Daily Papers

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

We consider learning in an adversarial Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the loss functions can change arbitrarily over K episodes and the state space can be arbitrarily large. We assume that the Q-function of any policy is linear in some known features, that is, a linear function approximation exists. The best existing regret upper bound for this setting (Luo et al., 2021) is of order mathcal O(K^{2/3}) (omitting all other dependencies), given access to a simulator. This paper provides two algorithms that improve the regret to mathcal O(sqrt K) in the same setting. Our first algorithm makes use of a refined analysis of the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm with the log-barrier regularizer. This analysis allows the loss estimators to be arbitrarily negative and might be of independent interest. Our second algorithm develops a magnitude-reduced loss estimator, further removing the polynomial dependency on the number of actions in the first algorithm and leading to the optimal regret bound (up to logarithmic terms and dependency on the horizon). Moreover, we also extend the first algorithm to simulator-free linear MDPs, which achieves mathcal O(K^{8/9}) regret and greatly improves over the best existing bound mathcal O(K^{14/15}). This algorithm relies on a better alternative to the Matrix Geometric Resampling procedure by Neu & Olkhovskaya (2020), which could again be of independent interest.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

In this paper, we focus on the task of conditional image generation, where an image is synthesized according to user instructions. The critical challenge underpinning this task is ensuring both the fidelity of the generated images and their semantic alignment with the provided conditions. To tackle this issue, previous studies have employed supervised perceptual losses derived from pre-trained models, i.e., reward models, to enforce alignment between the condition and the generated result. However, we observe one inherent shortcoming: considering the diversity of synthesized images, the reward model usually provides inaccurate feedback when encountering newly generated data, which can undermine the training process. To address this limitation, we propose an uncertainty-aware reward modeling, called Ctrl-U, including uncertainty estimation and uncertainty-aware regularization, designed to reduce the adverse effects of imprecise feedback from the reward model. Given the inherent cognitive uncertainty within reward models, even images generated under identical conditions often result in a relatively large discrepancy in reward loss. Inspired by the observation, we explicitly leverage such prediction variance as an uncertainty indicator. Based on the uncertainty estimation, we regularize the model training by adaptively rectifying the reward. In particular, rewards with lower uncertainty receive higher loss weights, while those with higher uncertainty are given reduced weights to allow for larger variability. The proposed uncertainty regularization facilitates reward fine-tuning through consistency construction. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our methodology in improving the controllability and generation quality, as well as its scalability across diverse conditional scenarios. Code will soon be available at https://grenoble-zhang.github.io/Ctrl-U-Page/.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

We design learning rate schedules that minimize regret for SGD-based online learning in the presence of a changing data distribution. We fully characterize the optimal learning rate schedule for online linear regression via a novel analysis with stochastic differential equations. For general convex loss functions, we propose new learning rate schedules that are robust to distribution shift, and we give upper and lower bounds for the regret that only differ by constants. For non-convex loss functions, we define a notion of regret based on the gradient norm of the estimated models and propose a learning schedule that minimizes an upper bound on the total expected regret. Intuitively, one expects changing loss landscapes to require more exploration, and we confirm that optimal learning rate schedules typically increase in the presence of distribution shift. Finally, we provide experiments for high-dimensional regression models and neural networks to illustrate these learning rate schedules and their cumulative regret.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

In this paper, we introduce a novel predict-and-optimize method for profit-driven churn prevention. We frame the task of targeting customers for a retention campaign as a regret minimization problem. The main objective is to leverage individual customer lifetime values (CLVs) to ensure that only the most valuable customers are targeted. In contrast, many profit-driven strategies focus on churn probabilities while considering average CLVs. This often results in significant information loss due to data aggregation. Our proposed model aligns with the guidelines of Predict-and-Optimize (PnO) frameworks and can be efficiently solved using stochastic gradient descent methods. Results from 12 churn prediction datasets underscore the effectiveness of our approach, which achieves the best average performance compared to other well-established strategies in terms of average profit.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of regret. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel unsupervised training loss of regret-loss, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

Recent direct preference alignment algorithms (DPA), such as DPO, have shown great promise in aligning large language models to human preferences. While this has motivated the development of many new variants of the original DPO loss, understanding the differences between these recent proposals, as well as developing new DPA loss functions, remains difficult given the lack of a technical and conceptual framework for reasoning about the underlying semantics of these algorithms. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this by formalizing DPA losses in terms of discrete reasoning problems. Specifically, we ask: Given an existing DPA loss, can we systematically derive a symbolic expression that characterizes its semantics? How do the semantics of two losses relate to each other? We propose a novel formalism for characterizing preference losses for single model and reference model based approaches, and identify symbolic forms for a number of commonly used DPA variants. Further, we show how this formal view of preference learning sheds new light on both the size and structure of the DPA loss landscape, making it possible to not only rigorously characterize the relationships between recent loss proposals but also to systematically explore the landscape and derive new loss functions from first principles. We hope our framework and findings will help provide useful guidance to those working on human AI alignment.

