Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly rely on prolonged reasoning chains to solve complex tasks. However, this trial-and-error approach often leads to high computational overhead and error propagation, where early mistakes can derail subsequent steps. To address these issues, we introduce Meta-Reasoner, a framework that dynamically optimizes inference-time reasoning by enabling LLMs to "think about how to think." Drawing inspiration from human meta-cognition and dual-process theory, Meta-Reasoner operates as a strategic advisor, decoupling high-level guidance from step-by-step generation. It employs "contextual multi-armed bandits" to iteratively evaluate reasoning progress, and select optimal strategies (e.g., backtrack, clarify ambiguity, restart from scratch, or propose alternative approaches), and reallocates computational resources toward the most promising paths. Our evaluations on mathematical reasoning and puzzles highlight the potential of dynamic reasoning chains to overcome inherent challenges in the LLM reasoning process and also show promise in broader applications, offering a scalable and adaptable solution for reasoning-intensive tasks.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

In Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been consistent advancements in task-specific performance, largely influenced by effective prompt design. While recent research on prompting has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, a gap remains in further improving their understanding abilities. In this study, we introduce Metacognitive Prompting (MP), a strategy inspired by human introspective reasoning processes. Using MP, LLMs undergo a systematic series of structured, self-aware evaluations, drawing on both their vast inherent knowledge and new insights. Our experiments involve five prevalent LLMs: Llama2, Vicuna, PaLM, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, all of which span various general natural language understanding (NLU) tasks from the GLUE and SuperGLUE benchmarks. Results indicate that, although GPT-4 consistently excels in most tasks, PaLM, when equipped with MP, approaches its performance level. Furthermore, across models and datasets, MP consistently outperforms existing prompting methods, including standard and chain-of-thought prompting. This study underscores the potential to amplify the understanding abilities of LLMs and highlights the benefits of mirroring human introspective reasoning in NLU tasks.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

In this report we review memory-based meta-learning as a tool for building sample-efficient strategies that learn from past experience to adapt to any task within a target class. Our goal is to equip the reader with the conceptual foundations of this tool for building new, scalable agents that operate on broad domains. To do so, we present basic algorithmic templates for building near-optimal predictors and reinforcement learners which behave as if they had a probabilistic model that allowed them to efficiently exploit task structure. Furthermore, we recast memory-based meta-learning within a Bayesian framework, showing that the meta-learned strategies are near-optimal because they amortize Bayes-filtered data, where the adaptation is implemented in the memory dynamics as a state-machine of sufficient statistics. Essentially, memory-based meta-learning translates the hard problem of probabilistic sequential inference into a regression problem.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Memory-based meta-learning is a technique for approximating Bayes-optimal predictors. Under fairly general conditions, minimizing sequential prediction error, measured by the log loss, leads to implicit meta-learning. The goal of this work is to investigate how far this interpretation can be realized by current sequence prediction models and training regimes. The focus is on piecewise stationary sources with unobserved switching-points, which arguably capture an important characteristic of natural language and action-observation sequences in partially observable environments. We show that various types of memory-based neural models, including Transformers, LSTMs, and RNNs can learn to accurately approximate known Bayes-optimal algorithms and behave as if performing Bayesian inference over the latent switching-points and the latent parameters governing the data distribution within each segment.

Meta-learning has emerged as an effective methodology to model several real-world tasks and problems due to its extraordinary effectiveness in the low-data regime. There are many scenarios ranging from the classification of rare diseases to language modelling of uncommon languages where the availability of large datasets is rare. Similarly, for more broader scenarios like self-driving, an autonomous vehicle needs to be trained to handle every situation well. This requires training the ML model on a variety of tasks with good quality data. But often times, we find that the data distribution across various tasks is skewed, i.e.the data follows a long-tail distribution. This leads to the model performing well on some tasks and not performing so well on others leading to model robustness issues. Meta-learning has recently emerged as a potential learning paradigm which can effectively learn from one task and generalize that learning to unseen tasks. In this study, we aim to exploit external knowledge of task relations to improve training stability via effective mini-batching of tasks. We hypothesize that selecting a diverse set of tasks in a mini-batch will lead to a better estimate of the full gradient and hence will lead to a reduction of noise in training.

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently don't possess tractable models.

Modern machine learning requires system designers to specify aspects of the learning pipeline, such as losses, architectures, and optimizers. Meta-learning, or learning-to-learn, instead aims to learn those aspects, and promises to unlock greater capabilities with less manual effort. One particularly ambitious goal of meta-learning is to train general-purpose in-context learning algorithms from scratch, using only black-box models with minimal inductive bias. Such a model takes in training data, and produces test-set predictions across a wide range of problems, without any explicit definition of an inference model, training loss, or optimization algorithm. In this paper we show that Transformers and other black-box models can be meta-trained to act as general-purpose in-context learners. We characterize transitions between algorithms that generalize, algorithms that memorize, and algorithms that fail to meta-train at all, induced by changes in model size, number of tasks, and meta-optimization. We further show that the capabilities of meta-trained algorithms are bottlenecked by the accessible state size (memory) determining the next prediction, unlike standard models which are thought to be bottlenecked by parameter count. Finally, we propose practical interventions such as biasing the training distribution that improve the meta-training and meta-generalization of general-purpose in-context learning algorithms.

Recent research on Reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sought to further enhance their performance by integrating meta-thinking -- enabling models to monitor, evaluate, and control their reasoning processes for more adaptive and effective problem-solving. However, current single-agent work lacks a specialized design for acquiring meta-thinking, resulting in low efficacy. To address this challenge, we introduce Reinforced Meta-thinking Agents (ReMA), a novel framework that leverages Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) to elicit meta-thinking behaviors, encouraging LLMs to think about thinking. ReMA decouples the reasoning process into two hierarchical agents: a high-level meta-thinking agent responsible for generating strategic oversight and plans, and a low-level reasoning agent for detailed executions. Through iterative reinforcement learning with aligned objectives, these agents explore and learn collaboration, leading to improved generalization and robustness. Experimental results demonstrate that ReMA outperforms single-agent RL baselines on complex reasoning tasks, including competitive-level mathematical benchmarks and LLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks. Comprehensive ablation studies further illustrate the evolving dynamics of each distinct agent, providing valuable insights into how the meta-thinking reasoning process enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

How to train a generalizable meta-policy by continually learning a sequence of tasks? It is a natural human skill yet challenging to achieve by current reinforcement learning: the agent is expected to quickly adapt to new tasks (plasticity) meanwhile retaining the common knowledge from previous tasks (stability). We address it by "Continual Task Allocation via Sparse Prompting (CoTASP)", which learns over-complete dictionaries to produce sparse masks as prompts extracting a sub-network for each task from a meta-policy network. CoTASP trains a policy for each task by optimizing the prompts and the sub-network weights alternatively. The dictionary is then updated to align the optimized prompts with tasks' embedding, thereby capturing tasks' semantic correlations. Hence, relevant tasks share more neurons in the meta-policy network due to similar prompts while cross-task interference causing forgetting is effectively restrained. Given a meta-policy and dictionaries trained on previous tasks, new task adaptation reduces to highly efficient sparse prompting and sub-network finetuning. In experiments, CoTASP achieves a promising plasticity-stability trade-off without storing or replaying any past tasks' experiences. It outperforms existing continual and multi-task RL methods on all seen tasks, forgetting reduction, and generalization to unseen tasks.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Meta-learning usually refers to a learning algorithm that learns from other learning algorithms. The problem of uncertainty in the predictions of neural networks shows that the world is only partially predictable and a learned neural network cannot generalize to its ever-changing surrounding environments. Therefore, the question is how a predictive model can represent multiple predictions simultaneously. We aim to provide a fundamental understanding of learning to learn in the contents of Decentralized Neural Networks (Decentralized NNs) and we believe this is one of the most important questions and prerequisites to building an autonomous intelligence machine. To this end, we shall demonstrate several pieces of evidence for tackling the problems above with Meta Learning in Decentralized NNs. In particular, we will present three different approaches to building such a decentralized learning system: (1) learning from many replica neural networks, (2) building the hierarchy of neural networks for different functions, and (3) leveraging different modality experts to learn cross-modal representations.

