text
stringlengths 195
512
|
|---|
to the creation
stage because of the ease and the speed with which digital objects can be manipulated, deleted
by accident or on purpose, or lost to technological obsolescence.
The notion that records preservation starts at the creation stage requires that preservation
considerations be incorporated and manifested in the design of record-making and
recordkeeping systems. Each aggregation of records appraised for preservation should be
identified in accordance with the classification scheme and the re |
cords retention schedule
established by the records creator in collaboration with the preserver, and this identification
should be indicated in the records metadata. The records so identified should be monitored
throughout their lifecycle by the preserver, so that appraisal decisions and preservation
considerations can be updated to accommodate any possible changes occurring after they are
first made. Appraisal decisions need to be reviewed to ensure that the information about the
appraised records is |
still valid, that changes to the records and their context have not adversely
affected their identity or integrity and that the details of the process of carrying out disposition
are still workable and applicable to the records. To monitor and implement appraisal decisions
and preservation considerations, the designated preserver should obtain continuing access to
InterPARES 2 Project, Policy Cross-domain
Page 18 of 18
Policy Framework, v1.2 (March 2008)
L. Duranti, J. Suderman and M. Todd
the re |
cords creator’s recordkeeping system within limits agreed upon with the creator and
reflected in the preserver’s access privileges. The preserver should establish procedures to
facilitate constant interaction with the records creator.
(P8) Third-party intellectual property rights attached to the creator’s records
should be explicitly identified and managed in the preservation system. (C10)
Preservers know that records under records creators’ control usually contain information
covered by intellectual |
property legislation. They should also be aware that, in some cases, the
intellectual property rights attached to records belong to a party other than the author; that is,
the intellectual property rights reside with a third party. Third-party intellectual property rights
should be documented in the metadata accompanying such records because they influence the
processes of refreshing, converting and migrating them for either continuous use or
preservation purposes. Subject to variations in different l |
egislative environments, reproductions
of records with third-party intellectual property rights attached to them may violate legislation
that protects such rights. In the case of records identified for long-term preservation, long-term
clearance of such rights should be addressed explicitly with the records creator.
Because preservation in a digital environment involves making copies, intellectual property
rights have become an issue, not just for access as in the past, but for preservation. It is the |
preserver’s responsibility; first, to advise the creator on how to address intellectual property
issues in its record-making and recordkeeping systems, and, second, to ensure that intellectual
property issues are addressed in the design of the preservation system. In particular, any issues
relevant to third-party intellectual property rights should be cleared before the transfer of records
to be preserved from the creator to the preserver. The latter must consider these issues as a
part of the assess |
ment of feasibility of preservation.
(P9) Privacy rights and obligations attached to the creator’s records should be
explicitly identified and protected in the preservation system. (C11)
Privacy legislation protects the rights of individuals with reference to personal data that may
be part of any record used and maintained by a records creator with whom they have interacted.
The limits of privacy depend on the legislative framework in which the records creator operates.
It may be in conflict with the |
access policy linked to the mandate of the records creator and even
with the access to information legislation in the same jurisdiction. Besides lobbying for
exceptions, the designated preserver should ensure that the consequences of the existing
situation for preservation and access are clearly understood.
The presence of personal information within the records should be identified and
documented among the metadata linked to the records in the record-making and recordkeeping
systems of the creators. |
This is the best way to ensure that the records are managed in
accordance with privacy legislation and that the preserver will be able to effectively include the
privacy issues relevant to the records in the preservation feasibility study during appraisal. The
designated preserver for each creator should, as a trusted custodian, obtain access to records
containing personal information to perform preservation activities. Archival processing of
personal information for preservation purposes is different |
from the use of it for research or
business purposes. Regardless of the legislative framework, the creator and the preserver
should be able to demonstrate that archival processing of records containing personal
information does not put such information at risk of unauthorized access.
Preservers should also insist that responsibility for processing records containing personal
data for preservation purposes must reside with the records creator and its legitimate
successors. Although the practice of outs |
ourcing these preservation functions to specialized
commercial operators may be authorized and regulated under most existing privacy legislation,
InterPARES 2 Project, Policy Cross-domain
Page 19 of 19
Policy Framework, v1.2 (March 2008)
L. Duranti, J. Suderman and M. Todd
InterPARES 2 Project, Policy Cross-domain
Page 20 of 20
the practice should still be avoided whenever possible to minimize the number of individuals
authorized to access and/or process the records, thus reducing the risk of u |
nauthorized
disclosure of personal information in the records and of jeopardizing the ability to obtain
permission to process personal information for preservation purposes.
