States and State LegislaturesExamining urban local governance in India through the case of BengaluruPrachi Kaur,Shruti Gupta- December 24, 2020Recently, the Karnataka legislature passed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Bill, 2020.  BBMP is the municipal corporation of the Greater Bengaluru metropolitan area.  The BBMP Act, 2020 seeks to improve decentralisation, ensure public participation, and address certain administrative and structural concerns in Bengaluru.  In this blog, we discuss some common issues in urban local governance in India, in the context of Bengaluru’s municipal administration.The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992providedfor the establishment of urban local bodies (ULBs) (including municipal corporations) as institutions of local self-government.  It also empowered state governments to devolve certain functions, authority, and power to collect revenue to these bodies, and made periodic elections for them compulsory.Urban governance is part of thestate listunder the Constitution.  Thus, the administrative framework and regulation of ULBs varies across states.  However,expertshave highlighted that ULBs across India face similar challenges.  For instance, ULBs across the countrylack autonomyin city management and several city-level functions are managed by parastatals (managed by and accountable to the state).  Several taxation powers have alsonot been devolvedto these bodies, leading to stressed municipal finances.  These challenges have led topoor service deliveryin cities and also created administrative and governance challenges at the municipal level.BBMP wasestablishedunder the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (KMC Act).  The BBMP Act, 2020replacesprovisions of the KMC Act, 1976 in its application to Bengaluru.  Itaddsa new level of zonal committees to the existing three-tier municipal structure in the city, and also gives the Corporation some more taxation powers.  Certain common issues in urban local governance in India, with provisions related to them in the BBMP Act, 2020 are given below.Functional overlap with parastatals for key functionsTheConstitution (74thAmendment) Act, 1992empoweredstates to devolve the responsibility of 18 functions including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, and slum upgradation to ULBs.  However, in most Indian cities including Bengaluru, a majority of these functions arecarried outby parastatals.  For example, in Bengaluru, the Bengaluru Development Authority isresponsiblefor land regulation and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board isresponsiblefor slum rehabilitation.TheBBMP Act, 2020provides the Corporation with the power and responsibility to prepare and implement schemes for the 18 functions provided for in the Constitution (74thAmendment) Act, 1992.  However, it does not provide clarity if new bodies at the municipal level will be created, or the existing parastatals will continue to perform these functions and if so, whether their accountability will shift from the state to the municipal corporation.This could create a two-fold challenge in administration.  First, if there are multiple agencies performing similar functions, it couldleadto a functional overlap, ambiguity, and wastage of resources.  Second, and more importantly, the presence of parastatals that are managed by and accountable to the state government leads to anerosionof the ULB’s autonomy.  Several experts havehighlightedthat this lack of autonomy faced by municipal corporations in most Indian cities leads to achallengein governance, effective service delivery, and development of urban areas.AnExpert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011)had recommended that activity mapping should be done for the 18 functions.  Under this, functions in the exclusive domain of municipalities and those which need to be shared with the state and the central government must be specified.  Experts have also recommended that the municipality should be responsible for providing civic amenities in its jurisdiction and if a parastatal exercises a civic function, it should beaccountable to the municipality.Stressed municipal financesIndian ULBs areamongst the weakestin the world in terms of fiscal autonomy and have limited effective devolution of revenue.  They also havelimited capacityto raise resources through their own sources of revenue such as property tax.  Municipal revenue in Indiaaccountsfor only one percent of the GDP (2017-18).  This leads to a dependence on transfers by the state and central government.ULBs in states like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Haryana are inpoorfinancial condition.  This has beenattributedto limited powers to raise revenue and levy taxes, and problems in the management of existing resources.  For instance, the finances of Bihar’s ULBs were assessed to be poorbecauseof: (i) delays in release of grants, (ii) inadequate devolution of funds, and (iii) delays in revision of tax rates andassessments of landholdings.In comparison, Karnatakarankshigh among Indian states in key indicators for fiscal capacity like collection of property taxes, grants from Central Finance Commissions, and state government transfers.  TheBBMP Act, 2020further increases the taxation powers of the Corporation, by allowing it to impose taxes on professions and entertainment.Experts haverecommendedthat the central government and the respective state government should provide additional funds and facilitate additional funding mechanisms for ULBs to strengthen their finances.  The revenue of ULBs can beaugmentedthrough measures including assignment of greater powers of taxation to the ULBs by the state government, reforms in land and property-based taxes (such as the use oftechnologyto cover more properties), and issuing of municipal bonds (debt instruments issued by ULBs to finance development projects).Powers of elected municipal officialsThe executive power with state-appointed municipal Commissioners and elected municipal officers differs across states.  States likeTamil NaduandGujarat, and cities likeChennaiandHyderabadvest the executive power in the Commissioner.  In contrast, the executive power of the Corporation is exercised by a Mayor-in council (consisting of the Mayor and up to 10 elected members of the Corporation) inKolkataandMadhya Pradesh.  This is unlike large metropolitan cities in other countries likeNew YorkandLondon, where elected Mayors are designated as executive heads.  Experts havenotedthat charging Commissioners with executive power diluted the role of the Mayor and violated the spirit of self-governance.Under theBBMP Act, 2020, both the elected Mayor and the state-appointed Chief Commissioner exercise several executive functions.  The Mayor is responsible for approving contracts and preparing the budget estimate for the Corporation.  He is also required to discharge all functions assigned to him by the Corporation.  On the other hand, executive functions of the Chief Commissioner include: (i) selling or leasing properties owned by the Corporation, and (ii) regulating and issuing instructions regarding public streets.The Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) hasrecommendedthat the Commissioner should act as a city manager and should be recruited through a transparent search-cum-selection process led by the Mayor.  A Model Municipal law, released by the Urban Development Ministry in 2003,providedthat the executive power should be exercised by an Empowered Standing Committee consisting of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and seven elected councillors.Management of staff and human resourcesExperts havenotedthat municipal administration in India suffers from staffing issues which leads to a failure in delivering basic urban services.  Theseincludeoverstaffing of untrained manpower, shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors, and unwillingness to innovate in methods for service delivery.TheBBMP Act, 2020provides that the Corporation may make bye-laws for the due performance of duties by its employees.  However, it does not mention other aspects of human resource management such as recruitment and promotion.  ACAG report (2020)looking at the implementation of the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 in Karnataka has observed that the power to assess municipal staff requirements, recruiting such staff, and determining their pay, transfer and promotion vests with the state government.  This is in contrast with therecommendationsof several experts who have suggested that municipalities should appoint their personnel to ensure accountability, adequate recruitment, and proper management of staff.Other states includingKerala,MaharashtraandTamil Nadualso allow the state governments to regulate recruitment and staffing for ULBs.  In cities likeMumbai, andCoimbatore, and some states likeGujaratandMadhya Pradesh, while the recruitment process is conducted by the respective municipal corporations, the final sanction for hiring staff lies with the state government.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»
States and State LegislaturesExamining urban local governance in India through the case of BengaluruPrachi Kaur,Shruti Gupta- December 24, 2020