Daily Papers

Omni-modal large language models (OmniLLMs) unify text, images, audio, and video, yet hallucinate when generation relies on the wrong evidence. Existing inference-time methods can reduce hallucinations, but rarely reveal which evidence sustains a generated commitment. We introduce OmniConfess, a training-free method for mitigating omni-modal hallucinations. It fixes a candidate response and re-scores it at token resolution under controlled channel-wise evidence interventions, producing a structured token-by-channel confession that reveals the response's evidential dependence. OmniConfess uses this confession to preserve grounded content and correct commitments driven by irrelevant or contradictory evidence. To evaluate OmniConfess, we construct OmniHalluBench, a 3,540-example benchmark built from six datasets spanning text, image, audio, and video settings and both judgment and free-form generation. Experiments show that OmniConfess mitigates hallucinations across heterogeneous modality and task settings. Our code and benchmark are publicly available at https://github.com/RongHuiQiang/OmniConfess.

In recent years, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress, primarily attributed to effective paradigms for integrating visual and textual information. The dominant connector-based paradigm projects visual features into textual sequence, enabling unified multimodal alignment and reasoning within a generative architecture. However, our experiments reveal two key limitations: (1) Although visual information serves as the core evidential modality in MLLMs, it is treated on par with textual tokens, diminishing the unique contribution of the visual modality; (2) As generation length increases, particularly within a limited context window, the model's dependence on visual information progressively weakens, resulting in deteriorated vision-language alignment and reduced consistency between generated content and visual semantics. To address these challenges, we propose the Vision Inference Former (VIF), a lightweight architectural module that establishes a direct bridge between pure visual representations and the model's output space. Specifically, VIF continuously injects visual semantics throughout the decoding phase of the inference process, ensuring that the model remains firmly grounded in visual content during generation. We conduct experiments on 14 benchmark tasks covering general reasoning, OCR, table understanding, vision-centric evaluation, and hallucination. Experimental results show that VIF consistently improves model performance across diverse architectures while introducing minimal additional overhead. The code for this work is available at https://github.com/Dong-Xinpeng/VIF.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

Popular approaches for quantifying predictive uncertainty in deep neural networks often involve distributions over weights or multiple models, for instance via Markov Chain sampling, ensembling, or Monte Carlo dropout. These techniques usually incur overhead by having to train multiple model instances or do not produce very diverse predictions. This comprehensive and extensive survey aims to familiarize the reader with an alternative class of models based on the concept of Evidential Deep Learning: For unfamiliar data, they aim to admit "what they don't know", and fall back onto a prior belief. Furthermore, they allow uncertainty estimation in a single model and forward pass by parameterizing distributions over distributions. This survey recapitulates existing works, focusing on the implementation in a classification setting, before surveying the application of the same paradigm to regression. We also reflect on the strengths and weaknesses compared to other existing methods and provide the most fundamental derivations using a unified notation to aid future research.

Reliable uncertainty quantification is essential for deploying deep learning models in high-stakes settings, where out-of-distribution and adversarial inputs can induce confident but unreliable predictions. Evidential Deep Learning provides efficient uncertainty estimates in a single forward pass, but can still assign high evidential strength to inputs that are poorly supported by the learned representation, such as adversarial inputs. We introduce CLEAR, a lightweight, task-agnostic post-hoc method that improves evidential robustness without retraining or altering the base prediction. Using held-out calibration data, CLEAR characterises the group-conditioned geometry of the model's latent space. At inference, it efficiently generates perturbation views directly in the latent space and measures their conflict relative to the calibrated geometry of the predicted group. High latent conflict indicates unsupported evidence, which CLEAR uses to selectively reduce evidential strength while retaining evidence for latent-consistent inputs. On ImageNetrightarrowCUB, CLEAR improves OOD and adversarial AUROC by +8.29 and +5.01 while running 17.4times faster than competing post-hoc methods while preserving predictive performance across classification, regression, and object detection benchmarks.

Uncertainty estimation is a key factor that makes deep learning reliable in practical applications. Recently proposed evidential neural networks explicitly account for different uncertainties by treating the network's outputs as evidence to parameterize the Dirichlet distribution, and achieve impressive performance in uncertainty estimation. However, for high data uncertainty samples but annotated with the one-hot label, the evidence-learning process for those mislabeled classes is over-penalized and remains hindered. To address this problem, we propose a novel method, Fisher Information-based Evidential Deep Learning (I-EDL). In particular, we introduce Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) to measure the informativeness of evidence carried by each sample, according to which we can dynamically reweight the objective loss terms to make the network more focused on the representation learning of uncertain classes. The generalization ability of our network is further improved by optimizing the PAC-Bayesian bound. As demonstrated empirically, our proposed method consistently outperforms traditional EDL-related algorithms in multiple uncertainty estimation tasks, especially in the more challenging few-shot classification settings.

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides agents with evidence that other similar agents are likely to cooperate too, resulting in gains from trade for all. This could be a crucial consideration for altruists. I develop a game-theoretic model of ECL as an incomplete information bargaining problem. The model incorporates uncertainty about others' value systems and empirical situations, and addresses the problem of selecting a compromise outcome. Using the model, I investigate issues with ECL and outline open technical and philosophical questions. I show that all cooperators must maximize the same weighted sum of utility functions to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. However, I argue against selecting a compromise outcome implicitly by normalizing utility functions. I review bargaining theory and argue that the Nash bargaining solution could be a relevant Schelling point. I introduce dependency equilibria (Spohn 2007), an equilibrium concept suitable for ECL, and generalize a folk theorem showing that the Nash bargaining solution is a dependency equilibrium. I discuss gains from trade given uncertain beliefs about other agents and analyze how these gains decrease in several toy examples as the belief in another agent decreases. Finally, I discuss open issues in my model. First, the Nash bargaining solution is sometimes not coalitionally stable, meaning that a subset of cooperators can unilaterally improve payoffs by deviating from the compromise. I investigate conditions under which stable payoff vectors exist. Second, I discuss how to model agents' default actions without ECL.

LLM-based agents are increasingly used to simulate deliberative interactions such as negotiation, conflict resolution, and multi-turn opinion exchange. Yet generated transcripts often do not reveal why an agent's stance changes: movement may reflect evidence uptake, anchoring, role drift, echoing, or changed prompt and retrieval context. We introduce the Belief Engine (BE), an auditable belief-update layer that treats "belief" as an evidential state over a proposition and exposes it as scalar stance. BE extracts arguments into structured memory and updates stance with a log-odds rule controlled by evidence uptake u and prior anchoring a. Across multiple base LLMs, parameter sweeps show that these controls reliably shape stance dynamics while preserving an evidence-level update trail. On DEBATE, a human deliberation dataset with pre/post opinions, BE best reconstructs participants whose final stance follows extracted evidence; stable and evidence-opposed cases instead point to anchoring or factors outside the extracted evidence stream. BE provides configurable infrastructure for studying evidence-grounded deliberation, where openness, commitment, convergence, and disagreement can be tied to explicit update assumptions rather than hidden prompt effects.

Fine-tuned large language models (LLMs) often exhibit overconfidence, particularly when trained on small datasets, resulting in poor calibration and inaccurate uncertainty estimates. Evidential Deep Learning (EDL), an uncertainty-aware approach, enables uncertainty estimation in a single forward pass, making it a promising method for calibrating fine-tuned LLMs. However, despite its computational efficiency, EDL is prone to overfitting, as its training objective can result in overly concentrated probability distributions. To mitigate this, we propose regularizing EDL by incorporating an information bottleneck (IB). Our approach IB-EDL suppresses spurious information in the evidence generated by the model and encourages truly predictive information to influence both the predictions and uncertainty estimates. Extensive experiments across various fine-tuned LLMs and tasks demonstrate that IB-EDL outperforms both existing EDL and non-EDL approaches. By improving the trustworthiness of LLMs, IB-EDL facilitates their broader adoption in domains requiring high levels of confidence calibration. Code is available at https://github.com/sandylaker/ib-edl.

Pretrained models have become standard in both vision and language, yet they typically do not provide reliable measures of confidence. Existing uncertainty estimation methods, such as deep ensembles and MC dropout, are often too computationally expensive to deploy in practice. Evidential Deep Learning (EDL) offers a more efficient alternative, but it requires models to be trained to output evidential quantities from the start, which is rarely true for pretrained networks. To enable EDL-style uncertainty estimation in pretrained models, we propose the Evidential Transformation Network (ETN), a lightweight post-hoc module that converts a pretrained predictor into an evidential model. ETN operates in logit space: it learns a sample-dependent affine transformation of the logits and interprets the transformed outputs as parameters of a Dirichlet distribution for uncertainty estimation. We evaluate ETN on image classification and large language model question-answering benchmarks under both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings. ETN consistently improves uncertainty estimation over post-hoc baselines while preserving accuracy and adding only minimal computational overhead.

Traditional weight of evidence assigns a credit characteristic a value based on its association with default across a population. Credit analysis also requires an assessment of that characteristic in the context of an individual applicant's record. We study conditional weight of evidence for this purpose. It measures the change in default log odds from observing a characteristic after the remaining credit information is known. Its sign identifies whether the characteristic adds adverse or favorable information for that applicant, and its magnitude measures the strength of that information. The same characteristic value can therefore receive different assessments for applicants with different payment histories or other credit attributes. We develop estimators using gradient-boosted trees and evaluate their accuracy in a bureau-style simulation. Regressions of the full model's predicted probabilities recover conditional evidence more accurately than separate models fitted to default outcomes, provided the full model is accurate. They also recover a deliberately constructed file-age effect whose direction varies with utilization and is often missed by marginal weight of evidence. Local class-frequency estimates improve on marginal weight of evidence but remain inaccurate for some weak effects. An application to FICO HELOC data illustrates estimation when the population evidence is unknown. Conditional weight of evidence provides an applicant-specific interpretation of the information in a credit characteristic; its population summary, a conditional information value, splits the joint information in the record across blocks when averaged over orderings. Neither is an adverse action reason, which explains the fitted score difference between the applicant and chosen passing records.

