Daily Papers

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Query-based object detectors directly decode image features into object instances with a set of learnable queries. These query vectors are progressively refined to stable meaningful representations through a sequence of decoder layers, and then used to directly predict object locations and categories with simple FFN heads. In this paper, we present a new query-based object detector (DEQDet) by designing a deep equilibrium decoder. Our DEQ decoder models the query vector refinement as the fixed point solving of an {implicit} layer and is equivalent to applying {infinite} steps of refinement. To be more specific to object decoding, we use a two-step unrolled equilibrium equation to explicitly capture the query vector refinement. Accordingly, we are able to incorporate refinement awareness into the DEQ training with the inexact gradient back-propagation (RAG). In addition, to stabilize the training of our DEQDet and improve its generalization ability, we devise the deep supervision scheme on the optimization path of DEQ with refinement-aware perturbation~(RAP). Our experiments demonstrate DEQDet converges faster, consumes less memory, and achieves better results than the baseline counterpart (AdaMixer). In particular, our DEQDet with ResNet50 backbone and 300 queries achieves the 49.5 mAP and 33.0 AP_s on the MS COCO benchmark under 2times training scheme (24 epochs).

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

Mathematical reasoning has proven to be a critical yet challenging task for large language models (LLMs), as they often struggle with complex multi-step problems. To address these limitations, we introduce the Monte Carlo Nash Equilibrium Self-Refine Tree (MC-NEST) algorithm, an enhancement of the Monte Carlo Tree Self-Refine (MCTSr) approach. By integrating Nash Equilibrium strategies with LLM-based self-refinement and self-evaluation processes, MC-NEST aims to improve decision-making for complex mathematical reasoning tasks. This method ensures balanced exploration and exploitation of potential solutions, leveraging Upper Confidence Bound (UCT) scores and various selection policies. Through iterative critique and refinement, MC-NEST enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, particularly for problems requiring strategic decision-making. Comparative analysis reveals that GPT-4o, equipped with MC-NEST using an Importance Sampling Policy, achieved superior accuracy in domains such as Number Theory and Geometry. These results suggest that both LLMs GPT-4o and Phi-3-mini can benefit from MC-NEST, with iterative self-refinement proving especially effective in expanding the reasoning capacity and problem-solving performance of LLMs. We evaluate the effectiveness of MC-NEST on challenging Olympiad-level benchmarks, demonstrating its potential to significantly boost complex mathematical reasoning performance in LLMs.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the latter is chosen heuristically by the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on each iteration. This might take many iterations, making the process computationally expensive, which might be harmful to real-time applications. We propose to replace this heuristic by viewing the problem in a holistic manner, as a game, and formulating it as a reinforcement-learning task. We set an environment which solves the non-linear equations and train an agent to choose the damping factor in a learned manner. We demonstrate that our approach considerably reduces the number of iterations required to reach the bundle adjustment's convergence, on both synthetic and real-life scenarios. We show that this reduction benefits the classic approach and can be integrated with other bundle adjustment acceleration methods.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Solving Olympiad-level mathematical problems represents a significant advancement in machine intelligence and automated reasoning. Current machine learning methods, however, struggle to solve Olympiad-level problems beyond Euclidean plane geometry due to a lack of large-scale, high-quality datasets. The challenge is even greater in algebraic systems, which involve infinite reasoning spaces within finite conditions. To address these issues, we propose AIPS, an Algebraic Inequality Proving System capable of autonomously generating complex inequality theorems and effectively solving Olympiad-level inequality problems without requiring human demonstrations. During proof search in a mixed reasoning manner, a value curriculum learning strategy on generated datasets is implemented to improve proving performance, demonstrating strong mathematical intuitions. On a test set of 20 International Mathematical Olympiad-level inequality problems, AIPS successfully solved 10, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, AIPS automatically generated a vast array of non-trivial theorems without human intervention, some of which have been evaluated by professional contestants and deemed to reach the level of the International Mathematical Olympiad. Notably, one theorem was selected as a competition problem in a major city 2024 Mathematical Olympiad.

Physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) are emerging as popular mesh-free solvers for partial differential equations (PDEs). Recent extensions decompose the domain, applying different PINNs to solve the equation in each subdomain and aligning the solution at the interface of the subdomains. Hence, they can further alleviate the problem complexity, reduce the computational cost, and allow parallelization. However, the performance of the multi-domain PINNs is sensitive to the choice of the interface conditions for solution alignment. While quite a few conditions have been proposed, there is no suggestion about how to select the conditions according to specific problems. To address this gap, we propose META Learning of Interface Conditions (METALIC), a simple, efficient yet powerful approach to dynamically determine the optimal interface conditions for solving a family of parametric PDEs. Specifically, we develop two contextual multi-arm bandit models. The first one applies to the entire training procedure, and online updates a Gaussian process (GP) reward surrogate that given the PDE parameters and interface conditions predicts the solution error. The second one partitions the training into two stages, one is the stochastic phase and the other deterministic phase; we update a GP surrogate for each phase to enable different condition selections at the two stages so as to further bolster the flexibility and performance. We have shown the advantage of METALIC on four bench-mark PDE families.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Solving a linear system Ax=b is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter omega has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm -- using only the number of iterations as feedback -- can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed omega as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best omega for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices solve this problem by balancing supply and demand in order to decongest the market. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, with the power of a platform limited to controlling representations -- the information made available about products. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform uses this power to learn representations that improve social welfare by reducing congestion. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from users' past choices, rather than true valuations; and working with representations that determine which features to reveal and are inherently combinatorial. We tackle both by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We provide theory giving sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present experiments on both synthetic and real data shedding light on our setting and approach.

The loss functions of many learning problems contain multiple additive terms that can disagree and yield conflicting update directions. For Physics-Informed Neural Networks (PINNs), loss terms on initial/boundary conditions and physics equations are particularly interesting as they are well-established as highly difficult tasks. To improve learning the challenging multi-objective task posed by PINNs, we propose the ConFIG method, which provides conflict-free updates by ensuring a positive dot product between the final update and each loss-specific gradient. It also maintains consistent optimization rates for all loss terms and dynamically adjusts gradient magnitudes based on conflict levels. We additionally leverage momentum to accelerate optimizations by alternating the back-propagation of different loss terms. We provide a mathematical proof showing the convergence of the ConFIG method, and it is evaluated across a range of challenging PINN scenarios. ConFIG consistently shows superior performance and runtime compared to baseline methods. We also test the proposed method in a classic multi-task benchmark, where the ConFIG method likewise exhibits a highly promising performance. Source code is available at https://tum-pbs.github.io/ConFIG

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

This paper introduces an innovative approach to analyzing and improving multi-hop reasoning in AI systems by drawing inspiration from Hamiltonian mechanics. We propose a novel framework that maps reasoning chains in embedding spaces to Hamiltonian systems, allowing us to leverage powerful analytical tools from classical physics. Our method defines a Hamiltonian function that balances the progression of reasoning (kinetic energy) against the relevance to the question at hand (potential energy). Using this framework, we analyze a large dataset of reasoning chains from a multi-hop question-answering task, revealing intriguing patterns that distinguish valid from invalid reasoning. We show that valid reasoning chains have lower Hamiltonian energy and move in ways that make the best trade-off between getting more information and answering the right question. Furthermore, we demonstrate the application of this framework to steer the creation of more efficient reasoning algorithms within AI systems. Our results not only provide new insights into the nature of valid reasoning but also open up exciting possibilities for physics-inspired approaches to understanding and improving artificial intelligence.

Recently, deep learning models have made great progress in MWP solving on answer accuracy. However, they are uninterpretable since they mainly rely on shallow heuristics to achieve high performance without understanding and reasoning the grounded math logic. To address this issue and make a step towards interpretable MWP solving, we first construct a high-quality MWP dataset named InterMWP which consists of 11,495 MWPs and annotates interpretable logical formulas based on algebraic knowledge as the grounded linguistic logic of each solution equation. Different from existing MWP datasets, our InterMWP benchmark asks for a solver to not only output the solution expressions but also predict the corresponding logical formulas. We further propose a novel approach with logical prompt and interpretation generation, called LogicSolver. For each MWP, our LogicSolver first retrieves some highly-correlated algebraic knowledge and then passes them to the backbone model as prompts to improve the semantic representations of MWPs. With these improved semantic representations, our LogicSolver generates corresponding solution expressions and interpretable knowledge formulas in accord with the generated solution expressions, simultaneously. Experimental results show that our LogicSolver has stronger logical formula-based interpretability than baselines while achieving higher answer accuracy with the help of logical prompts, simultaneously. The source code and dataset is available at https://github.com/yangzhch6/InterMWP.

