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Jul 8

Introspective Growth: Automatically Advancing LLM Expertise in Technology Judgment

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly demonstrate signs of conceptual understanding, yet much of their internal knowledge remains latent, loosely structured, and difficult to access or evaluate. We propose self-questioning as a lightweight and scalable strategy to improve LLMs' understanding, particularly in domains where success depends on fine-grained semantic distinctions. To evaluate this approach, we introduce a challenging new benchmark of 1.3 million post-2015 computer science patent pairs, characterized by dense technical jargon and strategically complex writing. The benchmark centers on a pairwise differentiation task: can a model distinguish between closely related but substantively different inventions? We show that prompting LLMs to generate and answer their own questions - targeting the background knowledge required for the task - significantly improves performance. These self-generated questions and answers activate otherwise underutilized internal knowledge. Allowing LLMs to retrieve answers from external scientific texts further enhances performance, suggesting that model knowledge is compressed and lacks the full richness of the training data. We also find that chain-of-thought prompting and self-questioning converge, though self-questioning remains more effective for improving understanding of technical concepts. Notably, we uncover an asymmetry in prompting: smaller models often generate more fundamental, more open-ended, better-aligned questions for mid-sized models than large models with better understanding do, revealing a new strategy for cross-model collaboration. Altogether, our findings establish self-questioning as both a practical mechanism for automatically improving LLM comprehension, especially in domains with sparse and underrepresented knowledge, and a diagnostic probe of how internal and external knowledge are organized.

Looking Inward: Language Models Can Learn About Themselves by Introspection

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

The Consciousness Prior

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.