Deterministic neural networks (NNs) are increasingly being deployed in safety critical domains, where calibrated, robust, and efficient measures of uncertainty are crucial. In this paper, we propose a novel method for training non-Bayesian NNs to estimate a continuous target as well as its associated evidence in order to learn both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. We accomplish this by placing evidential priors over the original Gaussian likelihood function and training the NN to infer the hyperparameters of the evidential distribution. We additionally impose priors during training such that the model is regularized when its predicted evidence is not aligned with the correct output. Our method does not rely on sampling during inference or on out-of-distribution (OOD) examples for training, thus enabling efficient and scalable uncertainty learning. We demonstrate learning well-calibrated measures of uncertainty on various benchmarks, scaling to complex computer vision tasks, as well as robustness to adversarial and OOD test samples.

Cervical cytology presents a fundamentally ambiguous diagnostic landscape, where equivocal categories such as Atypical Squamous Cells of Undetermined Significance (ASC-US) occupy a morphological grey zone that is definitional. For clinical decision support, the goal extends beyond assigning a definitive label to every sample: cases must also be distinguished by whether the available evidence supports a confident decision or warrants further consideration, a distinction conventional classification models are not designed to explicitly represent. We propose a multiscale evidential framework that models cervical cytology along an ordinal disease continuum using clinically grounded soft anchors, representing progression from benign reactive changes to precancerous lesions and malignancy. Three biologically motivated spatial contexts--nuclear morphology, cytoplasmic characteristics, and neighbourhood cellular architecture--are independently encoded using a shared frozen DINOv2 backbone, preserving inter-scale disagreement that early fusion may obscure. Calibrated predictions are transformed into Dempster--Shafer belief masses and fused with reliability discounting, allowing conflicting evidence and insufficient support to remain explicitly uncommitted rather than forcing a decision. The fused belief state drives interpretable routing that separates confidently classified cases from those with irreducible evidential insufficiency, enabling clinically meaningful triage. Across two independent publicly available conventional cytology datasets, RIVA and CRIC Cervix, the framework generalises consistently, with uncertainty strongly associated with diagnostic difficulty: incorrect predictions carry 1.94x-4.13x higher uncertainty than correct ones.

Evidence-grounded reasoning requires more than attaching retrieved text to a prediction: a model should make decisions that depend on whether the provided evidence supports the target claim. In practice, this often fails because supervision is weak, evidence is only loosely tied to the claim, and evaluation does not test evidence dependence directly. We introduce case-grounded evidence verification, a general framework in which a model receives a local case context, external evidence, and a structured claim, and must decide whether the evidence supports the claim for that case. Our key contribution is a supervision construction procedure that generates explicit support examples together with semantically controlled non-support examples, including counterfactual wrong-state and topic-related negatives, without manual evidence annotation. We instantiate the framework in radiology and train a standard verifier on the resulting support task. The learned verifier substantially outperforms both case-only and evidence-only baselines, remains strong under correct evidence, and collapses when evidence is removed or swapped, indicating genuine evidence dependence. This behavior transfers across unseen evidence articles and an external case distribution, though performance degrades under evidence-source shift and remains sensitive to backbone choice. Overall, the results suggest that a major bottleneck in evidence grounding is not only model capacity, but the lack of supervision that encodes the causal role of evidence.

Are pairs of words that tend to occur together also likely to stand in a linguistic dependency? This empirical question is motivated by a long history of literature in cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and NLP. In this work we contribute an extensive analysis of the relationship between linguistic dependencies and statistical dependence between words. Improving on previous work, we introduce the use of large pretrained language models to compute contextualized estimates of the pointwise mutual information between words (CPMI). For multiple models and languages, we extract dependency trees which maximize CPMI, and compare to gold standard linguistic dependencies. Overall, we find that CPMI dependencies achieve an unlabelled undirected attachment score of at most approx 0.5. While far above chance, and consistently above a non-contextualized PMI baseline, this score is generally comparable to a simple baseline formed by connecting adjacent words. We analyze which kinds of linguistic dependencies are best captured in CPMI dependencies, and also find marked differences between the estimates of the large pretrained language models, illustrating how their different training schemes affect the type of dependencies they capture.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

We show that there is a general, informative and reliable procedure for discovering causal relations when, for all the investigator knows, both latent variables and selection bias may be at work. Given information about conditional independence and dependence relations between measured variables, even when latent variables and selection bias may be present, there are sufficient conditions for reliably concluding that there is a causal path from one variable to another, and sufficient conditions for reliably concluding when no such causal path exists.

LLMs are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as medical triage and legal assistance, often as document-grounded QA systems in which a user provides a description, relevant sources are retrieved, and an LLM generates a prediction. In practice, initial user queries are often underspecified, and a single retrieval pass is insufficient for reliable decision-making, leading to incorrect and overly confident answers. While follow-up questioning can elicit missing information, existing methods typically depend on implicit, unstructured confidence signals from the LLM, making it difficult to determine what remains unknown, what information matters most, and when to stop asking questions. We propose InfoGatherer, a framework that gathers missing information from two complementary sources: retrieved domain documents and targeted follow-up questions to the user. InfoGatherer models uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer belief assignments over a structured evidential network, enabling principled fusion of incomplete and potentially contradictory evidence from both sources without prematurely collapsing to a definitive answer. Across legal and medical tasks, InfoGatherer outperforms strong baselines while requiring fewer turns. By grounding uncertainty in formal evidential theory rather than heuristic LLM signals, InfoGatherer moves towards trustworthy, interpretable decision support in domains where reliability is critical.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

Medical image segmentation has immense clinical applicability but remains a challenge despite advancements in deep learning. The Segment Anything Model (SAM) exhibits potential in this field, yet the requirement for expertise intervention and the domain gap between natural and medical images poses significant obstacles. This paper introduces a novel training-free evidential prompt generation method named EviPrompt to overcome these issues. The proposed method, built on the inherent similarities within medical images, requires only a single reference image-annotation pair, making it a training-free solution that significantly reduces the need for extensive labeling and computational resources. First, to automatically generate prompts for SAM in medical images, we introduce an evidential method based on uncertainty estimation without the interaction of clinical experts. Then, we incorporate the human prior into the prompts, which is vital for alleviating the domain gap between natural and medical images and enhancing the applicability and usefulness of SAM in medical scenarios. EviPrompt represents an efficient and robust approach to medical image segmentation, with evaluations across a broad range of tasks and modalities confirming its efficacy.

Agentic Entity Resolution (ER) systems iteratively plan actions, retrieve evidence, revise hypotheses, and propose graph mutations. An erroneous identity hypothesis may condition later retrieval and produce apparent confirmation. This paper proposes a Digital Identity Optimization (DIO) and Ontology of Digital Identity (ODI)-informed authorization boundary between evidence available for agent reasoning and evidence eligible to authorize persistent identity-changing mutations. A domain-governed constraint-binding function maps selected reconstruction-failure distinctions to explicit identity-preserving constraints. An abstract two-phase supervisor permits a commit only when claim-specific authorization-eligible evidence supports every required proposition, relevant conflicts are resolved, the operation remains within its authorized scope, and relevant state and policy versions remain valid. Admission as UNVERIFIED does not confer authorization eligibility. Separate claim-specific promotion governs evidentiary use; insufficient support or unresolved material conflict leads to deferral. The contribution is a specification connecting diagnostic-to-constraint mapping, evidence promotion, proposition coverage, conflict handling, scope binding, and commit-time version integrity. A proposed evaluation protocol is designed to assess the mapping's incremental value beyond generic authorization and conventional identifier rules. This is a conceptual architecture without implementation or empirical validation, not a theorem of semantic correctness. Its property depends on domain-policy adequacy, evidence promotion, and enforcement. It does not prevent erroneous hypotheses or hypothesis-conditioned retrieval; dependency-aware evidence flow remains future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Existing Video Temporal Grounding (VTG) models excel in accuracy but often overlook open-world challenges posed by open-vocabulary queries and untrimmed videos. This leads to unreliable predictions for noisy, corrupted, and out-of-distribution data. Adapting VTG models to dynamically estimate uncertainties based on user input can address this issue. To this end, we introduce SRAM, a robust network module that benefits from a two-stage cross-modal alignment task. More importantly, it integrates Deep Evidential Regression (DER) to explicitly and thoroughly quantify uncertainty during training, thus allowing the model to say "I do not know" in scenarios beyond its handling capacity. However, the direct application of traditional DER theory and its regularizer reveals structural flaws, leading to unintended constraints in VTG tasks. In response, we develop a simple yet effective Geom-regularizer that enhances the uncertainty learning framework from the ground up. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first successful attempt of DER in VTG. Our extensive quantitative and qualitative results affirm the effectiveness, robustness, and interpretability of our modules and the uncertainty learning paradigm in VTG tasks. The code will be made available.

