddHeader(JFIF_DHT_FAKE);
DecodeDHT(true);
// Need to mark DHT tables as OK
m_bStateDht = true;
m_bStateDhtFake = true;
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
m_nPos += nLength-2; // Skip over, and undo length short read
} else {
// Not JFIF or AVI1
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not known APP0 type. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos += nLength-2;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DQT: // Define quantization tables
m_bStateDqt = true;
unsigned nDqtPrecision_Pq;
unsigned nDqtQuantDestId_Tq;
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Lq
nPosEnd = m_nPos+nLength;
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Table length <Lq> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Table length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
while (nPosEnd > m_nPos)
{
strTmp.Format(_T(" ----"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++); // Pq | Tq
nDqtPrecision_Pq = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4; // Pq, range 0-1
nDqtQuantDestId_Tq = nTmpVal & 0x0F; // Tq, range 0-3
// Decode per ITU-T.81 standard
#if 1
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T(" Unsupported precision value [%u]"),nDqtPrecision_Pq);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
strDqtPrecision = _T("???");
// FIXME: Consider terminating marker parsing early
}
if (!ValidateValue(nDqtPrecision_Pq,0,1,_T("DQT Precision <Pq>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,0,3,_T("DQT Destination ID <Tq>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),(LPCTSTR)strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
#else
// Decode with additional DQT extension (ITU-T-JPEG-Plus-Proposal_R3.doc)
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0xE) == 0) {
// Per ITU-T.81 Standard
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
} else {
// Non-standard
// JPEG-Plus-Proposal-R3:
// - Alternative sub-block-wise sequence
strTmp.Format(_T(" Non-Standard DQT Extension detected"));
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
// FIXME: Should prevent attempt to decode until this is implemented
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x2) == 0) {
strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("Diagonal zig-zag coeff scan seqeunce");
} else if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x2) == 1) {
strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("Alternate coeff scan seqeunce");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Coeff Scan Sequence=%s"),strDqtZigZagOrder);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x4) == 1) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" Custom coeff scan sequence"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Now expect sequence of 64 coefficient entries
CString strSequence = _T("");
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<64;nInd++) {
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T("%u"),nTmpVal);
strSequence += strTmp;
if (nInd!=63) {
strSequence += _T(", ");
}
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Custom sequence = [ %s ]"),strSequence);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
}
#endif
strTmp.Format(_T(" Destination ID=%u"),nDqtQuantDestId_Tq);
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
strTmp += _T(" (Luminance)");
}
else if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 1) {
strTmp += _T(" (Chrominance)");
}
else if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 2) {
strTmp += _T(" (Chrominance)");
}
else {
strTmp += _T(" (???)");
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// FIXME: The following is somewhat superseded by ValidateValue() above
// with the exception of skipping remainder
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq >= MAX_DQT_DEST_ID) {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Destination ID <Tq> = %u, >= %u"),nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,MAX_DQT_DEST_ID);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Now skip remainder of DQT
// FIXME
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipping remainder of marker [%u bytes]"),nPosMarkerStart + nLength - m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
m_nPos = nPosMarkerStart + nLength;
return DECMARK_OK;
}
}
bool bQuantAllOnes = true;
double dComparePercent;
double dSumPercent=0;
double dSumPercentSqr=0;
for (unsigned nCoeffInd=0;nCoeffInd<MAX_DQT_COEFF;nCoeffInd++)
{
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
// 16-bit DQT entries!
nTmpVal <<= 8;
nTmpVal += Buf(m_nPos++);
}
m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = nTmpVal;
/* scaling factor in percent */
// Now calculate the comparison with the Annex sample
// FIXME: Should probably use check for landscape orientation and
// rotate comparison matrix accordingly
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 0) {
m_afStdQuantLumCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] =
(float)(glb_anStdQuantLum[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(float)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
dComparePercent = 100.0 *
(double)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(double)(glb_anStdQuantLum[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
} else {
m_afStdQuantLumCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = (float)999.99;
dComparePercent = 999.99;
}
} else {
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 0) {
m_afStdQuantChrCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] =
(float)(glb_anStdQuantChr[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(float)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
dComparePercent = 100.0 *
(double)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(double)(glb_anStdQuantChr[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
} else {
m_afStdQuantChrCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = (float)999.99;
}
}
dSumPercent += dComparePercent;
dSumPercentSqr += dComparePercent * dComparePercent;
// Check just in case entire table are ones (Quality 100)
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 1) bQuantAllOnes = 0;
} // 0..63
// Note that the DQT table that we are saving is already
// after doing zigzag reordering:
// From high freq -> low freq
// To X,Y, left-to-right, top-to-bottom
// Flag this DQT table as being set!
m_abImgDqtSet[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq] = true;
unsigned nCoeffInd;
// Now display the table
for (unsigned nDqtY=0;nDqtY<8;nDqtY++) {
strFull.Format(_T(" DQT, Row #%u: "),nDqtY);
for (unsigned nDqtX=0;nDqtX<8;nDqtX++) {
nCoeffInd = nDqtY*8+nDqtX;
strTmp.Format(_T("%3u "),m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][nCoeffInd]);
strFull += strTmp;
// Store the DQT entry into the Image Decoder
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDqtEntry(nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,nCoeffInd,glb_anUnZigZag[nCoeffInd],
m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][nCoeffInd]);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
}
// Now add the compare with Annex K
// Decided to disable this as it was confusing users
/*
strFull += _T(" AnnexRatio: <");
for (unsigned nDqtX=0;nDqtX<8;nDqtX++) {
nCoeffInd = nDqtY*8+nDqtX;
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%5.1f "),m_afStdQuantLumCompare[nCoeffInd]);
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("%5.1f "),m_afStdQuantChrCompare[nCoeffInd]);
}
strFull += strTmp;
}
strFull += _T(">");
*/
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
// Perform some statistical analysis of the quality factor
// to determine the likelihood of the current quantization
// table being a scaled version of the "standard" tables.
// If the variance is high, it is unlikely to be the case.
double dQuality;
double dVariance;
dSumPercent /= 64.0; /* mean scale factor */
dSumPercentSqr /= 64.0;
dVariance = dSumPercentSqr - (dSumPercent * dSumPercent); /* variance */
// Generate the equivalent IJQ "quality" factor
if (bQuantAllOnes) /* special case for all-ones table */
dQuality = 100.0;
else if (dSumPercent <= 100.0)
dQuality = (200.0 - dSumPercent) / 2.0;
else
dQuality = 5000.0 / dSumPercent;
// Save the quality rating for later
m_adImgDqtQual[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq] = dQuality;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Approx quality factor = %.2f (scaling=%.2f variance=%.2f)"),
dQuality,dSumPercent,dVariance);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
m_bStateDqtOk = true;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DAC: // DAC (Arithmetic Coding)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // La
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Arithmetic coding header length <La> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Arithmetic coding header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nDAC_n;
unsigned nDAC_Tc,nDAC_Tb;
unsigned nDAC_Cs;
nDAC_n = (nLength>2)?(nLength-2)/2:0;
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<nDAC_n;nInd++) {
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++); // Tc,Tb
nDAC_Tc = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4;
nDAC_Tb = (nTmpVal & 0x0F);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table class <Tc> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tc);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table class = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tc);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table destination identifier <Tb> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tb);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table destination identifier = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tb);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nDAC_Cs = Buf(m_nPos++); // Cs
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Conditioning table value <Cs> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Cs);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Conditioning table value = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Cs);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Tc,0,1,_T("Table class <Tc>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Tb,0,3,_T("Table destination ID <Tb>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
// Parameter range constraints per Table B.6:
// ------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------
// | Sequential DCT | Progressive DCT | Lossless
// Parameter | Baseline Extended | |
// ------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|------------
// Cs | Undef | Tc=0: 0-255 | Tc=0: 0-255 | 0-255
// | | Tc=1: 1-63 | Tc=1: 1-63 |
// ------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|------------
// However, to keep it simple (and not depend on lossless mode),
// we will only check the maximal range
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Cs,0,255,_T("Conditioning table value <Cs>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DNL: // DNL (Define number of lines)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Ld
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length <Ld> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // NL
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of lines <NL> = %u"),nTmpVal);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of lines = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nTmpVal,1,65535,_T("Number of lines <NL>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_EXP:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Le
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length <Le> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nEXP_Eh,nEXP_Ev;
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Eh,Ev
nEXP_Eh = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4;
nEXP_Ev = (nTmpVal & 0x0F);
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand horizontally <Eh> = %u"),nEXP_Eh);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand horizontally = %u"),nEXP_Eh);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand vertically <Ev> = %u"),nEXP_Ev);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand vertically = %u"),nEXP_Ev);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nEXP_Eh,0,1,_T("Expand horizontally <Eh>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nEXP_Ev,0,1,_T("Expand vertically <Ev>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_SOF0: // SOF0 (Baseline DCT)
case JFIF_SOF1: // SOF1 (Extended sequential)
case JFIF_SOF2: // SOF2 (Progressive)
case JFIF_SOF3:
case JFIF_SOF5:
case JFIF_SOF6:
case JFIF_SOF7:
case JFIF_SOF9:
case JFIF_SOF10:
case JFIF_SOF11:
case JFIF_SOF13:
case JFIF_SOF14:
case JFIF_SOF15:
// TODO:
// - JFIF_DHP should be able to reuse the JFIF_SOF marker parsing
// however as we don't support hierarchical image decode, we
// would want to skip the update of class members.
m_bStateSof = true;
// Determine if this is a SOF mode that we support
// At this time, we only support Baseline DCT & Extended Sequential Baseline DCT
// (non-differential) with Huffman coding. Progressive, Lossless,
// Differential and Arithmetic coded modes are not supported.
m_bImgSofUnsupported = true;
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF0) { m_bImgSofUnsupported = false; }
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF1) { m_bImgSofUnsupported = false; }
// For reference, note progressive scan files even though
// we don't currently support their decode
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF2) { m_bImgProgressive = true; }
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Lf
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Frame header length <Lf> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Frame header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSofPrecision_P = Buf(m_nPos++); // P
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision <P> = %u"),m_nSofPrecision_P);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision = %u"),m_nSofPrecision_P);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofPrecision_P,2,16,_T("Precision <P>"),true,8)) return DECMARK_ERR;
m_nSofNumLines_Y = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Y
m_nPos += 2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Lines <Y> = %u"),m_nSofNumLines_Y);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Lines = %u"),m_nSofNumLines_Y);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofNumLines_Y,0,65535,_T("Number of Lines <Y>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
m_nSofSampsPerLine_X = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // X
m_nPos += 2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Samples per Line <X> = %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Samples per Line = %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,1,65535,_T("Samples per Line <X>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Image Size = %u x %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,m_nSofNumLines_Y);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Determine orientation
// m_nSofSampsPerLine_X = X
// m_nSofNumLines_Y = Y
m_eImgLandscape = ENUM_LANDSCAPE_YES;
if (m_nSofNumLines_Y > m_nSofSampsPerLine_X)
m_eImgLandscape = ENUM_LANDSCAPE_NO;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Raw Image Orientation = %s"),(m_eImgLandscape==ENUM_LANDSCAPE_YES)?_T("Landscape"):_T("Portrait"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSofNumComps_Nf = Buf(m_nPos++); // Nf, range 1..255
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Img components <Nf> = %u"),m_nSofNumComps_Nf);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Img components = %u"),m_nSofNumComps_Nf);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofNumComps_Nf,1,255,_T("Number of Img components <Nf>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
unsigned nCompIdent;
unsigned anSofSampFact[MAX_SOF_COMP_NF];
m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax = 0;
m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax = 0;
// Now clear the output image content (all components)
// TODO: Migrate some of the bitmap allocation / clearing from
// DecodeScanImg() into ResetImageContent() and call here
//m_pImgDec->ResetImageContent();
// Per JFIF v1.02:
// - Nf = 1 or 3
// - C1 = Y
// - C2 = Cb
// - C3 = Cr
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = Buf(m_nPos++); // Ci, range 0..255
m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd] = nCompIdent;
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd],0,255,_T("Component ID <Ci>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent] = Buf(m_nPos++); // Tqi, range 0..3
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent],0,3,_T("Table Destination ID <Tqi>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
// NOTE: We protect against bad input here as replication ratios are
// determined later that depend on dividing by sampling factor (hence
// possibility of div by 0).
m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent] = (anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] & 0xF0) >> 4; // Hi, range 1..4
m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent] = (anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] & 0x0F); // Vi, range 1..4
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Horizontal Sampling Factor <Hi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Vertical Sampling Factor <Vi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
// Calculate max sampling factors
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Calculate maximum sampling factor for the SOF. This is only
// used for later generation of m_strImgQuantCss an the SOF
// reporting below. The CimgDecode block is responsible for
// calculating the maximum sampling factor on a per-scan basis.
m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax = max(m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax,m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent]);
m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax = max(m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax,m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
// Report per-component sampling factors and quantization table selectors
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Create subsampling ratio
// - Protect against division-by-zero
CString strSubsampH = _T("?");
CString strSubsampV = _T("?");
if (m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent] > 0) {
strSubsampH.Format(_T("%u"),m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax/m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent]);
}
if (m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent] > 0) {
strSubsampV.Format(_T("%u"),m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax/m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
strFull.Format(_T(" Component[%u]: "),nCompInd); // Note i in Ci is 1-based
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T("ID=0x%02X, Samp Fac <Hi,Vi>=0x%02X (Subsamp %u x %u), Quant Tbl Sel <Tqi>=0x%02X"),
strTmp.Format(_T("ID=0x%02X, Samp Fac=0x%02X (Subsamp %s x %s), Quant Tbl Sel=0x%02X"),
nCompIdent,anSofSampFact[nCompIdent],
(LPCTSTR)strSubsampH,(LPCTSTR)strSubsampV,
m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent]);
strFull += strTmp;
// Mapping from component index (not ID) to colour channel per JFIF
if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 1) {
// Assume grayscale
strFull += _T(" (Lum: Y)");
} else if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 3) {
// Assume YCC
if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_Y) {
strFull += _T(" (Lum: Y)");
}
else if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_CB) {
strFull += _T(" (Chrom: Cb)");
}
else if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_CR) {
strFull += _T(" (Chrom: Cr)");
}
} else if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 4) {
// Assume YCCK
if (nCompInd == 1) {
strFull += _T(" (Y)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 2) {
strFull += _T(" (Cb)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 3) {
strFull += _T(" (Cr)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 4) {
strFull += _T(" (K)");
}
} else {
strFull += _T(" (???)"); // Unknown
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
// Test for bad input, clean up if bad
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd],0,255,_T("Component ID <Ci>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent],0,3,_T("Table Destination ID <Tqi>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Horizontal Sampling Factor <Hi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Vertical Sampling Factor <Vi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
// Finally, assign the cleaned values to the decoder
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Store the DQT Table selection for the Image Decoder
// Param values: Nf,Tqi
// Param ranges: 1..255,0..3
// Note that the Image Decoder doesn't need to see the Component Identifiers
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDqtTables(nCompInd,m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent]);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
// Store the Precision (to handle 12-bit decode)
m_pImgDec->SetPrecision(m_nSofPrecision_P);
}
if (!m_bStateAbort) {
// Set the component sampling factors (chroma subsampling)
// FIXME: check ranging
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf;nCompInd++) {
// nCompInd is component index (1...Nf)
// nCompIdent is Component Identifier (Ci)
// Note that the Image Decoder doesn't need to see the Component Identifiers
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
m_pImgDec->SetSofSampFactors(nCompInd,m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
// Now mark the image as been somewhat OK (ie. should
// also be suitable for EmbeddedThumb() and PrepareSignature()
m_bImgOK = true;
m_bStateSofOk = true;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_COM: // COM
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Comment length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Check for JPEG COM vulnerability
// http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=109524346729948
// Note that the recovery is not very graceful. It will assume that the
// field is actually zero-length, which will make the next byte trigger the
// "Expected marker 0xFF" error message and probably abort. There is no
// obvious way to
if ( (nLength == 0) || (nLength == 1) ) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" JPEG Comment Field Vulnerability detected!"));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipping data until next marker..."));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
nLength = 2;
bool bDoneSearch = false;
unsigned nSkipStart = m_nPos;
while (!bDoneSearch) {
if (Buf(m_nPos) != 0xFF) {
m_nPos++;
} else {
bDoneSearch = true;
}
if (m_nPos >= m_pWBuf->GetPosEof()) {
bDoneSearch = true;
}
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipped %u bytes"),m_nPos - nSkipStart);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
// Break out of case statement
break;
}
// Assume COM field valid length (ie. >= 2)
strFull = _T(" Comment=");
m_strComment = _T("");
for (unsigned ind=0;ind<nLength-2;ind++)
{
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (_istprint(nTmpVal)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%c"),nTmpVal);
m_strComment += strTmp;
} else {
m_strComment += _T(".");
}
}
strFull += m_strComment;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case JFIF_DHT: // DHT
m_bStateDht = true;
DecodeDHT(false);
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
break;
case JFIF_SOS: // SOS
unsigned long nPosScanStart; // Byte count at start of scan data segment
m_bStateSos = true;
// NOTE: Only want to capture position of first SOS
// This should make other function such as AVI frame extract
// more robust in case we get multiple SOS segments.
// We assume that this value is reset when we start a new decode
if (m_nPosSos == 0) {
m_nPosSos = m_nPos-2; // Used for Extract. Want to include actual marker
}
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
m_nPos+=2;
// Ensure that we have seen proper markers before we try this one!
if (!m_bStateSofOk) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" ERROR: SOS before valid SOF defined"));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Scan header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns = Buf(m_nPos++); // Ns, range 1..4
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of image components <Ns> = %u"),m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of img components = %u"),m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Just in case something got corrupted, don't want to get out
// of range here. Note that this will be a hard abort, and
// will not resume decoding.
if (m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns > MAX_SOS_COMP_NS) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" ERROR: Scan decode does not support > %u components"),MAX_SOS_COMP_NS);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
unsigned nSosCompSel_Cs;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSel;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta;
// Max range of components indices is between 1..4
for (unsigned int nScanCompInd=1;((nScanCompInd<=m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns) && (!m_bStateAbort));nScanCompInd++)
{
strFull.Format(_T(" Component[%u]: "),nScanCompInd);
nSosCompSel_Cs = Buf(m_nPos++); // Cs, range 0..255
nSosHuffTblSel = Buf(m_nPos++);
nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td = (nSosHuffTblSel & 0xf0)>>4; // Td, range 0..3
nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta = (nSosHuffTblSel & 0x0f); // Ta, range 0..3
strTmp.Format(_T("selector=0x%02X, table=%u(DC),%u(AC)"),nSosCompSel_Cs,nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td,nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDhtTables(nScanCompInd,nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td,nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
}
m_nSosSpectralStart_Ss = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nSosSpectralEnd_Se = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nSosSuccApprox_A = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Spectral selection = %u .. %u"),m_nSosSpectralStart_Ss,m_nSosSpectralEnd_Se);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Successive approximation = 0x%02X"),m_nSosSuccApprox_A);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Scan Data: (after bitstuff removed)"));
}
// Save the scan data segment position
nPosScanStart = m_nPos;
// Skip over the Scan Data segment
// Pass 1) Quick, allowing for bOutputScanDump to dump first 640B.
// Pass 2) If bDecodeScanImg, we redo the process but in detail decoding.
// FIXME: Not sure why, but if I skip over Pass 1 (eg if I leave in the
// following line uncommented), then I get an error at the end of the
// pass 2 decode (indicating that EOI marker not seen, and expecting
// marker).