This paper introduces an approach for learning to solve continuous constraint satisfaction problems (CCSP) in robotic reasoning and planning. Previous methods primarily rely on hand-engineering or learning generators for specific constraint types and then rejecting the value assignments when other constraints are violated. By contrast, our model, the compositional diffusion continuous constraint solver (Diffusion-CCSP) derives global solutions to CCSPs by representing them as factor graphs and combining the energies of diffusion models trained to sample for individual constraint types. Diffusion-CCSP exhibits strong generalization to novel combinations of known constraints, and it can be integrated into a task and motion planner to devise long-horizon plans that include actions with both discrete and continuous parameters. Project site: https://diffusion-ccsp.github.io/

Despite their spectacular progress, language models still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, such as advanced mathematics. We consider a long-standing open problem in mathematics: discovering a Lyapunov function that ensures the global stability of a dynamical system. This problem has no known general solution, and algorithmic solvers only exist for some small polynomial systems. We propose a new method for generating synthetic training samples from random solutions, and show that sequence-to-sequence transformers trained on such datasets perform better than algorithmic solvers and humans on polynomial systems, and can discover new Lyapunov functions for non-polynomial systems.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

We describe an iterative procedure for optimizing policies, with guaranteed monotonic improvement. By making several approximations to the theoretically-justified procedure, we develop a practical algorithm, called Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO). This algorithm is similar to natural policy gradient methods and is effective for optimizing large nonlinear policies such as neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate its robust performance on a wide variety of tasks: learning simulated robotic swimming, hopping, and walking gaits; and playing Atari games using images of the screen as input. Despite its approximations that deviate from the theory, TRPO tends to give monotonic improvement, with little tuning of hyperparameters.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving math problems, a hallmark of human intelligence. Despite high success rates on current benchmarks; however, these often feature simple problems with only one or two unknowns, which do not sufficiently challenge their reasoning capacities. This paper introduces a novel benchmark, BeyondX, designed to address these limitations by incorporating problems with multiple unknowns. Recognizing the challenges in proposing multi-unknown problems from scratch, we developed BeyondX using an innovative automated pipeline that progressively increases complexity by expanding the number of unknowns in simpler problems. Empirical study on BeyondX reveals that the performance of existing LLMs, even those fine-tuned specifically on math tasks, significantly decreases as the number of unknowns increases - with a performance drop of up to 70\% observed in GPT-4. To tackle these challenges, we propose the Formulate-and-Solve strategy, a generalized prompting approach that effectively handles problems with an arbitrary number of unknowns. Our findings reveal that this strategy not only enhances LLM performance on the BeyondX benchmark but also provides deeper insights into the computational limits of LLMs when faced with more complex mathematical challenges.

Constructing agents with planning capabilities has long been one of the main challenges in the pursuit of artificial intelligence. Tree-based planning methods have enjoyed huge success in challenging domains, such as chess and Go, where a perfect simulator is available. However, in real-world problems the dynamics governing the environment are often complex and unknown. In this work we present the MuZero algorithm which, by combining a tree-based search with a learned model, achieves superhuman performance in a range of challenging and visually complex domains, without any knowledge of their underlying dynamics. MuZero learns a model that, when applied iteratively, predicts the quantities most directly relevant to planning: the reward, the action-selection policy, and the value function. When evaluated on 57 different Atari games - the canonical video game environment for testing AI techniques, in which model-based planning approaches have historically struggled - our new algorithm achieved a new state of the art. When evaluated on Go, chess and shogi, without any knowledge of the game rules, MuZero matched the superhuman performance of the AlphaZero algorithm that was supplied with the game rules.

The conjoining of dynamical systems and deep learning has become a topic of great interest. In particular, neural differential equations (NDEs) demonstrate that neural networks and differential equation are two sides of the same coin. Traditional parameterised differential equations are a special case. Many popular neural network architectures, such as residual networks and recurrent networks, are discretisations. NDEs are suitable for tackling generative problems, dynamical systems, and time series (particularly in physics, finance, ...) and are thus of interest to both modern machine learning and traditional mathematical modelling. NDEs offer high-capacity function approximation, strong priors on model space, the ability to handle irregular data, memory efficiency, and a wealth of available theory on both sides. This doctoral thesis provides an in-depth survey of the field. Topics include: neural ordinary differential equations (e.g. for hybrid neural/mechanistic modelling of physical systems); neural controlled differential equations (e.g. for learning functions of irregular time series); and neural stochastic differential equations (e.g. to produce generative models capable of representing complex stochastic dynamics, or sampling from complex high-dimensional distributions). Further topics include: numerical methods for NDEs (e.g. reversible differential equations solvers, backpropagation through differential equations, Brownian reconstruction); symbolic regression for dynamical systems (e.g. via regularised evolution); and deep implicit models (e.g. deep equilibrium models, differentiable optimisation). We anticipate this thesis will be of interest to anyone interested in the marriage of deep learning with dynamical systems, and hope it will provide a useful reference for the current state of the art.