Zero-shot learning (ZSL) enables the recognition of novel classes by leveraging semantic knowledge transfer from known to unknown categories. This knowledge, typically encapsulated in attribute descriptions, aids in identifying class-specific visual features, thus facilitating visual-semantic alignment and improving ZSL performance. However, real-world challenges such as distribution imbalances and attribute co-occurrence among instances often hinder the discernment of local variances in images, a problem exacerbated by the scarcity of fine-grained, region-specific attribute annotations. Moreover, the variability in visual presentation within categories can also skew attribute-category associations. In response, we propose a bidirectional cross-modal ZSL approach CREST. It begins by extracting representations for attribute and visual localization and employs Evidential Deep Learning (EDL) to measure underlying epistemic uncertainty, thereby enhancing the model's resilience against hard negatives. CREST incorporates dual learning pathways, focusing on both visual-category and attribute-category alignments, to ensure robust correlation between latent and observable spaces. Moreover, we introduce an uncertainty-informed cross-modal fusion technique to refine visual-attribute inference. Extensive experiments demonstrate our model's effectiveness and unique explainability across multiple datasets. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/JethroJames/CREST

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is a perspective approach to detecting Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations and low quality output. In this work, we address one of the challenges of UQ in generation tasks that arises from the conditional dependency between the generation steps of an LLM. We propose to learn this dependency from data. We train a regression model, which target variable is the gap between the conditional and the unconditional generation confidence. During LLM inference, we use this learned conditional dependency model to modulate the uncertainty of the current generation step based on the uncertainty of the previous step. Our experimental evaluation on nine datasets and three LLMs shows that the proposed method is highly effective for uncertainty quantification, achieving substantial improvements over rivaling approaches.

A correctly reconstructed distant point appears uncertain even when a frozen 3D model processes equivalent inputs because its output frame rotates fractionally. This exposes a weakness of trainingfree perturbation uncertainty: when outputs contain an unobserved symmetry, run-to-run variation potentially reflects symmetry rather than error. Existing alternatives have trade-offs: built-in confidence is outperformed in most evaluated conditions, while trained evidential heads require modelspecific supervision. For point maps, this research derives a closed-form, error-independent variance term that grows with scene extent and potentially overwhelms the desired signal. Simulation reproduces the effect; all 30 real VGGT view-sets tested exhibit its predicted |x_p|^2 signature. ReVar3R robustly registers predictions to a common similarity frame before computing per-point variance, without retraining or modifying the frozen model. Optional calibration and fusion use a held-out split. Across VGGT, π3, and MASt3R on six datasets, the same estimator on every backbone lowers AUSE below built-in confidence in 15 of 18 conditions. The staged evaluation yields 11 of 18 wins for the label-free core, 12/18 for label-free equal-weight fusion, 14/18 with held-out weights, and 15/18 when the built-in signal is included. Against a trained evidential head, the result is a trade-off: the head calibrates magnitude better and leads in its training domain, whereas ReVar3R transfers across backbones without adaptation. Its ranking improves point filtering, but it does not detect stable systematic bias, aid novel-view synthesis, or transfer calibration across domains.

Video Large Language Models (Video-LLMs) are rapidly improving, yet current Video Question Answering (VideoQA) benchmarks often allow questions to be answered from a single salient cue, under-testing reasoning that must aggregate multiple, temporally separated visual evidence. We present HERBench, a VideoQA benchmark purpose-built to assess multi-evidence integration across time. Each question requires aggregating at least three non-overlapping evidential cues across distinct video segments, so neither language priors nor a single snapshot can suffice. HERBench comprises 26K five-way multiple-choice questions organized into twelve compositional tasks that probe identity binding, cross-entity relations, temporal ordering, co-occurrence verification, and counting. To make evidential demand measurable, we introduce the Minimum Required Frame-Set (MRFS), the smallest number of frames a model must fuse to answer correctly, and show that HERBench imposes substantially higher demand than prior datasets (mean MRFS 5.5 vs. 2.6-4.2). Evaluating 13 state-of-the-art Video-LLMs on HERBench reveals pervasive failures: accuracies of 31-42% are only slightly above the 20% random-guess baseline. We disentangle this failure into two critical bottlenecks: (1) a retrieval deficit, where frame selectors overlook key evidence, and (2) a fusion deficit, where models fail to integrate information even when all necessary evidence is provided. By making cross-time evidence both unavoidable and quantifiable, HERBench establishes a principled target for advancing robust, compositional video understanding.

Multimodal rumor detectors increasingly rely on retrieved evidence, yet relevant evidence is not necessarily sufficient for verification. Missing provenance, duplicated reports, and unresolved contradictions can produce confident predictions without adequate support. We introduce SAFE-MR, a framework that separates claim veracity from evidence sufficiency. The method decomposes image-text posts into verifiable claims, constructs a relation-aware claim-evidence graph, and aggregates evidence using provenance and contextual compatibility. Separate veracity and sufficiency heads support selective prediction, while evidence interventions encourage stability under irrelevant additions and sensitivity to evidence removal. On NewsCLIPpings, VERITE, and XFacta, SAFE-MR achieves macro-F1 scores of 91.2%, 75.8%, and 85.2%, respectively. Against the matched backbone with evidence, its macro-F1 gains are 2.2, 4.9, and 4.8 percentage points. On the diagnostic selection set, SAFE-MR reduces AURC from 0.105 for maximum-probability rejection to 0.075 and lowers error at 80% coverage from 13.8% to 8.5%. Evidence-perturbation and ablation results support the role of sufficiency learning and intervention training in improving selective verification.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to perform well on exclusive, multi-class classification tasks. However, when different classes have similar visual features, it becomes challenging for human annotators to differentiate them. This scenario necessitates the use of composite class labels. In this paper, we propose a novel framework called Hyper-Evidential Neural Network (HENN) that explicitly models predictive uncertainty due to composite class labels in training data in the context of the belief theory called Subjective Logic (SL). By placing a grouped Dirichlet distribution on the class probabilities, we treat predictions of a neural network as parameters of hyper-subjective opinions and learn the network that collects both single and composite evidence leading to these hyper-opinions by a deterministic DNN from data. We introduce a new uncertainty type called vagueness originally designed for hyper-opinions in SL to quantify composite classification uncertainty for DNNs. Our results demonstrate that HENN outperforms its state-of-the-art counterparts based on four image datasets. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/Hugo101/HyperEvidentialNN.

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

An agent harness, the code that turns a model into an agent, writes its own record of each run, and that record is all a later reader gets when a run is disputed, investigated or audited. We call a record evidentiary when a reader who was not there can check it without trusting the writer. Across sixteen deployed frameworks, none writes one in full. Hearsay examines the record, not the task: five harnesses run fourteen tasks, three blinded LLM examiners and a human panel read the records, and every excerpt an examiner quotes is checked mechanically for who wrote it. First, the record lets a reader name the fault but not prove how the run went. Examiners name the right fault in 74 to 91% of 140 runs, but the fault can be proved only from two files the benchmark adds; for what happened in between, fewer than one citation in ten lands on anything the harness did not write, and the examiner with the fewest false alarms catches half of the entries we delete, rewrite or fabricate. Second, the remedy is a second author, not a stronger seal on the first. An append-only log of what passes between harness and model, kept outside the harness and read against the record in both directions, reports all 28 omissions and fabrications we made a harness commit as it ran, where a hash chain over the harness's own record passes all 28. Handed the log, examiners keep their fault verdicts but rest more of their citations on what the harness did not write. What makes a record evidence is who writes it, not what is captured.

Accurate classification of computed tomography (CT) images is essential for diagnosis and treatment planning, but existing methods often struggle with the subtle and spatially diverse nature of pathological features. Current approaches typically process images uniformly, limiting their ability to detect localized abnormalities that require focused analysis. We introduce UGPL, an uncertainty-guided progressive learning framework that performs a global-to-local analysis by first identifying regions of diagnostic ambiguity and then conducting detailed examination of these critical areas. Our approach employs evidential deep learning to quantify predictive uncertainty, guiding the extraction of informative patches through a non-maximum suppression mechanism that maintains spatial diversity. This progressive refinement strategy, combined with an adaptive fusion mechanism, enables UGPL to integrate both contextual information and fine-grained details. Experiments across three CT datasets demonstrate that UGPL consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving improvements of 3.29%, 2.46%, and 8.08% in accuracy for kidney abnormality, lung cancer, and COVID-19 detection, respectively. Our analysis shows that the uncertainty-guided component provides substantial benefits, with performance dramatically increasing when the full progressive learning pipeline is implemented. Our code is available at: https://github.com/shravan-18/UGPL