In the case of records that are not yet designated for permanent preservation, appraisal
decisions should be taken before the initial mandate for processing personal information has
expired to ensure that the legal basis for retaining such records is still in force.
(P10) Archival appraisal should identify and analyze all the busi |
ness processes
that contribute to the creation and/or use of the same records. (C9)
A record may be created for one purpose and then subsequently used for different purposes
by different persons. Any appraisal decision should consider all uses of the record and be aware
of the business processes behind them. This is necessary to make an informed decision about
what to preserve as well as to be able to dispose effectively of all possible copies of the records
that have not been selected for preservatio |
n.
The use of records or information within records by different business processes may be
desirable from the creator’s standpoint in terms of providing a degree of interoperability among
the creator’s information and record systems. In such situations, the preserver should advise the
creator that metadata attached to records used by many business processes must identify each
relevant business process. This is critical for the creator because it ensures the authenticity of
the records by establishing |
their identity and integrity in each context. It is also critical for the
preserver who must understand all contexts in which the records were used to effectively
undertake appraisal and also to meet the baseline requirements for maintaining authenticity for
any records acquired into the preservation system.
(P11) Archival appraisal should assess the authenticity of the records. (C6)
Appraisal decisions should be made by compiling information about kept records and their
context(s), assessing their va |
lue and determining the feasibility of their preservation.36
As part of the assessment of value, preservers must establish the grounds for presuming
that the records being appraised are authentic. This means that preservers must ensure that
each record identity has been documented and maintained as documented and must ascertain
the degree to which the records’ creator has guaranteed their integrity by making sure that its
records are intact and uncorrupted. The evidence supporting the presumption of au |
thenticity
must be measured against the InterPARES Benchmark Requirements.37
(P12) Archival description should be used as a collective authentication of the
records in an archival fonds. (C6)
Archival description of a fonds emerges from the comprehensive analysis of the various
relationships interwoven in the course of the formation and accumulation of records and
therefore is the most reliable means of establishing the continued authenticity of a body of
interrelated records. While the authenticity |
of individual records can be in part established
through their metadata, the authenticity of aggregations of records (i.e., file, series or fonds),
can only be proved through archival description.
It has always been the function, either explicit or implicit, of archival description to
authenticate the records by perpetuating their administrative and documentary relationships;
36 See Terry Eastwood et al., “Part Two – Choosing to Preserve: The Selection |
of Electronic Records: Appraisal Task Force Report,”
in The Long-term Preservation of Authentic Electronic Records: Findings of the InterPARES Project, Luciana Duranti, ed. (San
Miniato, Italy: Archilab, 2005), 67–98. PDF version available at http://www.interpares.org/book/interpares_book_e_part2.pdf.
37 See the already cited benchmark requirements in MacNeil et al., “Appraisal Task Force Report,” op. cit.
Policy Framework, v1.2 (March 2008)
L. Duranti, J. Suderman and M. Todd
InterPARES 2 Project, P |
olicy Cross-domain
Page 21 of 21
but, with digital records, this function has moved to the forefront. In fact, as original digital
records disappear and an interminable chain of non-identical reproductions follows them, the
researchers looking at the last of those reproductions will not find in it any information regarding
provenance, authority, context or authenticity.
The authentication function of archival description is different from that of a certificate of
authenticity, because it is not si |
mply an attestation of the authenticity of individual records, but a
collective attestation of the authenticity of the records of a fonds and of all their
interrelationships as made explicit by their administrative, custodial and technological history
(including a description of the recordkeeping system(s) within which they have been maintained
and used), the scope and content and the hierarchical representation of the records aggregates.
It is also different both from the identity and integrity metada |
ta attached to individual records,
which are part of the record itself and are reproduced time after time with it and from the
additional metadata attached to records aggregations (e.g., file, series) within the recordkeeping
system to identify them and document their technological transformations.
The unique function of archival description is to provide an historical view of the records and
of their becoming, while presenting them as a universality in which each member’s individuality
is subject to |
the bond of a common provenance and destination.
