Daily Papers

User-generated contents (UGCs) on online platforms allow marketing researchers to understand consumer preferences for products and services. With the advance of large language models (LLMs), some studies utilized the models for annotation and sentiment analysis. However, the relationship between the accuracy and the hyper-parameters of LLMs is yet to be thoroughly examined. In addition, the issues of variability and reproducibility of results from each trial of LLMs have rarely been considered in existing literature. Since actual human annotation uses majority voting to resolve disagreements among annotators, this study introduces a majority voting mechanism to a sentiment analysis model using local LLMs. By a series of three analyses of online reviews on restaurant evaluations, we demonstrate that majority voting with multiple attempts using a medium-sized model produces more robust results than using a large model with a single attempt. Furthermore, we conducted further analysis to investigate the effect of each aspect on the overall evaluation.

Recent advances have demonstrated the effectiveness of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in improving the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing works inevitably rely on high-quality instructions and verifiable rewards for effective training, both of which are often difficult to obtain in specialized domains. In this paper, we propose Self-play Reinforcement Learning(SeRL) to bootstrap LLM training with limited initial data. Specifically, SeRL comprises two complementary modules: self-instruction and self-rewarding. The former module generates additional instructions based on the available data at each training step, employing robust online filtering strategies to ensure instruction quality, diversity, and difficulty. The latter module introduces a simple yet effective majority-voting mechanism to estimate response rewards for additional instructions, eliminating the need for external annotations. Finally, SeRL performs conventional RL based on the generated data, facilitating iterative self-play learning. Extensive experiments on various reasoning benchmarks and across different LLM backbones demonstrate that the proposed SeRL yields results superior to its counterparts and achieves performance on par with those obtained by high-quality data with verifiable rewards. Our code is available at https://github.com/wantbook-book/SeRL.

With the growing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has raised significant concerns. However, there is still a lack of definitive standards for evaluating their safety due to the subjective nature of current safety benchmarks. To address this gap, we conducted the first exploration of LLMs' safety evaluation from a legal perspective by proposing the SafeLawBench benchmark. SafeLawBench categorizes safety risks into three levels based on legal standards, providing a systematic and comprehensive framework for evaluation. It comprises 24,860 multi-choice questions and 1,106 open-domain question-answering (QA) tasks. Our evaluation included 2 closed-source LLMs and 18 open-source LLMs using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, highlighting the safety features of each model. We also evaluated the LLMs' safety-related reasoning stability and refusal behavior. Additionally, we found that a majority voting mechanism can enhance model performance. Notably, even leading SOTA models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o have not exceeded 80.5% accuracy in multi-choice tasks on SafeLawBench, while the average accuracy of 20 LLMs remains at 68.8\%. We urge the community to prioritize research on the safety of LLMs.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable performance across various tasks, exhibiting the capacity to swiftly acquire new skills, such as through In-Context Learning (ICL) with minimal demonstration examples. In this work, we present a comprehensive framework for investigating Multimodal ICL (M-ICL) in the context of Large Multimodal Models. We consider the best open-source multimodal models (e.g., IDEFICS, OpenFlamingo) and a wide range of multimodal tasks. Our study unveils several noteworthy findings: (1) M-ICL primarily relies on text-driven mechanisms, showing little to no influence from the image modality. (2) When used with advanced-ICL strategy (like RICES), M-ICL is not better than a simple strategy based on majority voting over context examples. Moreover, we identify several biases and limitations of M-ICL that warrant consideration prior to deployment. Code available at https://gitlab.com/folbaeni/multimodal-icl