Meta-learning enables algorithms to quickly learn a newly encountered task with just a few labeled examples by transferring previously learned knowledge. However, the bottleneck of current meta-learning algorithms is the requirement of a large number of meta-training tasks, which may not be accessible in real-world scenarios. To address the challenge that available tasks may not densely sample the space of tasks, we propose to augment the task set through interpolation. By meta-learning with task interpolation (MLTI), our approach effectively generates additional tasks by randomly sampling a pair of tasks and interpolating the corresponding features and labels. Under both gradient-based and metric-based meta-learning settings, our theoretical analysis shows MLTI corresponds to a data-adaptive meta-regularization and further improves the generalization. Empirically, in our experiments on eight datasets from diverse domains including image recognition, pose prediction, molecule property prediction, and medical image classification, we find that the proposed general MLTI framework is compatible with representative meta-learning algorithms and consistently outperforms other state-of-the-art strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly surpassing human knowledge in many domains. While improving these models traditionally relies on costly human data, recent self-rewarding mechanisms (Yuan et al., 2024) have shown that LLMs can improve by judging their own responses instead of relying on human labelers. However, existing methods have primarily focused on improving model responses rather than judgment capabilities, resulting in rapid saturation during iterative training. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Meta-Rewarding step to the self-improvement process, where the model judges its own judgements and uses that feedback to refine its judgment skills. Surprisingly, this unsupervised approach improves the model's ability to judge {\em and} follow instructions, as demonstrated by a win rate improvement of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 22.9% to 39.4% on AlpacaEval 2, and 20.6% to 29.1% on Arena-Hard. These results strongly suggest the potential for self-improving models without human supervision.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

The ability to adapt beliefs or behaviors in response to unexpected outcomes, reflection, is fundamental to intelligent systems' interaction with the world. From a cognitive science perspective, this serves as a core principle of intelligence applicable to both human and AI systems. To address the debate on the intelligence of large language models (LLMs), we propose Reflection-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 7 tasks spanning core cognitive functions crucial for reflection, including perception, memory, belief updating, decision-making, prediction, counterfactual thinking, and meta-reflection. We evaluate the performances of 13 prominent LLMs such as OpenAI o1, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, etc. The results indicate that current LLMs still lack satisfactory reflection ability. We discuss the underlying causes of these results and suggest potential avenues for future research. In conclusion, Reflection-Bench offers both evaluation tools and inspiration for developing AI capable of reliably interacting with the environment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/YabYum/ReflectionBench.

Recent studies show that the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be improved by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to question-answering (QA) tasks in areas such as math and coding. With a long context length, LLMs may learn to perform search, as indicated by the self-correction behavior observed in DeepSeek R1. However, this search behavior is often imprecise and lacks confidence, resulting in long, redundant responses and highlighting deficiencies in intuition and verification. Inspired by the Dual Process Theory in psychology, we introduce a simple modification to the QA task that includes four stages: Fast Thinking, where the LLM must answer within a strict token budget; Verification, where the model evaluates its initial response; Slow Thinking, where it refines the initial response with more deliberation; and Summarization, where it distills the refinement from the previous stage into precise steps. Our proposed task improves average accuracy from 24.9% to 27.9% for Qwen2.5-1.5B, and from 45.9% to 49.8% for DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-1.5B. Notably, for Qwen2.5-1.5B, the Fast Thinking mode alone achieves 26.8% accuracy using fewer than 1000 tokens, demonstrating substantial inference efficiency gains. These findings suggest that intuition and deliberative reasoning are distinct, complementary systems benefiting from targeted training.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Critique ability, a meta-cognitive capability of humans, presents significant challenges for LLMs to improve. Recent works primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using critiques generated by a single LLM like GPT-4. However, these model-generated critiques often exhibit flaws due to the inherent complexity of the critique. Consequently, fine-tuning LLMs on such flawed critiques typically limits the model's performance and propagates these flaws into the learned model. To overcome these challenges, this paper proposes a novel data generation pipeline, named MultiCritique, that improves the critique ability of LLMs by utilizing multi-agent feedback in both the SFT and reinforcement learning (RL) stages. First, our data generation pipeline aggregates high-quality critiques from multiple agents instead of a single model, with crucial information as input for simplifying the critique. Furthermore, our pipeline improves the preference accuracy of critique quality through multi-agent feedback, facilitating the effectiveness of RL in improving the critique ability of LLMs. Based on our proposed MultiCritique data generation pipeline, we construct the MultiCritiqueDataset for the SFT and RL fine-tuning stages. Extensive experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate: 1) the superior quality of our constructed SFT dataset compared to existing critique datasets; 2) additional improvements to the critique ability of LLMs brought by the RL stage. Notably, our fine-tuned 7B model significantly surpasses other advanced 7B-13B open-source models, approaching the performance of advanced 70B LLMs and GPT-4. Codes, datasets and model weights will be publicly available.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

The weight matrix (WM) of a neural network (NN) is its program. The programs of many traditional NNs are learned through gradient descent in some error function, then remain fixed. The WM of a self-referential NN, however, can keep rapidly modifying all of itself during runtime. In principle, such NNs can meta-learn to learn, and meta-meta-learn to meta-learn to learn, and so on, in the sense of recursive self-improvement. While NN architectures potentially capable of implementing such behaviour have been proposed since the '90s, there have been few if any practical studies. Here we revisit such NNs, building upon recent successes of fast weight programmers and closely related linear Transformers. We propose a scalable self-referential WM (SRWM) that learns to use outer products and the delta update rule to modify itself. We evaluate our SRWM in supervised few-shot learning and in multi-task reinforcement learning with procedurally generated game environments. Our experiments demonstrate both practical applicability and competitive performance of the proposed SRWM. Our code is public.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) already possess a latent capacity for long chain-of-thought reasoning. Prior work has shown that outcome-based reinforcement learning (RL) can incidentally elicit advanced reasoning behaviors such as self-correction, backtracking, and verification phenomena often referred to as the model's "aha moment". However, the timing and consistency of these emergent behaviors remain unpredictable and uncontrollable, limiting the scalability and reliability of LRMs' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we move beyond reliance on prompts and coincidental "aha moments". Instead, we explicitly align models with three meta-abilities: deduction, induction, and abduction, using automatically generated, self-verifiable tasks. Our three stage-pipeline individual alignment, parameter-space merging, and domain-specific reinforcement learning, boosting performance by over 10\% relative to instruction-tuned baselines. Furthermore, domain-specific RL from the aligned checkpoint yields an additional 2\% average gain in the performance ceiling across math, coding, and science benchmarks, demonstrating that explicit meta-ability alignment offers a scalable and dependable foundation for reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/zhiyuanhubj/Meta-Ability-Alignment

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

Self-tuning algorithms that adapt the learning process online encourage more effective and robust learning. Among all the methods available, meta-gradients have emerged as a promising approach. They leverage the differentiability of the learning rule with respect to some hyper-parameters to adapt them in an online fashion. Although meta-gradients can be accumulated over multiple learning steps to avoid myopic updates, this is rarely used in practice. In this work, we demonstrate that whilst multi-step meta-gradients do provide a better learning signal in expectation, this comes at the cost of a significant increase in variance, hindering performance. In the light of this analysis, we introduce a novel method mixing multiple inner steps that enjoys a more accurate and robust meta-gradient signal, essentially trading off bias and variance in meta-gradient estimation. When applied to the Snake game, the mixing meta-gradient algorithm can cut the variance by a factor of 3 while achieving similar or higher performance.

Meta learning has been widely used to exploit rich-resource source tasks to improve the performance of low-resource target tasks. Unfortunately, most existing meta learning approaches treat different source tasks equally, ignoring the relatedness of source tasks to the target task in knowledge transfer. To mitigate this issue, we propose a reinforcement-based multi-source meta-transfer learning framework (Meta-RTL) for low-resource commonsense reasoning. In this framework, we present a reinforcement-based approach to dynamically estimating source task weights that measure the contribution of the corresponding tasks to the target task in the meta-transfer learning. The differences between the general loss of the meta model and task-specific losses of source-specific temporal meta models on sampled target data are fed into the policy network of the reinforcement learning module as rewards. The policy network is built upon LSTMs that capture long-term dependencies on source task weight estimation across meta learning iterations. We evaluate the proposed Meta-RTL using both BERT and ALBERT as the backbone of the meta model on three commonsense reasoning benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that Meta-RTL substantially outperforms strong baselines and previous task selection strategies and achieves larger improvements on extremely low-resource settings.