(P13) Procedures for providing access to records created in one jurisdiction to
users in other jurisdictions should be established on the basis of the legal
environment in which the records were created. (C13)
Different jurisdictions may have different laws and regulations with regard to access rights in
relation to the protection of privacy, intellectual property and any other kind of public or private
interests (e.g., market sensitive records). Prese |
rvers who are a unit of a records creator (e.g.,
in-house archival programs or archives) that has geographically separated branches falling
under different legislation must be aware of the impact of such diverse legal contexts on their
records-sharing activities. This will affect access policies relevant to both internal and external
sharing activities.
|
Top Threats Working Group
The Notorious Nine
Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
February 2013
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
2
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
The permanent and official location for Cloud Security Alliance Top Threats research is
http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats.
© 2013 Cloud Security Alliance – All Rights Reserved
All rights reserved. You may d |
ownload, store, display on your computer, view, print, and link to The Notorious Nine:
Cloud Computing Threats in 2013 at http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats/, subject to the following: (a) the
Report may be used solely for your personal, informational, non-commercial use; (b) the Report may not be modified or
altered in any way; (c) the Report may not be redistributed; and (d) the trademark, copyright or other notices may not
be removed. You may quote portions of the Report as permitted b |
y the Fair Use provisions of the United States
Copyright Act, provided that you attribute the portions to The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Threats in 2013.
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
3
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
Contents
Acknowledgments
................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Executive S |
ummary
................................................................................................................................................................. 6
1.0 Top Threat: Data Breaches
................................................................................................................................................ 8
1.1 Implications
.............................................................................................................................................. |
..................... 8
1.2 Controls ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 Links .............................................................................................................................................................................. 8
2.0 Top Threat: Data Loss ....................................................................................... |
................................................................ 9
2.1 Implications
................................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Controls ......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.3 Links ............................................................... |
............................................................................................................... 9
3.0 Top Threat: Account or Service Traffic Hijacking ............................................................................................................ 10
3.1 Implications
................................................................................................................................................................. 10
3.2 Controls .................................. |
..................................................................................................................................... 10
3.3 Links ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10
4.0 Top Threat: Insecure Interfaces and APIs ....................................................................................................................... 12
4.1 Implications
|
................................................................................................................................................................. 12
4.2 Controls ....................................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.3 Links ....................................................................................................................................................... |
..................... 12
5.0 Top Threat: Denial of Service .......................................................................................................................................... 14
5.1 Implications
................................................................................................................................................................. 14
5.2 Controls ................................................................................................................ |
....................................................... 14
5.3 Links ............................................................................................................................................................................ 14
6.0 Top Threat: Malicious Insiders ........................................................................................................................................ 16
6.1 Implications
....................................................................... |
.......................................................................................... 16
6.2 Controls ....................................................................................................................................................................... 16
6.3 Links ............................................................................................................................................................................ 17
7.0 Top Threat: Abuse of Cloud Services ..... |
......................................................................................................................... 18
7.1 Implications
................................................................................................................................................................. 18
7.2 Controls ....................................................................................................................................................................... 18
7.3 Links ....... |
..................................................................................................................................................................... 18
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
4
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
8.0 Top Threat: Insufficient Due Diligence
............................................................................................................................ 19
8.1 Implications
..... |
............................................................................................................................................................ 19
8.2 Controls ....................................................................................................................................................................... 19
8.3 Links ............................................................................................................................................................ |
................ 20
9.0 Top Threat: Shared Technology Vulnerabilities .............................................................................................................. 21
9.1 Implications
................................................................................................................................................................. 21
9.2 Controls ................................................................................................................................. |
...................................... 21
9.3 Links ............................................................................................................................................................................ 21
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
5
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
Acknowledgments
Co-Chairs
Rafal Los, HP
Dave Shackleford, Voodoo Security
Bryan Sullivan, Microsoft
CSA Global Staff
Alex |
Ginsburg, Copywriter
Luciano JR Santos, Research Director
Evan Scoboria, Webmaster
Kendall Scoboria, Graphic Designer
John Yeoh, Research Analyst
The CSA Top Threats to Cloud Computing Survey in 2012 was assisted by the extended CSA Top Threats Working Group,
led by committee members: Aaron Alva, Olivier Caleff, Greg Elkins, Allen Lum, Keith Pasley, Satheesh Sudarsan, Vinoth
Sivasubramanian, and Rajeev Venkitaraman
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
6
CLOUD SECURIT |
Y ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
Executive Summary
At an unprecedented pace, cloud computing has simultaneously transformed business and government, and created
new security challenges. The development of the cloud service model delivers business-supporting technology more
efficiently than ever before. The shift from server to service-based thinking is transforming the way technology
departments think about, design, and deliver computing technology and applications. |
Yet these advances have created
new security vulnerabilities, including security issues whose full impact is still emerging.