We consider solving equality-constrained nonlinear, nonconvex optimization problems. This class of problems appears widely in a variety of applications in machine learning and engineering, ranging from constrained deep neural networks, to optimal control, to PDE-constrained optimization. We develop an adaptive inexact Newton method for this problem class. In each iteration, we solve the Lagrangian Newton system inexactly via a randomized iterative sketching solver, and select a suitable stepsize by performing line search on an exact augmented Lagrangian merit function. The randomized solvers have advantages over deterministic linear system solvers by significantly reducing per-iteration flops complexity and storage cost, when equipped with suitable sketching matrices. Our method adaptively controls the accuracy of the randomized solver and the penalty parameters of the exact augmented Lagrangian, to ensure that the inexact Newton direction is a descent direction of the exact augmented Lagrangian. This allows us to establish a global almost sure convergence. We also show that a unit stepsize is admissible locally, so that our method exhibits a local linear convergence. Furthermore, we prove that the linear convergence can be strengthened to superlinear convergence if we gradually sharpen the adaptive accuracy condition on the randomized solver. We demonstrate the superior performance of our method on benchmark nonlinear problems in CUTEst test set, constrained logistic regression with data from LIBSVM, and a PDE-constrained problem.

Designing solutions for complex engineering challenges is crucial in human production activities. However, previous research in the retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) field has not sufficiently addressed tasks related to the design of complex engineering solutions. To fill this gap, we introduce a new benchmark, SolutionBench, to evaluate a system's ability to generate complete and feasible solutions for engineering problems with multiple complex constraints. To further advance the design of complex engineering solutions, we propose a novel system, SolutionRAG, that leverages the tree-based exploration and bi-point thinking mechanism to generate reliable solutions. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that SolutionRAG achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on the SolutionBench, highlighting its potential to enhance the automation and reliability of complex engineering solution design in real-world applications.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Existing methods for optimal control struggle to deal with the complexity commonly encountered in real-world systems, including dimensionality, process error, model bias and data heterogeneity. Instead of tackling these system complexities directly, researchers have typically sought to simplify models to fit optimal control methods. But when is the optimal solution to an approximate, stylized model better than an approximate solution to a more accurate model? While this question has largely gone unanswered owing to the difficulty of finding even approximate solutions for complex models, recent algorithmic and computational advances in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) might finally allow us to address these questions. DRL methods have to date been applied primarily in the context of games or robotic mechanics, which operate under precisely known rules. Here, we demonstrate the ability for DRL algorithms using deep neural networks to successfully approximate solutions (the "policy function" or control rule) in a non-linear three-variable model for a fishery without knowing or ever attempting to infer a model for the process itself. We find that the reinforcement learning agent discovers an effective simplification of the problem to obtain an interpretable control rule. We show that the policy obtained with DRL is both more profitable and more sustainable than any constant mortality policy -- the standard family of policies considered in fishery management.

One of the fundamental quests of AI is to produce agents that coordinate well with humans. This problem is challenging, especially in domains that lack high quality human behavioral data, because multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) often converges to different equilibria from the ones that humans prefer. We propose a novel framework, instructRL, that enables humans to specify what kind of strategies they expect from their AI partners through natural language instructions. We use pretrained large language models to generate a prior policy conditioned on the human instruction and use the prior to regularize the RL objective. This leads to the RL agent converging to equilibria that are aligned with human preferences. We show that instructRL converges to human-like policies that satisfy the given instructions in a proof-of-concept environment as well as the challenging Hanabi benchmark. Finally, we show that knowing the language instruction significantly boosts human-AI coordination performance in human evaluations in Hanabi.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