A longstanding goal of artificial general intelligence is highly capable generalists that can learn from diverse experiences and generalize to unseen tasks. The language and vision communities have seen remarkable progress toward this trend by scaling up transformer-based models trained on massive datasets, while reinforcement learning (RL) agents still suffer from poor generalization capacity under such paradigms. To tackle this challenge, we propose Meta Decision Transformer (Meta-DT), which leverages the sequential modeling ability of the transformer architecture and robust task representation learning via world model disentanglement to achieve efficient generalization in offline meta-RL. We pretrain a context-aware world model to learn a compact task representation, and inject it as a contextual condition to the causal transformer to guide task-oriented sequence generation. Then, we subtly utilize history trajectories generated by the meta-policy as a self-guided prompt to exploit the architectural inductive bias. We select the trajectory segment that yields the largest prediction error on the pretrained world model to construct the prompt, aiming to encode task-specific information complementary to the world model maximally. Notably, the proposed framework eliminates the requirement of any expert demonstration or domain knowledge at test time. Experimental results on MuJoCo and Meta-World benchmarks across various dataset types show that Meta-DT exhibits superior few and zero-shot generalization capacity compared to strong baselines while being more practical with fewer prerequisites. Our code is available at https://github.com/NJU-RL/Meta-DT.

We propose a meta-ability decoupling (MAD) paradigm, which brings together various object navigation methods in an architecture system, allowing them to mutually enhance each other and evolve together. Based on the MAD paradigm, we design a multiple thinking (MT) model that leverages distinct thinking to abstract various meta-abilities. Our method decouples meta-abilities from three aspects: input, encoding, and reward while employing the multiple thinking collaboration (MTC) module to promote mutual cooperation between thinking. MAD introduces a novel qualitative and quantitative interpretability system for object navigation. Through extensive experiments on AI2-Thor and RoboTHOR, we demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods on both typical and zero-shot object navigation tasks.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

The goal of few-shot learning is to generalize and achieve high performance on new unseen learning tasks, where each task has only a limited number of examples available. Gradient-based meta-learning attempts to address this challenging task by learning how to learn new tasks by embedding inductive biases informed by prior learning experiences into the components of the learning algorithm. In this work, we build upon prior research and propose Neural Procedural Bias Meta-Learning (NPBML), a novel framework designed to meta-learn task-adaptive procedural biases. Our approach aims to consolidate recent advancements in meta-learned initializations, optimizers, and loss functions by learning them simultaneously and making them adapt to each individual task to maximize the strength of the learned inductive biases. This imbues each learning task with a unique set of procedural biases which is specifically designed and selected to attain strong learning performance in only a few gradient steps. The experimental results show that by meta-learning the procedural biases of a neural network, we can induce strong inductive biases towards a distribution of learning tasks, enabling robust learning performance across many well-established few-shot learning benchmarks.

Meta-learning has emerged as a powerful approach to train neural networks to learn new tasks quickly from limited data. Broad exposure to different tasks leads to versatile representations enabling general problem solving. But, what are the limits of meta-learning? In this work, we explore the potential of amortizing the most powerful universal predictor, namely Solomonoff Induction (SI), into neural networks via leveraging meta-learning to its limits. We use Universal Turing Machines (UTMs) to generate training data used to expose networks to a broad range of patterns. We provide theoretical analysis of the UTM data generation processes and meta-training protocols. We conduct comprehensive experiments with neural architectures (e.g. LSTMs, Transformers) and algorithmic data generators of varying complexity and universality. Our results suggest that UTM data is a valuable resource for meta-learning, and that it can be used to train neural networks capable of learning universal prediction strategies.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Neural Memory Networks (NMNs) have received increased attention in recent years compared to deep architectures that use a constrained memory. Despite their new appeal, the success of NMNs hinges on the ability of the gradient-based optimiser to perform incremental training of the NMN controllers, determining how to leverage their high capacity for knowledge retrieval. This means that while excellent performance can be achieved when the training data is consistent and well distributed, rare data samples are hard to learn from as the controllers fail to incorporate them effectively during model training. Drawing inspiration from the human cognition process, in particular the utilisation of neuromodulators in the human brain, we propose to decouple the learning process of the NMN controllers to allow them to achieve flexible, rapid adaptation in the presence of new information. This trait is highly beneficial for meta-learning tasks where the memory controllers must quickly grasp abstract concepts in the target domain, and adapt stored knowledge. This allows the NMN controllers to quickly determine which memories are to be retained and which are to be erased, and swiftly adapt their strategy to the new task at hand. Through both quantitative and qualitative evaluations on multiple public benchmarks, including classification and regression tasks, we demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach. Our evaluations not only highlight the ability of the proposed NMN architecture to outperform the current state-of-the-art methods, but also provide insights on how the proposed augmentations help achieve such superior results. In addition, we demonstrate the practical implications of the proposed learning strategy, where the feedback path can be shared among multiple neural memory networks as a mechanism for knowledge sharing.

In this work, we introduce a novel evaluation paradigm for Large Language Models, one that challenges them to engage in meta-reasoning. This approach addresses critical shortcomings in existing math problem-solving benchmarks, traditionally used to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of agents. Our paradigm shifts the focus from result-oriented assessments, which often overlook the reasoning process, to a more holistic evaluation that effectively differentiates the cognitive capabilities among models. For example, in our benchmark, GPT-4 demonstrates a performance ten times more accurate than GPT3-5. The significance of this new paradigm lies in its ability to reveal potential cognitive deficiencies in LLMs that current benchmarks, such as GSM8K, fail to uncover due to their saturation and lack of effective differentiation among varying reasoning abilities. Our comprehensive analysis includes several state-of-the-art math models from both open-source and closed-source communities, uncovering fundamental deficiencies in their training and evaluation approaches. This paper not only advocates for a paradigm shift in the assessment of LLMs but also contributes to the ongoing discourse on the trajectory towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). By promoting the adoption of meta-reasoning evaluation methods similar to ours, we aim to facilitate a more accurate assessment of the true cognitive abilities of LLMs.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

Thinking aloud is an effective meta-cognitive strategy human reasoners apply to solve difficult problems. We suggest to improve the reasoning ability of pre-trained neural language models in a similar way, namely by expanding a task's context with problem elaborations that are dynamically generated by the language model itself. Our main result is that dynamic problem elaboration significantly improves the zero-shot performance of GPT-2 in a deductive reasoning and natural language inference task: While the model uses a syntactic heuristic for predicting an answer, it is capable (to some degree) of generating reasoned additional context which facilitates the successful application of its heuristic. We explore different ways of generating elaborations, including fewshot learning, and find that their relative performance varies with the specific problem characteristics (such as problem difficulty). Moreover, the effectiveness of an elaboration can be explained in terms of the degree to which the elaboration semantically coheres with the corresponding problem. In particular, elaborations that are most faithful to the original problem description may boost accuracy by up to 24%.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has played an important role in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). Some studies apply RL directly to smaller base models (known as zero-RL) and also achieve notable progress. However, in this paper, we show that using only 920 examples, a simple distillation method based on the base model can clearly outperform zero-RL, which typically requires much more data and computational cost. By analyzing the token frequency in model outputs, we find that the distilled model shows more flexible reasoning. It uses anthropomorphic tokens and logical connectors much more often than the zero-RL model. Further analysis reveals that distillation enhances the presence of two advanced cognitive behaviors: Multi-Perspective Thinking or Attempting and Metacognitive Awareness. Frequent occurrences of these two advanced cognitive behaviors give rise to flexible reasoning, which is essential for solving complex reasoning problems, while zero-RL fails to significantly boost the frequency of these behaviors.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Disentangling the factors of variation in data is a fundamental concept in machine learning and has been studied in various ways by different researchers, leading to a multitude of definitions. Despite the numerous empirical studies, more theoretical research is needed to fully understand the defining properties of disentanglement and how different definitions relate to each other. This paper presents a meta-analysis of existing definitions of disentanglement, using category theory as a unifying and rigorous framework. We propose that the concepts of the cartesian and monoidal products should serve as the core of disentanglement. With these core concepts, we show the similarities and crucial differences in dealing with (i) functions, (ii) equivariant maps, (iii) relations, and (iv) stochastic maps. Overall, our meta-analysis deepens our understanding of disentanglement and its various formulations and can help researchers navigate different definitions and choose the most appropriate one for their specific context.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations. One potential reason for hallucinations is the lack of relevant knowledge or context. Thus, a promising solution to mitigate this issue involves instructing LLMs to respond with "I do not know" when a question falls outside their knowledge domain or the provided context. However, in this work, we observed that LLMs struggle to admit their lack of knowledge, primarily due to existing instruction datasets designed to encourage specific answers. To improve large language models' capability to recognize the boundaries of their knowledge, we propose a novel approach called uncertainty-sensitive tuning. This method involves two-stage training designed for uncertainty recognition and prompt-sensitive activation. In the first stage, we guide the LLM to reject unknown questions. In the second stage, we recover the decreased performance in QA tasks by incorporating designed causal instructions. By leveraging this method, we aim to enhance the model's ability to identify areas of uncertainty. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed uncertainty-sensitive tuning method significantly improves the performance of the Llama2-chat-7B model. Specifically, it achieves a substantial 34.7% improvement in handling questions involving knowledge gaps compared to the original model. Moreover, our approach outperforms GPT-4, exhibiting a 9.4% increase in overall performance. We open-source the model and code on GitHub.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