Loss functions serve as the foundation of supervised learning and are often chosen prior to model development. To avoid potentially ad hoc choices of losses, statistical decision theory describes a desirable property for losses known as properness, which asserts that Bayes' rule is optimal. Recent works have sought to learn losses and models jointly. Existing methods do this by fitting an inverse canonical link function which monotonically maps R to [0,1] to estimate probabilities for binary problems. In this paper, we extend monotonicity to maps between R^{C-1} and the projected probability simplex Delta^{C-1} by using monotonicity of gradients of convex functions. We present {\sc LegendreTron} as a novel and practical method that jointly learns proper canonical losses and probabilities for multiclass problems. Tested on a benchmark of domains with up to 1,000 classes, our experimental results show that our method consistently outperforms the natural multiclass baseline under a t-test at 99% significance on all datasets with greater than 10 classes.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

We study a K-armed bandit with delayed feedback and intermediate observations. We consider a model where intermediate observations have a form of a finite state, which is observed immediately after taking an action, whereas the loss is observed after an adversarially chosen delay. We show that the regime of the mapping of states to losses determines the complexity of the problem, irrespective of whether the mapping of actions to states is stochastic or adversarial. If the mapping of states to losses is adversarial, then the regret rate is of order (K+d)T (within log factors), where T is the time horizon and d is a fixed delay. This matches the regret rate of a K-armed bandit with delayed feedback and without intermediate observations, implying that intermediate observations are not helpful. However, if the mapping of states to losses is stochastic, we show that the regret grows at a rate of big(K+min{|mathcal{S|,d}big)T} (within log factors), implying that if the number |S| of states is smaller than the delay, then intermediate observations help. We also provide refined high-probability regret upper bounds for non-uniform delays, together with experimental validation of our algorithms.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

Growth in the penetration of renewable energy sources makes supply more uncertain and leads to an increase in the system imbalance. This trend, together with the single imbalance pricing, opens an opportunity for balance responsible parties (BRPs) to perform energy arbitrage in the imbalance settlement mechanism. To this end, we propose a battery control framework based on distributional reinforcement learning (DRL). Our proposed control framework takes a risk-sensitive perspective, allowing BRPs to adjust their risk preferences: we aim to optimize a weighted sum of the arbitrage profit and a risk measure while constraining the daily number of cycles for the battery. We assess the performance of our proposed control framework using the Belgian imbalance prices of 2022 and compare two state-of-the-art RL methods, deep Q learning and soft actor-critic. Results reveal that the distributional soft actor-critic method can outperform other methods. Moreover, we note that our fully risk-averse agent appropriately learns to hedge against the risk related to the unknown imbalance price by (dis)charging the battery only when the agent is more certain about the price.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become the predominant approach for language model (LM) alignment. At its core, RLHF uses a margin-based loss for preference optimization, specifying ideal LM behavior only by the difference between preferred and dispreferred responses. In this paper, we identify a common pitfall of margin-based methods -- the under-specification of ideal LM behavior on preferred and dispreferred responses individually, which leads to two unintended consequences as the margin increases: (1) The probability of dispreferred (e.g., unsafe) responses may increase, resulting in potential safety alignment failures. (2) The probability of preferred responses may decrease, even when those responses are ideal. We demystify the reasons behind these problematic behaviors: margin-based losses couple the change in the preferred probability to the gradient of the dispreferred one, and vice versa, often preventing the preferred probability from increasing while the dispreferred one decreases, and thus causing a synchronized increase or decrease in both probabilities. We term this effect, inherent in margin-based objectives, gradient entanglement. Formally, we derive conditions for general margin-based alignment objectives under which gradient entanglement becomes concerning: the inner product of the gradients of preferred and dispreferred log-probabilities is large relative to the individual gradient norms. We theoretically investigate why such inner products can be large when aligning language models and empirically validate our findings. Empirical implications of our framework extend to explaining important differences in the training dynamics of various preference optimization algorithms, and suggesting potential algorithm designs to mitigate the under-specification issue of margin-based methods and thereby improving language model alignment.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We consider the problem of preference based reinforcement learning (PbRL), where, unlike traditional reinforcement learning, an agent receives feedback only in terms of a 1 bit (0/1) preference over a trajectory pair instead of absolute rewards for them. The success of the traditional RL framework crucially relies on the underlying agent-reward model, which, however, depends on how accurately a system designer can express an appropriate reward function and often a non-trivial task. The main novelty of our framework is the ability to learn from preference-based trajectory feedback that eliminates the need to hand-craft numeric reward models. This paper sets up a formal framework for the PbRL problem with non-markovian rewards, where the trajectory preferences are encoded by a generalized linear model of dimension d. Assuming the transition model is known, we then propose an algorithm with almost optimal regret guarantee of mathcal{O}left( SH d log (T / delta) T right). We further, extend the above algorithm to the case of unknown transition dynamics, and provide an algorithm with near optimal regret guarantee mathcal{O}((d + H^2 + |S|)dT +|mathcal{S||A|TH} ). To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first to give tight regret guarantees for preference based RL problems with trajectory preferences.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

