readme: # Work In Progress
  
  # How to use?
  
  This model can only generate regular text. 
  
  # Training details
  
  We continued the pre-training of [gpt2](https://huggingface.co/gpt2).
  
  Dataset:[Natural_Questions_HTML_reduced_all](https://huggingface.co/datasets/SaulLu/Natural_Questions_HTML_reduced_all)
  
  100% of the examples were just plain text.
  
  Training example: 
  
  ```
   start up firms to succeed.[4] Firms like power companies, cable television companies and wireless communication companies with large start up costs fall within this category. A company wishing to enter such industries must have the financial ability to spend millions of dollars before starting operations and generating any revenue.[5] Similarly established firms also have a competitive advantage over new firms. An established firm threatened by a new competitor can lower prices to drive out the competition. Microsoft is a firm that has substantial pricing or market power due to technological superiority in its design and production processes.[4] Finally government created barriers to entry can be a source of market power. A prime example are patents granted to pharmaceutical companies. These patents give the drug companies a virtual monopoly in the protected product for the term of the patent.
  Measurement[edit]
  Concentration ratios are the most common measures of market power.[6] The four-firm concentration ratio measures the percentage of total industry output attributable to the top four companies. For monopolies the four firm ratio is 100 per cent while the ratio is zero for perfect competition.[7] The four firm concentration domestic (U.S) ratios for cigarettes is 93%; for automobiles, 84% and for beer, 85%.[8]
  Another measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which is calculated by "summing the squares of the percentage market shares of all participants in the market".[8] The HHI index for perfect competition is zero; for monopoly, 10,000.
  U.S. courts almost never consider a firm to possess market power if it has a market share of less than 50 percent.[9]
  Elasticity of demand[edit]
  Market power is the ability to raise price above marginal cost (MC) and earn a positive profit.[10] The degree to which a firm can raise price (P) above marginal cost depends on the shape of the demand curve at the profit maximizing output.[10] That is, elasticity is the critical factor in determining market power. The relationship between market power and the price elasticity of demand (PED) can be summarized by the equation:
  P M C = P E D 1 + P E D. {\displaystyle {\frac {P}{MC}}={\frac {PED}{1+PED}}.}
  Note that PED will be negative, so the ratio is always greater than one. The higher the P/MC ratio, the more market power the firm possesses. As PED increases in magnitude, the P/MC ratio approaches one, and market power approaches zero.[11] The equation is derived from the monopolist pricing rule:
  P − M C P = − 1 P E D. {\displaystyle {\frac {P-MC}{P}}=-{\frac {1}{PED}}.}
  Nobel Memorial Prize[edit]
  Jean Tirole was awarded the 2014 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his analysis of market power and economic regulation.
  See also[edit]
  Bargaining power
  Imperfect competition
  Market concentration
  Natural monopoly
  Predatory pricing
  Price discrimination
  Dominance (economics)
  References[edit]
  Jump up ^ Vatiero Massimiliano (2010). "The Ordoliberal notion of market power: an institutionalist reassessment". European Competition Journal. 6 (3): 689–707. doi:10.5235/ecj.v6n3.689.
  Jump up ^ Vatiero M. (2009), "An Institutionalist Explanation of Market Dominances". World Competition. Law and Economics Review, 32(2):221–226.
  Jump up ^ If the power company raised rates the customer either pays the increase or does without power.
  ^ Jump up to: a b c d e Krugman & Wells, Microeconomics 2d ed. (Worth 2009)
  Jump up ^ Often such natural monopolies will also have the benefit of government granted monopolies.
  Jump up ^ Samuelson & Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 17th ed. (McGraw-Hill 2001) at 183–184.
  Jump up ^ Samuelson & Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 17th ed. (McGraw-Hill 2001) at 183.
  ^ Jump up to: a b Samuelson & Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 17th ed. (McGraw-Hill 2001) at 184.
  Jump up ^ J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Überregulation Without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 34 (2004), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1388&context=fclj.
  ^ Jump up to: a b
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