Daily Papers

Large language models frequently encounter conflicts between their parametric knowledge and contextual input, often resulting in factual inconsistencies or hallucinations. We propose Self-Reflective Debate for Contextual Reliability (SR-DCR), a lightweight framework that integrates token-level self-confidence with an asymmetric multi-agent debate to adjudicate such conflicts. A critic, deprived of context, challenges a defender who argues from the given passage; a judge model evaluates the debate and determines the context's reliability. The final answer is selected by combining the verdict with model confidence. Experiments on the ClashEval benchmark demonstrate that SR-DCR consistently enhances robustness to misleading context while maintaining accuracy on trustworthy inputs, outperforming both classical debate and confidence-only baselines with minimal computational overhead. The code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/Self-Reflective-Debates.

The remarkable growth in large language model (LLM) capabilities has spurred exploration into multi-agent systems, with debate frameworks emerging as a promising avenue for enhanced problem-solving. These multi-agent debate (MAD) approaches, where agents collaboratively present, critique, and refine arguments, potentially offer improved reasoning, robustness, and diverse perspectives over monolithic models. Despite prior studies leveraging MAD, a systematic understanding of its effectiveness compared to self-agent methods, particularly under varying conditions, remains elusive. This paper seeks to fill this gap by conceptualizing MAD as a test-time computational scaling technique, distinguished by collaborative refinement and diverse exploration capabilities. We conduct a comprehensive empirical investigation comparing MAD with strong self-agent test-time scaling baselines on mathematical reasoning and safety-related tasks. Our study systematically examines the influence of task difficulty, model scale, and agent diversity on MAD's performance. Key findings reveal that, for mathematical reasoning, MAD offers limited advantages over self-agent scaling but becomes more effective with increased problem difficulty and decreased model capability, while agent diversity shows little benefit. Conversely, for safety tasks, MAD's collaborative refinement can increase vulnerability, but incorporating diverse agent configurations facilitates a gradual reduction in attack success through the collaborative refinement process. We believe our findings provide critical guidance for the future development of more effective and strategically deployed MAD systems.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in natural language generation but often confidently produce incorrect responses, especially in tasks like mathematical reasoning. Chain-of-thought prompting, self-verification, and multi-agent debate are among the strategies proposed to improve the reasoning and factual accuracy of LLMs. Building on Du et al.'s multi-agent debate framework, we find that multi-agent debate helps at any model scale, and that diversity of thought elicits stronger reasoning in debating LLMs. Across various model sizes, performance on mathematical reasoning tasks benefits most when diverse trained models are used. Remarkably, after 4 rounds of debate, a diverse set of medium-capacity models (Gemini-Pro, Mixtral 7BX8, and PaLM 2-M) outperforms GPT-4 on the GSM-8K benchmark, scoring 91% accuracy. By comparison, when 3 instances of Gemini-Pro are used, performance only reaches 82%. Finally, this diverse set of medium-capacity models sets a new state-of-the-art performance on the ASDiv benchmark (94%). These results underscore the idea that the future of AI is agentic, with diverse cooperating agents yielding emergent capabilities beyond even the most powerful individual models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have advanced autonomous agents' planning and decision-making, yet they struggle with complex tasks requiring diverse expertise and multi-step reasoning. Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) systems, introduced in NLP research, address this gap by enabling structured debates among LLM-based agents to refine solutions iteratively. MAD promotes divergent thinking through role-specific agents, dynamic interactions, and structured decision-making. Recognizing parallels between Software Engineering (SE) and collaborative human problem-solving, this study investigates MAD's effectiveness on two SE tasks. We adapt MAD systems from NLP, analyze agent interactions to assess consensus-building and iterative refinement, and propose two enhancements targeting observed weaknesses. Our findings show that structured debate and collaboration improve problem-solving and yield strong performance in some cases, highlighting MAD's potential for SE automation while identifying areas for exploration.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

Multi-agent AI systems can be used for simulating collective decision-making in scientific and practical applications. They can also be used to introduce a diverse group discussion step in chatbot pipelines, enhancing the cultural sensitivity of the chatbot's responses. These applications, however, are predicated on the ability of AI agents to reliably adopt assigned personas and mimic human interactions. To see whether LLM agents satisfy these requirements, we examine AI agent ensembles engaged in cross-national collaboration and debate by analyzing their private responses and chat transcripts. Our findings suggest that multi-agent discussions can support collective AI decisions that more often reflect diverse perspectives, yet this effect is tempered by the agents' susceptibility to conformity due to perceived peer pressure and occasional challenges in maintaining consistent personas and opinions. Instructions that encourage debate in support of one's opinions rather than collaboration increase the rate of inconstancy. Without addressing the factors we identify, the full potential of multi-agent frameworks for producing more culturally diverse AI outputs or more realistic simulations of group decision-making may remain untapped.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

In an era where single large language models have dominated the landscape of artificial intelligence for years, multi-agent systems arise as new protagonists in conversational task-solving. While previous studies have showcased their potential in reasoning tasks and creative endeavors, an analysis of their limitations concerning the conversational paradigms and the impact of individual agents is missing. It remains unascertained how multi-agent discussions perform across tasks of varying complexity and how the structure of these conversations influences the process. To fill that gap, this work systematically evaluates multi-agent systems across various discussion paradigms, assessing their strengths and weaknesses in both generative tasks and question-answering tasks. Alongside the experiments, I propose a taxonomy of 20 multi-agent research studies from 2022 to 2024, followed by the introduction of a framework for deploying multi-agent LLMs in conversational task-solving. I demonstrate that while multi-agent systems excel in complex reasoning tasks, outperforming a single model by leveraging expert personas, they fail on basic tasks. Concretely, I identify three challenges that arise: 1) While longer discussions enhance reasoning, agents fail to maintain conformity to strict task requirements, which leads to problem drift, making shorter conversations more effective for basic tasks. 2) Prolonged discussions risk alignment collapse, raising new safety concerns for these systems. 3) I showcase discussion monopolization through long generations, posing the problem of fairness in decision-making for tasks like summarization. This work uncovers both the potential and challenges that arise with multi-agent interaction and varying conversational paradigms, providing insights into how future research could improve the efficiency, performance, and safety of multi-agent LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

This paper presents a pilot study aimed at introducing multi-agent debate into multimodal reasoning. The study addresses two key challenges: the trivialization of opinions resulting from excessive summarization and the diversion of focus caused by distractor concepts introduced from images. These challenges stem from the inductive (bottom-up) nature of existing debating schemes. To address the issue, we propose a deductive (top-down) debating approach called Blueprint Debate on Graphs (BDoG). In BDoG, debates are confined to a blueprint graph to prevent opinion trivialization through world-level summarization. Moreover, by storing evidence in branches within the graph, BDoG mitigates distractions caused by frequent but irrelevant concepts. Extensive experiments validate that BDoG is able to achieve state-of-the-art results in ScienceQA and MMBench with significant improvements over previous methods. The source code can be accessed at https://github.com/thecharm/BDoG.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

This paper presents a simple, effective, and cost-efficient strategy to improve LLM performance by scaling test-time compute. Our strategy builds upon the repeated-sampling-then-voting framework, with a novel twist: incorporating multiple models, even weaker ones, to leverage their complementary strengths that potentially arise from diverse training data and paradigms. By using consistency as a signal, our strategy dynamically switches between models. Theoretical analysis highlights the efficiency and performance advantages of our strategy. Extensive experiments on six datasets demonstrate that our strategy not only outperforms self-consistency and state-of-the-art multi-agent debate approaches, but also significantly reduces inference costs. Additionally, ModelSwitch requires only a few comparable LLMs to achieve optimal performance and can be extended with verification methods, demonstrating the potential of leveraging multiple LLMs in the generation-verification paradigm.