Among the most significant security risks associated with cloud computing is the tendency to bypass information
technology (IT) departments and information officers. Although shifting to cloud technologies exclusively is affordable
and fast, doing so undermines important business-level security policies, processes, and best practices. In the absence
of these standards, busin |
esses are vulnerable to security breaches that can quickly erase any gains made by the switch
to SaaS.
Recognizing both the promise of cloud computing, and the risks associated with it, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has
pioneered the creation of industry-wide standards for effective cloud security. In recent years, CSA released the
“Security Guidance for Critical Areas in Cloud Computing” and the “Security as a Service Implementation Guidance.”
These documents have quickly become the industry-s |
tandard catalogue of best practices to secure cloud computing,
comprehensively addressing this within the thirteen domains of CSA Guidance and ten categories of service associated
with the SecaaS Implementation Guidance series. Already, many businesses, organizations, and governments have
incorporated this guidance into their cloud strategies.
However, CSA recognizes that a central component of managing risks in cloud computing is to understand the nature of
security threats. The purpose of the “ |
The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013” report is to provide
organizations with an up-to-date, expert-informed understanding of cloud security threats in order to make educated
risk-management decisions regarding cloud adoption strategies.
The top threats report reflects the current consensus among experts about the most significant threats to cloud security.
While there are many vulnerabilities to cloud security, this report focuses on threats specifically related to the shared,
on |
-demand nature of cloud computing.
To identify the top threats, CSA conducted a survey of industry experts to compile professional opinion on the greatest
vulnerabilities within cloud computing. The Top Threats working group used these survey results alongside their
expertise to craft the final 2013 report. The survey methodology validated that the threat listing reflects the most
current concerns of the industry. In this most recent edition of this report, experts identified the following nine c |
ritical
threats to cloud security (ranked in order of severity):
1. Data Breaches
2. Data Loss
3. Account Hijacking
4. Insecure APIs
5. Denial of Service
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
7
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
6. Malicious Insiders
7. Abuse of Cloud Services
8. Insufficient Due Diligence
9. Shared Technology Issues
With descriptions and analysis of these threats, this report serves as an up-to-date threat |
identification guide that will
help cloud users and providers make informed decisions about risk mitigation within a cloud strategy. This threat
research document should be utilized in conjunction with the best practices guides, “Security Guidance for Critical Areas
in Cloud Computing V.3” and “Security as a Service Implementation Guidance.” Together, these documents will offer
valuable guidance during the formation of comprehensive, appropriate cloud security strategies.
© 2013, Cloud Security Alli |
ance. All rights reserved.
8
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
1.0 Top Threat: Data Breaches
It’s every CIO’s worst nightmare: the organization’s sensitive internal data falls
into the hands of their competitors. While this scenario has kept executives
awake at night long before the advent of computing, cloud computing
introduces significant new avenues of attack. In November 2012, researchers
from the University of North Carolina, the University |
of Wisconsin and RSA
Corporation released a paper describing how a virtual machine could use side
channel timing information to extract private cryptographic keys being used in
other virtual machines on the same physical server. However, in many cases
an attacker wouldn’t even need to go to such lengths. If a multitenant cloud
service database is not properly designed, a flaw in one client’s application
could allow an attacker access not only to that client’s data, but every other
client’s data as |
well.
1.1 Implications
Unfortunately, while data loss and data leakage are both serious threats to
cloud computing, the measures you put in place to mitigate one of these
threats can exacerbate the other. You may be able to encrypt your data to
reduce the impact of a data breach, but if you lose your encryption key, you’ll
lose your data as well. Conversely, you may decide to keep offline backups of
your data to reduce the impact of a catastrophic data loss, but this increases
your exposure to dat |
a breaches.