// if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump) {
// --- PASS 1 ---
bool bSkipDone;
unsigned nSkipCount;
unsigned nSkipData;
unsigned nSkipPos;
bool bScanDumpTrunc;
bSkipDone = false;
nSkipCount = 0;
nSkipPos = 0;
bScanDumpTrunc = FALSE;
strFull = _T("");
while (!bSkipDone)
{
nSkipCount++;
nSkipPos++;
nSkipData = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (nSkipData == 0xFF) {
// this could either be a marker or a byte stuff
nSkipData = Buf(m_nPos++);
nSkipCount++;
if (nSkipData == 0x00) {
// Byte stuff
nSkipData = 0xFF;
} else if ((nSkipData >= JFIF_RST0) && (nSkipData <= JFIF_RST7)) {
// Skip over
} else {
// Marker
bSkipDone = true;
m_nPos -= 2;
}
}
if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump && (!bSkipDone) ) {
// Only display 20 lines of scan data
if (nSkipPos > 640) {
if (!bScanDumpTrunc) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" WARNING: Dump truncated."));
bScanDumpTrunc = TRUE;
}
} else {
if ( ((nSkipPos-1) == 0) || (((nSkipPos-1) % 32) == 0) ) {
strFull = _T(" ");
}
strTmp.Format(_T("%02x "),nSkipData);
strFull += strTmp;
if (((nSkipPos-1) % 32) == 31) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
}
}
}
// Did we run out of bytes?
// FIXME:
// NOTE: This line here doesn't allow us to attempt to
// decode images that are missing EOI. Maybe this is
// not the best solution here? Instead, we should be
// checking m_nPos against file length? .. and not
// return but "break".
if (!m_pWBuf->GetBufOk()) {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Ran out of buffer before EOI during phase 1 of Scan decode @ 0x%08X"),m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
break;
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
// }
// --- PASS 2 ---
// If the option is set, start parsing!
if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && m_bImgSofUnsupported) {
// SOF marker was of type we don't support, so skip decoding
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan parsing doesn't support this SOF mode."));
#ifndef DEBUG_YCCK
} else if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 4)) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan parsing doesn't support CMYK files yet."));
#endif
} else if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && !m_bImgSofUnsupported) {
if (!m_bStateSofOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as SOF not decoded."));
} else if (!m_bStateDqtOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as DQT not decoded."));
} else if (!m_bStateDhtOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as DHT not decoded."));
} else {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
// Set the primary image details
m_pImgDec->SetImageDetails(m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,m_nSofNumLines_Y,
m_nSofNumComps_Nf,m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns,m_nImgRstEn,m_nImgRstInterval);
// Only recalculate the scan decoding if we need to (i.e. file
// changed, offset changed, scan option changed)
// TODO: In order to decode multiple scans, we will need to alter the
// way that m_pImgSrcDirty is set
if (m_pImgSrcDirty) {
m_pImgDec->DecodeScanImg(nPosScanStart,true,false);
m_pImgSrcDirty = false;
}
}
}
m_bStateSosOk = true;
break;
case JFIF_DRI:
unsigned nVal;
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nVal = Buf(m_nPos+2)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+3);
// According to ITU-T spec B.2.4.4, we only expect
// restart markers if DRI value is non-zero!
m_nImgRstInterval = nVal;
if (nVal != 0) {
m_nImgRstEn = true;
} else {
m_nImgRstEn = false;
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" interval = %u"),m_nImgRstInterval);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += 4;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_EOI: // EOI
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
// Save the EOI file position
// NOTE: If the file is missing the EOI, then this variable will be
// set to mark the end of file.
m_nPosEmbedEnd = m_nPos;
m_nPosEoi = m_nPos;
m_bStateEoi = true;
return DECMARK_EOI;
break;
// Markers that are not yet supported in JPEGsnoop
case JFIF_DHP:
// Markers defined for future use / extensions
case JFIF_JPG:
case JFIF_JPG0:
case JFIF_JPG1:
case JFIF_JPG2:
case JFIF_JPG3:
case JFIF_JPG4:
case JFIF_JPG5:
case JFIF_JPG6:
case JFIF_JPG7:
case JFIF_JPG8:
case JFIF_JPG9:
case JFIF_JPG10:
case JFIF_JPG11:
case JFIF_JPG12:
case JFIF_JPG13:
case JFIF_TEM:
// Unsupported marker
// - Provide generic decode based on length
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Length
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping unsupported marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
break;
case JFIF_RST0:
case JFIF_RST1:
case JFIF_RST2:
case JFIF_RST3:
case JFIF_RST4:
case JFIF_RST5:
case JFIF_RST6:
case JFIF_RST7:
// We don't expect to see restart markers outside the entropy coded segment.
// NOTE: RST# are standalone markers, so no length indicator exists
// But for the sake of robustness, we can check here to see if treating
// as a standalone marker will arrive at another marker (ie. OK). If not,
// proceed to assume there is a length indicator.
strTmp.Format(_T(" WARNING: Restart marker [0xFF%02X] detected outside scan"),nCode);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
// Abort
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Use [Img Search Fwd/Rev] to locate other valid embedded JPEGs"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Ignore
// Check to see if standalone marker treatment looks OK
if (Buf(m_nPos+2) == 0xFF) {
// Looks like standalone
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Ignoring standalone marker. Proceeding with decode."));
m_nPos += 2;
} else {
// Looks like marker with length
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
}
}
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T(" WARNING: Unknown marker [0xFF%02X]"),nCode);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
// Abort
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Use [Img Search Fwd/Rev] to locate other valid embedded JPEGs"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Skip
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
}
}
// Add white-space between each marker
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" "));
// If we decided to abort for any reason, make sure we trap it now.
// This will stop the ProcessFile() while loop. We can set m_bStateAbort
// if user says that they want to stop.
if (m_bStateAbort) {
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
return DECMARK_OK;
}
| 209,975,869,287,019,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-369"
] | CVE-2017-1000414 | ImpulseAdventure JPEGsnoop version 1.7.5 is vulnerable to a division by zero in the JFIF decode handling resulting denial of service. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000414 |
518,319 | JPEGsnoop | b4e458612d4294e0cfe01dbf1c0b09a07a8133a4 | https://github.com/ImpulseAdventure/JPEGsnoop | https://github.com/ImpulseAdventure/JPEGsnoop/commit/b4e458612d4294e0cfe01dbf1c0b09a07a8133a4#diff-cf9182aecc9d630e8db2e0e35f1eec65 | Fixed div0 vulnerability in SampFact | 0 | unsigned CjfifDecode::DecodeMarker()
{
TCHAR acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER];
CString strTmp;
CString strFull; // Used for concatenation
unsigned nLength; // General purpose
unsigned nTmpVal;
unsigned nCode;
unsigned long nPosEnd;
unsigned long nPosSaved; // General-purpose saved position in file
unsigned long nPosExifStart;
unsigned nRet; // General purpose return value
bool bRet;
unsigned long nPosMarkerStart; // Offset for current marker
unsigned nColTransform = 0; // Color Transform from APP14 marker
// For DQT
CString strDqtPrecision = _T("");
CString strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("");
if (Buf(m_nPos) != 0xFF) {
if (m_nPos == 0) {
// Don't give error message if we've already alerted them of AVI / PSD
if ((!m_bAvi) && (!m_bPsd)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("NOTE: File did not start with JPEG marker. Consider using [Tools->Img Search Fwd] to locate embedded JPEG."));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
}
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Expected marker 0xFF, got 0x%02X @ offset 0x%08X. Consider using [Tools->Img Search Fwd/Rev]."),Buf(m_nPos),m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
}
m_nPos++;
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
m_nPos++;
// Read the current marker code
nCode = Buf(m_nPos++);
// Handle Marker Padding
//
// According to Section B.1.1.2:
// "Any marker may optionally be preceded by any number of fill bytes, which are bytes assigned code XFF."
//
unsigned nSkipMarkerPad = 0;
while (nCode == 0xFF) {
// Count the pad
nSkipMarkerPad++;
// Read another byte
nCode = Buf(m_nPos++);
}
// Report out any padding
if (nSkipMarkerPad>0) {
strTmp.Format(_T("*** Skipped %u marker pad bytes ***"),nSkipMarkerPad);
m_pLog->AddLineHdr(strTmp);
}
// Save the current marker offset
nPosMarkerStart = m_nPos;
AddHeader(nCode);
switch (nCode)
{
case JFIF_SOI: // SOI
m_bStateSoi = true;
break;
case JFIF_APP12:
// Photoshop DUCKY (Save For Web)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Ducky")) != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not Photoshop DUCKY. Skipping remainder."));
}
else // Photoshop
{
// Please see reference on http://cpan.uwinnipeg.ca/htdocs/Image-ExifTool/Image/ExifTool/APP12.pm.html
// A direct indexed approach should be safe
m_nImgQualPhotoshopSfw = Buf(m_nPos+6);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Photoshop Save For Web Quality = [%d]"),m_nImgQualPhotoshopSfw);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP14:
// JPEG Adobe tag
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
// Some files had very short segment (eg. nLength=2)
if (nLength < 2+12) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Segment too short for Identifier. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
}
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
// TODO: Confirm Adobe flag
m_nPos += 5;
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+0)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" DCTEncodeVersion = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+2)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+3);
strTmp.Format(_T(" APP14Flags0 = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+4)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+5);
strTmp.Format(_T(" APP14Flags1 = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nColTransform = Buf(m_nPos+6);
switch (nColTransform) {
case APP14_COLXFM_UNK_RGB:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [Unknown (RGB or CMYK)]"),nColTransform);
break;
case APP14_COLXFM_YCC:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [YCbCr]"),nColTransform);
break;
case APP14_COLXFM_YCCK:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [YCCK]"),nColTransform);
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T(" ColorTransform = %u [???]"),nColTransform);
break;
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nApp14ColTransform = (nColTransform & 0xFF);
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP13:
// Photoshop (Save As)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
// Some files had very short segment (eg. nLength=2)
if (nLength < 2+20) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Segment too short for Identifier. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
}
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Photoshop 3.0")) != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not Photoshop. Skipping remainder."));
}
else // Photoshop
{
DecodeApp13Ps();
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP1:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier);
if (!_tcsnccmp(acIdentifier,_T("http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/\x00"),29) != 0) {
// XMP
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" XMP = "));
m_nPos++;
unsigned nPosMarkerEnd = nPosSaved+nLength-1;
unsigned sXmpLen = nPosMarkerEnd-m_nPos;
char cXmpChar;
bool bNonSpace;
CString strLine;
// Reset state
strLine = _T(" |");
bNonSpace = false;
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<sXmpLen;nInd++) {
// Get the next char
cXmpChar = (char)m_pWBuf->Buf(m_nPos+nInd);
// Detect a non-space in line
if ((cXmpChar != 0x20) && (cXmpChar != 0x0A)) {
bNonSpace = true;
}
// Detect Linefeed, print out line
if (cXmpChar == 0x0A) {
// Only print line if some non-space elements!
if (bNonSpace) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strLine);
}
// Reset state
strLine = _T(" |");
bNonSpace = false;
} else {
// Add the char
strLine.AppendChar(cXmpChar);
}
}
}
else if (!_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("Exif")) != 0)
{
// Only decode it further if it is EXIF format
m_nPos += 2; // Skip two 00 bytes
nPosExifStart = m_nPos; // Save m_nPos @ start of EXIF used for all IFD offsets
// =========== EXIF TIFF Header (Start) ===========
// - Defined in Exif 2.2 Standard (JEITA CP-3451) section 4.5.2
// - Contents (8 bytes total)
// - Byte order (2 bytes)
// - 0x002A (2 bytes)
// - Offset of 0th IFD (4 bytes)
unsigned char acIdentifierTiff[9];
strFull = _T("");
strTmp = _T("");
strFull = _T(" Identifier TIFF = ");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<8;i++) {
acIdentifierTiff[i] = (unsigned char)Buf(m_nPos++);
}
strTmp = PrintAsHexUC(acIdentifierTiff,8);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
switch (acIdentifierTiff[0]*256+acIdentifierTiff[1])
{
case 0x4949: // "II"
// Intel alignment
m_nImgExifEndian = 0;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Endian = Intel (little)"));
break;
case 0x4D4D: // "MM"
// Motorola alignment
m_nImgExifEndian = 1;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Endian = Motorola (big)"));
break;
}
// We expect the TAG mark of 0x002A (depending on endian mode)
unsigned test_002a;
test_002a = ByteSwap2(acIdentifierTiff[2],acIdentifierTiff[3]);
strTmp.Format(_T(" TAG Mark x002A = 0x%04X"),test_002a);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nIfdCount; // Current IFD #
unsigned nOffsetIfd1;
// Mark pointer to EXIF Sub IFD as 0 so that we can
// detect if the tag never showed up.
m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifMakerPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr = 0;
m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr = 0;
bool exif_done = FALSE;
nOffsetIfd1 = ByteSwap4(acIdentifierTiff[4],acIdentifierTiff[5],
acIdentifierTiff[6],acIdentifierTiff[7]);
// =========== EXIF TIFF Header (End) ===========
// =========== EXIF IFD 0 ===========
// Do we start the 0th IFD for the "Primary Image Data"?
// Even though the nOffsetIfd1 pointer should indicate to
// us where the IFD should start (0x0008 if immediately after
// EXIF TIFF Header), I have observed JPEG files that
// do not contain the IFD. Therefore, we must check for this
// condition by comparing against the APP marker length.
// Example file: http://img9.imageshack.us/img9/194/90114543.jpg
if ((nPosSaved + nLength) <= (nPosExifStart+nOffsetIfd1)) {
// We've run out of space for any IFD, so cancel now
exif_done = true;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" NOTE: No IFD entries"));
}
nIfdCount = 0;
while (!exif_done) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
strTmp.Format(_T("IFD%u"),nIfdCount);
// Process the IFD
nRet = DecodeExifIfd(strTmp,nPosExifStart,nOffsetIfd1);
// Now that we have gone through all entries in the IFD directory,
// we read the offset to the next IFD
nOffsetIfd1 = ByteSwap4(Buf(m_nPos+0),Buf(m_nPos+1),Buf(m_nPos+2),Buf(m_nPos+3));
m_nPos += 4;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Offset to Next IFD = 0x%08X"),nOffsetIfd1);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (nRet != 0) {
// Error condition (DecodeExifIfd returned error)
nOffsetIfd1 = 0x00000000;
}
if (nOffsetIfd1 == 0x00000000) {
// Either error condition or truly end of IFDs
exif_done = TRUE;
} else {
nIfdCount++;
}
} // while ! exif_done
// If EXIF SubIFD was defined, then handle it now
if (m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("SubIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifSubIfdPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifMakerPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("MakerIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifMakerPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("GPSIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifGpsIfdPtr);
}
if (m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr != 0)
{
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
DecodeExifIfd(_T("InteropIFD"),nPosExifStart,m_nImgExifInteropIfdPtr);
}
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("Identifier [%s] not supported. Skipping remainder."),(LPCTSTR)acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
//////////
// Dump out Makernote area
// TODO: Disabled for now
#if 0
unsigned ptr_base;
if (m_bVerbose)
{
if (m_nImgExifMakerPtr != 0)
{
// FIXME: Seems that nPosExifStart is not initialized in VERBOSE mode
ptr_base = nPosExifStart+m_nImgExifMakerPtr;
m_pLog->AddLine(_T("Exif Maker IFD DUMP"));
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset @ 0x%08X"),ptr_base);
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
#endif
// End of dump out makernote area
// Restore file position
m_nPos = nPosSaved;
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP2:
// Typically used for Flashpix and possibly ICC profiles
// Photoshop (Save As)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nPosSaved = m_nPos;
m_nPos += 2; // Move past length now that we've used it
_tcscpy_s(acIdentifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
acIdentifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),acIdentifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += (unsigned)_tcslen(acIdentifier)+1;
if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("FPXR")) == 0) {
// Photoshop
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" FlashPix:"));
DecodeApp2Flashpix();
} else if (_tcscmp(acIdentifier,_T("ICC_PROFILE")) == 0) {
// ICC Profile
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" ICC Profile:"));
DecodeApp2IccProfile(nLength);
} else {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not supported. Skipping remainder."));
}
// Restore original position in file to a point
// after the section
m_nPos = nPosSaved+nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP3:
case JFIF_APP4:
case JFIF_APP5:
case JFIF_APP6:
case JFIF_APP7:
case JFIF_APP8:
case JFIF_APP9:
case JFIF_APP10:
case JFIF_APP11:
//case JFIF_APP12: // Handled separately
//case JFIF_APP13: // Handled separately
//case JFIF_APP14: // Handled separately
case JFIF_APP15:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (m_bVerbose)
{
strFull = _T("");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<nLength;i++)
{
// Start a new line for every 16 codes
if ((i % 16) == 0) {
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset [%04X]: "),i);
} else if ((i % 8) == 0) {
strFull += _T(" ");
}
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+i);
strTmp.Format(_T("%02X "),nTmpVal);
strFull += strTmp;
if ((i%16) == 15) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
for (unsigned int i=0;i<nLength;i++)
{
// Start a new line for every 16 codes
if ((i % 32) == 0) {
strFull.Format(_T(" MarkerOffset [%04X]: "),i);
} else if ((i % 8) == 0) {
strFull += _T(" ");
}
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos+i);
if (_istprint(nTmpVal)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%c"),nTmpVal);
strFull += strTmp;
} else {
strFull += _T(".");
}
if ((i%32)==31) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
} // nVerbose
m_nPos += nLength;
break;
case JFIF_APP0: // APP0
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//nLength = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
_tcscpy_s(m_acApp0Identifier,MAX_IDENTIFIER,m_pWBuf->BufReadStrn(m_nPos,MAX_IDENTIFIER-1));
m_acApp0Identifier[MAX_IDENTIFIER-1] = 0; // Null terminate just in case
strTmp.Format(_T(" Identifier = [%s]"),m_acApp0Identifier);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!_tcscmp(m_acApp0Identifier,_T("JFIF")))
{
// Only process remainder if it is JFIF. This marker
// is also used for application-specific functions.
m_nPos += (unsigned)(_tcslen(m_acApp0Identifier)+1);
m_nImgVersionMajor = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgVersionMinor = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" version = [%u.%u]"),m_nImgVersionMajor,m_nImgVersionMinor);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nImgUnits = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgDensityX = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//m_nImgDensityX = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
m_nImgDensityY = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
//m_nImgDensityY = m_pWBuf->BufX(m_nPos,2,!m_nImgExifEndian);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" density = %u x %u "),m_nImgDensityX,m_nImgDensityY);
strFull = strTmp;
switch (m_nImgUnits)
{
case 0:
strFull += _T("(aspect ratio)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case 1:
strFull += _T("DPI (dots per inch)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case 2:
strFull += _T("DPcm (dots per cm)");
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Unknown ImgUnits parameter [%u]"),m_nImgUnits);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strFull);
//return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
}
m_nImgThumbSizeX = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nImgThumbSizeY = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" thumbnail = %u x %u"),m_nImgThumbSizeX,m_nImgThumbSizeY);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Unpack the thumbnail:
unsigned thumbnail_r,thumbnail_g,thumbnail_b;
if (m_nImgThumbSizeX && m_nImgThumbSizeY) {
for (unsigned y=0;y<m_nImgThumbSizeY;y++) {
strFull.Format(_T(" Thumb[%03u] = "),y);
for (unsigned x=0;x<m_nImgThumbSizeX;x++) {
thumbnail_r = Buf(m_nPos++);
thumbnail_g = Buf(m_nPos++);
thumbnail_b = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T("(0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X) "),thumbnail_r,thumbnail_g,thumbnail_b);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
}
}
// TODO:
// - In JPEG-B mode (GeoRaster), we will need to fake out
// the DHT & DQT tables here. Unfortunately, we'll have to
// rely on the user to put us into this mode as there is nothing
// in the file that specifies this mode.