Recent progress in LLMs discussion suggests that multi-agent discussion improves the reasoning abilities of LLMs. In this work, we reevaluate this claim through systematic experiments, where we propose a novel group discussion framework to enrich the set of discussion mechanisms. Interestingly, our results show that a single-agent LLM with strong prompts can achieve almost the same performance as the best existing discussion approach on a wide range of reasoning tasks and backbone LLMs. We observe that the multi-agent discussion performs better than a single agent only when there is no demonstration in the prompt. Further study reveals the common interaction mechanisms of LLMs during the discussion.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with complex reasoning tasks. Motivated by the society of minds (Minsky, 1988), we propose ReConcile, a multi-model multi-agent framework designed as a round table conference among diverse LLM agents to foster diverse thoughts and discussion for improved consensus. ReConcile enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by holding multiple rounds of discussion, learning to convince other agents to improve their answers, and employing a confidence-weighted voting mechanism. In each round, ReConcile initiates discussion between agents via a 'discussion prompt' that consists of (a) grouped answers and explanations generated by each agent in the previous round, (b) their uncertainties, and (c) demonstrations of answer-rectifying human explanations, used for convincing other agents. This discussion prompt enables each agent to revise their responses in light of insights from other agents. Once a consensus is reached and the discussion ends, ReConcile determines the final answer by leveraging the confidence of each agent in a weighted voting scheme. We implement ReConcile with ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude2 as the three agents. Our experimental results on various benchmarks demonstrate that ReConcile significantly enhances the reasoning performance of the agents (both individually and as a team), surpassing prior single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 7.7% and also outperforming GPT-4 on some of these datasets. We also experiment with GPT-4 itself as one of the agents in ReConcile and demonstrate that its initial performance also improves by absolute 10.0% through discussion and feedback from other agents. Finally, we also analyze the accuracy after every round and observe that ReConcile achieves better and faster consensus between agents, compared to a multi-agent debate baseline. Our code is available at: https://github.com/dinobby/ReConcile

Large language models (LLMs), while promising, face criticisms for biases, hallucinations, and a lack of reasoning capability. This paper introduces SocraSynth, a multi-LLM agent reasoning platform developed to mitigate these issues. SocraSynth utilizes conditional statistics and systematic context enhancement through continuous arguments, alongside adjustable debate contentiousness levels. The platform typically involves a human moderator and two LLM agents representing opposing viewpoints on a given subject. SocraSynth operates in two main phases: knowledge generation and reasoning evaluation. In the knowledge generation phase, the moderator defines the debate topic and contentiousness level, prompting the agents to formulate supporting arguments for their respective stances. The reasoning evaluation phase then employs Socratic reasoning and formal logic principles to appraise the quality of the arguments presented. The dialogue concludes with the moderator adjusting the contentiousness from confrontational to collaborative, gathering final, conciliatory remarks to aid in human reasoning and decision-making. Through case studies in three distinct application domains, this paper showcases SocraSynth's effectiveness in fostering rigorous research, dynamic reasoning, comprehensive assessment, and enhanced collaboration. This underscores the value of multi-agent interactions in leveraging LLMs for advanced knowledge extraction and decision-making support.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

Enabling effective collaboration among LLMs is a crucial step toward developing autonomous systems capable of solving complex problems. While LLMs are typically used as single-model generators, where humans critique and refine their outputs, the potential for jointly-trained collaborative models remains largely unexplored. Despite promising results in multi-agent communication and debate settings, little progress has been made in training models to work together on tasks. In this paper, we present a first step toward "Multi-agent LLM training" (MALT) on reasoning problems. Our approach employs a sequential multi-agent setup with heterogeneous LLMs assigned specialized roles: a generator, verifier, and refinement model iteratively solving problems. We propose a trajectory-expansion-based synthetic data generation process and a credit assignment strategy driven by joint outcome based rewards. This enables our post-training setup to utilize both positive and negative trajectories to autonomously improve each model's specialized capabilities as part of a joint sequential system. We evaluate our approach across MATH, GSM8k, and CQA, where MALT on Llama 3.1 8B models achieves relative improvements of 14.14%, 7.12%, and 9.40% respectively over the same baseline model. This demonstrates an early advance in multi-agent cooperative capabilities for performance on mathematical and common sense reasoning questions. More generally, our work provides a concrete direction for research around multi-agent LLM training approaches.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Large Language Model Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) have achieved great progress in solving complex tasks. It performs communication among agents within the system to collaboratively solve tasks, under the premise of shared information. However, when agents' communication is leveraged to enhance human cooperation, a new challenge arises due to information asymmetry, since each agent can only access the information of its human user. Previous MAS struggle to complete tasks under this condition. To address this, we propose a new MAS paradigm termed iAgents, which denotes Informative Multi-Agent Systems. In iAgents, the human social network is mirrored in the agent network, where agents proactively exchange human information necessary for task resolution, thereby overcoming information asymmetry. iAgents employs a novel agent reasoning mechanism, InfoNav, to navigate agents' communication towards effective information exchange. Together with InfoNav, iAgents organizes human information in a mixed memory to provide agents with accurate and comprehensive information for exchange. Additionally, we introduce InformativeBench, the first benchmark tailored for evaluating LLM agents' task-solving ability under information asymmetry. Experimental results show that iAgents can collaborate within a social network of 140 individuals and 588 relationships, autonomously communicate over 30 turns, and retrieve information from nearly 70,000 messages to complete tasks within 3 minutes.

Multimodal scientific problems (MSPs) involve complex issues that require the integration of multiple modalities, such as text and diagrams, presenting a significant challenge in artificial intelligence. While progress has been made in addressing traditional scientific problems, MSPs still face two primary issues: the challenge of multi-modal comprehensive reasoning in scientific problem-solving and the lack of reflective and rethinking capabilities. To address these issues, we introduce a Multi-Agent framework based on the Big Seven Personality and Socratic guidance (MAPS). This framework employs seven distinct agents that leverage feedback mechanisms and the Socratic method to guide the resolution of MSPs. To tackle the first issue, we propose a progressive four-agent solving strategy, where each agent focuses on a specific stage of the problem-solving process. For the second issue, we introduce a Critic agent, inspired by Socratic questioning, which prompts critical thinking and stimulates autonomous learning. We conduct extensive experiments on the EMMA, Olympiad, and MathVista datasets, achieving promising results that outperform the current SOTA model by 15.84% across all tasks. Meanwhile, the additional analytical experiments also verify the model's progress as well as generalization ability.

Progress in fields of machine learning and adversarial planning has benefited significantly from benchmark domains, from checkers and the classic UCI data sets to Go and Diplomacy. In sequential decision-making, agent evaluation has largely been restricted to few interactions against experts, with the aim to reach some desired level of performance (e.g. beating a human professional player). We propose a benchmark for multiagent learning based on repeated play of the simple game Rock, Paper, Scissors along with a population of forty-three tournament entries, some of which are intentionally sub-optimal. We describe metrics to measure the quality of agents based both on average returns and exploitability. We then show that several RL, online learning, and language model approaches can learn good counter-strategies and generalize well, but ultimately lose to the top-performing bots, creating an opportunity for research in multiagent learning.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in general natural language processing tasks but often fall short in complex reasoning tasks. Recent studies have explored human-like problem-solving strategies, such as self-correct, to push further the boundary of single-model reasoning ability. In this work, we let a single model "step outside the box" by engaging multiple models to correct each other. We introduce a multi-agent collaboration strategy that emulates the academic peer review process. Each agent independently constructs its own solution, provides reviews on the solutions of others, and assigns confidence levels to its reviews. Upon receiving peer reviews, agents revise their initial solutions. Extensive experiments on three different types of reasoning tasks show that our collaboration approach delivers superior accuracy across all ten datasets compared to existing methods. Further study underscores the effectiveness of integrating confidence in reviews, demonstrates the superiority of feedback exchange over mere solution sharing, and highlights the role of capability and diversity in fostering successful collaboration.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