We consider the problem of multi-objective alignment of foundation models with human preferences, which is a critical step towards helpful and harmless AI systems. However, it is generally costly and unstable to fine-tune large foundation models using reinforcement learning (RL), and the multi-dimensionality, heterogeneity, and conflicting nature of human preferences further complicate the alignment process. In this paper, we introduce Rewards-in-Context (RiC), which conditions the response of a foundation model on multiple rewards in its prompt context and applies supervised fine-tuning for alignment. The salient features of RiC are simplicity and adaptivity, as it only requires supervised fine-tuning of a single foundation model and supports dynamic adjustment for user preferences during inference time. Inspired by the analytical solution of an abstracted convex optimization problem, our dynamic inference-time adjustment method approaches the Pareto-optimal solution for multiple objectives. Empirical evidence demonstrates the efficacy of our method in aligning both Large Language Models (LLMs) and diffusion models to accommodate diverse rewards with only around 10% GPU hours compared with multi-objective RL baseline.

Designing control policies whose performance level is guaranteed to remain above a given threshold in a span of environments is a critical feature for the adoption of reinforcement learning (RL) in real-world applications. The search for such robust policies is a notoriously difficult problem, related to the so-called dynamic model of transition function uncertainty, where the environment dynamics are allowed to change at each time step. But in practical cases, one is rather interested in robustness to a span of static transition models throughout interaction episodes. The static model is known to be harder to solve than the dynamic one, and seminal algorithms, such as robust value iteration, as well as most recent works on deep robust RL, build upon the dynamic model. In this work, we propose to revisit the static model. We suggest an analysis of why solving the static model under some mild hypotheses is a reasonable endeavor, based on an equivalence with the dynamic model, and formalize the general intuition that robust MDPs can be solved by tackling a series of static problems. We introduce a generic meta-algorithm called IWOCS, which incrementally identifies worst-case transition models so as to guide the search for a robust policy. Discussion on IWOCS sheds light on new ways to decouple policy optimization and adversarial transition functions and opens new perspectives for analysis. We derive a deep RL version of IWOCS and demonstrate it is competitive with state-of-the-art algorithms on classical benchmarks.

In this paper, a mathematical model is developed to describe the evolution of the concentration of compounds through a gas chromatography column. The model couples mass balances and kinetic equations for all components. Both single and multiple-component cases are considered with constant or variable velocity. Non-dimensionalisation indicates the small effect of diffusion. The system where diffusion is neglected is analysed using Laplace transforms. In the multiple-component case, it is demonstrated that the competition between the compounds is negligible and the equations may be decoupled. This reduces the problem to solving a single integral equation to determine the concentration profile for all components (since they are scaled versions of each other). For a given analyte, we then only two parameters need to be fitted to the data. To verify this approach, the full governing equations are also solved numerically using the finite difference method and a global adaptive quadrature method to integrate the Laplace transformation. Comparison with the Laplace solution verifies the high degree of accuracy of the simpler Laplace form. The Laplace solution is then verified against experimental data from BTEX chromatography. This novel method, which involves solving a single equation and fitting parameters in pairs for individual components, is highly efficient. It is significantly faster and simpler than the full numerical solution and avoids the computationally expensive methods that would normally be used to fit all curves at the same time.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Offline-to-online reinforcement learning (RL) is a training paradigm that combines pre-training on a pre-collected dataset with fine-tuning in an online environment. However, the incorporation of online fine-tuning can intensify the well-known distributional shift problem. Existing solutions tackle this problem by imposing a policy constraint on the policy improvement objective in both offline and online learning. They typically advocate a single balance between policy improvement and constraints across diverse data collections. This one-size-fits-all manner may not optimally leverage each collected sample due to the significant variation in data quality across different states. To this end, we introduce Family Offline-to-Online RL (FamO2O), a simple yet effective framework that empowers existing algorithms to determine state-adaptive improvement-constraint balances. FamO2O utilizes a universal model to train a family of policies with different improvement/constraint intensities, and a balance model to select a suitable policy for each state. Theoretically, we prove that state-adaptive balances are necessary for achieving a higher policy performance upper bound. Empirically, extensive experiments show that FamO2O offers a statistically significant improvement over various existing methods, achieving state-of-the-art performance on the D4RL benchmark. Codes are available at https://github.com/LeapLabTHU/FamO2O.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

Reasoning system dynamics is one of the most important analytical approaches for many scientific studies. With the initial state of a system as input, the recent graph neural networks (GNNs)-based methods are capable of predicting the future state distant in time with high accuracy. Although these methods have diverse designs in modeling the coordinates and interacting forces of the system, we show that they actually share a common paradigm that learns the integration of the velocity over the interval between the initial and terminal coordinates. However, their integrand is constant w.r.t. time. Inspired by this observation, we propose a new approach to predict the integration based on several velocity estimations with Newton-Cotes formulas and prove its effectiveness theoretically. Extensive experiments on several benchmarks empirically demonstrate consistent and significant improvement compared with the state-of-the-art methods.