1.2 Controls
CCM DG-04: Data Governance - Retention Policy
CCM DG-05: Data Governance - Secure Disposal
CCM DG-06: Data Governance - Non-Production Data
CCM DG-07: Data Governance - Information Leakage
CCM DG-08: Data Governance - Risk Assessments
CCM IS-18: Information Security - Encryption
CCM IS-19: Information Security - Encryption Key Management
CCM SA-02: Security Architecture - User ID Credentials
CCM SA-03: Security Architecture - Data Security/Integrity
CCM SA-06: Security Ar |
chitecture - Production/Non-Production Environments
CCM SA-07: Security Architecture - Remote User Multi-Factor Authentication
1.3 Links
1. Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private Keys
http://www.cs.unc.edu/~yinqian/papers/crossvm.pdf
2. Multi-Tenant Data Architecture
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Aa479086
SERVICE MODEL
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: Confidentiality
STRIDE: Information Disclosure
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 5: Information Management
and Data Security
Domain 10: App |
lication Security
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement
and Access Management
Domain 13: Virtualization
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
9
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
2.0 Top Threat: Data Loss
For both consumers and businesses, the prospect of permanently losing one’s
data is terrifying. Just ask Mat Ho |
nan, writer for Wired magazine: in the
summer of 2012, attackers broke into Mat’s Apple, Gmail and Twitter accounts.
They then used that access to erase all of his personal data in those accounts,
including all of the baby pictures Mat had taken of his 18-month-old daughter.
Of course, data stored in the cloud can be lost due to reasons other than
malicious attackers. Any accidental deletion by the cloud service provider, or
worse, a physical catastrophe such as a fire or earthquake, could lead to t |
he
permanent loss of customers’ data unless the provider takes adequate
measures to backup data. Furthermore, the burden of avoiding data loss does
not fall solely on the provider’s shoulders. If a customer encrypts his or her
data before uploading it to the cloud, but loses the encryption key, the data
will be lost as well.
2.1 Implications
Under the new EU data protection rules, data destruction and corruption of
personal data are considered forms of data breaches and would require
appropriate |
notifications.
Additionally, many compliance policies require organizations to retain audit
records or other documentation. If an organization stores this data in the
cloud, loss of that data could jeopardize the organization’s compliance status.
2.2 Controls
CCM DG-04: Data Governance - Retention Policy
CCM DG-08: Data Governance - Risk Assessments
CCM RS-05: Resiliency - Environmental Risks
CCM RS-06: Resiliency - Equipment Location
2.3 Links
1. Cloud Computing Users Are Losing Data, Syma |
ntec Finds
http://news.investors.com/technology/011613-640851-cloud-computing-data-
loss-high-in-symantec-study.htm
2. Kill the Password: Why a String of Characters Can’t Protect Us Anymore
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/11/ff-mat-honan-password-hacker/
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: Availability, Non-Repudiation
STRIDE: Repudiation, Denial of
Service
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 5: Information Management
and Data Security
Domain 10: Application Security
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement
and Access |
Management
Domain 13: Virtualization
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
10
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
3.0 Top Threat: Account or Service
Traffic Hijacking
Account or service hijacking is not new. Attack methods such as phishing,
fraud, and exploitation of software vulnerabilities s |
till achieve results.
Credentials and passwords are often reused, which amplifies the impact of
such attacks. Cloud solutions add a new threat to the landscape. If an attacker
gains access to your credentials, they can eavesdrop on your activities and
transactions, manipulate data, return falsified information, and redirect your
clients to illegitimate sites. Your account or service instances may become a
new base for the attacker. From here, they may leverage the power of your
reputation to lau |
nch subsequent attacks.
In April 2010, Amazon experienced a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) bug that allowed
attackers to hijack credentials from the site. In 2009, numerous Amazon
systems were hijacked to run Zeus botnet nodes.
3.1 Implications
Account and service hijacking, usually with stolen credentials, remains a top
threat. With stolen credentials, attackers can often access critical areas of
deployed cloud computing services, allowing them to compromise the
confidentiality, integrity and availab |
ility of those services. Organizations
should be aware of these techniques as well as common defense in depth
protection strategies to contain the damage (and possible litigation) resulting
from a breach. Organizations should look to prohibit the sharing of account
credentials between users and services, and leverage strong two-factor
authentication techniques where possible.