The emergence of complex life on Earth is often attributed to the arms race that ensued from a huge number of organisms all competing for finite resources. We present an artificial intelligence research environment, inspired by the human game genre of MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, a.k.a. MMOs), that aims to simulate this setting in microcosm. As with MMORPGs and the real world alike, our environment is persistent and supports a large and variable number of agents. Our environment is well suited to the study of large-scale multiagent interaction: it requires that agents learn robust combat and navigation policies in the presence of large populations attempting to do the same. Baseline experiments reveal that population size magnifies and incentivizes the development of skillful behaviors and results in agents that outcompete agents trained in smaller populations. We further show that the policies of agents with unshared weights naturally diverge to fill different niches in order to avoid competition.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Progress in multiagent intelligence research is fundamentally limited by the number and quality of environments available for study. In recent years, simulated games have become a dominant research platform within reinforcement learning, in part due to their accessibility and interpretability. Previous works have targeted and demonstrated success on arcade, first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS), and massive online battle arena (MOBA) games. Our work considers massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs), which capture several complexities of real-world learning that are not well modeled by any other game genre. We present Neural MMO, a massively multiagent game environment inspired by MMOs and discuss our progress on two more general challenges in multiagent systems engineering for AI research: distributed infrastructure and game IO. We further demonstrate that standard policy gradient methods and simple baseline models can learn interesting emergent exploration and specialization behaviors in this setting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities as autonomous agents, yet existing benchmarks either focus on single-agent tasks or are confined to narrow domains, failing to capture the dynamics of multi-agent coordination and competition. In this paper, we introduce MultiAgentBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate LLM-based multi-agent systems across diverse, interactive scenarios. Our framework measures not only task completion but also the quality of collaboration and competition using novel, milestone-based key performance indicators. Moreover, we evaluate various coordination protocols (including star, chain, tree, and graph topologies) and innovative strategies such as group discussion and cognitive planning. Notably, gpt-4o-mini reaches the average highest task score, graph structure performs the best among coordination protocols in the research scenario, and cognitive planning improves milestone achievement rates by 3%. Code and datasets are public available at https://github.com/MultiagentBench/MARBLE.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional results on current benchmarks when working individually. The advancement in their capabilities, along with a reduction in parameter size and inference times, has facilitated the use of these models as agents, enabling interactions among multiple models to execute complex tasks. Such collaborations offer several advantages, including the use of specialized models (e.g. coding), improved confidence through multiple computations, and enhanced divergent thinking, leading to more diverse outputs. Thus, the collaborative use of language models is expected to grow significantly in the coming years. In this work, we evaluate the behavior of a network of models collaborating through debate under the influence of an adversary. We introduce pertinent metrics to assess the adversary's effectiveness, focusing on system accuracy and model agreement. Our findings highlight the importance of a model's persuasive ability in influencing others. Additionally, we explore inference-time methods to generate more compelling arguments and evaluate the potential of prompt-based mitigation as a defensive strategy.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning shines as the pinnacle of multi-agent systems, conquering intricate real-world challenges, fostering collaboration and coordination among agents, and unleashing the potential for intelligent decision-making across domains. However, training a multi-agent reinforcement learning network is a formidable endeavor, demanding substantial computational resources to interact with diverse environmental variables, extract state representations, and acquire decision-making knowledge. The recent breakthroughs in large-scale pre-trained models ignite our curiosity: Can we uncover shared knowledge in multi-agent reinforcement learning and leverage pre-trained models to expedite training for future tasks? Addressing this issue, we present an innovative multi-task learning approach that aims to extract and harness common decision-making knowledge, like cooperation and competition, across different tasks. Our approach involves concurrent training of multiple multi-agent tasks, with each task employing independent front-end perception layers while sharing back-end decision-making layers. This effective decoupling of state representation extraction from decision-making allows for more efficient training and better transferability. To evaluate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments in two distinct environments: the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) and the Google Research Football (GRF) environments. The experimental results unequivocally demonstrate the smooth transferability of the shared decision-making network to other tasks, thereby significantly reducing training costs and improving final performance. Furthermore, visualizations authenticate the presence of general multi-agent decision-making knowledge within the shared network layers, further validating the effectiveness of our approach.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We introduce an approach to evaluate language model (LM) agency using negotiation games. This approach better reflects real-world use cases and addresses some of the shortcomings of alternative LM benchmarks. Negotiation games enable us to study multi-turn, and cross-model interactions, modulate complexity, and side-step accidental evaluation data leakage. We use our approach to test six widely used and publicly accessible LMs, evaluating performance and alignment in both self-play and cross-play settings. Noteworthy findings include: (i) only closed-source models tested here were able to complete these tasks; (ii) cooperative bargaining games proved to be most challenging to the models; and (iii) even the most powerful models sometimes "lose" to weaker opponents

This paper explores existing works of multi-agent systems and identifies challenges that remain inadequately addressed. By leveraging the diverse capabilities and roles of individual agents within a multi-agent system, these systems can tackle complex tasks through collaboration. We discuss optimizing task allocation, fostering robust reasoning through iterative debates, managing complex and layered context information, and enhancing memory management to support the intricate interactions within multi-agent systems. We also explore the potential application of multi-agent systems in blockchain systems to shed light on their future development and application in real-world distributed systems.

One of the most challenging forms of misinformation involves the out-of-context (OOC) use of images paired with misleading text, creating false narratives. Existing AI-driven detection systems lack explainability and require expensive finetuning. We address these issues with LLM-Consensus, a multi-agent debate system for OOC misinformation detection. LLM-Consensus introduces a novel multi-agent debate framework where multimodal agents collaborate to assess contextual consistency and request external information to enhance cross-context reasoning and decision-making. Our framework enables explainable detection with state-of-the-art accuracy even without domain-specific fine-tuning. Extensive ablation studies confirm that external retrieval significantly improves detection accuracy, and user studies demonstrate that LLM-Consensus boosts performance for both experts and non-experts. These results position LLM-Consensus as a powerful tool for autonomous and citizen intelligence applications.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

Recent advances in large language models (LLM) have enabled richer social simulations, allowing for the study of various social phenomena with LLM-based agents. However, most work has used an omniscient perspective on these simulations (e.g., single LLM to generate all interlocutors), which is fundamentally at odds with the non-omniscient, information asymmetric interactions that humans have. To examine these differences, we develop an evaluation framework to simulate social interactions with LLMs in various settings (omniscient, non-omniscient). Our experiments show that interlocutors simulated omnisciently are much more successful at accomplishing social goals compared to non-omniscient agents, despite the latter being the more realistic setting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning from omniscient simulations improves the apparent naturalness of interactions but scarcely enhances goal achievement in cooperative scenarios. Our findings indicate that addressing information asymmetry remains a fundamental challenge for LLM-based agents.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

With recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs), Agentic AI has become phenomenal in real-world applications, moving toward multiple LLM-based agents to perceive, learn, reason, and act collaboratively. These LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) enable groups of intelligent agents to coordinate and solve complex tasks collectively at scale, transitioning from isolated models to collaboration-centric approaches. This work provides an extensive survey of the collaborative aspect of MASs and introduces an extensible framework to guide future research. Our framework characterizes collaboration mechanisms based on key dimensions: actors (agents involved), types (e.g., cooperation, competition, or coopetition), structures (e.g., peer-to-peer, centralized, or distributed), strategies (e.g., role-based or model-based), and coordination protocols. Through a review of existing methodologies, our findings serve as a foundation for demystifying and advancing LLM-based MASs toward more intelligent and collaborative solutions for complex, real-world use cases. In addition, various applications of MASs across diverse domains, including 5G/6G networks, Industry 5.0, question answering, and social and cultural settings, are also investigated, demonstrating their wider adoption and broader impacts. Finally, we identify key lessons learned, open challenges, and potential research directions of MASs towards artificial collective intelligence.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

AI has become pervasive in recent years, but state-of-the-art approaches predominantly neglect the need for AI systems to be contestable. Instead, contestability is advocated by AI guidelines (e.g. by the OECD) and regulation of automated decision-making (e.g. GDPR). In this position paper we explore how contestability can be achieved computationally in and for AI. We argue that contestable AI requires dynamic (human-machine and/or machine-machine) explainability and decision-making processes, whereby machines can (i) interact with humans and/or other machines to progressively explain their outputs and/or their reasoning as well as assess grounds for contestation provided by these humans and/or other machines, and (ii) revise their decision-making processes to redress any issues successfully raised during contestation. Given that much of the current AI landscape is tailored to static AIs, the need to accommodate contestability will require a radical rethinking, that, we argue, computational argumentation is ideally suited to support.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Large language models, employed as multiple agents that interact and collaborate with each other, have excelled at solving complex tasks. The agents are programmed with prompts that declare their functionality, along with the topologies that orchestrate interactions across agents. Designing prompts and topologies for multi-agent systems (MAS) is inherently complex. To automate the entire design process, we first conduct an in-depth analysis of the design space aiming to understand the factors behind building effective MAS. We reveal that prompts together with topologies play critical roles in enabling more effective MAS design. Based on the insights, we propose Multi-Agent System Search (MASS), a MAS optimization framework that efficiently exploits the complex MAS design space by interleaving its optimization stages, from local to global, from prompts to topologies, over three stages: 1) block-level (local) prompt optimization; 2) workflow topology optimization; 3) workflow-level (global) prompt optimization, where each stage is conditioned on the iteratively optimized prompts/topologies from former stages. We show that MASS-optimized multi-agent systems outperform a spectrum of existing alternatives by a substantial margin. Based on the MASS-found systems, we finally propose design principles behind building effective multi-agent systems.