A language model's ability to reflect on its own reasoning provides a key advantage for solving complex problems. While most recent research has focused on how this ability develops during reinforcement learning, we show that it actually begins to emerge much earlier - during the model's pre-training. To study this, we introduce deliberate errors into chains-of-thought and test whether the model can still arrive at the correct answer by recognizing and correcting these mistakes. By tracking performance across different stages of pre-training, we observe that this self-correcting ability appears early and improves steadily over time. For instance, an OLMo2-7B model pre-trained on 4 trillion tokens displays self-correction on our six self-reflection tasks.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Current Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate strong reasoning and tool use capabilities, but often lack self-awareness, failing to balance these approaches effectively. This imbalance leads to Tool Overuse, where models unnecessarily rely on external tools for tasks solvable with parametric knowledge, increasing computational overhead. Inspired by human metacognition, we introduce SMART (Strategic Model-Aware Reasoning with Tools), a paradigm that enhances an agent's self-awareness to optimize task handling and reduce tool overuse. To support this paradigm, we introduce SMART-ER, a dataset spanning three domains, where reasoning alternates between parametric knowledge and tool-dependent steps, with each step enriched by rationales explaining when tools are necessary. Through supervised training, we develop SMARTAgent, a family of models that dynamically balance parametric knowledge and tool use. Evaluations show that SMARTAgent reduces tool use by 24% while improving performance by over 37%, enabling 7B-scale models to match its 70B counterpart and GPT-4o. Additionally, SMARTAgent generalizes to out-of-distribution test data like GSM8K and MINTQA, maintaining accuracy with just one-fifth the tool calls. These highlight the potential of strategic tool use to enhance reasoning, mitigate overuse, and bridge the gap between model size and performance, advancing intelligent and resource-efficient agent designs.

Meta-learning empowers artificial intelligence to increase its efficiency by learning how to learn. Unlocking this potential involves overcoming a challenging meta-optimisation problem. We propose an algorithm that tackles this problem by letting the meta-learner teach itself. The algorithm first bootstraps a target from the meta-learner, then optimises the meta-learner by minimising the distance to that target under a chosen (pseudo-)metric. Focusing on meta-learning with gradients, we establish conditions that guarantee performance improvements and show that the metric can control meta-optimisation. Meanwhile, the bootstrapping mechanism can extend the effective meta-learning horizon without requiring backpropagation through all updates. We achieve a new state-of-the art for model-free agents on the Atari ALE benchmark and demonstrate that it yields both performance and efficiency gains in multi-task meta-learning. Finally, we explore how bootstrapping opens up new possibilities and find that it can meta-learn efficient exploration in an epsilon-greedy Q-learning agent, without backpropagating through the update rule.

Recent work has shown that large text-based neural language models, trained with conventional supervised learning objectives, acquire a surprising propensity for few- and one-shot learning. Here, we show that an embodied agent situated in a simulated 3D world, and endowed with a novel dual-coding external memory, can exhibit similar one-shot word learning when trained with conventional reinforcement learning algorithms. After a single introduction to a novel object via continuous visual perception and a language prompt ("This is a dax"), the agent can re-identify the object and manipulate it as instructed ("Put the dax on the bed"). In doing so, it seamlessly integrates short-term, within-episode knowledge of the appropriate referent for the word "dax" with long-term lexical and motor knowledge acquired across episodes (i.e. "bed" and "putting"). We find that, under certain training conditions and with a particular memory writing mechanism, the agent's one-shot word-object binding generalizes to novel exemplars within the same ShapeNet category, and is effective in settings with unfamiliar numbers of objects. We further show how dual-coding memory can be exploited as a signal for intrinsic motivation, stimulating the agent to seek names for objects that may be useful for later executing instructions. Together, the results demonstrate that deep neural networks can exploit meta-learning, episodic memory and an explicitly multi-modal environment to account for 'fast-mapping', a fundamental pillar of human cognitive development and a potentially transformative capacity for agents that interact with human users.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

We propose an algorithm for meta-learning that is model-agnostic, in the sense that it is compatible with any model trained with gradient descent and applicable to a variety of different learning problems, including classification, regression, and reinforcement learning. The goal of meta-learning is to train a model on a variety of learning tasks, such that it can solve new learning tasks using only a small number of training samples. In our approach, the parameters of the model are explicitly trained such that a small number of gradient steps with a small amount of training data from a new task will produce good generalization performance on that task. In effect, our method trains the model to be easy to fine-tune. We demonstrate that this approach leads to state-of-the-art performance on two few-shot image classification benchmarks, produces good results on few-shot regression, and accelerates fine-tuning for policy gradient reinforcement learning with neural network policies.

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Large language model (LLM)-based decision-making agents have shown the ability to generalize across multiple tasks. However, their performance relies on massive data and compute. We argue that this inefficiency stems from the forgetting phenomenon, in which a model memorizes its behaviors in parameters throughout training. As a result, training on a new task may deteriorate the model's performance on previous tasks. In contrast to LLMs' implicit memory mechanism, the human brain utilizes distributed memory storage, which helps manage and organize multiple skills efficiently, mitigating the forgetting phenomenon. Thus inspired, we propose an internal working memory module to store, blend, and retrieve information for different downstream tasks. Evaluation results show that the proposed method improves training efficiency and generalization in both Atari games and meta-world object manipulation tasks. Moreover, we demonstrate that memory fine-tuning further enhances the adaptability of the proposed architecture.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

PRefLexOR (Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning) combines preference optimization with concepts from Reinforcement Learning to enable models to self-teach through iterative reasoning improvements. We propose a recursive learning approach that engages the model in multi-step reasoning, revisiting, and refining intermediate steps before producing a final output in training and inference phases. Through multiple training stages, the model first learns to align its reasoning with accurate decision paths by optimizing the log odds between preferred and non-preferred responses. During this process, PRefLexOR builds a dynamic knowledge graph by generating questions from random text chunks and retrieval-augmentation to contextualize relevant details from the entire training corpus. In the second stage, preference optimization enhances model performance by using rejection sampling to fine-tune reasoning quality by continually producing in-situ training data while masking the reasoning steps. Recursive optimization within a thinking token framework introduces iterative feedback loops, where the model refines reasoning, achieving deeper coherence, consistency, and adaptability. Implemented in small language models with only 3 billion parameters, we should that even tiny models can iteratively teach themselves to reason with greater depth and reflectivity. Our implementation is straightforward and can be incorporated into any existing pretrained LLM. We focus our examples on applications in biological materials science and demonstrate the method in a variety of case studies that range from in-domain to cross-domain applications. Using reasoning strategies that include thinking and reflection modalities we build a multi-agent recursive self-improving inference approach to successively improve responses via repeated sampling in inference time.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Meta-training, which fine-tunes the language model (LM) on various downstream tasks by maximizing the likelihood of the target label given the task instruction and input instance, has improved the zero-shot task generalization performance. However, meta-trained LMs still struggle to generalize to challenging tasks containing novel labels unseen during meta-training. In this paper, we propose Flipped Learning, an alternative method of meta-training which trains the LM to generate the task instruction given the input instance and label. During inference, the LM trained with Flipped Learning, referred to as Flipped, selects the label option that is most likely to generate the task instruction. On 14 tasks of the BIG-bench benchmark, the 11B-sized Flipped outperforms zero-shot T0-11B and even a 16 times larger 3-shot GPT-3 (175B) on average by 8.4% and 9.7% points, respectively. Flipped gives particularly large improvements on tasks with unseen labels, outperforming T0-11B by up to +20% average F1 score. This indicates that the strong task generalization of Flipped comes from improved generalization to novel labels. We release our code at https://github.com/seonghyeonye/Flipped-Learning.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Large language models have been shown to struggle with limited context memory and multi-step reasoning. We propose a simple method for solving both of these problems by allowing the model to take Self-Notes. Unlike recent scratchpad approaches, the model can deviate from the input context at any time to explicitly think. This allows the model to recall information and perform reasoning on the fly as it reads the context, thus extending its memory and enabling multi-step reasoning. Our experiments on multiple tasks demonstrate that our method can successfully generalize to longer and more complicated instances from their training setup by taking Self-Notes at inference time.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