Video misinformation increasingly operates at the semantic and evidential level: authentic footage may be selectively edited, temporally reordered, spliced across sources, or augmented with AI-generated content to construct false narratives. Such evidence-dependent manipulations cannot be reliably verified from the input video alone, because the missing, reordered, replaced, or recontextualized evidence lies outside the video itself. We introduce EVID-Bench, a benchmark for search-grounded video misinformation detection, where a system must search the open web for related videos and identify what information is false through cross-video comparison. EVID-Bench comprises 222 videos spanning 9 manipulation types across 3 categories: AI generation, single-source editing, and multi-source editing. All samples are verified to be undetectable by frontier models through visual inspection alone. We evaluate nine frontier multimodal models using a retrieval-augmented verification baseline. The best system achieves only 61.43\% point-level accuracy and 43.24\% video-level accuracy, while AI-generated manipulations remain especially challenging. Error analysis reveals recurring challenges: models fixate on irrelevant anchors, misattribute synthetic content to editorial splicing, and terminate search prematurely before fully explaining the manipulation.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can now process hour-long videos, making extended multi-turn dialogue over a single video a natural mode of use. Sustaining such a dialogue requires more than answering each question in isolation: the model must retrieve and reuse information established earlier in the conversation, both what it has seen and what it has said, an ability we term in-context video memory. Existing video QA benchmarks leave this ability unmeasured: their questions are mutually independent, never reference one another, and each is answerable from the video alone, so nothing ever requires carrying information across turns. We introduce VideoMemBench, in which each sample pairs a single video with a long multi-turn dialogue, whose turns are connected by typed cross-turn dependencies: an Episodic Dependency refers back to a visual episode described in an earlier turn, probing memory of what the model has seen, while an Answer Dependency builds on the model's own earlier answer, probing memory of what the model has said. Every dependency is verified considering two properties: 1) necessity, meaning the question cannot be answered without its earlier turns, and 2) non-leakage, meaning the question does not restate the information from its earlier turns. To enforce these properties, we design a construction pipeline with three LLM roles: a planner, a generator, and a judger, with each dialogue reviewed by human experts. VideoMemBench comprises 326 videos with 2,476 turns, of which 1,387 depend on earlier turns, including multi-parent dependencies and long-range call-back. Among over 20 evaluated open- and closed-source MLLMs, Claude Opus 5 performs the best with an overall score of only 45.7%, highlighting the challenge of in-context video memory. Our dataset and evaluation are released.

Streaming omni-modal models must decide what and when to answer from the video chunks and synchronized audio observed so far. Visual cues often support an interpretation before an utterance or sound event is complete. If that interpretation enters memory as a fact, later reasoning can keep relaying it even after audio contradicts it. We call this failure premature cross-modal commitment. We propose Omni-Streaming Thinking (OST), which generates structured outputs that include evidence observed so far, forecasts of future evidence, and claims based on this evidence. Each claim is initially marked as pending and linked to a future verification interval. Audio and visual evidence are stored separately, and OST checks a claim against the evidence from the specified modality at the end of the verification interval. When contradictory evidence is detected, a refutation process reduces the influence of the claim and its dependent states, and then guides a state update using the new evidence. An answer gate decides whether the answer-critical claims meet the conditions for giving a response. Using a frozen Qwen3-Omni-30B-A3B-Instruct backbone with lightweight adaptation, OST outperforms the strongest open baselines on five streaming and audio-visual benchmarks by more than 10% relative on average. We also introduce OST-DiagBench, which holds video fixed and edits audio to test agreement, absence, contradiction, coexistence, and subtitle-speech conflict. OST reaches d-prime = 2.95, compared with at most 1.38 for open baselines, while reducing vision-induced auditory hallucinations.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to structured clinical data, yet whether they can recognize the limits of their own knowledge on such tasks remains unexplored. We study this question through the lens of cross-model attribution divergence with the goal of reducing epistemic uncertainty for structured tasks, comparing Qwen 2.5 7B and XGBoost on a prediction task via attribution divergence analysis. We report four findings. First, LLM verbalized confidence is epistemically vacuous, it outputs a near-constant (0.856-0.937) regardless of whether accuracy is 49% or 75.3%, tracking prompt format rather than prediction quality. Second, the LLM exhibits an inverse difficulty effect: accuracy drops to 64.8% when XGBoost is 99% correct, but matches XGBoost (73.8% vs. 73.1%) when it is moderately uncertain. Third, few-shot examples and SHAP-derived feature evidence are orthogonal, super-additive interventions: they reduce the Attribution Disagreement Score (ADS) from 1.54 to 0.38 and improve accuracy from 49% to 75.3% without training. Fourth, a cross-model calibrator that determined LLM reliability using attribution divergence signals reduces expected calibration error from 0.254 to 0.080, replacing uninformative verbalized confidence with patient-specific reliability estimates, without accessing model internals or requiring repeated inference. We frame these findings as a cold start problem for LLMs on structured data and outline a path toward genuine epistemic self-awareness.

Fine-tuning MLLMs for Video Temporal Grounding (VTG) often improves in-domain performance but degrades sharply under domain shift. In this work, we find that this failure is primarily driven not just by unseen query concepts, but by visual domain shift, which prevents the model from coupling its learned temporal localization knowledge with its inherent entity-attention capability. To address this, we introduce EVIDENT, a parameter-efficient adaptation framework that anchors temporal grounding in the inherent entity-attention of pre-trained MLLMs by routing VTG adaptation through explicit visual entity evidence. EVIDENT consists of three components: (i) an Entity Bottleneck Adapter that transforms dense visual tokens into compact entity-level slots, (ii) an Entity-Binding Distillation loss that instills objectness priors into the semantically unstructured MLLM visual space, guiding each slot to bind to a coherent entity, and (iii) an Entity-to-eVidence gating mechanism that leverages the captured entities as evidence, steering the model to localize moments containing query-relevant entities. Together, these components enable VTG fine-tuning to rely on entity-grounded evidence rather than brittle dataset shortcuts. Experiments on cross-domain VTG benchmarks show that EVIDENT consistently improves out-of-domain robustness while preserving competitive in-domain performance with modest parameter overhead. These results suggest that entity-level grounding is an effective inductive bias for generalizable temporal localization.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

When can an agent failure be caught? An audit is usually limited by the record rather than by the method. CatchBench therefore puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST). Prior benchmarks fix one of these states or vary the telemetry; to our knowledge none scores all three under one task-method interface. Each state admits different questions, so seven task contracts carry their own labels and metrics rather than one leaderboard. Four are evidential; three are Gold-derived mechanism diagnostics. The release scores 72 entrants, from rule scanners and structural models to eleven LLM judges across nine model families (GPT, Claude, Gemini, Gemma, Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, Nova), over 1187 declared configurations and 1162 recorded runs. Most of the arena does not order: 56 of 138 registered contrasts separate, and the rest are published unresolved rather than ranked. The two sharpest results cut against our own data. One rule ignores every name and permission; it flags each capability declared after the first. On one of six configuration sources it reaches a perfect F1, so a score there measures how the corpus was built rather than how well a method reasons. Our admissibility bar then rejected one injected substrate and withheld evidential status from the other. A benchmark number is therefore not interpretable until the process behind its labels is published and tested for the shortcut it may leave. We report both, and regenerate every ordering from released predictions with no model call.

Long-running LLM agents compress past interactions into persistent memories that may be reused as premises for later tasks. This creates a distinct derivation problem: whether the memory actually follows from what the interaction history supports. Relevant evidence may be scattered across earlier interactions, while compression can introduce relations or event status that the history never established. A valid memory may therefore appear unsupported because its citations omit relevant evidence, while individually supported facts may be composed into a stronger statement the history never established. We characterize this problem through three coupled requirements: (1) Evidence scope; (2) Compositional validity; (3) Admission reliability. We therefore ask whether the interaction history available at write time supports what enters persistent memory. We introduce DerivAudit, a framework for auditing whether a memory is actually supported by the history available when it was written. The audit separates three questions: whether supporting evidence lies beyond writer-provided citations, whether the composed memory introduces unsupported meaning, and how write-time admission decisions affect later memory use. Across two natural memory corpora, audits using broader pre-write history recover support for nearly 60% of memories that appear unsupported from citations alone, while 17-21% remain unsupported after expansion. Yet broader evidence does not by itself make admission reliable: unsupported memories are still frequently admitted across verification models, and evidence expansion alone worsens it on two backbones.

A myriad of different Large Language Models (LLMs) face a common challenge in contextually analyzing table question-answering tasks. These challenges are engendered from (1) finite context windows for large tables, (2) multi-faceted discrepancies amongst tokenization patterns against cell boundaries, and (3) various limitations stemming from data confidentiality in the process of using external models such as gpt-3.5-turbo. We propose a cooperative game dubbed "HiddenTables" as a potential resolution to this challenge. In essence, "HiddenTables" is played between the code-generating LLM "Solver" and the "Oracle" which evaluates the ability of the LLM agents to solve Table QA tasks. This game is based on natural language schemas and importantly, ensures the security of the underlying data. We provide evidential experiments on a diverse set of tables that demonstrate an LLM's collective inability to generalize and perform on complex queries, handle compositional dependencies, and align natural language to programmatic commands when concrete table schemas are provided. Unlike encoder-based models, we have pushed the boundaries of "HiddenTables" to not be limited by the number of rows - therefore we exhibit improved efficiency in prompt and completion tokens. Our infrastructure has spawned a new dataset "PyQTax" that spans across 116,671 question-table-answer triplets and provides additional fine-grained breakdowns & labels for varying question taxonomies. Therefore, in tandem with our academic contributions regarding LLMs' deficiency in TableQA tasks, "HiddenTables" is a tactile manifestation of how LLMs can interact with massive datasets while ensuring data security and minimizing generation costs.

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

A probabilistic classifier with reliable predictive uncertainties i) fits successfully to the target domain data, ii) provides calibrated class probabilities in difficult regions of the target domain (e.g.\ class overlap), and iii) accurately identifies queries coming out of the target domain and rejects them. We introduce an original combination of Evidential Deep Learning, Neural Processes, and Neural Turing Machines capable of providing all three essential properties mentioned above for total uncertainty quantification. We observe our method on five classification tasks to be the only one that can excel all three aspects of total calibration with a single standalone predictor. Our unified solution delivers an implementation-friendly and compute efficient recipe for safety clearance and provides intellectual economy to an investigation of algorithmic roots of epistemic awareness in deep neural nets.