/*
// TODO: Need to ensure that Faked DHT is correct table
AddHeader(JFIF_DHT_FAKE);
DecodeDHT(true);
// Need to mark DHT tables as OK
m_bStateDht = true;
m_bStateDhtFake = true;
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
// ... same for DQT
*/
} else if (!_tcsnccmp(m_acApp0Identifier,_T("AVI1"),4))
{
// AVI MJPEG type
// Need to fill in predefined DHT table from spec:
// OpenDML file format for AVI, section "Proposed Data Chunk Format"
// Described in MMREG.H
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Detected MotionJPEG"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Importing standard Huffman table..."));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
AddHeader(JFIF_DHT_FAKE);
DecodeDHT(true);
// Need to mark DHT tables as OK
m_bStateDht = true;
m_bStateDhtFake = true;
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
m_nPos += nLength-2; // Skip over, and undo length short read
} else {
// Not JFIF or AVI1
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Not known APP0 type. Skipping remainder."));
m_nPos += nLength-2;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DQT: // Define quantization tables
m_bStateDqt = true;
unsigned nDqtPrecision_Pq;
unsigned nDqtQuantDestId_Tq;
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Lq
nPosEnd = m_nPos+nLength;
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Table length <Lq> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Table length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
while (nPosEnd > m_nPos)
{
strTmp.Format(_T(" ----"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++); // Pq | Tq
nDqtPrecision_Pq = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4; // Pq, range 0-1
nDqtQuantDestId_Tq = nTmpVal & 0x0F; // Tq, range 0-3
// Decode per ITU-T.81 standard
#if 1
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T(" Unsupported precision value [%u]"),nDqtPrecision_Pq);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
strDqtPrecision = _T("???");
// FIXME: Consider terminating marker parsing early
}
if (!ValidateValue(nDqtPrecision_Pq,0,1,_T("DQT Precision <Pq>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,0,3,_T("DQT Destination ID <Tq>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),(LPCTSTR)strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
#else
// Decode with additional DQT extension (ITU-T-JPEG-Plus-Proposal_R3.doc)
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0xE) == 0) {
// Per ITU-T.81 Standard
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
} else {
// Non-standard
// JPEG-Plus-Proposal-R3:
// - Alternative sub-block-wise sequence
strTmp.Format(_T(" Non-Standard DQT Extension detected"));
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
// FIXME: Should prevent attempt to decode until this is implemented
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 0) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("8 bits");
} else if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
strDqtPrecision = _T("16 bits");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision=%s"),strDqtPrecision);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x2) == 0) {
strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("Diagonal zig-zag coeff scan seqeunce");
} else if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x2) == 1) {
strDqtZigZagOrder = _T("Alternate coeff scan seqeunce");
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Coeff Scan Sequence=%s"),strDqtZigZagOrder);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if ((nDqtPrecision_Pq & 0x4) == 1) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" Custom coeff scan sequence"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Now expect sequence of 64 coefficient entries
CString strSequence = _T("");
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<64;nInd++) {
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T("%u"),nTmpVal);
strSequence += strTmp;
if (nInd!=63) {
strSequence += _T(", ");
}
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Custom sequence = [ %s ]"),strSequence);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
}
#endif
strTmp.Format(_T(" Destination ID=%u"),nDqtQuantDestId_Tq);
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
strTmp += _T(" (Luminance)");
}
else if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 1) {
strTmp += _T(" (Chrominance)");
}
else if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 2) {
strTmp += _T(" (Chrominance)");
}
else {
strTmp += _T(" (???)");
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// FIXME: The following is somewhat superseded by ValidateValue() above
// with the exception of skipping remainder
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq >= MAX_DQT_DEST_ID) {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Destination ID <Tq> = %u, >= %u"),nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,MAX_DQT_DEST_ID);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Now skip remainder of DQT
// FIXME
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipping remainder of marker [%u bytes]"),nPosMarkerStart + nLength - m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
m_nPos = nPosMarkerStart + nLength;
return DECMARK_OK;
}
}
bool bQuantAllOnes = true;
double dComparePercent;
double dSumPercent=0;
double dSumPercentSqr=0;
for (unsigned nCoeffInd=0;nCoeffInd<MAX_DQT_COEFF;nCoeffInd++)
{
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (nDqtPrecision_Pq == 1) {
// 16-bit DQT entries!
nTmpVal <<= 8;
nTmpVal += Buf(m_nPos++);
}
m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = nTmpVal;
/* scaling factor in percent */
// Now calculate the comparison with the Annex sample
// FIXME: Should probably use check for landscape orientation and
// rotate comparison matrix accordingly
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 0) {
m_afStdQuantLumCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] =
(float)(glb_anStdQuantLum[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(float)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
dComparePercent = 100.0 *
(double)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(double)(glb_anStdQuantLum[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
} else {
m_afStdQuantLumCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = (float)999.99;
dComparePercent = 999.99;
}
} else {
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 0) {
m_afStdQuantChrCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] =
(float)(glb_anStdQuantChr[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(float)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
dComparePercent = 100.0 *
(double)(m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]) /
(double)(glb_anStdQuantChr[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]]);
} else {
m_afStdQuantChrCompare[glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] = (float)999.99;
}
}
dSumPercent += dComparePercent;
dSumPercentSqr += dComparePercent * dComparePercent;
// Check just in case entire table are ones (Quality 100)
if (m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][glb_anZigZag[nCoeffInd]] != 1) bQuantAllOnes = 0;
} // 0..63
// Note that the DQT table that we are saving is already
// after doing zigzag reordering:
// From high freq -> low freq
// To X,Y, left-to-right, top-to-bottom
// Flag this DQT table as being set!
m_abImgDqtSet[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq] = true;
unsigned nCoeffInd;
// Now display the table
for (unsigned nDqtY=0;nDqtY<8;nDqtY++) {
strFull.Format(_T(" DQT, Row #%u: "),nDqtY);
for (unsigned nDqtX=0;nDqtX<8;nDqtX++) {
nCoeffInd = nDqtY*8+nDqtX;
strTmp.Format(_T("%3u "),m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][nCoeffInd]);
strFull += strTmp;
// Store the DQT entry into the Image Decoder
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDqtEntry(nDqtQuantDestId_Tq,nCoeffInd,glb_anUnZigZag[nCoeffInd],
m_anImgDqtTbl[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq][nCoeffInd]);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
}
// Now add the compare with Annex K
// Decided to disable this as it was confusing users
/*
strFull += _T(" AnnexRatio: <");
for (unsigned nDqtX=0;nDqtX<8;nDqtX++) {
nCoeffInd = nDqtY*8+nDqtX;
if (nDqtQuantDestId_Tq == 0) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%5.1f "),m_afStdQuantLumCompare[nCoeffInd]);
} else {
strTmp.Format(_T("%5.1f "),m_afStdQuantChrCompare[nCoeffInd]);
}
strFull += strTmp;
}
strFull += _T(">");
*/
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
// Perform some statistical analysis of the quality factor
// to determine the likelihood of the current quantization
// table being a scaled version of the "standard" tables.
// If the variance is high, it is unlikely to be the case.
double dQuality;
double dVariance;
dSumPercent /= 64.0; /* mean scale factor */
dSumPercentSqr /= 64.0;
dVariance = dSumPercentSqr - (dSumPercent * dSumPercent); /* variance */
// Generate the equivalent IJQ "quality" factor
if (bQuantAllOnes) /* special case for all-ones table */
dQuality = 100.0;
else if (dSumPercent <= 100.0)
dQuality = (200.0 - dSumPercent) / 2.0;
else
dQuality = 5000.0 / dSumPercent;
// Save the quality rating for later
m_adImgDqtQual[nDqtQuantDestId_Tq] = dQuality;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Approx quality factor = %.2f (scaling=%.2f variance=%.2f)"),
dQuality,dSumPercent,dVariance);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
}
m_bStateDqtOk = true;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DAC: // DAC (Arithmetic Coding)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // La
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Arithmetic coding header length <La> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Arithmetic coding header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nDAC_n;
unsigned nDAC_Tc,nDAC_Tb;
unsigned nDAC_Cs;
nDAC_n = (nLength>2)?(nLength-2)/2:0;
for (unsigned nInd=0;nInd<nDAC_n;nInd++) {
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++); // Tc,Tb
nDAC_Tc = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4;
nDAC_Tb = (nTmpVal & 0x0F);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table class <Tc> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tc);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table class = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tc);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table destination identifier <Tb> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tb);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Table destination identifier = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Tb);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nDAC_Cs = Buf(m_nPos++); // Cs
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Conditioning table value <Cs> = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Cs);
strTmp.Format(_T(" #%02u: Conditioning table value = %u"),nInd+1,nDAC_Cs);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Tc,0,1,_T("Table class <Tc>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Tb,0,3,_T("Table destination ID <Tb>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
// Parameter range constraints per Table B.6:
// ------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------
// | Sequential DCT | Progressive DCT | Lossless
// Parameter | Baseline Extended | |
// ------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|------------
// Cs | Undef | Tc=0: 0-255 | Tc=0: 0-255 | 0-255
// | | Tc=1: 1-63 | Tc=1: 1-63 |
// ------------|-----------|-------------|-------------------|------------
// However, to keep it simple (and not depend on lossless mode),
// we will only check the maximal range
if (!ValidateValue(nDAC_Cs,0,255,_T("Conditioning table value <Cs>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_DNL: // DNL (Define number of lines)
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Ld
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length <Ld> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // NL
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of lines <NL> = %u"),nTmpVal);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of lines = %u"),nTmpVal);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nTmpVal,1,65535,_T("Number of lines <NL>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_EXP:
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Le
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length <Le> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
unsigned nEXP_Eh,nEXP_Ev;
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Eh,Ev
nEXP_Eh = (nTmpVal & 0xF0) >> 4;
nEXP_Ev = (nTmpVal & 0x0F);
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand horizontally <Eh> = %u"),nEXP_Eh);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand horizontally = %u"),nEXP_Eh);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand vertically <Ev> = %u"),nEXP_Ev);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Expand vertically = %u"),nEXP_Ev);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(nEXP_Eh,0,1,_T("Expand horizontally <Eh>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(nEXP_Ev,0,1,_T("Expand vertically <Ev>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_SOF0: // SOF0 (Baseline DCT)
case JFIF_SOF1: // SOF1 (Extended sequential)
case JFIF_SOF2: // SOF2 (Progressive)
case JFIF_SOF3:
case JFIF_SOF5:
case JFIF_SOF6:
case JFIF_SOF7:
case JFIF_SOF9:
case JFIF_SOF10:
case JFIF_SOF11:
case JFIF_SOF13:
case JFIF_SOF14:
case JFIF_SOF15:
// TODO:
// - JFIF_DHP should be able to reuse the JFIF_SOF marker parsing
// however as we don't support hierarchical image decode, we
// would want to skip the update of class members.
m_bStateSof = true;
// Determine if this is a SOF mode that we support
// At this time, we only support Baseline DCT & Extended Sequential Baseline DCT
// (non-differential) with Huffman coding. Progressive, Lossless,
// Differential and Arithmetic coded modes are not supported.
m_bImgSofUnsupported = true;
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF0) { m_bImgSofUnsupported = false; }
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF1) { m_bImgSofUnsupported = false; }
// For reference, note progressive scan files even though
// we don't currently support their decode
if (nCode == JFIF_SOF2) { m_bImgProgressive = true; }
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Lf
m_nPos+=2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Frame header length <Lf> = %u"),nLength);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Frame header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSofPrecision_P = Buf(m_nPos++); // P
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision <P> = %u"),m_nSofPrecision_P);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Precision = %u"),m_nSofPrecision_P);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofPrecision_P,2,16,_T("Precision <P>"),true,8)) return DECMARK_ERR;
m_nSofNumLines_Y = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Y
m_nPos += 2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Lines <Y> = %u"),m_nSofNumLines_Y);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Lines = %u"),m_nSofNumLines_Y);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofNumLines_Y,0,65535,_T("Number of Lines <Y>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
m_nSofSampsPerLine_X = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // X
m_nPos += 2;
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Samples per Line <X> = %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Samples per Line = %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,1,65535,_T("Samples per Line <X>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Image Size = %u x %u"),m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,m_nSofNumLines_Y);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Determine orientation
// m_nSofSampsPerLine_X = X
// m_nSofNumLines_Y = Y
m_eImgLandscape = ENUM_LANDSCAPE_YES;
if (m_nSofNumLines_Y > m_nSofSampsPerLine_X)
m_eImgLandscape = ENUM_LANDSCAPE_NO;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Raw Image Orientation = %s"),(m_eImgLandscape==ENUM_LANDSCAPE_YES)?_T("Landscape"):_T("Portrait"));
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSofNumComps_Nf = Buf(m_nPos++); // Nf, range 1..255
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Img components <Nf> = %u"),m_nSofNumComps_Nf);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of Img components = %u"),m_nSofNumComps_Nf);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (!ValidateValue(m_nSofNumComps_Nf,1,255,_T("Number of Img components <Nf>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
unsigned nCompIdent;
unsigned anSofSampFact[MAX_SOF_COMP_NF];
m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax = 0;
m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax = 0;
// Now clear the output image content (all components)
// TODO: Migrate some of the bitmap allocation / clearing from
// DecodeScanImg() into ResetImageContent() and call here
//m_pImgDec->ResetImageContent();
// Per JFIF v1.02:
// - Nf = 1 or 3
// - C1 = Y
// - C2 = Cb
// - C3 = Cr
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = Buf(m_nPos++); // Ci, range 0..255
m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd] = nCompIdent;
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd],0,255,_T("Component ID <Ci>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent] = Buf(m_nPos++); // Tqi, range 0..3
//if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent],0,3,_T("Table Destination ID <Tqi>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
// NOTE: We protect against bad input here as replication ratios are
// determined later that depend on dividing by sampling factor (hence
// possibility of div by 0).
m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent] = (anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] & 0xF0) >> 4; // Hi, range 1..4
m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent] = (anSofSampFact[nCompIdent] & 0x0F); // Vi, range 1..4
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Horizontal Sampling Factor <Hi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Vertical Sampling Factor <Vi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
// Calculate max sampling factors
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Calculate maximum sampling factor for the SOF. This is only
// used for later generation of m_strImgQuantCss an the SOF
// reporting below. The CimgDecode block is responsible for
// calculating the maximum sampling factor on a per-scan basis.
m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax = max(m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax,m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent]);
m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax = max(m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax,m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
// Report per-component sampling factors and quantization table selectors
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Create subsampling ratio
// - Protect against division-by-zero
CString strSubsampH = _T("?");
CString strSubsampV = _T("?");
if (m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent] > 0) {
strSubsampH.Format(_T("%u"),m_nSofHorzSampFactMax_Hmax/m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent]);
}
if (m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent] > 0) {
strSubsampV.Format(_T("%u"),m_nSofVertSampFactMax_Vmax/m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
strFull.Format(_T(" Component[%u]: "),nCompInd); // Note i in Ci is 1-based
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T("ID=0x%02X, Samp Fac <Hi,Vi>=0x%02X (Subsamp %u x %u), Quant Tbl Sel <Tqi>=0x%02X"),
strTmp.Format(_T("ID=0x%02X, Samp Fac=0x%02X (Subsamp %s x %s), Quant Tbl Sel=0x%02X"),
nCompIdent,anSofSampFact[nCompIdent],
(LPCTSTR)strSubsampH,(LPCTSTR)strSubsampV,
m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent]);
strFull += strTmp;
// Mapping from component index (not ID) to colour channel per JFIF
if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 1) {
// Assume grayscale
strFull += _T(" (Lum: Y)");
} else if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 3) {
// Assume YCC
if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_Y) {
strFull += _T(" (Lum: Y)");
}
else if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_CB) {
strFull += _T(" (Chrom: Cb)");
}
else if (nCompInd == SCAN_COMP_CR) {
strFull += _T(" (Chrom: Cr)");
}
} else if (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 4) {
// Assume YCCK
if (nCompInd == 1) {
strFull += _T(" (Y)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 2) {
strFull += _T(" (Cb)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 3) {
strFull += _T(" (Cr)");
}
else if (nCompInd == 4) {
strFull += _T(" (K)");
}
} else {
strFull += _T(" (???)"); // Unknown
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
}
// Test for bad input, clean up if bad
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd],0,255,_T("Component ID <Ci>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent],0,3,_T("Table Destination ID <Tqi>"),true,0)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Horizontal Sampling Factor <Hi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
if (!ValidateValue(m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent],1,4,_T("Vertical Sampling Factor <Vi>"),true,1)) return DECMARK_ERR;
}
// Finally, assign the cleaned values to the decoder
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;((!m_bStateAbort)&&(nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf));nCompInd++)
{
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
// Store the DQT Table selection for the Image Decoder
// Param values: Nf,Tqi
// Param ranges: 1..255,0..3
// Note that the Image Decoder doesn't need to see the Component Identifiers
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDqtTables(nCompInd,m_anSofQuantTblSel_Tqi[nCompIdent]);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
// Store the Precision (to handle 12-bit decode)
m_pImgDec->SetPrecision(m_nSofPrecision_P);
}
if (!m_bStateAbort) {
// Set the component sampling factors (chroma subsampling)
// FIXME: check ranging
for (unsigned nCompInd=1;nCompInd<=m_nSofNumComps_Nf;nCompInd++) {
// nCompInd is component index (1...Nf)
// nCompIdent is Component Identifier (Ci)
// Note that the Image Decoder doesn't need to see the Component Identifiers
nCompIdent = m_anSofQuantCompId[nCompInd];
m_pImgDec->SetSofSampFactors(nCompInd,m_anSofHorzSampFact_Hi[nCompIdent],m_anSofVertSampFact_Vi[nCompIdent]);
}
// Now mark the image as been somewhat OK (ie. should
// also be suitable for EmbeddedThumb() and PrepareSignature()
m_bImgOK = true;
m_bStateSofOk = true;
}
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_COM: // COM
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
m_nPos+=2;
strTmp.Format(_T(" Comment length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Check for JPEG COM vulnerability
// http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=109524346729948
// Note that the recovery is not very graceful. It will assume that the
// field is actually zero-length, which will make the next byte trigger the
// "Expected marker 0xFF" error message and probably abort. There is no
// obvious way to
if ( (nLength == 0) || (nLength == 1) ) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" JPEG Comment Field Vulnerability detected!"));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipping data until next marker..."));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
nLength = 2;
bool bDoneSearch = false;
unsigned nSkipStart = m_nPos;
while (!bDoneSearch) {
if (Buf(m_nPos) != 0xFF) {
m_nPos++;
} else {
bDoneSearch = true;
}
if (m_nPos >= m_pWBuf->GetPosEof()) {
bDoneSearch = true;
}
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Skipped %u bytes"),m_nPos - nSkipStart);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
// Break out of case statement
break;
}
// Assume COM field valid length (ie. >= 2)
strFull = _T(" Comment=");
m_strComment = _T("");
for (unsigned ind=0;ind<nLength-2;ind++)
{
nTmpVal = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (_istprint(nTmpVal)) {
strTmp.Format(_T("%c"),nTmpVal);
m_strComment += strTmp;
} else {
m_strComment += _T(".");
}
}
strFull += m_strComment;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
break;
case JFIF_DHT: // DHT
m_bStateDht = true;
DecodeDHT(false);
m_bStateDhtOk = true;
break;
case JFIF_SOS: // SOS
unsigned long nPosScanStart; // Byte count at start of scan data segment
m_bStateSos = true;
// NOTE: Only want to capture position of first SOS
// This should make other function such as AVI frame extract
// more robust in case we get multiple SOS segments.