An obstacle to artificial general intelligence is set by continual learning of multiple tasks of different nature. Recently, various heuristic tricks, both from machine learning and from neuroscience angles, were proposed, but they lack a unified theory ground. Here, we focus on continual learning in single-layered and multi-layered neural networks of binary weights. A variational Bayesian learning setting is thus proposed, where the neural networks are trained in a field-space, rather than gradient-ill-defined discrete-weight space, and furthermore, weight uncertainty is naturally incorporated, and modulates synaptic resources among tasks. From a physics perspective, we translate the variational continual learning into Franz-Parisi thermodynamic potential framework, where previous task knowledge acts as a prior and a reference as well. We thus interpret the continual learning of the binary perceptron in a teacher-student setting as a Franz-Parisi potential computation. The learning performance can then be analytically studied with mean-field order parameters, whose predictions coincide with numerical experiments using stochastic gradient descent methods. Based on the variational principle and Gaussian field approximation of internal preactivations in hidden layers, we also derive the learning algorithm considering weight uncertainty, which solves the continual learning with binary weights using multi-layered neural networks, and performs better than the currently available metaplasticity algorithm. Our proposed principled frameworks also connect to elastic weight consolidation, weight-uncertainty modulated learning, and neuroscience inspired metaplasticity, providing a theory-grounded method for the real-world multi-task learning with deep networks.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

The transformer architecture and variants presented remarkable success across many machine learning tasks in recent years. This success is intrinsically related to the capability of handling long sequences and the presence of context-dependent weights from the attention mechanism. We argue that these capabilities suit the central role of a Meta-Reinforcement Learning algorithm. Indeed, a meta-RL agent needs to infer the task from a sequence of trajectories. Furthermore, it requires a fast adaptation strategy to adapt its policy for a new task -- which can be achieved using the self-attention mechanism. In this work, we present TrMRL (Transformers for Meta-Reinforcement Learning), a meta-RL agent that mimics the memory reinstatement mechanism using the transformer architecture. It associates the recent past of working memories to build an episodic memory recursively through the transformer layers. We show that the self-attention computes a consensus representation that minimizes the Bayes Risk at each layer and provides meaningful features to compute the best actions. We conducted experiments in high-dimensional continuous control environments for locomotion and dexterous manipulation. Results show that TrMRL presents comparable or superior asymptotic performance, sample efficiency, and out-of-distribution generalization compared to the baselines in these environments.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

There is a significant gap between patient needs and available mental health support today. In this paper, we aim to thoroughly examine the potential of using Large Language Models (LLMs) to assist professional psychotherapy. To this end, we propose a new benchmark, CBT-BENCH, for the systematic evaluation of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) assistance. We include three levels of tasks in CBT-BENCH: I: Basic CBT knowledge acquisition, with the task of multiple-choice questions; II: Cognitive model understanding, with the tasks of cognitive distortion classification, primary core belief classification, and fine-grained core belief classification; III: Therapeutic response generation, with the task of generating responses to patient speech in CBT therapy sessions. These tasks encompass key aspects of CBT that could potentially be enhanced through AI assistance, while also outlining a hierarchy of capability requirements, ranging from basic knowledge recitation to engaging in real therapeutic conversations. We evaluated representative LLMs on our benchmark. Experimental results indicate that while LLMs perform well in reciting CBT knowledge, they fall short in complex real-world scenarios requiring deep analysis of patients' cognitive structures and generating effective responses, suggesting potential future work.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

Recent LLMs have significantly improved reasoning capabilities, primarily by including an explicit, lengthy Thinking process as part of generation. In this paper, we question whether this explicit thinking is necessary. Using the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, we find that bypassing the thinking process via simple prompting, denoted as NoThinking, can be surprisingly effective. When controlling for the number of tokens, NoThinking outperforms Thinking across a diverse set of seven challenging reasoning datasets--including mathematical problem solving, formal theorem proving, and coding--especially in low-budget settings, e.g., 51.3 vs. 28.9 on ACM 23 with 700 tokens. Notably, the performance of NoThinking becomes more competitive with pass@k as k increases. Building on this observation, we demonstrate that a parallel scaling approach that uses NoThinking to generate N outputs independently and aggregates them is highly effective. For aggregation, we use task-specific verifiers when available, or we apply simple best-of-N strategies such as confidence-based selection. Our method outperforms a range of baselines with similar latency using Thinking, and is comparable to Thinking with significantly longer latency (up to 9x). Together, our research encourages a reconsideration of the necessity of lengthy thinking processes, while also establishing a competitive reference for achieving strong reasoning performance in low-budget settings or at low latency using parallel scaling.

Meta-learning algorithms are able to learn a new task using previously learned knowledge, but they often require a large number of meta-training tasks which may not be readily available. To address this issue, we propose a method for few-shot learning with fewer tasks, which we call MetaModulation. The key idea is to use a neural network to increase the density of the meta-training tasks by modulating batch normalization parameters during meta-training. Additionally, we modify parameters at various network levels, rather than just a single layer, to increase task diversity. To account for the uncertainty caused by the limited training tasks, we propose a variational MetaModulation where the modulation parameters are treated as latent variables. We also introduce learning variational feature hierarchies by the variational MetaModulation, which modulates features at all layers and can consider task uncertainty and generate more diverse tasks. The ablation studies illustrate the advantages of utilizing a learnable task modulation at different levels and demonstrate the benefit of incorporating probabilistic variants in few-task meta-learning. Our MetaModulation and its variational variants consistently outperform state-of-the-art alternatives on four few-task meta-learning benchmarks.

A major goal of unsupervised learning is to discover data representations that are useful for subsequent tasks, without access to supervised labels during training. Typically, this involves minimizing a surrogate objective, such as the negative log likelihood of a generative model, with the hope that representations useful for subsequent tasks will arise as a side effect. In this work, we propose instead to directly target later desired tasks by meta-learning an unsupervised learning rule which leads to representations useful for those tasks. Specifically, we target semi-supervised classification performance, and we meta-learn an algorithm -- an unsupervised weight update rule -- that produces representations useful for this task. Additionally, we constrain our unsupervised update rule to a be a biologically-motivated, neuron-local function, which enables it to generalize to different neural network architectures, datasets, and data modalities. We show that the meta-learned update rule produces useful features and sometimes outperforms existing unsupervised learning techniques. We further show that the meta-learned unsupervised update rule generalizes to train networks with different widths, depths, and nonlinearities. It also generalizes to train on data with randomly permuted input dimensions and even generalizes from image datasets to a text task.

Large language models (LLMs) often suffer from context faithfulness hallucinations, where outputs deviate from retrieved information due to insufficient context utilization and high output uncertainty. Our uncertainty evaluation experiments reveal a strong correlation between high uncertainty and hallucinations. We hypothesize that attention mechanisms encode signals indicative of contextual utilization, validated through probing analysis. Based on these insights, we propose Dynamic Attention-Guided Context Decoding (DAGCD), a lightweight framework that integrates attention distributions and uncertainty signals in a single-pass decoding process. Experiments across QA datasets demonstrate DAGCD's effectiveness, achieving significant improvements in faithfulness and robustness while maintaining computational efficiency.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

The reflection capacity of Large Language Model (LLM) has garnered extensive attention. A post-hoc prompting strategy, e.g., reflexion and self-refine, refines LLM's response based on self-evaluated or external feedback. However, recent research indicates without external feedback, LLM's intrinsic reflection is unstable. Our investigation unveils that the key bottleneck is the quality of the self-evaluated feedback. We find LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or high randomness when self-evaluate, offering stubborn or inconsistent feedback, which causes poor reflection. To remedy this, we advocate Self-Contrast: It adaptively explores diverse solving perspectives tailored to the request, contrasts the differences, and summarizes these discrepancies into a checklist which could be used to re-examine and eliminate discrepancies. Our method endows LLM with diverse perspectives to alleviate stubborn biases. Moreover, their discrepancies indicate potential errors or inherent uncertainties that LLM often overlooks. Reflecting upon these can catalyze more accurate and stable reflection. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning and translation tasks with different LLMs serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our strategy.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

We propose a novel framework for comprehending the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) through the perspective of meta-learning. By conceptualizing reasoning trajectories as pseudo-gradient descent updates to the LLM's parameters, we identify parallels between LLM reasoning and various meta-learning paradigms. We formalize the training process for reasoning tasks as a meta-learning setup, with each question treated as an individual task, and reasoning trajectories serving as the inner loop optimization for adapting model parameters. Once trained on a diverse set of questions, the LLM develops fundamental reasoning capabilities that can generalize to previously unseen questions. Extensive empirical evaluations substantiate the strong connection between LLM reasoning and meta-learning, exploring several issues of significant interest from a meta-learning standpoint. Our work not only enhances the understanding of LLM reasoning but also provides practical insights for improving these models through established meta-learning techniques.