Long-term memory enables LLM agents to reuse past experiences, yet retrieving relevant memories does not necessarily provide sufficient evidence for answering a query. Essential information may remain fragmented across memory records, obscured by abstraction, or disconnected from the relations required for reasoning. We identify this relevance-sufficiency gap and propose QEMem, a framework that reformulates memory utilization as the construction of query-specific evidence sets, shifting the focus from individual retrieval relevance to collective evidential support. QEMem integrates three complementary mechanisms: query-guided discovery retrieves evidence across multiple memory granularities; source-grounded reification organizes it into structured ViewCards with explicit evidential roles and source references; and sufficiency-guided refinement selectively recovers missing information. Operating on existing memory stores without modifying memory formation, QEMem achieves 91.43% LLM-judge accuracy on LoCoMo with Claude Opus 4.5, outperforming the strongest evaluated baseline, MemR^3, by 7.6 percentage points and NEMORI by 10.7 points under a shared memory store. Further analyses demonstrate improved evidence coverage and strong performance on questions requiring cross-session evidence integration.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Serial verification gates are a core reliability primitive in LLM harnesses: a candidate answer is returned only if k verifier calls all accept it. Under conditionally independent gates, the recent Odds Law (arXiv:2606.15712) shows that posterior log-odds grow linearly in k, so failure decays exponentially, and states that "a tight theory of partially correlated verifier cascades remains open." This note gives a minimal such theory. Modeling the per-instance false-accept rate on the generator's own errors as a latent variable αsim G (de Finetti), the exact cascade posterior is ell_k = ell_0 - ln m_k, with m_k the k-th moment of G. Then: (i) ell_k is concave in k for every non-degenerate G -- the Odds Law is its tangent at the first gate and an upper bound; (ii) for Beta(a,b) latents, failure decays polynomially, 1-r_k asymp k^{-b}, with correlation parameter ρ_v = 1/(a+b+1); (iii) a blind-spot atom of mass 1-π at α=1 caps the evidence extractable from any number of gates at -ln(1-π) nats, so reliability saturates below 1; (iv) letting the true-accept rate also vary (βsim H) yields a trichotomy -- gates eventually always help, plateau, or actively harm -- decided by the upper-tail exponents of G and H, with closed-form crossover k^dagger. The mechanism is survivorship: errors surviving gates are the high-α ones. The theory is measurable: R repeated verdicts per instance identify the first R moments of G, so two verdicts identify ρ_v; beta-binomial likelihood and NPMLE recover the reliability curve and the ill-posed ceiling. In synthetic tests, independence-based extrapolation underestimates failure by 20x at k=5 and ~3000x at k=10; the correlated fit at R=8 tracks held-out depths. The practical lever is decorrelation -- changing model family, modality, or evidence source -- not adding gates.

Suppose Alice trains an open-weight language model and Bob uses a blackbox derivative of Alice's model to produce text. Can Alice prove that Bob is using her model, either by querying Bob's derivative model (query setting) or from the text alone (observational setting)? We formulate this question as an independence testing problem--in which the null hypothesis is that Bob's model or text is independent of Alice's randomized training run--and investigate it through the lens of palimpsestic memorization in language models: models are more likely to memorize data seen later in training, so we can test whether Bob is using Alice's model using test statistics that capture correlation between Bob's model or text and the ordering of training examples in Alice's training run. If Alice has randomly shuffled her training data, then any significant correlation amounts to exactly quantifiable statistical evidence against the null hypothesis, regardless of the composition of Alice's training data. In the query setting, we directly estimate (via prompting) the likelihood Bob's model gives to Alice's training examples and order; we correlate the likelihoods of over 40 fine-tunes of various Pythia and OLMo base models ranging from 1B to 12B parameters with the base model's training data order, achieving a p-value on the order of at most 1e-8 in all but six cases. In the observational setting, we try two approaches based on estimating 1) the likelihood of Bob's text overlapping with spans of Alice's training examples and 2) the likelihood of Bob's text with respect to different versions of Alice's model we obtain by repeating the last phase (e.g., 1%) of her training run on reshuffled data. The second approach can reliably distinguish Bob's text from as little as a few hundred tokens; the first does not involve any retraining but requires many more tokens (several hundred thousand) to achieve high power.

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Are LLM-based search agents genuinely searching, or using the web to verify what they already know? We study this question on BrowseComp with three diagnostics. Our analysis reveals Intrinsic Knowledge Dependence (IKD): even with tool access, agents often rely on intrinsic knowledge -- information encoded in the model before retrieval -- rather than on external evidence. Agents answer up to 44.5% of BrowseComp questions without tools, generate more than half of their search queries from internally produced hypotheses rather than retrieved leads, and perform worse than closed-book baselines when answer-supporting evidence is removed. These results suggest that static search benchmarks can reward memory-backed verification rather than evidence-driven discovery, conflating what agents already know with what they can find. We then introduce LiveBrowseComp, a deep-search benchmark designed to evaluate agents beyond intrinsic coverage. It contains 335 human-authored questions whose answers depend on facts published within the 90 days preceding benchmark construction, drawn from six updated sources and filtered to exclude globally salient events. On LiveBrowseComp, all evaluated agents fall below 2% closed-book accuracy, search-augmented scores drop by 25-40 points relative to BrowseComp, and prior model rankings no longer reliably predict performance. LiveBrowseComp is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Forival/LiveBrowseComp.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution, but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence, but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The CbD analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowdsourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making.}{The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the "Snow Queen" experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), where contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounds answers in retrieved passages, yet relevance does not guarantee sufficiency: a topical passage may still fail to justify the answer. We study evidence sufficiency verification for selective RAG answering, in which a verifier receives a question, a candidate answer, and retrieved evidence and decides whether the evidence supports, refutes, or is insufficient for the answer, answering only when support is established. We present SURE-RAG, an aggregation protocol that treats evidence sufficiency as a set-level property: missing hops and unresolved conflicts cannot be detected by scoring passages independently. A shared claim-evidence verifier produces a local relation distribution for each (claim, passage) pair, which SURE-RAG aggregates into four interpretable answer-level feature blocks (coverage, relation strength, uncertainty, and retrieval), producing a three-way decision and an auditable selective score. We evaluate on HotpotQA-RAG v3, a controlled multi-hop benchmark, under an artifact-aware protocol (shortcut baselines, counterfactual swaps, no-oracle checks, and GPT-4o audits). Calibrated SURE-RAG attains 0.9075 Macro-F1 (raw 0.8951 +/- 0.0069), well above DeBERTa mean-pooling (0.6516) and a GPT-4o judge (0.7284), and on par with a strong concat cross-encoder (0.8888 +/- 0.0109) while remaining fully auditable. At 30% coverage, risk falls from 0.2588 to 0.1642, a 37% relative reduction. As a boundary-mapping experiment, we contrast SURE-RAG with GPT-4o on HaluBench unsafe detection: the ranking reverses (0.3343 vs. 0.7389 unsafe-F1), indicating that controlled sufficiency verification and natural hallucination detection are distinct problems.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Existing reasoning evaluations typically provide task-relevant information to models as available premises, rarely examining concurrently how models discover evidence autonomously and how information presentation within narratives guides or obscures judgment. This paper proposes the WORTH Benchmark: models read original mystery narratives without clue annotations, autonomously select key clue sentences, identify case participants, and explain their reasoning process. The narrative materials are designed by professional authors such that evidence facilitating reasoning coexists with narrative arrangements that delay the revelation of truth. We report a pilot experiment under full-story conditions across two episodes, conducting a total of 70 formal runs on models, of which 67 runs are content-scorable. Scoring separately records hits on author-designated key clue sentences and participant selections; natural language explanations are used for case diagnosis and are not scored independently. The results show that clue hits and participant judgments are not synchronized; across 37 content-scorable runs in Episode 02, 31 runs simultaneously selected the same set of incorrect participants, while adjacent suspicion-oriented and exoneration-oriented sentences were selected 25 times and 0 times, respectively. These phenomena illustrate the diagnostic value of component-wise analysis and suggest that not-fully-cooperative informational relationships may influence evidence selection and judgment. This study only implements full-story conditions for two episodes, and does not establish stable model rankings or infer general mechanisms on this basis; human player records have not yet been cleaned, and this version does not report human-model comparisons.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) encompasses methods that draw on different sources of information and address different explanatory needs. A common framework is needed to describe how this information becomes evidence and is communicated as an explanation for a particular recipient. We propose the General Framework for Generating Explanations (GFGE), grounded in interpretative frameworks and the complementary activities of sense-reading and sense-giving. Its conceptual foundation is the Interpret/Explain Schema (IES), which connects an analyst's interpretation of system evidence, the communication of a selected account, and the recipient's interpretation of that account. GFGE operationalises this schema through five roles: data interpretation, model interpretation, output interpretation, optional post-hoc analysis, and aggregation. A role-typed operation graph records method-specific dependencies, while evidence records retain the sources, assumptions, and limitations of explanatory claims. The explanatory question, audience, and context guide the procedure. We instantiate GFGE for attribution, surrogate, counterfactual, concept and prototype, intrinsic rule, argumentation, and language-model methods. These instantiations show how intrinsic, post-hoc, and hybrid workflows can be represented through the same roles while preserving their distinct evidential requirements. GFGE provides a common basis for analysing explanation workflows, tracing communicated claims to their evidence, and identifying unresolved explanatory dependencies.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