// We assume that this value is reset when we start a new decode
if (m_nPosSos == 0) {
m_nPosSos = m_nPos-2; // Used for Extract. Want to include actual marker
}
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
m_nPos+=2;
// Ensure that we have seen proper markers before we try this one!
if (!m_bStateSofOk) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" ERROR: SOS before valid SOF defined"));
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" Scan header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns = Buf(m_nPos++); // Ns, range 1..4
//XXX strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of image components <Ns> = %u"),m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Number of img components = %u"),m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
// Just in case something got corrupted, don't want to get out
// of range here. Note that this will be a hard abort, and
// will not resume decoding.
if (m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns > MAX_SOS_COMP_NS) {
strTmp.Format(_T(" ERROR: Scan decode does not support > %u components"),MAX_SOS_COMP_NS);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
unsigned nSosCompSel_Cs;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSel;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td;
unsigned nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta;
// Max range of components indices is between 1..4
for (unsigned int nScanCompInd=1;((nScanCompInd<=m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns) && (!m_bStateAbort));nScanCompInd++)
{
strFull.Format(_T(" Component[%u]: "),nScanCompInd);
nSosCompSel_Cs = Buf(m_nPos++); // Cs, range 0..255
nSosHuffTblSel = Buf(m_nPos++);
nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td = (nSosHuffTblSel & 0xf0)>>4; // Td, range 0..3
nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta = (nSosHuffTblSel & 0x0f); // Ta, range 0..3
strTmp.Format(_T("selector=0x%02X, table=%u(DC),%u(AC)"),nSosCompSel_Cs,nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td,nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta);
strFull += strTmp;
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
bRet = m_pImgDec->SetDhtTables(nScanCompInd,nSosHuffTblSelDc_Td,nSosHuffTblSelAc_Ta);
DecodeErrCheck(bRet);
}
m_nSosSpectralStart_Ss = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nSosSpectralEnd_Se = Buf(m_nPos++);
m_nSosSuccApprox_A = Buf(m_nPos++);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Spectral selection = %u .. %u"),m_nSosSpectralStart_Ss,m_nSosSpectralEnd_Se);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Successive approximation = 0x%02X"),m_nSosSuccApprox_A);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump) {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Scan Data: (after bitstuff removed)"));
}
// Save the scan data segment position
nPosScanStart = m_nPos;
// Skip over the Scan Data segment
// Pass 1) Quick, allowing for bOutputScanDump to dump first 640B.
// Pass 2) If bDecodeScanImg, we redo the process but in detail decoding.
// FIXME: Not sure why, but if I skip over Pass 1 (eg if I leave in the
// following line uncommented), then I get an error at the end of the
// pass 2 decode (indicating that EOI marker not seen, and expecting
// marker).
// if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump) {
// --- PASS 1 ---
bool bSkipDone;
unsigned nSkipCount;
unsigned nSkipData;
unsigned nSkipPos;
bool bScanDumpTrunc;
bSkipDone = false;
nSkipCount = 0;
nSkipPos = 0;
bScanDumpTrunc = FALSE;
strFull = _T("");
while (!bSkipDone)
{
nSkipCount++;
nSkipPos++;
nSkipData = Buf(m_nPos++);
if (nSkipData == 0xFF) {
// this could either be a marker or a byte stuff
nSkipData = Buf(m_nPos++);
nSkipCount++;
if (nSkipData == 0x00) {
// Byte stuff
nSkipData = 0xFF;
} else if ((nSkipData >= JFIF_RST0) && (nSkipData <= JFIF_RST7)) {
// Skip over
} else {
// Marker
bSkipDone = true;
m_nPos -= 2;
}
}
if (m_pAppConfig->bOutputScanDump && (!bSkipDone) ) {
// Only display 20 lines of scan data
if (nSkipPos > 640) {
if (!bScanDumpTrunc) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" WARNING: Dump truncated."));
bScanDumpTrunc = TRUE;
}
} else {
if ( ((nSkipPos-1) == 0) || (((nSkipPos-1) % 32) == 0) ) {
strFull = _T(" ");
}
strTmp.Format(_T("%02x "),nSkipData);
strFull += strTmp;
if (((nSkipPos-1) % 32) == 31) {
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
strFull = _T("");
}
}
}
// Did we run out of bytes?
// FIXME:
// NOTE: This line here doesn't allow us to attempt to
// decode images that are missing EOI. Maybe this is
// not the best solution here? Instead, we should be
// checking m_nPos against file length? .. and not
// return but "break".
if (!m_pWBuf->GetBufOk()) {
strTmp.Format(_T("ERROR: Ran out of buffer before EOI during phase 1 of Scan decode @ 0x%08X"),m_nPos);
m_pLog->AddLineErr(strTmp);
break;
}
}
m_pLog->AddLine(strFull);
// }
// --- PASS 2 ---
// If the option is set, start parsing!
if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && m_bImgSofUnsupported) {
// SOF marker was of type we don't support, so skip decoding
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan parsing doesn't support this SOF mode."));
#ifndef DEBUG_YCCK
} else if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && (m_nSofNumComps_Nf == 4)) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan parsing doesn't support CMYK files yet."));
#endif
} else if (m_pAppConfig->bDecodeScanImg && !m_bImgSofUnsupported) {
if (!m_bStateSofOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as SOF not decoded."));
} else if (!m_bStateDqtOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as DQT not decoded."));
} else if (!m_bStateDhtOk) {
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" NOTE: Scan decode disabled as DHT not decoded."));
} else {
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
// Set the primary image details
m_pImgDec->SetImageDetails(m_nSofSampsPerLine_X,m_nSofNumLines_Y,
m_nSofNumComps_Nf,m_nSosNumCompScan_Ns,m_nImgRstEn,m_nImgRstInterval);
// Only recalculate the scan decoding if we need to (i.e. file
// changed, offset changed, scan option changed)
// TODO: In order to decode multiple scans, we will need to alter the
// way that m_pImgSrcDirty is set
if (m_pImgSrcDirty) {
m_pImgDec->DecodeScanImg(nPosScanStart,true,false);
m_pImgSrcDirty = false;
}
}
}
m_bStateSosOk = true;
break;
case JFIF_DRI:
unsigned nVal;
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
nVal = Buf(m_nPos+2)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+3);
// According to ITU-T spec B.2.4.4, we only expect
// restart markers if DRI value is non-zero!
m_nImgRstInterval = nVal;
if (nVal != 0) {
m_nImgRstEn = true;
} else {
m_nImgRstEn = false;
}
strTmp.Format(_T(" interval = %u"),m_nImgRstInterval);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_nPos += 4;
if (!ExpectMarkerEnd(nPosMarkerStart,nLength))
return DECMARK_ERR;
break;
case JFIF_EOI: // EOI
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(""));
// Save the EOI file position
// NOTE: If the file is missing the EOI, then this variable will be
// set to mark the end of file.
m_nPosEmbedEnd = m_nPos;
m_nPosEoi = m_nPos;
m_bStateEoi = true;
return DECMARK_EOI;
break;
// Markers that are not yet supported in JPEGsnoop
case JFIF_DHP:
// Markers defined for future use / extensions
case JFIF_JPG:
case JFIF_JPG0:
case JFIF_JPG1:
case JFIF_JPG2:
case JFIF_JPG3:
case JFIF_JPG4:
case JFIF_JPG5:
case JFIF_JPG6:
case JFIF_JPG7:
case JFIF_JPG8:
case JFIF_JPG9:
case JFIF_JPG10:
case JFIF_JPG11:
case JFIF_JPG12:
case JFIF_JPG13:
case JFIF_TEM:
// Unsupported marker
// - Provide generic decode based on length
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1); // Length
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping unsupported marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
break;
case JFIF_RST0:
case JFIF_RST1:
case JFIF_RST2:
case JFIF_RST3:
case JFIF_RST4:
case JFIF_RST5:
case JFIF_RST6:
case JFIF_RST7:
// We don't expect to see restart markers outside the entropy coded segment.
// NOTE: RST# are standalone markers, so no length indicator exists
// But for the sake of robustness, we can check here to see if treating
// as a standalone marker will arrive at another marker (ie. OK). If not,
// proceed to assume there is a length indicator.
strTmp.Format(_T(" WARNING: Restart marker [0xFF%02X] detected outside scan"),nCode);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
// Abort
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Use [Img Search Fwd/Rev] to locate other valid embedded JPEGs"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Ignore
// Check to see if standalone marker treatment looks OK
if (Buf(m_nPos+2) == 0xFF) {
// Looks like standalone
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Ignoring standalone marker. Proceeding with decode."));
m_nPos += 2;
} else {
// Looks like marker with length
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
}
}
break;
default:
strTmp.Format(_T(" WARNING: Unknown marker [0xFF%02X]"),nCode);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(strTmp);
if (!m_pAppConfig->bRelaxedParsing) {
// Abort
m_pLog->AddLineErr(_T(" Stopping decode"));
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" Use [Img Search Fwd/Rev] to locate other valid embedded JPEGs"));
return DECMARK_ERR;
} else {
// Skip
nLength = Buf(m_nPos)*256 + Buf(m_nPos+1);
strTmp.Format(_T(" Header length = %u"),nLength);
m_pLog->AddLine(strTmp);
m_pLog->AddLineWarn(_T(" Skipping marker"));
m_nPos += nLength;
}
}
// Add white-space between each marker
m_pLog->AddLine(_T(" "));
// If we decided to abort for any reason, make sure we trap it now.
// This will stop the ProcessFile() while loop. We can set m_bStateAbort
// if user says that they want to stop.
if (m_bStateAbort) {
return DECMARK_ERR;
}
return DECMARK_OK;
}
| 124,451,953,334,289,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-369"
] | CVE-2017-1000414 | ImpulseAdventure JPEGsnoop version 1.7.5 is vulnerable to a division by zero in the JFIF decode handling resulting denial of service. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000414 |
217,206 | libofx | a70934eea95c76a7737b83773bffe8738935082d | https://github.com/libofx/libofx | https://github.com/libofx/libofx/commit/a70934eea95c76a7737b83773bffe8738935082d | Fix a buffer overflow.
This is only the minimum workaround to prevent buffer overflow:
Stop iterating once the (fixed!) size of the output buffers is
reached. In response to
https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0317
However, this code is a huge mess anyway and is in no way
anything like up-to-date C++ code. Please, anyone, replace it
with something more modern. Thanks. | 1 | string sanitize_proprietary_tags(string input_string)
{
unsigned int i;
size_t input_string_size;
bool strip = false;
bool tag_open = false;
int tag_open_idx = 0; //Are we within < > ?
bool closing_tag_open = false; //Are we within </ > ?
int orig_tag_open_idx = 0;
bool proprietary_tag = false; //Are we within a proprietary element?
bool proprietary_closing_tag = false;
int crop_end_idx = 0;
char buffer[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
char tagname[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
int tagname_idx = 0;
char close_tagname[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
for (i = 0; i < READ_BUFFER_SIZE; i++)
{
buffer[i] = 0;
tagname[i] = 0;
close_tagname[i] = 0;
}
input_string_size = input_string.size();
for (i = 0; i < input_string_size; i++)
{
if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '<')
{
tag_open = true;
tag_open_idx = i;
if (proprietary_tag == true && input_string.c_str()[i+1] == '/')
{
//We are now in a closing tag
closing_tag_open = true;
//cout<<"Comparaison: "<<tagname<<"|"<<&(input_string.c_str()[i+2])<<"|"<<strlen(tagname)<<endl;
if (strncmp(tagname, &(input_string.c_str()[i+2]), strlen(tagname)) != 0)
{
//If it is the begining of an other tag
//cout<<"DIFFERENT!"<<endl;
crop_end_idx = i - 1;
strip = true;
}
else
{
//Otherwise, it is the start of the closing tag of the proprietary tag
proprietary_closing_tag = true;
}
}
else if (proprietary_tag == true)
{
//It is the start of a new tag, following a proprietary tag
crop_end_idx = i - 1;
strip = true;
}
}
else if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '>')
{
tag_open = false;
closing_tag_open = false;
tagname[tagname_idx] = 0;
tagname_idx = 0;
if (proprietary_closing_tag == true)
{
crop_end_idx = i;
strip = true;
}
}
else if (tag_open == true && closing_tag_open == false)
{
if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '.')
{
if (proprietary_tag != true)
{
orig_tag_open_idx = tag_open_idx;
proprietary_tag = true;
}
}
tagname[tagname_idx] = input_string.c_str()[i];
tagname_idx++;
}
//cerr <<i<<endl;
if (strip == true && orig_tag_open_idx < input_string.size())
{
input_string.copy(buffer, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1, orig_tag_open_idx);
message_out(INFO, "sanitize_proprietary_tags() (end tag or new tag) removed: " + string(buffer));
input_string.erase(orig_tag_open_idx, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1);
i = orig_tag_open_idx - 1;
proprietary_tag = false;
proprietary_closing_tag = false;
closing_tag_open = false;
tag_open = false;
strip = false;
input_string_size = input_string.size();
}
}//end for
if (proprietary_tag == true && orig_tag_open_idx < input_string.size())
{
if (crop_end_idx == 0) //no closing tag
{
crop_end_idx = input_string.size() - 1;
}
input_string.copy(buffer, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1, orig_tag_open_idx);
message_out(INFO, "sanitize_proprietary_tags() (end of line) removed: " + string(buffer));
input_string.erase(orig_tag_open_idx, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1);
input_string_size = input_string.size();
}
return input_string;
} | 170,627,852,305,112,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-2920 | An memory corruption vulnerability exists in the .SVG parsing functionality of Computerinsel Photoline 20.02. A specially crafted .SVG file can cause a vulnerability resulting in memory corruption, which can potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send a specific .SVG file to trigger this vulnerability. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2920 |
518,533 | libofx | a70934eea95c76a7737b83773bffe8738935082d | https://github.com/libofx/libofx | https://github.com/libofx/libofx/commit/a70934eea95c76a7737b83773bffe8738935082d | Fix a buffer overflow.
This is only the minimum workaround to prevent buffer overflow:
Stop iterating once the (fixed!) size of the output buffers is
reached. In response to
https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0317
However, this code is a huge mess anyway and is in no way
anything like up-to-date C++ code. Please, anyone, replace it
with something more modern. Thanks. | 0 | string sanitize_proprietary_tags(string input_string)
{
unsigned int i;
bool strip = false;
bool tag_open = false;
int tag_open_idx = 0; //Are we within < > ?
bool closing_tag_open = false; //Are we within </ > ?
int orig_tag_open_idx = 0;
bool proprietary_tag = false; //Are we within a proprietary element?
bool proprietary_closing_tag = false;
int crop_end_idx = 0;
char buffer[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
char tagname[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
int tagname_idx = 0;
char close_tagname[READ_BUFFER_SIZE] = "";
for (i = 0; i < READ_BUFFER_SIZE; i++)
{
buffer[i] = 0;
tagname[i] = 0;
close_tagname[i] = 0;
}
size_t input_string_size = input_string.size();
// Minimum workaround to prevent buffer overflow: Stop iterating
// once the (fixed!) size of the output buffers is reached. In
// response to
// https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0317
//
// However, this code is a huge mess anyway and is in no way
// anything like up-to-date C++ code. Please, anyone, replace it
// with something more modern. Thanks. - cstim, 2017-09-17.
for (i = 0; i < std::min(input_string_size, size_t(READ_BUFFER_SIZE)); i++)
{
if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '<')
{
tag_open = true;
tag_open_idx = i;
if (proprietary_tag == true && input_string.c_str()[i+1] == '/')
{
//We are now in a closing tag
closing_tag_open = true;
//cout<<"Comparaison: "<<tagname<<"|"<<&(input_string.c_str()[i+2])<<"|"<<strlen(tagname)<<endl;
if (strncmp(tagname, &(input_string.c_str()[i+2]), strlen(tagname)) != 0)
{
//If it is the begining of an other tag
//cout<<"DIFFERENT!"<<endl;
crop_end_idx = i - 1;
strip = true;
}
else
{
//Otherwise, it is the start of the closing tag of the proprietary tag
proprietary_closing_tag = true;
}
}
else if (proprietary_tag == true)
{
//It is the start of a new tag, following a proprietary tag
crop_end_idx = i - 1;
strip = true;
}
}
else if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '>')
{
tag_open = false;
closing_tag_open = false;
tagname[tagname_idx] = 0;
tagname_idx = 0;
if (proprietary_closing_tag == true)
{
crop_end_idx = i;
strip = true;
}
}
else if (tag_open == true && closing_tag_open == false)
{
if (input_string.c_str()[i] == '.')