In this work, we study the simple yet universally applicable case of reward shaping in value-based Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). We show that reward shifting in the form of the linear transformation is equivalent to changing the initialization of the Q-function in function approximation. Based on such an equivalence, we bring the key insight that a positive reward shifting leads to conservative exploitation, while a negative reward shifting leads to curiosity-driven exploration. Accordingly, conservative exploitation improves offline RL value estimation, and optimistic value estimation improves exploration for online RL. We validate our insight on a range of RL tasks and show its improvement over baselines: (1) In offline RL, the conservative exploitation leads to improved performance based on off-the-shelf algorithms; (2) In online continuous control, multiple value functions with different shifting constants can be used to tackle the exploration-exploitation dilemma for better sample efficiency; (3) In discrete control tasks, a negative reward shifting yields an improvement over the curiosity-based exploration method.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The fairness of machine learning-based decisions has become an increasingly important focus in the design of supervised machine learning methods. Most fairness approaches optimize a specified trade-off between performance measure(s) (e.g., accuracy, log loss, or AUC) and fairness metric(s) (e.g., demographic parity, equalized odds). This begs the question: are the right performance-fairness trade-offs being specified? We instead re-cast fair machine learning as an imitation learning task by introducing superhuman fairness, which seeks to simultaneously outperform human decisions on multiple predictive performance and fairness measures. We demonstrate the benefits of this approach given suboptimal decisions.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

We study Pareto optimality in multi-objective multi-armed bandit by providing a formulation of adversarial multi-objective multi-armed bandit and defining its Pareto regrets that can be applied to both stochastic and adversarial settings. The regrets do not rely on any scalarization functions and reflect Pareto optimality compared to scalarized regrets. We also present new algorithms assuming both with and without prior information of the multi-objective multi-armed bandit setting. The algorithms are shown optimal in adversarial settings and nearly optimal up to a logarithmic factor in stochastic settings simultaneously by our established upper bounds and lower bounds on Pareto regrets. Moreover, the lower bound analyses show that the new regrets are consistent with the existing Pareto regret for stochastic settings and extend an adversarial attack mechanism from bandit to the multi-objective one.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular tool to control the risk of uncertain outcomes and ensure reliable performance in various sequential decision-making problems. While policy gradient methods have been developed for risk-sensitive RL, it remains unclear if these methods enjoy the same global convergence guarantees as in the risk-neutral case. In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic time-consistent risk measures, called Expected Conditional Risk Measures (ECRMs), and derive policy gradient updates for ECRM-based objective functions. Under both constrained direct parameterization and unconstrained softmax parameterization, we provide global convergence and iteration complexities of the corresponding risk-averse policy gradient algorithms. We further test risk-averse variants of REINFORCE and actor-critic algorithms to demonstrate the efficacy of our method and the importance of risk control.