Understanding the abilities of LLMs to reason about natural language plans, such as instructional text and recipes, is critical to reliably using them in decision-making systems. A fundamental aspect of plans is the temporal order in which their steps needs to be executed, which reflects the underlying causal dependencies between them. We introduce CaT-Bench, a benchmark of Step Order Prediction questions, which test whether a step must necessarily occur before or after another in cooking recipe plans. We use this to evaluate how well frontier LLMs understand causal and temporal dependencies. We find that SOTA LLMs are underwhelming (best zero-shot is only 0.59 in F1), and are biased towards predicting dependence more often, perhaps relying on temporal order of steps as a heuristic. While prompting for explanations and using few-shot examples improve performance, the best F1 result is only 0.73. Further, human evaluation of explanations along with answer correctness show that, on average, humans do not agree with model reasoning. Surprisingly, we also find that explaining after answering leads to better performance than normal chain-of-thought prompting, and LLM answers are not consistent across questions about the same step pairs. Overall, results show that LLMs' ability to detect dependence between steps has significant room for improvement.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

Clinical early warning systems built on irregularly sampled medical time series (ISMTS) from electronic health records must deliver continuous risk scores for patient triage as well as interpretable rationales that clinicians can verify. Large language models (LLMs) are uniquely positioned for both, deriving risk from their output probabilities and rationales from their medical knowledge. However, we find that conventional LLM reasoning collapses graded risk into overconfident predictions and thereby undermines the cross-patient comparability on which triage depends. We refer to this failure mode as risk polarization and identify two underlying behaviors: early commitment to a single outcome, and one-sided reasoning that focuses only on the evidence for that outcome. To address this, we propose TRIAGE, a framework that trains an LLM to reason dialectically over competing clinical outcomes by eliciting outcome-specific rationales. This dialectical formulation mitigates risk polarization, enabling a single LLM to jointly provide explicit clinical rationales and risk scores comparable across patients. Across five ISMTS benchmarks, TRIAGE improves mean AUPRC by 17.0% and reduces mean calibration error by 82.8% relative to the competitive LLM-based baseline, while surpassing the strongest ISMTS baseline by 3.5% in mean AUPRC.

Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

Medical vision-language models (VLMs) generate chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before answering clinical questions, but whether this reasoning causally influences predictions remains unclear. We present CoT-Mediate, a behavioral framework that perturbs a single clinically meaningful attribute within a model's own generated reasoning and measures whether the resulting prediction follows the edited reasoning. Our framework combines a dual-arm protocol comparing re-prompted evidence with prefix-forced continuation, together with a provenance-controlled intervention that varies only the attributed source of identical reasoning to disentangle reasoning mediation from sycophancy. We evaluate LLaVA-Med and MedGemma on 1,000 VQA-RAD samples each. Prefix-forced continuation consistently yields higher mediation faithfulness than re-prompting, while the provenance analysis reveals distinct model-specific deference behaviors. Across both models, removing visual evidence increases reliance on injected reasoning, whereas laterality is the least faithfully tracked clinical attribute. These results show that the mechanism used to inject reasoning substantially affects measured faithfulness and that contextual position, rather than stated provenance, is the primary determinant of whether medical VLMs use their generated reasoning.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Long-horizon agents often struggle to recover from failures whose causes lie several steps earlier, beyond what local reflection or backtracking can resolve. We introduce BELIEFWEAVER, a framework that combines persistent evidence across attempts with prospective reasoning over repair directions. It maintains a relational belief state over frontiers, attempts, observations, and checkpoints. Execution evidence updates related frontier priorities across attempts and rollback, while diagnostic evidence gates execution. An implicit world model (IWM) evaluates repair hypotheses, predicts progress, and identifies relations among frontiers to guide exploration. We further distill these recurring IWM reasoning components into a 9B student through supervised fine-tuning and on-policy distillation (OPD). Across three terminal-based benchmarks, BELIEFWEAVER improves aggregate final score by 5.1 percentage points over native Terminus-2 continuation, with positive trends in exploration efficiency. The distilled 9B student improves final score by 9.8 percentage points over the reported native baseline while reducing estimated teacher API cost by 54.8% relative to the matched teacher. These results show that persistent evidence and prospective reasoning can improve recovery in long-horizon agent tasks while substantially reducing reliance on teacher-model inference.

The traditional i.i.d.-based learning paradigm faces inherent challenges in addressing causal relationships, which has become increasingly evident with the rise of applications in causal representation learning. Our understanding of causality naturally requires a perspective as the creator rather than observer, as the ``what...if'' questions only hold within the possible world we conceive. The traditional perspective limits capturing dynamic causal outcomes and leads to compensatory efforts such as the reliance on hidden confounders. This paper lays the groundwork for the new perspective, which enables the relation-first modeling paradigm for causality. Also, it introduces the Relation-Indexed Representation Learning (RIRL) as a practical implementation, supported by experiments that validate its efficacy.

Independence testing is a fundamental and classical statistical problem that has been extensively studied in the batch setting when one fixes the sample size before collecting data. However, practitioners often prefer procedures that adapt to the complexity of a problem at hand instead of setting sample size in advance. Ideally, such procedures should (a) allow stopping earlier on easy tasks (and later on harder tasks), hence making better use of available resources, and (b) continuously monitor the data and efficiently incorporate statistical evidence after collecting new data, while controlling the false alarm rate. It is well known that classical batch tests are not tailored for streaming data settings: valid inference after data peeking requires correcting for multiple testing but such corrections generally result in low power. Following the principle of testing by betting, we design sequential kernelized independence tests (SKITs) that overcome such shortcomings. We exemplify our broad framework using bets inspired by kernelized dependence measures, e.g, the Hilbert-Schmidt independence criterion. Our test is valid under non-i.i.d. time-varying settings, for which there exist no batch tests. We demonstrate the power of our approaches on both simulated and real data.

Distance correlation is a novel class of multivariate dependence measure, taking positive values between 0 and 1, and applicable to random vectors of arbitrary dimensions, not necessarily equal. It offers several advantages over the well-known Pearson correlation coefficient, the most important is that distance correlation equals zero if and only if the random vectors are independent. There are two different estimators of the distance correlation available in the literature. The first one, proposed by Székely et al. (2007), is based on an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the distance covariance which turns out to be a V-statistic. The second one builds on an unbiased estimator of the distance covariance proposed in Székely et al. (2014), proved to be an U-statistic by Székely and Huo (2016). This study evaluates their efficiency (mean squared error) and compares computational times for both methods under different dependence structures. Under conditions of independence or near-independence, the V-estimates are biased, while the U-estimator frequently cannot be computed due to negative values. To address this challenge, a convex linear combination of the former estimators is proposed and studied, yielding good results regardless of the level of dependence.

The ubiquitous independence assumption among symbolic concepts in neurosymbolic (NeSy) predictors is a convenient simplification: NeSy predictors use it to speed up probabilistic reasoning. Recent works like van Krieken et al. (2024) and Marconato et al. (2024) argued that the independence assumption can hinder learning of NeSy predictors and, more crucially, prevent them from correctly modelling uncertainty. There is, however, scepticism in the NeSy community around the scenarios in which the independence assumption actually limits NeSy systems (Faronius and Dos Martires, 2025). In this work, we settle this question by formally showing that assuming independence among symbolic concepts entails that a model can never represent uncertainty over certain concept combinations. Thus, the model fails to be aware of reasoning shortcuts, i.e., the pathological behaviour of NeSy predictors that predict correct downstream tasks but for the wrong reasons.

Autonomous agents increasingly perform bounded software tasks under an orchestrator that retries, resumes, and budgets them. The machinery such orchestrators reach for is the service mesh's: retry, timeout, and error-rate circuit breaking. We report a failure study of a production agentic software-delivery platform over 147 numbered incidents spanning 81 runs, each with a measured cost and, in most cases, a mutation proof reproducing the failure. All three assumptions those primitives rest on are violated in practice, and we quantify the consequences: a loop of fifty-four consecutive successful tool calls no error-rate breaker could see; a progress signal constant by construction, guaranteeing a false trip on the third repair round and driving one run from six of six components to three; twenty-one events accumulated across six invocations of one delegation, making a correct, idempotent component unwinnable; a misrouted failure that woke five components for a two-component fault, leaving three bystanders regressing working code; and twelve incidents in which the enforcement layer blocked correct work, the most expensive costing 107 agent turns and zero accepted writes. We find one cross-cutting cause and its dual. Identity adequacy: in five separate subsystems an identity that failed to discriminate produced a confident wrong answer, and two of them derived the corrective rule independently. Evidence adequacy: a reliability decision may be taken only on evidence capable of moving, attributable to what it measures, and deterministic under identical conditions. From the findings we derive seven reliability primitives whose enforcement unit is the delegation rather than the message, and specify the controlled evaluation the study motivates but does not constitute.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

In order to avoid well-know paradoxes associated with self-referential definitions, higher-order dependent type theories stratify the theory using a countably infinite hierarchy of universes (also known as sorts), Type_0 : Type_1 : cdots . Such type systems are called cumulative if for any type A we have that A : Type_{i} implies A : Type_{i+1}. The predicative calculus of inductive constructions (pCIC) which forms the basis of the Coq proof assistant, is one such system. In this paper we present and establish the soundness of the predicative calculus of cumulative inductive constructions (pCuIC) which extends the cumulativity relation to inductive types.