3.2 Controls
CCM IS-07: Information Security - User Access Policy
CCM IS-08: Information Security - User Access Restriction |
/Authorization
CCM IS-09: Information Security - User Access Revocation
CCM IS-10: Information Security - User Access Reviews
CCM IS-22: Information Security - Incident Management
CCM SA-02: Security Architecture - User ID Credentials
CCM SA-07: Security Architecture - Remote User Multi-Factor Authentication
CCM SA-14: Security Architecture - Audit Logging / Intrusion Detection
3.3 Links
1. Amazon purges account hijacking threat from site
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/20/amazon_website |
_treat/
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: Authenticity, Integrity,
Confidentiality, Non-repudiation,
Availability
STRIDE: Tampering with Data,
Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Elevation of Privilege, Spoofing
Identity
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
11
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
2. |
Zeus bot found using Amazon’s EC2 as C&C Server
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/12/09/amazon_ec2_bot_control_channel/
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 5: Information Management
and Data Security
Domain 7: Traditional Security,
Business Continuity, and Disaster
Recovery
Domain 9: Incident Response
Domain 11: Encryption and Key
Management
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement,
and Access Management
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights rese |
rved.
12
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
4.0 Top Threat: Insecure Interfaces and
APIs
Cloud computing providers expose a set of software interfaces or APIs that
customers use to manage and interact with cloud services. Provisioning,
management, orchestration, and monitoring are all performed using these
interfaces. The security and availability of general cloud services is dependent
upon the security of these basic APIs. From authentication and |
access control
to encryption and activity monitoring, these interfaces must be designed to
protect against both accidental and malicious attempts to circumvent policy.
Furthermore, organizations and third parties often build upon these interfaces
to offer value-added services to their customers. This introduces the
complexity of the new layered API; it also increases risk, as organizations may
be required to relinquish their credentials to third-parties in order to enable
their agency.
4.1 Implica |
tions
While most providers strive to ensure security is well integrated into their
service models, it is critical for consumers of those services to understand the
security implications associated with the usage, management, orchestration
and monitoring of cloud services. Reliance on a weak set of interfaces and APIs
exposes organizations to a variety of security issues related to confidentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability.
4.2 Controls
CCM IS-08: Information Security - User Access |
Restriction/Authorization
CCM SA-03: Security Architecture - Data Security/Integrity
CCM SA-04: Security Architecture - Application Security
4.3 Links
1. Insecure API Implementations Threaten Cloud
http://www.darkreading.com/cloud-security/167901092/security/application-
security/232900809/insecure-api-implementations-threaten-cloud.html
2. Web Services Single Sign-On Contains Big Flaws
http://www.darkreading.com/authentication/167901072/security/news/2326
02844/web-services-single-sign |
-on-contain-big-flaws.html
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: Authenticity, Integrity,
Confidentiality
STRIDE: Tampering with Data,
Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Elevation of Privilege
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
13
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 5 |
: Information Management
and Data Security
Domain 6: Interoperability and
Portability
Domain 9: Incident Response
Domain 10: Application Security
Domain 11: Encryption and Key
Management
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement,
and Access Management
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
14
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
5.0 Top Threat: Denial of Service
Simply put, denial-of-service attacks are attacks meant to prevent users of a |
cloud service from being able to access their data or their applications. By
forcing the victim cloud service to consume inordinate amounts of finite
system resources such as processor power, memory, disk space or network
bandwidth, the attacker (or attackers, as is the case in distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks) causes an intolerable system slowdown and leaves all
of the legitimate service users confused and angry as to why the service isn’t
responding.
While DDoS attacks tend to genera |
te a lot of fear and media attention
(especially when the perpetrators are acting out of a sense of political
“hactivism”), they are by no means the only form of DoS attack. Asymmetric
application-level DoS attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in web servers,
databases, or other cloud resources, allowing a malicious individual to take out
an application using a single extremely small attack payload – in some cases
less than 100 bytes long.
5.1 Implications
Experiencing a denial-of-service atta |
ck is like being caught in rush-hour traffic
gridlock: there’s no way to get to your destination, and nothing you can do
about it except sit and wait. As a consumer, service outages not only frustrate
you, but also force you to reconsider whether moving your critical data to the
cloud to reduce infrastructure costs was really worthwhile after all. Even
worse, since cloud providers often bill clients based on the compute cycles and
disk space they consume, there’s the possibility that an attacker may |
not be
able to completely knock your service off of the net, but may still cause it to
consume so much processing time that it becomes too expensive for you to run
and you’ll be forced to take it down yourself.