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have marked a significant advancement in the field of natural language processing, demonstrating exceptional capabilities in reasoning, tool usage, and memory. As their applications extend into multi-agent environments, a need has arisen for a comprehensive evaluation framework that captures their abilities in reasoning, planning, collaboration, and more. This work introduces a novel benchmarking framework specifically tailored to assess LLMs within multi-agent settings, providing quantitative metrics to evaluate their judgment, reasoning, deception, self-awareness, cooperation, coordination, and rationality. We utilize games such as Chameleon and Undercover, alongside game theory scenarios like Cost Sharing, Multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma, and Public Good, to create diverse testing environments. Our framework is fortified with the Probabilistic Graphical Modeling (PGM) method, enhancing the LLMs' capabilities in navigating complex social and cognitive dimensions. The benchmark evaluates seven multi-agent systems powered by different LLMs, quantitatively highlighting a significant capability gap over threefold between the strongest, GPT-4, and the weakest, Llama-2-70B. It also confirms that our PGM enhancement boosts the inherent abilities of all selected models by 50% on average. Our codes are released here https://github.com/cathyxl/MAgIC.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) based Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) has recently gained attention due to its efficiency and scalability. Several MARL-MAPF methods choose to use communication to enrich the information one agent can perceive. However, existing works still struggle in structured environments with high obstacle density and a high number of agents. To further improve the performance of the communication-based MARL-MAPF solvers, we propose a new method, Ensembling Prioritized Hybrid Policies (EPH). We first propose a selective communication block to gather richer information for better agent coordination within multi-agent environments and train the model with a Q learning-based algorithm. We further introduce three advanced inference strategies aimed at bolstering performance during the execution phase. First, we hybridize the neural policy with single-agent expert guidance for navigating conflict-free zones. Secondly, we propose Q value-based methods for prioritized resolution of conflicts as well as deadlock situations. Finally, we introduce a robust ensemble method that can efficiently collect the best out of multiple possible solutions. We empirically evaluate EPH in complex multi-agent environments and demonstrate competitive performance against state-of-the-art neural methods for MAPF. We open-source our code at https://github.com/ai4co/eph-mapf.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

Text evaluation has historically posed significant challenges, often demanding substantial labor and time cost. With the emergence of large language models (LLMs), researchers have explored LLMs' potential as alternatives for human evaluation. While these single-agent-based approaches show promise, experimental results suggest that further advancements are needed to bridge the gap between their current effectiveness and human-level evaluation quality. Recognizing that best practices of human evaluation processes often involve multiple human annotators collaborating in the evaluation, we resort to a multi-agent debate framework, moving beyond single-agent prompting strategies. The multi-agent-based approach enables a group of LLMs to synergize with an array of intelligent counterparts, harnessing their distinct capabilities and expertise to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in handling intricate tasks. In this paper, we construct a multi-agent referee team called ChatEval to autonomously discuss and evaluate the quality of generated responses from different models on open-ended questions and traditional natural language generation (NLG) tasks. Our analysis shows that ChatEval transcends mere textual scoring, offering a human-mimicking evaluation process for reliable assessments. Our code is available at https://github.com/chanchimin/ChatEval.

As Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems are increasingly employed in intricate social environments, a pressing query emerges: Can these NLP systems mirror human-esque collaborative intelligence, in a multi-agent society consisting of multiple large language models (LLMs)? This paper probes the collaboration mechanisms among contemporary NLP systems by melding practical experiments with theoretical insights. We fabricate four unique `societies' comprised of LLM agents, where each agent is characterized by a specific `trait' (easy-going or overconfident) and engages in collaboration with a distinct `thinking pattern' (debate or reflection). Evaluating these multi-agent societies on three benchmark datasets, we discern that LLM agents navigate tasks by leveraging diverse social behaviors, from active debates to introspective reflections. Notably, certain collaborative strategies only optimize efficiency (using fewer API tokens), but also outshine previous top-tier approaches. Moreover, our results further illustrate that LLM agents manifest human-like social behaviors, such as conformity or majority rule, mirroring foundational Social Psychology theories. In conclusion, we integrate insights from Social Psychology to contextualize the collaboration of LLM agents, inspiring further investigations into the collaboration mechanism for LLMs. We commit to sharing our code and datasets (already submitted in supplementary materials), hoping to catalyze further research in this promising avenue (All code and data are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/MachineSoM.).

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

Recent advances in LLMs have enabled their use as autonomous agents across a range of tasks, yet they continue to struggle with formulating and adhering to coherent long-term strategies. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM agents can self-improve when placed in environments that explicitly challenge their strategic planning abilities. Using the board game Settlers of Catan, accessed through the open-source Catanatron framework, we benchmark a progression of LLM-based agents, from a simple game-playing agent to systems capable of autonomously rewriting their own prompts and their player agent's code. We introduce a multi-agent architecture in which specialized roles (Analyzer, Researcher, Coder, and Player) collaborate to iteratively analyze gameplay, research new strategies, and modify the agent's logic or prompt. By comparing manually crafted agents to those evolved entirely by LLMs, we evaluate how effectively these systems can diagnose failure and adapt over time. Our results show that self-evolving agents, particularly when powered by models like Claude 3.7 and GPT-4o, outperform static baselines by autonomously adopting their strategies, passing along sample behavior to game-playing agents, and demonstrating adaptive reasoning over multiple iterations.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

This paper introduces Multi-Agent MDP Homomorphic Networks, a class of networks that allows distributed execution using only local information, yet is able to share experience between global symmetries in the joint state-action space of cooperative multi-agent systems. In cooperative multi-agent systems, complex symmetries arise between different configurations of the agents and their local observations. For example, consider a group of agents navigating: rotating the state globally results in a permutation of the optimal joint policy. Existing work on symmetries in single agent reinforcement learning can only be generalized to the fully centralized setting, because such approaches rely on the global symmetry in the full state-action spaces, and these can result in correspondences across agents. To encode such symmetries while still allowing distributed execution we propose a factorization that decomposes global symmetries into local transformations. Our proposed factorization allows for distributing the computation that enforces global symmetries over local agents and local interactions. We introduce a multi-agent equivariant policy network based on this factorization. We show empirically on symmetric multi-agent problems that globally symmetric distributable policies improve data efficiency compared to non-equivariant baselines.

