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created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 123, "full_page_content": "124 \n \n \n \nTable 3.3. Example Stateful Firewall Connection State Table \nApplication-Level Gateway \nAn application-level gateway, also called a proxy server, acts as a relay of application-\nlevel traffic. \n The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and \nthe gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user \nresponds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway \ncontacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the \napplication data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy \ncode for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded \nacross the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific \nfeatures of an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while \ndenying all other features.  \n Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying \nto deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at \nthe TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable \napplications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application \nlevel.  \nA prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on \neach connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with \nthe gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in \nboth directions. \n3.7.2.3 Circuit-Level Gateway \nA third type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway (Figure 20.1c). This can be a \nstand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level \ngateway for certain applications. A circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end", "chunk_id": "c6525143-ed88-493e-9524-73368087d3a0", "chroma:document": "across the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific \nfeatures of an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while \ndenying all other features.  \n Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying \nto deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 123, "full_page_content": "124 \n \n \n \nTable 3.3. Example Stateful Firewall Connection State Table \nApplication-Level Gateway \nAn application-level gateway, also called a proxy server, acts as a relay of application-\nlevel traffic. \n The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and \nthe gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user \nresponds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway \ncontacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the \napplication data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy \ncode for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded \nacross the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific \nfeatures of an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while \ndenying all other features.  \n Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying \nto deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at \nthe TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable \napplications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application \nlevel.  \nA prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on \neach connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with \nthe gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in \nboth directions. \n3.7.2.3 Circuit-Level Gateway \nA third type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway (Figure 20.1c). This can be a \nstand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level \ngateway for certain applications. A circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end", "chunk_id": "043765d3-032b-4671-845d-2e2809d7c0f4", "chroma:document": "the TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable \napplications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application \nlevel.  \nA prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on \neach connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 123, "full_page_content": "124 \n \n \n \nTable 3.3. Example Stateful Firewall Connection State Table \nApplication-Level Gateway \nAn application-level gateway, also called a proxy server, acts as a relay of application-\nlevel traffic. \n The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and \nthe gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user \nresponds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway \ncontacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the \napplication data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy \ncode for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded \nacross the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific \nfeatures of an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while \ndenying all other features.  \n Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying \nto deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at \nthe TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable \napplications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application \nlevel.  \nA prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on \neach connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with \nthe gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in \nboth directions. \n3.7.2.3 Circuit-Level Gateway \nA third type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway (Figure 20.1c). This can be a \nstand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level \ngateway for certain applications. A circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end", "chunk_id": "43d71fd8-b416-467f-b0b1-8d47efd35269", "chroma:document": "the gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in \nboth directions. \n3.7.2.3 Circuit-Level Gateway \nA third type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway (Figure 20.1c). This can be a \nstand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 123, "full_page_content": "124 \n \n \n \nTable 3.3. Example Stateful Firewall Connection State Table \nApplication-Level Gateway \nAn application-level gateway, also called a proxy server, acts as a relay of application-\nlevel traffic. \n The user contacts the gateway using a TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FTP, and \nthe gateway asks the user for the name of the remote host to be accessed. When the user \nresponds and provides a valid user ID and authentication information, the gateway \ncontacts the application on the remote host and relays TCP segments containing the \napplication data between the two endpoints. If the gateway does not implement the proxy \ncode for a specific application, the service is not supported and cannot be forwarded \nacross the firewall. Further, the gateway can be configured to support only specific \nfeatures of an application that the network administrator considers acceptable while \ndenying all other features.  \n Application-level gateways tend to be more secure than packet filters. Rather than trying \nto deal with the numerous possible combinations that are to be allowed and forbidden at \nthe TCP and IP level, the application-level gateway need only scrutinize a few allowable \napplications. In addition, it is easy to log and audit all incoming traffic at the application \nlevel.  \nA prime disadvantage of this type of gateway is the additional processing overhead on \neach connection. In effect, there are two spliced connections between the end users, with \nthe gateway at the splice point, and the gateway must examine and forward all traffic in \nboth directions. \n3.7.2.3 Circuit-Level Gateway \nA third type of firewall is the circuit-level gateway (Figure 20.1c). This can be a \nstand-alone system or it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level \ngateway for certain applications. A circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end", "chunk_id": "2c5a7312-1d11-4a21-9c95-6292dbd3d5e0", "chroma:document": "gateway for certain applications. A circuit-level gateway does not permit an end-to-end"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "4794046c-b7f2-444e-8dd7-56bdde1b7157", "chroma:document": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "f359acfd-3882-4bba-9b08-aad5bfaaa5aa", "chroma:document": "An example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "1a27cb17-d6e9-437d-bc9c-9243e1b5fbf8", "chroma:document": "firewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "6dffea87-e5eb-4f33-b8da-6644ddad3e00", "chroma:document": "A bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "45ad46d8-89e9-4db1-8fe5-53850fafff53", "chroma:document": "\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "833d55ed-5c1f-4ad7-920c-05743efdfd28", "chroma:document": "command set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 124, "full_page_content": "125 \n \nTCP connection; rather, the gateway sets up two TCP connections, one between itself \nand a TCP user on an inner host and one between itself and a TCP user on an outside \nhost. Once the two connections are established, the gateway typically relays TCP \nsegments from one connection to the other without examining the contents.  \nAn example of a circuit-level gateway implementation is the SOCKS package; \nversion 5 of SOCKS is defined in RFC 1928. The RFC defines SOCKS in the following \nfashion:  \nSOCKS consists of the following components:  \n\u25cf The SOCKS server, which runs on a UNIX-based firewall. \n \u25cf The SOCKS client library, which runs on internal hosts protected by the \nfirewall.  \n\u25cf SOCKS-ified versions of several standard client programs such as FTP and \nTELNET. The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the \nrecompilation or relinking of TCP based client applications to use the appropriate \nencapsulation routines in the SOCKS library. \n 3.7.2.4 Bastion Host \nA bastion host is a system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical \nstrong point in the network's security. Common characteristics of a bastion host include \nthe following: \n\u25cf The bastion host hardware platform executes a secure version of its operating \nsystem, making it a trusted system. \n\u25cf Only the services that the network administrator considers essential are installed \non the bastion host.  \n\u25cf The bastion host may require additional authentication before a user is allowed \naccess to the proxy services.  \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the standard application's \ncommand set. \n\u25cf Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host systems. This \nmeans that the limited command/feature set may be applied only to a subset of systems \non the protected network. \n\u25cf Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all traffic, each \nconnection, and the duration of each connection. The audit log is an essential tool for \ndiscovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000.", "chunk_id": "eb94a2d3-2af3-4537-b61f-c925e7244dc8", "chroma:document": "discovering and terminating intruder attacks. \n\u25cf Each proxy module is a very small software package specifically designed for \nnetwork security. Because of its relative simplicity, it is easier to check such modules for \nsecurity flaws. For example, a typical UNIX mail application may contain over 20,000 \nlines of code, while a mail proxy may contain fewer than 1000."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 125, "full_page_content": "126 \n \n\u25cf Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a \nproblem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can \nbe uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications.  \n\u25cf A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial \nconfiguration file.  \n\u25cf Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on \nthe bastion host. \n3.7.3 Firewall Configurations \nIn addition to the use of a simple configuration consisting of a single system, such \nas a single packet filtering router or a single gateway, more complex configurations are \npossible and indeed more common. Figure 3.13 illustrates three common firewall \nconfigurations. We examine each of these in turn. \n \nFigure 3.13  Firewall Configurations", "chunk_id": "87b530e7-4d5d-466b-98cd-fc44b265b4f8", "chroma:document": "126 \n \n\u25cf Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a \nproblem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can \nbe uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications.  \n\u25cf A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial \nconfiguration file."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 125, "full_page_content": "126 \n \n\u25cf Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a \nproblem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can \nbe uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications.  \n\u25cf A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial \nconfiguration file.  \n\u25cf Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on \nthe bastion host. \n3.7.3 Firewall Configurations \nIn addition to the use of a simple configuration consisting of a single system, such \nas a single packet filtering router or a single gateway, more complex configurations are \npossible and indeed more common. Figure 3.13 illustrates three common firewall \nconfigurations. We examine each of these in turn. \n \nFigure 3.13  Firewall Configurations", "chunk_id": "29684069-e65f-44d9-a88b-2e1ebd129836", "chroma:document": "\u25cf Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on \nthe bastion host. \n3.7.3 Firewall Configurations \nIn addition to the use of a simple configuration consisting of a single system, such \nas a single packet filtering router or a single gateway, more complex configurations are"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
id: 5d98dda7-5cae-44ad-a357-9ae4f8bfc58f
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 125, "full_page_content": "126 \n \n\u25cf Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host. If there is a \nproblem with the operation of any proxy, or if a future vulnerability is discovered, it can \nbe uninstalled without affecting the operation of the other proxy applications.  \n\u25cf A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read its initial \nconfiguration file.  \n\u25cf Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and secured directory on \nthe bastion host. \n3.7.3 Firewall Configurations \nIn addition to the use of a simple configuration consisting of a single system, such \nas a single packet filtering router or a single gateway, more complex configurations are \npossible and indeed more common. Figure 3.13 illustrates three common firewall \nconfigurations. We examine each of these in turn. \n \nFigure 3.13  Firewall Configurations", "chunk_id": "7f4e888f-405c-4226-a7d2-e81a7f03149d", "chroma:document": "possible and indeed more common. Figure 3.13 illustrates three common firewall \nconfigurations. We examine each of these in turn. \n \nFigure 3.13  Firewall Configurations"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
id: a7396dfd-b0dd-40ca-bf57-b63134710d6d
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "a2e5d197-1eca-4f55-9fb1-1b334dd419f0", "chroma:document": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
id: 32611bbc-b325-4dfc-be20-c2edb9233377
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "b3d7f7e4-219c-4ed8-a63e-d4c63c33441e", "chroma:document": "in. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "f992968b-6f2e-4c63-b56c-a6fa13f6f488", "chroma:document": "This configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "42b802f2-d247-4adc-b24e-dc3c6d96cace", "chroma:document": "The screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "edc379b7-6a3f-46ac-8ab8-ee4161639bd5", "chroma:document": "The screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages:"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "2ff0cd91-b481-402b-9a25-03c546d8502d", "chroma:document": "\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "e30a291e-5f08-48f1-bfe4-c4f24447c8c2", "chroma:document": "to the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 126, "full_page_content": "127 \n \nIn the screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration (Figure 3.13 a), the \nfirewall consists of two systems: a packet-filtering router and a bastion host. Typically, \nthe router is configured so that \n1. For traffic from the Internet, only IP packets destined for the bastion host are allowed \nin. \n2. For traffic from the internal network, only IP packets from the bastion host are allowed \nout. \nThe bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions. This configuration \nhas greater security than simply a packet-filtering router or an application-level gateway \nalone, for two reasons.  \nThis configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access. For \nexample, the internal network may include a public information server, such as a Web \nserver, for which a high level of security is not required. In that case, the router can be \nconfigured to allow direct traffic between the information server and the Internet. \nThe screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration physically \nprevents such a security breach (3.13 b). The advantages of dual layers of security that \nwere present in the previous configuration are present here as well. Again, an information \nserver or other hosts can be allowed direct communication with the router if this is in \naccord with the security policy. \nThe screened subnet firewall configuration of Figure 20.2c is the most secure of \nthose we have considered. In this configuration, two packet-filtering routers are used, one \nbetween the bastion host and the Internet and one between the bastion host and the \ninternal network. This configuration offers several advantages: \n\u25cf There are now three levels of defense to thwart intruders. \n\u25cf The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the \nInternet; therefore, the internal network is invisible to the Internet. \n\u25cf Similarly, the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet \nto the internal network; therefore, the systems on the inside network cannot construct \ndirect routes to the Internet. \n3.8 Trusted Systems \nOne way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious \nprograms is to implement trusted system technology. \n3.8.1 Data Access Control \nFollowing successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible", "chunk_id": "2c8f307f-0a1a-454a-835c-fabe8c8ccb93", "chroma:document": "Following successful logon, the user has been granted access to one or a set of \nhosts and applications. This is generally not sufficient for a system that includes sensitive \ndata in its database. Through the user access control procedure, a user can be identified \nto the system. Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 127, "full_page_content": "128 \n \noperations and file accesses. The operating system can then enforce rules based on the \nuser profile.  \n A general model of access control as exercised by a file or database management \nsystem is that of an access matrix (3.14 a). The basic elements of the model are as \nfollows:  \n\u25cf Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects. Generally, the concept of \nsubject equates with that of process. Any user or application actually gains access to an \nobject by means of a process that represents that user or application.  \n\u25cf Object: Anything to which access is controlled. Examples include files, \nportions of files, programs, and segments of memory. \n \u25cf Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject. Examples \nare read, write, and execute.", "chunk_id": "f7749e87-61d4-49f6-b45c-0bf9e284ade9", "chroma:document": "128 \n \noperations and file accesses. The operating system can then enforce rules based on the \nuser profile.  \n A general model of access control as exercised by a file or database management \nsystem is that of an access matrix (3.14 a). The basic elements of the model are as \nfollows:  \n\u25cf Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects. Generally, the concept of"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 127, "full_page_content": "128 \n \noperations and file accesses. The operating system can then enforce rules based on the \nuser profile.  \n A general model of access control as exercised by a file or database management \nsystem is that of an access matrix (3.14 a). The basic elements of the model are as \nfollows:  \n\u25cf Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects. Generally, the concept of \nsubject equates with that of process. Any user or application actually gains access to an \nobject by means of a process that represents that user or application.  \n\u25cf Object: Anything to which access is controlled. Examples include files, \nportions of files, programs, and segments of memory. \n \u25cf Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject. Examples \nare read, write, and execute.", "chunk_id": "62fe73af-c9c1-4249-9fca-bd40ef4f8374", "chroma:document": "subject equates with that of process. Any user or application actually gains access to an \nobject by means of a process that represents that user or application.  \n\u25cf Object: Anything to which access is controlled. Examples include files, \nportions of files, programs, and segments of memory. \n \u25cf Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject. Examples"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 127, "full_page_content": "128 \n \noperations and file accesses. The operating system can then enforce rules based on the \nuser profile.  \n A general model of access control as exercised by a file or database management \nsystem is that of an access matrix (3.14 a). The basic elements of the model are as \nfollows:  \n\u25cf Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects. Generally, the concept of \nsubject equates with that of process. Any user or application actually gains access to an \nobject by means of a process that represents that user or application.  \n\u25cf Object: Anything to which access is controlled. Examples include files, \nportions of files, programs, and segments of memory. \n \u25cf Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject. Examples \nare read, write, and execute.", "chunk_id": "9ecd9c03-0272-42f7-a9cb-6341d2077d6b", "chroma:document": "are read, write, and execute."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "b4fcfe1b-7529-4f36-88d2-98a97b617649", "chroma:document": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "7031fa7a-e1e1-4553-a930-9d07e326b116", "chroma:document": "Decomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
id: c6f805eb-294a-4951-ac42-40349a1b472b