{
if (proprietary_tag != true)
{
orig_tag_open_idx = tag_open_idx;
proprietary_tag = true;
}
}
tagname[tagname_idx] = input_string.c_str()[i];
tagname_idx++;
}
//cerr <<i<<endl;
if (strip == true && orig_tag_open_idx < input_string.size())
{
input_string.copy(buffer, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1, orig_tag_open_idx);
message_out(INFO, "sanitize_proprietary_tags() (end tag or new tag) removed: " + string(buffer));
input_string.erase(orig_tag_open_idx, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1);
i = orig_tag_open_idx - 1;
proprietary_tag = false;
proprietary_closing_tag = false;
closing_tag_open = false;
tag_open = false;
strip = false;
input_string_size = input_string.size();
}
}//end for
if (proprietary_tag == true && orig_tag_open_idx < input_string.size())
{
if (crop_end_idx == 0) //no closing tag
{
crop_end_idx = input_string.size() - 1;
}
input_string.copy(buffer, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1, orig_tag_open_idx);
message_out(INFO, "sanitize_proprietary_tags() (end of line) removed: " + string(buffer));
input_string.erase(orig_tag_open_idx, (crop_end_idx - orig_tag_open_idx) + 1);
input_string_size = input_string.size();
}
return input_string;
} | 296,383,376,717,599,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-2920 | An memory corruption vulnerability exists in the .SVG parsing functionality of Computerinsel Photoline 20.02. A specially crafted .SVG file can cause a vulnerability resulting in memory corruption, which can potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send a specific .SVG file to trigger this vulnerability. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2920 |
217,217 | iortcw | 11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | All: Merge some file writing extension checks | 1 | void Con_Dump_f( void ) {
int l, x, i;
short *line;
fileHandle_t f;
int bufferlen;
char *buffer;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: condump <filename>\n" );
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".txt" );
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf ("ERROR: couldn't open %s.\n", filename);
return;
}
Com_Printf ("Dumped console text to %s.\n", filename );
// skip empty lines
for ( l = con.current - con.totallines + 1 ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++ )
if ( ( line[x] & 0xff ) != ' ' ) {
break;
}
if ( x != con.linewidth ) {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 3 * sizeof ( char );
#else
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 2 * sizeof ( char );
#endif
buffer = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( bufferlen );
// write the remaining lines
buffer[bufferlen-1] = 0;
for ( ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
buffer[i] = line[i] & 0xff;
for ( x = con.linewidth - 1 ; x >= 0 ; x-- )
{
if ( buffer[x] == ' ' ) {
buffer[x] = 0;
} else {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\r\n");
#else
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\n");
#endif
FS_Write( buffer, strlen( buffer ), f );
}
Hunk_FreeTempMemory( buffer );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
} | 128,730,628,186,736,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-269"
] | CVE-2017-6903 | In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6903 |
519,025 | iortcw | 11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998 | All: Merge some file writing extension checks | 0 | void Con_Dump_f( void ) {
int l, x, i;
short *line;
fileHandle_t f;
int bufferlen;
char *buffer;
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: condump <filename>\n" );
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".txt" );
if (!COM_CompareExtension(filename, ".txt"))
{
Com_Printf("Con_Dump_f: Only the \".txt\" extension is supported by this command!\n");
return;
}
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf ("ERROR: couldn't open %s.\n", filename);
return;
}
Com_Printf ("Dumped console text to %s.\n", filename );
// skip empty lines
for ( l = con.current - con.totallines + 1 ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++ )
if ( ( line[x] & 0xff ) != ' ' ) {
break;
}
if ( x != con.linewidth ) {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 3 * sizeof ( char );
#else
bufferlen = con.linewidth + 2 * sizeof ( char );
#endif
buffer = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory( bufferlen );
// write the remaining lines
buffer[bufferlen-1] = 0;
for ( ; l <= con.current ; l++ )
{
line = con.text + ( l % con.totallines ) * con.linewidth;
for ( i = 0; i < con.linewidth; i++ )
buffer[i] = line[i] & 0xff;
for ( x = con.linewidth - 1 ; x >= 0 ; x-- )
{
if ( buffer[x] == ' ' ) {
buffer[x] = 0;
} else {
break;
}
}
#ifdef _WIN32
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\r\n");
#else
Q_strcat(buffer, bufferlen, "\n");
#endif
FS_Write( buffer, strlen( buffer ), f );
}
Hunk_FreeTempMemory( buffer );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
} | 160,930,453,638,616,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-269"
] | CVE-2017-6903 | In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6903 |
217,218 | ps-lite | 4be817e8b03e7e92517e91f2dfcc50865e91c6ea | https://github.com/dmlc/ps-lite | https://github.com/dmlc/ps-lite/commit/4be817e8b03e7e92517e91f2dfcc50865e91c6ea | Avoid listening on all interfaces by default | 1 | int Bind(const Node& node, int max_retry) override {
receiver_ = zmq_socket(context_, ZMQ_ROUTER);
CHECK(receiver_ != NULL)
<< "create receiver socket failed: " << zmq_strerror(errno);
int local = GetEnv("DMLC_LOCAL", 0);
std::string addr = local ? "ipc:///tmp/" : "tcp://*:";
int port = node.port;
unsigned seed = static_cast<unsigned>(time(NULL)+port);
for (int i = 0; i < max_retry+1; ++i) {
auto address = addr + std::to_string(port);
if (zmq_bind(receiver_, address.c_str()) == 0) break;
if (i == max_retry) {
port = -1;
} else {
port = 10000 + rand_r(&seed) % 40000;
}
}
return port;
} | 27,773,348,298,973,745,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2018-1281 | The clustered setup of Apache MXNet allows users to specify which IP address and port the scheduler will listen on via the DMLC_PS_ROOT_URI and DMLC_PS_ROOT_PORT env variables. In versions older than 1.0.0, however, the MXNet framework will listen on 0.0.0.0 rather than user specified DMLC_PS_ROOT_URI once a scheduler node is initialized. This exposes the instance running MXNet to any attackers reachable via the interface they didn't expect to be listening on. For example: If a user wants to run a clustered setup locally, they may specify to run on 127.0.0.1. But since MXNet will listen on 0.0.0.0, it makes the port accessible on all network interfaces. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1281 |
519,035 | ps-lite | 4be817e8b03e7e92517e91f2dfcc50865e91c6ea | https://github.com/dmlc/ps-lite | https://github.com/dmlc/ps-lite/commit/4be817e8b03e7e92517e91f2dfcc50865e91c6ea | Avoid listening on all interfaces by default | 0 | int Bind(const Node& node, int max_retry) override {
receiver_ = zmq_socket(context_, ZMQ_ROUTER);
CHECK(receiver_ != NULL)
<< "create receiver socket failed: " << zmq_strerror(errno);
int local = GetEnv("DMLC_LOCAL", 0);
std::string hostname = node.hostname.empty() ? "*" : node.hostname;
std::string addr = local ? "ipc:///tmp/" : "tcp://" + hostname + ":";
int port = node.port;
unsigned seed = static_cast<unsigned>(time(NULL)+port);
for (int i = 0; i < max_retry+1; ++i) {
auto address = addr + std::to_string(port);
if (zmq_bind(receiver_, address.c_str()) == 0) break;
if (i == max_retry) {
port = -1;
} else {
port = 10000 + rand_r(&seed) % 40000;
}
}
return port;
} | 287,329,875,877,248,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2018-1281 | The clustered setup of Apache MXNet allows users to specify which IP address and port the scheduler will listen on via the DMLC_PS_ROOT_URI and DMLC_PS_ROOT_PORT env variables. In versions older than 1.0.0, however, the MXNet framework will listen on 0.0.0.0 rather than user specified DMLC_PS_ROOT_URI once a scheduler node is initialized. This exposes the instance running MXNet to any attackers reachable via the interface they didn't expect to be listening on. For example: If a user wants to run a clustered setup locally, they may specify to run on 127.0.0.1. But since MXNet will listen on 0.0.0.0, it makes the port accessible on all network interfaces. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1281 |
217,219 | WAVM | 2de6cf70c5ef31e22ed119a25ac2daeefd3d18a1 | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM/commit/2de6cf70c5ef31e22ed119a25ac2daeefd3d18a1 | Fix out-of-bounds array access when passing a <4 byte input file to wavm or wavm-compile | 1 | inline bool loadModule(const char* filename, IR::Module& outModule)
{
// Read the specified file into an array.
std::vector<U8> fileBytes;
if(!loadFile(filename, fileBytes)) { return false; }
// If the file starts with the WASM binary magic number, load it as a binary irModule.
if(*(U32*)fileBytes.data() == 0x6d736100)
{ return loadBinaryModule(fileBytes.data(), fileBytes.size(), outModule); }
else
{
// Make sure the WAST file is null terminated.
fileBytes.push_back(0);
// Load it as a text irModule.
std::vector<WAST::Error> parseErrors;
if(!WAST::parseModule(
(const char*)fileBytes.data(), fileBytes.size(), outModule, parseErrors))
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Error parsing WebAssembly text file:\n");
reportParseErrors(filename, parseErrors);
return false;
}
return true;
}
} | 247,635,764,926,562,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-17292 | An issue was discovered in WAVM before 2018-09-16. The loadModule function in Include/Inline/CLI.h lacks checking of the file length before a file magic comparison, allowing attackers to cause a Denial of Service (application crash caused by out-of-bounds read) by crafting a file that has fewer than 4 bytes. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17292 |
519,044 | WAVM | 2de6cf70c5ef31e22ed119a25ac2daeefd3d18a1 | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM/commit/2de6cf70c5ef31e22ed119a25ac2daeefd3d18a1 | Fix out-of-bounds array access when passing a <4 byte input file to wavm or wavm-compile | 0 | inline bool loadModule(const char* filename, IR::Module& outModule)
{
// Read the specified file into an array.
std::vector<U8> fileBytes;
if(!loadFile(filename, fileBytes)) { return false; }
// If the file starts with the WASM binary magic number, load it as a binary irModule.
if(fileBytes.size() >= 4 && *(U32*)fileBytes.data() == 0x6d736100)
{ return loadBinaryModule(fileBytes.data(), fileBytes.size(), outModule); }
else
{
// Make sure the WAST file is null terminated.
fileBytes.push_back(0);
// Load it as a text irModule.
std::vector<WAST::Error> parseErrors;
if(!WAST::parseModule(
(const char*)fileBytes.data(), fileBytes.size(), outModule, parseErrors))
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Error parsing WebAssembly text file:\n");
reportParseErrors(filename, parseErrors);
return false;
}
return true;
}
} | 226,446,143,927,897,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2018-17292 | An issue was discovered in WAVM before 2018-09-16. The loadModule function in Include/Inline/CLI.h lacks checking of the file length before a file magic comparison, allowing attackers to cause a Denial of Service (application crash caused by out-of-bounds read) by crafting a file that has fewer than 4 bytes. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17292 |
217,220 | WAVM | 31d670b6489e6d708c3b04b911cdf14ac43d846d | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM/commit/31d670b6489e6d708c3b04b911cdf14ac43d846d | Fix dereferencing null pointer when running wavm with WebAssembly main function that takes command-line arguments but no Emscripten memory to write them to | 1 | static int run(const CommandLineOptions& options)
{
IR::Module irModule;
// Load the module.
if(!loadModule(options.filename, irModule)) { return EXIT_FAILURE; }
if(options.onlyCheck) { return EXIT_SUCCESS; }
// Compile the module.
Runtime::Module* module = nullptr;
if(!options.precompiled) { module = Runtime::compileModule(irModule); }
else
{
const UserSection* precompiledObjectSection = nullptr;
for(const UserSection& userSection : irModule.userSections)
{
if(userSection.name == "wavm.precompiled_object")
{
precompiledObjectSection = &userSection;
break;
}
}
if(!precompiledObjectSection)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Input file did not contain 'wavm.precompiled_object' section");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
else
{
module = Runtime::loadPrecompiledModule(irModule, precompiledObjectSection->data);
}
}
// Link the module with the intrinsic modules.
Compartment* compartment = Runtime::createCompartment();
Context* context = Runtime::createContext(compartment);
RootResolver rootResolver(compartment);
Emscripten::Instance* emscriptenInstance = nullptr;
if(options.enableEmscripten)
{
emscriptenInstance = Emscripten::instantiate(compartment, irModule);
if(emscriptenInstance)
{
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("env", emscriptenInstance->env);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("asm2wasm", emscriptenInstance->asm2wasm);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("global", emscriptenInstance->global);
}
}
if(options.enableThreadTest)
{
ModuleInstance* threadTestInstance = ThreadTest::instantiate(compartment);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("threadTest", threadTestInstance);
}
LinkResult linkResult = linkModule(irModule, rootResolver);
if(!linkResult.success)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Failed to link module:\n");
for(auto& missingImport : linkResult.missingImports)
{
Log::printf(Log::error,
"Missing import: module=\"%s\" export=\"%s\" type=\"%s\"\n",
missingImport.moduleName.c_str(),
missingImport.exportName.c_str(),
asString(missingImport.type).c_str());
}
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
// Instantiate the module.
ModuleInstance* moduleInstance = instantiateModule(
compartment, module, std::move(linkResult.resolvedImports), options.filename);
if(!moduleInstance) { return EXIT_FAILURE; }
// Call the module start function, if it has one.
FunctionInstance* startFunction = getStartFunction(moduleInstance);
if(startFunction) { invokeFunctionChecked(context, startFunction, {}); }
if(options.enableEmscripten)
{
// Call the Emscripten global initalizers.
Emscripten::initializeGlobals(context, irModule, moduleInstance);
}
// Look up the function export to call.
FunctionInstance* functionInstance;
if(!options.functionName)
{
functionInstance = asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, "main"));
if(!functionInstance)
{ functionInstance = asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, "_main")); }
if(!functionInstance)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Module does not export main function\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
else
{
functionInstance
= asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, options.functionName));
if(!functionInstance)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Module does not export '%s'\n", options.functionName);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
FunctionType functionType = getFunctionType(functionInstance);
// Set up the arguments for the invoke.
std::vector<Value> invokeArgs;
if(!options.functionName)
{
if(functionType.params().size() == 2)
{
MemoryInstance* defaultMemory = Runtime::getDefaultMemory(moduleInstance);
if(!defaultMemory)
{
Log::printf(
Log::error,
"Module does not declare a default memory object to put arguments in.\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
std::vector<const char*> argStrings;
argStrings.push_back(options.filename);
char** args = options.args;
while(*args) { argStrings.push_back(*args++); };
Emscripten::injectCommandArgs(emscriptenInstance, argStrings, invokeArgs);
}
else if(functionType.params().size() > 0)
{
Log::printf(Log::error,
"WebAssembly function requires %" PRIu64
" argument(s), but only 0 or 2 can be passed!",
functionType.params().size());
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
else
{
for(U32 i = 0; options.args[i]; ++i)
{
Value value;
switch(functionType.params()[i])
{
case ValueType::i32: value = (U32)atoi(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::i64: value = (U64)atol(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::f32: value = (F32)atof(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::f64: value = atof(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::v128:
case ValueType::anyref:
case ValueType::anyfunc:
Errors::fatalf("Cannot parse command-line argument for %s function parameter",
asString(functionType.params()[i]));
default: Errors::unreachable();
}
invokeArgs.push_back(value);
}
}
// Invoke the function.
Timing::Timer executionTimer;
IR::ValueTuple functionResults = invokeFunctionChecked(context, functionInstance, invokeArgs);
Timing::logTimer("Invoked function", executionTimer);
if(options.functionName)
{
Log::printf(Log::debug,
"%s returned: %s\n",
options.functionName,
asString(functionResults).c_str());
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
else if(functionResults.size() == 1 && functionResults[0].type == ValueType::i32)
{
return functionResults[0].i32;
}
else
{
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
} | 232,153,025,347,729,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2018-17293 | An issue was discovered in WAVM before 2018-09-16. The run function in Programs/wavm/wavm.cpp does not check whether there is Emscripten memory to store the command-line arguments passed by the input WebAssembly file's main function, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash by NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact by crafting certain WebAssembly files. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17293 |
519,050 | WAVM | 31d670b6489e6d708c3b04b911cdf14ac43d846d | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM | https://github.com/WAVM/WAVM/commit/31d670b6489e6d708c3b04b911cdf14ac43d846d | Fix dereferencing null pointer when running wavm with WebAssembly main function that takes command-line arguments but no Emscripten memory to write them to | 0 | static int run(const CommandLineOptions& options)
{
IR::Module irModule;
// Load the module.
if(!loadModule(options.filename, irModule)) { return EXIT_FAILURE; }
if(options.onlyCheck) { return EXIT_SUCCESS; }
// Compile the module.
Runtime::Module* module = nullptr;
if(!options.precompiled) { module = Runtime::compileModule(irModule); }
else
{
const UserSection* precompiledObjectSection = nullptr;
for(const UserSection& userSection : irModule.userSections)
{
if(userSection.name == "wavm.precompiled_object")
{
precompiledObjectSection = &userSection;
break;
}
}
if(!precompiledObjectSection)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Input file did not contain 'wavm.precompiled_object' section");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
else
{
module = Runtime::loadPrecompiledModule(irModule, precompiledObjectSection->data);
}
}
// Link the module with the intrinsic modules.
Compartment* compartment = Runtime::createCompartment();
Context* context = Runtime::createContext(compartment);
RootResolver rootResolver(compartment);
Emscripten::Instance* emscriptenInstance = nullptr;
if(options.enableEmscripten)
{
emscriptenInstance = Emscripten::instantiate(compartment, irModule);
if(emscriptenInstance)
{
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("env", emscriptenInstance->env);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("asm2wasm", emscriptenInstance->asm2wasm);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("global", emscriptenInstance->global);
}
}
if(options.enableThreadTest)
{
ModuleInstance* threadTestInstance = ThreadTest::instantiate(compartment);
rootResolver.moduleNameToInstanceMap.set("threadTest", threadTestInstance);
}
LinkResult linkResult = linkModule(irModule, rootResolver);
if(!linkResult.success)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Failed to link module:\n");
for(auto& missingImport : linkResult.missingImports)
{
Log::printf(Log::error,
"Missing import: module=\"%s\" export=\"%s\" type=\"%s\"\n",
missingImport.moduleName.c_str(),
missingImport.exportName.c_str(),
asString(missingImport.type).c_str());
}
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
// Instantiate the module.
ModuleInstance* moduleInstance = instantiateModule(
compartment, module, std::move(linkResult.resolvedImports), options.filename);
if(!moduleInstance) { return EXIT_FAILURE; }
// Call the module start function, if it has one.
FunctionInstance* startFunction = getStartFunction(moduleInstance);
if(startFunction) { invokeFunctionChecked(context, startFunction, {}); }
if(options.enableEmscripten)
{
// Call the Emscripten global initalizers.
Emscripten::initializeGlobals(context, irModule, moduleInstance);
}
// Look up the function export to call.
FunctionInstance* functionInstance;
if(!options.functionName)
{
functionInstance = asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, "main"));
if(!functionInstance)
{ functionInstance = asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, "_main")); }
if(!functionInstance)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Module does not export main function\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
else
{
functionInstance
= asFunctionNullable(getInstanceExport(moduleInstance, options.functionName));
if(!functionInstance)
{
Log::printf(Log::error, "Module does not export '%s'\n", options.functionName);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
FunctionType functionType = getFunctionType(functionInstance);
// Set up the arguments for the invoke.
std::vector<Value> invokeArgs;
if(!options.functionName)
{
if(functionType.params().size() == 2)
{
if(!emscriptenInstance)
{
Log::printf(
Log::error,
"Module does not declare a default memory object to put arguments in.\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
else
{
std::vector<const char*> argStrings;
argStrings.push_back(options.filename);
char** args = options.args;
while(*args) { argStrings.push_back(*args++); };
wavmAssert(emscriptenInstance);
Emscripten::injectCommandArgs(emscriptenInstance, argStrings, invokeArgs);
}
}
else if(functionType.params().size() > 0)
{
Log::printf(Log::error,
"WebAssembly function requires %" PRIu64
" argument(s), but only 0 or 2 can be passed!",
functionType.params().size());
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
else
{
for(U32 i = 0; options.args[i]; ++i)
{
Value value;
switch(functionType.params()[i])
{
case ValueType::i32: value = (U32)atoi(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::i64: value = (U64)atol(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::f32: value = (F32)atof(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::f64: value = atof(options.args[i]); break;
case ValueType::v128:
case ValueType::anyref:
case ValueType::anyfunc:
Errors::fatalf("Cannot parse command-line argument for %s function parameter",
asString(functionType.params()[i]));
default: Errors::unreachable();
}
invokeArgs.push_back(value);
}
}
// Invoke the function.
Timing::Timer executionTimer;
IR::ValueTuple functionResults = invokeFunctionChecked(context, functionInstance, invokeArgs);
Timing::logTimer("Invoked function", executionTimer);
if(options.functionName)
{
Log::printf(Log::debug,
"%s returned: %s\n",
options.functionName,
asString(functionResults).c_str());
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
else if(functionResults.size() == 1 && functionResults[0].type == ValueType::i32)
{
return functionResults[0].i32;
}
else
{
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
} | 71,582,623,173,496,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2018-17293 | An issue was discovered in WAVM before 2018-09-16. The run function in Programs/wavm/wavm.cpp does not check whether there is Emscripten memory to store the command-line arguments passed by the input WebAssembly file's main function, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash by NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact by crafting certain WebAssembly files. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17293 |
217,235 | abuild | 4f90ce92778d0ee302e288def75591b96a397c8b | https://github.com/sroracle/abuild | https://github.com/sroracle/abuild/commit/4f90ce92778d0ee302e288def75591b96a397c8b | abuild-sudo: don't allow --keys-dir
Not allowing --allow-untrusted is obviously a good idea, but it can be
trivially bypassed if --keys-dir is allowed:
$ abuild-apk add foo-1-r0.apk
ERROR: foo-1-r0.apk: UNTRUSTED signature
$ abuild-apk --allow-untrusted add foo-1-r0.apk
abuild-apk: --allow-untrusted: not allowed option
$ cp -rp /etc/apk/keys /tmp/keys
$ cp untrusted.pub /tmp/keys
$ abuild-apk --keys-dir /tmp/keys add foo-1-r0.apk
(1/1) Installing foo (1-r0)
OK: 4319 MiB in 806 packages
If both --allow-untrusted and --keys-dir are not allowed, then it should
no longer be possible for an unprivileged member of the abuild group to
add an untrusted package.
