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Jun 17

When Two LLMs Debate, Both Think They'll Win

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Experts Don't Cheat: Learning What You Don't Know By Predicting Pairs

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Alice in Wonderland: Simple Tasks Showing Complete Reasoning Breakdown in State-Of-the-Art Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Spurious Feature Diversification Improves Out-of-distribution Generalization

Generalization to out-of-distribution (OOD) data is a critical challenge in machine learning. Ensemble-based methods, like weight space ensembles that interpolate model parameters, have been shown to achieve superior OOD performance. However, the underlying mechanism for their effectiveness remains unclear. In this study, we closely examine WiSE-FT, a popular weight space ensemble method that interpolates between a pre-trained and a fine-tuned model. We observe an unexpected phenomenon, in which WiSE-FT successfully corrects many cases where each individual model makes incorrect predictions, which contributes significantly to its OOD effectiveness. To gain further insights, we conduct theoretical analysis in a multi-class setting with a large number of spurious features. Our analysis predicts the above phenomenon and it further shows that ensemble-based models reduce prediction errors in the OOD settings by utilizing a more diverse set of spurious features. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that focuses on learning invariant features for better OOD performance, our findings suggest that incorporating a large number of diverse spurious features weakens their individual contributions, leading to improved overall OOD generalization performance. Empirically we demonstrate the effectiveness of utilizing diverse spurious features on a MultiColorMNIST dataset, and our experimental results are consistent with the theoretical analysis. Building upon the new theoretical insights into the efficacy of ensemble methods, we further identify an issue of WiSE-FT caused by the overconfidence of fine-tuned models in OOD situations. This overconfidence magnifies the fine-tuned model's incorrect prediction, leading to deteriorated OOD ensemble performance. To remedy this problem, we propose a novel method called BAlaNced averaGing (BANG), which significantly enhances the OOD performance of WiSE-FT.

Can LLMs Express Their Uncertainty? An Empirical Evaluation of Confidence Elicitation in LLMs

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

"I'm Not Sure, But...": Examining the Impact of Large Language Models' Uncertainty Expression on User Reliance and Trust

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Taming Overconfidence in LLMs: Reward Calibration in RLHF

Language model calibration refers to the alignment between the confidence of the model and the actual performance of its responses. While previous studies point out the overconfidence phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) and show that LLMs trained with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) are overconfident with a more sharpened output probability, in this study, we reveal that RLHF tends to lead models to express verbalized overconfidence in their own responses. We investigate the underlying cause of this overconfidence and demonstrate that reward models used for Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) exhibit inherent biases towards high-confidence scores regardless of the actual quality of responses. Building upon this insight, we propose two PPO variants: PPO-M: PPO with Calibrated Reward Modeling and PPO-C: PPO with Calibrated Reward Calculation. PPO-M integrates explicit confidence scores in reward model training, which calibrates reward models to better capture the alignment between response quality and verbalized confidence. PPO-C adjusts the reward score during PPO based on the difference between the current reward and the moving average of past rewards. Both PPO-M and PPO-C can be seamlessly integrated into the current PPO pipeline and do not require additional golden labels. We evaluate our methods on both Llama3-8B and Mistral-7B across six diverse datasets including multiple-choice and open-ended generation. Experiment results demonstrate that both of our methods can reduce calibration error and maintain performance comparable to standard PPO. We further show that they do not compromise model capabilities in open-ended conversation settings.

DEUP: Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Thought Manipulation: External Thought Can Be Efficient for Large Reasoning Models

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

The Danger of Overthinking: Examining the Reasoning-Action Dilemma in Agentic Tasks

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

The Law of Knowledge Overshadowing: Towards Understanding, Predicting, and Preventing LLM Hallucination

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Missing Premise exacerbates Overthinking: Are Reasoning Models losing Critical Thinking Skill?

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Let LLMs Break Free from Overthinking via Self-Braking Tuning

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Rethinking Fine-Tuning when Scaling Test-Time Compute: Limiting Confidence Improves Mathematical Reasoning

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights the power of scaling test-time compute to achieve strong performance on complex tasks, such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. This raises a critical question: how should model training be modified to optimize performance under a subsequent test-time compute strategy and budget? To explore this, we focus on pass@N, a simple test-time strategy that searches for a correct answer in N independent samples. We show, surprisingly, that training with cross-entropy (CE) loss can be {it misaligned} with pass@N in that pass@N accuracy {it decreases} with longer training. We explain the origins of this misalignment in terms of model overconfidence induced by CE, and experimentally verify our prediction of overconfidence as an impediment to scaling test-time compute via pass@N. Furthermore we suggest a principled, modified training loss that is better aligned to pass@N by limiting model confidence and rescuing pass@N test performance. Our algorithm demonstrates improved mathematical reasoning on MATH and MiniF2F benchmarks under several scenarios: (1) providing answers to math questions; and (2) proving theorems by searching over proof trees of varying shapes. Overall our work underscores the importance of co-designing two traditionally separate phases of LLM development: training-time protocols and test-time search and reasoning strategies.