We consider the problem of team formation within multiagent adversarial games. We propose BERTeam, a novel algorithm that uses a transformer-based deep neural network with Masked Language Model training to select the best team of players from a trained population. We integrate this with coevolutionary deep reinforcement learning, which trains a diverse set of individual players to choose teams from. We test our algorithm in the multiagent adversarial game Marine Capture-The-Flag, and we find that BERTeam learns non-trivial team compositions that perform well against unseen opponents. For this game, we find that BERTeam outperforms MCAA, an algorithm that similarly optimizes team formation.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

Pioneering advancements in large language model-powered agents have underscored the design pattern of multi-agent collaboration, demonstrating that collective intelligence can surpass the capabilities of each individual. Inspired by the neural scaling law, which posits that increasing neurons leads to emergent abilities, this study investigates whether a similar principle applies to increasing agents in multi-agent collaboration. Technically, we propose multi-agent collaboration networks (MacNet), which utilize directed acyclic graphs to organize agents and streamline their interactive reasoning via topological ordering, with solutions derived from their dialogues. Extensive experiments show that MacNet consistently outperforms baseline models, enabling effective agent collaboration across various network topologies and supporting cooperation among more than a thousand agents. Notably, we observed a small-world collaboration phenomenon, where topologies resembling small-world properties achieved superior performance. Additionally, we identified a collaborative scaling law, indicating that normalized solution quality follows a logistic growth pattern as scaling agents, with collaborative emergence occurring much earlier than previously observed instances of neural emergence. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/OpenBMB/ChatDev.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Many challenging tasks such as managing traffic systems, electricity grids, or supply chains involve complex decision-making processes that must balance multiple conflicting objectives and coordinate the actions of various independent decision-makers (DMs). One perspective for formalising and addressing such tasks is multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL). MOMARL broadens reinforcement learning (RL) to problems with multiple agents each needing to consider multiple objectives in their learning process. In reinforcement learning research, benchmarks are crucial in facilitating progress, evaluation, and reproducibility. The significance of benchmarks is underscored by the existence of numerous benchmark frameworks developed for various RL paradigms, including single-agent RL (e.g., Gymnasium), multi-agent RL (e.g., PettingZoo), and single-agent multi-objective RL (e.g., MO-Gymnasium). To support the advancement of the MOMARL field, we introduce MOMAland, the first collection of standardised environments for multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning. MOMAland addresses the need for comprehensive benchmarking in this emerging field, offering over 10 diverse environments that vary in the number of agents, state representations, reward structures, and utility considerations. To provide strong baselines for future research, MOMAland also includes algorithms capable of learning policies in such settings.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across a wide array of tasks. Due to the impressive planning and reasoning abilities of LLMs, they have been used as autonomous agents to do many tasks automatically. Recently, based on the development of using one LLM as a single planning or decision-making agent, LLM-based multi-agent systems have achieved considerable progress in complex problem-solving and world simulation. To provide the community with an overview of this dynamic field, we present this survey to offer an in-depth discussion on the essential aspects of multi-agent systems based on LLMs, as well as the challenges. Our goal is for readers to gain substantial insights on the following questions: What domains and environments do LLM-based multi-agents simulate? How are these agents profiled and how do they communicate? What mechanisms contribute to the growth of agents' capacities? For those interested in delving into this field of study, we also summarize the commonly used datasets or benchmarks for them to have convenient access. To keep researchers updated on the latest studies, we maintain an open-source GitHub repository, dedicated to outlining the research on LLM-based multi-agent systems.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

Despite growing enthusiasm for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to accomplish tasks, their performance gains across popular benchmarks remain minimal compared to single-agent frameworks. This gap highlights the need to analyze the challenges hindering MAS effectiveness. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study of MAS challenges. We analyze five popular MAS frameworks across over 150 tasks, involving six expert human annotators. We identify 14 unique failure modes and propose a comprehensive taxonomy applicable to various MAS frameworks. This taxonomy emerges iteratively from agreements among three expert annotators per study, achieving a Cohen's Kappa score of 0.88. These fine-grained failure modes are organized into 3 categories, (i) specification and system design failures, (ii) inter-agent misalignment, and (iii) task verification and termination. To support scalable evaluation, we integrate MASFT with LLM-as-a-Judge. We also explore if identified failures could be easily prevented by proposing two interventions: improved specification of agent roles and enhanced orchestration strategies. Our findings reveal that identified failures require more complex solutions, highlighting a clear roadmap for future research. We open-source our dataset and LLM annotator.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Deep reinforcement learning has emerged as a powerful tool for obtaining high-performance policies. However, the safety of these policies has been a long-standing issue. One promising paradigm to guarantee safety is a shield, which shields a policy from making unsafe actions. However, computing a shield scales exponentially in the number of state variables. This is a particular concern in multi-agent systems with many agents. In this work, we propose a novel approach for multi-agent shielding. We address scalability by computing individual shields for each agent. The challenge is that typical safety specifications are global properties, but the shields of individual agents only ensure local properties. Our key to overcome this challenge is to apply assume-guarantee reasoning. Specifically, we present a sound proof rule that decomposes a (global, complex) safety specification into (local, simple) obligations for the shields of the individual agents. Moreover, we show that applying the shields during reinforcement learning significantly improves the quality of the policies obtained for a given training budget. We demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our multi-agent shielding framework in two case studies, reducing the computation time from hours to seconds and achieving fast learning convergence.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models (LLMs) offer a promising path toward solving complex, real-world tasks that single-agent systems often struggle to manage. While recent advancements in test-time scaling (TTS) have significantly improved single-agent performance on challenging reasoning tasks, how to effectively scale collaboration and reasoning in MAS remains an open question. In this work, we introduce an adaptive multi-agent framework designed to enhance collaborative reasoning through both model-level training and system-level coordination. We construct M500, a high-quality dataset containing 500 multi-agent collaborative reasoning traces, and fine-tune Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct on this dataset to produce M1-32B, a model optimized for multi-agent collaboration. To further enable adaptive reasoning, we propose a novel CEO agent that dynamically manages the discussion process, guiding agent collaboration and adjusting reasoning depth for more effective problem-solving. Evaluated in an open-source MAS across a range of tasks-including general understanding, mathematical reasoning, and coding-our system significantly outperforms strong baselines. For instance, M1-32B achieves 12% improvement on GPQA-Diamond, 41% on AIME2024, and 10% on MBPP-Sanitized, matching the performance of state-of-the-art models like DeepSeek-R1 on some tasks. These results highlight the importance of both learned collaboration and adaptive coordination in scaling multi-agent reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/jincan333/MAS-TTS

Message passing graph neural networks (GNNs) would appear to be powerful tools to learn distributed algorithms via gradient descent, but generate catastrophically incorrect predictions when nodes update asynchronously during inference. This failure under asynchrony effectively excludes these architectures from many potential applications, such as learning local communication policies between resource-constrained agents in, e.g., robotic swarms or sensor networks. In this work we explore why this failure occurs in common GNN architectures, and identify "implicitly-defined" GNNs as a class of architectures which is provably robust to partially asynchronous "hogwild" inference, adapting convergence guarantees from work in asynchronous and distributed optimization, e.g., Bertsekas (1982); Niu et al. (2011). We then propose a novel implicitly-defined GNN architecture, which we call an energy GNN. We show that this architecture outperforms other GNNs from this class on a variety of synthetic tasks inspired by multi-agent systems, and achieves competitive performance on real-world datasets.

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

Multi-agent systems (MAS) leveraging the impressive capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) hold significant potential for tackling complex tasks. However, most current MAS depend on manually designed agent roles and communication protocols. These manual designs often fail to align with the underlying LLMs' strengths and struggle to adapt to novel tasks. Recent automatic MAS approaches attempt to mitigate these limitations but typically necessitate a validation set for tuning and yield static MAS designs lacking adaptability during inference. We introduce MAS-ZERO, the first self-evolved, inference-time framework for automatic MAS design. MAS-ZERO employs meta-level design to iteratively generate, evaluate, and refine MAS configurations tailored to each problem instance, without requiring a validation set. Critically, it enables dynamic agent composition and problem decomposition through meta-feedback on solvability and completeness. Experiments across math, graduate-level QA, and software engineering benchmarks, using both closed-source and open-source LLM backbones of varying sizes, demonstrate that MAS-ZERO outperforms both manual and automatic MAS baselines, achieving a 7.44% average accuracy improvement over the next strongest baseline while maintaining cost-efficiency. These findings underscore the promise of meta-level self-evolved design for creating effective and adaptive MAS.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has recently excelled in solving challenging cooperative and competitive multi-agent problems in various environments with, mostly, few agents and full observability. Moreover, a range of crucial robotics-related tasks, such as multi-robot navigation and obstacle avoidance, that have been conventionally approached with the classical non-learnable methods (e.g., heuristic search) is currently suggested to be solved by the learning-based or hybrid methods. Still, in this domain, it is hard, not to say impossible, to conduct a fair comparison between classical, learning-based, and hybrid approaches due to the lack of a unified framework that supports both learning and evaluation. To this end, we introduce POGEMA, a set of comprehensive tools that includes a fast environment for learning, a generator of problem instances, the collection of pre-defined ones, a visualization toolkit, and a benchmarking tool that allows automated evaluation. We introduce and specify an evaluation protocol defining a range of domain-related metrics computed on the basics of the primary evaluation indicators (such as success rate and path length), allowing a fair multi-fold comparison. The results of such a comparison, which involves a variety of state-of-the-art MARL, search-based, and hybrid methods, are presented.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