The problem of designing NLP solvers for math word problems (MWP) has seen sustained research activity and steady gains in the test accuracy. Since existing solvers achieve high performance on the benchmark datasets for elementary level MWPs containing one-unknown arithmetic word problems, such problems are often considered "solved" with the bulk of research attention moving to more complex MWPs. In this paper, we restrict our attention to English MWPs taught in grades four and lower. We provide strong evidence that the existing MWP solvers rely on shallow heuristics to achieve high performance on the benchmark datasets. To this end, we show that MWP solvers that do not have access to the question asked in the MWP can still solve a large fraction of MWPs. Similarly, models that treat MWPs as bag-of-words can also achieve surprisingly high accuracy. Further, we introduce a challenge dataset, SVAMP, created by applying carefully chosen variations over examples sampled from existing datasets. The best accuracy achieved by state-of-the-art models is substantially lower on SVAMP, thus showing that much remains to be done even for the simplest of the MWPs.

We study the use of amortized optimization to predict optimal transport (OT) maps from the input measures, which we call Meta OT. This helps repeatedly solve similar OT problems between different measures by leveraging the knowledge and information present from past problems to rapidly predict and solve new problems. Otherwise, standard methods ignore the knowledge of the past solutions and suboptimally re-solve each problem from scratch. We instantiate Meta OT models in discrete and continuous settings between grayscale images, spherical data, classification labels, and color palettes and use them to improve the computational time of standard OT solvers. Our source code is available at http://github.com/facebookresearch/meta-ot

The ability of large language models to solve complex mathematical problems has progressed significantly, particularly for tasks requiring advanced reasoning. However, the scarcity of sufficiently challenging problems, particularly at the Olympiad level, hinders further advancements. In this work, we introduce PromptCoT, a novel approach for automatically generating high-quality Olympiad-level math problems. The proposed method synthesizes complex problems based on mathematical concepts and the rationale behind problem construction, emulating the thought processes of experienced problem designers. We provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating that an optimal rationale should maximize both the likelihood of rationale generation given the associated concepts and the likelihood of problem generation conditioned on both the rationale and the concepts. Our method is evaluated on standard benchmarks including GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME2024, where it consistently outperforms existing problem generation methods. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PromptCoT exhibits superior data scalability, consistently maintaining high performance as the dataset size increases, outperforming the baselines. The implementation is available at https://github.com/zhaoxlpku/PromptCoT.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

Understanding equilibration and thermalization in isolated many-body quantum systems is a central challenge in quantum physics. The traditional approach focuses on the study of the full state of the quantum system which, at equilibrium, is best described by the Diagonal Ensemble. Here, we present Observable Statistical Mechanics, a novel paradigm that shifts attention from the full quantum state to the statistics of measurement outcomes. This approach is grounded in the Maximum Observable Entropy Principle, positing that equilibrium measurement statistics tend to maximize observable entropy under conserved average energy. By focusing on accessible measurements, the theory accurately predicts equilibrium probability distributions without needing detailed microscopic information like the energy eigenstates. Extensive numerical experiments on 7 spin-1/2 Hamiltonians demonstrate the broad applicability and robustness of this framework.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Solving algebraic word problems requires executing a series of arithmetic operations---a program---to obtain a final answer. However, since programs can be arbitrarily complicated, inducing them directly from question-answer pairs is a formidable challenge. To make this task more feasible, we solve these problems by generating answer rationales, sequences of natural language and human-readable mathematical expressions that derive the final answer through a series of small steps. Although rationales do not explicitly specify programs, they provide a scaffolding for their structure via intermediate milestones. To evaluate our approach, we have created a new 100,000-sample dataset of questions, answers and rationales. Experimental results show that indirect supervision of program learning via answer rationales is a promising strategy for inducing arithmetic programs.