Iterative preference learning, though yielding superior performances, requires online annotated preference labels. In this work, we study strategies to select worth-annotating response pairs for cost-efficient annotation while achieving competitive or even better performances compared with the random selection baseline for iterative preference learning. Built on assumptions regarding uncertainty and distribution shifts, we propose a comparative view to rank the implicit reward margins as predicted by DPO to select the response pairs that yield more benefits. Through extensive experiments, we show that annotating those response pairs with small margins is generally better than large or random, under both single- and multi-iteration scenarios. Besides, our empirical results suggest allocating more annotation budgets in the earlier iterations rather than later across multiple iterations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a popular paradigm for aligning models with human intent. Typically RLHF algorithms operate in two phases: first, use human preferences to learn a reward function and second, align the model by optimizing the learned reward via reinforcement learning (RL). This paradigm assumes that human preferences are distributed according to reward, but recent work suggests that they instead follow the regret under the user's optimal policy. Thus, learning a reward function from feedback is not only based on a flawed assumption of human preference, but also leads to unwieldy optimization challenges that stem from policy gradients or bootstrapping in the RL phase. Because of these optimization challenges, contemporary RLHF methods restrict themselves to contextual bandit settings (e.g., as in large language models) or limit observation dimensionality (e.g., state-based robotics). We overcome these limitations by introducing a new family of algorithms for optimizing behavior from human feedback using the regret-based model of human preferences. Using the principle of maximum entropy, we derive Contrastive Preference Learning (CPL), an algorithm for learning optimal policies from preferences without learning reward functions, circumventing the need for RL. CPL is fully off-policy, uses only a simple contrastive objective, and can be applied to arbitrary MDPs. This enables CPL to elegantly scale to high-dimensional and sequential RLHF problems while being simpler than prior methods.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Preference based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) removes the need to hand specify a reward function by learning a reward from preference feedback over policy behaviors. Current approaches to PbRL do not address the credit assignment problem inherent in determining which parts of a behavior most contributed to a preference, which result in data intensive approaches and subpar reward functions. We address such limitations by introducing a credit assignment strategy (Hindsight PRIOR) that uses a world model to approximate state importance within a trajectory and then guides rewards to be proportional to state importance through an auxiliary predicted return redistribution objective. Incorporating state importance into reward learning improves the speed of policy learning, overall policy performance, and reward recovery on both locomotion and manipulation tasks. For example, Hindsight PRIOR recovers on average significantly (p<0.05) more reward on MetaWorld (20%) and DMC (15%). The performance gains and our ablations demonstrate the benefits even a simple credit assignment strategy can have on reward learning and that state importance in forward dynamics prediction is a strong proxy for a state's contribution to a preference decision. Code repository can be found at https://github.com/apple/ml-rlhf-hindsight-prior.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

When facing data with imbalanced classes or groups, practitioners follow an intriguing strategy to achieve best results. They throw away examples until the classes or groups are balanced in size, and then perform empirical risk minimization on the reduced training set. This opposes common wisdom in learning theory, where the expected error is supposed to decrease as the dataset grows in size. In this work, we leverage extreme value theory to address this apparent contradiction. Our results show that the tails of the data distribution play an important role in determining the worst-group-accuracy of linear classifiers. When learning on data with heavy tails, throwing away data restores the geometric symmetry of the resulting classifier, and therefore improves its worst-group generalization.

Simple regret is a natural and parameter-free performance criterion for pure exploration in multi-armed bandits yet is less popular than the probability of missing the best arm or an epsilon-good arm, perhaps due to lack of easy ways to characterize it. In this paper, we make significant progress on minimizing simple regret in both data-rich (Tge n) and data-poor regime (T le n) where n is the number of arms, and T is the number of samples. At its heart is our improved instance-dependent analysis of the well-known Sequential Halving (SH) algorithm, where we bound the probability of returning an arm whose mean reward is not within epsilon from the best (i.e., not epsilon-good) for any choice of epsilon>0, although epsilon is not an input to SH. Our bound not only leads to an optimal worst-case simple regret bound of n/T up to logarithmic factors but also essentially matches the instance-dependent lower bound for returning an epsilon-good arm reported by Katz-Samuels and Jamieson (2020). For the more challenging data-poor regime, we propose Bracketing SH (BSH) that enjoys the same improvement even without sampling each arm at least once. Our empirical study shows that BSH outperforms existing methods on real-world tasks.