In living organisms, homeostasis is the natural regulation of internal states aimed at maintaining conditions compatible with life. Typical artificial systems are not equipped with comparable regulatory features. Here, we introduce an artificial neural network that incorporates homeostatic features. Its own computing substrate is placed in a needful and vulnerable relation to the very objects over which it computes. For example, artificial neurons performing classification of MNIST digits or Fashion-MNIST articles of clothing may receive excitatory or inhibitory effects, which alter their own learning rate as a direct result of perceiving and classifying the digits. In this scenario, accurate recognition is desirable to the agent itself because it guides decisions to regulate its vulnerable internal states and functionality. Counterintuitively, the addition of vulnerability to a learner does not necessarily impair its performance. On the contrary, self-regulation in response to vulnerability confers benefits under certain conditions. We show that homeostatic design confers increased adaptability under concept shift, in which the relationships between labels and data change over time, and that the greatest advantages are obtained under the highest rates of shift. This necessitates the rapid un-learning of past associations and the re-learning of new ones. We also demonstrate the superior abilities of homeostatic learners in environments with dynamically changing rates of concept shift. Our homeostatic design exposes the artificial neural network's thinking machinery to the consequences of its own "thoughts", illustrating the advantage of putting one's own "skin in the game" to improve fluid intelligence.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Cognitive dynamics are pivotal to advance human understanding of the world. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal their potential for cognitive simulation. However, these LLM-based cognitive studies primarily focus on static modeling, overlooking the dynamic nature of cognition. To bridge this gap, we propose the concept of the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and present a corresponding task with the inspiration of longitudinal studies. Towards the task, we develop CogBench, a novel benchmark to assess the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and validate it through participant surveys. We also design two evaluation metrics for CogBench, including Authenticity and Rationality. Recognizing the inherent static nature of LLMs, we introduce CogGPT for the task, which features an innovative iterative cognitive mechanism aimed at enhancing lifelong cognitive dynamics. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of CogGPT over existing methods, particularly in its ability to facilitate role-specific cognitive dynamics under continuous information flows.

In a systematic way, we investigate a widely asked question: Do LLMs really understand what they say?, which relates to the more familiar term Stochastic Parrot. To this end, we propose a summative assessment over a carefully designed physical concept understanding task, PhysiCo. Our task alleviates the memorization issue via the usage of grid-format inputs that abstractly describe physical phenomena. The grids represents varying levels of understanding, from the core phenomenon, application examples to analogies to other abstract patterns in the grid world. A comprehensive study on our task demonstrates: (1) state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, o1 and Gemini 2.0 flash thinking, lag behind humans by ~40%; (2) the stochastic parrot phenomenon is present in LLMs, as they fail on our grid task but can describe and recognize the same concepts well in natural language; (3) our task challenges the LLMs due to intrinsic difficulties rather than the unfamiliar grid format, as in-context learning and fine-tuning on same formatted data added little to their performance.

Large LMs such as GPT-3 are powerful, but can commit mistakes that are obvious to humans. For example, GPT-3 would mistakenly interpret "What word is similar to good?" to mean a homophone, while the user intended a synonym. Our goal is to effectively correct such errors via user interactions with the system but without retraining, which will be prohibitively costly. We pair GPT-3 with a growing memory of recorded cases where the model misunderstood the user's intents, along with user feedback for clarification. Such a memory allows our system to produce enhanced prompts for any new query based on the user feedback for error correction on similar cases in the past. On four tasks (two lexical tasks, two advanced ethical reasoning tasks), we show how a (simulated) user can interactively teach a deployed GPT-3, substantially increasing its accuracy over the queries with different kinds of misunderstandings by the GPT-3. Our approach is a step towards the low-cost utility enhancement for very large pre-trained LMs. Code, data, and instructions to implement MEMPROMPT for a new task at https://www.memprompt.com/.

Meta-learning researchers face two fundamental issues in their empirical work: prototyping and reproducibility. Researchers are prone to make mistakes when prototyping new algorithms and tasks because modern meta-learning methods rely on unconventional functionalities of machine learning frameworks. In turn, reproducing existing results becomes a tedious endeavour -- a situation exacerbated by the lack of standardized implementations and benchmarks. As a result, researchers spend inordinate amounts of time on implementing software rather than understanding and developing new ideas. This manuscript introduces learn2learn, a library for meta-learning research focused on solving those prototyping and reproducibility issues. learn2learn provides low-level routines common across a wide-range of meta-learning techniques (e.g. meta-descent, meta-reinforcement learning, few-shot learning), and builds standardized interfaces to algorithms and benchmarks on top of them. In releasing learn2learn under a free and open source license, we hope to foster a community around standardized software for meta-learning research.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

Most meta-learning methods assume that the (very small) context set used to establish a new task at test time is passively provided. In some settings, however, it is feasible to actively select which points to label; the potential gain from a careful choice is substantial, but the setting requires major differences from typical active learning setups. We clarify the ways in which active meta-learning can be used to label a context set, depending on which parts of the meta-learning process use active learning. Within this framework, we propose a natural algorithm based on fitting Gaussian mixtures for selecting which points to label; though simple, the algorithm also has theoretical motivation. The proposed algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art active learning methods when used with various meta-learning algorithms across several benchmark datasets.

Reasoning ability is essential for Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). In the absence of multimodal chain-of-thought annotated data, self-evolving training, where the model learns from its own outputs, has emerged as an effective and scalable approach for enhancing reasoning abilities. Despite its growing usage, a comprehensive understanding of self-evolving training, particularly in the context of multimodal reasoning, remains limited. In this paper, we delve into the intricacies of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning, pinpointing three key factors: Training Method, Reward Model, and Prompt Variation. We systematically examine each factor and explore how various configurations affect the training's effectiveness. Our analysis leads to a set of best practices for each factor, aimed at optimizing multimodal reasoning. Furthermore, we explore the Self-Evolution Dynamics during training and the impact of automatic balancing mechanisms in boosting performance. After all the investigations, we present a final recipe for self-evolving training in multimodal reasoning, encapsulating these design choices into a framework we call MSTaR (Multimodal Self-evolving Training for Reasoning), which is universally effective for models with different sizes on various benchmarks, e.g., surpassing the pre-evolved model significantly on 5 multimodal reasoning benchmarks without using additional human annotations, as demonstrated on MiniCPM-V-2.5 (8B), Phi-3.5-Vision (4B) and InternVL2 (2B). We believe this study fills a significant gap in the understanding of self-evolving training for multimodal reasoning and offers a robust framework for future research. Our policy and reward models, as well as the collected data, is released to facilitate further investigation in multimodal reasoning.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) often generate inaccurate or fabricated information and generally fail to indicate their confidence, which limits their broader applications. Previous work elicits confidence from LLMs by direct or self-consistency prompting, or constructing specific datasets for supervised finetuning. The prompting-based approaches have inferior performance, and the training-based approaches are limited to binary or inaccurate group-level confidence estimates. In this work, we present the advanced SaySelf, a training framework that teaches LLMs to express more accurate fine-grained confidence estimates. In addition, beyond the confidence scores, SaySelf initiates the process of directing LLMs to produce self-reflective rationales that clearly identify gaps in their parametric knowledge and explain their uncertainty. This is achieved by using an LLM to automatically summarize the uncertainties in specific knowledge via natural language. The summarization is based on the analysis of the inconsistency in multiple sampled reasoning chains, and the resulting data is utilized for supervised fine-tuning. Moreover, we utilize reinforcement learning with a meticulously crafted reward function to calibrate the confidence estimates, motivating LLMs to deliver accurate, high-confidence predictions and to penalize overconfidence in erroneous outputs. Experimental results in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of SaySelf in reducing the confidence calibration error and maintaining the task performance. We show that the generated self-reflective rationales are reasonable and can further contribute to the calibration. The code is made public at https://github.com/xu1868/SaySelf.

Despite the remarkable advancements and widespread applications of deep neural networks, their ability to perform reasoning tasks remains limited, particularly in domains requiring structured, abstract thought. In this paper, we investigate the linguistic reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) by introducing IOLBENCH, a novel benchmark derived from International Linguistics Olympiad (IOL) problems. This dataset encompasses diverse problems testing syntax, morphology, phonology, and semantics, all carefully designed to be self-contained and independent of external knowledge. These tasks challenge models to engage in metacognitive linguistic reasoning, requiring the deduction of linguistic rules and patterns from minimal examples. Through extensive benchmarking of leading LLMs, we find that even the most advanced models struggle to handle the intricacies of linguistic complexity, particularly in areas demanding compositional generalization and rule abstraction. Our analysis highlights both the strengths and persistent limitations of current models in linguistic problem-solving, offering valuable insights into their reasoning capabilities. By introducing IOLBENCH, we aim to foster further research into developing models capable of human-like reasoning, with broader implications for the fields of computational linguistics and artificial intelligence.