Large language models increasingly collaborate with humans and peer AI agents whose contributions may be incomplete, inconsistent, or incorrect. Effective collaboration requires calibrated trust, whereby decisions to rely on, verify, or assist a partner adapt rationally as empirical evidence accumulates. We investigate whether models translate partner evidence into appropriate reliance policies. We introduce a benchmark of 324 scenarios across 23 collaboration categories. Each scenario involves three sequential decisions with explicit transition dynamics, feedback emissions, and cost schedules, permitting exact analytical evaluation of choices against their expected consequences over the remaining interaction. Evaluating seven models alongside 36 controlled-history probes, we dissociate evidence sensitivity from normatively appropriate action. While the strongest frontier model approaches near-optimal decisions, other models exhibit recurring pathologies: procuring excessive safeguards, purchasing verification tests with zero expected value of information, prioritizing immediate savings over cooperative learning, and misallocating assistance to suboptimal channels. Supplying explicit posterior distributions resolves certain errors while introducing new failure modes. Calibrated trust in autonomous agents critically demands coupling empirical evidence with forward-looking decision utility.

A language model's prediction of its next token develops across layers, and lens methods track this process by decoding intermediate hidden states into tokens. But a lens reading reflects both the hidden state and the readout (the unembedding matrix) used to decode it. Many lenses are fit on a corpus, and we show that two lenses differing only in their fitting corpus can report different tokens for the same hidden states. We call this dependence corpus conditionality. To examine readout structure independently of the fitting corpus, we introduce Sparse Readout Prism (SRP), which decomposes the readout using only its weights and expresses any token logit or logit difference as a sum of contributions from sparse readout features. This reveals readout features as a new unit of analysis for lens readings, exposing structure that token identities can obscure and enabling comparisons across tokens, contexts, layers, and lenses. Replacing the original readout with SRP's sparse approximation reconstructs 8.9-17.3 percentage points more of the tested logit differences than the strongest of six baselines built on geometric relations among readout rows. Ablating features shifts logit differences in proportion to their SRP contributions. Although token readings vary with the fitting corpus, the dominant readout feature remains stable. Because SRP uses no corpus in its construction, it provides a control independent of the fitting corpus for lens analyses.

As economics scales, a key bottleneck is representing what papers claim in a comparable, aggregable form. We introduce evidence-annotated claim graphs that map each paper into a directed network of standardized economic concepts (nodes) and stated relationships (edges), with each edge labeled by evidentiary basis, including whether it is supported by causal inference designs or by non-causal evidence. Using a structured multi-stage AI workflow, we construct claim graphs for 44,852 economics papers from 1980-2023. The share of causal edges rises from 7.7% in 1990 to 31.7% in 2020. Measures of causal narrative structure and causal novelty are positively associated with top-five publication and long-run citations, whereas non-causal counterparts are weakly related or negative.

Although existing stereo matching models have achieved continuous improvement, they often face issues related to trustworthiness due to the absence of uncertainty estimation. Additionally, effectively leveraging multi-scale and multi-view knowledge of stereo pairs remains unexplored. In this paper, we introduce the Evidential Local-global Fusion (ELF) framework for stereo matching, which endows both uncertainty estimation and confidence-aware fusion with trustworthy heads. Instead of predicting the disparity map alone, our model estimates an evidential-based disparity considering both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. With the normal inverse-Gamma distribution as a bridge, the proposed framework realizes intra evidential fusion of multi-level predictions and inter evidential fusion between cost-volume-based and transformer-based stereo matching. Extensive experimental results show that the proposed framework exploits multi-view information effectively and achieves state-of-the-art overall performance both on accuracy and cross-domain generalization. The codes are available at https://github.com/jimmy19991222/ELFNet.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

We develop a framework, in the style of Adler, for interpreting the notion of "witnessing" that has appeared (usually as a variant of Kim's Lemma) in different areas of neostability theory as a binary relation between abstract independence relations. This involves extending the relativisations of Kim-independence and Conant-independence due to Mutchnik to arbitrary independence relations. After developing this framework, we show that several results from simplicity, NTP_2, NSOP_1, and beyond follow as instances of general theorems for abstract independence relations. In particular, we prove the equivalence between witnessing and symmetry and the implications from this notion to chain local character and the weak independence theorem, and recover some partial converses. Finally, we use this framework to prove a dichotomy between NSOP_1 and Kruckman and Ramsey's BTP that applies to most known NSOP_4 examples in the literature.

Accurate quantification of lung disease severity from chest imaging is critical for clinical decision-making and resource allocation. We propose a tri-modal deep learning framework, TMF-RSE (Tri-Modal Fusion with Regional Semantics and Evidential Uncertainty), that combines appearance features from two-dimensional chest inputs, structural features from lung segmentation masks, and semantic features from vision-language models (VLMs) for severity quantification. Our approach employs complementary fusion mechanisms that integrate semantic guidance, structural priors, and hierarchical interactions across modalities. The model employs evidential regression to provide both severity predictions and uncertainty estimates. Experiments on the Per-COVID-19 CT and RALO datasets show that TMF-RSE outperforms recent transformer-based baselines, achieving MAE of 4.02 and Pearson correlation of 0.9629 on Per-COVID-19 validation, and 0.339 MAE / 0.973 PC on RALO geographic extent.

Open-ended scientific discovery with large language models (LLMs) increasingly operates as a long-horizon loop of hypothesis search and verification, where a reward signal guides which hypotheses to test next. A notable recent example is AutoDiscovery, which uses "Bayesian surprise" - the belief shift an LLM undergoes after observing evidence for a hypothesis - as both a discovery metric and a reward for search. We first observe that AutoDiscovery treats surprisal as a static quantity, while surprisal in human reasoning is non-stationary - it is defined relative to beliefs that evolve with experience, a prerequisite for continual scientific discovery. We address this mismatch with evidence-informed LLM beliefs: priors updated with evidence from previous hypotheses to compute non-stationary surprisal for new hypotheses. We compare in-context belief-updating mechanisms and find that embedding-based retrieval-augmented generation over prior discoveries best anticipates eventual posteriors, identifying 37.5% of static surprisals as spurious. We then modify search to avoid these spurious rewards and prioritize hypotheses that remain surprising under non-stationary beliefs. Concretely, we introduce two complementary changes to the original search procedure: belief-update filtering and diversity maximization. Across five discovery domains, our method increases accumulated non-stationary surprisal by 30.62% on average compared to the original search procedure, demonstrating that continual scientific discovery with LLMs requires not only better belief measurement but also search procedures that avoid redundancy and encourage diversity.

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

Surprising events trigger measurable brain activity and influence human behavior by affecting learning, memory, and decision-making. Currently there is, however, no consensus on the definition of surprise. Here we identify 18 mathematical definitions of surprise in a unifying framework. We first propose a technical classification of these definitions into three groups based on their dependence on an agent's belief, show how they relate to each other, and prove under what conditions they are indistinguishable. Going beyond this technical analysis, we propose a taxonomy of surprise definitions and classify them into four conceptual categories based on the quantity they measure: (i) 'prediction surprise' measures a mismatch between a prediction and an observation; (ii) 'change-point detection surprise' measures the probability of a change in the environment; (iii) 'confidence-corrected surprise' explicitly accounts for the effect of confidence; and (iv) 'information gain surprise' measures the belief-update upon a new observation. The taxonomy poses the foundation for principled studies of the functional roles and physiological signatures of surprise in the brain.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Public-service recommendations require evidence that matches the requested service, scope, and date. Yet treating every missing detail as decisive can withhold useful recommendations. We introduce EviGraph, which distinguishes critical decision requirements from information that can remain unresolved. A language agent links these requirements to evidence in a temporal knowledge graph, while a deterministic checker establishes whether a recommendation is supported. Evaluation on a bilingual Hong Kong public-service benchmark with executable policy references shows that this distinction reduces unnecessary abstention. Additional verification, however, can withdraw supported recommendations without improving decision quality. These findings suggest that reliable evidence-based navigation depends on specifying what must be established for a decision, rather than simply adding more verification.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Modern multi-agent knowledge systems increasingly accumulate knowledge through chains of autonomous transformations rather than direct retrieval. Existing provenance work records what happened - execution traces, tool calls, evidence links - and source-reliability estimation is long established (truth discovery, reputation systems). What is missing is an operational framework that attaches graded, per-domain transmitter reliability to claim-level transmission chains, with completeness semantics, transformation-typed aggregation, decoupled content criticism, and serve/review/quarantine routing. Classical Islamic hadith science confronted a structurally similar problem: deciding whether knowledge transmitted through chains of human narrators should be accepted. Over centuries it developed a rigorous methodology - isnad (a complete transmission chain attached to every claim), rijal (systematic grading of each narrator's integrity and precision), weakest-link chain evaluation, corroboration through independent chains, and matn criticism (content evaluated independently of chain quality). This paper transfers that methodology to AI system design. We contribute a formal mapping from hadith-science concepts to multi-agent pipelines, a relational schema implementing claim chains and a graded narrator registry, a decision matrix combining chain grade with content criticism, and an evaluation on 20,000 claims from real physics textbooks. The evaluation validates weakest-link quarantine and independent-chain corroboration; reports a partial failure of the grade-recovery loop, which missed the highest-fault narrator; and reports two analyses as inconclusive, including a matched-coverage comparison the framework could not reach with the reference content critic. The paper is explicit throughout about which claims the evidence does and does not yet support.