Meta-Bayesian optimisation (meta-BO) aims to improve the sample efficiency of Bayesian optimisation by leveraging data from related tasks. While previous methods successfully meta-learn either a surrogate model or an acquisition function independently, joint training of both components remains an open challenge. This paper proposes the first end-to-end differentiable meta-BO framework that generalises neural processes to learn acquisition functions via transformer architectures. We enable this end-to-end framework with reinforcement learning (RL) to tackle the lack of labelled acquisition data. Early on, we notice that training transformer-based neural processes from scratch with RL is challenging due to insufficient supervision, especially when rewards are sparse. We formalise this claim with a combinatorial analysis showing that the widely used notion of regret as a reward signal exhibits a logarithmic sparsity pattern in trajectory lengths. To tackle this problem, we augment the RL objective with an auxiliary task that guides part of the architecture to learn a valid probabilistic model as an inductive bias. We demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art regret results against various baselines in experiments on standard hyperparameter optimisation tasks and also outperforms others in the real-world problems of mixed-integer programming tuning, antibody design, and logic synthesis for electronic design automation.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Emotional support dialogue systems aim to reduce help-seekers' distress and help them overcome challenges. While human valuesx2013core beliefs that shape an individual's prioritiesx2013are increasingly emphasized in contemporary psychological therapy for their role in fostering internal transformation and long-term emotional well-being, their integration into emotional support systems remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we present a value-driven method for training emotional support dialogue systems designed to reinforce positive values in seekers. Notably, our model identifies which values to reinforce at each turn and how to do so, by leveraging online support conversations from Reddit. We evaluate the method across support skills, seekers' emotional intensity, and value reinforcement. Our method consistently outperforms various baselines, effectively exploring and eliciting values from seekers. Additionally, leveraging crowd knowledge from Reddit significantly enhances its effectiveness. Therapists highlighted its ability to validate seekers' challenges and emphasize positive aspects of their situationsx2013both crucial elements of value reinforcement. Our work, being the first to integrate value reinforcement into emotional support systems, demonstrates its promise and establishes a foundation for future research.

Process Reward Modeling (PRM) is critical for complex reasoning and decision-making tasks where the accuracy of intermediate steps significantly influences the overall outcome. Existing PRM approaches, primarily framed as classification problems, employ cross-entropy loss to independently evaluate each step's correctness. This method can lead to suboptimal reward distribution and does not adequately address the interdependencies among steps. To address these limitations, we introduce the Process Q-value Model (PQM), a novel framework that redefines PRM in the context of a Markov Decision Process. PQM optimizes Q-value rankings based on a novel comparative loss function, enhancing the model's ability to capture the intricate dynamics among sequential decisions. This approach provides a more granular and theoretically grounded methodology for process rewards. Our extensive empirical evaluations across various sampling policies, language model backbones, and multi-step reasoning benchmarks show that PQM outperforms classification-based PRMs. The effectiveness of the comparative loss function is highlighted in our comprehensive ablation studies, confirming PQM's practical efficacy and theoretical advantage.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Specifying rewards for reinforcement learned (RL) agents is challenging. Preference-based RL (PbRL) mitigates these challenges by inferring a reward from feedback over sets of trajectories. However, the effectiveness of PbRL is limited by the amount of feedback needed to reliably recover the structure of the target reward. We present the PRIor Over Rewards (PRIOR) framework, which incorporates priors about the structure of the reward function and the preference feedback into the reward learning process. Imposing these priors as soft constraints on the reward learning objective reduces the amount of feedback required by half and improves overall reward recovery. Additionally, we demonstrate that using an abstract state space for the computation of the priors further improves the reward learning and the agent's performance.

In this paper, we study risk-sensitive Reinforcement Learning (RL), focusing on the objective of Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) with risk tolerance tau. Starting with multi-arm bandits (MABs), we show the minimax CVaR regret rate is Omega(tau^{-1AK}), where A is the number of actions and K is the number of episodes, and that it is achieved by an Upper Confidence Bound algorithm with a novel Bernstein bonus. For online RL in tabular Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), we show a minimax regret lower bound of Omega(tau^{-1SAK}) (with normalized cumulative rewards), where S is the number of states, and we propose a novel bonus-driven Value Iteration procedure. We show that our algorithm achieves the optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1SAK}) under a continuity assumption and in general attains a near-optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1}SAK), which is minimax-optimal for constant tau. This improves on the best available bounds. By discretizing rewards appropriately, our algorithms are computationally efficient.

Preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL) is an approach that enables RL agents to learn from preference, which is particularly useful when formulating a reward function is challenging. Existing PbRL methods generally involve a two-step procedure: they first learn a reward model based on given preference data and then employ off-the-shelf reinforcement learning algorithms using the learned reward model. However, obtaining an accurate reward model solely from preference information, especially when the preference is from human teachers, can be difficult. Instead, we propose a PbRL algorithm that directly learns from preference without requiring any reward modeling. To achieve this, we adopt a contrastive learning framework to design a novel policy scoring metric that assigns a high score to policies that align with the given preferences. We apply our algorithm to offline RL tasks with actual human preference labels and show that our algorithm outperforms or is on par with the existing PbRL methods. Notably, on high-dimensional control tasks, our algorithm surpasses offline RL methods that learn with ground-truth reward information. Finally, we show that our algorithm can be successfully applied to fine-tune large language models.