On Task Performance and Model Calibration with Supervised and Self-Ensembled In-Context Learning

Following the standard supervised fine-tuning (SFT) paradigm, in-context learning (ICL) has become an efficient approach propelled by the recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), yielding promising performance across various tasks in few-shot data setups. However, both paradigms are prone to suffer from the critical problem of overconfidence (i.e., miscalibration), especially in such limited data setups. In this work, we deliver an in-depth analysis of the behavior across different choices of learning methods from the perspective of both performance and calibration, as well as their interplay. Through extensive controlled experiments, we find that simultaneous gains for both task performance and calibration are difficult to achieve, and the problem of miscalibration exists across all learning methods in low-resource scenarios. To address this challenging trade-off between performance and calibration, we then investigate the potential of self-ensembling techniques applied at different modeling stages (e.g., variations of in-context examples or variations in prompts or different ensembling strategies). We justify the feasibility of self-ensembling on SFT in addition to ICL, to make the predictions more calibrated and have comparable or even better performance. Our work sheds light on which learning paradigm to choose and how to enhance both task performance and calibration of LLMs.

MOSSBench: Is Your Multimodal Language Model Oversensitive to Safe Queries?

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

LACIE: Listener-Aware Finetuning for Confidence Calibration in Large Language Models

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

Building Safe and Reliable AI systems for Safety Critical Tasks with Vision-Language Processing

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Evaluating language models as risk scores

Current question-answering benchmarks predominantly focus on accuracy in realizable prediction tasks. Conditioned on a question and answer-key, does the most likely token match the ground truth? Such benchmarks necessarily fail to evaluate LLMs' ability to quantify ground-truth outcome uncertainty. In this work, we focus on the use of LLMs as risk scores for unrealizable prediction tasks. We introduce folktexts, a software package to systematically generate risk scores using LLMs, and evaluate them against US Census data products. A flexible API enables the use of different prompting schemes, local or web-hosted models, and diverse census columns that can be used to compose custom prediction tasks. We evaluate 17 recent LLMs across five proposed benchmark tasks. We find that zero-shot risk scores produced by multiple-choice question-answering have high predictive signal but are widely miscalibrated. Base models consistently overestimate outcome uncertainty, while instruction-tuned models underestimate uncertainty and produce over-confident risk scores. In fact, instruction-tuning polarizes answer distribution regardless of true underlying data uncertainty. This reveals a general inability of instruction-tuned LLMs to express data uncertainty using multiple-choice answers. A separate experiment using verbalized chat-style risk queries yields substantially improved calibration across instruction-tuned models. These differences in ability to quantify data uncertainty cannot be revealed in realizable settings, and highlight a blind-spot in the current evaluation ecosystem that folktexts covers.

Disagreement as a way to study misinformation and its effects

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Reinforcement Learning-based Counter-Misinformation Response Generation: A Case Study of COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

The Universality Lens: Why Even Highly Over-Parametrized Models Learn Well

A fundamental question in modern machine learning is why large, over-parameterized models, such as deep neural networks and transformers, tend to generalize well, even when their number of parameters far exceeds the number of training samples. We investigate this phenomenon through the lens of information theory, grounded in universal learning theory. Specifically, we study a Bayesian mixture learner with log-loss and (almost) uniform prior over an expansive hypothesis class. Our key result shows that the learner's regret is not determined by the overall size of the hypothesis class, but rather by the cumulative probability of all models that are close, in Kullback-Leibler divergence distance, to the true data-generating process. We refer to this cumulative probability as the weight of the hypothesis. This leads to a natural notion of model simplicity: simple models are those with large weight and thus require fewer samples to generalize, while complex models have small weight and need more data. This perspective provides a rigorous and intuitive explanation for why over-parameterized models often avoid overfitting: the presence of simple hypotheses allows the posterior to concentrate on them when supported by the data. We further bridge theory and practice by recalling that stochastic gradient descent with Langevin dynamics samples from the correct posterior distribution, enabling our theoretical learner to be approximated using standard machine learning methods combined with ensemble learning. Our analysis yields non-uniform regret bounds and aligns with key practical concepts such as flat minima and model distillation. The results apply broadly across online, batch, and supervised learning settings, offering a unified and principled understanding of the generalization behavior of modern AI systems.

Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Knowledge Overshadowing Causes Amalgamated Hallucination in Large Language Models

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

Intriguing Properties of Adversarial Examples

It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the functional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network, which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversarial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Motivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to previous attempts.

Language Model Uncertainty Quantification with Attention Chain

Accurately quantifying a large language model's (LLM) predictive uncertainty is crucial for judging the reliability of its answers. While most existing research focuses on short, directly answerable questions with closed-form outputs (e.g., multiple-choice), involving intermediate reasoning steps in LLM responses is increasingly important. This added complexity complicates uncertainty quantification (UQ) because the probabilities assigned to answer tokens are conditioned on a vast space of preceding reasoning tokens. Direct marginalization is infeasible, and the dependency inflates probability estimates, causing overconfidence in UQ. To address this, we propose UQAC, an efficient method that narrows the reasoning space to a tractable size for marginalization. UQAC iteratively constructs an "attention chain" of tokens deemed "semantically crucial" to the final answer via a backtracking procedure. Starting from the answer tokens, it uses attention weights to identify the most influential predecessors, then iterates this process until reaching the input tokens. Similarity filtering and probability thresholding further refine the resulting chain, allowing us to approximate the marginal probabilities of the answer tokens, which serve as the LLM's confidence. We validate UQAC on multiple reasoning benchmarks with advanced open-source LLMs, demonstrating that it consistently delivers reliable UQ estimates with high computational efficiency.

Fact-Checking the Output of Large Language Models via Token-Level Uncertainty Quantification

Large language models (LLMs) are notorious for hallucinating, i.e., producing erroneous claims in their output. Such hallucinations can be dangerous, as occasional factual inaccuracies in the generated text might be obscured by the rest of the output being generally factual, making it extremely hard for the users to spot them. Current services that leverage LLMs usually do not provide any means for detecting unreliable generations. Here, we aim to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a novel fact-checking and hallucination detection pipeline based on token-level uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty scores leverage information encapsulated in the output of a neural network or its layers to detect unreliable predictions, and we show that they can be used to fact-check the atomic claims in the LLM output. Moreover, we present a novel token-level uncertainty quantification method that removes the impact of uncertainty about what claim to generate on the current step and what surface form to use. Our method Claim Conditioned Probability (CCP) measures only the uncertainty of particular claim value expressed by the model. Experiments on the task of biography generation demonstrate strong improvements for CCP compared to the baselines for six different LLMs and three languages. Human evaluation reveals that the fact-checking pipeline based on uncertainty quantification is competitive with a fact-checking tool that leverages external knowledge.

Reasoning Model is Stubborn: Diagnosing Instruction Overriding in Reasoning Models

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Superintelligent Agents Pose Catastrophic Risks: Can Scientist AI Offer a Safer Path?

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

SaySelf: Teaching LLMs to Express Confidence with Self-Reflective Rationales

Large language models (LLMs) often generate inaccurate or fabricated information and generally fail to indicate their confidence, which limits their broader applications. Previous work elicits confidence from LLMs by direct or self-consistency prompting, or constructing specific datasets for supervised finetuning. The prompting-based approaches have inferior performance, and the training-based approaches are limited to binary or inaccurate group-level confidence estimates. In this work, we present the advanced SaySelf, a training framework that teaches LLMs to express more accurate fine-grained confidence estimates. In addition, beyond the confidence scores, SaySelf initiates the process of directing LLMs to produce self-reflective rationales that clearly identify gaps in their parametric knowledge and explain their uncertainty. This is achieved by using an LLM to automatically summarize the uncertainties in specific knowledge via natural language. The summarization is based on the analysis of the inconsistency in multiple sampled reasoning chains, and the resulting data is utilized for supervised fine-tuning. Moreover, we utilize reinforcement learning with a meticulously crafted reward function to calibrate the confidence estimates, motivating LLMs to deliver accurate, high-confidence predictions and to penalize overconfidence in erroneous outputs. Experimental results in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of SaySelf in reducing the confidence calibration error and maintaining the task performance. We show that the generated self-reflective rationales are reasonable and can further contribute to the calibration. The code is made public at https://github.com/xu1868/SaySelf.

What makes Reasoning Models Different? Follow the Reasoning Leader for Efficient Decoding

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Thinking Out Loud: Do Reasoning Models Know When They're Right?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.