Daily Papers

It is common practice to apply padding prior to convolution operations to preserve the resolution of feature-maps in Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). While many alternatives exist, this is often achieved by adding a border of zeros around the inputs. In this work, we show that adversarial attacks often result in perturbation anomalies at the image boundaries, which are the areas where padding is used. Consequently, we aim to provide an analysis of the interplay between padding and adversarial attacks and seek an answer to the question of how different padding modes (or their absence) affect adversarial robustness in various scenarios.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models rely on encoded prompts to guide the image generation process. Typically, these prompts are extended to a fixed length by adding padding tokens before text encoding. Despite being a default practice, the influence of padding tokens on the image generation process has not been investigated. In this work, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of the role padding tokens play in T2I models. We develop two causal techniques to analyze how information is encoded in the representation of tokens across different components of the T2I pipeline. Using these techniques, we investigate when and how padding tokens impact the image generation process. Our findings reveal three distinct scenarios: padding tokens may affect the model's output during text encoding, during the diffusion process, or be effectively ignored. Moreover, we identify key relationships between these scenarios and the model's architecture (cross or self-attention) and its training process (frozen or trained text encoder). These insights contribute to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of padding tokens, potentially informing future model design and training practices in T2I systems.

An attacker can gain information of a user by analyzing its network traffic. The size of transferred data leaks information about the file being transferred or the service being used, and this is particularly revealing when the attacker has background knowledge about the files or services available for transfer. To prevent this, servers may pad their files using a padding scheme, changing the file sizes and preventing anyone from guessing their identity uniquely. This work focuses on finding optimal padding schemes that keep a balance between privacy and the costs of bandwidth increase. We consider R\'enyi-min leakage as our main measure for privacy, since it is directly related with the success of a simple attacker, and compare our algorithms with an existing solution that minimizes Shannon leakage. We provide improvements to our algorithms in order to optimize average total padding and Shannon leakage while minimizing R\'enyi-min leakage. Moreover, our algorithms are designed to handle a more general and important scenario in which multiple servers wish to compute padding schemes in a way that protects the servers' identity in addition to the identity of the files.

Finding the mode of a high dimensional probability distribution D is a fundamental algorithmic problem in statistics and data analysis. There has been particular interest in efficient methods for solving the problem when D is represented as a mixture model or kernel density estimate, although few algorithmic results with worst-case approximation and runtime guarantees are known. In this work, we significantly generalize a result of (LeeLiMusco:2021) on mode approximation for Gaussian mixture models. We develop randomized dimensionality reduction methods for mixtures involving a broader class of kernels, including the popular logistic, sigmoid, and generalized Gaussian kernels. As in Lee et al.'s work, our dimensionality reduction results yield quasi-polynomial algorithms for mode finding with multiplicative accuracy (1-epsilon) for any epsilon > 0. Moreover, when combined with gradient descent, they yield efficient practical heuristics for the problem. In addition to our positive results, we prove a hardness result for box kernels, showing that there is no polynomial time algorithm for finding the mode of a kernel density estimate, unless P = NP. Obtaining similar hardness results for kernels used in practice (like Gaussian or logistic kernels) is an interesting future direction.

Padding is often used in tuning LLM models by adding special tokens to shorter training examples to match the length of the longest sequence in each batch. While this ensures uniformity for batch processing, it introduces inefficiencies by including irrelevant padding tokens in the computation and wastes GPU resources. On the other hand, the Hugging Face SFT trainer offers the option to use packing to combine multiple training examples up to the maximum sequence length. This allows for maximal utilization of GPU resources. However, without proper masking of each packed training example, attention will not be computed correctly when using SFT trainer. We enable and then analyse packing and Flash Attention with proper attention masking of each example and show the benefits of this training paradigm.