5.2 Controls
CCM IS-04: Information Security - Baseline Requirements
CCM OP-03: Operations Management - Capacity/Resource Planning
CCM RS-07: Resiliency - Equipment Power Failures
CCM SA-04: Security Architecture - Application Security
5.3 Links
1. As Cloud Use Grows, So Will Rate of |
DDoS Attacks
http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-computing/cloud-use-grows-so-will-rate-
of-ddos-attacks-211876
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: Availability
STRIDE: Denial of Service
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 8: Data Center Operations
Domain 9: Incident Response
Domain 10: Application Security
Domain 13: Virtualization
Domain 14: Security as a Service
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Securit |
y Alliance. All rights reserved.
15
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
2. Computerworld: DDoS is Cloud’s security Achilles heel (September 16,
2011)
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/401127/ddos_cloud_security_achil
les_heel/
3. OWASP: Application Denial of Service
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Denial_of_Service
4. Radware DDoSpedia
http://security.radware.com/knowledge-center/DDoSPedia/
© 2013, Cloud |
Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
16
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
6.0 Top Threat: Malicious Insiders
The risk of malicious insiders has been debated in the security industry. While
the level of threat is left to debate, the fact that the insider threat is a real
adversary is not.
CERN defines an insider threat as such:1
“A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former employee,
contractor, or other business partner |
who has or had authorized access to an
organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity,
or availability of the organization's information or information systems.”
6.1 Implications
A malicious insider, such as a system administrator, in an improperly designed
cloud scenario can have access to potentially sensitive information.
From IaaS to PaaS and SaaS, the malicious insider has increasing l |
evels of
access to more critical systems, and eventually to data. Systems that depend
solely on the cloud service provider (CSP) for security are at great risk here.
Even if encryption is implemented, if the keys are not kept with the customer
and are only available at data-usage time, the system is still vulnerable to
malicious insider attack.
6.2 Controls
CCM CO-03: Compliance - Third Party Audits
CCM DG-01: Data Governance - Ownership / Stewardship
CCM DG-03: Data Governance - Handling / Label |
ing / Security Policy
CCM DG-07: Data Governance - Information Leakage
CCM FS-02: Facility Security - User Access
CCM FS-05: Facility Security - Unauthorized Persons Entry
CCM FS-06: Facility Security - Off-Site Authorization
CCM HR-01: Human Resources Security - Background Screening
CCM IS-06: Information Security - Policy Enforcement
CCM IS-08: Information Security - User Access Restriction / Authorization
CCM IS-10: Information Security - User Access Reviews
CCM IS-13: Information Security - Rol |
es / Responsibilities
CCM IS-15: Information Security - Segregation of Duties
CCM IS-18: Information Security - Encryption
1 http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/
RISK ANALYSIS
STRIDE: Spoofing, Tampering,
Information Disclosure
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
17
CLOUD SECU |
RITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
CCM IS-19: Information Security - Encryption Key Management
CCM IS-29: Information Security - Audit Tools Access
CCM RI-02: Risk Management - Assessments
CCM SA-09: Security Architecture - Segmentation
6.3 Links
1. Insider threats to cloud computing
http://www.cloudtweaks.com/2012/10/insider-threats-to-cloud-computing/
2. Cloud’s privileged identity gap intensifies insider threats
http://www.darkreading.com/insider- |
threat/167801100/security/news/240146276/cloud-s-privileged-identity-gap-
intensifies-insider-threats.html
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 5: Information
Management and Data Security
Domain 11: Encryption and Key
Management
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement
and Access Management
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
18
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
7.0 Top Threat: Abuse of Cl |
oud Services
One of cloud computing’s greatest benefits is that it allows even small
organizations access to vast amounts of computing power. It would be difficult
for most organizations to purchase and maintain tens of thousands of servers,
but renting time on tens of thousands of servers from a cloud computing
provider is much more affordable. However, not everyone wants to use this
power for good. It might take an attacker years to crack an encryption key
using his own limited hardware, but usi |
ng an array of cloud servers, he might
be able to crack it in minutes. Alternately, he might use that array of cloud
servers to stage a DDoS attack, serve malware or distribute pirated software.
7.1 Implications
This threat is more of an issue for cloud service providers than cloud
consumers, but it does raise a number of serious implications for those
providers. How will you detect people abusing your service? How will you
define abuse? How will you prevent them from doing it again?