Recent reasoning models through test-time scaling have demonstrated that long chain-of-thoughts can unlock substantial performance boosts in hard reasoning tasks such as math and code. However, the benefit of such long thoughts for system-2 reasoning is relatively less explored in other domains such as perceptual tasks where shallower, system-1 reasoning seems sufficient. In this paper, we introduce LongPerceptualThoughts, a new synthetic dataset with 30K long-thought traces for perceptual tasks. The key challenges in synthesizing elaborate reasoning thoughts for perceptual tasks are that off-the-shelf models are not yet equipped with such thinking behavior and that it is not straightforward to build a reliable process verifier for perceptual tasks. Thus, we propose a novel three-stage data synthesis framework that first synthesizes verifiable multiple-choice questions from dense image descriptions, then extracts simple CoTs from VLMs for those verifiable problems, and finally expands those simple thoughts to elaborate long thoughts via frontier reasoning models. In controlled experiments with a strong instruction-tuned 7B model, we demonstrate notable improvements over existing visual reasoning data-generation methods. Our model, trained on the generated dataset, achieves an average +3.4 points improvement over 5 vision-centric benchmarks, including +11.8 points on V^* Bench. Notably, despite being tuned for vision tasks, it also improves performance on the text reasoning benchmark, MMLU-Pro, by +2 points.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

We study offline meta-reinforcement learning, a practical reinforcement learning paradigm that learns from offline data to adapt to new tasks. The distribution of offline data is determined jointly by the behavior policy and the task. Existing offline meta-reinforcement learning algorithms cannot distinguish these factors, making task representations unstable to the change of behavior policies. To address this problem, we propose a contrastive learning framework for task representations that are robust to the distribution mismatch of behavior policies in training and test. We design a bi-level encoder structure, use mutual information maximization to formalize task representation learning, derive a contrastive learning objective, and introduce several approaches to approximate the true distribution of negative pairs. Experiments on a variety of offline meta-reinforcement learning benchmarks demonstrate the advantages of our method over prior methods, especially on the generalization to out-of-distribution behavior policies. The code is available at https://github.com/PKU-AI-Edge/CORRO.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Open-ended learning agents must efficiently prioritize goals in vast possibility spaces, focusing on those that maximize learning progress (LP). When such autotelic exploration is achieved by LLM agents trained with online RL in high-dimensional and evolving goal spaces, a key challenge for LP prediction is modeling one's own competence, a form of metacognitive monitoring. Traditional approaches either require extensive sampling or rely on brittle expert-defined goal groupings. We introduce MAGELLAN, a metacognitive framework that lets LLM agents learn to predict their competence and LP online. By capturing semantic relationships between goals, MAGELLAN enables sample-efficient LP estimation and dynamic adaptation to evolving goal spaces through generalization. In an interactive learning environment, we show that MAGELLAN improves LP prediction efficiency and goal prioritization, being the only method allowing the agent to fully master a large and evolving goal space. These results demonstrate how augmenting LLM agents with a metacognitive ability for LP predictions can effectively scale curriculum learning to open-ended goal spaces.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have introduced Reasoning Large Language Models (RLLMs), which employ extended thinking processes with reflection and self-correction capabilities, demonstrating the effectiveness of test-time scaling. RLLMs exhibit innate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capability obtained from training, leading to a natural question: "Is CoT prompting, a popular In-Context Learning (ICL) method for chat LLMs, necessary to enhance the reasoning capability of RLLMs?" In this work, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Zero-shot CoT and Few-shot CoT on RLLMs across mathematical reasoning tasks. We examine models ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, finding that contrary to concerns, CoT prompting significantly enhances RLLMs' performance in most scenarios. Our results reveal distinct patterns: large-capacity models show minimal improvement on simple tasks but substantial gains on complex problems, while smaller models exhibit the opposite behavior. Further analysis demonstrates that CoT prompting effectively controls the distribution of the numbers of thinking tokens and reasoning steps, reducing excessive reflections by approximately 90% in some cases. Moreover, attention logits analysis reveals the RLLMs' overfitting to reflection-related words, which is mitigated by external CoT guidance. Notably, our experiments indicate that for RLLMs, one-shot CoT consistently yields superior performance compared to Few-shot CoT approaches. Our findings provide important insights for optimizing RLLMs' performance through appropriate prompting strategies.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

What if artificial intelligence could not only solve problems for which it was trained but also learn to teach itself to solve new problems (i.e., meta-learn)? In this study, we demonstrate that a pre-trained transformer fine-tuned with reinforcement learning over multiple episodes develops the ability to solve problems that it has never encountered before - an emergent ability called In-Context Reinforcement Learning (ICRL). This powerful meta-learner not only excels in solving unseen in-distribution environments with remarkable sample efficiency, but also shows strong performance in out-of-distribution environments. In addition, we show that it exhibits robustness to the quality of its training data, seamlessly stitches together behaviors from its context, and adapts to non-stationary environments. These behaviors demonstrate that an RL-trained transformer can iteratively improve upon its own solutions, making it an excellent general-purpose problem solver.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

The ability of large vision-language models (LVLMs) to critique and correct their reasoning is an essential building block towards their self-improvement. However, a systematic analysis of such capabilities in LVLMs is still lacking. We propose VISCO, the first benchmark to extensively analyze the fine-grained critique and correction capabilities of LVLMs. Compared to existing work that uses a single scalar value to critique the entire reasoning [4], VISCO features dense and fine-grained critique, requiring LVLMs to evaluate the correctness of each step in the chain-of-thought and provide natural language explanations to support their judgments. Extensive evaluation of 24 LVLMs demonstrates that human-written critiques significantly enhance the performance after correction, showcasing the potential of the self-improvement strategy. However, the model-generated critiques are less helpful and sometimes detrimental to the performance, suggesting that critique is the crucial bottleneck. We identified three common patterns in critique failures: failure to critique visual perception, reluctance to "say no", and exaggerated assumption of error propagation. To address these issues, we propose an effective LookBack strategy that revisits the image to verify each piece of information in the initial reasoning. LookBack significantly improves critique and correction performance by up to 13.5%.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

Recent advancements in Chain of Thought (COT) generation have significantly improved the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), with reinforcement learning (RL) emerging as an effective post-training approach. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) inherit this reasoning potential but remain underexplored in tasks requiring both perception and logical reasoning. To address this, we introduce SEED-Bench-R1, a benchmark designed to systematically evaluate post-training methods for MLLMs in video understanding. It includes intricate real-world videos and complex everyday planning tasks in the format of multiple-choice questions, requiring sophisticated perception and reasoning. SEED-Bench-R1 assesses generalization through a three-level hierarchy: in-distribution, cross-environment, and cross-environment-task scenarios, equipped with a large-scale training dataset with easily verifiable ground-truth answers. Using Qwen2-VL-Instruct-7B as a base model, we compare RL with supervised fine-tuning (SFT), demonstrating RL's data efficiency and superior performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution tasks, even outperforming SFT on general video understanding benchmarks like LongVideoBench. Our detailed analysis reveals that RL enhances visual perception but often produces less logically coherent reasoning chains. We identify key limitations such as inconsistent reasoning and overlooked visual cues, and suggest future improvements in base model reasoning, reward modeling, and RL robustness against noisy signals.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the integration of visual and linguistic modalities, establishing themselves as the dominant paradigm for visual-language tasks. Current approaches like chain of thought (CoT) reasoning have augmented the cognitive capabilities of large language models (LLMs), yet their adaptation to MLLMs is hindered by heightened risks of hallucination in cross-modality comprehension. In this paper, we find that the thinking while looking paradigm in current multimodal CoT approaches--where reasoning chains are generated alongside visual input--fails to mitigate hallucinations caused by misleading images. To address these limitations, we propose the Visual Inference Chain (VIC) framework, a novel approach that constructs reasoning chains using textual context alone before introducing visual input, effectively reducing cross-modal biases and enhancing multimodal reasoning accuracy. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that VIC significantly improves zero-shot performance across various vision-related tasks, mitigating hallucinations while refining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. Our code repository can be found at https://github.com/Terry-Xu-666/visual_inference_chain.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Despite their impressive capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., the generated content that is nonsensical or unfaithful to input sources. Unlike in LLMs, hallucinations in MLLMs often stem from the sensitivity of text decoder to visual tokens, leading to a phenomenon akin to "amnesia" about visual information. To address this issue, we propose MemVR, a novel decoding paradigm inspired by common cognition: when the memory of an image seen the moment before is forgotten, people will look at it again for factual answers. Following this principle, we treat visual tokens as supplementary evidence, re-injecting them into the MLLM through Feed Forward Network (FFN) as "key-value memory" at the middle trigger layer. This "look-twice" mechanism occurs when the model exhibits high uncertainty during inference, effectively enhancing factual alignment. Comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that MemVR significantly mitigates hallucination across various MLLMs and excels in general benchmarks without incurring additional time overhead. The implementation is available from https://github.com/1zhou-Wang/MemVR