$ abuild-apk --keys-dir /tmp/keys add foo-1-r0.apk
abuild-apk: --keys-dir: not allowed option | 1 | int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
struct group *grent;
const char *cmd;
const char *path;
int i;
struct passwd *pw;
grent = getgrnam(ABUILD_GROUP);
if (grent == NULL)
errx(1, "%s: Group not found", ABUILD_GROUP);
char *name = NULL;
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (pw)
name = pw->pw_name;
if (!is_in_group(grent->gr_gid)) {
errx(1, "User %s is not a member of group %s\n",
name ? name : "(unknown)", ABUILD_GROUP);
}
if (name == NULL)
warnx("Could not find username for uid %d\n", getuid());
setenv("USER", name ?: "", 1);
cmd = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
if (cmd)
cmd++;
else
cmd = argv[0];
cmd = strchr(cmd, '-');
if (cmd == NULL)
errx(1, "Calling command has no '-'");
cmd++;
path = get_command_path(cmd);
if (path == NULL)
errx(1, "%s: Not a valid subcommand", cmd);
/* we dont allow --allow-untrusted option */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
if (strcmp(argv[i], "--allow-untrusted") == 0)
errx(1, "%s: not allowed option", "--allow-untrusted");
argv[0] = path;
/* set our uid to root so bbsuid --install works */
setuid(0);
/* set our gid to root so apk commit hooks run with the same gid as for "sudo apk add ..." */
setgid(0);
execv(path, (char * const*)argv);
perror(path);
return 1;
} | 246,817,719,144,674,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2019-12875 | Alpine Linux abuild through 3.4.0 allows an unprivileged member of the abuild group to add an untrusted package via a --keys-dir option that causes acceptance of an untrusted signing key. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12875 |
519,115 | abuild | 4f90ce92778d0ee302e288def75591b96a397c8b | https://github.com/sroracle/abuild | https://github.com/sroracle/abuild/commit/4f90ce92778d0ee302e288def75591b96a397c8b | abuild-sudo: don't allow --keys-dir
Not allowing --allow-untrusted is obviously a good idea, but it can be
trivially bypassed if --keys-dir is allowed:
$ abuild-apk add foo-1-r0.apk
ERROR: foo-1-r0.apk: UNTRUSTED signature
$ abuild-apk --allow-untrusted add foo-1-r0.apk
abuild-apk: --allow-untrusted: not allowed option
$ cp -rp /etc/apk/keys /tmp/keys
$ cp untrusted.pub /tmp/keys
$ abuild-apk --keys-dir /tmp/keys add foo-1-r0.apk
(1/1) Installing foo (1-r0)
OK: 4319 MiB in 806 packages
If both --allow-untrusted and --keys-dir are not allowed, then it should
no longer be possible for an unprivileged member of the abuild group to
add an untrusted package.
$ abuild-apk --keys-dir /tmp/keys add foo-1-r0.apk
abuild-apk: --keys-dir: not allowed option | 0 | int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
struct group *grent;
const char *cmd;
const char *path;
int i;
struct passwd *pw;
grent = getgrnam(ABUILD_GROUP);
if (grent == NULL)
errx(1, "%s: Group not found", ABUILD_GROUP);
char *name = NULL;
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (pw)
name = pw->pw_name;
if (!is_in_group(grent->gr_gid)) {
errx(1, "User %s is not a member of group %s\n",
name ? name : "(unknown)", ABUILD_GROUP);
}
if (name == NULL)
warnx("Could not find username for uid %d\n", getuid());
setenv("USER", name ?: "", 1);
cmd = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
if (cmd)
cmd++;
else
cmd = argv[0];
cmd = strchr(cmd, '-');
if (cmd == NULL)
errx(1, "Calling command has no '-'");
cmd++;
path = get_command_path(cmd);
if (path == NULL)
errx(1, "%s: Not a valid subcommand", cmd);
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
check_option(argv[i]);
argv[0] = path;
/* set our uid to root so bbsuid --install works */
setuid(0);
/* set our gid to root so apk commit hooks run with the same gid as for "sudo apk add ..." */
setgid(0);
execv(path, (char * const*)argv);
perror(path);
return 1;
} | 293,885,072,328,865,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2019-12875 | Alpine Linux abuild through 3.4.0 allows an unprivileged member of the abuild group to add an untrusted package via a --keys-dir option that causes acceptance of an untrusted signing key. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12875 |
217,243 | elog | 993bed4923c88593cc6b1186e0d1b9564994a25a | https://bitbucket.org/ritt/elog | https://bitbucket.org/ritt/elog/commits/993bed4923c88593cc6b1186e0d1b9564994a25a | Serve SVG files as attachments only to avoid XSS vulnerabilities | 1 | void send_file_direct(char *file_name) {
int fh, i, length, delta;
char str[MAX_PATH_LENGTH], dir[MAX_PATH_LENGTH], charset[80];
getcwd(dir, sizeof(dir));
fh = open(file_name, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
if (fh > 0) {
lseek(fh, 0, SEEK_END);
length = TELL(fh);
lseek(fh, 0, SEEK_SET);
rsprintf("HTTP/1.1 200 Document follows\r\n");
rsprintf("Server: ELOG HTTP %s-%s\r\n", VERSION, git_revision());
rsprintf("Accept-Ranges: bytes\r\n");
/* set expiration time to one day if no thumbnail */
if (isparam("thumb")) {
rsprintf("Pragma: no-cache\r\n");
rsprintf("Cache-control: private, max-age=0, no-cache, no-store\r\n");
} else {
rsprintf("Cache-control: public, max-age=86400\r\n");
}
if (keep_alive) {
rsprintf("Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n");
rsprintf("Keep-Alive: timeout=60, max=10\r\n");
}
/* return proper header for file type */
for (i = 0; i < (int) strlen(file_name); i++)
str[i] = toupper(file_name[i]);
str[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; filetype[i].ext[0]; i++)
if (chkext(str, filetype[i].ext))
break;
if (!getcfg("global", "charset", charset, sizeof(charset)))
strcpy(charset, DEFAULT_HTTP_CHARSET);
if (filetype[i].ext[0]) {
if (strncmp(filetype[i].type, "text", 4) == 0)
rsprintf("Content-Type: %s;charset=%s\r\n", filetype[i].type, charset);
else
rsprintf("Content-Type: %s\r\n", filetype[i].type);
} else if (is_ascii(file_name))
rsprintf("Content-Type: text/plain;charset=%s\r\n", charset);
else
rsprintf("Content-Type: application/octet-stream;charset=%s\r\n", charset);
rsprintf("Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n", length);
/* increase return buffer size if file too big */
if (length > return_buffer_size - (int) strlen(return_buffer)) {
delta = length - (return_buffer_size - strlen(return_buffer)) + 1000;
return_buffer = xrealloc(return_buffer, return_buffer_size + delta);
memset(return_buffer + return_buffer_size, 0, delta);
return_buffer_size += delta;
}
return_length = strlen(return_buffer) + length;
read(fh, return_buffer + strlen(return_buffer), length);
close(fh);
} else {
char encodedname[256];
show_html_header(NULL, FALSE, "404 Not Found", TRUE, FALSE, NULL, FALSE, 0);
rsprintf("<body><h1>Not Found</h1>\r\n");
rsprintf("The requested file <b>");
strencode2(encodedname, file_name, sizeof(encodedname));
if (strchr(file_name, DIR_SEPARATOR))
rsprintf("%s", encodedname);
else
rsprintf("%s%c%s", dir, DIR_SEPARATOR, encodedname);
rsprintf("</b> was not found on this server<p>\r\n");
rsprintf("<hr><address>ELOG version %s</address></body></html>\r\n\r\n", VERSION);
return_length = strlen_retbuf;
keep_alive = FALSE;
}
} | 336,698,074,074,745,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-79"
] | CVE-2019-20376 | A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Electronic Logbook (ELOG) 3.1.4 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted SVG document to elogd.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20376 |
519,320 | elog | 993bed4923c88593cc6b1186e0d1b9564994a25a | https://bitbucket.org/ritt/elog | https://bitbucket.org/ritt/elog/commits/993bed4923c88593cc6b1186e0d1b9564994a25a | Serve SVG files as attachments only to avoid XSS vulnerabilities | 0 | void send_file_direct(char *file_name) {
int fh, i, length, delta;
char str[MAX_PATH_LENGTH], dir[MAX_PATH_LENGTH], charset[80];
getcwd(dir, sizeof(dir));
fh = open(file_name, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
if (fh > 0) {
lseek(fh, 0, SEEK_END);
length = TELL(fh);
lseek(fh, 0, SEEK_SET);
rsprintf("HTTP/1.1 200 Document follows\r\n");
rsprintf("Server: ELOG HTTP %s-%s\r\n", VERSION, git_revision());
rsprintf("Accept-Ranges: bytes\r\n");
/* set expiration time to one day if no thumbnail */
if (isparam("thumb")) {
rsprintf("Pragma: no-cache\r\n");
rsprintf("Cache-control: private, max-age=0, no-cache, no-store\r\n");
} else {
rsprintf("Cache-control: public, max-age=86400\r\n");
}
if (keep_alive) {
rsprintf("Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n");
rsprintf("Keep-Alive: timeout=60, max=10\r\n");
}
/* return proper header for file type */
for (i = 0; i < (int) strlen(file_name); i++)
str[i] = toupper(file_name[i]);
str[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; filetype[i].ext[0]; i++)
if (chkext(str, filetype[i].ext))
break;
if (!getcfg("global", "charset", charset, sizeof(charset)))
strcpy(charset, DEFAULT_HTTP_CHARSET);
if (filetype[i].ext[0]) {
if (strncmp(filetype[i].type, "text", 4) == 0)
rsprintf("Content-Type: %s;charset=%s\r\n", filetype[i].type, charset);
else if (strcmp(filetype[i].ext, ".SVG") == 0) {
rsprintf("Content-Type: %s\r\n", filetype[i].type);
if (strrchr(file_name, '/'))
strlcpy(str, strrchr(file_name, '/')+1, sizeof(str));
else
strlcpy(str, file_name, sizeof(str));
if (str[6] == '_' && str[13] == '_')
rsprintf("Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"%s\"\r\n", str+14);
else
rsprintf("Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"%s\"\r\n", str);
} else
rsprintf("Content-Type: %s\r\n", filetype[i].type);
} else if (is_ascii(file_name))
rsprintf("Content-Type: text/plain;charset=%s\r\n", charset);
else
rsprintf("Content-Type: application/octet-stream;charset=%s\r\n", charset);
rsprintf("Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n", length);
/* increase return buffer size if file too big */
if (length > return_buffer_size - (int) strlen(return_buffer)) {
delta = length - (return_buffer_size - strlen(return_buffer)) + 1000;
return_buffer = xrealloc(return_buffer, return_buffer_size + delta);
memset(return_buffer + return_buffer_size, 0, delta);
return_buffer_size += delta;
}
return_length = strlen(return_buffer) + length;
read(fh, return_buffer + strlen(return_buffer), length);
close(fh);
} else {
char encodedname[256];
show_html_header(NULL, FALSE, "404 Not Found", TRUE, FALSE, NULL, FALSE, 0);
rsprintf("<body><h1>Not Found</h1>\r\n");
rsprintf("The requested file <b>");
strencode2(encodedname, file_name, sizeof(encodedname));
if (strchr(file_name, DIR_SEPARATOR))
rsprintf("%s", encodedname);
else
rsprintf("%s%c%s", dir, DIR_SEPARATOR, encodedname);
rsprintf("</b> was not found on this server<p>\r\n");
rsprintf("<hr><address>ELOG version %s</address></body></html>\r\n\r\n", VERSION);
return_length = strlen_retbuf;
keep_alive = FALSE;
}
} | 325,071,300,405,512,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-79"
] | CVE-2019-20376 | A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Electronic Logbook (ELOG) 3.1.4 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted SVG document to elogd.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20376 |
217,247 | naviserver | a5c3079f1d8996d5f34c9384a440acf3519ca3bb | https://bitbucket.org/naviserver/naviserver | https://bitbucket.org/naviserver/naviserver/commits/a5c3079f1d8996d5f34c9384a440acf3519ca3bb | fix for bug https://sourceforge.net/p/naviserver/bugs/89/
A negative value provided as chunk encoding length led to a potential crash.
A test case for this case was added to the regression test. | 1 | ChunkedDecode(Request *reqPtr, bool update)
{
const Tcl_DString *bufPtr;
const char *end, *chunkStart;
bool success = NS_TRUE;
NS_NONNULL_ASSERT(reqPtr != NULL);
bufPtr = &reqPtr->buffer;
end = bufPtr->string + bufPtr->length;
chunkStart = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkStartOff;
while (reqPtr->chunkStartOff < (size_t)bufPtr->length) {
char *p = strstr(chunkStart, "\r\n");
size_t chunk_length;
if (p == NULL) {
Ns_Log(DriverDebug, "ChunkedDecode: chunk did not find end-of-line");
success = NS_FALSE;
break;
}
*p = '\0';
chunk_length = (size_t)strtol(chunkStart, NULL, 16);
*p = '\r';
if (p + 2 + chunk_length > end) {
Ns_Log(DriverDebug, "ChunkedDecode: chunk length past end of buffer");
success = NS_FALSE;
break;
}
if (update) {
char *writeBuffer = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkWriteOff;
memmove(writeBuffer, p + 2, chunk_length);
reqPtr->chunkWriteOff += chunk_length;
*(writeBuffer + chunk_length) = '\0';
}
reqPtr->chunkStartOff += (size_t)(p - chunkStart) + 4u + chunk_length;
chunkStart = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkStartOff;
}
return success;
} | 210,559,204,718,292,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2020-13111 | NaviServer 4.99.4 to 4.99.19 allows denial of service due to the nsd/driver.c ChunkedDecode function not properly validating the length of a chunk. A remote attacker can craft a chunked-transfer request that will result in a negative value being passed to memmove via the size parameter, causing the process to crash. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13111 |
519,503 | naviserver | a5c3079f1d8996d5f34c9384a440acf3519ca3bb | https://bitbucket.org/naviserver/naviserver | https://bitbucket.org/naviserver/naviserver/commits/a5c3079f1d8996d5f34c9384a440acf3519ca3bb | fix for bug https://sourceforge.net/p/naviserver/bugs/89/
A negative value provided as chunk encoding length led to a potential crash.