7.2 Control |
s
CCM IS-24: Information Security - Incident Response Legal Preparation
CCM IS-26: Information Security - Acceptable Use
7.3 Links
1. Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private Keys
http://www.cs.unc.edu/~yinqian/papers/crossvm.pdf
2. Pirate Bay Ditches Servers and Switches to the Cloud
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57534707-93/pirate-bay-ditches-servers-
and-switches-to-the-cloud/
RISK ANALYSIS
CIANA: N/A
STRIDE: N/A
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 2: Governance and
Ente |
rprise Risk Management
Domain 9: Incident Response
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
RISK MATRIX
N/A
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
19
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
8.0 Top Threat: Insufficient Due
Diligence
Cloud computing has brought with it a gold rush of sorts, with many
organizations rushing into the promise of cost reductions, operational
efficiencies and |
improved security. While these can be realistic goals for
organizations that have the resources to adopt cloud technologies properly,
too many enterprises jump into the cloud without understanding the full scope
of the undertaking.
Without a complete understanding of the CSP environment, applications or
services being pushed to the cloud, and operational responsibilities such as
incident response, encryption, and security monitoring, organizations are
taking on unknown levels of risk in ways they ma |
y not even comprehend, but
that are a far departure from their current risks.
8.1 Implications
An organization that rushes to adopt cloud technologies subjects itself to a
number of issues. Contractual issues arise over obligations on liability,
response, or transparency by creating mismatched expectations between the
CSP and the customer. Pushing applications that are dependent on “internal”
network-level security controls to the cloud is dangerous when those controls
disappear or do not match th |
e customer’s expectation. Unknown operational
and architectural issues arise when designers and architects unfamiliar with
cloud technologies are designing applications being pushed to the cloud.
The bottom line for enterprises and organizations moving to a cloud
technology model is that they must have capable resources, and perform
extensive internal and CSP due-diligence to understand the risks it assumes by
adopting this new technology model.
8.2 Controls
CCM DG-08: Data Governance - Risk Assess |
ments
CCM IS-04: Information Security - Baseline Requirements
CCM IS-12: Information Security - Industry Knowledge / Benchmarking
CCM OP-03: Operations Management - Capacity / Resource Planning
CCM RI-01: Risk Management - Program
CCM RI-02: Risk Management - Assessments
CCM RS-01: Resiliency - Management Program
CCM RS-02: Resiliency - Impact Analysis
CCM RS -03: Resiliency - Business Continuity Planning
CCM SA-03: Security Architecture - Data Security / Integrity
CCM SA-04: Security Architecture |
- Application Security
RISK ANALYSIS
STRIDE: All
CSA REFERENCE
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 3: Legal and Electronic
Discovery
Domain 8: Data Center
Operations
Domain 9: Incident Response,
Notification and Remediation
IS THREAT STILL RELEVANT?
TOP THREAT RANKING
SERVICE MODEL
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
RISK MATRIX
Perceived Risk
Actual Risk
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
20
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: C |
loud Computing Top Threats in 2013
CCM SA-08: Security Architecture - Network Security
CCM SA-09: Security Architecture - Segmentation
8.3 Links
1. Perfecting the unknown: Cloud Computing
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Perfecting-the-Unknown-
Cloud-Computing-4157844.php
© 2013, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
21
CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013
9.0 Top Threat: Shared Technology
Vulnerabilities
Cloud servi |
ce providers deliver their services in a scalable way by sharing
infrastructure, platforms, and applications. Whether it’s the underlying
components that make up this infrastructure (e.g. CPU caches, GPUs, etc.) that
were not designed to offer strong isolation properties for a multi-tenant
architecture (IaaS), re-deployable platforms (PaaS), or multi-customer
applications (SaaS), the threat of shared vulnerabilities exists in all delivery
models. A defensive in-depth strategy is recommended and shou |
ld include
compute, storage, network, application and user security enforcement, and
monitoring, whether the service model is IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS. The key is that a
single vulnerability or misconfiguration can lead to a compromise across an
entire provider’s cloud.
9.1 Implications
A compromise of an integral piece of shared technology such as the hypervisor,
a shared platform component, or an application in a SaaS environment exposes
more than just the compromised customer; rather, it exposes the |
entire
environment to a potential of compromise and breach. This vulnerability is
dangerous because it potentially can affect an entire cloud at once.
9.2 Controls
CCM DG-03: Data Governance - Handling / Labeling / Security Policy
CCM IS-04: Information Security - Baseline Requirements
CCM IS-07: Information Security - User Access Policy
CCM IS-15: Information Security - Segregation of Duties
CCM IS-18: Information Security - Encryption
CCM IS-20: Information Security - Vulnerability / Patch Manag |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.