This paper introduces a new environment LLM-PySC2 (the Large Language Model StarCraft II Learning Environment), a platform derived from DeepMind's StarCraft II Learning Environment that serves to develop Large Language Models (LLMs) based decision-making methodologies. This environment is the first to offer the complete StarCraft II action space, multi-modal observation interfaces, and a structured game knowledge database, which are seamlessly connected with various LLMs to facilitate the research of LLMs-based decision-making. To further support multi-agent research, we developed an LLM collaborative framework that supports multi-agent concurrent queries and multi-agent communication. In our experiments, the LLM-PySC2 environment is adapted to be compatible with the StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC) task group and provided eight new scenarios focused on macro-decision abilities. We evaluated nine mainstream LLMs in the experiments, and results show that sufficient parameters are necessary for LLMs to make decisions, but improving reasoning ability does not directly lead to better decision-making outcomes. Our findings further indicate the importance of enabling large models to learn autonomously in the deployment environment through parameter training or train-free learning techniques. Ultimately, we expect that the LLM-PySC2 environment can promote research on learning methods for LLMs, helping LLM-based methods better adapt to task scenarios.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their finetuning strategies has triggered the renewed interests in multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this paper, we introduce a focal diversity-optimized multi-agent reinforcement learning approach, coined as MARL-Focal, with three unique characteristics. First, we develop an agent-fusion framework for encouraging multiple LLM based agents to collaborate in producing the final inference output for each LLM query. Second, we develop a focal-diversity optimized agent selection algorithm that can choose a small subset of the available agents based on how well they can complement one another to generate the query output. Finally, we design a conflict-resolution method to detect output inconsistency among multiple agents and produce our MARL-Focal output through reward-aware and policy-adaptive inference fusion. Extensive evaluations on five benchmarks show that MARL-Focal is cost-efficient and adversarial-robust. Our multi-agent fusion model achieves performance improvement of 5.51\% compared to the best individual LLM-agent and offers stronger robustness over the TruthfulQA benchmark. Code is available at https://github.com/sftekin/rl-focal

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

The generalization of decision-making agents encompasses two fundamental elements: learning from past experiences and reasoning in novel contexts. However, the predominant emphasis in most interactive environments is on learning, often at the expense of complexity in reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CivRealm, an environment inspired by the Civilization game. Civilization's profound alignment with human history and society necessitates sophisticated learning, while its ever-changing situations demand strong reasoning to generalize. Particularly, CivRealm sets up an imperfect-information general-sum game with a changing number of players; it presents a plethora of complex features, challenging the agent to deal with open-ended stochastic environments that require diplomacy and negotiation skills. Within CivRealm, we provide interfaces for two typical agent types: tensor-based agents that focus on learning, and language-based agents that emphasize reasoning. To catalyze further research, we present initial results for both paradigms. The canonical RL-based agents exhibit reasonable performance in mini-games, whereas both RL- and LLM-based agents struggle to make substantial progress in the full game. Overall, CivRealm stands as a unique learning and reasoning challenge for decision-making agents. The code is available at https://github.com/bigai-ai/civrealm.

Large language models (LLMs) are often praised for exhibiting near-human performance on a wide range of tasks and valued for their ability to hold a general conversation. The rise of agentic AI systems is, however, ushering in a mass of applications in which language models perform a small number of specialized tasks repetitively and with little variation. Here we lay out the position that small language models (SLMs) are sufficiently powerful, inherently more suitable, and necessarily more economical for many invocations in agentic systems, and are therefore the future of agentic AI. Our argumentation is grounded in the current level of capabilities exhibited by SLMs, the common architectures of agentic systems, and the economy of LM deployment. We further argue that in situations where general-purpose conversational abilities are essential, heterogeneous agentic systems (i.e., agents invoking multiple different models) are the natural choice. We discuss the potential barriers for the adoption of SLMs in agentic systems and outline a general LLM-to-SLM agent conversion algorithm. Our position, formulated as a value statement, highlights the significance of the operational and economic impact even a partial shift from LLMs to SLMs is to have on the AI agent industry. We aim to stimulate the discussion on the effective use of AI resources and hope to advance the efforts to lower the costs of AI of the present day. Calling for both contributions to and critique of our position, we commit to publishing all such correspondence at https://research.nvidia.com/labs/lpr/slm-agents.

The remarkable progress in Large Language Models (LLMs) opens up new avenues for addressing planning and decision-making problems in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). However, as the number of agents increases, the issues of hallucination in LLMs and coordination in MAS have become increasingly prominent. Additionally, the efficient utilization of tokens emerges as a critical consideration when employing LLMs to facilitate the interactions among a substantial number of agents. In this paper, we develop a modular framework called LLaMAC to mitigate these challenges. LLaMAC implements a value distribution encoding similar to that found in the human brain, utilizing internal and external feedback mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and iterative reasoning among its modules. Through evaluations involving system resource allocation and robot grid transportation, we demonstrate the considerable advantages afforded by our proposed approach.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

In this paper, we propose a framework for solving a single-agent task by using multiple agents, each focusing on different aspects of the task. This approach has two main advantages: 1) it allows for training specialized agents on different parts of the task, and 2) it provides a new way to transfer knowledge, by transferring trained agents. Our framework generalizes the traditional hierarchical decomposition, in which, at any moment in time, a single agent has control until it has solved its particular subtask. We illustrate our framework with empirical experiments on two domains.

Probabilistic model checking is a technique for formal automated reasoning about software or hardware systems that operate in the context of uncertainty or stochasticity. It builds upon ideas and techniques from a diverse range of fields, from logic, automata and graph theory, to optimisation, numerical methods and control. In recent years, probabilistic model checking has also been extended to integrate ideas from game theory, notably using models such as stochastic games and solution concepts such as equilibria, to formally verify the interaction of multiple rational agents with distinct objectives. This provides a means to reason flexibly about agents acting in either an adversarial or a collaborative fashion, and opens up opportunities to tackle new problems within, for example, artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems. In this paper, we summarise some of the advances in this area, and highlight applications for which they have already been used. We discuss how the strengths of probabilistic model checking apply, or have the potential to apply, to the multi-agent setting and outline some of the key challenges required to make further progress in this field.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

While significant advances have been made for single-agent perception, many applications require multiple sensing agents and cross-agent communication due to benefits such as coverage and robustness. It is therefore critical to develop frameworks which support multi-agent collaborative perception in a distributed and bandwidth-efficient manner. In this paper, we address the collaborative perception problem, where one agent is required to perform a perception task and can communicate and share information with other agents on the same task. Specifically, we propose a communication framework by learning both to construct communication groups and decide when to communicate. We demonstrate the generalizability of our framework on two different perception tasks and show that it significantly reduces communication bandwidth while maintaining superior performance.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Agentic workflows -- where multiple large language model (LLM) instances interact to solve tasks -- are increasingly built on feedback mechanisms, where one model evaluates and critiques another. Despite the promise of feedback-driven improvement, the stability of agentic workflows rests on the reliability of the judge. However, judges may hallucinate information, exhibit bias, or act adversarially -- introducing critical vulnerabilities into the workflow. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of agentic workflows under deceptive or misleading feedback. We introduce a two-dimensional framework for analyzing judge behavior, along axes of intent (from constructive to malicious) and knowledge (from parametric-only to retrieval-augmented systems). Using this taxonomy, we construct a suite of judge behaviors and develop WAFER-QA, a new benchmark with critiques grounded in retrieved web evidence to evaluate robustness of agentic workflows against factually supported adversarial feedback. We reveal that even strongest agents are vulnerable to persuasive yet flawed critiques -- often switching correct answers after a single round of misleading feedback. Taking a step further, we study how model predictions evolve over multiple rounds of interaction, revealing distinct behavioral patterns between reasoning and non-reasoning models. Our findings highlight fundamental vulnerabilities in feedback-based workflows and offer guidance for building more robust agentic systems.

LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems ( LLM-MAS ) have become a research hotspot since the rise of large language models (LLMs). However, with the continuous influx of new related works, the existing reviews struggle to capture them comprehensively. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of these studies. We first discuss the definition of LLM-MAS, a framework encompassing much of previous work. We provide an overview of the various applications of LLM-MAS in (i) solving complex tasks, (ii) simulating specific scenarios, and (iii) evaluating generative agents. Building on previous studies, we also highlight several challenges and propose future directions for research in this field.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Large language models and autonomous AI agents have evolved rapidly, resulting in a diverse array of evaluation benchmarks, frameworks, and collaboration protocols. However, the landscape remains fragmented and lacks a unified taxonomy or comprehensive survey. Therefore, we present a side-by-side comparison of benchmarks developed between 2019 and 2025 that evaluate these models and agents across multiple domains. In addition, we propose a taxonomy of approximately 60 benchmarks that cover general and academic knowledge reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, code generation and software engineering, factual grounding and retrieval, domain-specific evaluations, multimodal and embodied tasks, task orchestration, and interactive assessments. Furthermore, we review AI-agent frameworks introduced between 2023 and 2025 that integrate large language models with modular toolkits to enable autonomous decision-making and multi-step reasoning. Moreover, we present real-world applications of autonomous AI agents in materials science, biomedical research, academic ideation, software engineering, synthetic data generation, chemical reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, geographic information systems, multimedia, healthcare, and finance. We then survey key agent-to-agent collaboration protocols, namely the Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), the Model Context Protocol (MCP), and the Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A). Finally, we discuss recommendations for future research, focusing on advanced reasoning strategies, failure modes in multi-agent LLM systems, automated scientific discovery, dynamic tool integration via reinforcement learning, integrated search capabilities, and security vulnerabilities in agent protocols.

We introduce a novel large language model (LLM)-driven agent framework, which iteratively refines queries and filters contextual evidence by leveraging dynamically evolving knowledge. A defining feature of the system is its decoupling of external sources from an internal knowledge cache that is progressively updated to guide both query generation and evidence selection. This design mitigates bias-reinforcement loops and enables dynamic, trackable search exploration paths, thereby optimizing the trade-off between exploring diverse information and maintaining accuracy through autonomous agent decision-making. Our approach is evaluated on a broad range of open-domain question answering benchmarks, including multi-step tasks that mirror real-world scenarios where integrating information from multiple sources is critical, especially given the vulnerabilities of LLMs that lack explicit reasoning or planning capabilities. The results show that the proposed system not only outperforms single-step baselines regardless of task difficulty but also, compared to conventional iterative retrieval methods, demonstrates pronounced advantages in complex tasks through precise evidence-based reasoning and enhanced efficiency. The proposed system supports both competitive and collaborative sharing of updated context, enabling multi-agent extension. The benefits of multi-agent configurations become especially prominent as task difficulty increases. The number of convergence steps scales with task difficulty, suggesting cost-effective scalability.

Over the past decades, superplatforms, digital companies that integrate a vast range of third-party services and applications into a single, unified ecosystem, have built their fortunes on monopolizing user attention through targeted advertising and algorithmic content curation. Yet the emergence of AI agents driven by large language models (LLMs) threatens to upend this business model. Agents can not only free user attention with autonomy across diverse platforms and therefore bypass the user-attention-based monetization, but might also become the new entrance for digital traffic. Hence, we argue that superplatforms have to attack AI agents to defend their centralized control of digital traffic entrance. Specifically, we analyze the fundamental conflict between user-attention-based monetization and agent-driven autonomy through the lens of our gatekeeping theory. We show how AI agents can disintermediate superplatforms and potentially become the next dominant gatekeepers, thereby forming the urgent necessity for superplatforms to proactively constrain and attack AI agents. Moreover, we go through the potential technologies for superplatform-initiated attacks, covering a brand-new, unexplored technical area with unique challenges. We have to emphasize that, despite our position, this paper does not advocate for adversarial attacks by superplatforms on AI agents, but rather offers an envisioned trend to highlight the emerging tensions between superplatforms and AI agents. Our aim is to raise awareness and encourage critical discussion for collaborative solutions, prioritizing user interests and perserving the openness of digital ecosystems in the age of AI agents.

Scaling laws for inference compute in multi-agent systems remain under-explored compared to single-agent scenarios. This work aims to bridge this gap by investigating the problem of data synthesis through multi-agent sampling, where synthetic responses are generated by sampling from multiple distinct language models. Effective model coordination is crucial for successful multi-agent collaboration. Unlike previous approaches that rely on fixed workflows, we treat model coordination as a multi-step decision-making process, optimizing generation structures dynamically for each input question. We introduce Tree Search-based Orchestrated Agents~(TOA), where the workflow evolves iteratively during the sequential sampling process. To achieve this, we leverage Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), integrating a reward model to provide real-time feedback and accelerate exploration. Our experiments on alignment, machine translation, and mathematical reasoning demonstrate that multi-agent sampling significantly outperforms single-agent sampling as inference compute scales. TOA is the most compute-efficient approach, achieving SOTA performance on WMT and a 71.8\% LC win rate on AlpacaEval. Moreover, fine-tuning with our synthesized alignment data surpasses strong preference learning methods on challenging benchmarks such as Arena-Hard and AlpacaEval.

Can we avoid wars at the crossroads of history? This question has been pursued by individuals, scholars, policymakers, and organizations throughout human history. In this research, we attempt to answer the question based on the recent advances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Large Language Models (LLMs). We propose WarAgent, an LLM-powered multi-agent AI system, to simulate the participating countries, their decisions, and the consequences, in historical international conflicts, including the World War I (WWI), the World War II (WWII), and the Warring States Period (WSP) in Ancient China. By evaluating the simulation effectiveness, we examine the advancements and limitations of cutting-edge AI systems' abilities in studying complex collective human behaviors such as international conflicts under diverse settings. In these simulations, the emergent interactions among agents also offer a novel perspective for examining the triggers and conditions that lead to war. Our findings offer data-driven and AI-augmented insights that can redefine how we approach conflict resolution and peacekeeping strategies. The implications stretch beyond historical analysis, offering a blueprint for using AI to understand human history and possibly prevent future international conflicts. Code and data are available at https://github.com/agiresearch/WarAgent.

Recent advancements in LLM-based multi-agent (LLM-MA) systems have shown promise, yet significant challenges remain in managing communication and refinement when agents collaborate on complex tasks. In this paper, we propose Talk Structurally, Act Hierarchically (TalkHier), a novel framework that introduces a structured communication protocol for context-rich exchanges and a hierarchical refinement system to address issues such as incorrect outputs, falsehoods, and biases. TalkHier surpasses various types of SoTA, including inference scaling model (OpenAI-o1), open-source multi-agent models (e.g., AgentVerse), and majority voting strategies on current LLM and single-agent baselines (e.g., ReAct, GPT4o), across diverse tasks, including open-domain question answering, domain-specific selective questioning, and practical advertisement text generation. These results highlight its potential to set a new standard for LLM-MA systems, paving the way for more effective, adaptable, and collaborative multi-agent frameworks. The code is available https://github.com/sony/talkhier.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning in the setting of episodic Markov decision processes, where multiple agents cooperate via communication through a central server. We propose a provably efficient algorithm based on value iteration that enable asynchronous communication while ensuring the advantage of cooperation with low communication overhead. With linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithm enjoys an mathcal{O}(d^{3/2}H^2K) regret with mathcal{O}(dHM^2) communication complexity, where d is the feature dimension, H is the horizon length, M is the total number of agents, and K is the total number of episodes. We also provide a lower bound showing that a minimal Omega(dM) communication complexity is required to improve the performance through collaboration.