A test case for this case was added to the regression test. | 0 | ChunkedDecode(Request *reqPtr, bool update)
{
const Tcl_DString *bufPtr;
const char *end, *chunkStart;
SockState result = SOCK_READY;
NS_NONNULL_ASSERT(reqPtr != NULL);
bufPtr = &reqPtr->buffer;
end = bufPtr->string + bufPtr->length;
chunkStart = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkStartOff;
while (reqPtr->chunkStartOff < (size_t)bufPtr->length) {
char *p = strstr(chunkStart, "\r\n");
long chunkLength;
if (p == NULL) {
Ns_Log(DriverDebug, "ChunkedDecode: chunk did not find end-of-line");
result = SOCK_MORE;
break;
}
*p = '\0';
chunkLength = strtol(chunkStart, NULL, 16);
*p = '\r';
if (chunkLength < 0) {
Ns_Log(Warning, "ChunkedDecode: negative chunk length");
result = SOCK_BADREQUEST;
break;
}
*p = '\r';
if (p + 2 + chunkLength > end) {
Ns_Log(DriverDebug, "ChunkedDecode: chunk length past end of buffer");
result = SOCK_MORE;
break;
}
if (update) {
char *writeBuffer = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkWriteOff;
memmove(writeBuffer, p + 2, (size_t)chunkLength);
reqPtr->chunkWriteOff += (size_t)chunkLength;
*(writeBuffer + chunkLength) = '\0';
}
reqPtr->chunkStartOff += (size_t)(p - chunkStart) + 4u + (size_t)chunkLength;
chunkStart = bufPtr->string + reqPtr->chunkStartOff;
}
return result;
} | 52,143,067,939,071,995,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2020-13111 | NaviServer 4.99.4 to 4.99.19 allows denial of service due to the nsd/driver.c ChunkedDecode function not properly validating the length of a chunk. A remote attacker can craft a chunked-transfer request that will result in a negative value being passed to memmove via the size parameter, causing the process to crash. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13111 |
217,250 | cbang | 1c1dba62bd3e6fa9d0d0c0aa21926043b75382c7 | https://github.com/CauldronDevelopmentLLC/cbang | https://github.com/CauldronDevelopmentLLC/cbang/commit/1c1dba62bd3e6fa9d0d0c0aa21926043b75382c7 | Don't allow extraction of tar files outside of the target directory, added tar tests | 1 | std::string TarFileReader::extract(const string &_path) {
if (_path.empty()) THROW("path cannot be empty");
if (!hasMore()) THROW("No more tar files");
string path = _path;
if (SystemUtilities::isDirectory(path)) path += "/" + getFilename();
LOG_DEBUG(5, "Extracting: " << path);
return extract(*SystemUtilities::oopen(path));
} | 230,347,907,451,407,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-22"
] | CVE-2020-15908 | tar/TarFileReader.cpp in Cauldron cbang (aka C-Bang or C!) before 1.6.0 allows Directory Traversal during extraction from a TAR archive. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15908 |
519,599 | cbang | 1c1dba62bd3e6fa9d0d0c0aa21926043b75382c7 | https://github.com/CauldronDevelopmentLLC/cbang | https://github.com/CauldronDevelopmentLLC/cbang/commit/1c1dba62bd3e6fa9d0d0c0aa21926043b75382c7 | Don't allow extraction of tar files outside of the target directory, added tar tests | 0 | std::string TarFileReader::extract(const string &_path) {
if (_path.empty()) THROW("path cannot be empty");
if (!hasMore()) THROW("No more tar files");
string path = _path;
if (SystemUtilities::isDirectory(path)) {
path += "/" + getFilename();
// Check that path is under the target directory
string a = SystemUtilities::getCanonicalPath(_path);
string b = SystemUtilities::getCanonicalPath(path);
if (!String::startsWith(b, a))
THROW("Tar path points outside of the extraction directory: " << path);
}
LOG_DEBUG(5, "Extracting: " << path);
switch (getType()) {
case NORMAL_FILE: case CONTIGUOUS_FILE:
return extract(*SystemUtilities::oopen(path));
case DIRECTORY: SystemUtilities::ensureDirectory(path); break;
default: THROW("Unsupported tar file type " << getType());
}
return getFilename();
} | 313,067,532,887,911,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-22"
] | CVE-2020-15908 | tar/TarFileReader.cpp in Cauldron cbang (aka C-Bang or C!) before 1.6.0 allows Directory Traversal during extraction from a TAR archive. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15908 |
217,251 | pdf2json | 80bf71f16c804108fd933e267fe31692aaa509b4 | https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json | https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/commit/80bf71f16c804108fd933e267fe31692aaa509b4 | Fix for heap vulnerability | 1 | void CharCodeToUnicode::addMapping(CharCode code, char *uStr, int n,
int offset) {
CharCode oldLen, i;
Unicode u;
char uHex[5];
int j;
if (code >= mapLen) {
oldLen = mapLen;
mapLen = (code + 256) & ~255;
map = (Unicode *)greallocn(map, mapLen, sizeof(Unicode));
for (i = oldLen; i < mapLen; ++i) {
map[i] = 0;
}
}
if (n <= 4) {
if (sscanf(uStr, "%x", &u) != 1) {
error(-1, "Illegal entry in ToUnicode CMap");
return;
}
map[code] = u + offset;
} else {
if (sMapLen >= sMapSize) {
sMapSize = sMapSize + 16;
sMap = (CharCodeToUnicodeString *)
greallocn(sMap, sMapSize, sizeof(CharCodeToUnicodeString));
}
map[code] = 0;
sMap[sMapLen].c = code;
sMap[sMapLen].len = n / 4;
for (j = 0; j < sMap[sMapLen].len && j < maxUnicodeString; ++j) {
strncpy(uHex, uStr + j*4, 4);
uHex[4] = '\0';
if (sscanf(uHex, "%x", &sMap[sMapLen].u[j]) != 1) {
error(-1, "Illegal entry in ToUnicode CMap");
}
}
sMap[sMapLen].u[sMap[sMapLen].len - 1] += offset;
++sMapLen;
}
} | 19,626,458,378,996,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-18750 | Buffer overflow in pdf2json 0.69 allows local users to execute arbitrary code by converting a crafted PDF file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-18750 |
519,625 | pdf2json | 80bf71f16c804108fd933e267fe31692aaa509b4 | https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json | https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/commit/80bf71f16c804108fd933e267fe31692aaa509b4 | Fix for heap vulnerability | 0 | void CharCodeToUnicode::addMapping(CharCode code, char *uStr, int n,
int offset) {
CharCode oldLen, i;
Unicode u;
char uHex[5];
int j;
if (code >= mapLen) {
oldLen = mapLen;
mapLen = (code + 256) & ~255;
if (unlikely(code >= mapLen)) {
error(-1, "Illegal code value in CharCodeToUnicode::addMapping");
return;
} else {
map = (Unicode *)greallocn(map, mapLen, sizeof(Unicode));
for (i = oldLen; i < mapLen; ++i) {
map[i] = 0;
}
}
}
if (n <= 4) {
if (sscanf(uStr, "%x", &u) != 1) {
error(-1, "Illegal entry in ToUnicode CMap");
return;
}
map[code] = u + offset;
} else {
if (sMapLen >= sMapSize) {
sMapSize = sMapSize + 16;
sMap = (CharCodeToUnicodeString *)
greallocn(sMap, sMapSize, sizeof(CharCodeToUnicodeString));
}
map[code] = 0;
sMap[sMapLen].c = code;
sMap[sMapLen].len = n / 4;
for (j = 0; j < sMap[sMapLen].len && j < maxUnicodeString; ++j) {
strncpy(uHex, uStr + j*4, 4);
uHex[4] = '\0';
if (sscanf(uHex, "%x", &sMap[sMapLen].u[j]) != 1) {
error(-1, "Illegal entry in ToUnicode CMap");
}
}
sMap[sMapLen].u[sMap[sMapLen].len - 1] += offset;
++sMapLen;
}
} | 86,424,053,612,770,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-18750 | Buffer overflow in pdf2json 0.69 allows local users to execute arbitrary code by converting a crafted PDF file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-18750 |
217,252 | Platinum | 9a4ceaccb1585ec35c45fd8e2585538fff6a865e | https://github.com/plutinosoft/Platinum | https://github.com/plutinosoft/Platinum/commit/9a4ceaccb1585ec35c45fd8e2585538fff6a865e | Fix vulnerability around urls crafter as http://host/../secret.foo (#24) | 1 | PLT_HttpServer::ServeFile(const NPT_HttpRequest& request,
const NPT_HttpRequestContext& context,
NPT_HttpResponse& response,
NPT_String file_path)
{
NPT_InputStreamReference stream;
NPT_File file(file_path);
NPT_FileInfo file_info;
// prevent hackers from accessing files outside of our root
if ((file_path.Find("/..") >= 0) || (file_path.Find("\\..") >= 0) ||
NPT_FAILED(NPT_File::GetInfo(file_path, &file_info))) {
return NPT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_ITEM;
}
// check for range requests
const NPT_String* range_spec = request.GetHeaders().GetHeaderValue(NPT_HTTP_HEADER_RANGE);
// handle potential 304 only if range header not set
NPT_DateTime date;
NPT_TimeStamp timestamp;
if (NPT_SUCCEEDED(PLT_UPnPMessageHelper::GetIfModifiedSince((NPT_HttpMessage&)request, date)) &&
!range_spec) {
date.ToTimeStamp(timestamp);
NPT_LOG_INFO_5("File %s timestamps: request=%d (%s) vs file=%d (%s)",
(const char*)request.GetUrl().GetPath(),
(NPT_UInt32)timestamp.ToSeconds(),
(const char*)date.ToString(),
(NPT_UInt32)file_info.m_ModificationTime,
(const char*)NPT_DateTime(file_info.m_ModificationTime).ToString());
if (timestamp >= file_info.m_ModificationTime) {
// it's a match
NPT_LOG_FINE_1("Returning 304 for %s", request.GetUrl().GetPath().GetChars());
response.SetStatus(304, "Not Modified", NPT_HTTP_PROTOCOL_1_1);
return NPT_SUCCESS;
}
}
// open file
if (NPT_FAILED(file.Open(NPT_FILE_OPEN_MODE_READ)) ||
NPT_FAILED(file.GetInputStream(stream)) ||
stream.IsNull()) {
return NPT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_ITEM;
}
// set Last-Modified and Cache-Control headers
if (file_info.m_ModificationTime) {
NPT_DateTime last_modified = NPT_DateTime(file_info.m_ModificationTime);
response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Last-Modified", last_modified.ToString(NPT_DateTime::FORMAT_RFC_1123), true);
response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=0,must-revalidate", true);
//response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=1800", true);
}
PLT_HttpRequestContext tmp_context(request, context);
return ServeStream(request, context, response, stream, PLT_MimeType::GetMimeType(file_path, &tmp_context));
} | 80,959,503,616,478,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-22"
] | CVE-2020-19858 | Platinum Upnp SDK through 1.2.0 has a directory traversal vulnerability. The attack could remote attack victim by sending http://ip:port/../privacy.avi URL to compromise a victim's privacy. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-19858 |
519,628 | Platinum | 9a4ceaccb1585ec35c45fd8e2585538fff6a865e | https://github.com/plutinosoft/Platinum | https://github.com/plutinosoft/Platinum/commit/9a4ceaccb1585ec35c45fd8e2585538fff6a865e | Fix vulnerability around urls crafter as http://host/../secret.foo (#24) | 0 | PLT_HttpServer::ServeFile(const NPT_HttpRequest& request,
const NPT_HttpRequestContext& context,
NPT_HttpResponse& response,
NPT_String file_path)
{
NPT_InputStreamReference stream;
NPT_File file(file_path);
NPT_FileInfo file_info;
// prevent hackers from accessing files outside of our root
if ((file_path.Find("../") >= 0) || (file_path.Find("..\\") >= 0) ||
NPT_FAILED(NPT_File::GetInfo(file_path, &file_info))) {
return NPT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_ITEM;
}
// check for range requests
const NPT_String* range_spec = request.GetHeaders().GetHeaderValue(NPT_HTTP_HEADER_RANGE);
// handle potential 304 only if range header not set
NPT_DateTime date;
NPT_TimeStamp timestamp;
if (NPT_SUCCEEDED(PLT_UPnPMessageHelper::GetIfModifiedSince((NPT_HttpMessage&)request, date)) &&
!range_spec) {
date.ToTimeStamp(timestamp);
NPT_LOG_INFO_5("File %s timestamps: request=%d (%s) vs file=%d (%s)",
(const char*)request.GetUrl().GetPath(),
(NPT_UInt32)timestamp.ToSeconds(),
(const char*)date.ToString(),
(NPT_UInt32)file_info.m_ModificationTime,
(const char*)NPT_DateTime(file_info.m_ModificationTime).ToString());
if (timestamp >= file_info.m_ModificationTime) {
// it's a match
NPT_LOG_FINE_1("Returning 304 for %s", request.GetUrl().GetPath().GetChars());
response.SetStatus(304, "Not Modified", NPT_HTTP_PROTOCOL_1_1);
return NPT_SUCCESS;
}
}
// open file
if (NPT_FAILED(file.Open(NPT_FILE_OPEN_MODE_READ)) ||
NPT_FAILED(file.GetInputStream(stream)) ||
stream.IsNull()) {
return NPT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_ITEM;
}
// set Last-Modified and Cache-Control headers
if (file_info.m_ModificationTime) {
NPT_DateTime last_modified = NPT_DateTime(file_info.m_ModificationTime);
response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Last-Modified", last_modified.ToString(NPT_DateTime::FORMAT_RFC_1123), true);
response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=0,must-revalidate", true);
//response.GetHeaders().SetHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=1800", true);
}
PLT_HttpRequestContext tmp_context(request, context);
return ServeStream(request, context, response, stream, PLT_MimeType::GetMimeType(file_path, &tmp_context));
} | 202,319,851,150,031,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-22"
] | CVE-2020-19858 | Platinum Upnp SDK through 1.2.0 has a directory traversal vulnerability. The attack could remote attack victim by sending http://ip:port/../privacy.avi URL to compromise a victim's privacy. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-19858 |
217,285 | jsish | 430ea27accd4d4ffddc946c9402e7c9064835a18 | https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish | https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/430ea27accd4d4ffddc946c9402e7c9064835a18 | Release "3.0.7": Fix toPrecision bug "stack overflow #4".
FossilOrigin-Name: 6c7f0c37027d7f890b57cb38f776af39b8f81f03e60ceeb0a231a1d21e24b5de | 1 | static Jsi_RC NumberToPrecisionCmd(Jsi_Interp *interp, Jsi_Value *args, Jsi_Value *_this,
Jsi_Value **ret, Jsi_Func *funcPtr)
{
char buf[100];
int prec = 0, skip = 0;
Jsi_Number num;
Jsi_Value *v;
ChkStringN(_this, funcPtr, v);
if (Jsi_GetIntFromValue(interp, Jsi_ValueArrayIndex(interp, args, skip), &prec) != JSI_OK)
return JSI_ERROR;
if (prec<=0) return JSI_ERROR;
Jsi_GetDoubleFromValue(interp, v, &num);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%.*" JSI_NUMFFMT, prec, num);
if (num<0)
prec++;
buf[prec+1] = 0;
if (buf[prec] == '.')
buf[prec] = 0;
Jsi_ValueMakeStringDup(interp, ret, buf);
return JSI_OK;
} | 25,461,200,118,267,773,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-22873 | Buffer overflow vulnerability in function NumberToPrecisionCmd in jsish before 3.0.7, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-22873 |
520,296 | jsish | 430ea27accd4d4ffddc946c9402e7c9064835a18 | https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish | https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/430ea27accd4d4ffddc946c9402e7c9064835a18 | Release "3.0.7": Fix toPrecision bug "stack overflow #4".
FossilOrigin-Name: 6c7f0c37027d7f890b57cb38f776af39b8f81f03e60ceeb0a231a1d21e24b5de | 0 | static Jsi_RC NumberToPrecisionCmd(Jsi_Interp *interp, Jsi_Value *args, Jsi_Value *_this,
Jsi_Value **ret, Jsi_Func *funcPtr)
{
char buf[JSI_MAX_NUMBER_STRING*2];
int prec = 0, skip = 0;
Jsi_Number num;
Jsi_Value *v;
ChkStringN(_this, funcPtr, v);
if (Jsi_GetIntFromValue(interp, Jsi_ValueArrayIndex(interp, args, skip), &prec) != JSI_OK)
return JSI_ERROR;
if (prec<=0 || prec>JSI_MAX_NUMBER_STRING) return Jsi_LogError("precision must be between 1 and %d", JSI_MAX_NUMBER_STRING);
Jsi_GetDoubleFromValue(interp, v, &num);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%.*" JSI_NUMFFMT, prec, num);
if (num<0)
prec++;
buf[prec+1] = 0;
if (buf[prec] == '.')
buf[prec] = 0;
Jsi_ValueMakeStringDup(interp, ret, buf);
return JSI_OK;
} | 176,441,123,893,071,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-120"
] | CVE-2020-22873 | Buffer overflow vulnerability in function NumberToPrecisionCmd in jsish before 3.0.7, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-22873 |
217,327 | retdec | 517298bafaaff0a8e3dd60dd055a67c41b545807 | https://github.com/avast/retdec | https://github.com/avast/retdec/commit/517298bafaaff0a8e3dd60dd055a67c41b545807 | Try to fix issue #637
Reference: https://github.com/avast/retdec/issues/637 | 1 | bool Decoder::canSplitFunctionOn(
utils::Address addr,
llvm::BasicBlock* splitBb,
std::set<llvm::BasicBlock*>& newFncStarts)
{
newFncStarts.insert(splitBb);
auto* f = splitBb->getParent();
auto fAddr = getFunctionAddress(f);
auto fSzIt = _fnc2sz.find(f);
if (fSzIt != _fnc2sz.end())
{
if (fAddr <= addr && addr < (fAddr+fSzIt->second))
{
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "!CAN S: addr cond @ " << addr << std::endl;
return false;
}
}
std::set<Address> fncStarts;
fncStarts.insert(fAddr);
fncStarts.insert(addr);
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << fAddr << std::endl;
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << addr << std::endl;
bool changed = true;
while (changed)
{
changed = false;
for (BasicBlock& b : *f)
{
// Address bAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(&b);
Address bAddr;
// TODO: shitty
BasicBlock* bPrev = &b;
while (bAddr.isUndefined() && bPrev)
{
bAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(bPrev);
bPrev = bPrev->getPrevNode();
}
if (bAddr.isUndefined())
{
continue;
}
auto up = fncStarts.upper_bound(bAddr);
--up;
Address bFnc = *up;
for (auto* p : predecessors(&b))
{
// Address pAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(p);
Address pAddr;
// TODO: shitty
BasicBlock* pPrev = p;
while (pAddr.isUndefined() && pPrev)
{
pAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(pPrev);
pPrev = pPrev->getPrevNode();
}
if (pAddr.isUndefined())
{
continue;
}
auto up = fncStarts.upper_bound(pAddr);
--up;
Address pFnc = *up;
if (bFnc != pFnc)
{
if (!canSplitFunctionOn(&b))
{
return false;
}
changed |= newFncStarts.insert(&b).second;
changed |= fncStarts.insert(bAddr).second;
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << bAddr << std::endl;
}
}
}
}
return true;
} | 251,333,548,688,546,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2020-23907 | An issue was discovered in retdec v3.3. In function canSplitFunctionOn() of ir_modifications.cpp, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a heap buffer overflow. The impact is: Deny of Service, Memory Disclosure, and Possible Code Execution. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-23907 |
520,976 | retdec | 517298bafaaff0a8e3dd60dd055a67c41b545807 | https://github.com/avast/retdec | https://github.com/avast/retdec/commit/517298bafaaff0a8e3dd60dd055a67c41b545807 | Try to fix issue #637
Reference: https://github.com/avast/retdec/issues/637 | 0 | bool Decoder::canSplitFunctionOn(
utils::Address addr,
llvm::BasicBlock* splitBb,
std::set<llvm::BasicBlock*>& newFncStarts)
{
newFncStarts.insert(splitBb);
auto* f = splitBb->getParent();
auto fAddr = getFunctionAddress(f);
auto fSzIt = _fnc2sz.find(f);
if (fSzIt != _fnc2sz.end())
{
if (fAddr <= addr && addr < (fAddr+fSzIt->second))
{
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "!CAN S: addr cond @ " << addr << std::endl;
return false;
}
}
std::set<Address> fncStarts;
fncStarts.insert(fAddr);
fncStarts.insert(addr);
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << fAddr << std::endl;
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << addr << std::endl;
bool changed = true;
while (changed)
{
changed = false;
for (BasicBlock& b : *f)
{
// Address bAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(&b);
Address bAddr;
// TODO: shitty
BasicBlock* bPrev = &b;
while (bAddr.isUndefined() && bPrev)
{
bAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(bPrev);
bPrev = bPrev->getPrevNode();
}
if (bAddr.isUndefined())
{
continue;
}
auto up = fncStarts.upper_bound(bAddr);
if (up == fncStarts.begin()) {
return false;
}
--up;
Address bFnc = *up;
for (auto* p : predecessors(&b))
{
// Address pAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(p);
Address pAddr;
// TODO: shitty
BasicBlock* pPrev = p;
while (pAddr.isUndefined() && pPrev)
{
pAddr = getBasicBlockAddress(pPrev);
pPrev = pPrev->getPrevNode();
}
if (pAddr.isUndefined())
{
continue;
}
auto up = fncStarts.upper_bound(pAddr);
if (up == fncStarts.begin()) {
return false;
}
--up;
Address pFnc = *up;
if (bFnc != pFnc)
{
if (!canSplitFunctionOn(&b))
{
return false;
}
changed |= newFncStarts.insert(&b).second;
changed |= fncStarts.insert(bAddr).second;
LOG << "\t\t\t\t\t" << "CAN S: split @ " << bAddr << std::endl;
}
}
}
}
return true;
} | 52,757,457,497,306,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2020-23907 | An issue was discovered in retdec v3.3. In function canSplitFunctionOn() of ir_modifications.cpp, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a heap buffer overflow. The impact is: Deny of Service, Memory Disclosure, and Possible Code Execution. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-23907 |
217,328 | oocborrt | 539851c66778f68a244633985f6f8d0df94ea3b3 | https://github.com/objsys/oocborrt | https://github.com/objsys/oocborrt/commit/539851c66778f68a244633985f6f8d0df94ea3b3 | fixed missing return status test error | 1 | static int cbor2json (OSCTXT* pCborCtxt, OSCTXT* pJsonCtxt)
{
int ret = 0;
OSOCTET tag, ub;
/* Read byte from stream */
ret = rtxReadBytes (pCborCtxt, &ub, 1);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
tag = ub >> 5;
/* Switch on tag value */
switch (tag) {
case OSRTCBOR_UINT: {
OSUINTTYPE value;
ret = rtCborDecUInt (pCborCtxt, ub, &value);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
#ifndef _NO_INT64_SUPPORT
ret = rtJsonEncUInt64Value (pJsonCtxt, value);
#else
ret = rtJsonEncUIntValue (pJsonCtxt, value);
#endif
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_NEGINT: {
OSINTTYPE value;
ret = rtCborDecInt (pCborCtxt, ub, &value);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
#ifndef _NO_INT64_SUPPORT
ret = rtJsonEncInt64Value (pJsonCtxt, value);
#else
ret = rtJsonEncIntValue (pJsonCtxt, value);
#endif
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_BYTESTR: {
OSDynOctStr64 byteStr;
ret = rtCborDecDynByteStr (pCborCtxt, ub, &byteStr);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
ret = rtJsonEncHexStr (pJsonCtxt, byteStr.numocts, byteStr.data);
rtxMemFreePtr (pCborCtxt, byteStr.data);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_UTF8STR: {
OSUTF8CHAR* utf8str;
ret = rtCborDecDynUTF8Str (pCborCtxt, ub, (char**)&utf8str);
ret = rtJsonEncStringValue (pJsonCtxt, utf8str);
rtxMemFreePtr (pCborCtxt, utf8str);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_ARRAY:
case OSRTCBOR_MAP: {
OSOCTET len = ub & 0x1F;
char startChar = (tag == OSRTCBOR_ARRAY) ? '[' : '{';
char endChar = (tag == OSRTCBOR_ARRAY) ? ']' : '}';