Recent work on chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness reports single aggregate numbers (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 acknowledges hints 39% of the time), implying that faithfulness is an objective, measurable property of a model. This paper demonstrates that it is not. Three classifiers (a regex-only detector, a two-stage regex-plus-LLM pipeline, and an independent Claude Sonnet 4 judge) are applied to 10,276 influenced reasoning traces from 12 open-weight models spanning 9 families and 7B to 1T parameters. On identical data, these classifiers produce overall faithfulness rates of 74.4%, 82.6%, and 69.7%, respectively, with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Per-model gaps range from 2.6 to 30.6 percentage points; all are statistically significant (McNemar's test, p < 0.001). The disagreements are systematic, not random: inter-classifier agreement measured by Cohen's kappa ranges from 0.06 ("slight") for sycophancy hints to 0.42 ("moderate") for grader hints, and the asymmetry is pronounced: for sycophancy, 883 cases are classified as faithful by the pipeline but unfaithful by the Sonnet judge, while only 2 go the other direction. Classifier choice can also reverse model rankings: Qwen3.5-27B ranks 1st under the pipeline but 7th under the Sonnet judge; OLMo-3.1-32B moves in the opposite direction, from 9th to 3rd. The root cause is that different classifiers operationalize related faithfulness constructs at different levels of stringency (lexical mention versus epistemic dependence), and these constructs yield divergent measurements on the same behavior. These results demonstrate that published faithfulness numbers cannot be meaningfully compared across studies that use different classifiers, and that future evaluations should report sensitivity ranges across multiple classification methodologies rather than single point estimates.

We present a complete theoretical characterization of Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a principled framework for aggregating multiple heterogeneous evidence items in probabilistic prediction tasks. Multi-evidence reasoning arises pervasively in high-stakes domains including healthcare diagnosis, financial risk assessment, legal case analysis, and regulatory compliance, yet existing approaches either lack formal guarantees or fail to handle multi-evidence scenarios architecturally. LPF encodes each evidence item into a Gaussian latent posterior via a variational autoencoder, converting posteriors to soft factors through Monte Carlo marginalization, and aggregating factors via exact Sum-Product Network inference (LPF-SPN) or a learned neural aggregator (LPF-Learned). We prove seven formal guarantees spanning the key desiderata for trustworthy AI: Calibration Preservation (ECE <= epsilon + C/sqrt(K_eff)); Monte Carlo Error decaying as O(1/sqrt(M)); a non-vacuous PAC-Bayes bound with train-test gap of 0.0085 at N=4200; operation within 1.12x of the information-theoretic lower bound; graceful degradation as O(epsilon*delta*sqrt(K)) under corruption, maintaining 88% performance with half of evidence adversarially replaced; O(1/sqrt(K)) calibration decay with R^2=0.849; and exact epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty decomposition with error below 0.002%. All theorems are empirically validated on controlled datasets spanning up to 4,200 training examples. Our theoretical framework establishes LPF as a foundation for trustworthy multi-evidence AI in safety-critical applications.

Research on causality extraction from text has so far almost entirely neglected counterclaims. Existing causality extraction datasets focus solely on "procausal" claims, i.e., statements that support a relationship. "Concausal" claims, i.e., statements that refute a relationship, are entirely ignored or even accidentally annotated as procausal. We address this shortcoming by developing a new dataset that integrates concausality. Based on an extensive literature review, we first show that concausality is an integral part of causal reasoning on incomplete knowledge. We operationalize this theory in the form of a rigorous guideline for annotation and then augment the Causal News Corpus with concausal statements, obtaining a substantial inter-annotator agreement of Cohen's κ=0.74. To demonstrate the importance of integrating concausal statements, we show that models trained without concausal relationships tend to misclassify these as procausal instead. Based on our new dataset, this mistake can be mitigated, enabling transformers to effectively distinguish pro- and concausality.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Reliable rubric grading requires more than accurate score prediction. Each judgement must be grounded in the mark scheme and evidence from the student answer. Existing credit-assignment and intervention methods, primarily designed for self-contained reasoning tasks such as mathematics reasoning, struggle in this setting because they do not identify where grading reasoning goes wrong or how the model's belief about the final mark changes during reasoning. We propose Evidence-Diagnosed Intervention Training (EDIT), a two-phase framework for training more rubric-faithful LLM graders. First, EDIT-SFT locates problematic reasoning steps using internal model signals: posterior belief over the final mark and input-grounding scores. It then revises only these local steps with help from a rubric checklist. Second, EDIT-RL calibrates the grader with belief-guided reward shaping, penalising large harmful belief drifts while still allowing helpful exploration. Experiments on two real-world, multi-subject grading benchmarks demonstrate that EDIT consistently outperforms strong supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning baselines on both in-domain and out-of-domain splits, with ablation studies confirming that internal-state diagnostics drive these gains.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to summarize and verify claims in critical sources that inform consequential decisions. Such claims are full of plural definites. If three of five patients improved after taking drug A, the claim the patients improved after drug A is not true, since two did not, yet its negation, the patients didn't improve after drug A, is not true either, since three did. In formal semantics, this truth-value gap is known as the Homogeneity Gap: both the plural definite and its negation are neither true nor false when the property holds for only a fraction of the plural referent. A model that cannot represent this gap turns mixed evidence into a clean verdict, an error that can be costly in high-stakes use. We introduce HomogeneityNLI, a diagnostic dataset of 1,000 minimal pair items crossing determiner, polarity, and group composition across ten logical conditions. Evaluating seven open-weight models, we uncover a pervasive Bivalence Bias: models assign plural definites their homogeneous truth conditions. In the zero-shot setting, no model recognizes the gap for both polarities in more than 15% of scenarios, and negated definites are judged False in 84% of cases. Explicit linguistic rules, chain-of-thought, and enumeration prompts produce unstable, model-specific effects that often entrench the bias. Our findings indicate that current open-weight LLMs acquire the truth conditions of plural predication but not its trivalent logic, and cannot yet be trusted to summarize or verify claims whose evidence is mixed.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

The Large Language Model from Power Law Decoder Representations (PLDR-LLM) and its attention, Power Law Graph Attention (PLGA), replace the fixed bilinear form of scaled dot-product attention (SDPA) with a learned, input-generated bilinear operator G_{LM}, built from a positive tensor A_{LM} by elementwise power laws. The architecture is fully specified, verified against pinned reference releases; claims are labeled theorem, conditional theorem, measurement, or conjecture. Unconditionally: PLGA contains SDPA exactly at G_{LM}=I; A_{LM} and A_P are strictly entrywise positive, with Perron-Frobenius structure on A_{LM}; the DAG regularizer has the NOTEARS walk-counting form and positivity obstructs exact acyclicity; and, under nonresonance (satisfied by standard rotary frequencies), a commutant criterion identifies which operators preserve relative-position dependence. An inference-collapse theorem: exact input invariance of deductive outputs collapses inference to generalized SDPA with a constant operator. Measured invariance: relative fluctuations of 10^{-6} and below; perturbation bounds quantify but do not certify cached inference; the assembled proxy misses the decoding margin. A conditional three-stage mechanism (rotary twirl, concentration, row-map contraction) is measured on a released checkpoint. Blockwise training and scoring under the global Gram are stated with explicit target exposure; on tested samples, block and sequential scoring select identical answers and agree on the published TruthfulQA probability-mass metric within 5times 10^{-5} per item. Self-organized criticality enters as a phenomenological framework with an intrinsic order parameter; open claims become falsifiable conjectures. Selected proof cores are machine-checked in Lean 4.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

In the era of large language models, creative writing quality lacks a computable theoretical anchor. The dominant approaches are rubric scoring -- decomposing holistic aesthetic judgment into sub-scores -- and RLHF preference signals -- replacing quality with group votes. Both bypass the statistical structure of the text itself. This paper provides an information-theoretic foundation to fill this gap. We propose 'calibrated surprise' as the information-theoretic essence of excellent creative writing. This judgment matches reading intuition and covers its opposite. This literary judgment admits a precise mathematical formulation. Under full-dimensional constraints Y, feasible writing choices are forced into an extremely narrow space. The rare survivors are, from the unconstrained perspective, exactly the least predictable choices. Both are measured precisely by Shannon mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) -- 'calibrated' corresponds to H(X|Y) approaching 0; 'surprising' corresponds to H(X) going high. The subtraction structure of the formula naturally separates 'well-grounded surprise' from 'pure noise'. We use token-level logprobs from Qwen1.5-7B as an operational proxy for the ideal reader's probability distribution. Across 20 pairs (12 Chinese / 8 English) of high-quality vs. systematically degraded literary passages, 20/20 pairs support the core prediction: high-quality passages have systematically higher I(X;Y) than their degraded versions.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly summarize clinical evidence, where a claim's weight depends on how strongly it is supported. Yet these models convey confidence poorly, and properties they never state, such as truth, are often readable from their activations. Whether a clinical model registers evidence strength, distinct from truth, and states it when asked is untested, and any such signal could be lexical. We compiled 45,134 clinical claims from six public sources, harmonized 20,611 into a four-level evidence grade under three independent frameworks, and tested 22 local, open-weight LLMs from several developers (0.6-70 billion parameters; general, medical, and reasoning), with lexical, truth, and cross-framework controls. A linear estimator recovered the grade in every model (median AUROC 71.8), yet decodability did not rise with scale and was weakest in reasoning models. The grade the models stated fell to chance, 25-27 percentage points below the estimator. The recoverable signal was largely lexical and did not transfer across topics or frameworks, yet it was distinct from factual truth and still flagged weakly supported claims (AUROC 69.2). Clinical LLMs thus carry an ordered evidence-strength signal they do not express, so their stated grades fail to convey a claim's support even when it is recoverable from their representations and text.