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "1175af68-9ba7-490c-8f5d-17992c848923", "chroma:document": "lists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "98a47eb8-1818-42c2-9361-e274f783e952", "chroma:document": "given message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "94599e9a-8114-4365-938e-9fff4c8ebbbf", "chroma:document": "This concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "56ef4e84-5493-4538-9cb8-47cb45d0fb9a", "chroma:document": "is that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "c3338c89-9b49-46a1-81b8-798ddd7ce1dd", "chroma:document": "This is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "49e62982-a2b6-4d97-a021-962fc6bb4687", "chroma:document": "subjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 128, "full_page_content": "129 \n \n \nFigure 3.14  Access Control Structure \nOne axis of the matrix consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access. \nTypically, this list will consist of individual users or user groups, although access could \nbe controlled for terminals, hosts, or applications instead of or in addition to users. The \nother axis lists the objects that may be accessed.  \nDecomposition by rows yields capability tickets (Figure 3.14 c). A capability \nticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user. Each user has a number of \ntickets and may be authorized to loan or give them to others. Because tickets may be \ndispersed around the system, they present a greater security problem than access control \nlists. In particular, the ticket must be unforgeable. One way to accomplish this is to have \nthe operating system hold all tickets on behalf of users. These tickets would have to be \nheld in a region of memory inaccessible to users. \n3.8.2 The Concept of Trusted Systems  \nMuch of what we have discussed so far has been concerned with protecting a \ngiven message or item from passive or active attacks by a given user. A somewhat \ndifferent but widely applicable requirement is to protect data or resources on the basis of \nlevels of security. This is commonly found in the military, where information is \ncategorized as unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), or beyond. \nThis concept is equally applicable in other areas, where information can be organized \ninto gross categories and users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of \ndata.  \nWhen multiple categories or levels of data are defined, the requirement is referred \nto as multilevel security. The general statement of the requirement for multilevel security \nis that a subject at a high level may not convey information to a subject at a lower or \nnoncomparable level unless that flow accurately reflects the will of an authorized user. A \nmultilevel secure system must enforce the following: \n \u25cf No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level. \nThis is referred to in the literature as the Simple Security Property.  \n\u25cf No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal \nsecurity level.  \nFig 3.15 illustrates reference monitor. The reference monitor is a controlling \nelement in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of \nsubjects to objects on the basis of security parameters of the subject and object. The \nreference monitor has access to a file, known as the security kernel database, that lists the \naccess privileges (security clearance) of each subject and the protection attributes \n(classification level) of each object. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no \nread up, no write down) and has the following properties:", "chunk_id": "d533c375-d4b1-4b71-b165-00342255c61f", "chroma:document": "read up, no write down) and has the following properties:"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 129, "full_page_content": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it \nmust be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure \nsoftware implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database.  \nA final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security \nCenter within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program.", "chunk_id": "ae73e802-899d-48b9-80a0-473386140e95", "chroma:document": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 129, "full_page_content": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it \nmust be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure \nsoftware implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database.  \nA final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security \nCenter within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program.", "chunk_id": "2af9e1e1-fa94-4e63-a992-6ef829dc4cdb", "chroma:document": "must be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 129, "full_page_content": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it \nmust be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure \nsoftware implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database.  \nA final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security \nCenter within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program.", "chunk_id": "8f352644-d3e0-462a-87c3-4a88fe0047f1", "chroma:document": "software implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 129, "full_page_content": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it \nmust be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure \nsoftware implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database.  \nA final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security \nCenter within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program.", "chunk_id": "a679194e-f8af-4d32-98c6-bf98433386cc", "chroma:document": "A final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 129, "full_page_content": "130 \n \n\u25cf Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, \nfor example, when a file is opened.  \n\u25cf Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized \nmodification.  \n\u25cf Verifiability: The reference monitor's correctness must be provable. That is, it \nmust be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the \nsecurity rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. \n \n \nFigure 3.15 Reference Monitor Concept \nThese are stiff requirements. The requirement for complete mediation means that \nevery access to data within main memory and on disk and tape must be mediated. Pure \nsoftware implementations impose too high a performance penalty to be practical; the \nsolution must be at least partly in hardware. The requirement for isolation means that it \nmust not be possible for an attacker, no matter how clever, to change the logic of the \nreference monitor or the contents of the security kernel database.  \nA final element illustrated in Figure 3.15 is an audit file. Important security \nevents, such as detected security violations and authorized changes to the security kernel \ndatabase, are stored in the audit file. In an effort to meet its own needs and as a service to \nthe public, the U.S. Department of Defense in 1981 established the Computer Security \nCenter within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program.", "chunk_id": "d2108b19-6772-4ce6-b089-06479b9cebd6", "chroma:document": "Center within the National Security Agency (NSA) with the goal of encouraging the \nwidespread availability of trusted computer systems. This goal is realized through the \ncenter's Commercial Product Evaluation Program."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "27feba92-3eaa-450f-a03b-66b46df46755", "chroma:document": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "cd62421b-4bf5-4917-85a4-9de825e32d73", "chroma:document": "through a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "64eec3ef-7b1e-4672-8a65-ac7b6e49b076", "chroma:document": "The Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "2ec6574f-13ba-425a-bd9f-2eb48916c4f6", "chroma:document": "the Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "c7a5ec51-d8da-4bda-9535-8df9e6e99518", "chroma:document": "access Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 130, "full_page_content": "131 \n \n3.8.3 Trojan Horse Defense  \nOne way to secure against Trojan horse attacks is the use of a secure, trusted \noperating system. Figure 3.16 illustrates an example. In this case, a Trojan horse is used \nto get around the standard security mechanism used by most file management and \noperating systems: the access control list. In this example, a user named Bob interacts \nthrough a program with a data file containing the critically sensitive character string \n\"CPE170KS.\" User Bob has created the file with read/write permission provided only to \nprograms executing on his own behalf: that is, only processes that are owned by Bob may \naccess the file.  \n \n \nFigure 3.16 Trojan Horse and Secure Operating System \nThe Trojan horse attack begins when a hostile user, named Alice, gains legitimate \naccess to the system and installs both a Trojan horse program and a private file to be used \nin the attack as a \"back pocket.\" Alice gives read/write permission to herself for this file \nand gives Bob write-only permission (Figure 3.16 a). Alice now induces Bob to invoke \nthe Trojan horse program, perhaps by advertising it as a useful utility. When the program \ndetects that it is being executed by Bob, it reads the sensitive character string from Bob's \nfile and copies it into Alice's back-pocket file (Figure 3.16 b). Both the read and write \noperations satisfy the constraints imposed by access control lists. Alice then has only to \naccess Bob's file at a later time to learn the value of the string. Now consider the use of a \nsecure operating system in this scenario (Figure 3.16 c). Security levels are assigned to \nsubjects at logon on the basis of criteria such as the terminal from which the computer is \nbeing accessed and the user involved, as identified by password/ID. Alice's file and \nprocesses are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple", "chunk_id": "6e8c8726-9fa3-42ae-826b-189308bccc34", "chroma:document": "processes are restricted to public. If Bob invokes the Trojan horse program (Figure 3.16 \nd), that program acquires Bob's security level. It is therefore able, under the simple"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 131, "full_page_content": "132 \n \nsecurity property, to observe the sensitive character string. When the program attempts \nto store the string in a public file (the back-pocket file), however, the is violated and the \nattempt is disallowed by the reference monitor. Thus, the attempt to write into the back-\npocket file is denied even though the access control list permits it:  \n \nReferences: \n\u2022 William Stallings, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, 4th Edition, Pearson, 2009. \n\u2022 Behrouz A. Forouzan, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008.", "chunk_id": "5ba119bf-fec7-4d40-b525-0ee7890492b6", "chroma:document": "132 \n \nsecurity property, to observe the sensitive character string. When the program attempts \nto store the string in a public file (the back-pocket file), however, the is violated and the \nattempt is disallowed by the reference monitor. Thus, the attempt to write into the back-\npocket file is denied even though the access control list permits it:  \n \nReferences:"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 131, "full_page_content": "132 \n \nsecurity property, to observe the sensitive character string. When the program attempts \nto store the string in a public file (the back-pocket file), however, the is violated and the \nattempt is disallowed by the reference monitor. Thus, the attempt to write into the back-\npocket file is denied even though the access control list permits it:  \n \nReferences: \n\u2022 William Stallings, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, 4th Edition, Pearson, 2009. \n\u2022 Behrouz A. Forouzan, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008.", "chunk_id": "87622557-e5d3-46b8-a9e7-e77be113542f", "chroma:document": "References: \n\u2022 William Stallings, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, 4th Edition, Pearson, 2009. \n\u2022 Behrouz A. Forouzan, \u201c Cryptography and Network Security\u201d, Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 133, "full_page_content": "134 \n \n4. Operations and Physical Security \nOrigin \u2013 Process \u2013 Laws \u2013Physical Security \u2013 Controls \u2013 Protecting People \u2013 Protecting Data \u2013 \nProtecting Equipment \n4.1 Operations Security \n\u2022 Operations security, known in military and government circles as OPSEC, is, at a high level, \na process that we use to protect our information.  \n\u2022 The entire process involves not only putting countermeasures in place, but before doing so, \ncarefully identifying what exactly we need to protect, and what we need to protect it against. \n\u2022 It is important to remember when putting security measures in place that we should be \nimplementing security measures that are relative to the value of what we are protecting. If we \nevenly apply the same level of security to everything, we may be overprotecting some things \nthat are not of high value and under protecting things of much greater value. \n4.1.1 Origins of operations Security \n\u2022 Operations security may be a fairly recent idea, as far as the specific implementation of \nOPSEC by the U.S.  government is concerned, but the concepts comprising it are truly ancient \nindeed.  \n\u2022 We can see such ideas put forth in the works of Sun Tzu thousands of years ago, and in the \nwords of the founders of the United States, such as George Washington and Benjamin \nFranklin.  \n\u2022 While we can point to nearly any period in history, and nearly any military or large \ncommercial organization, and find the principles of operations security present, a few specific \noccasions present themselves as being particularly influential in the development and use of \noperations security. \n4.1.1.1 Sun Tzu \n\u2022 Sun Tzu was a Chinese military general who lived in the sixth century BC.  \n\u2022 Among those of a military or strategic bent, Sun Tzu\u2019s work The Art of War is considered to \nbe somewhat of a bible for conducting such operations.  \n\u2022 The Art of War has spawned countless clones and texts that apply the principles it espouses \nto a variety of situations, including, but not limited to, information security.  \n\u2022 The text provides some of the earliest examples of operations security principles that are \nplainly stated and clearly documented.", "chunk_id": "0ed5a1f4-7be0-4988-9d86-83895b6f64ee", "chroma:document": "134 \n \n4. Operations and Physical Security \nOrigin \u2013 Process \u2013 Laws \u2013Physical Security \u2013 Controls \u2013 Protecting People \u2013 Protecting Data \u2013 \nProtecting Equipment \n4.1 Operations Security \n\u2022 Operations security, known in military and government circles as OPSEC, is, at a high level, \na process that we use to protect our information."}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 133, "full_page_content": "134 \n \n4. Operations and Physical Security \nOrigin \u2013 Process \u2013 Laws \u2013Physical Security \u2013 Controls \u2013 Protecting People \u2013 Protecting Data \u2013 \nProtecting Equipment \n4.1 Operations Security \n\u2022 Operations security, known in military and government circles as OPSEC, is, at a high level, \na process that we use to protect our information.  \n\u2022 The entire process involves not only putting countermeasures in place, but before doing so, \ncarefully identifying what exactly we need to protect, and what we need to protect it against. \n\u2022 It is important to remember when putting security measures in place that we should be \nimplementing security measures that are relative to the value of what we are protecting. If we \nevenly apply the same level of security to everything, we may be overprotecting some things \nthat are not of high value and under protecting things of much greater value. \n4.1.1 Origins of operations Security \n\u2022 Operations security may be a fairly recent idea, as far as the specific implementation of \nOPSEC by the U.S.  government is concerned, but the concepts comprising it are truly ancient \nindeed.  \n\u2022 We can see such ideas put forth in the works of Sun Tzu thousands of years ago, and in the \nwords of the founders of the United States, such as George Washington and Benjamin \nFranklin.  \n\u2022 While we can point to nearly any period in history, and nearly any military or large \ncommercial organization, and find the principles of operations security present, a few specific \noccasions present themselves as being particularly influential in the development and use of \noperations security. \n4.1.1.1 Sun Tzu \n\u2022 Sun Tzu was a Chinese military general who lived in the sixth century BC.  \n\u2022 Among those of a military or strategic bent, Sun Tzu\u2019s work The Art of War is considered to \nbe somewhat of a bible for conducting such operations.  \n\u2022 The Art of War has spawned countless clones and texts that apply the principles it espouses \nto a variety of situations, including, but not limited to, information security.  \n\u2022 The text provides some of the earliest examples of operations security principles that are \nplainly stated and clearly documented.", "chunk_id": "102755bd-0035-4e45-b6dd-519d4043e084", "chroma:document": "commercial organization, and find the principles of operations security present, a few specific \noccasions present themselves as being particularly influential in the development and use of \noperations security. \n4.1.1.1 Sun Tzu \n\u2022 Sun Tzu was a Chinese military general who lived in the sixth century BC."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "1daec38b-f9fd-45ba-8803-2f5c54721c09", "chroma:document": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "6c06d6a9-0bdb-41c3-bfb2-11e61f67fb7c", "chroma:document": "our own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "91010b92-4858-4c17-aea4-8f08221d5979", "chroma:document": "\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "3496ac8b-6a6f-4aa0-99af-2dcf912918d9", "chroma:document": "\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "1f67cbaf-edb2-4d9a-909a-e5da59171751", "chroma:document": "combination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "b3061735-684b-4940-9177-0c1b0b958875", "chroma:document": "\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 134, "full_page_content": "135 \n \n\u2022 We can point out numerous passages within The Art of War as being related to operations \nsecurity principles.  \n\u2022 The first passage is \u201cIf I am able to determine the enemy\u2019s dispositions while at the same \ntime, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide\u201d.  \n\u2022 This is a simple admonition to discover information held by our opponents while protecting \nour own. This is one of the most basic tenets of operations security. \n4.1.1.2 George Washington \n\u2022 George Washington, the first president of the United States, was well known for being an \nastute and skilled military commander and is also well known for promoting good operational \nsecurity practices.  \n\u2022 He is known in the operations security community for having said, \u201cEven minutiae should \nhave a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with \nothers of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion\u201d, meaning that even small items \nof information, which are valueless individually, can be of great value in combination.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in the three main items of information that constitute \nan identity: a name, an address, and a Social Security number.  \n\u2022 Individually, these items are completely useless. We could take any one of them in isolation \nand put it up on a billboard for the world to see, and not be any worse for having done so. In \ncombination, these three items are sufficient for an attacker to steal our identity and use it for \nall manners of fraudulent activities. \n4.1.1.3 Vietnam War \n\u2022 During the Vietnam War, the United States came to realize that information regarding troop \nmovements, operations, and other military activities was being leaked to the enemy.  \n\u2022 Clearly, in most environments, military or otherwise, having our opponents gain \nforeknowledge of our activities is a bad thing, particularly so when lives may be at stake.  \n\u2022 In an effort to curtail this unauthorized passing of information, a study, codenamed Purple \nDragon, a symbol of OPSEC that persists to this day Ultimately, the study brought about two \nmain ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC.", "chunk_id": "ee569aca-44ab-4a08-92b6-4d7bba7339b5", "chroma:document": "main ideas: first, in that particular environment, eavesdroppers and spies abounded; and \nsecond, a survey was needed to get to the bottom of the information loss.  \n\u2022 The survey asked questions about the information itself, vulnerability analysis, and other \nitems. The team conducting these surveys and analyses also coined the term operations \nsecurity and the acronym OPSEC."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 135, "full_page_content": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a \ncompetitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.  \n\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a \nfairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management.  \n\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process", "chunk_id": "75c3caa1-914b-4647-a8fb-d903b04096bc", "chroma:document": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 135, "full_page_content": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a \ncompetitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.  \n\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a \nfairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management.  \n\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process", "chunk_id": "937e60ec-fbbf-4f9f-a203-4c70e738608c", "chroma:document": "competitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors."}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 135, "full_page_content": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a \ncompetitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.  \n\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a \nfairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management.  \n\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process", "chunk_id": "5d194c8a-44dd-490e-a3f0-62bb21958ad2", "chroma:document": "\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 135, "full_page_content": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a \ncompetitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.  \n\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a \nfairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management.  \n\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process", "chunk_id": "ee581b60-d977-4dc5-a909-12c049c3069b", "chroma:document": "fairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 135, "full_page_content": "136 \n \n4.1.1.4 Business \n\u2022 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of the operations security concepts that were used in \nthe world of the military and government were beginning to take root in the commercial \nworld.  \n\u2022 The ideas of industrial espionage and spying on our business competition in order to gain a \ncompetitive advantage have been around since the beginning of time, but as such concepts \nwere becoming more structured in the military world, they were becoming more structured in \nthe business world as well.  \n\u2022 In 1980, Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, published a book titled \nCompetitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.  \n\u2022 This text, now nearing its sixtieth printing, set the basis for what is referred to as competitive \nintelligence.  \n\u2022 Competitive intelligence is generally defined as the process of intelligence gathering and \nanalysis in order to support business decisions.  \n\u2022 The counterpart of competitive intelligence, competitive counterintelligence, correlates in a \nfairly direct manner to the operations security principles that were laid out by the government \nonly a few years previously, and is an active part of conducting business to this day. \n4.1.2 The operations security Process \n\u2022 The operations security process, as laid out by the U.S. government, will look very familiar \nto anyone who has worked with risk management.  \n\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process", "chunk_id": "8827b764-c47f-42c8-bd3b-57f5e931304b", "chroma:document": "\u2022 In essence, the process is to identify what information we have that needs protection, analyze \nthe threats and vulnerabilities that might impact it, and develop methods of mitigation for \nthose threats and vulnerabilities. \n \nFig. 1 Operation Security Process"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "e6588a2e-37d2-4239-a474-5133a9c60e8f", "chroma:document": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "49fa8aa0-febd-4d89-b282-6a90ee28c8ae", "chroma:document": "might even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "83da0c88-a893-4963-ad5e-1a9e3a4e84f4", "chroma:document": "\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "28159a9c-61f1-4ca5-9c22-256f91f2d029", "chroma:document": "\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "07980c3b-af85-43b4-b017-64fc51ac7eaa", "chroma:document": "\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "90999b44-68c5-41f7-973c-34297dae992f", "chroma:document": "threats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "a53ae436-ddf8-40a9-9bd9-d54fbfde6097", "chroma:document": "to software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 136, "full_page_content": "137 \n \n4.1.2.1 Identification of Critical Information \n\u2022 The initial step, and, arguably, the most important step in the operations curity process, is to \nidentify our most critical information assets.  \n\u2022 Although we could spend a great deal of time identifying every little item of information that \nmight even remotely be of importance, this is not the goal in this step of the operations security \nprocess.  \n\u2022 For any given business, individual, military operation, process, or project, there are bound to \nbe at least a few critical items of information on which everything else depends.  \n\u2022 For a soft drink company, it might be our secret recipe, for an application vendor it might be \nour source code, for a military operation it might be our attack timetable, and so on.  \n\u2022 These are the assets that most need protection and will cause us the most harm if exposed, \nand these are the assets we should be identifying.  \n4.2.2.2 Analysis of Threats  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing threats to our information assets, we would start with the critical \ninformation we identified in the previous step.  \n\u2022 With the list of critical information, we can then begin to look at what harm might be caused \nby critical information being exposed, and who might exploit the exposure.  \n\u2022 This is the same process used by many military and government organizations to classify \ninformation and determine who is allowed to see it.  \n\u2022 For instance, if we are a software company that has identified the proprietary source code of \none of our main products as an item of critical information, we might determine that the chief \nthreats of such an exposure could be exposure to attackers and exposure to our competition.  \n\u2022 If the source code were exposed to attackers, they might be able to determine the scheme we \nuse to generate license keys for our products in order to prevent piracy, and use access to the \nsource code to develop a utility that could generate legitimate keys, thus costing us revenue \nto software piracy.  \n\u2022 In the case of our competition, they might use access to our source code to copy features for \nuse in their own applications, or they might copy large portions of our application and sell it \nthemselves.  \n\u2022 This step in the process needs to be repeated for each item of information we have identified \nas being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information.", "chunk_id": "56ab0f80-4dd5-4359-be17-2e19522da26f", "chroma:document": "as being critical, for each party that might take advantage of it if it were exposed, and for each \nuse they might make of the information."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "c941ae95-b948-4b76-a4e1-0c6617fe02a1", "chroma:document": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "f8da8b88-d775-44de-856e-b91755acfdfc", "chroma:document": "\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "3bf38f02-5ef7-4d42-9d50-eddbc6fd6c16", "chroma:document": "with which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "bd465b7f-a551-4207-92a0-7bef5c5bc4a7", "chroma:document": "with, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "c6129059-d463-4842-a258-97668fa00803", "chroma:document": "\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code,"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "9b7c9f12-1ad4-4e3f-b880-e3381d403d16", "chroma:document": "and a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "4bcbefb4-5b5d-4a18-b94b-04638ab81ce2", "chroma:document": "\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 137, "full_page_content": "138 \n \n4.2.2.3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities \n\u2022 Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that can be used to harm us.  \n\u2022 In the case of analyzing the vulnerabilities in the protections we have put in place for our \ninformation assets, we will be looking at how the processes that interact with these assets are \nnormally conducted, and where we might attack in order to compromise them.  \n\u2022 When we looked at threats, we used the source of a software company as an example of an \nitem of critical information that might cause us harm if it were to find its way into the hands \nof our competition.  \n\u2022 When we look at vulnerabilities, we might find that our security controls on the source code \nwith which we are concerned are not very rigorous, and that it is possible to access, copy, \ndelete, or alter it without any authorization beyond that needed to access the operating system \nor network shares.  \n\u2022 This might make it possible for an attacker who has compromised the system to copy, tamper \nwith, or entirely delete the source code, or might render the files vulnerable to accidental \nalteration while the system is undergoing maintenance.  \n4.2.2.4 Assessment of Risks \n\u2022 Assessment of risks is where the proverbial rubber meets the road, in terms of deciding what \nissues we really need to be concerned about during the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Risk occurs when we have a matching threat and vulnerability, and only then. To go back to \nour software source code example, we had determined that we had seen a threat in the \npotential for our application source code being exposed in an unauthorized manner.  \n\u2022 Furthermore, we found that we had a threat in the poor controls on access to our source code, \nand a lack of policy in how exactly it was controlled.  \n\u2022 These two matching issues could potentially lead to the exposure of our critical information \nto our competitors or attackers. It is important to note again that we need a matching threat \nand vulnerability to constitute a risk.  \n\u2022 If the confidentiality of our source code was not an issue\u2014for instance, if we were creating \nan open source project and the source code was freely available to the public\u2014we would not \nhave a risk in this particular case. \n4.2.2.5 Application of Countermeasures  \n\u2022 Once we have discovered what risks to our critical information might be present, we would \nthen put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations", "chunk_id": "ac6ba5b1-408d-4917-90aa-61f9acba23fa", "chroma:document": "then put measures in place to mitigate them. Such measures are referred to in operations"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "3e1ca71e-3d21-4783-a853-5f2c7854cb7b", "chroma:document": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "dec39e00-81b1-4984-8756-b05bcf612ab6", "chroma:document": "\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "270127f0-d8df-41d1-bd37-64cd74bddb08", "chroma:document": "without changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "639dc283-3195-431f-aa35-74649bf84c16", "chroma:document": "\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "256f9f64-8c82-4ad6-803f-96fc1444f7e2", "chroma:document": "\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "52792fcc-7fbc-4b19-948e-47d2bdd3b02b", "chroma:document": "gained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 138, "full_page_content": "139 \n \nsecurity as countermeasures. As we discussed, in order to constitute a risk, we need a \nmatching set of threats and vulnerabilities.  \n\u2022 When we construct a countermeasure for a particular risk, in order to do the bare minimum, \nwe need only to mitigate either the threat or the vulnerability.  \n\u2022 In the case of our source code example, the threat was that our source code might be exposed \nto our competitors or attackers, and the vulnerability was the poor set of security controls we \nhad in place to protect it. \n\u2022 In this instance, there is not much that we can do to protect ourselves from the threat itself \nwithout changing the nature of our application entirely, so there is really not a good step for \nus to take to mitigate the threat.  \n\u2022 We can, however, put measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability. In the case of our source \ncode example, we had a vulnerability to match the threat because of the poor controls on  he \nhandling of the code itself.  \n\u2022 If we institute stronger measures on controlling access to the code and also put policy in place \nto lay out a set of rules for how it is to be handled, we will largely remove this vulnerability.  \n\u2022 Once we have broken the threat/vulnerability pair, we will likely no longer be left with much \nin the way of a serious risk.  \n\u2022 It is important to note that this is an iterative process; once we reach the end of the cycle, we \nwill, in all likelihood, need to go through the cycle more than once in order to fully mitigate \nany issues.  \n\u2022 Each time we go through the cycle, we will do so based on the knowledge and experience we \ngained from our previous mitigation efforts, and we will be able to tune our solution for an \neven greater level of security.  \n\u2022 In addition, when our environment changes and new factors arise, we will need to revisit this \nprocess.  \n4.1.2 Laws of operations security \n\u2022 \nAs a somewhat different, and briefer, viewpoint on the operations security process, we can \nlook at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure.", "chunk_id": "b25c7d18-1c61-4b6d-bbed-41fd06cf3499", "chroma:document": "look at the Laws of OPSEC, developed by Kurt Haas while he was employed at the Nevada \nOperations Office of the DOE.  \n\u2022 \nThese laws represent a distillation of the operations security process we discussed earlier and, \nwhile we might not necessarily call them the most important parts of the process, they do \nserve to highlight some of the main concepts of the overall procedure."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "8f344104-8d06-4342-b92f-1e59c9055274", "chroma:document": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "bd3d1ee7-beb9-4e19-b502-17ca45220e44", "chroma:document": "\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "4a3f82f7-f6a6-4ab4-af7f-7bd8fe4d3138", "chroma:document": "\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "a3cdbba4-3270-4eb2-8834-34f10a59e029", "chroma:document": "may differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "f25d86c0-a07b-4553-9dae-ab16fc6c448b", "chroma:document": "\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "83a647fb-994b-4fbf-b689-b69c48e637aa", "chroma:document": "\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "8d7e7d6e-a104-4629-953a-070de773f4c8", "chroma:document": "sporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information),"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 139, "full_page_content": "140 \n \n(a) First Law \n\u2022 The first law of operations security is \u201cIf you don\u2019t know the threat, how do you know what \nto protect?\u201d. This law refers to the need to develop an awareness of both the actual and \npotential threats that our critical data might face.  \n\u2022 This law maps directly to the second step in the operations security process.  \n\u2022 Ultimately, as we discussed earlier, we may face many threats against our critical information.  \n\u2022 Each item of information may have a unique set of threats and may have multiple threats, \neach from a different source.  \n\u2022 Particularly as we see the surge of services that are cloud based, it is also important to \nunderstand that threats may be location dependent.  \n\u2022 We may have enumerated all the threats that face our critical data for a particular location, \nbut if we have our data replicated across multiple storage areas in multiple countries due to a \ncloud-based storage mechanism, threats may differ from one storage location to another. \nDifferent parties may have better or easier potential access in one particular area, or the laws \nmay differ significantly from one location to another and pose entirely new threats.  \n(b) Second Law \n\u2022 \u201cIf you don\u2019t know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it?\u201d  This law of \noperations security discusses the need to evaluate our information assets and determine what \nexactly we might consider to be our critical information.  \n\u2022 This second law equates to the first step in the operations security process. In the vast majority \nof government environments, identification and classification of information is mandated.  \n\u2022 Each item of information, perhaps a document or file, is assigned a label that attests to the \nsensitivity of its contents, such as classified, top secret, and so forth.  \n\u2022 Such labeling makes the task of identifying our critical information considerably easier, but \nis, unfortunately, not as frequently used outside of government.  \n\u2022 In the business world, we may see the policy that dictates the use of such information \nclassification, but, in the experience of the author, such labeling is usually implemented \nsporadically, at best. A few civilian industries, such as those that deal with data that has \nfederally mandated requirements for protection (financial data, medical data), do utilize \ninformation classification, but these are the exception rather than the rule. \n(c) Third Law  \n\u2022 The third and last law of operations security is \u201cIf you are not protecting it (the information), \n\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d.", "chunk_id": "3a7d4118-6080-4d83-8056-46be529692e5", "chroma:document": "\u2026 THE DRAGON WINS!\u201d."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 140, "full_page_content": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track \nbreaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane \nUniversity in January 2011. In this case, the university exposed a database containing the \nnames, addresses, Social Security numbers, and tax documents for every employee of the \nschool, more than 10,000 individuals all told.  \n\u2022 Although we might assume that a wily band of hackers had subverted the university\u2019s \nstringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security  \n\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they \nperform.  \n\u2022 Next in order of priority of protection is our data. If we have sufficiently planned and prepared \nin advance, we should be able to easily protect our data from any disaster that is not global in \nscale.  \n\u2022 If we do not prepare for such an issue, we can very easily lose our data permanently.  \n\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2", "chunk_id": "e6854968-35e9-4d30-8213-67c29e5dd74f", "chroma:document": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 140, "full_page_content": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track \nbreaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane \nUniversity in January 2011. In this case, the university exposed a database containing the \nnames, addresses, Social Security numbers, and tax documents for every employee of the \nschool, more than 10,000 individuals all told.  \n\u2022 Although we might assume that a wily band of hackers had subverted the university\u2019s \nstringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security  \n\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they \nperform.  \n\u2022 Next in order of priority of protection is our data. If we have sufficiently planned and prepared \nin advance, we should be able to easily protect our data from any disaster that is not global in \nscale.  \n\u2022 If we do not prepare for such an issue, we can very easily lose our data permanently.  \n\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2", "chunk_id": "f7723978-a076-4ad8-a446-7b29353feff0", "chroma:document": "breaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 140, "full_page_content": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track \nbreaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane \nUniversity in January 2011. In this case, the university exposed a database containing the \nnames, addresses, Social Security numbers, and tax documents for every employee of the \nschool, more than 10,000 individuals all told.  \n\u2022 Although we might assume that a wily band of hackers had subverted the university\u2019s \nstringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security  \n\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they \nperform.  \n\u2022 Next in order of priority of protection is our data. If we have sufficiently planned and prepared \nin advance, we should be able to easily protect our data from any disaster that is not global in \nscale.  \n\u2022 If we do not prepare for such an issue, we can very easily lose our data permanently.  \n\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2", "chunk_id": "dc02d732-1375-4130-9351-ca351b4bb2c3", "chroma:document": "stringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 140, "full_page_content": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track \nbreaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane \nUniversity in January 2011. In this case, the university exposed a database containing the \nnames, addresses, Social Security numbers, and tax documents for every employee of the \nschool, more than 10,000 individuals all told.  \n\u2022 Although we might assume that a wily band of hackers had subverted the university\u2019s \nstringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security  \n\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they \nperform.  \n\u2022 Next in order of priority of protection is our data. If we have sufficiently planned and prepared \nin advance, we should be able to easily protect our data from any disaster that is not global in \nscale.  \n\u2022 If we do not prepare for such an issue, we can very easily lose our data permanently.  \n\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2", "chunk_id": "40b26481-9385-477e-9da5-1ed3ec953895", "chroma:document": "\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they"}


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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 140, "full_page_content": "141 \n \n\u2022 This law is an overall reference to the necessity of the operations security process.  \n\u2022 If we do not take steps to protect our information from the dragon (our adversaries or \ncompetitors), they win by default. The case of the \u201cdragon\u201d winning\u2014from the constant \nappearance of security breaches reported by the news media and on Web sites that track \nbreaches, such as www.datalossdb.org\u2014appears to be unfortunately common.  \n\u2022 In many cases, we can examine a breach and find that it was the result of simple carelessness \nand noncompliance with the most basic security measures and due diligence.  \n\u2022 We can see an example of exactly this in a breach announced by Louisiana\u2019s Tulane \nUniversity in January 2011. In this case, the university exposed a database containing the \nnames, addresses, Social Security numbers, and tax documents for every employee of the \nschool, more than 10,000 individuals all told.  \n\u2022 Although we might assume that a wily band of hackers had subverted the university\u2019s \nstringent security measures and managed to steal a copy of the database from a protected \nsystem on the university network, this is sadly not the case.  \n\u2022 The employee data was located on an unencrypted laptop, which was placed in a briefcase \nand left in a car by a university employee that had gone out of town. \n \n4.2 Physical Security  \n\u2022 Physical security is largely concerned with the protection of three main categories of assets: \npeople, equipment, and data. Our primary concern, of course, is to protect people.  \n\u2022 People are considerably more difficult to replace than equipment or data, particularly when \nthey are experienced in their particular field and are familiar with the processes and tasks they \nperform.  \n\u2022 Next in order of priority of protection is our data. If we have sufficiently planned and prepared \nin advance, we should be able to easily protect our data from any disaster that is not global in \nscale.  \n\u2022 If we do not prepare for such an issue, we can very easily lose our data permanently.  \n\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2", "chunk_id": "4c1ae2ff-7150-406c-a6b4-fc6c7e74744f", "chroma:document": "\u2022 The threats we face when we are concerned with physical security generally fall into a few \nmain categories, as listed here and shown in Figure 2"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 141, "full_page_content": "142 \n \n \nFig.2 Major Categories of Physical Threats \n4.2.1 Physical security controls  \n\u2022 Physical security controls are the devices, systems, people, and other methods we put in place \nto ensure our security in a physical sense.  \n\u2022 There are three main types of physical controls: deterrent, detective, and preventive, as shown \nin Figure 3.  \n\u2022 Each has a different focus, but none is completely distinct and separate from the others, as we \nwill discuss shortly.  \n\u2022 Additionally, these controls work best when used in concert. Any one of them is not sufficient \nto ensure our physical security in most situations. \n \nFig. 3 Types of Security Controls \n \n(a) Deterrent  \n\u2022 Deterrent controls are designed to discourage those who might seek to violate our security \ncontrols from doing so.  \n\u2022 A variety of controls might be considered to be a deterrent, including, as we discussed earlier \nin this section, several that overlap with the other categories.", "chunk_id": "90a06715-8559-4e84-9c9d-155166279594", "chroma:document": "142 \n \n \nFig.2 Major Categories of Physical Threats \n4.2.1 Physical security controls  \n\u2022 Physical security controls are the devices, systems, people, and other methods we put in place \nto ensure our security in a physical sense.  \n\u2022 There are three main types of physical controls: deterrent, detective, and preventive, as shown \nin Figure 3."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 141, "full_page_content": "142 \n \n \nFig.2 Major Categories of Physical Threats \n4.2.1 Physical security controls  \n\u2022 Physical security controls are the devices, systems, people, and other methods we put in place \nto ensure our security in a physical sense.  \n\u2022 There are three main types of physical controls: deterrent, detective, and preventive, as shown \nin Figure 3.  \n\u2022 Each has a different focus, but none is completely distinct and separate from the others, as we \nwill discuss shortly.  \n\u2022 Additionally, these controls work best when used in concert. Any one of them is not sufficient \nto ensure our physical security in most situations. \n \nFig. 3 Types of Security Controls \n \n(a) Deterrent  \n\u2022 Deterrent controls are designed to discourage those who might seek to violate our security \ncontrols from doing so.  \n\u2022 A variety of controls might be considered to be a deterrent, including, as we discussed earlier \nin this section, several that overlap with the other categories.", "chunk_id": "a578680c-fe3d-4175-970b-36789043a9ef", "chroma:document": "in Figure 3.  \n\u2022 Each has a different focus, but none is completely distinct and separate from the others, as we \nwill discuss shortly.  \n\u2022 Additionally, these controls work best when used in concert. Any one of them is not sufficient \nto ensure our physical security in most situations. \n \nFig. 3 Types of Security Controls \n \n(a) Deterrent"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 141, "full_page_content": "142 \n \n \nFig.2 Major Categories of Physical Threats \n4.2.1 Physical security controls  \n\u2022 Physical security controls are the devices, systems, people, and other methods we put in place \nto ensure our security in a physical sense.  \n\u2022 There are three main types of physical controls: deterrent, detective, and preventive, as shown \nin Figure 3.  \n\u2022 Each has a different focus, but none is completely distinct and separate from the others, as we \nwill discuss shortly.  \n\u2022 Additionally, these controls work best when used in concert. Any one of them is not sufficient \nto ensure our physical security in most situations. \n \nFig. 3 Types of Security Controls \n \n(a) Deterrent  \n\u2022 Deterrent controls are designed to discourage those who might seek to violate our security \ncontrols from doing so.  \n\u2022 A variety of controls might be considered to be a deterrent, including, as we discussed earlier \nin this section, several that overlap with the other categories.", "chunk_id": "1ea2cee0-5f31-4ab8-87d6-a688aeefb2a3", "chroma:document": "(a) Deterrent  \n\u2022 Deterrent controls are designed to discourage those who might seek to violate our security \ncontrols from doing so.  \n\u2022 A variety of controls might be considered to be a deterrent, including, as we discussed earlier \nin this section, several that overlap with the other categories."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
topic: persistent://default/default/a5c4f461-3901-4175-9ce9-937730884692
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "ec34a6da-7357-4ebe-8ee5-3b49da8d92bd", "chroma:document": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "f06e2483-449d-46ef-8457-f3ac595ad07f", "chroma:document": "\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "f362da86-9cac-475e-8d3f-4905729d2369", "chroma:document": "(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "fe187429-7e8c-4e7e-b36e-61aa285fdc15", "chroma:document": "windows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "19a3485b-4a1c-48ea-a981-d00148a52c68", "chroma:document": "physically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "58671088-9b1b-41d9-b44e-dd1810efa245", "chroma:document": "will need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "1af2c43d-d891-46e9-917d-3f209e28c525", "chroma:document": "physical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 142, "full_page_content": "143 \n \n\u2022 In the sense of pure detective controls, we can point to specific items that are intended to \nindicate that other controls may be in place.  \n\u2022 Examples of this include signs in public places that indicate that video monitoring is in place, \nand the yard signs with alarm company logos that we might find in residential areas.  \n\u2022 The signs themselves do nothing to prevent people from acting in an undesirable fashion, but \nthey do point out that there may be consequences for doing so.  \n\u2022 Such measures, while not directly adding to what we might think of as physical security, do \nhelp to keep honest people honest.  \n(b) Detective \n\u2022 Detective controls serve to detect and report undesirable events that are taking place. The \nclassic example of a detective control can be found in burglar alarms and physical intrusion \ndetection systems.  \n\u2022 Such systems typically monitor for indicators of unauthorized activity, such as doors or \nwindows opening, glass being broken, movement, and temperature changes, and also can be \nin place to monitor for undesirable environmental conditions such as flooding, smoke and \nfire, electrical outages, excessive carbon dioxide in the air, and so on.  \n\u2022 We may also see detective systems in the form of human or animal guards, whether they are \nphysically patrolling an area or monitoring second hand through the use of technology such \nas camera systems.  \n\u2022 This type of monitoring has both good and bad points, in that a living being may be technically \nless focused than an electronic system, but does have the potential to become distracted and \nwill need to be relieved for meals, bathroom breaks, and other similar activities.  \n\u2022 Additionally, we can scale such guards from the lowliest unarmed security guard to highly \ntrained and well-armed security forces, as is appropriate for the situation.  \n(c) Preventive \n\u2022 Preventive controls are used to physically prevent unauthorized entities from breaching our \nphysical security.  \n\u2022 An excellent example of preventive security can be found in the simple mechanical lock. \nLocks are nearly ubiquitous for securing various facilities against unauthorized entry, \nincluding businesses, residences, and other locations.  \n\u2022 \nIn addition to locks, we can also see preventive controls in the form of high fences, bollards \n(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs.", "chunk_id": "3d1be935-5350-4f3c-b021-0bc118e56a7f", "chroma:document": "(the brightly painted and cement-filled posts that are placed to prevent vehicles from driving \ninto buildings), and, once again, guards and dogs."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 143, "full_page_content": "144 \n \n\u2022 \nWe may also see preventive controls focused specifically on people, vehicles, or other \nparticular areas of concern, depending on the environment in question.  \n4.2.2 How We Use Physical Access Controls \n\u2022 Preventive controls are generally the core of our security efforts, and in some cases, they may \nbe the only effort and the only physical security control actually in place.  \n\u2022 We can commonly see this in residences, where there are locks on the doors, but no alarm \nsystems or any other measures that might deter a criminal from gaining unauthorized entry.  \n\u2022 In commercial facilities, we are much more likely to see all three types of controls \nimplemented, in the form of locks, alarm systems, and signs indicating the presence of the \nalarm systems.  \n\u2022 Following the principles of defense in depth, the more layers we put in place for physical \nsecurity, the better-off we will be.  \n\u2022 Another important consideration in implementing physical security is to only put security in \nplace that is reasonably consistent with the value of what we are protecting.  \n\u2022 If we have an empty warehouse, it does not make sense to put in high-security locks, alarm \nsystems, and armed guards.  \n\u2022 Likewise, if we have a house full of expensive computers and electronics, it does not make \nsense to equip it with cheap locks and forgo an alarm system entirely. \n(a) Protecting people  \n\u2022 \nThe primary concern of physical security is to protect the individuals on which our business \ndepends and those that are close to us.  \n\u2022 \nWhile we put security measures and backup systems in place to ensure that our facilities, \nequipment, and data remain in functional condition, if we lose the people we depend on to \nwork with the equipment and data, we have a rather difficult problem to solve.  \n\u2022 \nIn many cases, we can restore our data from backups, we can build new facilities if they \nbecome destroyed or damaged, and we can buy new equipment; but replacing experienced \npeople beyond the one or two at a time that we find with normal turnover is difficult, if not \nimpossible, within any reasonable period of time.  \n(b) Physical Concerns for People \n\u2022 As people are rather fragile in comparison to equipment, they can be susceptible to nearly the \nentire scope of threats.  \n\u2022 Extreme temperatures, or even not so extreme temperatures, can quickly render a person very \nuncomfortable, at best.", "chunk_id": "658cfcbc-6b59-4dad-9f55-f5776d3bcbf0", "chroma:document": "144 \n \n\u2022 \nWe may also see preventive controls focused specifically on people, vehicles, or other \nparticular areas of concern, depending on the environment in question.  \n4.2.2 How We Use Physical Access Controls \n\u2022 Preventive controls are generally the core of our security efforts, and in some cases, they may"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 143, "full_page_content": "144 \n \n\u2022 \nWe may also see preventive controls focused specifically on people, vehicles, or other \nparticular areas of concern, depending on the environment in question.  \n4.2.2 How We Use Physical Access Controls \n\u2022 Preventive controls are generally the core of our security efforts, and in some cases, they may \nbe the only effort and the only physical security control actually in place.  \n\u2022 We can commonly see this in residences, where there are locks on the doors, but no alarm \nsystems or any other measures that might deter a criminal from gaining unauthorized entry.  \n\u2022 In commercial facilities, we are much more likely to see all three types of controls \nimplemented, in the form of locks, alarm systems, and signs indicating the presence of the \nalarm systems.  \n\u2022 Following the principles of defense in depth, the more layers we put in place for physical \nsecurity, the better-off we will be.  \n\u2022 Another important consideration in implementing physical security is to only put security in \nplace that is reasonably consistent with the value of what we are protecting.  \n\u2022 If we have an empty warehouse, it does not make sense to put in high-security locks, alarm \nsystems, and armed guards.  \n\u2022 Likewise, if we have a house full of expensive computers and electronics, it does not make \nsense to equip it with cheap locks and forgo an alarm system entirely. \n(a) Protecting people  \n\u2022 \nThe primary concern of physical security is to protect the individuals on which our business \ndepends and those that are close to us.  \n\u2022 \nWhile we put security measures and backup systems in place to ensure that our facilities, \nequipment, and data remain in functional condition, if we lose the people we depend on to \nwork with the equipment and data, we have a rather difficult problem to solve.  \n\u2022 \nIn many cases, we can restore our data from backups, we can build new facilities if they \nbecome destroyed or damaged, and we can buy new equipment; but replacing experienced \npeople beyond the one or two at a time that we find with normal turnover is difficult, if not \nimpossible, within any reasonable period of time.  \n(b) Physical Concerns for People \n\u2022 As people are rather fragile in comparison to equipment, they can be susceptible to nearly the \nentire scope of threats.  \n\u2022 Extreme temperatures, or even not so extreme temperatures, can quickly render a person very \nuncomfortable, at best.", "chunk_id": "0bb0ab83-b203-4cfd-b3b7-3d8b515f1b46", "chroma:document": "implemented, in the form of locks, alarm systems, and signs indicating the presence of the \nalarm systems.  \n\u2022 Following the principles of defense in depth, the more layers we put in place for physical \nsecurity, the better-off we will be.  \n\u2022 Another important consideration in implementing physical security is to only put security in"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 143, "full_page_content": "144 \n \n\u2022 \nWe may also see preventive controls focused specifically on people, vehicles, or other \nparticular areas of concern, depending on the environment in question.  \n4.2.2 How We Use Physical Access Controls \n\u2022 Preventive controls are generally the core of our security efforts, and in some cases, they may \nbe the only effort and the only physical security control actually in place.  \n\u2022 We can commonly see this in residences, where there are locks on the doors, but no alarm \nsystems or any other measures that might deter a criminal from gaining unauthorized entry.  \n\u2022 In commercial facilities, we are much more likely to see all three types of controls \nimplemented, in the form of locks, alarm systems, and signs indicating the presence of the \nalarm systems.  \n\u2022 Following the principles of defense in depth, the more layers we put in place for physical \nsecurity, the better-off we will be.  \n\u2022 Another important consideration in implementing physical security is to only put security in \nplace that is reasonably consistent with the value of what we are protecting.  \n\u2022 If we have an empty warehouse, it does not make sense to put in high-security locks, alarm \nsystems, and armed guards.  \n\u2022 Likewise, if we have a house full of expensive computers and electronics, it does not make \nsense to equip it with cheap locks and forgo an alarm system entirely. \n(a) Protecting people  \n\u2022 \nThe primary concern of physical security is to protect the individuals on which our business \ndepends and those that are close to us.  \n\u2022 \nWhile we put security measures and backup systems in place to ensure that our facilities, \nequipment, and data remain in functional condition, if we lose the people we depend on to \nwork with the equipment and data, we have a rather difficult problem to solve.  \n\u2022 \nIn many cases, we can restore our data from backups, we can build new facilities if they \nbecome destroyed or damaged, and we can buy new equipment; but replacing experienced \npeople beyond the one or two at a time that we find with normal turnover is difficult, if not \nimpossible, within any reasonable period of time.  \n(b) Physical Concerns for People \n\u2022 As people are rather fragile in comparison to equipment, they can be susceptible to nearly the \nentire scope of threats.  \n\u2022 Extreme temperatures, or even not so extreme temperatures, can quickly render a person very \nuncomfortable, at best.", "chunk_id": "462ba855-9306-41a5-8ab0-9ef0292678fa", "chroma:document": "work with the equipment and data, we have a rather difficult problem to solve.  \n\u2022 \nIn many cases, we can restore our data from backups, we can build new facilities if they \nbecome destroyed or damaged, and we can buy new equipment; but replacing experienced \npeople beyond the one or two at a time that we find with normal turnover is difficult, if not"}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 143, "full_page_content": "144 \n \n\u2022 \nWe may also see preventive controls focused specifically on people, vehicles, or other \nparticular areas of concern, depending on the environment in question.  \n4.2.2 How We Use Physical Access Controls \n\u2022 Preventive controls are generally the core of our security efforts, and in some cases, they may \nbe the only effort and the only physical security control actually in place.  \n\u2022 We can commonly see this in residences, where there are locks on the doors, but no alarm \nsystems or any other measures that might deter a criminal from gaining unauthorized entry.  \n\u2022 In commercial facilities, we are much more likely to see all three types of controls \nimplemented, in the form of locks, alarm systems, and signs indicating the presence of the \nalarm systems.  \n\u2022 Following the principles of defense in depth, the more layers we put in place for physical \nsecurity, the better-off we will be.  \n\u2022 Another important consideration in implementing physical security is to only put security in \nplace that is reasonably consistent with the value of what we are protecting.  \n\u2022 If we have an empty warehouse, it does not make sense to put in high-security locks, alarm \nsystems, and armed guards.  \n\u2022 Likewise, if we have a house full of expensive computers and electronics, it does not make \nsense to equip it with cheap locks and forgo an alarm system entirely. \n(a) Protecting people  \n\u2022 \nThe primary concern of physical security is to protect the individuals on which our business \ndepends and those that are close to us.  \n\u2022 \nWhile we put security measures and backup systems in place to ensure that our facilities, \nequipment, and data remain in functional condition, if we lose the people we depend on to \nwork with the equipment and data, we have a rather difficult problem to solve.  \n\u2022 \nIn many cases, we can restore our data from backups, we can build new facilities if they \nbecome destroyed or damaged, and we can buy new equipment; but replacing experienced \npeople beyond the one or two at a time that we find with normal turnover is difficult, if not \nimpossible, within any reasonable period of time.  \n(b) Physical Concerns for People \n\u2022 As people are rather fragile in comparison to equipment, they can be susceptible to nearly the \nentire scope of threats.  \n\u2022 Extreme temperatures, or even not so extreme temperatures, can quickly render a person very \nuncomfortable, at best.", "chunk_id": "ffbe7fe8-1a26-4ffc-ada6-99053096aa8f", "chroma:document": "impossible, within any reasonable period of time.  \n(b) Physical Concerns for People \n\u2022 As people are rather fragile in comparison to equipment, they can be susceptible to nearly the \nentire scope of threats.  \n\u2022 Extreme temperatures, or even not so extreme temperatures, can quickly render a person very \nuncomfortable, at best."}


created_at: 2025-01-28 05:36:03
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{"producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2019", "creationdate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "source": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "file_path": "data/SITA1602.pdf", "total_pages": 165, "format": "PDF 1.7", "title": "", "author": "Jabez J", "subject": "", "keywords": "", "moddate": "2022-02-08T09:25:32+05:30", "trapped": "", "page": 144, "full_page_content": "145 \n \n\u2022 In the case of liquids, gases, or toxins, the absence, presence, or incorrect proportion of a \nvariety of them can be harmful to individuals.  \n\u2022 We can very clearly see how a liquid such as water, in excessive quantities, might be an \nundesirable thing, as we saw in the case of the massive flooding that took place in the southern \nUnited States during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  \n\u2022 Likewise, the lack of a gas such as oxygen, or too much of the same, can become deadly to \npeople very quickly.  \n\u2022 Although we can see where harm might come from a toxin being introduced to an \nenvironment very clearly, a number of common substances may already be present, but are \nnot toxic in the quantities or mixtures in which they are commonly used.  \n\u2022 We might see certain chemicals as being beneficial when they are used to filter the water in \nour facilities, but the same might not be true if the chemical ratios or mixtures are changed. \nAny variety of living organisms can be dangerous to people, from larger animals, to insects, \nto nearly invisible molds, fungi, or other microscopic organisms.  \n\u2022 People can suffer from contact with living organisms in a variety of ways, from being bitten \nor stung by various critters, to developing breathing problems from inhaling mold.  \n\u2022 Movement can be very harmful to people, particularly when said movement is the result of \nan earthquake, mudslide, avalanche, building structural issue, or other similar problems.  \n\u2022 In most cases, such threats can be both very harmful and very difficult to protect against. \n(c) Safety  \n\u2022 The safety of people is the first and foremost concern on our list when we plan for physical \nsecurity. Safety of people falls above any other concern and must be prioritized above saving \nequipment or data, even when such actions will directly cause such items to be damaged. \n\u2022 We might find an example of this in the fire suppression systems in use in some data centres.  \n\u2022 In many cases, the chemicals, gases, or liquids that are used to extinguish fires in such \nenvironments are very harmful to people and may kill them if used in such an environment.  \n\u2022 For this reason, fire suppression systems are often equipped with a safety override that can \nprevent them from being deployed if there are people in the area.  \n\u2022 If we were to prevent the suppression system from extinguishing the fire because we knew a \nperson was still in the data centre, we might lose all the equipment in the data centre, and \npotentially data that we could not replace.  \n(d) Evacuation \n\u2022 Evacuation is one of the best methods we can use to keep our people safe.", "chunk_id": "0c69f126-f4e4-41cc-9e91-3ec7bbc00625", "chroma:document": "145 \n \n\u2022 In the case of liquids, gases, or toxins, the absence, presence, or incorrect proportion of a \nvariety of them can be harmful to individuals.  \n\u2022 We can very clearly see how a liquid such as water, in excessive quantities, might be an \nundesirable thing, as we saw in the case of the massive flooding that took place in the southern"}