Improving Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in the post-training stage typically relies on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning (RL). However, these supervised methods require expensive and manually annotated multi-modal data--an ultimately unsustainable resource. While recent efforts have explored unsupervised post-training, their methods are complex and difficult to iterate. In this work, we are the first to investigate the use of GRPO, a stable and scalable online RL algorithm, for enabling continual self-improvement without any external supervision. We propose MM-UPT, a simple yet effective framework for unsupervised post-training of MLLMs. MM-UPT builds upon GRPO, replacing traditional reward signals with a self-rewarding mechanism based on majority voting over multiple sampled responses. Our experiments demonstrate that MM-UPT significantly improves the reasoning ability of Qwen2.5-VL-7B (e.g., 66.3 %rightarrow72.9 % on MathVista, 62.9 %rightarrow68.7 % on We-Math), using standard dataset without ground truth labels. MM-UPT also outperforms prior unsupervised baselines and even approaches the results of supervised GRPO. Furthermore, we show that incorporating synthetic questions, generated solely by MLLM itself, can boost performance as well, highlighting a promising approach for scalable self-improvement. Overall, MM-UPT offers a new paradigm for continual, autonomous enhancement of MLLMs in the absence of external supervision. Our code is available at https://github.com/waltonfuture/MM-UPT.

Reliably labelling data typically requires annotations from multiple human workers. However, humans are far from being perfect. Hence, it is a common practice to aggregate labels gathered from multiple annotators to make a more confident estimate of the true label. Among many aggregation methods, the simple and well known Majority Vote (MV) selects the class label polling the highest number of votes. However, despite its importance, the optimality of MV's label aggregation has not been extensively studied. We address this gap in our work by characterising the conditions under which MV achieves the theoretically optimal lower bound on label estimation error. Our results capture the tolerable limits on annotation noise under which MV can optimally recover labels for a given class distribution. This certificate of optimality provides a more principled approach to model selection for label aggregation as an alternative to otherwise inefficient practices that sometimes include higher experts, gold labels, etc., that are all marred by the same human uncertainty despite huge time and monetary costs. Experiments on both synthetic and real world data corroborate our theoretical findings.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

A key component of understanding hand-object interactions is the ability to identify the active object -- the object that is being manipulated by the human hand. In order to accurately localize the active object, any method must reason using information encoded by each image pixel, such as whether it belongs to the hand, the object, or the background. To leverage each pixel as evidence to determine the bounding box of the active object, we propose a pixel-wise voting function. Our pixel-wise voting function takes an initial bounding box as input and produces an improved bounding box of the active object as output. The voting function is designed so that each pixel inside of the input bounding box votes for an improved bounding box, and the box with the majority vote is selected as the output. We call the collection of bounding boxes generated inside of the voting function, the Relational Box Field, as it characterizes a field of bounding boxes defined in relationship to the current bounding box. While our voting function is able to improve the bounding box of the active object, one round of voting is typically not enough to accurately localize the active object. Therefore, we repeatedly apply the voting function to sequentially improve the location of the bounding box. However, since it is known that repeatedly applying a one-step predictor (i.e., auto-regressive processing with our voting function) can cause a data distribution shift, we mitigate this issue using reinforcement learning (RL). We adopt standard RL to learn the voting function parameters and show that it provides a meaningful improvement over a standard supervised learning approach. We perform experiments on two large-scale datasets: 100DOH and MECCANO, improving AP50 performance by 8% and 30%, respectively, over the state of the art.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates robust and challenging benchmarks. Leaderboards like Chatbot Arena rank LLMs based on how well their responses align with human preferences. However, many tasks such as those related to emotional intelligence, creative writing, or persuasiveness, are highly subjective and often lack majoritarian human agreement. Judges may have irreconcilable disagreements about what constitutes a better response. To address the challenge of ranking LLMs on highly subjective tasks, we propose a novel benchmarking framework, the Language Model Council (LMC). The LMC operates through a democratic process to: 1) formulate a test set through equal participation, 2) administer the test among council members, and 3) evaluate responses as a collective jury. We deploy a council of 20 newest LLMs on an open-ended emotional intelligence task: responding to interpersonal dilemmas. Our results show that the LMC produces rankings that are more separable, robust, and less biased than those from any individual LLM judge, and is more consistent with a human-established leaderboard compared to other benchmarks.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.