Daily Papers

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

In many real-world multi-agent cooperative tasks, due to high cost and risk, agents cannot continuously interact with the environment and collect experiences during learning, but have to learn from offline datasets. However, the transition dynamics in the dataset of each agent can be much different from the ones induced by the learned policies of other agents in execution, creating large errors in value estimates. Consequently, agents learn uncoordinated low-performing policies. In this paper, we propose a framework for offline decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning, which exploits value deviation and transition normalization to deliberately modify the transition probabilities. Value deviation optimistically increases the transition probabilities of high-value next states, and transition normalization normalizes the transition probabilities of next states. They together enable agents to learn high-performing and coordinated policies. Theoretically, we prove the convergence of Q-learning under the altered non-stationary transition dynamics. Empirically, we show that the framework can be easily built on many existing offline reinforcement learning algorithms and achieve substantial improvement in a variety of multi-agent tasks.

The paper studies the linear model for Bitcoin price which includes regression features based on Bitcoin currency statistics, mining processes, Google search trends, Wikipedia pages visits. The pattern of deviation of regression model prediction from real prices is simpler comparing to price time series. It is assumed that this pattern can be predicted by an experienced expert. In such a way, using the combination of the regression model and expert correction, one can receive better results than with either regression model or expert opinion only. It is shown that Bayesian approach makes it possible to utilize the probabilistic approach using distributions with fat tails and take into account the outliers in Bitcoin price time series.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.

We present a new distribution-free conformal prediction algorithm for sequential data (e.g., time series), called the sequential predictive conformal inference (SPCI). We specifically account for the nature that time series data are non-exchangeable, and thus many existing conformal prediction algorithms are not applicable. The main idea is to adaptively re-estimate the conditional quantile of non-conformity scores (e.g., prediction residuals), upon exploiting the temporal dependence among them. More precisely, we cast the problem of conformal prediction interval as predicting the quantile of a future residual, given a user-specified point prediction algorithm. Theoretically, we establish asymptotic valid conditional coverage upon extending consistency analyses in quantile regression. Using simulation and real-data experiments, we demonstrate a significant reduction in interval width of SPCI compared to other existing methods under the desired empirical coverage.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Training large-scale machine learning models poses distinct system challenges, given both the size and complexity of today's workloads. Recently, many organizations training state-of-the-art Generative AI models have reported cases of instability during training, often taking the form of loss spikes. Numeric deviation has emerged as a potential cause of this training instability, although quantifying this is especially challenging given the costly nature of training runs. In this work, we develop a principled approach to understanding the effects of numeric deviation, and construct proxies to put observations into context when downstream effects are difficult to quantify. As a case study, we apply this framework to analyze the widely-adopted Flash Attention optimization. We find that Flash Attention sees roughly an order of magnitude more numeric deviation as compared to Baseline Attention at BF16 when measured during an isolated forward pass. We then use a data-driven analysis based on the Wasserstein Distance to provide upper bounds on how this numeric deviation impacts model weights during training, finding that the numerical deviation present in Flash Attention is 2-5 times less significant than low-precision training.

Conformal prediction is a theoretically grounded framework for constructing predictive intervals. We study conformal prediction with missing values in the covariates -- a setting that brings new challenges to uncertainty quantification. We first show that the marginal coverage guarantee of conformal prediction holds on imputed data for any missingness distribution and almost all imputation functions. However, we emphasize that the average coverage varies depending on the pattern of missing values: conformal methods tend to construct prediction intervals that under-cover the response conditionally to some missing patterns. This motivates our novel generalized conformalized quantile regression framework, missing data augmentation, which yields prediction intervals that are valid conditionally to the patterns of missing values, despite their exponential number. We then show that a universally consistent quantile regression algorithm trained on the imputed data is Bayes optimal for the pinball risk, thus achieving valid coverage conditionally to any given data point. Moreover, we examine the case of a linear model, which demonstrates the importance of our proposal in overcoming the heteroskedasticity induced by missing values. Using synthetic and data from critical care, we corroborate our theory and report improved performance of our methods.