Games have been vital test beds for the rapid development of Agent-based research. Remarkable progress has been achieved in the past, but it is unclear if the findings equip for real-world problems. While pressure grows, some of the most critical ecological challenges can find mitigation and prevention solutions through technology and its applications. Most real-world domains include multi-agent scenarios and require machine-machine and human-machine collaboration. Open-source environments have not advanced and are often toy scenarios, too abstract or not suitable for multi-agent research. By mimicking real-world problems and increasing the complexity of environments, we hope to advance state-of-the-art multi-agent research and inspire researchers to work on immediate real-world problems. Here, we present HIVEX, an environment suite to benchmark multi-agent research focusing on ecological challenges. HIVEX includes the following environments: Wind Farm Control, Wildfire Resource Management, Drone-Based Reforestation, Ocean Plastic Collection, and Aerial Wildfire Suppression. We provide environments, training examples, and baselines for the main and sub-tasks. All trained models resulting from the experiments of this work are hosted on Hugging Face. We also provide a leaderboard on Hugging Face and encourage the community to submit models trained on our environment suite.

Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

This paper introduces a simulator designed for opinion dynamics researchers to model competing influences within social networks in the presence of LLM-based agents. By integrating established opinion dynamics principles with state-of-the-art LLMs, this tool enables the study of influence propagation and counter-misinformation strategies. The simulator is particularly valuable for researchers in social science, psychology, and operations research, allowing them to analyse societal phenomena without requiring extensive coding expertise. Additionally, the simulator will be openly available on GitHub, ensuring accessibility and adaptability for those who wish to extend its capabilities for their own research.

LLM-based agents have made significant advancements in interactive environments, such as mobile operations and web browsing, and other domains beyond computer using. Current multi-agent systems universally excel in performance, compared to single agents, but struggle with generalization across environments due to predefined roles and inadequate strategies for generalizing language agents. The challenge of achieving both strong performance and good generalization has hindered the progress of multi-agent systems for interactive environments. To address these issues, we propose CollabUIAgents, a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework with a novel multi-agent credit re-assignment (CR) strategy, assigning process rewards with LLMs rather than environment-specific rewards and learning with synthesized preference data, in order to foster generalizable, collaborative behaviors among the role-free agents' policies. Empirical results show that our framework improves both performance and cross-environment generalizability of multi-agent systems. Moreover, our 7B-parameter system achieves results on par with or exceed strong closed-source models, and the LLM that guides the CR. We also provide insights in using granular CR rewards effectively for environment generalization, and accommodating trained LLMs in multi-agent systems.

In numerous artificial intelligence applications, the collaborative efforts of multiple intelligent agents are imperative for the successful attainment of target objectives. To enhance coordination among these agents, a distributed communication framework is often employed. However, indiscriminate information sharing among all agents can be resource-intensive, and the adoption of manually pre-defined communication architectures imposes constraints on inter-agent communication, thus limiting the potential for effective collaboration. Moreover, the communication framework often remains static during inference, which may result in sustained high resource consumption, as in most cases, only key decisions necessitate information sharing among agents. In this study, we introduce a novel approach wherein we conceptualize the communication architecture among agents as a learnable graph. We formulate this problem as the task of determining the communication graph while enabling the architecture parameters to update normally, thus necessitating a bi-level optimization process. Utilizing continuous relaxation of the graph representation and incorporating attention units, our proposed approach, CommFormer, efficiently optimizes the communication graph and concurrently refines architectural parameters through gradient descent in an end-to-end manner. Additionally, we introduce a temporal gating mechanism for each agent, enabling dynamic decisions on whether to receive shared information at a given time, based on current observations, thus improving decision-making efficiency. Extensive experiments on a variety of cooperative tasks substantiate the robustness of our model across diverse cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies regardless of changes in the number of agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities in reasoning, planning, and decision-making. Building upon these strengths, researchers have begun incorporating LLMs into multi-agent systems (MAS), where agents collaborate or compete through natural language interactions to tackle tasks beyond the scope of single-agent setups. In this survey, we present a communication-centric perspective on LLM-based multi-agent systems, examining key system-level features such as architecture design and communication goals, as well as internal mechanisms like communication strategies, paradigms, objects and content. We illustrate how these communication elements interplay to enable collective intelligence and flexible collaboration. Furthermore, we discuss prominent challenges, including scalability, security, and multimodal integration, and propose directions for future work to advance research in this emerging domain. Ultimately, this survey serves as a catalyst for further innovation, fostering more robust, scalable, and intelligent multi-agent systems across diverse application domains.

Recent advancements in Vision Language Models (VLMs) have expanded their capabilities to interactive agent tasks, yet existing benchmarks remain limited to single-agent or text-only environments. In contrast, real-world scenarios often involve multiple agents interacting within rich visual and linguistic contexts, posing challenges with both multimodal observations and strategic interactions. To bridge this gap, we introduce Visual Strategic Bench (VS-Bench), a multimodal benchmark that evaluates VLMs for strategic reasoning and decision-making in multi-agent environments. VS-Bench comprises eight vision-grounded environments spanning cooperative, competitive, and mixed-motive interactions, designed to assess agents' ability to predict others' future moves and optimize for long-term objectives. We consider two complementary evaluation dimensions, including offline evaluation of strategic reasoning by next-action prediction accuracy and online evaluation of decision-making by normalized episode return. Extensive experiments of fourteen leading VLMs reveal a significant gap between current models and optimal performance, with the best models attaining 47.8% prediction accuracy and 24.3% normalized return. We further conduct in-depth analyses on multimodal observations, test-time scaling, social behaviors, and failure cases of VLM agents. By standardizing the evaluation and highlighting the limitations of existing models, we envision VS-Bench as a foundation for future research on strategic multimodal agents. Code and data are available at https://vs-bench.github.io.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

We investigate the use of natural language to drive the generalization of policies in multi-agent settings. Unlike single-agent settings, the generalization of policies should also consider the influence of other agents. Besides, with the increasing number of entities in multi-agent settings, more agent-entity interactions are needed for language grounding, and the enormous search space could impede the learning process. Moreover, given a simple general instruction,e.g., beating all enemies, agents are required to decompose it into multiple subgoals and figure out the right one to focus on. Inspired by previous work, we try to address these issues at the entity level and propose a novel framework for language grounding in multi-agent reinforcement learning, entity divider (EnDi). EnDi enables agents to independently learn subgoal division at the entity level and act in the environment based on the associated entities. The subgoal division is regularized by opponent modeling to avoid subgoal conflicts and promote coordinated strategies. Empirically, EnDi demonstrates the strong generalization ability to unseen games with new dynamics and expresses the superiority over existing methods.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the uncertainty that any agent can be adversarial, we propose a Bayesian Adversarial Robust Dec-POMDP (BARDec-POMDP) framework, which views Byzantine adversaries as nature-dictated types, represented by a separate transition. This allows agents to learn policies grounded on their posterior beliefs about the type of other agents, fostering collaboration with identified allies and minimizing vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We define the optimal solution to the BARDec-POMDP as an ex post robust Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium, which we proof to exist and weakly dominates the equilibrium of previous robust MARL approaches. To realize this equilibrium, we put forward a two-timescale actor-critic algorithm with almost sure convergence under specific conditions. Experimentation on matrix games, level-based foraging and StarCraft II indicate that, even under worst-case perturbations, our method successfully acquires intricate micromanagement skills and adaptively aligns with allies, demonstrating resilience against non-oblivious adversaries, random allies, observation-based attacks, and transfer-based attacks.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized Natural Language Processing but exhibit limitations, particularly in autonomously addressing novel challenges such as reasoning and problem-solving. Traditional techniques like chain-of-thought prompting necessitate explicit human guidance. This paper introduces a novel multi-agent communication framework, inspired by the CAMEL model, to enhance LLMs' autonomous problem-solving capabilities. The framework employs multiple LLM agents, each with a distinct persona, engaged in role-playing communication, offering a nuanced and adaptable approach to diverse problem scenarios. Extensive experimentation demonstrates the framework's superior performance and adaptability, providing valuable insights into the collaborative potential of multiple agents in overcoming the limitations of individual models.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.