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, startChar);
if (len == OSRTCBOR_INDEF) {
OSBOOL first = TRUE;
for (;;) {
if (OSRTCBOR_MATCHEOC (pCborCtxt)) {
pCborCtxt->buffer.byteIndex++;
break;
}
if (!first)
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, ',');
else
first = FALSE;
/* If map, decode object name */
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_MAP) {
ret = cborElemNameToJson (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
}
/* Make recursive call */
if (0 == ret)
ret = cbor2json (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
if (0 != ret) {
OSCTXT* pctxt =
(rtxErrGetErrorCnt(pJsonCtxt) > 0) ? pJsonCtxt : pCborCtxt;
return LOG_RTERR (pctxt, ret);
}
}
}
else { /* definite length */
OSSIZE nitems;
/* Decode tag and number of items */
ret = rtCborDecSize (pCborCtxt, len, &nitems);
if (0 == ret) {
OSSIZE i;
/* Loop to decode array items */
for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++) {
if (0 != i) OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, ',');
/* If map, decode object name */
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_MAP) {
ret = cborElemNameToJson (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
}
/* Make recursive call */
if (0 == ret)
ret = cbor2json (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
if (0 != ret) {
OSCTXT* pctxt =
(rtxErrGetErrorCnt(pJsonCtxt) > 0) ? pJsonCtxt : pCborCtxt;
return LOG_RTERR (pctxt, ret);
}
}
}
}
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, endChar);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_FLOAT:
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_FALSEENC || tag == OSRTCBOR_TRUEENC) {
OSBOOL boolval = (ub == OSRTCBOR_TRUEENC) ? TRUE : FALSE;
ret = rtJsonEncBoolValue (pJsonCtxt, boolval);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
}
else if (tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT16ENC ||
tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT32ENC ||
tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT64ENC) {
OSDOUBLE fltval;
ret = rtCborDecFloat (pCborCtxt, ub, &fltval);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
ret = rtJsonEncDoubleValue (pJsonCtxt, fltval, 0);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
}
else {
ret = cborTagNotSupp (pCborCtxt, tag);
}
break;
default:
ret = cborTagNotSupp (pCborCtxt, tag);
}
return ret;
}
| 127,504,669,515,341,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2020-24753 | A memory corruption vulnerability in Objective Open CBOR Run-time (oocborrt) in versions before 2020-08-12 could allow an attacker to execute code via crafted Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) input to the cbor2json decoder. An uncaught error while decoding CBOR Major Type 3 text strings leads to the use of an attacker-controllable uninitialized stack value. This can be used to modify memory, causing a crash or potentially exploitable heap corruption. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24753 |
520,982 | oocborrt | 539851c66778f68a244633985f6f8d0df94ea3b3 | https://github.com/objsys/oocborrt | https://github.com/objsys/oocborrt/commit/539851c66778f68a244633985f6f8d0df94ea3b3 | fixed missing return status test error | 0 | static int cbor2json (OSCTXT* pCborCtxt, OSCTXT* pJsonCtxt)
{
int ret = 0;
OSOCTET tag, ub;
/* Read byte from stream */
ret = rtxReadBytes (pCborCtxt, &ub, 1);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
tag = ub >> 5;
/* Switch on tag value */
switch (tag) {
case OSRTCBOR_UINT: {
OSUINTTYPE value;
ret = rtCborDecUInt (pCborCtxt, ub, &value);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
#ifndef _NO_INT64_SUPPORT
ret = rtJsonEncUInt64Value (pJsonCtxt, value);
#else
ret = rtJsonEncUIntValue (pJsonCtxt, value);
#endif
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_NEGINT: {
OSINTTYPE value;
ret = rtCborDecInt (pCborCtxt, ub, &value);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
#ifndef _NO_INT64_SUPPORT
ret = rtJsonEncInt64Value (pJsonCtxt, value);
#else
ret = rtJsonEncIntValue (pJsonCtxt, value);
#endif
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_BYTESTR: {
OSDynOctStr64 byteStr;
ret = rtCborDecDynByteStr (pCborCtxt, ub, &byteStr);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
ret = rtJsonEncHexStr (pJsonCtxt, byteStr.numocts, byteStr.data);
rtxMemFreePtr (pCborCtxt, byteStr.data);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_UTF8STR: {
OSUTF8CHAR* utf8str;
ret = rtCborDecDynUTF8Str (pCborCtxt, ub, (char**)&utf8str);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
ret = rtJsonEncStringValue (pJsonCtxt, utf8str);
rtxMemFreePtr (pCborCtxt, utf8str);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_ARRAY:
case OSRTCBOR_MAP: {
OSOCTET len = ub & 0x1F;
char startChar = (tag == OSRTCBOR_ARRAY) ? '[' : '{';
char endChar = (tag == OSRTCBOR_ARRAY) ? ']' : '}';
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, startChar);
if (len == OSRTCBOR_INDEF) {
OSBOOL first = TRUE;
for (;;) {
if (OSRTCBOR_MATCHEOC (pCborCtxt)) {
pCborCtxt->buffer.byteIndex++;
break;
}
if (!first)
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, ',');
else
first = FALSE;
/* If map, decode object name */
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_MAP) {
ret = cborElemNameToJson (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
}
/* Make recursive call */
if (0 == ret)
ret = cbor2json (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
if (0 != ret) {
OSCTXT* pctxt =
(rtxErrGetErrorCnt(pJsonCtxt) > 0) ? pJsonCtxt : pCborCtxt;
return LOG_RTERR (pctxt, ret);
}
}
}
else { /* definite length */
OSSIZE nitems;
/* Decode tag and number of items */
ret = rtCborDecSize (pCborCtxt, len, &nitems);
if (0 == ret) {
OSSIZE i;
/* Loop to decode array items */
for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++) {
if (0 != i) OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, ',');
/* If map, decode object name */
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_MAP) {
ret = cborElemNameToJson (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
}
/* Make recursive call */
if (0 == ret)
ret = cbor2json (pCborCtxt, pJsonCtxt);
if (0 != ret) {
OSCTXT* pctxt =
(rtxErrGetErrorCnt(pJsonCtxt) > 0) ? pJsonCtxt : pCborCtxt;
return LOG_RTERR (pctxt, ret);
}
}
}
}
OSRTSAFEPUTCHAR (pJsonCtxt, endChar);
break;
}
case OSRTCBOR_FLOAT:
if (tag == OSRTCBOR_FALSEENC || tag == OSRTCBOR_TRUEENC) {
OSBOOL boolval = (ub == OSRTCBOR_TRUEENC) ? TRUE : FALSE;
ret = rtJsonEncBoolValue (pJsonCtxt, boolval);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
}
else if (tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT16ENC ||
tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT32ENC ||
tag == OSRTCBOR_FLT64ENC) {
OSDOUBLE fltval;
ret = rtCborDecFloat (pCborCtxt, ub, &fltval);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pCborCtxt, ret);
/* Encode JSON */
ret = rtJsonEncDoubleValue (pJsonCtxt, fltval, 0);
if (0 != ret) return LOG_RTERR (pJsonCtxt, ret);
}
else {
ret = cborTagNotSupp (pCborCtxt, tag);
}
break;
default:
ret = cborTagNotSupp (pCborCtxt, tag);
}
return ret;
}
| 182,192,642,033,756,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2020-24753 | A memory corruption vulnerability in Objective Open CBOR Run-time (oocborrt) in versions before 2020-08-12 could allow an attacker to execute code via crafted Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) input to the cbor2json decoder. An uncaught error while decoding CBOR Major Type 3 text strings leads to the use of an attacker-controllable uninitialized stack value. This can be used to modify memory, causing a crash or potentially exploitable heap corruption. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24753 |
217,461 | sqlcipher | cb71f53e8cea4802509f182fa5bead0ac6ab0e7f | https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher | https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher/commit/cb71f53e8cea4802509f182fa5bead0ac6ab0e7f | fix sqlcipher_export handling of NULL parameters | 1 | void sqlcipher_exportFunc(sqlite3_context *context, int argc, sqlite3_value **argv) {
sqlite3 *db = sqlite3_context_db_handle(context);
const char* targetDb, *sourceDb;
int targetDb_idx = 0;
u64 saved_flags = db->flags; /* Saved value of the db->flags */
u32 saved_mDbFlags = db->mDbFlags; /* Saved value of the db->mDbFlags */
int saved_nChange = db->nChange; /* Saved value of db->nChange */
int saved_nTotalChange = db->nTotalChange; /* Saved value of db->nTotalChange */
u8 saved_mTrace = db->mTrace; /* Saved value of db->mTrace */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Return code from service routines */
char *zSql = NULL; /* SQL statements */
char *pzErrMsg = NULL;
if(argc != 1 && argc != 2) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("invalid number of arguments (%d) passed to sqlcipher_export", argc);
goto end_of_export;
}
targetDb = (const char*) sqlite3_value_text(argv[0]);
sourceDb = (argc == 2) ? (char *) sqlite3_value_text(argv[1]) : "main";
/* if the name of the target is not main, but the index returned is zero
there is a mismatch and we should not proceed */
targetDb_idx = sqlcipher_find_db_index(db, targetDb);
if(targetDb_idx == 0 && sqlite3StrICmp("main", targetDb) != 0) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("unknown database %s", targetDb);
goto end_of_export;
}
db->init.iDb = targetDb_idx;
db->flags |= SQLITE_WriteSchema | SQLITE_IgnoreChecks;
db->mDbFlags |= DBFLAG_PreferBuiltin | DBFLAG_Vacuum;
db->flags &= ~(u64)(SQLITE_ForeignKeys | SQLITE_ReverseOrder | SQLITE_Defensive | SQLITE_CountRows);
db->mTrace = 0;
/* Query the schema of the main database. Create a mirror schema
** in the temporary database.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name!='sqlite_sequence'"
" AND rootpage>0"
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE sql LIKE 'CREATE INDEX %%' "
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE sql LIKE 'CREATE UNIQUE INDEX %%'"
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Loop through the tables in the main database. For each, do
** an "INSERT INTO rekey_db.xxx SELECT * FROM main.xxx;" to copy
** the contents to the temporary database.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT 'INSERT INTO %s.' || quote(name) "
"|| ' SELECT * FROM %s.' || quote(name) || ';'"
"FROM %s.sqlite_master "
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name!='sqlite_sequence' "
" AND rootpage>0"
, targetDb, sourceDb, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Copy over the contents of the sequence table
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT 'INSERT INTO %s.' || quote(name) "
"|| ' SELECT * FROM %s.' || quote(name) || ';' "
"FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE name=='sqlite_sequence';"
, targetDb, sourceDb, targetDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Copy the triggers, views, and virtual tables from the main database
** over to the temporary database. None of these objects has any
** associated storage, so all we have to do is copy their entries
** from the SQLITE_MASTER table.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"INSERT INTO %s.sqlite_master "
" SELECT type, name, tbl_name, rootpage, sql"
" FROM %s.sqlite_master"
" WHERE type='view' OR type='trigger'"
" OR (type='table' AND rootpage=0)"
, targetDb, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = NULL;
end_of_export:
db->init.iDb = 0;
db->flags = saved_flags;
db->mDbFlags = saved_mDbFlags;
db->nChange = saved_nChange;
db->nTotalChange = saved_nTotalChange;
db->mTrace = saved_mTrace;
if(zSql) sqlite3_free(zSql);
if(rc) {
if(pzErrMsg != NULL) {
sqlite3_result_error(context, pzErrMsg, -1);
sqlite3DbFree(db, pzErrMsg);
} else {
sqlite3_result_error(context, sqlite3ErrStr(rc), -1);
}
}
} | 76,223,646,707,037,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2021-3119 | Zetetic SQLCipher 4.x before 4.4.3 has a NULL pointer dereferencing issue related to sqlcipher_export in crypto.c and sqlite3StrICmp in sqlite3.c. This may allow an attacker to perform a remote denial of service attack. For example, an SQL injection can be used to execute the crafted SQL command sequence, which causes a segmentation fault. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3119 |
521,506 | sqlcipher | cb71f53e8cea4802509f182fa5bead0ac6ab0e7f | https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher | https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher/commit/cb71f53e8cea4802509f182fa5bead0ac6ab0e7f | fix sqlcipher_export handling of NULL parameters | 0 | void sqlcipher_exportFunc(sqlite3_context *context, int argc, sqlite3_value **argv) {
sqlite3 *db = sqlite3_context_db_handle(context);
const char* targetDb, *sourceDb;
int targetDb_idx = 0;
u64 saved_flags = db->flags; /* Saved value of the db->flags */
u32 saved_mDbFlags = db->mDbFlags; /* Saved value of the db->mDbFlags */
int saved_nChange = db->nChange; /* Saved value of db->nChange */
int saved_nTotalChange = db->nTotalChange; /* Saved value of db->nTotalChange */
u8 saved_mTrace = db->mTrace; /* Saved value of db->mTrace */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Return code from service routines */
char *zSql = NULL; /* SQL statements */
char *pzErrMsg = NULL;
if(argc != 1 && argc != 2) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("invalid number of arguments (%d) passed to sqlcipher_export", argc);
goto end_of_export;
}
if(sqlite3_value_type(argv[0]) == SQLITE_NULL) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("target database can't be NULL");
goto end_of_export;
}
targetDb = (const char*) sqlite3_value_text(argv[0]);
sourceDb = "main";
if(argc == 2) {
if(sqlite3_value_type(argv[1]) == SQLITE_NULL) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("target database can't be NULL");
goto end_of_export;
}
sourceDb = (char *) sqlite3_value_text(argv[1]);
}
/* if the name of the target is not main, but the index returned is zero
there is a mismatch and we should not proceed */
targetDb_idx = sqlcipher_find_db_index(db, targetDb);
if(targetDb_idx == 0 && targetDb != NULL && sqlite3StrICmp("main", targetDb) != 0) {
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
pzErrMsg = sqlite3_mprintf("unknown database %s", targetDb);
goto end_of_export;
}
db->init.iDb = targetDb_idx;
db->flags |= SQLITE_WriteSchema | SQLITE_IgnoreChecks;
db->mDbFlags |= DBFLAG_PreferBuiltin | DBFLAG_Vacuum;
db->flags &= ~(u64)(SQLITE_ForeignKeys | SQLITE_ReverseOrder | SQLITE_Defensive | SQLITE_CountRows);
db->mTrace = 0;
/* Query the schema of the main database. Create a mirror schema
** in the temporary database.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name!='sqlite_sequence'"
" AND rootpage>0"
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE sql LIKE 'CREATE INDEX %%' "
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT sql "
" FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE sql LIKE 'CREATE UNIQUE INDEX %%'"
, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Loop through the tables in the main database. For each, do
** an "INSERT INTO rekey_db.xxx SELECT * FROM main.xxx;" to copy
** the contents to the temporary database.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT 'INSERT INTO %s.' || quote(name) "
"|| ' SELECT * FROM %s.' || quote(name) || ';'"
"FROM %s.sqlite_master "
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name!='sqlite_sequence' "
" AND rootpage>0"
, targetDb, sourceDb, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Copy over the contents of the sequence table
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"SELECT 'INSERT INTO %s.' || quote(name) "
"|| ' SELECT * FROM %s.' || quote(name) || ';' "
"FROM %s.sqlite_master WHERE name=='sqlite_sequence';"
, targetDb, sourceDb, targetDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execExecSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
/* Copy the triggers, views, and virtual tables from the main database
** over to the temporary database. None of these objects has any
** associated storage, so all we have to do is copy their entries
** from the SQLITE_MASTER table.
*/
zSql = sqlite3_mprintf(
"INSERT INTO %s.sqlite_master "
" SELECT type, name, tbl_name, rootpage, sql"
" FROM %s.sqlite_master"
" WHERE type='view' OR type='trigger'"
" OR (type='table' AND rootpage=0)"
, targetDb, sourceDb);
rc = (zSql == NULL) ? SQLITE_NOMEM : sqlcipher_execSql(db, &pzErrMsg, zSql);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ) goto end_of_export;
sqlite3_free(zSql);
zSql = NULL;
end_of_export:
db->init.iDb = 0;
db->flags = saved_flags;
db->mDbFlags = saved_mDbFlags;
db->nChange = saved_nChange;
db->nTotalChange = saved_nTotalChange;
db->mTrace = saved_mTrace;
if(zSql) sqlite3_free(zSql);
if(rc) {
if(pzErrMsg != NULL) {
sqlite3_result_error(context, pzErrMsg, -1);
sqlite3DbFree(db, pzErrMsg);
} else {
sqlite3_result_error(context, sqlite3ErrStr(rc), -1);
}
}
} | 291,673,322,331,677,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2021-3119 | Zetetic SQLCipher 4.x before 4.4.3 has a NULL pointer dereferencing issue related to sqlcipher_export in crypto.c and sqlite3StrICmp in sqlite3.c. This may allow an attacker to perform a remote denial of service attack. For example, an SQL injection can be used to execute the crafted SQL command sequence, which causes a segmentation fault. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3119 |
217,552 | maddy | 7ee6a39c6a1939b376545f030a5efd6f90913583 | https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy | https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy/commit/7ee6a39c6a1939b376545f030a5efd6f90913583 | auth/pam: Check for account/password expiry
See GHSA-6cp7-g972-w9m9. Thanks Youssef Rebahi-Gilbert (ysf) for
reporting the issue. | 1 | struct error_obj run_pam_auth(const char *username, char *password) {
// PAM frees pam_response for us.
struct pam_response *reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response));
if (reply == NULL) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "malloc";
ret_val.error_msg = "Out of memory";
return ret_val;
}
reply->resp = password;
reply->resp_retcode = 0;
const struct pam_conv local_conv = { conv_func, reply };
pam_handle_t *local_auth = NULL;
int status = pam_start("maddy", username, &local_conv, &local_auth);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "pam_start";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
status = pam_authenticate(local_auth, PAM_SILENT|PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
if (status == PAM_AUTH_ERR || status == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
ret_val.status = 1;
} else {
ret_val.status = 2;
}
ret_val.func_name = "pam_authenticate";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
status = pam_end(local_auth, status);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "pam_end";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 0;
ret_val.func_name = NULL;
ret_val.error_msg = NULL;
return ret_val;
} | 65,001,628,105,258,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-613"
] | CVE-2022-24732 | Maddy Mail Server is an open source SMTP compatible email server. Versions of maddy prior to 0.5.4 do not implement password expiry or account expiry checking when authenticating using PAM. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should manually remove expired accounts via existing filtering mechanisms. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24732 |
522,443 | maddy | 7ee6a39c6a1939b376545f030a5efd6f90913583 | https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy | https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy/commit/7ee6a39c6a1939b376545f030a5efd6f90913583 | auth/pam: Check for account/password expiry
See GHSA-6cp7-g972-w9m9. Thanks Youssef Rebahi-Gilbert (ysf) for
reporting the issue. | 0 | struct error_obj run_pam_auth(const char *username, char *password) {
// PAM frees pam_response for us.
struct pam_response *reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response));
if (reply == NULL) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "malloc";
ret_val.error_msg = "Out of memory";
return ret_val;
}
reply->resp = password;
reply->resp_retcode = 0;
const struct pam_conv local_conv = { conv_func, reply };
pam_handle_t *local_auth = NULL;
int status = pam_start("maddy", username, &local_conv, &local_auth);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "pam_start";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
status = pam_authenticate(local_auth, PAM_SILENT|PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
if (status == PAM_AUTH_ERR || status == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
ret_val.status = 1;
} else {
ret_val.status = 2;
}
ret_val.func_name = "pam_authenticate";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
status = pam_acct_mgmt(local_auth, PAM_SILENT|PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
if (status == PAM_AUTH_ERR || status == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN || status == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
ret_val.status = 1;
} else {
ret_val.status = 2;
}
ret_val.func_name = "pam_acct_mgmt";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
status = pam_end(local_auth, status);
if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 2;
ret_val.func_name = "pam_end";
ret_val.error_msg = pam_strerror(local_auth, status);
return ret_val;
}
struct error_obj ret_val;
ret_val.status = 0;
ret_val.func_name = NULL;
ret_val.error_msg = NULL;
return ret_val;
} | 311,322,554,352,065,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-613"
] | CVE-2022-24732 | Maddy Mail Server is an open source SMTP compatible email server. Versions of maddy prior to 0.5.4 do not implement password expiry or account expiry checking when authenticating using PAM. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should manually remove expired accounts via existing filtering mechanisms. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24732 |
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