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have enabled LLM-based agents to successfully tackle interactive planning tasks. However, despite their successes, existing approaches often suffer from planning hallucinations and require retraining for each new agent. To address these challenges, we propose the Meta Plan Optimization (MPO) framework, which enhances agent planning capabilities by directly incorporating explicit guidance. Unlike previous methods that rely on complex knowledge, which either require significant human effort or lack quality assurance, MPO leverages high-level general guidance through meta plans to assist agent planning and enables continuous optimization of the meta plans based on feedback from the agent's task execution. Our experiments conducted on two representative tasks demonstrate that MPO significantly outperforms existing baselines. Moreover, our analysis indicates that MPO provides a plug-and-play solution that enhances both task completion efficiency and generalization capabilities in previous unseen scenarios.

Image Schemas are repetitive cognitive patterns that influence the way we conceptualize and reason about various concepts present in speech. These patterns are deeply embedded within our cognitive processes and are reflected in our bodily expressions including gestures. Particularly, metaphoric gestures possess essential characteristics and semantic meanings that align with Image Schemas, to visually represent abstract concepts. The shape and form of gestures can convey abstract concepts, such as extending the forearm and hand or tracing a line with hand movements to visually represent the image schema of PATH. Previous behavior generation models have primarily focused on utilizing speech (acoustic features and text) to drive the generation model of virtual agents. They have not considered key semantic information as those carried by Image Schemas to effectively generate metaphoric gestures. To address this limitation, we introduce META4, a deep learning approach that generates metaphoric gestures from both speech and Image Schemas. Our approach has two primary goals: computing Image Schemas from input text to capture the underlying semantic and metaphorical meaning, and generating metaphoric gestures driven by speech and the computed image schemas. Our approach is the first method for generating speech driven metaphoric gestures while leveraging the potential of Image Schemas. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and highlight the importance of both speech and image schemas in modeling metaphoric gestures.

Data-free Knowledge Distillation (DFKD) has gained popularity recently, with the fundamental idea of carrying out knowledge transfer from a Teacher neural network to a Student neural network in the absence of training data. However, in the Adversarial DFKD framework, the student network's accuracy, suffers due to the non-stationary distribution of the pseudo-samples under multiple generator updates. To this end, at every generator update, we aim to maintain the student's performance on previously encountered examples while acquiring knowledge from samples of the current distribution. Thus, we propose a meta-learning inspired framework by treating the task of Knowledge-Acquisition (learning from newly generated samples) and Knowledge-Retention (retaining knowledge on previously met samples) as meta-train and meta-test, respectively. Hence, we dub our method as Learning to Retain while Acquiring. Moreover, we identify an implicit aligning factor between the Knowledge-Retention and Knowledge-Acquisition tasks indicating that the proposed student update strategy enforces a common gradient direction for both tasks, alleviating interference between the two objectives. Finally, we support our hypothesis by exhibiting extensive evaluation and comparison of our method with prior arts on multiple datasets.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Machine learning methods can be a valuable aid in the scientific process, but they need to face challenging settings where data come from inhomogeneous experimental conditions. Recent meta-learning methods have made significant progress in multi-task learning, but they rely on black-box neural networks, resulting in high computational costs and limited interpretability. Leveraging the structure of the learning problem, we argue that multi-environment generalization can be achieved using a simpler learning model, with an affine structure with respect to the learning task. Crucially, we prove that this architecture can identify the physical parameters of the system, enabling interpreable learning. We demonstrate the competitive generalization performance and the low computational cost of our method by comparing it to state-of-the-art algorithms on physical systems, ranging from toy models to complex, non-analytical systems. The interpretability of our method is illustrated with original applications to physical-parameter-induced adaptation and to adaptive control.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of LLM test-time scaling. However, existing approaches to incentivize LLMs' deep thinking abilities generally require large-scale data or significant training efforts. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how to improve the thinking abilities of less powerful base models. In this work, we introduce S^2R, an efficient framework that enhances LLM reasoning by teaching models to self-verify and self-correct during inference. Specifically, we first initialize LLMs with iterative self-verification and self-correction behaviors through supervised fine-tuning on carefully curated data. The self-verification and self-correction skills are then further strengthened by both outcome-level and process-level reinforcement learning, with minimized resource requirements, enabling the model to adaptively refine its reasoning process during inference. Our results demonstrate that, with only 3.1k self-verifying and self-correcting behavior initialization samples, Qwen2.5-math-7B achieves an accuracy improvement from 51.0\% to 81.6\%, outperforming models trained on an equivalent amount of long-CoT distilled data. Extensive experiments and analysis based on three base models across both in-domain and out-of-domain benchmarks validate the effectiveness of S^2R. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/NineAbyss/S2R.

Despite the promising few-shot ability of large language models (LLMs), the standard paradigm of In-context Learning (ICL) suffers the disadvantages of susceptibility to selected demonstrations and the intricacy to generate these demonstrations. In this paper, we raise the fundamental question that whether human-generated demonstrations are necessary for ICL. To answer this question, we propose self-contemplation prompting strategy (SEC), a paradigm free from human-crafted demonstrations. The key point of SEC is that, instead of using hand-crafted examples as demonstrations in ICL, SEC asks LLMs to first create demonstrations on their own, based on which the final output is generated. SEC is a flexible framework and can be adapted to both the vanilla ICL and the chain-of-thought (CoT), but with greater ease: as the manual-generation process of both examples and rationale can be saved. Extensive experiments in arithmetic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, multi-task language understanding, and code generation benchmarks, show that SEC, which does not require hand-crafted demonstrations, significantly outperforms the zero-shot learning strategy, and achieves comparable results to ICL with hand-crafted demonstrations. This demonstrates that, for many tasks, contemporary LLMs possess a sufficient level of competence to exclusively depend on their own capacity for decision making, removing the need for external training data. Code is available at https://github.com/ruili33/SEC.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) via prompting is the de facto method for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). But for what kinds of tasks is this extra ``thinking'' really helpful? To analyze this, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis covering over 100 papers using CoT and ran our own evaluations of 20 datasets across 14 models. Our results show that CoT gives strong performance benefits primarily on tasks involving math or logic, with much smaller gains on other types of tasks. On MMLU, directly generating the answer without CoT leads to almost identical accuracy as CoT unless the question or model's response contains an equals sign, indicating symbolic operations and reasoning. Following this finding, we analyze the behavior of CoT on these problems by separating planning and execution and comparing against tool-augmented LLMs. Much of CoT's gain comes from improving symbolic execution, but it underperforms relative to using a symbolic solver. Our results indicate that CoT can be applied selectively, maintaining performance while saving inference costs. Furthermore, they suggest a need to move beyond prompt-based CoT to new paradigms that better leverage intermediate computation across the whole range of LLM applications.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made in automated task-solving through the use of multi-agent driven by large language models (LLMs). However, existing LLM-based multi-agent works primarily focus on solving simple dialogue tasks, and complex tasks are rarely studied, mainly due to the LLM hallucination problem. This type of hallucination becomes cascading when naively chaining multiple intelligent agents, resulting in a failure to effectively address complex problems. Therefore, we introduce MetaGPT, an innovative framework that incorporates efficient human workflows as a meta programming approach into LLM-based multi-agent collaboration. Specifically, MetaGPT encodes Standardized Operating Procedures (SOPs) into prompts to enhance structured coordination. Subsequently, it mandates modular outputs, empowering agents with domain expertise comparable to human professionals, to validate outputs and minimize compounded errors. In this way, MetaGPT leverages the assembly line paradigm to assign diverse roles to various agents, thereby establishing a framework that can effectively and cohesively deconstruct complex multi-agent collaborative problems. Our experiments on collaborative software engineering benchmarks demonstrate that MetaGPT generates more coherent and correct solutions compared to existing chat-based multi-agent systems. This highlights the potential of integrating human domain knowledge into multi-agent systems, thereby creating new opportunities to tackle complex real-world challenges. The GitHub repository of this project is publicly available on:https://github.com/geekan/MetaGPT.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.